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Nina Holst-Christensen,  
Jens Hartig Danielsen and Grith Skovgaard Ølykke1 
 
Introduction 
From 1978 to 2014 
From 28-31 May 2014 the XXVIth FIDE Congress will take place in Copen-
hagen. Thus, it will be the second time that Copenhagen has the pleasure to 
host a FIDE Congress. 36 years earlier, in 1978, one took place for the first 
time in Copenhagen.2 The president of FIDE at that time, Professor Ole Lan-
do, said the following in his opening speech:  
‘When you get gr[e]y hairs you tend to look back to your childhood and early youth more 
often than you did earlier. You often remind yourself of how you looked upon the world 
then. You also remember how the grown-ups of that time looked upon it. Forty years ago 
those who had grey hairs and compared Europe with the Europe of their youth were gener-
ally very gloomy in their outlook. Whereas in 1898 Europe had seemed set on a course of 
peaceful progress, in 1938 many people prophesied war, tyranny and poverty, and they 
were right. In 1939 we had war. During the war most of us experienced tyranny, and when 
the war ended in 1945 we lived in misery and poverty. Yet, only ten years after the war six 
European countries, two of which had been at war with the other four, created an Econom-
ic Community. Their aim was to establish a closer union among the European people, to 
further economic and social progress, to improve living conditions, and to maintain and 
strengthen freedom and peace. When in 1955 it was thus proposed to establish a Common 
Market, the people of Europe still remembered the war, and were willing to accept 
                                                        
1. Professor, Dr. Ulla Neergaard, University of Copenhagen, President of the Danish 
Association for European Law, President for FIDE 2013-14; Associate Professor, Dr. 
Catherine Jacqueson, University of Copenhagen, Secretary General for FIDE 2013-
14; Commissioner in EU Law and Human Rights, Nina Holst-Christensen, Ministry 
of Justice; Professor, Dr.jur., Dr. Jens Hartig Danielsen, University of Aarhus; and 
Associate Professor, Dr. Grith Skovgaard Ølykke, Copenhagen Business School. Ulla 
Neergaard and Catherine Jacqueson have had the overall responsibility for all three 
volumes, whereas Jens Hartig Danielsen has been primarily involved in Volume 1; 
Nina Holst-Christensen in Volume 2; and Grith Skovgaard Ølykke in Volume 3. 
2. The topics then dealt with were: 1. ‘Equal Treatment of Public and Private Enter-
prise’; and 2. ‘Due Process in the Administrative Procedure’. 
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measures which could guarantee peace and freedom. Peace and freedom were in the minds 
both of those who had visions of a brotherhood of European nations and of those who 
wanted to secure prosperity by creating a wider market for trade and industry. During the 
years which have passed since then, the fears of tyranny and war have faded. The organiza-
tion known as the European Communities is no longer seen as a preserver of peace and 
liberty. The prosperity which so many had hoped for has come and has gone away again. 
Today the former enthusiasm for a united Europe has evaporated.’3 
Again, almost four decades have passed by, and one can again look back 
anew in the same manner as Professor Ole Lando did. As we all know, so 
much has happened. The European Union of today has experienced many 
successes such as the profound enlargement; the enactment of the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights; the broadening of democracy and important values; the 
strengthening of free trade; the relative prosperity; the establishment of Union 
citizenship; and the improved degree of security and peace. However, one 
could still say that the enthusiasm for a united Europe has to some extent 
evaporated, and that crisis and challenges at several different levels are deep-
ly felt. The FIDE Congress of 2014 will explore many layers thereof with 
outset taken in the selection of significant and important themes, which to 
some degree become clear from reading the present volume and its ‘sisters’.  
FIDE – an Unusual European Organisation 
FIDE (i.e. Fédération Internationale pour le Droit Européen/International 
Federation of European Law) focuses on research and analysis of European 
Union law and EU institutions, as well as their interaction with the legal sys-
tems for the Member States. It unites the national associations for European 
law of most of the EU Member States and candidate countries, as well as 
Norway and Switzerland. At present, there are 29 member associations – 
each situated in different countries – who all work voluntarily for the spread-
ing of knowledge of the EU.  
 FIDE was established already in 1961, and is by many seen as having 
been a very important actor in the original establishment of EU law as a legal 
discipline.4 Even today, despite the establishment of many other channels for 
                                                        
3. See Ole Lando: ‘Europe: From quantity to quality. Speech delivered on the occasion 
of the opening of the Congress on June 22 1978’, in ‘FIDE. Eighth Congress 22-24 
June 1978. Adresses Summing up of discussions. Volume 1. Copenhagen 1979’, p. 6.  
4. See for discussions Morten Rasmussen e.g.: ‘Establishing a Constitutional Practice: 
The Role of the European Law Associations’, in Wolfram Kaiser and Jan-Henrik 




dealing with EU law, FIDE’s most important activity consists in the organisa-
tion of the biennial FIDE Congresses and the related publications are viewed 
by many as still having an extraordinary design, significance and influence.5 
The XXVI FIDE Congress and Its Main Themes 
The main topics of the XXVI FIDE Congress have been selected a couple of 
years in advance after several ‘hearings’ of relevant actors all over Europe 
and are the following: 
– General Topic 1 – The Economic and Monetary Union: Constitutional and 
Institutional Aspects of the Economic Governance within the EU;6 
– General Topic 2 – Union Citizenship: Development, Impact and Chal-
lenges;7 
– General Topic 3 – Public Procurement Law: Limitations, Opportunities 
and Paradoxes;8 and 
– Saturday’s General Topic – In the Era of Legal Pluralism: The Relation-
ship between the EU, National and International Courts, and the Interplay 
of the Multiple Sources of Law.9 
                                                        
Making, 1958-1992’, Palgrave Macmillan, 2013, pp. 173-197; and Alexandre Ber-
nier: ‘Constructing and Legitimating: Transnational Jurist Networks and the Making of 
a Constitutional Practice of European Law, 1950-1970’, in ‘Contemporary European 
History’, 2012, pp. 399-415.  
5. See further Julia Laffranque: ‘FIDE – Uniting Great Minds of European Law: 50 
years of the International Federation for European Law’, Juridica International, 2011, 
pp. 173-181. 
6. Appointed as ‘General Rapporteur’ is: Professor Fabian Amtenbrink; and as ‘Institu-
tional Rapporteur’: Jean-Paul Keppenne, Legal Service, European Commission. 
7. Appointed as ‘Joint General Rapporteurs’ are: Professor Niamh Nic Shibhne & Pro-
fessor Jo Shaw; and as ‘Institutional Rapporteur’: Michal Meduna, DG Justice, Euro-
pean Commission. 
8. Appointed as ‘General Rapporteur’ is: Professor Roberto Caranta; and as ‘Institution-
al Rapporteur’: Adrián Tokár, Legal Service, European Commission. 
9. The treatment of this topic has not followed the ‘system’ of ‘questionnaires’, ‘General 
Rapporteurs’, ‘Institutional Rapporteurs’, and ‘National Rapporteurs’. Instead a panel 
discussion of leading court presidents and judges from both the international and the 
national courts, as well as academics has been organised. Although the ‘Saturday’s 
General Topic’ thus is not the direct focus of the present publications, it may for the 
sake of completeness be mentioned that this topic might on the surface seem a bit 
theoretical, but in actual fact it is of great and also concrete importance in the daily 
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The selected topics all have in common that they are very central and im-
portant for the understanding of the challenges facing Europe these years, and 
for the development of European law. With the selection it is ensured that 
both constitutional and institutional elements are dealt with. It is also made 
certain that one of the most significant founding stones of the EU, namely the 
internal market, is touched upon. In addition, the importance of the EU to the 
individuals, namely the Union citizens themselves, is given heavy weight. 
We therefore hope that both practitioners, officials, academics, civil society, 
and so on, will all find a huge interest in the topics selected. 
 Everyone is likely to agree that the first topic on economic governance 
constitutes a very natural and unavoidable choice. Indeed, the Economic and 
Monetary Union was created more than twenty years ago and is heavily chal-
lenged in this tumultuous time of financial and economic crisis. Although 
improvements of the economic situation in Europe have recently occurred, 
nothing is yet completely stabilised, and in any event there is real need for a 
legal analysis of the developments which have taken place. It is thus time to 
assess the legal status of EU economic governance, and the issue of constitu-
tional asymmetry in respect of economic and monetary issues. Other issues to 
be dealt with are: what are the legal consequences of possible divergences 
from EU law; what is the role of the Court of Justice of the European Union; 
what are the prospects for the future; is an ever closer Fiscal Union a question 
of balancing national sovereignty and the Euro’s fundamental governance 
structures; is there a need for Treaty changes in order to introduce Eurobonds; 
and to what extent may tax law be harmonised. 
 Union citizenship is equally topical and challenging. What is the reality of 
Union citizenship in the Member States more than two decades after the in-
sertion of Union citizenship in the Treaty? The intention is to enhance the un-
derstanding of how the rights attached to Union citizenship have been im-
plemented and respected by the national authorities. It is also to address the 
interesting issue for the citizens of whether Union citizenship might backfire 
and negatively affect the ‘acquired’ rights of the workers. Union citizenship 
                                                        
legal work of many lawyers, and others. It focuses more specifically on how EU law 
has to operate in a multi-level legal order and thereby on the interrelationship of 
courts and the phenomenon of a plurality of sources of law. According to the concep-
tion of legal pluralism, hierarchies no longer exist in the same manner as in the tradi-
tional nation state. Also, it is part of this conception that one has to accept that the 
present state of affairs to some degree contains elements of complexity and unpre-
dictability, and that there is a need for compromises. As part of the search for com-
promise, some may prefer to leave forever open the issue of supremacy. 
INTRODUCTION 
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is also interesting from the perspective of the Union’s legitimacy and it is 
worth considering how far-reaching the sense of solidarity of the Member 
States and their citizens is towards other Member States and their citizens. In 
addition, delicate issues such as family reunification, expulsion, and the par-
ticular case of third country nationals might be of relevance. 
 The third general topic, which concerns public procurement law, touches 
upon an area of law which has a huge practical importance in most Member 
States. It is linked to public spending and thus to some degree to the financial 
and economic crisis. Public procurement regulation is increasingly relevant 
for many lawyers, undertakings, and public authorities. Very timely, the pub-
lic procurement directives have been under revision for the last couple of 
years, and the FIDE Congress offers the possibility of discussing in which di-
rection the proposed changes go and analyse their implications. The same is 
true in respect of the remedies directive. In times of economic crisis the issue 
of public-private partnerships and the financing of services of general eco-
nomic interest is crucial and at times a rather controversial issue. This may 
also be true in respect to the environmental and social protection, which in-
creasingly figures as considerations in this area. 
 Altogether, the XXVIth FIDE Congress and this volume, together with its 
two ‘sisters’, propose to take the temperature of EU law at both the level of 
the EU and at the national level with the outset taken in three topical and es-
sential legal areas. Thereby, they hopefully constitute a goldmine for compar-
ative and EU lawyers. 
A Collaboration of Great Minds of EUropean Law10 
In order to lift discussions and analysis even further, in conformity with the 
traditions of FIDE detailed comparative studies have been provided. There-
fore – long time in advance of the actual congress – for each of the three top-
ics, a ‘questionnaire’ has been carefully prepared by the ‘General Rappor-
teur(s)’ responsible of the topic. Based on these ‘questionnaires’, national 
                                                        
10. This headline is inspired from the slogan of the XXVIth FIDE Congress, which again 
is inspired from the headline of the following article: Julia Laffranque: ‘FIDE – Unit-
ing Great Minds of European Law: 50 years of the International Federation for Euro-
pean Law’, Juridica International, 2011, pp. 173-181. This use as the slogan has been 
permitted by Julia Laffranque. A slight change was made so that the slogan became: 
‘FIDE – Uniting Great Minds of EUropean Law’. The purpose was to stress the rela-
tionship between EU law and European law. 
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analyses were elaborated by national experts appointed by the national asso-
ciations of FIDE.  
 All these reports have subsequently been published in this collection, 
along with the ‘general reports’ prepared by the ‘General Rapporteurs’ sup-
plemented by so-called ‘institutional reports’ prepared by representatives of 
the EU institutions.11 As FIDE and its congresses – based on long tradition – 
function on a trilingual basis, these are elaborated either in English, French, 
or German.12  
Words of Gratitude 
A project such as the organisation of an event like the FIDE Congress and the 
present publications could not have been possible without the help of many! 
Therefore, on behalf of the Danish Association for European Law (DFE), 
which is the Danish member association of FIDE (since 1973), we wish to 
express our gratitude to everyone whom we have met on our way, some hav-
ing helped perhaps a little, others a great deal – some having helped at a more 
practical level, others financially.13 FIDE and its congresses can only live on 
the basis of almost endless voluntary forces. We owe our thanks to all. No 
one mentioned, no one forgotten, it is often said in Danish when one wants to 
express one’s gratitude, however being in fear of not being forgiven, if some-
one is unintendedly forgotten. Nevertheless, we dare to try to express our ex-
                                                        
11. The analyses and results regarding Topic 1 are presented in Volume 1; of Topic 2 in 
Volume 2; and of Topic 3 in Volume 3. Those oral presentations received as papers, 
etc., are intended to be published on the website www.fide2014.eu. 
12. That is also the reason why e.g. the ‘questionnaires’ and this introductory chapter ex-
ist in all three languages. 
13. DFE was the seventh Member State association to become a member of FIDE, and 
thereby the first the join the ‘original six’ in the context of FIDE. The Board of Direc-
tors of DFE consists for the time being of: Partner Peter Biering, Kammeradvokaten; 
Partner Andreas Christensen, Horten Law Firm; Professor, Dr.jur., Dr. Jens Hartig 
Danielsen, School of Law, Aarhus University; Commissioner in EU Law and Human 
Rights, Nina Holst-Christensen, Ministry of Justice; Head of Division, Christian 
Thorning, Ministry of Foreign Affairs; Justice Lene Pagter Kristensen, Supreme 
Court; Partner Charlotte Friis Bach Ryhl, Friis Bach Ryhl Law Firm; and Associate 
Professor, Dr. Grith Skovgaard Ølykke, Law Department, Copenhagen Business 
School. Until 14 November 2013, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was instead of 
Christian Thorning ‘represented’ by Vibeke Pasternak Jørgensen, who stepped out 
due to a promotion. 
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plicit thanks to the following, and hope for forgiveness if anyone has been 
left out unintendedly.14 
 Warm and sincere tributes to His Royal Highness, the Crown Prince 
Frederik of Denmark, who had kindly accepted to be the Patron of the Con-
gress as his mother HM the Queen did in relation to the FIDE Congress in 
1978 in Copenhagen. 
 In 2009, at a meeting in the Steering Group (also known as the ‘Comité 
Directeur’ or the executive committee) of FIDE in Madrid, it entrusted to the 
DFE not only the Presidency of FIDE, but also the organisation of the FIDE 
Congress to take place in 2014. It was eventually decided by DFE to invite 
the Faculty of Law at the University of Copenhagen to be involved in the or-
ganisation for practical reasons and in order to ensure a high academic stan-
dard. Luckily, the Dean at that time, Henrik Dam, was very enthusiastic about 
the idea, and decided to support the forthcoming congress in various ways. It 
is clearly our wish to offer the most sincere thanks to him from DFE and 
FIDE for this decision and his continuous support. In that connection, our 
gratitude is also due to the more administrative team at the Faculty of Law 
helping the event come true, in particular project coordinator Tina Futtrup 
Borg, but also all her many helpers, as well as Head of Communications Bir-
gitte Faber. At the Faculty of Law special mention should also be made of the 
PhD school and those persons who organised a PhD course on European Un-
ion Law in connection with the Congress (in particular Associate Professor 
Constanze Semmelmann and Associate Professor Clement Petersen).15  
 Also to be mentioned with great appreciation is the help provided by Sec-
retary Jette Nim Larsen, Horten Law Firm, who in particular has given her 
precious administrative support with regard to all matters of concern to the 
Steering Group of FIDE. In addition, DIS Congress Service has been our pro-
fessional partner, and from this company in particular Marianne Sjødahl and 
Peder Andersen have been invaluable. Chief editor Vivi Antonsen from 
DJØF Publishing, which is behind the present publications, has as always 
been efficient and patient, and indeed she deserves our deeply felt acknowl-
edgement. Regarding the volume concerning ‘General Topic 3’ thanks to 
stud.HA-jur., Mette Marie Lamm Larsen should be expressed. 
                                                        
14. Since this ‘Introduction’ was written and turned in for publication, more help might 
have been received, and we are of course also grateful to all these at the present 
stage unknown supporters, etc. 
15. To our knowledge, this is the first time such a course has been organised in relation to 
a FIDE Congress, and may among others be looked upon as an attempt to support the 
coming generations of researchers’ interest and involvement in FIDE. 
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 Furthermore, a sincere tribute to our supporters, foundations, and partners, 
should be paid. In particular, we are more than grateful to the following:  
– The European courts (in particular President Vassilios Skouris; Vice-
President Koen Lenaerts; Judge Lars Bay Larsen; and the many interpret-
ers) and other European institutions; 
– The Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs (in particular Head of Division 
Vibeke Pasternak Jørgensen and Head of Division Christian Thorning); 
– The Danish Supreme Court (in particular President Børge Dahl and Justice 
Lene Pagter Kristensen); 
– The contributors Knud Højgaards Fond; Professor Dr.jur. Max Sørensens 
Mindefond; Reinholdt W. Jorck og Hustrus Fond; Dreyers Fond, Fonden 
til Støtte af Retsvidenskabelig Forskning ved Københavns Universitet; and 
EURECO at the University of Copenhagen. 
– The premium partner Kammeradvokaten, Law Firm Poul Smith (in par-
ticular partner Peter Biering);  
– The congress supporter Horten Law Firm (in particular partner Andreas 
Christensen);  
– The congress supporter Copenhagen Business School 
– The congress supporter DJØF Publishing; 
– Partner Per Magid, Bruun & Hjejle Law Firm; 
– The congress exhibitioners; and 
– The City of Copenhagen. 
We also owe our special gratitude to the many members of the FIDE Steering 
Group who have so kindly been helpful in answering our many questions re-
garding FIDE traditions, expectations, etc. In particular, the associations of 
the following countries have provided extraordinary help: Austria (in particu-
lar Professor Heribert Köck), Estonia (in particular Judge Julia Laffranque), 
Germany (in particular Professor Peter-Christian Müller-Graff), and Spain (in 
particular Advocate Luis Ortiz Blanco). 
 Last, but not least, of course the XXVIth FIDE Congress and the present 
volumes could never have come to life without our enthusiastic, hardworking, 
flexible, and dedicated ‘General Rapporteurs’, i.e. Professor Fabian 
Amtenbrink, Professor Niamh Nic Shuibhne, Professor Jo Shaw, and Profes-
sor Roberto Caranta. In addition, the ‘Institutional Rapporteurs’, i.e. Jean-
Paul Keppenne, Michal Meduna, and Adrián Tokár, have met the challenge 
with a similar positive spirit, which is equally highly appreciated. All national 
rapporteurs have made it possible to get a fairly full picture of the law and 
practice as this stands today in most of the Member States of the European 
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Union, and a huge tribute should consequently be paid to them for their tre-
mendous and valuable contributions. Although lastly mentioned, not least 
important are the excellent speakers, moderators, and participants, whose 
work will undoubtedly contribute to the Congress becoming an excellent 
event as ever. 
 To sum up, what everyone has done and will do deserves the highest 
praise, and we are indeed grateful to all. It has been an honour and a pleasure 
– but also a challenge – to organise the XXVIth FIDE Congress and bring the 
present volumes to life. It is our belief that FIDE and its congresses even after 
having reached the age of more than half a century still have a lot to offer us 
all, which the present volumes hopefully can help document to some degree. 
We hope that both will continue to live and successfully develop themselves 
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Introduction 
De 1978 à 2014 
Le XXVIe congrès de la FIDE se tiendra du 28 au 31 mai 2014 à Copen-
hague. Ce sera la deuxième fois que Copenhague aura le plaisir d'accueillir 
un congrès de la FIDE. La première fois remonte à 1978, il y a 36 ans.2 Le 
Professeur Ole Lando, Président de la FIDE à cette époque, tenait alors ces 
propos dans son discours d'ouverture :  
« Quand vous commencez à avoir des cheveux blancs, vous avez tendance à vous retour-
ner plus souvent vers votre enfance et votre jeunesse. Vous vous rappelez de votre façon 
de voir le monde à ce moment-là. Vous vous souvenez aussi comment les grandes per-
sonnes voyaient le monde à cette époque. Il y a quarante ans, ceux qui avaient des cheveux 
blancs étaient généralement très pessimistes à l'égard de l'Europe, par comparaison avec 
l'Europe de leur jeunesse. Alors qu'en 1898, l'Europe semblait être lancée sur la voie d'un 
progrès pacifique, en 1938, nombreux sont ceux qui prédirent la guerre, la tyrannie et la 
pauvreté, et à juste titre. En 1939, la guerre éclata. Pendant la guerre, la plupart d'entre 
nous ont subi la tyrannie, et en 1945, à la fin de la guerre, nous vivions dans la misère et la 
pauvreté. Pourtant, seulement dix ans après, six pays européens, dont deux avaient été en 
guerre contre les quatre autres, créèrent une Communauté économique. Ils avaient pour 
objectif de renforcer les liens entre les peuples européens, afin de favoriser le progrès éco-
                                                        
1. Professeur, Dr Ulla Neergaard, Université de Copenhague, Présidente de l'Associa-
tion danoise pour le droit européen, Présidente de la FIDE 2013-14 ; Maître de confé-
rences, Dr Catherine Jacqueson, Université de Copenhague, Secrétaire générale de la 
FIDE 2013-14 ; Commissaire au droit de l’UE et aux droits de l'homme, Nina Holst-
Christensen, Ministère de la Justice ; Professeur, Dr et Dr.jur, Jens Hartig Danielsen, 
Université d'Aarhus ; et Maître de conférences, Dr Grith Skovgaard Ølykke, Copen-
hagen Business School. Ulla Neergaard et Catherine Jacqueson ont supervisé les trois 
volumes ; Jens Hartig Danielsen a contribué principalement au Volume 1, Nina 
Holst-Christensen au Volume 2 et Grith Skovgaard Ølykke au Volume 3.  
2. Les sujets abordés étaient les suivants : 1. « L'égalité de traitement des entreprises 
publiques et privées » et 2. « Les garanties légales dans la procédure administra-
tive ». 
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nomique et social, d’améliorer les conditions de vie et de maintenir et consolider la liberté 
et la paix. Lorsqu'en 1955 la création d’un Marché commun fut proposée, les peuples d'Eu-
rope se souvenaient encore de la guerre et étaient prêts à accepter des mesures susceptibles 
de garantir la paix et la liberté. La paix et la liberté étaient dans les esprits de ceux qui rê-
vaient de fraternité entre les pays européens et également de ceux qui souhaitaient garantir 
la prospérité en créant un marché élargi pour le commerce et l'industrie. Depuis, les 
craintes liées à la tyrannie et à la guerre se sont dissipées. Les organisations appelées 
Communautés européennes ne sont plus considérées comme destinées à préserver la paix 
et la liberté. La prospérité tant espérée est arrivée et a disparu à nouveau. Aujourd'hui, l'en-
thousiasme exprimé par le passé en faveur d’une Europe unie s'est évaporé. »3 
Alors que près de quarante ans ont passé, nous pouvons à notre tour nous 
tourner vers le passé tout comme le Professeur Ole Lando. Comme nous le 
savons tous, il s’est passé tant de choses. L'Union européenne a connu de 
nombreux succès : un profond élargissement, la promulgation de la Charte 
des droits fondamentaux, l'élargissement de la démocratie et des valeurs es-
sentielles, le renforcement du libre-échange, une relative prospérité, la créa-
tion de la citoyenneté européenne et un plus haut degré de sécurité et de paix. 
Néanmoins, force est de constater que l'enthousiasme exprimé en faveur 
d’une Europe unie s'est dans une certaine mesure évaporé, et que la crise et 
les défis rencontrés à plusieurs niveaux sont durement ressentis. Le Congrès 
2014 de la FIDE en explorera de nombreux aspects au travers d’une sélection 
de thèmes significatifs et importants, ce qui apparaît clairement à la lecture du 
présent volume et de ses « acolytes ».  
La FIDE : une organisation européenne hors du commun 
La FIDE (Fédération Internationale pour le Droit Européen) s'intéresse à la 
recherche et à l'analyse du droit de l'Union européenne et des institutions de 
l'UE, ainsi qu’à leurs interactions avec les systèmes juridiques des Etats 
membres. Elle réunit les associations nationales pour le droit européen de la 
plupart des Etats membres de l'UE et des pays candidats, ainsi que de la Nor-
vège et de la Suisse. À l'heure actuelle, il existe 29 associations membres 
(toutes situées dans un pays différent). Toutes œuvrent bénévolement à la dif-
fusion du savoir dans l'UE.  
                                                        
3. Ole Lando (traduit de l’anglais), « Europe: From quantity to quality. Speech delivered 
on the occasion of the opening of the Congress on June 22 1978 », dans « FIDE. 
Eighth Congress 22-24 June 1978. Adresses Summing up of discussions. Volume 1. 
Copenhagen 1979 », p. 6.  
INTRODUCTION 
 19
 La FIDE a été créée en 1961 et beaucoup considèrent qu'elle a joué un rôle 
très important dans la création initiale du droit de l'UE en tant que discipline 
juridique.4 Aujourd'hui encore, malgré la mise en place de nombreuses autres 
organisations consacrées au droit communautaire, la conception, l'importance 
et l'influence extraordinaires des congrès biennaux de la FIDE et de ses pu-
blications connexes (l'activité la plus importante de la FIDE) sont toujours 
largement reconnues.5 
Le XXVIe Congrès de la FIDE et ses thèmes principaux 
Les thèmes principaux du XXVIe Congrès de la FIDE ont été choisis plu-
sieurs années à l'avance, après avoir consulté à plusieurs reprises les acteurs 
concernés dans toute l'Europe. Ces thèmes sont les suivants : 
– Thème général 1 : L'Union économique et monétaire : les aspects constitu-
tionnels et institutionnels de la gouvernance économique dans l'UE ;6 
– Thème général 2 : La citoyenneté de l'Union : développement, impact et 
défis ;7 
– Thème général 3 : Le droit des marchés publics : restrictions, possibilités 
et paradoxes ;8 et 
– Thème général du samedi : À l'ère du pluralisme juridique : relations entre 
les cours nationales, internationales et celles de l'UE et les interactions 
entre les multiples sources de droit.9 
                                                        
4. Voir à ce sujet Morten Rasmussen, p. ex. : « Establishing a Constitutional Practice: 
The Role of the European Law Associations », dans Wolfram Kaiser et Jan-Henrik 
Meyer (éd.) : « Societal Actors in European Integration. Polity-Building and Poli-
cy-Making, 1958-1992 », Palgrave Macmillan, 2013, p. 173-197 ; et Alexandre Ber-
nier : « Constructing and Legitimating: Transnational Jurist Networks and the Mak-
ing of a Constitutional Practice of European Law, 1950-1970 », dans « Contemporary 
European History », 2012, p. 399-415.  
5. Voir également Julia Laffranque : « FIDE – Uniting Great Minds of European Law: 
50 years of the International Federation for European Law », Juridica International, 
2011, pp. 173-181. 
6. Sont nommés « Rapporteur général » : Professeur Fabian Amtenbrink ; et « Rapporteur 
institutionnel » : Jean-Paul Keppenne, Service juridique, Commission européenne. 
7. Sont nommées « Co-rapporteures générales » : Professeur Niamh Nic Shibhne et Pro-
fesseur Jo Shaw ; et « Rapporteur institutionnel » : Michal Meduna, DG Justice, 
Commission européenne. 
8. Sont nommés « Rapporteur général » : Professeur Roberto Caranta ; et « Rapporteur 
institutionnel » : Adrián Tokár, Service juridique, Commission européenne. 
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Les thèmes choisis sont tous très importants pour la compréhension des défis 
auxquels l'Europe est actuellement confrontée et pour le développement du 
droit européen. Cette sélection permet d'aborder aussi bien les aspects consti-
tutionnels qu'institutionnels. Par ailleurs, l'une des pierres fondatrices les plus 
importantes de l'UE, à savoir le marché intérieur, n'est pas oubliée. D'autre 
part, le choix des thèmes souligne l'importance de l'UE pour les individus, 
c'est-à-dire les citoyens de l'Union eux-mêmes. Nous espérons donc qu’il sa-
tisfera aussi bien les praticiens, les fonctionnaires, les universitaires, la société 
civile, etc. 
 Tout le monde conviendra certainement que le premier thème sur la gou-
vernance économique constitue un choix naturel et inévitable. En effet, 
l'Union économique et monétaire, créée il y a plus de vingt ans, est fortement 
contestée en cette période tumultueuse de crise financière et économique. 
Malgré la récente amélioration de la situation économique en Europe, rien 
n'est encore complètement stabilisé, et dans tous les cas une analyse juridique 
des faits s'impose. Le temps est donc venu d'évaluer le statut juridique de la 
gouvernance économique de l'UE, et la question de l'asymétrie constitution-
nelle entre les politiques économiques et monétaires. D’autres questions res-
tent à traiter, telles que : quelles sont les conséquences juridiques des pos-
sibles divergences par rapport au droit de l'UE ? Quel est le rôle de la Cour de 
justice de l'Union européenne ? Quelles sont les perspectives pour l'avenir ? 
Le renforcement de l'union budgétaire est-il une question d'équilibre entre la 
souveraineté nationale et les structures de gouvernance fondamentales de 
l'euro ? Est-il nécessaire de modifier le traité pour introduire les euro-
                                                        
9. Le traitement de ce sujet n'a pas suivi le « système » de « questionnaires », « Rappor-
teurs généraux », « Rapporteurs institutionnels » et « Rapporteurs nationaux ». Une 
table ronde réunissant les présidents et juges de cours internationales et nationales, 
ainsi que des universitaires, a été organisée à la place. Bien que le « Thème général 
du samedi » ne fasse pas directement l'objet de la présente publication, par souci 
d'exhaustivité, il convient de mentionner que ce sujet, en apparence un peu théorique, 
a en fait une importance concrète dans le travail quotidien de nombreux juristes et 
d'autres acteurs. Il porte plus particulièrement sur la façon dont le droit communau-
taire doit opérer dans un ordre juridique à plusieurs niveaux, et donc sur la relation 
des cours entre elles, et sur la pluralité des sources de droit. Dans la conception du 
pluralisme juridique, les hiérarchies n'existent plus de la même manière que dans 
l'Etat-nation traditionnel. En outre, cette conception nous invite à accepter que l'état 
actuel des choses contient dans une certaine mesure des éléments de complexité et 
d'imprévisibilité, et qu'il convient de faire des compromis. Dans le cadre de la re-




obligations ? Dans quelle mesure la législation fiscale doit-elle être harmoni-
sée ? 
 La citoyenneté de l'Union est un sujet tout autant d'actualité et stimulant. 
Quelle est la réalité de la citoyenneté de l'Union dans les Etats membres, plus 
de deux décennies après l'insertion du concept dans le traité ? L'objectif est de 
mieux comprendre la mise en œuvre et le respect des droits associés à la ci-
toyenneté de l'Union par les autorités nationales. Il s'agit également d'aborder 
une question essentielle pour les citoyens, à savoir si la citoyenneté de 
l'Union pourrait avoir un effet inverse à celui prévu et affecter les droits « ac-
quis » des travailleurs. La citoyenneté de l'Union est également intéressante 
du point de vue de la légitimité de l’UE, et il est intéressant d'examiner l'éten-
due du sentiment de solidarité des Etats membres et de leurs citoyens à 
l'égard des autres Etats membres et citoyens. En outre, d’autres sujets déli-
cats, comme le regroupement familial, les expulsions et le cas particulier des 
ressortissants de pays tiers, peuvent s'avérer pertinents. 
 Le troisième thème général, qui concerne le droit des marchés publics, 
touche à un domaine du droit qui joue un rôle pratique considérable dans la 
plupart des Etats membres. Il est lié aux dépenses publiques et donc, dans une 
certaine mesure, à la crise financière et économique. La réglementation des 
marchés publics revêt une importance croissante pour de nombreux juristes, 
entreprises et pouvoirs publics. Il se trouve justement que les directives sur 
les marchés publics ont fait l'objet d'une révision ces deux dernières années, 
et le Congrès de la FIDE offre ainsi la possibilité de discuter de l'orientation 
des changements proposés et d'analyser leurs implications. Le même constat 
s’applique à la directive sur les recours. En période de crise économique, la 
question des partenariats public-privé et du financement des services d'intérêt 
économique général est cruciale et parfois assez controversée. Cela est pro-
bablement également vrai concernant la protection sociale et environnemen-
tale, qui prend une place de plus en plus importante dans ce domaine. 
 En résumé, le XXVIe Congrès de la FIDE et ce volume, ainsi que ses 
deux « acolytes », se proposent de prendre la température du droit de l'UE, 
tant au niveau de l'Union qu'au niveau national, en s'intéressant à trois do-
maines juridiques essentiels et d'actualité. Ils constitueront ainsi, nous l'espé-
rons, une mine d'or pour les juristes de l'UE et les spécialistes du droit com-
paré. 
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Une collaboration des grands esprits du droit Européen10 
Afin d'approfondir plus encore les discussions et les analyses, ces volumes 
comprennent des études comparatives détaillées, conformément aux tradi-
tions de la FIDE. Par conséquent, longtemps avant le congrès proprement dit, 
un « questionnaire » a été soigneusement préparé pour chacun des trois 
thèmes par le ou les « Rapporteurs généraux » en charge du thème. À partir 
de ces « questionnaires », des analyses ont été réalisées par des experts natio-
naux nommés par les associations nationales de la FIDE.  
 Tous ces rapports sont publiés dans cette collection, ainsi que les « rap-
ports généraux » rédigés par les « Rapporteurs généraux », complétés par les 
« rapports institutionnels » élaborés par les représentants des institutions de 
l'UE.11 Du fait de la longue tradition de trilinguisme adoptée par la FIDE et 
ses congrès, les rapports sont rédigés soit en anglais, français ou allemand.12  
Remerciements 
L'organisation d'un événement comme le Congrès de la FIDE et les présentes 
publications n'auraient pas pu voir le jour sans l'aide d’un grand nombre de 
personnes ! Aussi, au nom de l'Association danoise pour le droit européen 
(DFE), qui est l'association danoise membre de la FIDE (depuis 1973), nous 
tenons à exprimer notre gratitude à tous ceux que nous avons rencontrés sur 
notre chemin, quelle que soit l’étendue de leur aide, qu’elle soit à un niveau 
pratique ou financier.13 La FIDE et ses congrès ne pourraient exister sans les 
                                                        
10. Ce titre s'inspire de la devise du XXVIe Congrès de la FIDE, elle-même inspirée du 
titre de l'article suivant : Julia Laffranque : « FIDE – Uniting Great Minds of Euro-
pean Law: 50 years of the International Federation for European Law », Juridica In-
ternational, 2011, p. 173-181. Julia Laffranque nous a autorisés à en faire notre de-
vise. Celle-ci a été légèrement modifiée ainsi : « FIDE – Uniting Great Minds of EU-
ropean Law », le but étant de souligner les relations entre le droit de l'UE et le droit 
européen. 
11. Les analyses et les résultats concernant les thèmes 1, 2 et 3 sont présentés respecti-
vement dans les volumes 1, 2 et 3. Les présentations orales reçues sous forme d'ar-
ticle, etc, sont destinées à être publiées sur le site Internet www.fide2014.eu. 
12. Cela explique aussi pourquoi les « questionnaires » et ce chapitre d'introduction 
sont disponibles dans les trois langues mentionnées. 
13. La DFE a été la septième association d'Etat membre à faire partie de la FIDE, et ainsi 
la première à se joindre aux « six premiers » dans le contexte de la FIDE. Le Conseil 
d'administration de la DFE comprend actuellement: Peter Biering, Kammeradvoka-
ten ; Andreas Christensen, cabinet d'avocats Horten ; Professeur, Dr et Dr.jur. Jens 




forces bénévoles quasi infinies qui les animent. À tous, nous disons merci. 
« Ne citons personne pour n'oublier personne », dit-on souvent en danois 
pour exprimer sa gratitude, mais également lorsque l'on craint de ne pas être 
pardonné si l’on a involontairement oublié quelqu'un. Néanmoins, nous osons 
exprimer explicitement nos remerciements aux personnes suivantes, en espé-
rant être pardonnés si quelqu'un a été omis involontairement.14 
 Nous présentons nos hommages chaleureux et sincères à Son Altesse 
Royale, le Prince héritier Frederik de Danemark, qui a aimablement accepté 
d'être le parrain du Congrès, comme sa mère Sa Majesté la Reine le fut pour 
le Congrès de la FIDE organisé en 1978 à Copenhague. 
 En 2009, lors d'une réunion du Groupe de pilotage (appelé également 
« Comité directeur » ou comité exécutif) de la FIDE à Madrid, la DFE s'est 
vue confier non seulement la présidence de la FIDE, mais aussi l'organisation 
du Congrès de la FIDE en 2014. La DFE a ensuite décidé d'inviter la Faculté 
de droit de l'Université de Copenhague à participer à l'organisation, pour des 
raisons d'ordre pratique et afin d’assurer un haut niveau universitaire. Heu-
reusement, Henrik Dam, doyen à ce moment-là, s'est montré très enthousiaste 
quant à cette idée, et a décidé de soutenir le prochain congrès de diverses ma-
nières. Nous souhaitons lui offrir les plus sincères remerciements de la part de 
la DFE et de la FIDE pour cette décision et son soutien continu. À cet égard, 
nous sommes également reconnaissants à l'équipe administrative de la Facul-
té de droit pour son aide dans la réalisation de cet événement. Nous remer-
cions en particulier la coordinatrice du projet, Tina Futtrup Borg, mais aussi 
ses nombreux assistants, ainsi que la Chef de la communication, Birgitte Fa-
ber. À la Faculté de droit, nous souhaitons mentionner aussi l'école doctorale 
et les personnes ayant organisé un cours de doctorat sur le droit de l'Union 
européenne dans le cadre du Congrès (en particulier, Maître de conférences 
Constanze Semmelmann et Maître de conférences Clement Petersen).15  
                                                        
l’UE et aux droits de l'homme Nina Holst-Christensen, Ministère de la Justice ; Chef 
de division, Christian Thorning, Ministère des Affaires étrangères ; Juge Lene Pagter 
Kristensen, Cour suprême ; Charlotte Friis Bach Ryhl, cabinet d'avocats Friis Bach 
Ryhl ; et Maître de conférences, Dr Grith Skovgaard Ølykke, Département de droit, 
Copenhagen Business School. Jusqu'au 14 novembre 2013, le ministère des Affaires 
étrangères était « représenté » par Vibeke Pasternak Jørgensen au lieu de Christian 
Thorning, celle-ci s'étant retirée à la suite d'une promotion. 
14. Depuis la rédaction de cette « Introduction » et sa remise pour publication, il est pos-
sible que nous ayons reçu de l'aide supplémentaire, et nous sommes bien sûr égale-
ment reconnaissants à l'égard de tous ces soutiens non mentionnés, etc. 
15. À notre connaissance, il s’agit de la première fois qu'un tel cours est organisé dans le 
cadre d'un congrès de la FIDE, et peut être considéré comme une tentative de favori-
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 Nous devons également exprimer notre grande reconnaissance pour les 
services reçus de la Secrétaire Jette Nim Larsen du cabinet d'avocats Horten, 
qui a notamment apporté un soutien administratif précieux sur de nombreux 
sujets au Groupe de pilotage de la FIDE. En outre, DIS Congress Service, 
notre partenaire professionnel, et ses collaborateurs, en particulier Marianne 
Sjødahl et Peder Andersen, ont joué un rôle inestimable. La rédactrice en chef 
Vivi Antonsen de DJØF Publishing, responsable des présentes publications, 
s'est comme toujours montrée efficace et patiente, et mérite amplement notre 
profonde reconnaissance. En ce qui concerne le volume abordant le « thème 
général 3 », nous devons également remercier Mette Marie Lamm Larsen, 
stud.HA-jur. 
 D'autre part, nous présentons notre sincère reconnaissance à nos soutiens, 
fondations et partenaires. En particulier, nous sommes plus que reconnais-
sants aux entités et personnes suivantes :  
– Les cours européennes (en particulier, Président Vassilios Skouris ; Vice-
président Koen Lenaerts ; Juge Lars Bay Larsen ; et les nombreux inter-
prètes) et autres institutions européennes ; 
– Le ministère danois des Affaires étrangères (en particulier, Chef de divi-
sion Vibeke Pasternak Jørgensen et Chef de division Christian Thorning) ; 
– La Cour suprême du Danemark (en particulier, Président Børge Dahl et 
Juge Lene Pagter Kristensen) ; 
– Les contributeurs Knud Højgaards Fond ; Professor og Dr.jur Max Søren-
sens Mindefond ; Reinholdt W. Jorck og Hustrus Fond ; Dreyers Fond, 
Fonden til Støtte af Retsvidenskabelig Forskning ved Københavns Univer-
sitet ; et EURECO à l'Université de Copenhague. 
– Le partenaire premium Kammeradvokaten, cabinet d'avocats Poul Smith 
(en particulier, Peter Biering) ;  
– Le soutien du congrès, cabinet d'avocats Horten (en particulier, Andreas 
Christensen) ;  
– Le soutien du congrès, Copenhagen Business School ; 
– Le soutien du congrès, DJØF Publishing ; 
– Per Magid, cabinet d'avocats Bruun & Hjejle ; 
– Les exposants du congrès ; et 
– La ville de Copenhague. 
                                                        
ser l'intérêt et la participation des prochaines générations de chercheurs à l'égard des 
activités de la FIDE. 
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Nous tenons également à exprimer notre gratitude aux nombreux membres du 
Groupe de pilotage de la FIDE, qui ont répondu si gentiment à nos nom-
breuses questions sur les traditions de la FIDE, les attentes, etc. Les associa-
tions des pays suivants ont notamment fourni une aide extraordinaire : Au-
triche (en particulier, Professeur Heribert Köck), Estonie (en particulier, Juge 
Julia Laffranque), Allemagne (en particulier, Professeur Peter-Christian 
Müller-Graff) et Espagne (en particulier, Avocat Luis Ortiz Blanco). 
 Enfin, le XXVIe Congrès de la FIDE et les présents volumes n'auraient 
jamais vu le jour sans nos « Rapporteurs généraux » enthousiastes, travail-
leurs, flexibles et dévoués : Professeur Fabian Amtenbrink, Professeur Niamh 
Nic Shibhne, Professeur Jo Shaw et Professeur Roberto Caranta. D'autre part, 
les « Rapporteurs institutionnels », Jean-Paul Keppenne, Michal Meduna et 
Adrián Tokár, ont relevé le défi avec un esprit positif similaire, également 
très apprécié. Grâce à tous les rapporteurs nationaux, nous avons pu obtenir 
une image assez complète du droit et des pratiques en vigueur dans la plupart 
des Etats membres de l'Union européenne, et nous leur témoignons notre 
immense reconnaissance pour leurs considérables contributions si précieuses. 
Enfin, citons les excellents conférenciers, modérateurs et participants, dont le 
travail contribuera sans aucun doute à faire de ce Congrès, encore une fois, un 
événement d’exception. 
 En résumé, les actions de chacun méritent les plus grands éloges, et nous 
sommes profondément reconnaissants à tous. Ce fut un honneur et un plaisir 
(mais aussi un défi) d'organiser le XXVIe Congrès de la FIDE et de donner 
jour à ces volumes. Nous sommes convaincus que, même après plus d’un 
demi-siècle d’existence, la FIDE et ses congrès ont encore beaucoup à nous 
offrir à tous, comme en témoigneront à leur façon, nous l'espérons, les pré-
sents volumes. Nous espérons également que la FIDE et ses congrès perdure-
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Vorwort 
Von 1978 bis 2014 
Vom 28. bis 31. Mai 2014 findet in Kopenhagen der XXVI. FIDE-Kongress 
statt. Es ist bereits das zweite Mal, dass Kopenhagen die Ehre zuteil wird, 
diese Veranstaltung auszurichten. Im Jahre 1978, das heißt vor 36 Jahren, 
fand der Kongress zum ersten Mal in Kopenhagen statt.2 Der damalige Präsi-
dent der FIDE, Professor Ole Lando, eröffnete das Treffen mit folgenden 
Worten:  
»Wenn sich die ersten grauen Haare zeigen, denken Sie häufiger an Ihre Kindheit und frü-
he Jugend zurück. Sie erinnern sich oftmals daran, wie Sie damals die Welt sahen. Sie er-
innern sich auch, wie die Erwachsenen der damaligen Zeit die Welt sahen. Vor 40 Jahren 
waren die ‚älteren Semester‘, die Europa mit dem Europa ihrer Jugend verglichen, im All-
gemeinen von einer sehr düsteren Perspektive geprägt. Im Jahre 1898 schien Europa auf 
einen Kurs des Fortschritts in Frieden zu setzen. 1938 prophezeiten viele Menschen Krieg, 
Tyrannei und Armut, und sie hatten Recht. 1939 kam der Krieg. Fortan litten die meisten 
von uns unter der Tyrannei, und als der Krieg 1945 zu Ende war, lebten wir in Elend und 
Armut. Doch bereits 10 Jahre nach dem Krieg gründeten sechs europäische Länder, von 
denen zwei gegen die anderen vier Krieg geführt hatten, die Europäische Wirtschaftsge-
meinschaft. Ihr Ziel war es, die europäischen Völker einander näher zu bringen, um wirt-
                                                        
1. Professor, Dr. Ulla Neergaard, Universität Kopenhagen, Präsidentin der Dänischen 
Vereinigung für Europarecht (DFE), Präsidentin der FIDE 2013-14; Associate Pro-
fessor, Dr. Catherine Jacqueson, Universität Kopenhagen, Generalsekretärin der 
FIDE 2013-14; Kommissarin für EU-Recht und Menschenrechte, Nina Holst-
Christensen, Justizministerium; Professor, Dr. jur., Dr. Jens Hartig Danielsen, Univer-
sität Aarhus; und Associate Professor, Dr. Grith Skovgaard Ølykke, Copenhagen 
Business School. Ulla Neergaard und Catherine Jacqueson tragen die Gesamtverant-
wortung für alle drei Bände, wohingegen Jens Hartig Danielsen in erster Linie an 
Band 1 arbeitete, Nina Holst-Christensen an Band 2 und Grith Skovgaard Ølykke an 
Band 3. 
2. Die behandelten Themen waren: 1.»Gleichbehandlung von öffentlichen und privaten 
Unternehmen«; und 2. »Fairer Prozess im Verwaltungsverfahren«. 
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schaftliches Wachstum und sozialen Fortschritt zu fördern, die Lebensbedingungen zu 
verbessern sowie Freiheit und Frieden zu bewahren und zu stärken. Als 1955 vorgeschla-
gen wurde, einen Gemeinsamen Markt zu schaffen, erinnerten sich die Menschen in Euro-
pa noch immer an den Krieg und waren bereit, eine Politik zu akzeptieren, die dazu be-
stimmt war, Frieden und Freiheit zu garantieren. Frieden und Freiheit dominierten sowohl 
in den Köpfen der Menschen, die die Vision einer Annährung der europäischen Nationen 
hatten, als auch jener, die den Wohlstand durch Schaffung eines größeren Marktes für 
Handel und Industrie gewährleisten wollten. In den zurückliegenden Jahren haben sich die 
Ängste vor Tyrannei und Krieg gelegt. Die als Europäische Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft be-
kannte Organisation wird nicht länger als Hüterin von Frieden und Freiheit gesehen. Der 
Wohlstand, den so viele herbeisehnten, ist gekommen und wieder gegangen. Heute hat 
sich die anfängliche Begeisterung für ein geeintes Europa verflüchtigt.«3 
Auch jetzt, nachdem wieder fast vier Jahrzehnte vergangen sind, kann man in 
der gleichen Weise zurückblicken, wie es Professor Ole Lando getan hat. Wie 
wir alle wissen, ist sehr viel passiert. Die Europäische Union von heute hat 
viel erreicht, z. B. eine tiefgreifende Erweiterung; die Verabschiedung der 
Grundrechtecharta; der Demokratiegedanke und europäische Grundwerte 
wurden weiter verbreitet; die Stärkung des freien Handels; beachtlichen 
Wohlstand; die Unionsbürgerschaft und mehr Sicherheit und Frieden. Aller-
dings könnte man weiterhin behaupten, dass sich die Begeisterung für ein ge-
eintes Europa teilweise verflüchtigt hat und dass die Krise und die damit ver-
bundenen Herausforderungen unterschiedlich bewertet werden. Der FIDE-
Kongress 2014 wird zahlreiche Facetten der Krise untersuchen in der Hoff-
nung, die richtigen Schwerpunkte gesetzt zu haben.  
FIDE – eine besondere Europäische Organisation 
Die FIDE (Fédération Internationale pour le Droit Européen / Internationale 
Föderation für Europarecht) konzentriert sich auf die Untersuchung und 
Analyse des Rechts der Europäischen Union und seiner Institutionen sowie 
auf deren Berührungspunkte mit den Rechtssystemen der Mitgliedsstaaten. 
Sie vereint die nationalen Verbände für Europäisches Recht der meisten EU-
Mitgliedsstaaten und Beitrittsländer sowie der norwegischen und Schweizeri-
schen Verbände. Gegenwärtig gibt es 29 Mitgliedsverbände – alle in einem 
anderen Land beheimatet – die es sich aufgrund eigener Initiative zum Ziel 
gesetzt haben, das Wissen über die EU zu verbreiten.  
                                                        
3. Siehe Ole Lando (übersetzt aus dem Englischen): »Europe: From quantity to quality. 
[Europa: von Quantität zu Qualität] Rede anlässlich der Kongresseröffnung am 22. 
Juni 1978« in »FIDE. Achter Kongress, 22.-24. Juni 1978. Zusammenfassung der 
Diskussionen. Band 1. Kopenhagen 1979«, S. 6. 
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 Die FIDE wurde bereits 1961 gegründet und gilt gemeinhin als treibende 
Kraft hinter der Etablierung des EU-Rechts als juristischer Disziplin.4 Heute 
gibt es zwar viele andere Kanäle, die sich mit dem EU-Recht befassen. Den-
noch werden der alle zwei Jahre stattfindende FIDE-Kongress und die damit 
verbundenen Publikationen von vielen als außerordentlich wichtig angesehen 
aufgrund ihrer Gestaltung, ihres Stellenwertes und nicht zuletzt ihres Einflus-
ses in Politik, Gesetzgebung und Wissenschaft.5 
Der XXVI. FIDE-Kongress und seine Hauptthemen 
Die Hauptthemen des XXVI. FIDE-Kongresses wurden bereits einige Jahre 
im Voraus bestimmt. Der Auswahl gingen eingehende Beratungen mit wich-
tigen Akteuren in ganz Europa voraus. Folgende Themen stehen zur Diskus-
sion: 
– Allgemeines Thema 1 – Die Wirtschafts- und Währungsunion: konstituti-
onelle und institutionelle Aspekte der wirtschaftspolitischen Steuerung in-
nerhalb der EU;6 
– Allgemeines Thema 2 – Unionsbürgerschaft: Entwicklung, Auswirkungen 
und Herausforderungen;7 
– Allgemeines Thema 3 – Vergaberecht für öffentliche Aufträge: Begren-
zungen, Möglichkeiten und Widersprüche;8 und 
                                                        
4. Siehe die Diskussionen in Morten Rasmussen, z. B. »Establishing a Constitutional 
Practice: The Role of the European Law Associations«, in Wolfram Kaiser und Jan-
Henrik Meyer (Hrg.): »Societal Actors in European Integration. Polity-Building 
and Policy-Making, 1958-1992«, Palgrave Macmillan, 2013, S. 173-197; und Alex-
andre Bernier: „Constructing and Legitimating: Transnational Jurist Networks and 
the Making of a Constitutional Practice of European Law, 1950-1970“, in »Contem-
porary European History«, 2012, S. 399-415.  
5. Siehe weiterhin Julia Laffranque: »FIDE – Uniting Great Minds of European Law: 50 
years of the International Federation for European Law«, Juridica International, 2011, 
S. 173-181. 
6. Ernannt als »Generalberichterstatter«: Professor Fabian Amtenbrink; »Berichterstat-
ter aus den EU-Institutionen«: Jean-Paul Keppenne, Juristischer Dienst, Europäische 
Kommission. 
7. Ernannt als »Generalberichterstatter«: Professor Niamh Nic Shibhne und Professor Jo 
Shaw; »Berichterstatter aus den EU-Institutionen«: Michal Meduna, Generaldirektion 
Justiz, Europäische Kommission. 
8. Ernannt als »Generalberichterstatter«: Professor Roberto Caranta; «Berichterstatter 
aus den EU-Institutionen«: Adrián Tokár, Juristischer Dienst, Europäische Kommis-
sion. 
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– Generalthema am Samstag – Das Verhältnis zwischen EU, nationalen und 
internationalen Gerichten und das Zusammenspiel mehrerer Rechtsquellen 
im Zeitalter des Rechtspluralismus.9 
Die ausgewählten Themen sind alle von eminenter Bedeutung, um die Her-
ausforderungen Europas in diesen Jahren und die Entwicklung des Europäi-
schen Rechts zu veranschaulichen. Mit dieser Auswahl ist sichergestellt, dass 
sowohl verfassungsrechtliche als auch institutionelle Aspekte behandelt wer-
den. Damit ist auch gewährleistet, dass der EU Binnenmarkt, einer der wich-
tigsten Grundsteine der EU, auf dem Kongress in angemessener Form Beach-
tung findet. Zusätzlich wird der Bedeutung der EU für die EU-Bürger, also 
die Menschen innerhalb der EU, großes Gewicht beigemessen. Wir hoffen, 
dass die ausgewählten Themen auf breites Interesse stoßen im privaten und 
öffentlichen Sektor sowie in den Bereichen Forschung, Lehre und Zivilge-
sellschaft.  
 Das Thema der »Economic Governance« ist gegenwärtig relevant wie 
kaum ein anderes. Die Wirtschafts- und Währungsunion wurde vor mehr als 
zwanzig Jahren ins Leben gerufen und war während der turbulenten Finanz- 
und Wirtschaftskrise nicht unerheblichem Druck ausgesetzt. Obwohl sich die 
wirtschaftliche Situation in Europa zuletzt verbesserte, hat sie sich noch nicht 
gänzlich stabilisiert. Eine rechtliche Analyse der Entwicklungen ist unum-
                                                        
9. Die Behandlung dieses Themas orientiert sich nicht am »System« der »Fragebögen«, 
»Generalberichterstatter«, »Berichterstatter aus den EU-Institutionen« und »Bericht-
erstatter eines Länderberichts«; stattdessen wird eine Podiumsdiskussion der Präsi-
denten und Richter führender internationaler/nationaler Gerichte sowie von Vertre-
tern aus der Wissenschaft organisiert. Obwohl die vorliegenden Publikationen nicht 
direkt auf das »Generalthema am Samstag« Bezug nehmen, muss aus Gründen der 
Vollständigkeit erwähnt werden, dass dieses Thema auf den ersten Blick etwas theo-
retisch erscheint, aber in Wirklichkeit von großer und konkreter Bedeutung für die 
tägliche Arbeit vieler Juristen ist. Es befasst sich damit, wie EU-Recht in einer viel-
schichtigen und zusammengesetzten Rechtsordnung angewandt werden muss, mit 
dem Zusammenwirken der Gerichte und dem Phänomen des Nebeneinanders ver-
schiedener Rechtsquellen. Im Zeitalter des Rechtspluralismus fehlen Normhierar-
chien wie sie aus den meisten nationalen Rechtsordnungen bekannt sind. In einem 
solchen zusammengesetzten Gebilde scheint es unumgänglich, ein gewisses Maß an 
Komplexität und Unvorhersehbarkeit zu akzeptieren und auf Kompromisse bei der 
Interaktion verschiedener normativer Ebenen hinzuarbeiten. Auf der Suche nach der-
artigen Kompromissen wird zum Teil dafür plädiert, die Frage nach dem Geltungs-
grund des Rechts in einer zusammengesetzten Rechtsordnung jenseits des Geltungs-




gänglich. Es ist daher angebracht, den rechtlichen Status der ‘Economic 
Governance‘ in der EU und die Asymmetrie in Bezug auf die Gesetzge-
bungskompetenzen in Wirtschafts- und Währungsfragen zu bewerten. Des 
Weiteren ist eine Auseinandersetzung mit folgenden Fragen notwendig: Wie 
sind mögliche Abweichungen vom EU-Recht zu sanktionieren? Welche Rol-
le spielt der Gerichtshof der Europäischen Union? Wie sind die Aussichten 
für die Zukunft? Müssen in einer Fiskalunion nationale Souveränität und 
grundlegende Governance-Strukturen des Euro aufeinander abgestimmt wer-
den? Sind Eurobonds nur nach Vertragsänderungen möglich? In welchem 
Umfang kann das Steuerrecht harmonisiert werden? 
 Die Unionsbürgerschaft ist ein gleichermaßen aktuelles wie komplexes 
Thema. Wie sieht die Realität der Unionsbürgerschaft in den Mitgliedsstaaten 
mehr als zwei Jahrzehnte nach Einführung der Unionsbürgerschaft im Ver-
trag aus? Es gilt zu untersuchen, wie die mit der Unionsbürgerschaft ver-
knüpften Rechte von den nationalen Behörden umgesetzt und angewendet 
wurden. Aus Sicht der EU-Bürger drängt sich die Frage auf, ob die Unions-
bürgerschaft gar kontraproduktive Wirkungen zeigen und die ‚erworbenen‘ 
Rechte der Arbeiternehmer negativ beeinflussen könnte. Die Unionsbürger-
schaft besitzt außerdem erhebliches Potenzial, die Legitimität der EU zu be-
einflussen. In diesem Zusammenhang stellt sich die Frage, wie groß die Soli-
darität der Mitgliedsstaaten und ihrer Bürger mit anderen Mitgliedsstaaten 
und deren Bürgern ist. Darüber hinaus gewinnen politisch und sozial sensible 
Themen wie Familienzusammenführung, Ausweisung und die Rolle von An-
gehörigen aus Drittstaaten an Relevanz. 
 Im dritten allgemeinen Thema geht es um das Recht der Vergabe öffentli-
cher Aufträge. Damit wird ein Bereich des Rechts berührt, der in den meisten 
Mitgliedsstaaten von herausragender praktischer Bedeutung ist. Das Thema 
berührt Fragen der öffentlichen Haushalte und ist von der Finanz- und Wirt-
schaftskrise kaum zu trennen. Das Regelwerk für die Vergabe öffentlicher 
Aufträge prägt die tägliche Arbeit vieler Anwälte, Unternehmen und Stellen 
im öffentlichen Sektor mit zunehmender Tendenz. Als Reaktion auf aktuelle 
Entwicklungen wurden die Vergaberechtsrichtlinien in den letzten Jahren 
überarbeitet. Der FIDE-Kongress bietet die Möglichkeit, die vorgeschlagenen 
Änderungen zu erörtern und ihre Implikationen kritisch zu analysieren. Das 
Gleiche gilt in Bezug auf die Richtlinie über Nachprüfungsverfahren. In Zei-
ten wirtschaftlicher Krisen sind Fragen der »public-private-partnerships« und 
der Finanzierung von Dienstleistungen von Allgemeinem Wirtschaftlichen 
Interesse von entscheidender Bedeutung – sie werden daher nicht selten kont-
rovers diskutiert. Dies mag auch für Umwelt- und Sozialfragen gelten, denen 
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in diesem Zusammenhang in Zukunft größere Beachtung geschenkt werden 
muss. 
 Insgesamt laden der XXVI. FIDE-Kongress und die damit verbundenen 
Publikationen dazu ein, sich sowohl auf EU-Ebene als auch auf nationaler 
Ebene mit dem Stand des EU-Rechts auseinanderzusetzen. Zu Beginn stehen 
drei hochaktuelle und ebenso gewichtige Themen, die weitreichende Betäti-
gungsmöglichkeiten für rechtsvergleichend und europarechtlich arbeitende 
Anwälte bieten. 
Eine Zusammenarbeit kenntnisreicher Spezialisten und großer Denker im 
Europäischen Recht10 
Um umfangreiche Diskussionen und Analysen anzuregen, wurden in Über-
einstimmung mit den Traditionen der FIDE detaillierte Vergleichsstudien er-
stellt. Lange Zeit vor dem eigentlichen Kongress wurde daher für jedes der 
drei Themen sorgfältig ein »Fragebogen« von dem für das Thema verant-
wortlichen »Generalberichterstatter« vorbereitet. Auf Grundlage dieser »Fra-
gebögen« wurden von nationalen Experten, die von nationalen Verbänden 
der FIDE ernannt wurden, nationale Untersuchungen durchgeführt.  
 All diese Berichte wurden anschließend in dieser Sammlung zusammen 
mit den von den »Generalberichterstattern« vorbereiteten »Allgemeinen Be-
richten« veröffentlicht. Ergänzend wurden so genannte »Berichte aus dem 
EU-Institutionen« beigefügt, die von den Vertretern der EU-Institutionen er-
arbeitet wurden.11 Wie die FIDE und ihre Kongresse werden diese Unterla-
gen traditionsgemäß dreisprachig (Englisch, Französisch, Deutsch) gehal-
ten.12  
                                                        
10. Diese Überschrift orientiert sich am Slogan des XXVI. FIDE-Kongresses, der sich 
wiederum von der Überschrift des folgenden Artikels leiten ließ: Julia Laffranque: 
»FIDE – Uniting Great Minds of European Law: 50 years of the International Federa-
tion for European Law«, Juridica International, 2011, S. 173-181. Der Verwendung 
als Slogan hat Julia Laffranque zugestimmt. Eine kleine Änderung wurde vorge-
nommen, so dass der Slogan im Englischen wie folgt lautet: »FIDE – Uniting Great 
Minds of European Law«.  
11. Die Analysen und Ergebnisse in Bezug auf Thema 1 werden in Band 1 vorgestellt, 
für Thema 2 in Band 2 und für Thema 3 in Band 3. Mündliche Präsentationen, die in 
Papierform etc. eingehen, werden, soweit möglich, auf der Webseite  
 www.fide2014.eu veröffentlicht. 





Die Organisation einer Veranstaltung wie des FIDE-Kongresses und die Vor-
bereitung der vorliegenden Publikationen wäre nicht möglich ohne die Hilfe 
der zahlreichen Mitarbeitenden. Daher danke ich im Namen der Dänischen 
Vereinigung für Europarecht (DFE) – seit 1973 der dänische Mitgliedsver-
band der FIDE – allen, die uns in der eine oder anderen Form durch tatkräfti-
ge Unterstützung und finanzielle Zuwendungen geholfen haben.13 Die FIDE 
und ihre Kongresse basieren größtenteils auf der Unterstützung freiwilliger 
Helfer. Wir sind allen zu großem Dank verpflichtet. »Niemand erwähnt, nie-
mand vergessen«, wie man im Dänischen sagt, um seinen Dank auszudrü-
cken. Wir bitten um Verzeihung, wenn wir jemanden aus Versehen vergessen 
haben sollten. Dennoch möchten wir ausdrücklich folgenden Personen dan-
ken:14 
 Unser herzlicher und aufrichtiger Dank gebührt Seiner Königlichen Ho-
heit, dem Kronprinzen Frederik von Dänemark, der freundlicherweise die 
Schirmherrschaft für den Kongress übernommen hat, ebenso wie seiner Mut-
ter, Ihrer Königlichen Hoheit, der Königin, anlässlich des FIDE-Kongress 
1978 in Kopenhagen. 
 Die DFE hat nicht nur die Präsidentschaft der FIDE, sondern auch die Or-
ganisation des FIDE-Kongresses 2014 übernommen. Es wurde schließlich 
von der DFE beschlossen, die Juristische Fakultät der Universität Kopenha-
gen einzuladen, sich an der Organisation zu beteiligen, um einen hohen aka-
demischen Standard zu gewährleisten. Glücklicherweise konnte der Dekan, 
Herr Henrik Dam, für diese Idee gewonnen werden und entschied sich dan-
                                                        
13. Die DFE war die siebte nationale Vereinigung, die der FIDE beitrat und damit die 
erste, die zu den sechs Gründungsvereinigungen der FIDE dazustiess. Derzeit arbei-
ten folgende Personen im Vorstand der DFE: Partner Peter Biering, Kammeradvoka-
ten; Partner Andreas Christensen, Horten Rechtsanwälte; Professor, Dr. jur., Dr. Jens 
Hartig Danielsen, Rechtsfakultät Universität Aarhus; Kommissar für EU-Recht und 
Menschenrechte; Nina Holst-Christensen, Justizministerium; Referatsleitung, Christi-
an Thorning, Außenministerium; Richterin Lene Pagter Kristensen, Oberster Ge-
richtshof; Partner Charlotte Friis Bach Ryhl, Friis Bach Ryhl Rechtsanwälte; und 
Associate Professor, Dr. Grith Skovgaard Ølykke, Abteilung Rechtswissenschaften, 
Copenhagen Business School. Bis zum 14. November 2013 war das Außenministeri-
um durch Vibeke Pasternak Jørgensen vertreten. Nachdem diese wegen einer Beför-
derung den Posten aufgab, trat Christian Thorning an ihre Stelle. 
14. Nachdem dieses Vorwort geschrieben und zur Veröffentlichung eingereicht worden 
ist, haben wir vermutlich noch weitere Unterstützung erhalten. Daher danken wir na-
türlich auch allen zum jetzigen Zeitpunkt noch unbekannten Unterstützern.  
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kenswerterweise, den bevorstehenden Kongress auf verschiedene Arten zu 
unterstützen. Seitens des DFE und der FIDE möchten wir Herrn Dekan Dam 
unseren aufrichtigen Dank für seine Entscheidung und die fortdauernde Un-
terstützung aussprechen. In diesem Zusammenhang danken wir auch dem 
administrativen Team der Juristischen Fakultät für die Unterstützung der 
Veranstaltung, insbesondere der Projektkoordinatorin, Frau Tina Futtrup 
Borg, und ihren vielen Helfern sowie der Leiterin der Kommunikationsabtei-
lung, Frau Birgitte Faber. Innerhalb der Juristischen Fakultät möchten wir be-
sonders die PhD School und jene Personen erwähnen, die einen PhD-Kurs 
zum Recht der Europäischen Union in Verbindung mit dem Kongress organi-
siert haben (insbesondere den beiden assoziierten Professoren, Frau Constan-
ze Semmelmann und Herrn Clement Petersen).15  
 In großer Anerkennung und Dankbarkeit erwähnen wir die Hilfe, die wir 
von Jette Nim Larsen, Sekretärin der Rechtsanwaltskanzlei Horten, erfahren 
haben. Ihre administrative Unterstützung war bei allen Anliegen der FIDE-
Lenkungsgruppe sehr wertvoll. Darüber hinaus fungierte der DIS Congress 
Service als unser Partner. Die Mitarbeit von Marianne Sjødahl und Peder 
Andersen war von unschätzbarem Wert. Die Chefredakteurin Vivi Antonsen 
von DJØF Publishing, die für die vorliegenden Publikationen verantwortlich 
ist, war eine höchst effiziente und geduldige Ansprechpartnerin, der unser be-
sonderer Dank gilt. Mit Blick auf den Band »Allgemeines Thema 3« danken 
wir insbesondere Frau stud.HA-jur. Mette Marie Lamm Larsen.  
 Darüber hinaus gilt unser Dank unseren Unterstützern, sowie den beteilig-
ten Stiftungen und Partnern. Ganz besonders danken möchten wir:  
– Dem Europäischen Gerichtshof (insbesondere dem Präsidenten, Herrn Va-
ssilios Skouris, dem Vizepräsidenten, Herrn Koen Lenaerts, dem Richter, 
Herrn Lars Bay Larsen, und den vielen Dolmetschern) und anderen euro-
päischen Institutionen;  
– Dem dänischen Außenministerium (insbesondere den Referatsleitern Vi-
beke Pasternak Jørgensen und Christian Thorning); 
– Dem Obersten Dänischen Gerichtshof (insbesondere dem Präsidenten 
Børge Dahl und Richterin Lene Pagter Kristensen); 
– Den Autoren Knud Højgaards Fond; Professor Dr. jur. Max Sørensens 
Mindefond; Reinholdt W. Jorck og Hustrus Fond; Dreyers Fond, Fonden 
                                                        
15. Unseres Wissens ist dies das erste Mal, dass ein solcher Kurs im Zusammenhang mit 
dem FIDE-Kongress organisiert wurde. Dieses Projekt kann als Versuch angesehen 
werden, die kommenden Generationen von Forschenden und ihr Engagement für die 
FIDE zu unterstützen. 
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til Støtte af Retsvidenskabelig Forskning ved Københavns Universitet; 
und EURECO an der Universität von Kopenhagen. 
– Dem Premiumpartner Kammeradvokaten, Rechtsanwaltskanzlei Poul 
Smith (insbesondere dem Partner Peter Biering);  
– Den Kongress-Helfern der Rechtsanwaltskanzlei Horten (insbesondere 
dem Partner Andreas Christensen);  
– Den Kongress-Helfern von der Copenhagen Business School 
– Den Kongress-Helfern von DJØF Publishing; 
– Dem Partner Per Magid, Rechtsanwaltskanzlei Bruun & Hjejle; 
– Den Kongress-Ausstellern; sowie  
– Der Stadt Kopenhagen 
Unser besonderer Dank gebührt auch den vielen Mitgliedern der FIDE-
Lenkungsgruppe, die uns freundlicherweise geholfen haben, unsere vielen 
Fragen zu den Traditionen und Erwartungen im Zusammenhang mit FIDE zu 
beantworten, insbesondere den Verbänden folgender Länder, die uns tatkräf-
tig unterstützt haben: Österreich (Professor Heribert Köck), Estland (Richte-
rin Julia Laffranque), Deutschland (Professor Peter-Christian Müller-Graff) 
und Spanien (Rechtsanwalt Luis Ortiz Blanco). 
 Zuallerletzt bleibt hervorzuheben, dass der XXVI. FIDE-Kongress und die 
vorliegenden Bände niemals ohne die tatkräftigen und engagierten »General-
berichterstatter« möglich gewesen wären. Wir bedanken uns bei Professor 
Fabian Amtenbrink, Professor Niamh Nic Shibhne, Professor Jo Shaw und 
Professor Roberto Caranta. Darüber hinaus haben die »Berichterstatter von 
den EU-Institutionen« Jean-Paul Keppenne, Michal Meduna und Adrián To-
kár, die Herausforderungen voller Enthusiasmus angenommen und mit Bra-
vour erfüllt, wofür Ihnen unser höchster Dank gilt. Die nationalen Berichter-
statter haben es ermöglicht, ein weitgehend vollständiges Bild von Gesetzge-
bung und Rechtspraxis in den meisten Mitgliedsstaaten der Europäischen 
Union zu erhalten. Wir danken ihnen für ihre umfangreichen und wertvollen 
Beiträge. Außerdem sollen die exzellenten Redner, Moderatoren und Teil-
nehmer nicht unerwähnt bleiben, deren Arbeit unzweifelhaft dazu beiträgt, 
den Kongress zu einem herausragenden und unvergesslichen Ereignis werden 
zu lassen. Tausend Dank an alle, die uns in welcher Form auch immer unter-
stützend zur Seite standen. 
 Es war uns eine große Ehre, Freude und zuweilen zugegebenermaßen eine 
kleine Herausforderung, den XXVI. FIDE-Kongress zu organisieren und die 
vorhandenen Bände zu vorzubereiten. Wir sind davon überzeugt, dass die 
FIDE und ihre Kongresse auch nach mehr als einem halben Jahrhundert noch 
immer eine große Bereicherung und Inspirationsquelle darstellen. Wir hoffen, 
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die vorliegenden Bände stellen dies unter Beweis. Wir wünschen uns, dass 
sowohl die FIDE als auch die Kongresse in Zukunft erfolgreich fortgeführt 







Questionnaire General Topic 2 
Union Citizenship: Development, Impact and Challenges 
Niamh Nic Shuibhne and Jo Shaw 1 
FIDE 2014 
 
Questionnaire in English 
General Introduction  
Union citizenship stands at the interface of integration and constitutionalism, 
and is a barometer for key trends and influences at the current crossroads be-
tween the Member States and the European Union. The purpose of this ques-
tionnaire is to stimulate national reports that enable us to understand better, as 
a primary objective, how the rights attached to Union citizenship are develop-
ing and being applied within the legal orders of the Member States. To 
achieve that objective, we are interested, in the first instance, in examples that 
demonstrate how national legislatures, administrations and judiciaries are in-
terpreting and applying the aspects of EU citizenship that require implemen-
tation at the national level, but we are also keen to gather evidence on how 
those actors are responding to case law of the Court of Justice relating to citi-
zenship rights that sit outside the parameters of direct national implementa-
tion.  
 Analysis of this rich empirical data will also enable us to present a com-
parative perspective on the development of EU citizenship rights. Most situa-
tions involving the application of EU legal rights happen at national level, 
and never reach the EU institutions at all. The EUDO Citizenship Observa-
tory and its existing datasets on the acquisition and loss of citizenship and 
more recently on electoral rights2 have started to fill a crucial information gap 
in this context; but cross-tabulation of that data with the national reports pre-
                                                        
1. University of Edinburgh. All three questionnaires have originally been elaborated in 
English, and subsequently translated into French and German. Therefore, in case of 
any discrepancies, it is the English versions which best represent the thinking of the 
General Rapporteurs. 
2. See http://eudo-citizenship.eu/databases.  
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pared for the FIDE Congress will enhance the available material, and thus our 
understanding of the reality of Union citizenship, very significantly.  
 As a secondary objective, however, we are also keen to get a greater sense 
of how Union citizenship is developing within and/or impacting upon the cul-
ture of national citizenship. For example, how are EU citizenship rights being 
portrayed by the national media and in popular or civil society discourse? 
Media actors have an extraordinary platform from which to shape the tone of 
national debate; have they acted responsibly (e.g. by providing accurate in-
formation on the applicable rights) in the specific context of Union citizen-
ship? How is civil society discourse (e.g. as emerging through blogs and 
websites) responding to that steer? More generally, how does EU free move-
ment law, and the citizenship rights associated with it, sit alongside national 
immigration law? In addition, where the interface between national citizen-
ship and EU citizenship is concerned, issues may also be raised about the 
rights that static EU citizens have, or do not have, and how this affects the 
perception of EU citizenship and those who hold the rights of mobile citizens. 
 The span of Union citizenship and associated rights covers a potentially 
enormous field and we have, therefore, decided to focus on four key, citizen-
specific themes in the questionnaire. What we are seeking to understand is 
how national actors are interpreting and applying the added-value rights of 
Union citizenship i.e. rights beyond those attached to more established free 
movement categories, such as workers. Our four selected themes are: 
A. Citizenship within Directive 2004/38/EC3 
B. Citizenship beyond Directive 2004/38/EC 
C. The political rights of EU citizens 
D. The emerging culture(s) of citizenship. 
By focusing on these distinct, yet interrelated elements of the development 
and impact of Union citizenship, we aim in our General Report to offer a 
cross section of insights into how EU citizenship has (or has not) become 
embedded into the national constitutional, legal and political cultures. We also 
intend to identify key challenges affecting the realisation of Union citizenship 
within the Member States.  
                                                        
3. Directive 2004/38/EC, on the right of citizens of the Union and their family members 
to move and reside freely within the territory of the Member States, [2004] OJ 
L158/77. 
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Guide to Answering Questions 
Please endeavour to answer questions in a manner that: 
– Provides information in a way that is accessible to a range of national au-
diences (i.e. explaining national issues in their proper context) and which 
is comparable across Member States; and 
– Is evidence-based and objective: we are interested in receiving examples, 
rather than a comprehensive account of national legal issues (beyond the 
scope of a single report), and examples objectively stated will offer much 
more important comparative data than the views of a particular commenta-
tor. Nevertheless, of course, if it is necessary to make a judgment about 
whether or not EU law is effectively implemented at the national level, 
this should be included. 
Moreover, Rapporteurs are kindly requested, whenever appropriate, to in-
clude in their reports information on the position taken on the relevant legal 
issues by: 
– Courts and tribunals in their case law in the relevant jurisdiction; 
– Executives and parliaments in the Member State described; 
– Academic and professional literature in the relevant Member State; and 
– The media in the relevant Member State. 
Themes and questions 
A. Questions 1-6: Citizenship within Directive 2004/38/EC – Stability of 
Residence for Union Citizens and their Family Members 
The adoption of Directive 2004/38/EC was a significant milestone in the regu-
lation of Union citizenship. In particular, it was anticipated that the applica-
tion of EU citizenship rights by national administrations, legislatures, and ju-
diciaries would be considerably improved by the existence of this detailed 
framework text. But has this happened in reality? In this section of the ques-
tionnaire, we have developed a series of questions that engage with the citi-
zenship-specific elements of the Directive against a thematic concern about 
stability of residence for EU citizens and their family members. The ques-
tions address: (1) the evolving definition of family members and relationships 
of dependency; (2) the potential challenge to residence stability generated by 
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the Directive’s economic self-sufficiency conditions; (3) the ground-breaking 
creation of direct EU legal rights for the family members of Union citizens, 
including third country national family members; (4) the similarly revolu-
tionary concept and status of ‘permanent residence’; (5) the express temporal 
limitations placed on access to certain social security benefits; and (6) against 
the backdrop of surprisingly moderate recent guidance from the Court of Jus-
tice, and also considering the extent to which Member State authorities are 
considering and applying the Directive’s ‘softening’ criteria when taking de-
cisions about the expulsion of Union citizens or their family members, the 
legislatively intended distinctions between different groups of Union citizens 
in the context of expulsion. 
1. With respect to a Union citizen’s family members, how have Articles 2, 3, 
and 5 of the Directive been transposed into national law? How have na-
tional courts and/or tribunals dealt with the different types of family rela-
tionships outlined in Articles 2 and 3? Are the procedural safeguards con-
tained in Article 5 providing effective protection? 
2. Is there any evidence of the expulsion of EU citizens (and/or their family 
members) on purely economic grounds (i.e. failure to satisfy the condi-
tions set out in Article 7 of the Directive) e.g. in the decisions of national 
courts and/or tribunals? 
3. How have Articles 12-15 of the Directive been transposed into national 
law? Have any disputes on the interpretation or application of these provi-
sions been addressed within national courts or tribunals? 
4. How have Articles 16-21 of the Directive been transposed into national 
law? Has data on the volume of applications to date for the status of per-
manent residence been published for your Member State? Have any dis-
putes on the interpretation or application of these provisions been ad-
dressed within national courts or tribunals? 
5. How has Article 24(2) of the Directive been transposed into national law? 
Does national law distinguish between the categories specified in Article 
24(2) and job-seekers in terms of entitlement to social benefits? Has Art-
icle 24(2) displaced the Court of Justice’s ‘real link’ case law before na-
tional courts or tribunals?4 
                                                        
4. Compare e.g. the ‘real link’ approach applied in Case C-209/03, Bidar v London 
Borough of Ealing; Secretary of State for Education and Skills, Judgment of the 
Court (Grand Chamber) of 15 March 2005, with the subsequent decision in Case C-
158/07, Förster v IB-Groep, Judgment of the Court (Grand Chamber) of 18 Novem-
ber 2008; and, in the context of job-seekers, Case C-138/02, Collins v Secretary of 
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6. Please describe how the national courts and tribunals have understood, ap-
plied and differentiated between the concepts of ‘public policy, public se-
curity, or public health’ (Article 27), ‘serious grounds of public policy or 
public security’, and ‘imperative grounds of public security’ (Article 28).5 
How has the principle of proportionality been understood and applied in 
these contexts? How have the national courts and tribunals taken account 
of considerations such as how long the individual concerned has resided 
on its territory, his/her age, state of health, family and economic situation, 
social and cultural integration into the host Member State, and the extent 
of his/her links with the country of origin? 
B. Questions 7-8: EU Citizenship beyond Directive 2004/38/EC – Explor-
ing National Application of Primary EU Law 
Thinking especially of the decisions in recent case law such as Rottmann and 
Ruiz Zambrano,6 it is clear that the adoption of Directive 2004/38 has not al-
together curtailed the interpretative powers of the Court of Justice with re-
spect to the primary citizenship rights conferred directly by the Treaties. In 
this section of the questionnaire, our questions are constructed to elicit infor-
mation about the extent to which national authorities are responding to that 
jurisprudence and are willing to go beyond the boundaries of the Directive. 
We highlight two key areas in this respect: (1) ‘purely internal situations’ and 
the issue of reverse discrimination, especially in cases involving the rights of 
family members; and (2) the extent to which national rules on the acquisition 
and loss of citizenship accommodate, or otherwise, the specific implications 
of those rules for acquisition and/or loss of the status of Union citizenship. 
                                                        
State for Work and Pensions, Judgement of the Court (Full Court) of 23 March 2004 
with Joined Cases C-22/08 and C-23/08, Vatsouras and Koupatantze v Arbeitsge-
meinschaft (ARGE) Nürnberg 900, Judgment of the Court (Third Chamber) of 4 June 
2009. 
5. See e.g. Case C-145/09, Land Baden-Württemberg v Panagiotis Tsakouridis, Judg-
ment of the Court (Grand Chamber) of 23 November 23 2010 and Case C-348/09, 
P.I. v Oberbürgermeisterin der Stadt Remscheid, Judgment of the Court (Grand 
Chamber) of 6 March 2012. 
6. See Case C-135/08, Janko Rottmann v Freistaat Bayern, Judgment of the Court 
(Grand Chamber) of 2nd March 2010; and Case C-34/09, Gerardo Ruiz Zambrano v 




7. To what extent do national courts and tribunals tend to reject arguments 
based on EU citizenship rights on the grounds that the dispute involves a 
‘purely internal situation’? To what extent has the Court of Justice’s case 
law grounded directly on the TFEU’s citizenship provisions (e.g. Chen,7 
Ruiz Zambrano, and subsequent decisions) been effectively implemented 
and applied at the national level? Does national case law distinguish clear-
ly between rights acquired under Directive 2004/38 and under Articles 20 
and/or 21 TFEU when EU citizens are seeking family reunification rights 
from their home Member States?8 Have legislative or specific administra-
tive changes been put in place? How are these matters being dealt with by 
the national courts?  
8. In the context of the judgment in Rottmann, to what extent do rules on the 
acquisition and/or loss of national citizenship reflect the implications of 
the particular requirements of EU citizenship? Please consider the EUDO 
Citizenship Observatory data on acquisition and loss of citizenship in an-
swering this question. 
C. Questions 9-12: Political Rights of EU Citizens 
Notwithstanding the emphasis in the Lisbon Treaty on the participatory and 
representative nature of democracy in the Union legal order, the Member 
States continue to lag behind the vision spelled out in the EU Treaties and by 
the EU legislature with respect to the realisation of appropriate electoral 
rights for Union citizens. This set of questions examines: (1) the implementa-
tion of Directive 93/109/EC9 on European Parliament elections; (2) the im-
plementation of Directive 94/80/EC10 on local elections; (3) the extent to 
which EU citizens residing in the country are granted electoral rights for re-
                                                        
7. Case C-200/02, Zhu and Chen v Secretary of State for the Home Department, Judg-
ment of the Court (Full Court) of 19 October 2004. 
8. See Case C-434/09 McCarthy v Secretary of State for the Home Department, Judg-
ment of the Court (Third Chamber) of 5 May 2011; Case C-256/11 Dereci and others 
v Bundesministerium für Inneres, Judgment of the Court (Grand Chamber) of 15 No-
vember 2011. 
9. Directive 93/109/EC, laying down detailed arrangements for the exercise of the right 
to vote and stand as a candidate in elections to the European Parliament for citizens of 
the Union residing in a Member State of which they are not nationals, [1993] OJ L 
329/34. 
10. Directive 94/80/EC, laying down detailed arrangements for the exercise of the right to 
vote and to stand as a candidate in municipal elections by citizens of the Union resid-
ing in a Member State of which they are not nationals, [1994] OJ L 368/38. 
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gional and other elections under national law i.e. above and beyond the 
threshold requirements set out in the EU Treaties; and (4) national restrictions 
imposed on access to the electoral rights applied to Union citizens, including 
those imposed on their own citizens which may be affected by EU law. 
9. Since when has Directive 93/109/EC on European Parliament elections 
been fully implemented? Have there been any derogations? Are there 
any additional conditions imposed on EU citizens compared to national 
citizens (special registration or residence requirements)? Has there been 
relevant case law in domestic courts? What additional changes will be 
required by the December 2012 amendments to Directive 93/109/EC.11 
10. Since when has Directive 94/80/EC on local elections been fully imple-
mented? Have there been any derogations? Are there any additional con-
ditions imposed on EU citizens compared to national citizens (special 
registration or residence requirements)? Has there been relevant case law 
in domestic courts? 
11. Briefly report on regional and other elections in which EU citizens resid-
ing in the country are granted electoral rights under national law. Is there 
a franchise for EU citizens that goes beyond the local and EP electoral 
rights required under EU law? What have been the reasons for extending 
such rights specifically to EU citizens? 
12. Are there any specific areas where tensions exist between EU law and 
national provisions limiting the scope of the franchise (e.g. in relation to 
the voting rights of persons convicted of criminal offences or persons 
with mental impairments)? In answering this question, rapporteurs may 
be interested to know about an emerging line of case law in the UK on 
the application of EU law, specifically Article 39 CFR, to restrictions on 
prisoners’ voting, which will reach the UK Supreme Court in June 
2013.12 
                                                        
11. An amending directive was adopted on 20 December 2012 by the Council of Minis-
ters, but has yet to be published in the OJ (Council Document 17198/12, 19 Decem-
ber 2012). 
12. The Scottish case of McGeoch v Lord President of the Council [2011] CSIH 67 and 
the English case of Chester v Secretary of State for Justice [2010] EWCA Civ 1439 
have been conjoined and will be heard together in the Supreme Court in June 2013. In 
both cases, the applicants will argue that the total ban on prisoners’ voting rights in 




Please consider the EUDO Citizenship Observatory (FRACIT) data, especial-
ly the relevant national reports, in answering these questions. 
D. Questions 13-15: Culture(s) of Citizenship 
We intend to chart the emerging cultures of (Union) citizenship in three key 
respects: (1) the status of Union citizenship is constructed around the para-
digm of individual rights; but immigration law more generally is traditionally 
grounded in an ethos of permission – do national actors (administrative, legis-
lative; and judicial) tend to apply that distinction appropriately in their appli-
cation and interpretation of Union citizenship? (2) To what extent has the cul-
ture of rights been strengthened by the changed legal status of the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights? Are rights-based arguments intensifying, in other 
words, since the Lisbon Treaty came into effect in 2009? (3) What is the gen-
eral tone of the national debate, in the media and civil society more broadly, 
on the status of and the rights attached to Union citizenship? 
13. On the basis of your findings from the above questions, do you consider 
that the implementation of EU citizenship in your Member State is un-
derstood at the national level as part of a rights-based EU ‘free move-
ment’ and ‘constitutional’ culture, or as an adjunct to national immigra-
tion systems based on ‘permissions’ to non-nationals to be present in the 
territory? 
14. Has the binding effect of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the Euro-
pean Union, following the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty in 2009, 
played any role in how the rights of EU citizens are being interpreted by 
the national courts and/or tribunals? 
15. Please describe the extent to which issues connected to EU citizenship 
have been a salient issue in the national media and how this issue has 
been dealt with in the national media. Are there any particularly domi-
nant themes within media reporting (e.g. expulsion; access to state bene-
fits; derived rights for third country nationals)? How accurate is national 
reporting of EU citizenship issues? Can you detect evidence of the influ-
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Questionnaire in French 
Introduction générale  
La citoyenneté de l'Union se trouve à l'intersection entre l'intégration et le 
constitutionnalisme, et elle reflète les principales tendances à la croisée entre 
les Etats membres et l'Union européenne. Le but de ce questionnaire est d'en-
courager l'élaboration de rapports nationaux qui nous permettent de mieux 
comprendre, en tant qu’objectif prioritaire, comment les droits liés à la ci-
toyenneté européenne se développent et sont appliqués dans les différents 
ordres juridiques des Etats membres. Pour réaliser cet objectif, nous nous in-
téressons d'abord aux exemples qui montrent comment les législations, les 
administrations et les autorités judiciaires nationales ont interprété et appliqué 
les aspects de la citoyenneté européenne qui exigent une transposition au ni-
veau national ; en outre, nous cherchons à recueillir des preuves sur la ma-
nière dont ces acteurs apportent une réponse à la jurisprudence de la Cour de 
Justice relative aux droits des citoyens qui ne sont pas couverts par les para-
mètres de transposition directe au niveau national.  
 L'analyse de ces données empiriques nombreuses nous permettra égale-
ment de présenter une perspective comparative sur le développement des 
droits de la citoyenneté européenne. La plupart des situations qui impliquent 
une application des droits de l’UE sont examinées au niveau national, sans 
jamais atteindre les institutions européennes. L'observatoire EUDO de la ci-
toyenneté et ses ensembles de données sur l'acquisition et la perte de la ci-
                                                        
1. Université d'Edinburgh. Les trois questionnaires ont été initialement rédigés en an-
glais, puis ils ont été traduits en français et en allemand. En cas de divergence, veuil-




toyenneté, et plus récemment sur les droits électoraux2 ont commencé à com-
bler le manque significatif d'informations dans ce domaine ; mais un recou-
pement de ces données avec les rapports nationaux élaborés par le Congrès de 
la FIDE pourrait enrichir considérablement les informations déjà disponibles 
et nous permettre ainsi de bien mieux cerner la réalité de la citoyenneté de 
l'Union.  
 Notre deuxième objectif est de mieux percevoir la manière dont la ci-
toyenneté de l'Union se développe et/ou influe sur la culture de la citoyenneté 
nationale. Par exemple, de quelle manière les droits de la citoyenneté euro-
péenne sont-ils décrits dans les médias nationaux, dans les débats publics et 
les discours de la société civile ? Les acteurs du monde des médias ont une 
extraordinaire plate-forme pour modeler le ton du débat public ; en ont-ils usé 
de manière responsable (notamment en fournissant des informations précises 
sur les droits en vigueur) sur le thème de la citoyenneté de l'Union ? Quel est 
le discours de la société civile (tel qu'il apparaît dans les blogs et les sites 
web, par exemple) en réponse à cette sollicitation ? De manière plus générale, 
comment la législation européenne en matière de libre circulation, et les 
droits du citoyen qui y sont associés, côtoient la législation nationale sur 
l'immigration ? Nous chercherons en outre à distinguer, dans l'interface entre 
la citoyenneté nationale et la citoyenneté européenne, quels sont les droits 
que les citoyens européens statiques possèdent, ou ne possèdent pas, et dans 
quelle mesure cela peut-il influer sur la perception de la citoyenneté euro-
péenne, et la perception de ceux qui exercent leur doit de libre circulation. 
 L'étendue de la citoyenneté de l'Union et des droits qui lui sont associés 
couvrant un champ de possibilités énorme, nous avons décidé de nous recen-
trer sur quatre thèmes principaux spécifiques au citoyen dans ce question-
naire. Nous essayons de comprendre comment des acteurs nationaux interprè-
tent et appliquent les droits à valeur ajoutée que sont les droits de la citoyen-
neté de l'Union, dans la mesure où ils s'ajoutent à ceux qui sont liés aux caté-
gories de libre circulation mieux établies comme celle des travailleurs. Les 
quatre thèmes sélectionnés sont les suivants : 
A. La citoyenneté dans le cadre la directive 2004/38/CE3 
B. La citoyenneté au-delà des dispositions de la directive 2004/38/CE 
                                                        
2. Consulter le site http://eudo-citizenship.eu/databases.  
3. La directive 2004/38/CE relative au droit des citoyens de l'Union et des membres de 
leurs familles de circuler et de séjourner librement sur le territoire des Etats membres, 
[2004] JO L158/77. 
QUESTIONNAIRE IN FRENCH 
 47
C. Les droits politiques des citoyens européens 
D. L'émergence d'une ou plusieurs cultures de la citoyenneté 
En mettant l'accent sur ces éléments distincts mais interdépendants du déve-
loppement et de l'influence de la citoyenneté de l'Union, nous souhaitons of-
frir un éventail représentatif des perceptions sur la manière dont la citoyenne-
té européenne a (ou n'a pas) trouvé d'ancrage dans les cultures constitution-
nelles, légales et politiques au niveau national. Nous avons également l'inten-
tion d'identifier les principaux défis qui pèsent sur la prise de conscience de la 
citoyenneté de l'Union dans les Etats membres.  
Lignes directrices pour répondre aux questions 
Pour répondre au mieux aux questions, nous vous invitons à suivre les lignes 
directrices suivantes :  
– Fournir des informations de manière à ce qu'elles puissent être accessibles 
à un large éventail de publics nationaux (notamment en expliquant les 
problèmes nationaux dans leur contexte), et de manière à ce qu'elles soient 
comparables avec celles d'autres Etats membres. 
– Les réponses doivent reposer sur des éléments concrets et objectifs : nous 
souhaitons obtenir des exemples plutôt qu'un compte-rendu exhaustif des 
problèmes juridiques nationaux (qui dépassent le propos d'un simple rap-
port), et des exemples exposés objectivement offrent bien plus de données 
comparatives importantes que l'opinion personnelle d'un commentateur. 
Néanmoins, bien sûr, il pourra s'avérer nécessaire de porter un jugement 
sur la transposition effective ou non du droit européen au niveau national, 
et de l'inclure dans ce questionnaire. 
Nous demandons en outre aux rapporteurs de bien vouloir inclure, chaque 
fois que cela s'avère opportun, des informations dans leur rapport sur la posi-
tion prise sur les différentes questions juridiques par : 
– les cours et tribunaux dans leur jurisprudence, pour la juridiction concer-
née 
– l'exécutif et le parlement dans l'Etat membre décrit 
– la doctrine de l'Etat membre en question 
– les médias dans l'Etat membre en question 
FIDE 2014 
 48
Thèmes et questions 
A. Questions 1 à 6 : La citoyenneté dans le cadre de la directive 
2004/38/CE – La stabilité de résidence des citoyens de l'Union et des 
membres de leurs familles 
L'adoption de la directive 2004/38/CE a été une étape importante dans la ré-
glementation de la citoyenneté de l'Union. Il était notamment prévu que l'ap-
plication des droits de citoyenneté européens par les administrations, les légi-
slations et les autorités judiciaires serait nettement facilitée par l'existence de 
cette directive-cadre détaillée. Mais cela s'est-il réellement produit ? Dans 
cette partie du questionnaire, nous avons élaboré une série de questions con-
cernant les éléments spécifiques à la citoyenneté dans la directive, en rapport 
avec une approche thématique : la stabilité de résidence pour les citoyens eu-
ropéens et les membres de leur famille. Les questions abordent : (1) l'évolu-
tion de la notion de membres de la famille et de la notion de relations de dé-
pendance ; (2) le problème que risque de poser la notion de stabilité de rési-
dence, suscité par les conditions d'autosuffisance économique stipulées dans 
la directive ; (3) la création sans précédent de droits juridiques européens di-
rects pour les membres de la famille des citoyens de l'Union, dont les 
membres de la famille ressortissants de pays tiers ; (4) de même, le concept et 
statut révolutionnaire de la notion ‘droit de séjour permanent’; (5) les limita-
tions temporelles explicites pour accéder à certaines prestations de sécurité 
sociale ; et (6) compte tenu des orientations récentes et étonnamment tièdes 
de la Cour de Justice, et de la manière dont les autorités des Etats membres 
considèrent et appliquent les conditions d'assouplissement de la directive 
lorsqu'elles prennent des décisions d'expulsion envers les citoyens de l'Union 
ou les membres de leur famille, les distinctions prévues par la législation 
entre les différents groupes de citoyens de l'Union dans le cadre des expul-
sions. 
1. En ce qui concerne les membres de la famille d'un citoyen de l'Union, 
comment les articles 2, 3 et 5 de la directive ont-ils été transposés en droit 
national ? Comment les cours et/ou les tribunaux nationaux ont-ils abordé 
les différents types de relations familiales décrites dans les articles 2 et 3 ? 
Les garanties procédurales décrites à l'article 5 fournissent-elles une pro-
tection efficace ? 
2. Existe-t-il des éléments de preuve de l'expulsion de citoyens européens 
(et/ou des membres de leur famille) pour des motifs purement écono-
miques (c'est-à-dire en raison de la non-satisfaction des conditions fixées à 
QUESTIONNAIRE IN FRENCH 
 49
l'article 7 de la directive), suite notamment à des décisions des cours et/ou 
des tribunaux nationaux ? 
3. Comment les articles 12 à 15 de la directive ont-ils été transposés en droit 
national ? Des différends sur l'interprétation ou l'application de ces dispo-
sitions ont-ils été portés devant les cours ou tribunaux nationaux ? 
4. Comment les articles 16 à 21 de la directive ont-ils été transposés en droit 
national ? Des données sur le volume des demandes concernant le statut 
de résident permanent ont-elles été publiées à ce jour dans votre Etat 
membre ? Des différends sur l'interprétation ou l'application de ces dispo-
sitions ont-ils été portés devant les cours ou tribunaux nationaux ? 
5. Comment l'article 24(2) de la directive a-t-il été transposé en droit national 
? Le droit national fait-il une distinction entre les catégories décrites à l'ar-
ticle 24(2) et les demandeurs d'emploi en ce qui concerne le droit aux 
prestations sociales ? L'article 24(2) a-t-il remplacé la jurisprudence rela-
tive au 'lien réel' de la Cour de Justice devant les cours et tribunaux natio-
naux ?4 
6. Veuillez décrire comment les cours et tribunaux nationaux ont compris, 
appliqué et établi une distinction entre les notions « d'ordre public, de sé-
curité publique ou de santé publique » (article 27), « des motifs graves 
d'ordre public ou de sécurité publique » et « des raisons impérieuses de sé-
curité publique » (article 28).5 Comment le principe de proportionnalité a-
t-il été compris et appliqué dans ces différents cas ? De quelle manière les 
cours et tribunaux nationaux ont-ils tenu compte des considérations liées à 
la durée de séjour de la personne concernée sur son territoire, de son âge, 
son état de santé, sa famille et sa situation économique, son intégration so-
ciale et culturelle dans l'Etat membre d'accueil, et l'étendue de ses liens 
avec le pays d'origine ? 
                                                        
4. Comparer notamment l'approche du ‘lien réel’ utilisée dans l'affaire C-209/03, Bidar 
contre London Borough of Ealing et Secretary of State for Education and Skills, 
Arrêt de la Cour (grande chambre) du 15 mars 2005, avec la décision ultérieure dans 
l'affaire C-158/07, Förster v IB-Groep, Arrêt de la Cour (grande chambre) du 18 no-
vembre 2008 ; et, dans le domaine des demandeurs d'emploi, l'affaire C-138/02, Col-
lins contre Secretary of State for Work and Pensions, Arrêt de la Cour (assemblée 
plénière) du 23 mars 2004 pour les affaires jointes C-22/08 et C-23/08, Vatsouras et 
Koupatantze contre Arbeitsgemeinschaft (ARGE) Nürnberg 900, Arrêt de la Cour 
(troisième chambre) du 4 juin 2009. 
5. Se reporter notamment à l'affaire C-145/09, Land Baden-Württemberg contre 
Panagiotis Tsakouridis, Arrêt de la Cour (grande chambre) du 23 novembre 2010 et 
à l'affaire C-348/09, P.I. contre Oberbürgermeisterin der Stadt Remscheid, Arrêt de 
la Cour (grande chambre) du 6 mars 2012. 
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B. Questions 7 à 8 : La citoyenneté européenne au-delà des dispositions de 
la directive 2004/38/CE – Etudier l'application, au niveau national, du 
droit primaire européen 
Nous rappelant tout particulièrement les décisions des affaires récentes 
comme Rottmann et Ruiz Zambrano,6 il est clair que l'adoption de la directive 
2004/38 n'a pas entièrement tronqué la compétence d'interprétation de la 
Cour de Justice relative aux droits de citoyenneté primaires conférés directe-
ment par les traités. Dans cette partie du questionnaire, nos questions sont 
formulées de manière à obtenir des informations permettant de déterminer à 
quel point les autorités nationales tiennent compte de cette jurisprudence et 
sont prêtes à aller au-delà des limites de la directive. Nous mettons l'accent 
sur deux domaines principaux : (1) les situations purement internes et la ques-
tion de la discrimination à rebours, en particulier dans les affaires relatives 
aux droits des membres de la famille ; et (2) dans quelle mesure les règles na-
tionales sur l'acquisition et la perte de la citoyenneté s'adaptent, ou bien 
quelles sont les conséquences spécifiques de ces règles sur l'acquisition et/ou 
la perte du statut de citoyen de l'Union. 
7. En quelle mesure les cours et tribunaux nationaux tendent-ils à rejeter les 
arguments basés sur les droits de la citoyenneté européenne parce que le 
différend met en cause une ‘situation purement interne’ ? En quelle me-
sure la jurisprudence de la Cour de Justice fondée directement sur les dis-
positions relatives à la citoyenneté du TFUE (notamment Chen,7 Ruiz 
Zambrano et les décisions ultérieures) a été réellement mise en œuvre et 
appliquée au niveau national ? La jurisprudence nationale fait-elle une 
claire distinction entre les droits acquis en vertu de la directive 2004/38 et 
ceux des articles 20 et/ou 21 du TFUE lorsque des citoyens européens 
demandent le regroupement familial dans leur Etat membre d'origine ?8 
Des changements législatifs ou administratifs particuliers ont-ils été mis 
                                                        
6. Se reporter à l'affaire C-135/08, Janko Rottmann contre Freistaat Bayern, Arrêt de 
la Cour (grande chambre) du 2 mars 2010 ; et l'affaire C-34/09, Gerardo Ruiz Zam-
brano contre Office national de l’emploi (ONEm), Arrêt de la Cour (grande 
chambre) du 8 mars 2011. 
7. L'affaire C-200/02, Zhu et Chen contre Secretary of State for the Home De-
partment, Arrêt de la Cour (assemblée plénière) du 19 octobre 2004. 
8. Se reporter à l'affaire C-434/09 McCarthy contre Secretary of State for the Home 
Department, Arrêt de la Cour (troisième chambre) du 5 mai 2011 ; et l'affaire C-
256/11 Dereci et autres contre Bundesministerium für Inneres, Arrêt de la Cour 
(grande chambre) du 15 novembre 2011. 
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en place ? Comment ces questions sont-elles réglées par les cours et tribu-
naux nationaux ?  
8. Dans le cadre de l'arrêt de Rottmann, en quelle mesure les règles d'acquisi-
tion et/ou de perte de la citoyenneté nationale tiennent-elles compte des 
implications liées aux exigences particulières de la citoyenneté européenne 
? Veuillez prendre en considération les données de l'observatoire EUDO 
de la citoyenneté relatives à l'acquisition et à la perte de citoyenneté en ré-
pondant à cette question. 
C. Questions 9 à 12 : Les droits politiques des citoyens européens 
En dépit de l'accent mis, dans le traité de Lisbonne, sur le caractère participa-
tif et représentatif de la démocratie dans l'ordre juridique de l'Union, les Etats 
membres continuent à accuser un certain retard face à la vision définie par les 
traités européens et par la législation européenne sur la mise en place de 
droits électoraux adéquats pour les citoyens de l'Union. Cette série de ques-
tions se penche sur : (1) La mise en œuvre de la directive 93/109/CE9 sur les 
élections au Parlement européen ; (2) la mise en œuvre de la directive 
94/80/CE10 sur les élections locales ; (3) dans quelle mesure les citoyens eu-
ropéens qui résident dans le pays se voient accorder des droits électoraux 
pour les élections, notamment les élections régionales, dans le cadre du droit 
national, c'est-à-dire en sus des critères minimum fixés par les traités euro-
péens ; et (4) les restrictions nationales concernant l’accès aux droits électo-
raux qui s'appliquent aux citoyens de l'Union, notamment celles que les Etats 
membres imposent à leurs propres citoyens, qui peuvent être affectées par le 
droit communautaire. 
9. Depuis quand la directive 93/109/CE sur les élections au Parlement eu-
ropéen est-elle entièrement mise en œuvre ? Y a-t-il eu des dérogations ? 
Existe-t-il des conditions supplémentaires imposées aux citoyens euro-
péens par rapport aux citoyens nationaux (procédure d'enregistrement 
spéciale ou exigences de résidence) ? Y a-t-il eu de la jurisprudence sur 
ce point dans les cours et tribunaux nationaux ? Quels changements sup-
                                                        
9. Directive 93/109/CE, fixant les modalités de l'exercice du droit de vote et d'éligibilité 
aux élections au Parlement européen pour les citoyens de l'Union résidant dans un 
Etat membre dont ils ne sont pas ressortissants, [1993] JO L 329/34. 
10. Directive 94/80/CE, fixant les modalités de l'exercice du droit de vote et d'éligibilité 
aux élections municipales pour les citoyens de l'Union résidant dans un Etat membre 
dont ils n'ont pas la nationalité, [1994] JO L 368/38. 
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plémentaires seront nécessaires suite aux modifications apportées par la 
directive 93/109/CE en décembre 2012.11 
10. Depuis quand la directive 94/80/CE sur les élections locales est-elle en-
tièrement mise en œuvre ? Y a-t-il eu des dérogations ? Existe-t-il des 
conditions supplémentaires imposées aux citoyens européens par rapport 
aux citoyens nationaux (procédure d'enregistrement spéciale ou exi-
gences de résidence) ? Y a-t-il eu de la jurisprudence sur ce point dans 
les cours et tribunaux nationaux ? 
11. Veuillez évoquer brièvement les élections, notamment les élections ré-
gionales, pour lesquelles les citoyens européens qui résident dans le pays 
se voient accorder des droits électoraux dans le cadre du droit national. 
Existe-t-il un droit de vote pour les citoyens européens qui va au-delà des 
droits électoraux aux élections locales et à celles du Parlement européen 
tels que prescrits dans le droit européen ? Pour quelles raisons ces droits 
ont-ils été étendus spécifiquement aux citoyens européens ? 
12. Y a-t-il des domaines spécifiques dans lesquels il existe des tensions 
entre le droit européen et les dispositions nationales qui limitent l'étendue 
du droit de vote (notamment le droit de vote des personnes condamnées 
au pénal ou des personnes ayant un handicap mental) ? En répondant à 
cette question, les rapporteurs pourraient être intéressés de savoir qu'un 
nouveau courant jurisprudentiel est en train d'émerger au Royaume-Uni 
suite à l'application du droit européen, et plus particulièrement de l'article 
39 de la Charte des droits fondamentaux, concernant des restrictions au 
droit de vote des prisonniers, qui sera soumis à la Cour suprême du 
Royaume-Uni en juin 2013.12 
Veuillez prendre en considération les données de l'observatoire EUDO de la 
citoyenneté (FRACIT), notamment les rapports nationaux dans ce domaine, 
en répondant à ces questions.  
                                                        
11. Une directive modificatrice a été adoptée le 20 décembre 2012 par le Conseil des mi-
nistres, mais elle n'est pas encore publiée au JO (Document du Conseil 17198/12, 19 
décembre 2012). 
12. L'affaire écossaise de McGeoch contre Lord President of the Council [2011] CSIH 
67 et l'affaire anglaise de Chester contre Secretary of State for Justice [2010] 
EWCA Civ 1439 ont été jointes et seront entendues devant la Cour suprême en juin 
2013. Dans les deux affaires, les requérants invoquent qu'une suppression totale du 
droit de vote des prisonniers au Royaume-Uni pour les prochaines élections du Par-
lement européen en juin 2014 est disproportionnée. 
QUESTIONNAIRE IN FRENCH 
 53
D. Questions 13 à 15 : Culture(s) de la citoyenneté 
Nous avons l'intention de définir l'émergence des cultures de la citoyenneté 
(européenne) dans trois domaines essentiels : (1) le statut de la citoyenneté de 
l'Union se construit autour du paradigme des droits individuels ; mais les lois 
sur l'immigration sont traditionnellement fondées sur le principe de l'autori-
sation – les acteurs nationaux (administratifs, législatifs et judiciaires) cher-
chent-ils à appliquer cette distinction de manière appropriée dans leur appli-
cation et leur interprétation de la citoyenneté de l'Union ? (2) En quelle me-
sure la culture des droits a-t-elle été renforcée par le changement de statut ju-
ridique de la Charte des droits fondamentaux ? En d'autres termes, assiste-t-
on à une intensification des arguments fondés sur la protection des droits in-
dividuels droit depuis l'entrée en vigueur du traité de Lisbonne en 2009 ? (3) 
Quel est le ton général du débat public, dans les médias et la société civile au 
sens large, sur le statut et les droits liés à la citoyenneté de l'Union ? 
13. Sur la base des réponses aux questions ci-dessus, considérez-vous que la 
mise en œuvre des normes en matière de citoyenneté européenne dans 
votre Etat membre est comprise au niveau national comme faisant partie 
d'une culture européenne basée sur les droits de la « libre circulation » et 
des droits « constitutionnels », ou comme un ajout aux systèmes d'immi-
gration national basé sur le principe de ‘l'autorisation’ aux non-résidents 
d'être présents sur le territoire national ?  
14. L'effet contraignant de la Charte des droits fondamentaux de l'Union eu-
ropéenne, suite à l'entrée en vigueur du traité de Lisbonne en 2009, a-t-il 
joué un rôle dans la manière dont les droits des citoyens européens sont 
interprétés par les cours et/ou les tribunaux nationaux ? 
15. Veuillez décrire dans quelle mesure les questions liées à la citoyenneté 
européenne se sont imposées dans les médias nationaux, et la manière 
dont ces questions ont été reprises dans les médias nationaux. Certains 
thèmes ont-ils dominé dans les informations données par les médias (no-
tamment l'expulsion, l'obtention de prestations sociales, les droits dérivés 
pour les résidents de pays tiers) ? Quelle est l'exactitude de l'information 
rapportée au niveau national sur les questions relatives à la citoyenneté 
européenne ? Pouvez-vous percevoir l'influence des médias dans le dis-
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Questionnaire in German 
Einführung  
Die Unionsbürgerschaft befindet sich an der Grenzfläche von Integration und 
Konstitutionalismus und ist somit ein Barometer für wichtige Trends und 
Einflüsse an den Schnittpunkten von Mitgliedstaaten und der Europäischen 
Union. Mit diesem Fragebogen soll die Ausarbeitung nationaler Berichte an-
geregt werden, die uns in erster Linie dabei helfen werden, ein besseres Ver-
ständnis für die Entwicklung der mit der Unionsbürgerschaft verknüpften 
Rechte und deren Anwendung in den Rechtsordnungen der Mitgliedstaaten 
zu entwickeln. Um dieses Ziel zu erreichen, sind wir zunächst an Beispielen 
dafür interessiert, wie nationale Legislativen, Exekutiven und Judikativen die 
Aspekte der Unionsbürgerschaft auslegen und anwenden, die eine Umset-
zung auf nationaler Ebene verlangen. Wir möchten aber auch Hinweise da-
rauf zusammentragen, wie diese Akteure auf die Rechtsprechung des Europä-
ischen Gerichtshofs zu Bürgerrechten reagieren, die außerhalb der Parameter 
einer direkten nationalen Umsetzung liegen.  
 Eine Analyse dieser vielfältigen empirischen Daten ermöglicht auch die 
Darstellung der mit einer Unionsbürgerschaft verbundenen Rechte in einer 
vergleichenden Perspektive. Die Anwendung von EU-Recht erfolgt in den 
meisten Fällen auf nationaler Ebene, erreicht also nicht die EU-Institutionen 
selbst. Das EUDO Citizenship Observatory und dessen Datensätze über den 
Erwerb und Verlust von Staatsbürgerschaft und, jüngeren Datums, über das 
                                                        
1. Universität Edinburgh. Alle drei Fragebögen wurden ursprünglich auf English aus-
gearbeitet und anschließend ins Französische und Deutsche übersetzt. Sollte es 
Abweichungen geben, sind es die englischen Versionen, die am besten das Denken 
der Berichterstatter repräsentieren. 
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Wahlrecht,2 beginnen, eine entscheidende Informationslücke in diesem Zu-
sammenhang zu schließen. Mit der Kreuztabellierung dieser Daten und den 
für den FIDE Kongress vorbereiteten nationalen Berichten wird das verfüg-
bare Material weiter deutlich verbessert und damit auch unser Verständnis für 
die Realität der Unionsbürgerschaft vertieft.  
 Wir möchten aber auch, als zweites Ziel, ein besseres Verständnis dafür 
entwickeln, wie sich die Unionsbürgerschaft im Rahmen der Kultur nationa-
ler Staatsbürgerschaften entwickelt bzw. sich auf diese auswirkt. Wie werden 
beispielsweise die mit der Unionsbürgerschaft verknüpften Rechte in nationa-
len Medien und im öffentlichen oder zivilgesellschaftlichen Diskurs darge-
stellt? Medienakteure können aufgrund ihrer Position den Ton der nationalen 
Debatte besonders leicht prägen. Haben die Medien, was die Unionsbürger-
schaft betrifft, Verantwortungsbewusstsein gezeigt, beispielsweise durch die 
Weitergabe korrekter Informationen über geltende Rechte? Und wie hat der 
zivilgesellschaftliche Diskurs, z. B. über Blogs und Websites, auf diese Len-
kung reagiert? Allgemeiner gefragt, wie ist das Verhältnis des EU-Rechts der 
Freizügigkeit und der damit verbundenen Bürgerrechte zu nationalem Ein-
wanderungsrecht? Außerdem können im Überschneidungsgebiet von natio-
naler Staatsbürgerschaft und Unionsbürgerschaft Fragen über die existieren-
den und nicht existierenden Rechte von nicht von ihrem Recht auf Freizügig-
keit Gebrauch machenden Unionsbürgern auftreten und wie diese die Wahr-
nehmung der Unionsbürgerschaft und von Personen, die die Rechte mobiler 
Bürger in Anspruch nehmen, beeinflussen. 
 Die Fragen zur Unionsbürgerschaft und der damit verbundenen Rechte 
decken ein potenziell riesiges Gebiet ab. Wir haben uns deswegen entschlos-
sen, den Schwerpunkt in diesem Fragebogen auf vier vorrangige bürger-
spezifische Themenbereiche zu legen. Dabei versuchen wir zu verstehen, wie 
nationale Akteure die einen Mehrwert bietenden Rechte der Unionsbürger-
schaft auslegen und anwenden, d. h. solche Rechte, die über die Rechte hin-
ausgehen, die an bekanntere Kategorien der Freizügigkeit geknüpft sind, wie 
z. B. bei Arbeitnehmern. Unsere vier Schwerpunktthemen sind: 
A. Unionsbürgerschaft im Rahmen der Richtlinie 2004/38/EG3 
B. Unionsbürgerschaft außerhalb der Richtlinie 2004/38/EG 
C. Politische Rechte von Unionsbürgern 
                                                        
2. Siehe http://eudo-citizenship.eu/databases.  
3. Richtlinie 2004/38/EG über das Recht der Unionsbürger und ihrer Familienangehöri-
gen, sich im Hoheitsgebiet der Mitgliedstaaten frei zu bewegen und aufzuhalten, ABl. 
L158/77 2004. 
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D. Neu entstehende Kultur(en) der Staatsbürgerschaft 
Mit diesen unterschiedlichen, allerdings zusammenhängenden Elementen der 
Entwicklung und Auswirkungen einer Unionsbürgerschaft präsentieren wir in 
unserem gemeinsamen Bericht einen Querschnitt an Erkenntnissen darüber, 
wie die Unionsbürgerschaft in die nationalen konstitutionellen, rechtlichen 
und politischen Kulturen eingebettet ist (oder auch nicht). Außerdem ist es 
unser Ziel, wichtige Herausforderungen aufzuzeigen, die die Umsetzung der 
Unionsbürgerschaft in den Mitgliedstaaten beeinflussen.  
Leitlinien zur Beantwortung der Fragen 
Bitte beachten Sie bei der Beantwortung der Fragen Folgendes: 
– Informationen sollten so dargestellt werden, dass sie Zuhörern aus den 
verschiedensten Ländern zugänglich sind, d. h., nationale Fragen sollen in 
einem verständlichen Zusammenhang erklärt werden und über alle Mit-
gliedstaaten hinweg vergleichbar sein. 
– Antworten sind evidenzbasiert und objektiv darzulegen: Wir sind mehr an 
Beispielen interessiert als an einem vollständigen Bericht zu nationalen 
Rechtsproblemen (was die Möglichkeiten des Berichts eines Einzelnen 
überschreitet). Objektiv dargelegte Beispiele bieten deutlich bessere Ver-
gleichsdaten als die Ansichten eines bestimmten Berichterstatters. Nichts-
destotrotz sollte die Beurteilung, ob EU-Recht wirksam auf nationaler 
Ebene umgesetzt ist, falls erforderlich, aufgenommen werden. 
Berichterstatter werden außerdem gebeten, soweit angemessen, Angaben 
über die Stellungnahmen der folgenden Institutionen/Körperschaften zu ein-
schlägigen Rechtsfragen in ihren Bericht aufzunehmen: 
– Rechtsprechung von Gerichten und Rechtsinstanzen im jeweiligen Zu-
ständigkeitsbereich 
– Exekutive und Legislative in den beschriebenen Mitgliedstaaten 
– Akademische Artikel und Fachartikel aus dem jeweiligen Mitgliedstaat 
– Medien aus dem jeweiligen Mitgliedstaat 
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Themen und Fragen 
A. 1.-6. Frage: Unionsbürgerschaft im Rahmen der Richtlinie 2004/38/EG 
– Beständigkeit des Aufenthalts von Unionsbürgern und ihren Familien-
angehörigen 
Die Annahme der Richtlinie 2004/38/EG war ein wichtiger Meilenstein für 
die Regelung der Unionsbürgerschaft. Insbesondere ging man davon aus, 
dass die Anwendung der mit der Unionsbürgerschaft verknüpften Rechte 
durch nationale Exekutiven, Legislativen und Judikativen aufgrund der Exis-
tenz dieses ausführlichen Rahmentextes deutlich verbessert würde. Aber ist 
dem tatsächlich so? Die für diesen Abschnitt des Fragebogens ausgearbeite-
ten Fragen beschäftigen sich mit für die Unionsbürgerschaft spezifischen 
Elementen der Richtlinie vor dem Hintergrund einer thematischen Fragestel-
lung zur Beständigkeit des Aufenthalts von Unionsbürgern und ihren Fami-
lienangehörigen. Angesprochen wird Folgendes: (1) die sich herausbildende 
Definition von Familienangehörigen und Abhängigkeitsverhältnissen; (2) die 
potenziellen Probleme der Aufenthaltsbeständigkeit aufgrund der Forderung 
der Richtlinie nach finanzieller Unabhängigkeit; (3) die wegweisende Schaf-
fung von direkten EU-Rechten für Familienangehörige von Unionsbürgern, 
einschließlich Angehöriger, die nicht die Staatsangehörigkeit eines Mitglied-
staats besitzen; (4) das ähnlich revolutionäre Konzept und der Status eines 
»Daueraufenthalts«; (5) die ausdrückliche zeitliche Begrenzung des An-
spruchs auf bestimmte Sozialhilfeleistungen; und (6) die rechtlichen Unter-
schiede zwischen verschiedenen Gruppen von Unionsbürgern in Verbindung 
mit der Ausweisung, insbesondere vor dem Hintergrund der überraschend 
moderaten jüngsten Urteile des Europäischen Gerichtshofs und in Anbetracht 
des Ausmaßes, in dem Behörden der Mitgliedstaaten die »Aufweichungskri-
terien« bei Entscheidungen über die Ausweisung von Unionsbürgern und ih-
ren Familienangehörigen in Erwägung ziehen und anwenden. 
1. Wie wurden Artikel 2, 3 und 5 der Richtlinie in Bezug auf Familienange-
hörige von Unionsbürgern in nationales Recht umgesetzt? Wie gehen na-
tionale Gerichte und Rechtsinstanzen mit den verschiedenen in Artikel 2 
und 3 genannten Verwandtschaftsgraden um? Bieten die Verfahrensvor-
schriften in Artikel 5 einen wirksamen Schutz? 
2. Gibt es Beweise für die Ausweisung von Unionsbürgern (und/oder ihren 
Familienangehörigen) aus rein finanziellen Gründen (d. h. Nichterfüllung 
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der Auflagen in Artikel 7 der Richtlinie), beispielsweise in Urteilen natio-
naler Gerichte und Rechtsinstanzen? 
3. Wie wurden Artikel 12 bis 15 der Richtlinie in nationales Recht umge-
setzt? Wurden Streitigkeiten in Bezug auf die Auslegung oder Anwen-
dung dieser Rechtsvorschriften vor ein nationales Gericht oder eine natio-
nale Rechtsinstanz gebracht? 
4. Wie wurden Artikel 16 bis 21 der Richtlinie in nationales Recht umge-
setzt? Wurden in Ihrem Mitgliedstaat Daten über die bisherige Anzahl An-
träge für den Status Daueraufenthalt veröffentlicht? Wurden Streitigkeiten 
in Bezug auf die Auslegung oder Anwendung dieser Rechtsvorschriften 
vor ein nationales Gericht oder eine nationale Rechtsinstanz gebracht? 
5. Wie wurde Artikel 24 Absatz 2 der Richtlinie in nationales Recht umge-
setzt? Unterscheidet nationales Recht ebenfalls zwischen den in Artikel 24 
Absatz 2 genannten Kategorien und Arbeitssuchenden, was Anspruch auf 
Sozialhilfe betrifft? Hat Artikel 24 Absatz 2 die Rechtsprechung zur »tat-
sächlichen Verbindung« des Europäischen Gerichtshofs an nationalen Ge-
richten oder Rechtsinstanzen ersetzt?4 
6. Bitte beschreiben Sie, wie nationale Gerichte und Rechtsinstanzen die 
Konzepte »öffentliche Ordnung, Sicherheit oder Gesundheit« (Artikel 27), 
»schwerwiegende Gründe der öffentlichen Ordnung oder Sicherheit« und 
»zwingende Gründe der öffentlichen Sicherheit« verstehen, anwenden und 
unterscheiden.5 Wie wird der Grundsatz der Verhältnismäßigkeit in die-
sem Zusammenhang verstanden und angewendet? Wie wurden von natio-
nalen Gerichten und Rechtsinstanzen Gründe wie die Dauer des Aufent-
halts des Betroffenen im Hoheitsgebiet, sein Alter, sein Gesundheitszu-
                                                        
4. Vergleiche z. B. den Ansatz der »tatsächlichen Verbindung« in der Rechtssache C-
209/03, The Queen, auf Antrag von Dany Bidar gegen London Borough of Ealing 
und Secretary of State for Education and Skills, Urteil des Gerichtshofes (Große 
Kammer) vom 15. März 2005, und das anschließende Urteil in der Rechtssache C-
158/07, Jacqueline Förster gegen Hoofddirectie van de Informatie Beheer Groep, 
Urteil des Gerichtshofes (Große Kammer) vom 18. November 2008; und in 
Verbindung mit Arbeitssuchenden die Rechtssache C-138/02, Brian Francis Collins 
gegen Secretary of State for Work and Pensions, Urteil des Gerichtshofes (Plenum) 
vom 23. März 2004 in Verbindung mit den Rechtssachen C-22/08 und C-23/08, Ath-
anasios Vatsouras und Josif Koupatantze gegen Arbeitsgemeinschaft (ARGE) Nürn-
berg 900, Urteil des Gerichtshofes (Dritte Kammer) vom 4. Juni 2009. 
5. Siehe z. B. Rechtssache C-145/09, Land Baden-Württemberg gegen Panagiotis Tsa-
kouridis, Urteil des Gerichtshofes (Große Kammer) vom 23. November 2010, und 
Rechtssache C-348/09, P.I. gegen Oberbürgermeisterin der Stadt Remscheid, Urteil 
des Gerichtshofes (Große Kammer) vom 22. Mai 2012. 
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stand, seine familiäre und wirtschaftliche Lage, seine soziale und kulturel-
le Integration im Aufnahmemitgliedstaat und das Ausmaß seiner Bindun-
gen zum Herkunftsstaat berücksichtigt? 
B. 7. -8. Frage: Unionsbürgerschaft außerhalb der Richtlinie 2004/38/EG 
– Untersuchung der nationalen Anwendung von primärem EU-Recht 
Angesichts insbesondere der jüngsten Urteile wie in den Fällen Rottmann und 
Ruiz Zambrano6 steht fest, dass die Annahme der Richtlinie 2004/38/EG die 
Auslegungsbefugnis des Europäischen Gerichtshofs in Bezug auf die direkt 
über Verträge verliehenen primären Bürgerrechte nicht vollständig einge-
schränkt hat. Die für diesen Abschnitt des Fragebogens ausgearbeiteten Fra-
gen sollen Informationen über das Ausmaß bereitstellen, in dem nationale 
Behörden auf diese Rechtsprechung reagieren und bereit sind, die durch die 
Richtlinie gegebenen Grenzen zu überschreiten. In diesem Zusammenhang 
konzentrieren wir uns auf zwei Hauptbereiche: (1) »rein interne Situationen« 
und die Frage einer umgekehrten Diskriminierung, insbesondere in Fällen, 
bei denen es um die Rechte von Familienangehörigen geht; und (2) das Aus-
maß, in dem nationale Vorschriften über den Erwerb und den Verlust der 
Staatsbürgerschaft die spezifischen Auswirkungen der Vorschriften für den 
Erwerb und/oder den Verlust des Status der Unionsbürgerschaft berücksich-
tigen oder nicht. 
7. In welchem Ausmaß neigen nationale Gerichte und Rechtsinstanzen dazu, 
Argumente auf der Grundlage von mit der Unionsbürgerschaft verknüpf-
ten Rechten mit der Begründung zurückzuweisen, dass die Streitigkeit ei-
ne rein interne Situation darstellt? In welchem Ausmaß wurde die Recht-
sprechung des Europäischen Gerichtshofs, die direkt auf den Vorschriften 
des AEUV über die Unionsbürgerschaft beruht (z. B. Chen,7 Ruiz Zam-
brano und Folgeurteile), wirksam auf nationaler Ebene umgesetzt und an-
gewendet? Unterscheidet die nationale Rechtsprechung eindeutig zwi-
schen Rechten gemäß der Richtlinie 2004/38/EG und denen gemäß Arti-
                                                        
6. Siehe Rechtssache C-135/08, Janko Rottmann gegen Freistaat Bayern, Urteil des 
Gerichtshofes (Große Kammer) vom 2. März 2010; und Rechtssache C-34/09, 
Gerardo Ruiz Zambrano gegen Office national de l’emploi (ONEm), Urteil des 
Gerichtshofes (Große Kammer) vom 8. März 2011. 
7. Rechtssache C-200/02, Kunqian Catherine Zhu und Man Lavette Chen gegen Secre-
tary of State for the Home Department, Urteil des Gerichtshofes (Plenum) vom 19. 
Oktober 2004. 
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kel 20 und/oder 21 AEUV, wenn Unionsbürger ihr Recht auf Familienzu-
sammenführung aus ihren Herkunftsmitgliedstaaten geltend machen?8 
Wurden rechtliche oder spezifische verwaltungsrechtliche Veränderungen 
eingeführt? Wie gehen nationale Gerichte mit diesen Fragen um?  
8. In welchem Ausmaß reflektieren die Vorschriften über den Erwerb 
und/oder den Verlust einer nationalen Staatsbürgerschaft angesichts des 
Urteils in der Rechtssache Rottmann die Auswirkungen der fraglichen An-
forderungen für die Unionsbürgerschaft? Bei der Beantwortung dieser 
Frage sollten die Daten über Erwerb und Verlust der Staatsbürgerschaft 
des EUDO Citizenship Observatory berücksichtigt werden. 
C. 9.-12. Frage: Politische Rechte von Unionsbürgern 
Ungeachtet der Bedeutung der partizipatorischen und repräsentativen Aus-
übung von Demokratie in der EU-Rechtsordnung, wie dies im Vertrag von 
Lissabon eindeutig festgelegt ist, ist es den Mitgliedstaaten immer noch nicht 
gelungen, die in den EU-Verträgen und durch die EU-Rechtsprechung ge-
schaffene Vorstellung eines angemessenen Wahlrechts für Unionsbürger um-
zusetzen. In diesen Fragenblock untersuchen wir: (1) die Umsetzung der 
Richtlinie 93/109/EG9 über Wahlen zum Europäischen Parlament; (2) die 
Umsetzung der Richtlinie 94/80/EG10 über Kommunalwahlen; (3) das Aus-
maß, in dem Unionsbürger mit Wohnsitz in einem anderen Mitgliedstaat nach 
nationalem Recht, d. h. über die durch die EU-Verträge gesetzten Grenzen 
hinaus, Anspruch auf Ausübung des Wahlrechts bei regionalen und anderen 
Wahlen haben; und (4) nationale Beschränkungen der Ausübung des Wahl-
rechts von Unionsbürgern, einschließlich solcher, die auch für die eigenen 
Bürger gelten, wodurch EU-Recht betroffen sein kann. 
                                                        
8. Siehe Rechtssache C-434/09 Shirley McCarthy gegen Secretary of State for the 
Home Department, Urteil des Gerichtshofes (Dritte Kammer) vom 5. Mai 2011; 
Case C-256/11 Murat Dereci und andere gegen Bundesministerium für Inneres, 
Urteil des Gerichtshofes (Große Kammer) vom 15. November 2011. 
9. Richtlinie 93/109/EG über die Einzelheiten der Ausübung des aktiven und passiven 
Wahlrechts bei den Wahlen zum Europäischen Parlament für Unionsbürger mit 
Wohnsitz in einem Mitgliedstaat, dessen Staatsangehörigkeit sie nicht besitzen, ABl. 
L 329/34 1993. 
10. Richtlinie 94/80/EG über die Einzelheiten der Ausübung des aktiven und passiven 
Wahlrechts bei den Kommunalwahlen für Unionsbürger mit Wohnsitz in einem 
Mitgliedstaat, dessen Staatsangehörigkeit sie nicht besitzen, ABl. L 368/38 1994. 
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9. Seit wann ist die Richtlinie 93/109/EG über Wahlen zum Europäischen 
Parlament vollständig umgesetzt? Gibt es Ausnahmeregelungen? Gibt es 
zusätzliche Auflagen für Unionsbürger im Vergleich zu den Bürgern des 
fraglichen Landes (besondere Registrierung oder Wohnsitzvorschriften)? 
Liegen einschlägige Urteile der nationalen Gerichte vor? Welche zusätz-
lichen Änderungen ergeben sich aus den Änderungen zur Richtlinie 
93/109/EWG vom Dezember 2012?11 
10. Seit wann ist die Richtlinie 94/80/EG über Kommunalwahlen vollständig 
umgesetzt? Gibt es Ausnahmeregelungen? Gibt es zusätzliche Auflagen 
für Unionsbürger im Vergleich zu den Bürgern des fraglichen Landes 
(besondere Registrierung oder Wohnsitzvorschriften)? Liegen einschlä-
gige Urteile der nationalen Gerichte vor? 
11. Nennen Sie kurz regionale und andere Wahlen, bei denen Unionsbürger 
mit Wohnsitz in Ihrem Land nach nationalem Recht das Wahlrecht ausü-
ben können. Haben Unionsbürger Rechte, die über das ihnen nach EU-
Recht zustehende Recht zur Teilnahme an Kommunalwahlen und Wah-
len zum Europäischen Parlament hinausgehen? Wie wurde die Auswei-
tung derartiger Rechte auf gerade Unionsbürger begründet? 
12. Gibt es in bestimmten Bereichen Konflikten zwischen EU-Recht und na-
tionalen Vorschriften, wodurch der Anwendungsbereich des Rechts be-
grenzt wird (z. B. in Bezug auf das Wahlrecht von verurteilten Straftä-
tern oder Personen mit geistigen Behinderungen)? Bei der Beantwortung 
dieser Frage ist es für Berichterstatter vielleicht von Interesse, dass sich 
in dem Vereinigten Königreich eine Rechtsprechung in Bezug auf die 
Anwendung von EU-Recht, insbesondere Artikel 39 der EU-Charta der 
Grundrechte, herausbildet, mit der das Wahlrecht von Häftlingen einge-
schränkt wird. Eine Entscheidung des Obersten Gerichtshofs des Verei-
nigten Königreichs wird für Juni 2013 erwartet.12 
                                                        
11. Eine geänderte Richtlinie wurde am 20. Dezember 2012 vom Ministerrat verabschie-
det, ist jedoch noch nicht im Amtsblatt veröffentlicht (Ratsdokument 17198/12, 
19. Dezember 2012). 
12. Die schottische Rechtssache McGeoch gegen Lord President of the Council, [2011] 
CSIH 67, und die englische Rechtssache Chester gegen Secretary of State for Justice, 
[2010] EWCA Civ 1439, werden gemeinsam im Juni 2013 vor dem Obersten 
Gerichtshof verhandelt. In beiden Fällen werden die Kläger vorbringen, dass die to-
tale Verweigerung des Wahlrechts für Häftlinge im Vereinigten Königreich in Bezug 
auf die kommende Wahl zum Europäischen Parlament im Juni 2014 unverhält-
nismäßig ist. 
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Bei der Beantwortung der Fragen sollten auch die Daten des EUDO Citi-
zenship Observatory (FRACIT) berücksichtigt werden, insbesondere der ein-
schlägigen nationalen Berichte. 
D. 13.-15. Frage: Kultur(en) der Staatsbürgerschaft 
Die neu entstehenden Kulturen der Unionsbürgerschaft sollen in drei wesent-
lichen Bereichen beleuchtet werden: (1) Der Status der Unionsbürgerschaft 
beruht auf dem Paradigma individueller Rechte; die Grundlage des Einwan-
derungsrechts ist traditionell mehr in einer Grundhaltung der Erlaubnis zu 
suchen. Wird diese Unterscheidung von nationalen Akteuren (Exekutive, Le-
gislative und Judikative) bei der Anwendung und Auslegung der Unionsbür-
gerschaft angemessen beachtet? (2) In welchem Ausmaß wurde die Kultur 
der Rechte durch den geänderten Rechtsstatus der EU-Charta für Grundrechte 
gestärkt? Anders ausgedrückt: Nehmen die auf Rechten basierenden Argu-
mente seit des Inkrafttretens des Vertrags von Lissabon im Jahr 2009 zu? (3) 
Wie ist der allgemeine Ton der nationalen Debatte in den Medien und allge-
meiner in der Zivilgesellschaft über den Status der Unionsbürgerschaft und 
der damit verbundenen Rechte? 
13. Sind Sie angesichts der Antworten auf die vorigen Fragen der Auffas-
sung, dass die Umsetzung der Unionsbürgerschaft in Ihrem Mitgliedstaat 
auf nationaler Ebene als Teil der auf Rechten basierenden Freizügigkeit 
und konstitutionellen Kultur innerhalb der EU verstanden wird oder als 
ein Zusatz für das nationale Einwanderungssystem, das Menschen aus 
anderen Staaten die Erlaubnis für den Aufenthalt im Hoheitsgebiet er-
teilt? 
14. Hat die bindende Wirkung der EU-Charta der Grundrechte nach dem In-
krafttreten des Vertrags von Lissabon im Jahr 2009 eine Rolle dabei ge-
spielt, wie die Rechte von Unionsbürgern von nationalen Gerichten und 
Rechtsinstanzen ausgelegt werden? 
15. Beschreiben Sie das Ausmaß, in dem Fragen zur Unionsbürgerschaft zu 
wichtigen Fragen in nationalen Medien wurden und wie nationale Medi-
en mit diesen Fragen umgegangen sind. Wird die Berichterstattung der 
Medien von speziellen Themen beherrscht (z. B. Ausweisung, Sozialhil-
feleistungen; abgeleitete Rechte von Bürgern aus Drittländern)? Wie 
korrekt ist die nationale Berichterstattung über Fragen zur Unionsbürger-
schaft? Können Sie Hinweise auf den Einfluss der Medien auf die natio-
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General Report  
Introduction 
Let us pause for a moment to consider the scale of the issue. In 2013, the 
population of the European Union stood at an estimated 507m person,2 of 
whom around 20m are not citizens of an EU Member State. That leaves near-
ly 490m EU citizens resident within the EU and doubtless quite a number 
who are resident in third countries. Some 13m persons are resident in a 
Member State other than the State(s) of which they have citizenship, or, if 
they have the citizenship of the host State, are resident as migrant EU citi-
zens.3 This is the primary group of persons benefitting from the free move-
ment rights associated with Union citizenship on a longer term basis, al-
though there are, of course, many millions more who exercise these freedoms 
and rely upon their equal treatment rights on a daily or almost daily basis – as 
tourists and travellers, as frontier workers, as persons providing or receiving 
services on a cross-border basis, as consumers of products originating in an-
other Member State. Union citizens who reside in another Member State still 
remain a small proportion of EU citizens overall, but they now constitute a 
sizeable group – equivalent to the population of a smallish Member State. 
 Union citizenship is a legal status established by the EU Treaties, which is 
additional to national citizenship (and dependent upon it). According to the 
Court of Justice, it is a status that is ‘destined to be the fundamental status of 
nationals of the Member States’.4 In this Report, by reference to data generat-
ed by national reports and supported by the insights of the Institutional Re-
port, we attempt to uncover a little more about what it actually means, and 
                                                        
1. Niamh Nic Shuibhne, Professor of European Union Law, University of Edinburgh; 
Jo Shaw, Salvesen Chair of European Institutions and Director of the Institute for 
Advanced Studies in the Humanities, University of Edinburgh. The report was fi-
nalised on the 12th of March 2014. 
2. See the data at http://europa.eu/about-eu/facts-figures/living/index_en.htm.  
3. See the data at http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/statisticsexplained/ index.php/Migra 
tion_and_migrant_population_statistics.  
4. Case C-184/99 Grzelczyk [2001] ECR I-6193, para. 31. 
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how it is experienced as a legal status by those who rely upon the rights asso-
ciated with it. 
 Moreover, as both a status and an ideal, Union citizenship stands at the in-
terface of integration and constitutionalism, and is a barometer for key trends 
and influences at the current crossroads between the Member States and the 
European Union. It is also a status that is shared between and shaped by both 
levels of governance. What are the consequences and implications of that dy-
namic in reality? 
 The primary purpose of the questionnaire developed for this topic was to 
stimulate national reports that enable us to understand better how the rights 
attached to Union citizenship are developing and being applied within the le-
gal orders of the Member States. To achieve that objective, we were interest-
ed, in the first instance, in examples that demonstrate how legislatures, ad-
ministrations, and judiciaries are interpreting and applying the elements of 
EU citizenship that require implementation at national level. Fundamentally, 
are EU citizenship claims treated differently from or as a subsumed part of 
national immigration law?  
 We were also keen to gather evidence on how national actors are respond-
ing to case law of the Court of Justice relating to citizenship rights that sit 
outside the parameters of direct national implementation. For example, think-
ing about the boundary between national citizenship and EU citizenship, 
questions were asked about the rights that static EU citizens have, or do not 
have, and about how recent developments in this area have affected percep-
tions of EU citizenship within the Member States.  
 Analysis of this rich empirical data has enabled us to present a compara-
tive perspective on the development of EU citizenship rights. Most situations 
involving the application of EU legal rights happen at national level, and nev-
er reach the EU institutions at all. The EUDO Citizenship Observatory and its 
existing datasets on the acquisition and loss of citizenship, and more recently 
on electoral rights, have started to fill a crucial information gap in this context 
(http://eudo-citizenship.eu/databases); but cross-tabulation of that data with 
the national reports prepared for the FIDE Congress enhances the available 
material on these questions, extends the dataset into several other dimensions 
of Union citizenship, and thus informs and deepens our understanding of the 
reality of Union citizenship very significantly.  
 As a secondary objective, we were also keen to get a greater sense of how 
Union citizenship is developing within and/or impacting upon culture(s) of 
citizenship. For example, how are EU citizenship rights being portrayed by 
the national media and in popular or civil society discourse? Media actors 
have an extraordinary platform from which to shape the tone of national de-
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bate; have they acted responsibly (e.g. by providing accurate information on 
the applicable rights) in the specific context of Union citizenship? How is 
civil society discourse (e.g. as emerging through blogs and websites) re-
sponding to that steer?  
 Turning to questions of methodology, the span of Union citizenship and 
associated rights covers a potentially enormous field5 and we decided, there-
fore, to focus on four key citizen-specific themes in the questionnaire. What 
we were seeking to understand is how national actors are interpreting and ap-
plying the added-value rights of Union citizenship i.e. rights beyond those at-
tached to more established free movement categories, such as workers. Our 
four selected themes are: 
A. Citizenship within Directive 2004/38; 
B. Citizenship beyond Directive 2004/38; 
C. The political rights of EU citizens; 
D. The emerging culture(s) of citizenship. 
By focusing on these distinct yet interrelated elements of the development 
and impact of Union citizenship, we seek to offer in our General Report a 
cross section of insights into how EU citizenship has (or has not) become 
embedded into national constitutional, legal, and political cultures. We also 
present reflections on the extent to which national law and practices influence 
EU law and practices, and vice versa. Finally, we try to identify key chal-
lenges affecting the realisation and enforcement of Union citizenship within 
the Member States, and to anticipate some emerging frontiers of citizenship’s 
continuing evolution. 
 Two final points should be noted with respect to our general approach. 
First, noting that the context of and history behind the development of current 
EU law is presented so comprehensively in the Institutional Report, we have 
not tried to replicate that dimension of the story of citizenship rights here. Ra-
ther, the two Reports can be taken as complementary from that perspective. 
Second, noting the different versions (and thus pagination) of national reports 
that we have worked with over the duration of preparing this Report, we do 
not use specific page references when national reports are cited or short quo-
tations are included in this Report. All references to national reports that fol-
                                                        
5. This is one reason among several why we were grateful to the FIDE 2014 organising 
committee for giving us the opportunity to work as co-Rapporteurs on this topic, thus 
bringing to the table our complementary areas of expertise in this vast field. 
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low can therefore be taken to relate to the specific question being discussed 
unless otherwise specified. 
 Finally, we wish to thank Katarína Macdonald Tömölová for her invalua-
ble research assistance on this project, supported by the School of Law at the 
University of Edinburgh; Kat led on the drafting for Question 15. 
Citizenship within Directive 2004/38 – Stability of residence for 
Union citizens and their family members 
The adoption of Directive 2004/38/EC6 was a significant milestone in the 
regulation of Union citizenship. Its preamble articulates a dual ambition: to 
simplify and strengthen the right of free movement and residence of all Union 
citizens. In particular, it was anticipated that the application of EU rights by 
national legislatures, administrations, and judiciaries would be considerably 
improved by the existence of this detailed framework text. To explore the ex-
tent to which this has materialised in reality – and, in particular, to build on 
the Commission’s disquieting 2008 report on the application of the Directive7 
– the questions discussed in this part of the Report engage with citizenship-
specific elements of the Directive against a thematic concern about stability 
of residence for EU citizens and their family members when they move to 
and reside in host Member States. The questions address:  
(1) Evolving definitions of family members and relationships of depend-
ency;  
(2) Potential challenges to residence stability generated by the Directive’s 
self-sufficiency conditions;  
(3) Ground-breaking direct EU rights for family members of Union citi-
zens, including third country national family members;  
(4) The revolutionary concept and rights of permanent residence; 
(5) Express temporal limitations placed on access to certain social security 
benefits; and  
(6) Intended distinctions between different groups of Union citizens in the 
context of expulsion. 
                                                        
6. Directive 2004/38/EC on the right of citizens of the Union and their family members 
to move and reside freely within the territory of the Member States, [2004] OJ 
L158/77. 




With respect to a Union citizen’s family members, how have Articles 2, 3 
and 5 of the Directive been transposed into national law? How have na-
tional courts dealt with the different types of family relationships outlined 
in Articles 2 and 3? Are the procedural safeguards contained in Article 5 
providing effective protection? 
Article 2: Definitions 
For the purposes of this Directive:  
1) ‘Union citizen’ means any person having the nationality of a Member State; 
2) ‘Family member’ means: 
(a) the spouse; 
(b) the partner with whom the Union citizen has contracted a registered partnership, on 
the basis of the legislation of a Member State, if the legislation of the host Member 
State treats registered partnerships as equivalent to marriage and in accordance with 
the conditions laid down in the relevant legislation of the host Member State; 
(c) the direct descendants who are under the age of 21 or are dependants and those of 
the spouse or partner as defined in point (b); 
(d) the dependent direct relatives in the ascending line and those of the spouse or part-
ner as defined in point (b); 
3) ‘Host Member State’ means the Member State to which a Union citizen moves in order 
to exercise his/her right of free movement and residence. 
1.1. Article 2: Introduction 
Article 2(1) confirms the basic gateway condition to Union citizenship that is 
laid down in Article 20 TFEU: the holding of Member State nationality. Arti-
cle 2(2) then provides a definition of ‘family members’ of Union citizens – a 
definition that goes beyond previous legislation in certain respects. Building 
on the logic of the decision in Reed,8 for example, Article 2(2)(b) includes the 
registered partner of a Union citizen – but only if such partnerships have 
been, first, contracted ‘on the basis of the legislation of a Member State’ and, 
second, are treated as equivalent to marriage in the legislation of the host 
State (and in accordance with any conditions also laid down in that legisla-
tion). For direct descendants of Union citizens (or of their spouses or regis-
tered partners) who are over 21 – and also for direct relatives in the ascending 
                                                        
8. Case 59/85 Reed [1986] ECR 1283. 
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line of the citizen (or of his or her spouse, or his or her registered partner) – 
the criterion of ‘dependency’ must be met.  
 Article 2(3) reflects a critical point about the scope of Directive 2004/38 
generally: it applies only when a Union citizen has moved to another State. 
Conversely, the Directive was not intended to address situations that are pure-
ly internal to a Member State9 and it does not address – directly at least – sit-
uations in which a Union citizen returns to his or her home State after a peri-
od of residence in another Member State. Whether or not the conditions and 
limitations contained in the Directive apply indirectly in such situations is one 
of the issues addressed very recently by the Court of Justice.10 Interestingly, 
some States had already addressed the question. For example, the report for 
Finland mentions that the national rules implementing Directive 2004/38 ap-
ply to the family members of Finnish citizens ‘if the Finnish citizen has exer-
cised his or her right of free movement under the Directive by settling in an-
other Member State, and the family member accompanies him or her to Fin-
land or joins him or her later’. Questions about differential treatment of home 
State nationals in a ‘returning’ situation are also raised in the reports for Es-
tonia and Ireland. 
 Three general points on the scope of Article 2 can be noted here. First, the 
significance of qualifying as an Article 2(2) family member who accompa-
nies or joins a migrant Union citizen is seen in Article 3(1): simply put, the 
substantive provisions of the Directive – including the right to work in the 
host State – will apply.  
 Second, while the situation of registered partners is rendered host State 
conditional in Article 2(2)(b), the legal position of same sex spouses is not 
clear: do all spouses fall within Article 2(2)(a)? Such an interpretation could 
                                                        
9. Confirmed in e.g. Case C-434/09 McCarthy [2011] ECR I-3375, paras 39-41. 
10. Case C-456/12 O and Case C-457/12 S; both judgments were delivered on 12 March 
2014. On this point, the Court ruled: ‘[s]o far as concerns the conditions for granting, 
when a Union citizen returns to the Member State of which he is a national, a derived 
right of residence, based on Article 21(1) TFEU, to a third-country national who is a 
family member of that Union citizen with whom that citizen has resided, solely by vir-
tue of his being a Union citizen, in a host Member State, those conditions should not, in 
principle, be more strict than those provided for by Directive 20004/38 for the grant of 
such a right of residence ... in a case where that citizen has exercised his right of free-
dom of movement ... Even though Directive 2004/38 does not cover such a return, it 
should be applied by analogy to the conditions for the residence of a Union citizen in a 
Member State other than that of which he is a national, given that in both cases it is the 
Union citizen who is the sponsor for the grant of a derived right of residence to a third-
country national who is a member of his family’ ( O, para. 50; emphasis added).  
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be supported by recital 31 of the preamble, which confirms that the Directive 
‘respects the fundamental rights and freedoms and observes the principles 
recognised in particular by the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the Europe-
an Union. In accordance with the prohibition of discrimination contained in 
the Charter, Member States should implement this Directive without discrim-
ination between the beneficiaries of this Directive on grounds such as ... sex-
ual orientation’.  
 Third, the criterion of dependency is not (in contrast to Article 3(2), dis-
cussed in Section 1.3 below) elaborated, suggesting that it should be defined 
in accordance with EU rather than national law. In Iida, the Court stated that 
a status of dependency ‘is the result of a factual situation characterised by the 
fact that material support for the family member is provided by the holder of 
the right of residence’.11 In Reyes, it added that a descendant over 21 does not 
need ‘to establish that he has tried without success to find work or obtain sub-
sistence support from the authorities of his country of origin and/or otherwise 
tried to support himself’ and, moreover, ‘the fact that a relative – due to per-
sonal circumstances such as age, education and health – is deemed to be well 
placed to obtain employment and in addition intends to start work in the 
Member State does not affect the interpretation of the requirement in that 
provision that he be a ‘dependant’.’12  
 Importantly, however, the Court also confirmed in Reyes that a dependent 
family member who does subsequently engage in economic activity in the 
host State does not lose his or her right of residence there, since to conclude 
otherwise would ‘infringe Article 23 of [the Directive], which expressly au-
thorises such a descendant, if he has the right of residence, to take up em-
ployment or self-employment’.13 
1.2. Transposition, application, and interpretation of Article 2 
No widespread problems with the transposition of Article 2 into national law 
were raised in the national reports, with most noting that the provision has 
                                                        
11. Case C-40/11 Iida, judgment of 8 November 2012, para. 55 (emphasis added), af-
firming the pre-Directive position established in e.g. Case C-1/05 Jia [2007] ECR I-1, 
para. 35. For national case law examining the extent of material dependency in the 
context of Article 2(2), see the reports for Slovenia, and Spain (which also addresses 
dependency beyond economic need, on the premise of respect for family life). 
12. Case C-423/12 Reyes, judgment of 16 January 2014, paras 25 and 33. 
13. Reyes, paras 31-32. 
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been translated very directly or literally in the relevant national measures.14 In 
fact, it is clear that several States have chosen to provide for more extensive 
protection of family members than Directive 2004/38 actually requires. Nev-
ertheless, the definitions codified in the Directive raise critical questions 
about equal treatment for different kinds of families and relationships.  
1.2.1. Definition of family members 
Here, there is considerable variation with respect to the inclusion/exclusion of 
same sex partnerships in particular, with examples ranging from: recognition 
of same sex marriage on the same basis as heterosexual marriage (e.g. 
France, the Netherlands, Sweden); recognition of same sex registered part-
nerships as equivalent to marriage (e.g. Finland, Ireland); no recognition of 
same sex registered partnerships in law (e.g. Estonia, Italy, Malta);15 and ex-
press legal designation of marriage as being between a man and a woman on-
ly (e.g. Croatia, Poland).  
 It was noted in Section 1.1 that the position of same sex spouses under the 
Directive is not yet clear.16 What can be said, however, is that the rights ex-
tended to the same sex partners of Union citizens clearly varies across the 
Member States, having obvious implications for the exercise of free move-
ment and residence rights – something that is increasingly difficult to recon-
cile with a status of citizenship in a Union committed to the prohibition of 
discrimination on the grounds of sexual orientation. Article 2(2) also excludes 
partnerships contracted outwith the Union Member States. These limitations 
are amplified by the lesser legal protection extended to partners in a ‘durable 
relationship’ under Article 3(2)(b) of the Directive, discussed further in Sec-
tion 1.3 below. 
 On the application and interpretation of Article 2(2) – and providing a 
good example of national responsiveness to the dynamic nature of EU legal 
change through case law – several reports refer to the removal from national 
rules of conditions requiring prior lawful residence in the EU for third coun-
                                                        
14. Cf. the report for Spain, where the annulment of several provisions of the national 
implementing measure by the Supreme Court is discussed in detail (e.g. to address the 
exclusion of separated spouses); and the report for Switzerland. 
15. Additionally, in some States, there is further potential for confusion where registered 
partnerships for same sex couples are not recognised in national law and specific 
conditions exist for recognition of other forms of partnership (see e.g. the discussion 
on ‘common law marriage’ in the report for Croatia). 
16. This issue has arisen for consideration by national courts in Italy. 
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try national family members, following the Court’s ruling in the Metock 
case.17 Another theme that emerges in this context is a concern to ensure that 
family relationships – and marriages in particular – are genuine in connection 
with the interpretation and application of Article 2(2).18 This issue was also 
raised in responses to questions about expulsion, and is discussed further in 
Section 6.2.5 below.  
 Finally, national courts have also has been engaged in the interpretation of 
some of the ambiguities of the Directive. The reports for Austria and Croatia 
note, for example, that the reference to ‘direct descendants’ in Article 2(2)(c) 
has interpreted as including grandchildren. In some States, national courts 
had made relatively generous assumptions that were later circumscribed by 
Court of Justice case law.19 
1.2.2. More extensive national protection 
There are several examples of States extending more protection than the Di-
rective requires with respect to defining family members. Some reports provide 
specific examples;20 but two thematic trends can be discerned more generally.  
 First, several States extend the scope of the Directive to the family members 
(irrespective of nationality) of their own static nationals, as illustrated below:21 
                                                        
17. Case C-127/08 Metock and others [2008] ECR I-6241; see e.g. the reports for Den-
mark, Finland, Ireland, and the UK (however, that report also points to judicial criti-
cism levelled at the UK Government for the slowness of its response). 
18. See e.g. the reports for the Czech Republic, Cyprus, Denmark, and the UK. In line 
with the recognition of cohabiting partners as family members (see below), the report 
for Sweden outlines related national case law on the definition of ‘cohabitant’. Other 
reports raise the distinction between civil and religious marriage (e.g. the report for 
France). 
19. E.g. in the UK, the Court of Appeal held that dependency could, in its view, arise in 
the host State i.e. a situation of dependency need not be pre-existing in the country 
from which a Union citizen’s family member has come (Pedro v Secretary of State for 
Work and Pensions [2009] EWCA Civ 1358); but cf. Reyes, para. 30. Another exam-
ple of national/EU judicial divergence can be seen with respect to Article 3(2) of the 
Directive (e.g. cf. Aladeselu v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2013] 
EWCA Civ 144 and Case C-83/11 Rahman, judgment of 5 September 2012, para. 33). 
20. E.g. in the report for Bulgaria, it was reported that the legislation transposing Article 
2 refers generally to dependent ‘descendants’ and ‘relatives in the ascending order’, 
without the direct proviso contained in Article 2(2). 
21. The majority of States achieve this through expanding the personal scope of the Di-
rective’s implementing measures; but the issues can also emerge through national 
case law (see e.g. the reports for Cyprus, Poland, and Spain). 
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STATES THAT DO/DO NOT EXTEND  






















YES CROATIA NO AUSTRIA 
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* This map serves for reference and illustrative purposes only and does not reflect accu-
rate geographic scale. It has been produced under the free Creative Commons At-
tribution-NoDerivs 3.0 Unported License (see http://ppt-toolkit.com). 
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Noting the endurance of the debate on whether reverse discrimination can 
and/or should be addressed at EU level, a debate that has only intensified fol-
lowing the ruling in Ruiz Zambrano,22 it is important to remember that 
through the application of national legal requirements on equal treatment, 
several States strive to ensure that situations of reverse discrimination will not 
actually occur in the first place in connection with, primarily, family reunifi-
cation rights.23 
 Second, several States extend the scope of the Directive to family mem-
bers other than those specified in Article 2(2) – in essence, collapsing togeth-
er the different types of families and relationships that are distinguished by 
Articles 2 and 3 of the Directive in a way that clearly benefits Union citizens. 
This issue is picked up again in Section 1.4 below but, for example, it was re-
ported that the definition of ‘family members’ for the purpose of the status 
and rights conferred by Article 2(2) also includes: 
Bulgaria:  ‘persons in factual cohabitation with a Union citizen’ 
Denmark:  ‘a durable relationship under the same roof’ 
Estonia:  ‘people who, in the country from which they arrive, are ... 
members of the household of the Union citizen’ 
Finland: ‘persons living continuously in a marriage-like relationship in 
the same household regardless of their sex ... if they have 
lived in the same household for at least two years’, with the
latter condition not applying ‘if the persons living in the same 
household have a child in their joint custody or if there are
other weighty reasons for it’ 
Hungary:  ‘the person having parental custody over a minor child who is
a Hungarian national’ 
Slovenia:  ‘a partner with whom the EU citizen resides in a long-term 
partnership’ 
Sweden: ‘cohabiting partners’ 
                                                        
22. Case C-34/09 Ruiz Zambrano [2011] ECR I-1177; see e.g. K Hailbronner and D 
Thym, ‘Comment on Case C-34/09 Ruiz Zambrano’ (2011) 48 CMLRev 1253; H van 
Eijken and SA de Vries, ‘A new route into the Promised Land? Being a European cit-
izen after Ruiz Zambrano’ (2011) 36 ELRev 704; and F Wollenschläger, ‘A new fun-
damental freedom beyond market integration: Union citizenship and its dynamics for 
shifting the economic paradigm of European integration’ (2011) 17 ELJ 34. 
23. See e.g. the case law on this point discussed in the reports for Cyprus, and Spain. 
NIAMH NIC SHUIBHNE & JO SHAW 
 76
However, looking across the responses to the questionnaire as a whole, it will 
become more apparent that when States depart from a literal transposition of 
the Directive’s provisions, they tend on balance to add more restrictive than 
rights-enhancing additional national conditions.  
Article 3: Beneficiaries 
1. This Directive shall apply to all Union citizens who move to or reside in a Member State 
other than that of which they are a national, and to their family members as defined in 
point 2 of Article 2 who accompany or join them. 
2. Without prejudice to any right to free movement and residence the persons concerned 
may have in their own right, the host Member State shall, in accordance with its na-
tional legislation, facilitate entry and residence for the following persons: 
(a) any other family members, irrespective of their nationality, not falling under the defini-
tion in point 2 of Article 2 who, in the country from which they have come, are de-
pendants or members of the household of the Union citizen having the primary right of 
residence, or where serious health grounds strictly require the personal care of the fami-
ly member by the Union citizen; 
(b) the partner with whom the Union citizen has a durable relationship, duly attested. 
The host Member State shall undertake an extensive examination of the personal circum-
stances and shall justify any denial of entry or residence to these people. 
1.3. Article 3: Introduction 
Article 3(1) of the Directive confirms an essential point already mentioned in 
Section 1.2: that the measure ‘shall apply’ to Union citizens who move to or 
reside in a Member State other than that of which they are a national, and to 
their family members per Article 2(2) who accompany or join them. 
 Article 3(2) has a wider personal scope than Article 2; but the rights con-
ferred by its material scope are significantly different. First, on personal 
scope, the provision applies to ‘other family members’ who meet specified 
conditions as well as to the partner (with no reference to gender) with whom 
a Union citizen has a ‘durable relationship’. In Article 3(2)(a), we see a wider 
understanding of dependency beyond material support, noting the inclusion 
of ‘serious health grounds’. There is also a more general reference to ‘mem-
bers of the household’ of a Union citizen who are not subject to any condi-
tions of dependency, the only requirements appearing to be that the connec-
tion to the Union citizen was established ‘in the country from which [the 
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members of the household] have come’ and that the person is a ‘family mem-
ber’ – the precise meaning of which (e.g. objective blood relationship on-
ly?24) is not specified in the Directive. 
 Second, as regards material scope, the Directive per se does not apply to 
persons who meet the personal scope criteria of Article 3(2). Rather, the host 
Member State is required to ‘facilitate’ their entry and residence, undertake 
an ‘extensive examination’ of their personal circumstances, and justify any 
denial of entry or residence decisions. 
 The Court of Justice discussed the scope of Article 3(2) in Rahman. There, 
Article 3(2) was considered to ‘impose an obligation on the Member States to 
confer a certain advantage, compared with applications for entry and resi-
dence of other nationals of third States, on applications submitted by persons 
who have a relationship of particular dependence with a Union citizen’.25 The 
purpose of the provision was linked to recital 6 of the Directive’s preamble 
i.e. ‘to ‘maintain the unity of the family in a broader sense’ by facilitating en-
try and residence for persons who are not included in the definition of family 
member of a Union citizen contained in Article 2(2) ... but who nevertheless 
maintain close and stable family ties with a Union citizen on account of spe-
cific factual circumstances’.26  
 The Court then articulated the limits of Article 3(2) and the parameters of 
related State discretion in more detail. When examining the personal circum-
stances of an applicant, States should ‘take account of the various factors that 
may be relevant in the particular case, such as the extent of economic or 
physical dependence and the degree of relationship between the family mem-
ber and the Union citizen whom he wishes to accompany or join’.27 But the 
Court acknowledged – noting the reference to ‘national legislation’ in Article 
3(2) – that ‘each Member State has a wide discretion as regards the selection 
of the factors to be taken into account’.28 In that context, a State may include 
in its legislation ‘particular requirements as to the nature and duration of de-
pendence, in order in particular to satisfy themselves that the situation of de-
                                                        
24. Cf. the reference in the report for Ireland to a case in which the High Court sug-
gested that ‘household’ might cover ‘an elderly housekeeper now retired who had 
lived with and been supported by the family over many years and thus was part of 
the household’ ( Wang v MJLR [2012] IEHC 311, para. 21). 
25. Case C-83/11 Rahman, judgment of 5 September 2012, para. 22; in para. 25, the 
Court also confirmed such an applicant’s entitlement to judicial review of a refusal 
decision. 
26. Rahman, para. 32. 
27. Rahman, para. 23.  
28. Rahman, para. 24. 
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pendence is genuine and stable and has not been brought about with the sole 
objective of obtaining entry into and residence in the host Member State’.29 
The Court also confirmed that ‘the situation of dependence must exist in the 
country from which the family member concerned comes, at the very least at 
the time when he applies to join the Union citizen on whom he is depend-
ent’.30 
1.4. Transposition, application, and interpretation of Article 3 
Picking up on the point made in Section 1.2 on the collapsing together of Ar-
ticles 2 and 3 of the Directive, it is remarkable to note that several States ex-
tend a derived right to enter and reside within their territory to persons that 
fall under the personal scope of Article 3(2)31 – resulting in considerably 
stronger legal protection for a much wider range of family members than EU 
law actually requires. More generally, two key issues emerged: questions 
connected to the transposition of Article 3(2); and questions that arise be-
cause of the discretion inherent in its application. 
1.4.1. Transposition 
While, once again, no recurring problems with the transposition or applica-
tion of Article 3 became apparent, specific exclusions from national imple-
menting measures were reported. At the time of reporting, Article 3(2) had 
not been directly transposed into German or Polish law (but an amendment of 
the relevant legislation was proceeding through the Polish parliament). In the 
report for Spain, it was noted that Article 3(2)(a) had not been transposed; 
and in Estonia and Malta, the reference to partners in a durable relationship in 
Article 3(2)(b) was excluded.32  
 We also found evidence of additional conditions that appear to go beyond 
the level of discretion permitted by the Directive (discussed separately below 
in Section 1.4.2). In the report for Estonia, for example, it is suggested that 
national law would seem to require ‘that a dependent person must already 
have resided together with the Union citizen prior to arriving in Estonia’ – a 
                                                        
29. Rahman, para. 38. 
30. Rahman, para. 35. 
31. See e.g. the reports for Bulgaria, Denmark, and Estonia. 
32. For discussion of a case before the Constitutional Court that similarly ignored the po-
tential implications of Article 3(2)(b) for unmarried partners, see the report for Malta. 
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requirement that may, it is pointed out, ‘prove to be problematic’ in light of 
the Court’s decision in Rahman.33 This example reflects the fact that the cri-
teria in Article 3(2) are sequential rather than cumulative – dependent or 
member of household or serious health grounds – but that they are not neces-
sarily applied in that way in national law.  
 Similar examples of additional conditionality can be seen in the reports for 
Hungary, where it is noted that the national implementing legislation speci-
fies a period of ‘at least one year’ with respect to dependency or being a 
household member ‘in the country from which they are arriving’; and the 
UK, where a prior EEA residence requirement had been imposed before the 
ruling in Metock.34 
1.4.2. The impact of national discretion in practice 
Article 3(2) expressly requires that the obligation to facilitate entry and resi-
dence rights should be discharged by a State ‘in accordance with its legisla-
tion’. That requirement – the implementation of which is taken seriously by 
the Commission35 – ensures that Union citizens are informed about the pro-
cedures that will be applied if they seek such rights in a host State for family 
members that come within the personal scope of the provision. However, the 
discretion conferred on the Member States – acknowledged by the Court in 
Rahman – clearly has an impact on the development of citizenship practice in 
reality.  
                                                        
33. See the report for Estonia, referring to paras 27-35 of the decision in Rahman; see es-
pecially, para. 31 (‘there is nothing to indicate that the term ‘country from which they 
have come’ or ‘country from which they are arriving’ [‘pays de provenance’] used in 
those provisions must be understood as referring to the country in which the Union 
citizen resided before settling in the host Member State. On the contrary, it is clear, 
on reading those provisions together, that the country referred to is, in the case of a 
national of a third State who declares that he is a ‘dependant’ of a Union citizen, the 
State in which he was resident on the date when he applied to accompany or join the 
Union citizen’) and para. 33 (‘such ties may exist without the family member of the 
Union citizen having resided in the same State as that citizen or having been a de-
pendant of that citizen shortly before or at the time when the latter settled in the host 
State. On the other hand, the situation of dependence must exist, in the country from 
which the family member concerned comes, at the time when he applies to join the 
Union citizen on whom he is dependent’). 
34. The report also notes that this requirement was deemed to be unlawful by national 
courts, and that the relevant national regulation was subsequently amended.  
35. See e.g. the report for Cyprus. 
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 What might constitute a ‘durable relationship, duly attested’ provides a 
good example of this. The requirement in Article 3(2) that national authorities 
‘shall undertake an extensive examination of the personal circumstances’ 
does appear to be widely recognised.36 And it is not surprising to see that 
relatively short periods of ‘common life’ will not be sufficient to constitute 
the requirement of durability.37 It is also to be expected that States require 
more than formal proof in these circumstances. For example, in Hungary, the 
fact that the Union citizen and the relevant family member have the same reg-
istered address will not be enough; instead, the fact that they have been ‘liv-
ing together in one household’ for at least one year needs to be verified. The 
report for Greece details other criteria that can ‘serve as proof of the durabil-
ity of the relationship’ i.e. ‘the undertaking of shared long-term legal, social 
or financial commitments (for example, a mortgage to buy a house) ... espe-
cially if the EU citizen and his/her partner live under the same roof’.  
 Beyond more obvious cases, however, we see variation. In the report for 
Denmark, reference is made to a Supreme Court case38 in which an Iraqi na-
tional failed to demonstrate that he was in a durable relationship with a Union 
citizen even though, according to the national report, ‘it was not disputed that 
the couple had known each other for at least six years, and had in fact lived 
together for at least one year. The fact that they had a child together and an-
other to come did not alter this finding’. 
 But having a child or children together is more decisive, in a positive 
sense, in other States. For example, referring to a ministerial decision, the re-
port for Greece notes that having or adopting children together means that a 
durable relationship is then ‘irrefutably presumed to exist’. In the report for 
Hungary, it is noted that, in accordance with a decision of the Supreme 
Court,39 a declaration of paternity where the actual paternal relationship has 
‘no real substantive elements’ will not suffice; indeed, it was suggested that 
claiming residence rights on that basis was ‘incompatible with the primary 
purposes of EU law and national law’. The report for the Netherlands empha-
sises that, responding to criticism of undue restrictiveness from the Council 
of State, policy was revised in June 2013 to make it clear that the evidence 
                                                        
36. E.g. the report for Hungary observes that this principle has been recognised by the 
Supreme Court ‘in several judgments’. 
37. E.g. the report for France notes two cases in which periods of ‘common life’ (‘une 
communauté de vie’) for three and four months were not sufficient. 





specified in applicable policy guidance was not to be considered as preclud-
ing other means of proof of a durable relationship; rules that are specified in-
clude cohabitation for six months (demonstrated by a common municipal ad-
dress registration if the couple cohabited in the Netherlands, or through e.g. a 
joint lease or utility bills if the couple had cohabited in another country) or 
having a child together. 
Article 5: Right of Entry 
1. Without prejudice to the provisions on travel documents applicable to national border 
controls, Member States shall grant Union citizens leave to enter their territory with a valid 
identity card or passport and shall grant family members who are not nationals of a Mem-
ber State leave to enter their territory with a valid passport. 
No entry visa or equivalent formality may be imposed on Union citizens. 
2. Family members who are not nationals of a Member State shall only be required to have 
an entry visa in accordance with Regulation (EC) No 539/2001 or, where appropriate, with 
national law. For the purposes of this Directive, possession of the valid residence card re-
ferred to in Article 10 shall exempt such family members from the visa requirement. 
Member States shall grant such persons every facility to obtain the necessary visas. Such 
visas shall be issued free of charge as soon as possible and on the basis of an accelerated 
procedure. 
3. The host Member State shall not place an entry or exit stamp in the passport of family 
members who are not nationals of a Member State provided that they present the residence 
card provided for in Article 10. 
4. Where a Union citizen, or a family member who is not a national of a Member State, 
does not have the necessary travel documents or, if required, the necessary visas, the 
Member State concerned shall, before turning them back, give such persons every reason-
able opportunity to obtain the necessary documents or have them brought to them within a 
reasonable period of time or to corroborate or prove by other means that they are covered 
by the right of free movement and residence. 
5. The Member State may require the person concerned to report his/her presence within 
its territory within a reasonable and non-discriminatory period of time. Failure to comply 
with this requirement may make the person concerned liable to proportionate and non-
discriminatory sanctions. 
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1.5. Article 5: Introduction 
Article 5 of the Directive outlines formal aspects of the right to enter a host 
Member State for Union citizens and for third country national family mem-
bers. The provision captures key principles from the case law, reflecting the 
fact that the right of entry is communicated rather than constituted by relevant 
documentary permits.40 The explicit emphasis on proportionality and implicit 
concern for respect for family life in paragraphs (4) and (5) signal another 
important example of this case law-formed approach. Our aim here was to 
discover if the safeguards established are providing effective protection in re-
ality. 
1.6. Transposition, application, and interpretation of Article 5 
The majority of the national reports confirm that the implementation of Arti-
cle 5 has been straightforward.41 Most authors also report that no evidence 
questioning the effectiveness of the procedures implemented has emerged to 
date, noting in particular the absence of national case law on these issues. 
Some reports expressly suggest a positive impact.42 
 The importance of Article 5 for third country national family members is 
the primary theme that emerges from the data presented. Many reports make 
express reference to the establishment of an accelerated procedure for the is-
suing of visas to third country national family members in accordance with 
                                                        
40. See e.g. Case C-459/99 MRAX [2002] ECR I-6591, esp. paras 57-61. 
41. An exception to this general impression can be seen in the report for Ireland, noting 
strong judicial criticism of ‘the State’s implementation and executive application of 
Article 5 of the Directive’ notwithstanding the fact that the actual wording of the im-
plementing measure ‘does reflect the provisions of Article 5’ (Raducan v Minister for 
Justice, Equality and Law Reform [2011] IEHC 224). See also, the report for Slove-
nia, where it is noted that the ‘procedural safeguards contained in Article 5(4) of the 
Directive have not been transposed’ into national law’; and the report for the UK, not-
ing a preliminary reference currently pending before the Court of Justice (Case C-
202/13 McCarthy and others v Secretary of State for the Home Department, [2013] 
OJ C189/6) asking (inter alia) whether ‘Article 35 of Directive 2004/38/EC ... enti-
tle[s] a Member State to adopt a measure of general application to refuse, terminate, 
or withdraw the right conferred by Article 5(2) of the Directive exempting non-
national EU family members who are holders of residence cards issued pursuant to 
Article 10 of the Directive (‘residence card holders’) from visa requirements’. 




Article 5(2),43 and to other preferential procedures that are applied in such 
cases.44 In that context, reports also discuss a requirement of proof of the 
family relationship.45 Others address the ‘reasonable period of time’ provided 
for in Article 5(4).46 
 Additionally, some States implement reporting mechanisms, as permitted 
by Article 5(5). In the report for Croatia, for example, it is stated that EEA 
nationals and their family members must ‘register their address, temporary 
residence or permanent residence at the latest eight days from the date of ar-
rival ... or from the change of address, temporary residence or permanent res-
idence’. A fine of HRK 100.00 (approx. €13) applies where there has been a 
failure to comply with this obligation. 
 The system outlined in the report for Italy does not establish an obligation 
to report presence within the Italian territory to the police. However, ‘if the 
Union citizen has not reported to the police office, s/he shall be regarded as 
having stayed in Italy for more than three months, unless s/he can prove oth-
erwise’ – a position that has obvious implications for the citizen vis-à-vis the 
conditions outlined in Article 7 of the Directive, discussed in Section 2 be-
low.47 
1.7. Question 1 – emerging issues and themes  
Directive 2004/38 makes choices when it establishes specific definitions of 
the concept of family member, the political background to which is detailed 
in the Institutional Report. However, the result is that some types of family 
                                                        
43. See e.g. the reports for Denmark (‘not exceeding 15 days unless the situation is ex-
ceptional and duly justified’), Finland (reporting evidence from an embassy website 
that ‘processing times for the free visas of EU/EEA citizens’ TCN family members 
varies between 3 to 10 days as compared to the normal 15 days’), and Hungary 
(‘within ten working days’). 
44. E.g. the report for Finland notes that an oral hearing may be arranged for visa appli-
cants who are third country national family members, which is not part of visa appli-
cation procedures more generally; decisions denying a visa in such cases are ‘more 
comprehensive’ as well as benefitting from ‘enhanced legal safeguards in the form of 
appeals which follow a more thorough and substantial procedure’. See similarly, the 
report for Sweden. 
45. See e.g. the reports for Denmark, and Estonia. 
46. See e.g. the report for Greece (‘one month’). 
47. The report also notes that registration with the municipal authority of the place of 
domicile is also required for residence in Italy for more than three months, an obliga-
tion that could similarly, then, be deemed to have been infringed in such cases. 
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circumstances and relationships are more privileged than others, which may 
well, to use the language of free movement restrictions, disadvantage certain 
Union citizens if they choose to move to another State or even deter them 
from moving in the first place.  
 Tellingly, the Institutional Report notes that the ‘issue of the protection 
Directive 2004/38/EC should afford to same-sex relationships and unmar-
ried partners was the most divisive issue during the discussions in the 
Council’. The compromise that was adopted raises challenging questions 
about the locus of responsibility for pioneering as well as reflecting social 
change when the equal treatment of Union citizens is clearly at stake. It also 
suggests a potential gap between EU, ECHR, and national approaches to dis-
crimination that may become even more apparent as the free movement 
equality paradigm is likely to shift beyond a conventional focus on nationality 
discrimination to other forms of discriminatory treatment, especially in light 
of the now-binding effect of the Charter of Fundamental Rights.48 
 The level of national regulatory discretion permitted through the appli-
cation of Article 3(2) is also important to note. The resulting legal distinction 
between persons that come within the scope of Article 2(2) and Article 3(2) 
respectively has been characterised as a distinction between members of the 
‘nuclear family’ and ‘other family members’.49 At one level, this approach 
reflects the fact that Union citizenship and free movement rights more gener-
ally involve shared EU/Member State competence. But the outcome is that 
citizens encounter different levels of recognition and protection of their fami-
ly circumstances in different States – something that the Directive exists pre-
cisely to guard against. This issue thus raises one of our Report’s central the-
matic questions about cultures of citizenship right from the very outset of 
the questionnaire i.e. the extent to which citizenship rights are implemented 
from a rights-based or permission-based perspective, and the differences that 
such a choice actually makes to citizenship practice. 
                                                        
48. See e.g. the report for Cyprus on this point, in connection with the ‘evolving notion 
and meaning of “family” and “marriage”’; there, it is also noted that the Cypriot 
Equality Body has acknowledged the discretion conferred on Member States by the 
Directive, but referred also to ‘broader considerations’ on the issue of non-
discrimination, principally the ECHR, general principles of EU law (including pro-
portionality), and the case law of both the Court of Justice and the European Court of 
Human Rights.  
49. See e.g. AG Mengozzi in Reyes, paras 33-37 of the Opinion. 
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 Another dynamic that surfaces in some of the national reports at this 
stage50 is the interplay between national legislative and/or administrative 
authorities and national courts and tribunals in the realisation of citizen-
ship rights that comply with EU legal obligations. Significantly, national 
courts tend to be portrayed, on the whole, as correcting errors made in either 
transposing or applying the Directive. This point leads to two important ob-
servations – about the importance of legal disputes in the furthering of citi-
zenship rights; but also, about recognising that relatively few individuals will 
actually persist with a legal challenge in the first place – points picked up 
again in several of the sections that follow. 
 Finally, while we tend to think of Union citizens as a relatively composite 
group, what emerges from the data reported is that there are at least five dif-
ferent groups of Union citizens that need to be considered: (1) migrant Un-
ion citizens residing in host States; (2) migrant Union citizens who have re-
turned to their home States; (3) static Union citizens residing in their home 
States for whom EU legal protection applies in exceptional circumstances 
(see further, Section 7.1 below); (4) static Union citizens residing in their 
home States for whom EU legal protection has been extended by analogy 
through national law; and (5) static Union citizens residing in their home 
States for whom no EU protection is relevant. Directive 2004/38 applies di-
rectly to Union citizens in category (1) only; primary citizenship rights con-
ferred by the Treaty apply to those belonging to categories (2) and (3).  
 The implications of this distinction are discussed more fully under Q7 be-
low, but a preliminary comment can be made here. On the one hand, Di-
rective 2004/38 has certainly simplified the ‘sector-by-sector, piecemeal ap-
proach’ (recital 4) previously applied to the regulation of free movement 
rights, in the sense of consolidating several legislative measures at EU level. 
But perhaps what we now see is that a more substantive diffusion in the 
movement and residence status of citizens persists notwithstanding the 
simplification of the framework, and thus presenting a different kind of chal-
lenge for stability of residence. There is a distinction, in other words, between 
simplification of the expression of rights and complexity of their substantive 
application. Life is complicated, and EU regulation of citizenship and free 
movement rights cannot change this. But it should try to avoid exacerbating 
it. 
                                                        
50. See e.g. the responses to Question 1 in the reports for Spain, and the UK. 
NIAMH NIC SHUIBHNE & JO SHAW 
 86
Question 2 
Is there any evidence of the expulsion of EU citizens (and/or their family 
members) on purely economic grounds (i.e. failure to satisfy the condi-
tions set out in Article 7 of the Directive) e.g. in the decisions of national 
courts and/or tribunals? 
Article 7: Right of residence for more than three months 
1. All Union citizens shall have the right of residence on the territory of another Member 
State for a period of longer than three months if they: 
(a) are workers or self-employed persons in the host Member State; or 
(b) have sufficient resources for themselves and their family members not to become a 
burden on the social assistance system of the host Member State during their period of 
residence and have comprehensive sickness insurance cover in the host Member State; 
or 
(c) – are enrolled at a private or public establishment, accredited or financed by the host 
Member State on the basis of its legislation or administrative practice, for the prin-
cipal purpose of following a course of study, including vocational training; and 
– have comprehensive sickness insurance cover in the host Member State and assure 
the relevant national authority, by means of a declaration or by such equivalent 
means as they may choose, that they have sufficient resources for themselves and 
their family members not to become a burden on the social assistance system of 
the host Member State during their period of residence;  
or 
(d) are family members accompanying or joining a Union citizen who satisfies the condi-
tions referred to in points (a), (b) or (c). 
2. The right of residence provided for in paragraph 1 shall extend to family members who 
are not nationals of a Member State, accompanying or joining the Union citizen in the host 
Member State, provided that such Union citizen satisfies the conditions referred to in para-
graph 1(a), (b) or (c). 
3 ... 
2.1. Introduction 
The conditions for lawful residence in a host Member State for longer than 
three months create, broadly speaking, two alternate obligations for Union 
citizens: either being engaged in economic activity (as a worker or self-
employed person); or having ‘sufficient resources for themselves and their 
family members not to become a burden on the social assistance system of 
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the host State’ (noting the different phrasing in Article 7(1)(c) for students) as 
well as ‘comprehensive sickness insurance’. The Institutional Report outlines 
the origins of these conditions in three Directives adopted in the early 1990s 
that extended free movement and residence rights to Member State nationals 
who were not economically active, as well as the history of their retention in 
Directive 2004/38.  
 It is a general principle of free movement law that the grounds on which a 
Member State may restrict free movement rights – public policy, public secu-
rity, or public health – may not be invoked to serve economic ends.51 That 
position is affirmed explicitly in Article 27(1) of the Directive,52 but recital 
16 of the preamble is more nuanced:  
As long as the beneficiaries of the right of residence do not become an unreasonable bur-
den on the social assistance system of the host Member State they should not be expelled. 
Therefore, an expulsion measure should not be the automatic consequence of recourse to 
the social assistance system. The host Member State should examine whether it is a case of 
temporary difficulties and take into account the duration of residence, the personal circum-
stances and the amount of aid granted in order to consider whether the beneficiary has be-
come an unreasonable burden on its social assistance system and to proceed to his expul-
sion. In no case should an expulsion measure be adopted against workers, self-employed 
persons or job-seekers as defined by the Court of Justice save on grounds of public policy 
or public security [emphasis added].  
The proportionality principle frames the intended distinction between ‘rea-
sonable’ and ‘unreasonable’ burden. Relatedly, Article 14(3) of the Directive 
confirms that ‘[a]n expulsion measure shall not be the automatic consequence 
of a Union citizen’s or his or her family member’s recourse to the social as-
sistance system of the host Member State’ (emphasis added) – an approach 
confirmed by the Court in Brey through its citation of the criteria listed in re-
cital 16.53  
 The Court emphasised that ‘the mere fact that a national of a Member 
State receives social assistance is not sufficient to show that he constitutes an 
unreasonable burden on the social assistance system of the host Member 
                                                        
51. E.g. Case C-35/98 Verkooijen [2000] ECR I-4071, para. 48: ‘according to settled case 
law, aims of a purely economic nature cannot constitute an overriding reason in the 
general interest justifying a restriction of a fundamental freedom guaranteed by the 
Treaty’. 
52. The report for Germany notes that this distinction is also clearly drawn in national 
law. 
53. Case C-140/12 Brey, judgment of 19 September 2013, para. 69. 
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State’.54 But even accepting that ‘the margin for manoeuvre which the Mem-
ber States are recognised as having must not be used by them in a manner 
which would compromise attainment of the objective of Directive 2004/38, 
which is, inter alia, to facilitate and strengthen the exercise of Union citizens’ 
primary right to move and reside freely within the territory of the Member 
States, and the practical effectiveness of [the Directive]’,55 it has to be 
acknowledged that recourse to the host State’s social assistance system can 
be a legitimate factor in expulsion decisions in appropriate cases.56  
 Article 7 should also be read in conjunction with Article 8(4), which pro-
vides: 
Member States may not lay down a fixed amount which they regard as ‘sufficient re-
sources’ but they must take into account the personal situation of the person concerned. In 
all cases this amount shall not be higher than the threshold below which nationals of the 
host Member State become eligible for social assistance, or, where this criterion is not ap-
plicable, higher than the minimum social security pension paid by the host Member State. 
In the Institutional Report, the position taken in the Commission’s 2009 
Transposition Guidelines is reaffirmed i.e. ‘the notion of sufficient resources 
should be assessed against the national criteria to be granted basic social as-
sistance benefit, not any social assistance benefit Member States may provide 
for in their national laws’.57 The Court of Justice confirmed this view in 
Brey.58 Importantly, however, the Court also clarified that ‘although Member 
States may indicate a certain sum as a reference amount, they may not impose 
a minimum income level below which it will be presumed that the person 
concerned does not have sufficient resources, irrespective of a specific exam-
ination of the situation of each person concerned’.59 
                                                        
54. Brey, para. 75. 
55. Brey, para. 71. 
56. See Case C-184/99 Grzelczyk [2001] ECR I-6193, para. 42 ‘[t]hat interpretation does 
not, however, prevent a Member State from taking the view that a student who has 
recourse to social assistance no longer fulfils the conditions of his right of residence 
or from taking measures, within the limits imposed by Community law, either to 
withdraw his residence permit or not to renew it’. See further, however, the report for 
France, referring to a case in which the Conseil d’Etat held that an expulsion decision 
based on the insufficiency of resources can be taken even if the person concerned has 
not yet resorted to the social security system. 
57. The Institutional Report refers to COM(2009) 313 final, at pp. 8-10. 
58. Brey, para. 67. 
59. Brey, para. 68. See further, Section 13.4 below. 
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 The requirement of self-sufficiency that Article 7 embodies is one of the 
most controversial features of citizenship law. As the Court of Justice has 
acknowledged, the condition of self-sufficiency ‘is based on the idea that the 
exercise of the right of residence for citizens of the Union can be subordinat-
ed to the legitimate interests of the Member States – in the present case, the 
protection of their public finances’.60 However, recognition of this fact, how-
ever politically expedient, clearly challenges the conventional view that aims 
of a ‘purely economic nature’ are excluded from consideration as a public in-
terest justification for restrictions on free movement. 
 At present, the significance of the self-sufficiency requirement and the le-
gitimacy of its various aims have been accentuated by the tenor of political 
and public debate on intra-EU migration, discussed in more detail below in 
the discussion on Q15. In connection with Q2, we sought to determine the ex-
tent to which a failure to satisfy the conditions set out in Article 7 features in 
national decision-making on the expulsion of Union citizens from host States, 
against the backdrop of the framework outlined briefly above – a framework 
that reflects both a permitted sphere of discretion for the Member States and 
the determining of the outer boundaries of that discretion through general 
principles of EU law.  
2.2. Article 7 in the context of expulsion  
In most of the reports submitted, it is noted that there is no evidence – from 
reported case law, at least – that decisions on expulsion have been based on 
purely economic grounds.61 That does not necessarily mean that the possibil-
ity is absent from relevant national rules. 62 But the authors of several national 
reports distinguish between cases where either a residence permit and/or enti-
tlement to social assistance is denied, on the one hand, and cases that lead to 
                                                        
60. Brey, para. 55. 
61. See e.g. the reports for Austria, Bulgaria, Croatia, Estonia, Greece, Hungary, Italy, 
Malta, Poland, Portugal, Slovenia, Spain, and Sweden. 
62. See e.g. the report for Finland; the imprint of proportionality is also evident here, 
however, noting that the prospect of Union citizens and their family members becom-
ing an ‘unreasonable burden’ on Finland’s social security system is characterised by 
‘resorting repeatedly to social assistance’ (emphasis added). See also, the reports for 
France, Germany, and Sweden. Cf. the report for Poland, where it is noted that ‘once 
the card of residence is granted, it may not be retired on economic grounds. The resi-
dence card may be annulled only in exceptional cases, namely when it was obtained 
as a result of submitting false documents or fraudulent information’. 
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actual expulsion orders on economic grounds, on the other.63 In the report for 
the UK, for example, the authors note that: 
The solution adopted by the UK courts is to treat EU citizens who do not enjoy a right of 
residence by virtue of [Article 7 of the Directive] as simply ‘present’ in the United King-
dom. That status does not confer any right of residence in the UK under either EU or na-
tional law. Such persons are deemed subject to UK immigration control and, therefore, lia-
ble to removal by the Secretary of State. 
Evidence of clear progression to expulsion decisions on the basis of econom-
ic circumstances is provided only in a minority of the reports. The report for 
Denmark cites information published by a Danish NGO in this context. Simi-
larly, in the report for the UK, and picking up on the text extracted above, the 
authors point to ‘clear evidence of targeted administrative efforts to deport 
EU citizens from the UK on grounds that are inherently linked to economic 
considerations ... at least with respect to specific categories of non-
economically active EU citizens’. To illustrate the implications of the strategy 
in practice, ‘a pilot scheme aimed at removing homeless EEA nationals from 
the United Kingdom’ is discussed.  
 Importantly, it was emphasised in several reports that the rationales un-
derpinning expulsion decisions can be blurred together. As the report for 
Denmark points out, ‘some expulsions on grounds of protection of the public 
order are inherently linked to economic considerations’. In that connection, 
the report notes that ‘fines for minor offences, such as ‘squatting’ have justi-
fied expulsion on grounds of protection of the public order, but were annulled 
by the Supreme Court’. Similarly, in the report for Sweden, it is noted that 
‘[t]here are for example situations where Union citizens have been expelled 
from Sweden because of begging or prostitution, in both cases because of 
dishonest self-support. However, neither begging nor to work as a prostitute 
is criminal in Sweden’. These issues are picked up again in the discussion on 
Q6 below. 
 
                                                        
63. See e.g. the reports for the Netherlands, and the UK. Similarly, in the report for Ire-
land, reference is made to a decision in which a residence card was denied, but no ex-
pulsion order was made because ‘the applicant had not established any basis for an 
Article 7 entitlement’ (referring to Singh and Anor v Minister for Justice, Equality 
and Law Reform [2010] IEHC 86). 
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2.3. Determining self-sufficiency in practice 
Short of expulsion scenarios, the responses to Q2 also generated evidence 
about administrative guidelines and procedures developed for the application 
of Article 7 in practice. In most of the reports, it was clear that national im-
plementing measures expressly incorporate the obligation to evaluate the per-
sonal circumstances of the individual concerned, as required by Article 8(4) 
of the Directive.64 In the report for Poland, for example, it is noted that proof 
of sufficient resources can be demonstrated by means such as the possession 
of a credit card ‘or a certification of having funds at a bank or other financial 
institution confirmed by a seal and a signature of an authorized officer of the 
bank or institution, issued one month before submitting an application for 
registration of stay at the latest’. The report for France is one of the few in 
which reference is made to administrative guidelines that address the relative 
comprehensiveness of national/other sickness insurance. That report also al-
ludes to the fact that, as confirmed by EU case law, financial resources can be 
provided on behalf of the Union citizen by a third person;65 but the relevant 
national guidance requires, in such situations, that the Union citizen must jus-
tify the sufficiency and duration of such resources.  
 However, more problematically, it also appears that some States either 
have in the past imposed or continue to impose minimum quantitative thresh-
olds for the determination of sufficient resources.66 It can also be seen that 
additional conditions have been attached to the application of Article 8(3) of 
the Directive,67 such as a requirement to submit proof of accommodation.68 In 
                                                        
64. In the report for the Netherlands, reference was made to a case in which it was held 
that ‘municipalities are under an obligation to assess themselves whether the EU citi-
zen has a right of residence. They cannot rely on the residence status as recorded by 
the immigration authorities’ (emphasis in original). 
65. E.g. Case C-200/02 Zhu and Chen [2004] ECR I-9925. 
66. See e.g. the reports for Cyprus, Denmark, and France. These conditions are not nec-
essarily addressed only to citizens who are not engaged in economic activity; see e.g. 
the report for Cyprus, noting that while the Commission had confirmed (in letters sent 
to the Cypriot Government) that national law correctly transposed Article 7 of the Di-
rective, ‘administrative practice deviates from that by requiring that the workers 
demonstrate certain income for themselves and their families to recognise their right 
to residence under art. 7(1)’. 
67. With respect to periods of residence longer than three months, Article 8(3) provides: 
‘For the registration certificate to be issued, Member States may only require that – 
Union citizens to whom point (a) of Article 7(1) applies present a valid identity card 
or passport, a confirmation of engagement from the employer or a certificate of em-
ployment, or proof that they are self-employed persons; – Union citizens to whom 
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the report for Estonia, for example, the requirement of a registered place of 
residence as being ‘the constitutive element of a Union citizen’s right of resi-
dence’ for periods longer than three months is highlighted as a ‘questionable’ 
linkage vis-à-vis the idea of proportionate sanctions for failure to comply 
with registration procedures suggested within Article 8 of the Directive.69 
The author also recalls recital 11 of the preamble, which states that ‘[t]he 
fundamental and personal right of residence in another Member State is con-
ferred directly on citizens by the Treaty and is not dependent upon their hav-
ing fulfilled administrative procedures’. In contrast, however, the same report 
also provides a rare example, in this context, of more extensive protection 
than EU law requires.70 
 The report for Denmark outlines another anomalous national practice: 
here, it is reported that ‘[d]ecisions refusing or terminating the right of resi-
dence on the specific ground of lack of sufficient resources can only be taken 
                                                        
point (b) of Article 7(1) applies present a valid identity card or passport and provide 
proof that they satisfy the conditions laid down therein; – Union citizens to whom 
point (c) of Article 7(1) applies present a valid identity card or passport, provide proof 
of enrolment at an accredited establishment and of comprehensive sickness insurance 
cover and the declaration or equivalent means referred to in point (c) of Article 7(1). 
Member States may not require this declaration to refer to any specific amount of re-
sources’.  
68. E.g. report for the Czech Republic. 
69. The first and second paragraphs of Article 8 provide: ‘1. Without prejudice to Article 
5(5), for periods of residence longer than three months, the host Member State may 
require Union citizens to register with the relevant authorities. 2. The deadline for 
registration may not be less than three months from the date of arrival. A registration 
certificate shall be issued immediately, stating the name and address of the person 
registering and the date of the registration. Failure to comply with the registration re-
quirement may render the person concerned liable to proportionate and non-
discriminatory sanctions’. 
70. In that report, it is stated that the national implementing measure ‘does not lay down 
any conditions for the right of residence of a Union citizen for more than 3 months in 
Estonia except the requirement to register one’s residence in the population register. 
This means that the Union citizen does not have to prove employment, sufficient re-
sources or valid health insurance coverage. However, the requirement of sufficient fi-
nancial resources does come into play when a Union citizen who has come to reside 
in Estonia wishes to be joined by his family members who themselves are not EU na-
tionals’. This distinction between Union citizens and third country nationals provides 
an interesting interpretation of the difference between reasonable and unreasonable 
burdens on the social assistance system. 
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within the first 3 months of arrival and by administrative decision’.71 But Ar-
ticle 7 of the Directive makes it very clear that self-sufficiency conditions ap-
ply only to periods of residence for longer than three months.72  
2.4. Question 2 – emerging issues and themes 
Responses to Q2 indicate, overall, a reasonable approach to the evaluation of 
an individual’s economic and personal circumstances and little evidence that 
ready recourse to expulsion occurs where Union citizens cannot demon-
strate compliance with the conditions in Article 7 – whatever current political 
and media rhetoric might suggest. However, such citizens can be left in an 
unstable liminal legal space in consequence: ‘present’ but not lawfully resi-
dent in the host State, under EU or national law, until or unless the authorities 
do progress to issuing a residence permit – or making an expulsion order. 
Some of the issues raised thus provide a preliminary indication of concern 
about the appropriate exercise of State discretion in the sphere of expul-
sion – a point addressed in detail in Section 6 below. 
 The way in which Article 7 is being applied in practice also raises im-
portant questions about the extent to which administrative practices con-
form to the framework established by the Directive, as fleshed out by the 
case law of the Court of Justice. A related issue concerns how (or even 
whether) judicial interpretation of the Directive’s concepts and definitions 
properly filters down to national authorities other than courts or tribunals. A 
directive can never capture each and every circumstantial nuance that might 
be relevant; but there is a question about whether even core concepts – such 
as ‘sufficient resources’ – might need to be further developed or elabo-
rated in follow-up legislation in order to ensure a greater degree of con-
sistency of application and interpretation at national level. 
 The data presented in the national reports on this issue also reinforces 
more general patterns already identified for Q1 – (1) pockets of problems 
that are often specific to individual Member States rather than more wide-
spread or systemic transposition failures; (2) the imposition of, on balance, 
more rights-limiting than rights-expanding national conditions, even where 
such conditions would seem to be precluded by the wording of the Directive 
                                                        
71. Report for Denmark (emphasis in original), referring to Section 28 of the Aliens Act 
of 2013. 
72. See also, the report for France, referring to concerns outlined in a report by Human 
Rights Watch on this point. 
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itself; and (3) the critical importance of judicial review in terms of redressing 
problematic procedures that restrict the scope of the Directive – and thus the 
implementation of citizenship rights – in practice. 
 
Question 3 
How have Articles 12-15 of the Directive been transposed into national 
law? Have any disputes on the interpretation or application of these pro-
visions been addressed within national courts or tribunals? 
Article 12: Retention of the right of residence by family members in the event of 
death or departure of the Union citizen 
1. Without prejudice to the second subparagraph, the Union citizen's death or departure 
from the host Member State shall not affect the right of residence of his/her family mem-
bers who are nationals of a Member State. 
Before acquiring the right of permanent residence, the persons concerned must meet the 
conditions laid down in points (a), (b), (c) or (d) of Article 7(1). 
2. Without prejudice to the second subparagraph, the Union citizen's death shall not entail 
loss of the right of residence of his/her family members who are not nationals of a Member 
State and who have been residing in the host Member State as family members for at least 
one year before the Union citizen's death. 
Before acquiring the right of permanent residence, the right of residence of the persons 
concerned shall remain subject to the requirement that they are able to show that they are 
workers or self-employed persons or that they have sufficient resources for themselves and 
their family members not to become a burden on the social assistance system of the host 
Member State during their period of residence and have comprehensive sickness insurance 
cover in the host Member State, or that they are members of the family, already constituted 
in the host Member State, of a person satisfying these requirements. ‘Sufficient resources’ 
shall be as defined in Article 8(4). 
Such family members shall retain their right of residence exclusively on a personal basis. 
3. The Union citizen's departure from the host Member State or his/her death shall not en-
tail loss of the right of residence of his/her children or of the parent who has actual custody 
of the children, irrespective of nationality, if the children reside in the host Member State 
and are enrolled at an educational establishment, for the purpose of studying there, until the 
completion of their studies. 
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Article 13: Retention of the right of residence by family members in the event of di-
vorce, annulment of marriage or termination of registered partnership 
1. Without prejudice to the second subparagraph, divorce, annulment of the Union citizen's 
marriage or termination of his/her registered partnership, as referred to in point 2(b) of Ar-
ticle 2 shall not affect the right of residence of his/her family members who are nationals of 
a Member State. 
Before acquiring the right of permanent residence, the persons concerned must meet the 
conditions laid down in points (a), (b), (c) or (d) of Article 7(1). 
2. Without prejudice to the second subparagraph, divorce, annulment of marriage or termi-
nation of the registered partnership referred to in point 2(b) of Article 2 shall not entail loss 
of the right of residence of a Union citizen's family members who are not nationals of a 
Member State where: 
(a) prior to initiation of the divorce or annulment proceedings or termination of the regis-
tered partnership referred to in point 2(b) of Article 2, the marriage or registered part-
nership has lasted at least three years, including one year in the host Member State; or 
(b) by agreement between the spouses or the partners referred to in point 2(b) of Article 2 
or by court order, the spouse or partner who is not a national of a Member State has 
custody of the Union citizen's children; or 
(c) this is warranted by particularly difficult circumstances, such as having been a victim 
of domestic violence while the marriage or registered partnership was subsisting; or 
(d) by agreement between the spouses or partners referred to in point 2(b) of Article 2 or 
by court order, the spouse or partner who is not a national of a Member State has the 
right of access to a minor child, provided that the court has ruled that such access must 
be in the host Member State, and for as long as is required. 
Before acquiring the right of permanent residence, the right of residence of the persons 
concerned shall remain subject to the requirement that they are able to show that they are 
workers or self-employed persons or that they have sufficient resources for themselves and 
their family members not to become a burden on the social assistance system of the host 
Member State during their period of residence and have comprehensive sickness insurance 
cover in the host Member State, or that they are members of the family, already constituted 
in the host Member State, of a person satisfying these requirements. Sufficient resources" 
shall be as defined in Article 8(4). 
Such family members shall retain their right of residence exclusively on personal basis. 
Article 14: Retention of the right of residence 
1. Union citizens and their family members shall have the right of residence provided for in 
Article 6, as long as they do not become an unreasonable burden on the social assistance 
system of the host Member State. 
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2. Union citizens and their family members shall have the right of residence provided for in 
Articles 7, 12 and 13 as long as they meet the conditions set out therein. 
In specific cases where there is a reasonable doubt as to whether a Union citizen or his/her 
family members satisfies the conditions set out in Articles 7, 12 and 13, Member States 
may verify if these conditions are fulfilled. This verification shall not be carried out sys-
tematically. 
3. An expulsion measure shall not be the automatic consequence of a Union citizen's or his 
or her family member's recourse to the social assistance system of the host Member State. 
4. By way of derogation from paragraphs 1 and 2 and without prejudice to the provisions 
of Chapter VI, an expulsion measure may in no case be adopted against Union citizens or 
their family members if: 
(a) the Union citizens are workers or self-employed persons, or 
(b) the Union citizens entered the territory of the host Member State in order to seek em-
ployment. In this case, the Union citizens and their family members may not be ex-
pelled for as long as the Union citizens can provide evidence that they are continuing to 
seek employment and that they have a genuine chance of being engaged. 
Article 15: Procedural safeguards 
1. The procedures provided for by Articles 30 and 31 shall apply by analogy to all deci-
sions restricting free movement of Union citizens and their family members on grounds 
other than public policy, public security or public health. 
2. Expiry of the identity card or passport on the basis of which the person concerned en-
tered the host Member State and was issued with a registration certificate or residence card 
shall not constitute a ground for expulsion from the host Member State. 
3. The host Member State may not impose a ban on entry in the context of an expulsion 
decision to which paragraph 1 applies. 
3.1. Introduction 
The protection guaranteed by Articles 12-15 of Directive 2004/38 marks a 
critical advance for protection of the retention of residence rights in a host 
State, especially in light of our thematic focus on stability of residence. The 
provisions are, in essence, about the consequences for residence status when 
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life intervenes – and they have particular implications for third country na-
tional family members.73 In that context, the statement in Articles 12(3) and 
13(2) that ‘[s]uch family members shall retain their right of residence on a 
personal basis’ signals a path-breaking shift from the standard derived rights 
paradigm.  
 Reflecting both the simplifying and strengthening aims of the Directive, 
the provisions construct a detailed framework that clearly exceeds the piece-
meal guidance it replaces – with respect to both repealed legislative 
measures74 and relevant case law.75 The particular position of jobseekers, 
raised in Article 14(4), will be picked up in the discussion on Q5 below. 
3.2. Articles 12-15: transposition, application, and interpretation 
Overall, the responses to Q3 indicate that Articles 12-15 have been correctly 
transposed into national law.76 In fact, the reports often use terms such as 
‘faithfully’, ‘fully’, ‘identical’, ‘literal’ or ‘reproducing’ vis-à-vis the wording 
of the provisions. Additionally, we found several instances of where national 
implementing measures provide even more extensive protection than required 
by the Directive.77 Respect for family life emerges as the common linking 
thread in that respect. Few reports indicate that Articles 12-15 have been con-
sidered in national case law.78 
                                                        
73. For an example of contrasting interpretations – and outcomes –before the adoption of 
the Directive, cf. the judgment and Opinion in Case C-257/00 Givane [2003] ECR I-
345. 
74. See e.g. Regulation 1251/70 on the right of workers to remain in the territory of a 
Member State after having been employed in that State, [1970] OJ L142/24; and 
Council Directive 75/34/EEC of 17 December 1974 concerning the right of nationals 
of a Member State to remain in the territory of another Member State after having 
pursued therein an activity in a self-employed capacity, [1975] OJ L14/10. 
75. E.g. on the position of separated spouses, see Case 267/83 Diatta [1985] ECR 567 
and Case C-370/90 Singh [1992] ECR I-4265; for discussion of the retention of resi-
dence rights in the event of divorce, see Case C-413/99 Baumbast and R [2002] ECR 
I-7091 (which also addresses the situation in which the Union citizen departs from the 
host State). 
76. Cf. the report for Switzerland. 
77. For example, in the report for Hungary; cf. three years in Article 13(2)(a) of the Di-
rective and two years in the national measure. See also, the reports for Ireland, Italy, 
and Portugal. 
78. But see e.g. the reports for France, and Ireland. 
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 However, other reports identify transposition problems that relate to dif-
ferences between either the Directive and national law or Court of Justice 
judgments and national law. In particular, the report for Bulgaria outlines a 
cluster of inconsistencies between the provisions of the Directive and the na-
tional implementing measures. For example, the self-sufficiency requirement 
in Articles 12(2) and 13(2) of the Directive has also been applied to the trans-
position of Article 12(3) – even though the latter provision makes no refer-
ence to that requirement, a point confirmed in the case law of the Court of 
Justice.79 Relatedly, the national implementing measure in France defines 
‘completion of studies’ as the completion of secondary school education, 
providing another example of a national condition at odds with the jurispru-
dence of the Court.80 The report for Poland provides a contrasting example on 
this point.81  
 In Italy, the national implementing measure constrains the scope of Article 
13(2)(c) by imposing an additional condition requiring national criminal pro-
ceedings.82 A generally strict approach to the same provision is also high-
lighted in the report for the UK, this time in connection with a requirement to 
demonstrate self-sufficiency.83  
                                                        
79. See e.g. Case C-310/08 Ibrahim [2010] ECR I-1065, paras 48-50; cf. the reports for 
Denmark and the UK on this point. 
80. See e.g. Case C-529/11 Alarape and Tijani, judgment of 8 May 2013, especially pa-
ras 25 (‘since, according to the Court’s settled case-law, the scope of Article 12 of 
Regulation No 1612/68 extends also to higher education, the date on which a child 
completes his or her education may lie after reaching the age of majority’) and 28 (‘as 
regards the derived right of residence of a parent who cared for a child who has 
reached the age of majority and who is exercising the right to continue his/her educa-
tion in the host Member State, the Court has held that, although that child is in princi-
ple assumed to be capable of meeting his or her own needs, the right of residence of 
that parent may nevertheless extend beyond that age, if the child continues to need the 
presence and the care of that parent in order to be able to pursue and complete his or 
her education’).  
81. There, it is stated that the implementing measure ‘takes into account widely under-
stood education, both obligatory education at school as well as studies, which seems 
to be connected with higher education at the university’. 
82. Article 13(2)(c) has been transposed in Italy as requiring that ‘the concerned person is 
the offended party in criminal proceedings, pending or defined by a judgment of con-
viction for crimes against the person committed within the family’. 
83. See the report for the UK, including references to relevant national case law; cf. the 
finding that a third country national ‘who had obtained a retained right of residence 
following divorce did not lose that right if he subsequently ceased to be employed or 
self-employed’ (referring to Samsam v Secretary of State for the Home Department 
[2011] UKUT 165 (IAC)). 
GENERAL REPORT 
 99
 Most national reports confirm appropriate transposition of the procedural 
safeguards enshrined in Article 15 of the Directive. However, a problem in 
this respect is identified in the report for the UK, concerning ‘access to appeal 
rights for family members in specific instances’ and a requirement of proof of 
the family relationship before a right to appeal is granted. The report notes 
that this practice was highlighted by the Commission in its 2008 report on the 
application of the Directive, but points out that ‘[t]hese issues are yet to be 
addressed by the UK’. 
 Linking back to the discussion on Q1, and to Sections 1.2.1 and 1.7 in par-
ticular, some reports raise questions about the uncertain legal position of 
same sex partners who do not fall within the scope of Article 13(2).84 In that 
context, the extension of the scope of Article 13(2)(a) by a national court in 
the Netherlands to ‘unmarried third country national partners of EU citizens’ 
who can establish that they were in ‘a durable relationship for at least three 
years with an EU citizen, at least one of which was spent living legally in the 
Netherlands’ provides a welcome example of good practice aimed at the 
achievement of effective equal treatment at national level.85 
 Finally, and picking up on another theme noted in Section 1.2.1, a concern 
to ensure that family relationships are genuine re-emerges in some reports 
under Q3 too, reflecting State concerns to identify possible cases of abuse of 
EU rights.86 
3.3. Question 3 – emerging issues and themes 
Broadly speaking, the responses to this question indicate a strong standard of 
rights recognition at the national level with respect to Articles 12-15 of the 
Directive – which may be connected to the degree of detail specified in 
these provisions. 
                                                        
84. See e.g. the reports for Cyprus, the Czech Republic, and the Netherlands (where it is 
reported that ‘the Netherlands has explicitly chosen to treat the non-registered part-
ners of EU citizens in a similar way to spouses or registered partners’). 
85. Cf. however, the report for the UK, where national case law has confirmed that the 
rights conferred on third country nationals by Article 13 of the Directive ‘apply only 
to the dissolution of marriages/civil partnerships and not with respect to durable rela-
tionships’. 
86. See e.g. the report for Finland; however, the report for Ireland indicates that marriages 
of convenience were deemed to be lawful under Irish law by the High Court in Iz-
mailovic v Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform [2011] 2IR 522, paras 22-36. 
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 Confirming themes already identified, the broad picture of transposition 
could be summarised as follows: appropriate implementation of the Directive 
overall, with consistent examples of both more extensive protection and 
problematic additional conditions (or failure to transpose at all) too. A posi-
tive conclusion that can be drawn from this depiction is that we are not, on 
the provisions analysed thus far at least, dealing with widespread or systemic 
transposition breakdown. But there is perhaps a more problematic side to the 
patchy and fragmented picture that results too: fundamentally, how should 
this range and variety of transposition problems be monitored and ad-
dressed effectively by the EU institutions? 
Question 4 
How have Articles 16-21 of the Directive been transposed into national 
law? Has data on the volume of permanent residence been published for 
your Member State? Have any disputes on the interpretation or applica-
tion of these provisions been addressed within national courts or tribu-
nals? 
Article 16 (Permanent residence): General rule for Union citizens and their family 
members 
1. Member State shall have the right of permanent residence there. This right shall not be 
subject to the conditions provided for in Chapter III. 
2. Paragraph 1 shall apply also to family members who are not nationals of a Member 
State and have legally resided with the Union citizen in the host Member State for a con-
tinuous period of five years. 
3. Continuity of residence shall not be affected by temporary absences not exceeding a to-
tal of six months a year, or by absences of a longer duration for compulsory military ser-
vice, or by one absence of a maximum of twelve consecutive months for important reasons 
such as pregnancy and childbirth, serious illness, study or vocational training, or a posting 
in another Member State or a third country. 
4. Once acquired, the right of permanent residence shall be lost only through absence from 
the host Member State for a period exceeding two consecutive years. 
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Article 17: Exemptions for persons no longer working in the host Member State and 
their family members 
... 
Article 18: Acquisition of the right of permanent residence by certain family mem-
bers who are not nationals of a Member State 
Without prejudice to Article 17, the family members of a Union citizen to whom Articles 
12(2) and 13(2) apply, who satisfy the conditions laid down therein, shall acquire the right 
of permanent residence after residing legally for a period of five consecutive years in the 
host Member State. 
4.1. Introduction 
Permanent residence is one of the most significant innovations of Directive 
2004/38. Recital 17 of the preamble proclaims an intention that permanent 
residence ‘would strengthen the feeling of Union citizenship and is a key el-
ement in promoting social cohesion’. In essence, the status attributes signifi-
cance to the fact that an extended period of residence in a host State – a con-
tinuous period of five years, in accordance with conditions and exemptions 
laid down in the Directive – generates a degree of integration that should be 
recognised in a distinctive way.  
 Two concrete examples of that distinctiveness are provided by the fact 
that, first, the right to permanent residence is not subject to the conditions in 
Chapter III of the Directive – including the obligation to be either economi-
cally active or self-sufficient – and, second, permanent residents benefit from 
a greater level of protection against expulsion under Article 28(2), discussed 
in more detail for Q6 below. Further reflecting the sense that Directive 
2004/38 signals an inclination towards more autonomous rights for family 
members in certain circumstances, it is significant that ‘family members who 
are not nationals of a Member State and have legally resided with the Union 
citizen in the host Member State for a continuous period of five years’ (Arti-
cle 16(2)) also acquire the right of permanent residence there.  
 Conditions regarding permitted interruptions to continuity of residence are 
outlined in Article 16(3) and, according to Article 16(4), the right will be lost 
only through absence from the host State for a period exceeding two consecu-
tive years. Articles 17 and 18 set out a series of exemptions and other condi-
tions e.g. relating to acquisition of the right before five years in certain cases, 
and Articles 19-21 outline relevant administrative formalities.  
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 Early case law on permanent residence addressed whether or not periods 
of legal residence completed in States prior to the expiry of the transposition 
period for Directive 2004/38,87 as well as prior to the accession of the host 
State to the Union,88 could be counted towards the acquisition of permanent 
residence – with both points responded to positively by the Court of Justice, 
on the basis that concluding otherwise would deprive the relevant rights of 
their effectiveness.  
 The meaning of ‘residing legally’ has come under scrutiny more recently. 
In Ziolkowski and Szeja, the Court held that the wording of Article 16(1) 
‘does not give any guidance on how the terms “who have resided legally” in 
the host Member State are to be understood’ but that, equally, the Directive 
‘does not contain any reference to national laws as regards the meaning of 
those terms either’.89 The Court thus reasoned that legal residence had to be 
considered as ‘an autonomous concept of European Union law which must be 
interpreted in a uniform manner throughout the Member States’.90 Drawing 
from the general scheme of the Directive, the Court held:  
 [T]he concept of legal residence implied by the terms ‘have resided legally’ in Article 
16(1) ... should be construed as meaning a period of residence which complies with the 
conditions laid down in the directive, in particular those set out in Article 7(1). Conse-
quently, a period of residence which complies with the law of a Member State but does not 
satisfy the conditions laid down in Article 7(1) of Directive 2004/38 cannot be regarded as 
a ‘legal’ period of residence within the meaning of Article 16(1).91  
The Court was careful to point out that its approach does not preclude the ap-
plication of more favourable national provisions.92 However, as a matter of 
EU law, periods of residence in which the self-sufficiency conditions in Arti-
cle 7(1) are not met cannot then be counted towards the acquisition of perma-
nent residence.  
 Another dimension of this issue concerns periods of imprisonment in a 
host State. In Onuekwere, the Court considered the question with respect to 
third country national family members of Union citizens. First, it reasoned 
                                                        
87. Case C-162/09 Lassal [2010] ECR I-9217. 
88. Joined Cases C-424/10 and C-425/10 Ziolkowski and Szeja, judgment of 21 Decem-
ber 2011; Joined Cases C-147/11 and C-148/11 Czop and Punakova, judgment of 6 
September 2012. 
89. Ziolkowski and Szeja, para. 33. 
90. Ziolkowski and Szeja, para. 33. 
91. Ziolkowski and Szeja, paras 46-47. 
92. Ziolkowski and Szeja, para. 50. 
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that the acquisition of permanent residence by family members ‘is dependent 
... not only on the fact that the Union citizen himself satisfies the conditions 
laid down in Article 16(1) ... but also on the fact that those family members 
have resided legally and continuously ‘with’ that citizen for the period in 
question, the word “with” reinforcing the condition that those family mem-
bers must accompany or join that same citizen’.93 The Court went on to em-
phasise the integration of the individual into host State society as a ‘precondi-
tion’ for acquiring permanent residence rights, and thus concluded: 
Such integration ... is based not only on territorial and temporal factors but also on qualita-
tive elements, relating to the level of integration in the host Member State ... to such an ex-
tent that the undermining of the link of integration between the person concerned and the 
host Member State justifies the loss of the right of permanent residence even outside the 
circumstances mentioned in Article 16(4) of Directive 2004/38 ... The imposition of a pris-
on sentence by the national court is such as to show the non-compliance by the person 
concerned with the values expressed by the society of the host Member State in its criminal 
law, with the result that the taking into consideration of periods of imprisonment for the 
purposes of the acquisition by family members of a Union citizen who are not nationals of 
a Member State of the right of permanent residence ... would clearly be contrary to the aim 
pursued by [Directive 2004/38] in establishing that right of residence [emphasis added].94 
The same analysis would presumably apply if the applicant were a Union cit-
izen.95 
 The Court is clear about the fact that it is introducing a precondition ‘out-
side the circumstances’ of the Directive – notwithstanding the stipulation in 
Article 21 TFEU that conditions placed on citizenship rights must be laid 
down in either the Treaty or secondary legislation. Moreover, within the text 
extracted above, we can see potential for other restrictions to be placed on the 
acquisition of permanent residence i.e. imprisonment being just one example 
of a situation that could be seen as an ‘undermining of the link of integration’. 
An illustration is provided by one of the questions recently sent by the High 
Court in Ireland for a preliminary ruling: 
                                                        
93. Case C-378/12 Onuekwere, judgment of 16 January 2014, para. 23.  
94. Onuekwere, paras 25-26. On the same basis, the Court also clarified that imprison-
ment interrupts the ‘continuity of residence’ demanded by Article 16(2) and (3) of the 
Directive. 
95. On the application of Onuekwere to Article 28(3) of the Directive in a case concern-
ing a Portuguese national residing in the UK, see Case C-400/12 MG, judgment of 16 
January 2014. 
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Can it be said that the spouse of an EU national who was not at the time himself a national 
of a Member State has ‘legally resided with the Union citizen in the host Member State for 
a continuous period of five years’ for the purposes of Article 16(2) of Directive 
2004/38/EC2, in circumstances where the couple had married in May 1999, where a right 
of residency was granted in October 1999 and where by early 2002 at the absolute latest 
the parties had agreed to live apart and where both spouses had commenced residing with 
entirely different partners by late 2002?96 
That question seeks to tease out the significance of residing ‘with’ the Union 
citizen – a seemingly simple expression that could turn out to have serious 
consequences here and in similar cases.  
 Another dimension of the decision in Onuekwere worth noting is the 
Court’s reference to the ‘strengthen the feeling’ phrase from recital 17. The 
Court referred to recital 17 for the first time in Lassal, but there, in order to 
apply a broad reading of the objectives and purpose – and thus of the condi-
tions underpinning the acquisition – of permanent residence.97 In Onuekwere, 
Advocate General Bot drew from the same words to contextualise his view 
that ‘citizenship is for the citizen a guarantee of belonging to a political 
community under the rule of law’.98 In its judgment, the Court used recital 17 
to claim that the ‘EU legislature accordingly made the acquisition of the right 
of permanent residence ... subject to the integration of the citizen of the Union 
in the host Member State’.99  
 The invocation of recital 17 in this manner raises two key questions of in-
terest for present purposes. First, in what ways does the status of permanent 
residence engender a second tier of Union citizenship beyond the pointers 
specified in the Directive, such as enhanced protection against expulsion and 
entitlement to social assistance in a host State? To what extent should it? 
How does the ethos of strengthening the feeling of Union citizenship differ (if 
at all) from the Court’s classic characterisation of citizenship as the funda-
mental status of Member State nationals?100 Second, if permanent residence 
cannot be accrued because of non-compliance with ‘the values expressed by 
the society of the host State in its criminal law’, there is a potentially broader 
link here between the specific question of permanent residence and the treat-
ment of criminal convictions more generally in the context of Member State 
expulsion practices – and, relatedly, between how State and EU policies and 
                                                        
96. Case C-244/13 Ogieriakhi, pending; see [2013] OJ C189/12. 
97. Lassal, paras 32 and, in particular, 53. 
98. AG Bot in Onuekwere , paras 51-52 of the Opinion. 
99. Onuekwere , para. 24 (emphasis added). 
100. See e.g. Grzelczyk, para. 31. 
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practices flow backwards and forwards from one level to the other. This issue 
will be picked up again below in the discussion on Q6. But here, alongside 
the ongoing process of judicial interpretation of the scope of permanent resi-
dence at EU level, we sought through Q4 further to enhance understanding of 
the right by looking at its transposition, application, and interpretation at na-
tional level since the entry into force of the Directive. 
4.2. Transposition, application, and interpretation of permanent residence 
The data collected suggest that, on the whole, there has been appropriate 
transposition of the substantive elements of the right to permanent residence – 
i.e. Articles 16-18 – and, once again, it is perhaps useful to recall that these 
provisions of the Directive are quite detailed. Additionally, several reports in-
cluded specific comments about the provisions on administrative formalities 
i.e. Articles 19-21. 
4.2.1. Permanent residence: substantive rights 
We found some evidence of the shift in mindset that the status of permanent 
residence is intended to effect. For example, the report for Finland discusses a 
case in which the Supreme Administrative Court held that an Italian national 
who had resided lawfully in Finland for more than five years was no longer 
required to register his residence there since ‘an ipso jure right of permanent 
residence existed, and a document certifying this [could] be issued upon ap-
plication’. This approach reflects very well the notion that permits merely ev-
idence rather than confer EU rights.101 Similarly, national courts in the UK 
have held that ‘a right to permanent residence ... cannot be lost even by sig-
nificant periods of imprisonment’.102 
 In some reports, the requirement and/or the task of demonstrating compli-
ance with the condition of ‘legally residing’ in the host State was highlighted; 
and it is not uncommon to observe that a strict approach is taken by national 
authorities in this context. In the report for the UK, for example, the authors 
refer to a case in which a claim for permanent residence ‘was rejected on the 
basis that the applicant’s sickness insurance complemented rather than re-
                                                        
101. See similarly, the cases outlined in the report for Sweden. 
102. Report for the UK, referring to Secretary of State for the Home Department v FV (Ita-
ly) [2012] EWCA Civ 1199, in which the Court of Appeal referred to the Court of 
Justice’s decision in Case C-145/09 Tsakouridis [2010] ECR I-11979. 
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placed all services provided by the UK’s publicly-funded National Health 
Service’.103 In the report for the Netherlands, however, it was stated that 
‘[l]egal residence for a continuous period of five years is presumed if the rel-
evant authorities have not withdrawn the residence permit’. 
 There are also instances of more extensive protection being extended un-
der national rules than the baseline set subsequently by EU law. For example, 
it was interesting to note that national ‘practice assimilates imprisonment to 
lawful residence’ in Denmark, a point that has now, as discussed in Section 
4.1, been determined to the contrary by the Court of Justice. The same issue 
is discussed in the report for the UK, where the authors refer to several deci-
sions in which national courts ruled that periods of imprisonment do not 
count towards the acquisition of ‘legal’ residence under Article 16 of the Di-
rective. However, the authors do note that the reference in Onuekwere – seek-
ing definitive clarification of this issue – came from a tribunal in the UK, 
notwithstanding the approach taken consistently in national case law. 
 The importance of guidance from the Court of Justice on the interpretation 
of the Directive is further shown by contrasting a case outlined in the report 
for Ireland with the reasoning of the Court on the same question i.e. counting 
periods of residence in a host State prior to the accession of the State of na-
tionality to the EU.104 In the report for the UK, however, the approach of the 
national courts to periods of residence that do not comply with the require-
ments of the Directive reflects the reasoning of the Court more closely. Im-
portantly, the UK courts distinguish between lawful residence under national 
law or under other frameworks of EU law, on the one hand, and lawful resi-
dence under the Directive, on the other. This issue is discussed in more detail 
under Q7 below. 
 Transposition, application, and interpretation anomalies can, of course, 
stem from ambiguities in the Directive itself. The potential significance of re-
siding ‘with’ a Union citizen for the purposes of Article 16(2) was raised in 
Section 4.1 above, noting a preliminary reference from Ireland currently 
pending before the Court of Justice. A national court in the UK has ruled that 
‘spouses who derive residence rights from a working or self-sufficient Union 
citizen do not have to live in the matrimonial home with that citizen in order 
                                                        
103. Report for the UK (emphasis in original), referring to FK (Kenya) v Secretary of State 
for the Home Department [2010] EWCA Civ 1302. The authors also note that the 
UK’s ‘refusal to view NHS provision as ‘sufficient medical insurance’ in relation to 
Union citizens is currently the subject of infringement proceedings’. 
104. Cf. the decision in B v Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform [2009] IEHC 
447, paras 18-20, with the ruling in Lassal. 
GENERAL REPORT 
 107 
for the residence to be “legal” under Art 16’.105 But the issue is raised in a 
different context in the report for Croatia – since Article 18 of the Directive 
has not been transposed into national law, the author suggests that it is unlike-
ly that family members claiming rights on the basis of Articles 12(2) and 
13(2) could then be granted a right to permanent residence in Croatia in con-
sequence.  
 Providing an example of additional conditionality at national level, the 
significance of having a registered place of residence in Estonia has conse-
quential implications for the acquisition of permanent residence too: ‘the 
concept of legal residence ... in Art 16(1) of the Directive can, in the context 
of the [implementing measure], be construed to mean having a registered 
place of residence in Estonia according to [national law]’. In the report for 
Slovenia, the issuing of a permanent residence permit is made subject to a se-
ries of conditions – some of which (e.g. ‘if there are no grounds to believe 
that his residence in the country would be associated with terrorist or other 
violent acts, illegal intelligence activities, trafficking in drugs, or with the 
commission of any other criminal acts’) differs from the imprisonment situa-
tion considered by the Court in Onuekwere. However, it is a useful illustra-
tion of a point made in Section 4.1 above: the fact that a broader test – i.e. 
‘the non-compliance by the person concerned with the values expressed by 
the society of the host Member State in its criminal law’ – is contained within 
the judgment. 
 Finally, some reports again raised the issue of less favourable treatment of 
different categories of family members. For example, in the report for Den-
mark, it was noted that national rules require a third country national family 
member who has acquired a right of permanent residence to demonstrate that 
they can support other third country national family members who seek to 
join them; whereas family members have an unconditional right to reside 
with a permanently resident Union citizen.106 Other reports discuss the situa-
tion of family members who do not fall within the scope of Article 2(2) of the 
Directive, especially same sex partners in a durable relationship with a Union 
citizen.107 
                                                        
105. See the report for the UK, referring to PM (Turkey) v Secretary of State for the Home 
Department [2011] UKUT 89 (IAC). 
106. Report for Denmark, referring to the contrasting decision of the EFTA Court in Case 
E-4/11 Clauder with respect to the situation of Union citizens. 
107. See e.g. the report for Croatia; cf. the more extensive scope outlined in the reports for 
Finland, and the Netherlands. 
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4.2.2. Procedural rights 
Broadly speaking, national procedures either comply with or surpass the re-
quirements of the Directive in terms of the specifications on timing. For ex-
ample, in the report for Bulgaria, it is noted that permanent residence cards 
are issued ‘on the same day’ for Union citizens (cf. Article 19(2) of the Di-
rective – ‘as soon as possible’) and ‘within one month’ for family members 
who are not Union citizens (cf. Article 20(1) – ‘within six months’).108 But 
transposition anomalies emerge here too. For example, even with respect to 
the clear and unambiguous statement in Article 20(1) that a permanent resi-
dence card ‘shall be renewable automatically every ten years’, the Nether-
lands has transposed the point of renewability as five years. 
 The option of applying ‘proportionate and non-discriminatory sanctions’ 
in cases of failure to apply for a permanent residence card before the current 
residence card expires – provided for in Article 20(2) – has been realised in 
practice. Some States have implemented specific sanctions in this respect; 
others take a more general approach. For example, the report for Bulgaria 
notes that the national implementing act ‘does not lay down specific sanc-
tions for failing to apply for a permanent residence card but stipulates instead 
that ‘minor’ violations of the [act] shall be subject to a fine of [approx. €10]’. 
This contrasts sharply with the enactment of a specific penalty in Cyprus of 
‘up to 1500 Cypriot pounds’ – which amounts to approx. €2500 and thus 
seems unlikely to stand as a ‘proportionate’ sanction. 
 Noting that Article 21 of the Directive provides that ‘continuity of resi-
dence may be attested by any means of proof in use in the host Member 
State’, some reports also provided examples of the types of evidence that 
would normally be used – including e.g. work or rental contracts.109 It is im-
portant to reiterate the general convention that administrative guidance can 
provide examples of evidence that are indicative only and may not exclude 
consideration of other documents or forms of evidence not specified.110 How-
ever, national rules in Denmark expressly provide that permanent residence 
                                                        
108. See also e.g. the report for Finland, where it is noted that ‘[i]n 2012, the average time 
of processing EU citizens’ documents on permanent residence was 14 days and for 
TCN family members 43 days’, and the report for Spain (three months for third coun-
try national family members). 
109. See e.g. the report for Austria; see similarly, the report for the Netherlands, noting 
that ‘the liberal rules on evidence generally adhered to in Dutch administrative law 
apply’. 
110. On this point, see the report for Cyprus. 
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ends where it has been achieved through fraudulent means (e.g. ‘marriage of 
convenience or false declaration’).111 
 Finally, most of the reports include data on applications for permanent res-
idence cards.112 It is difficult to extract general themes on this point, since the 
data provided differ in several key respects e.g. the time period covered. But 
some interesting points of comparison can be noted nonetheless. Some States 
provide information on an annual basis,113 while others publish updated data 
more regularly.114 Some States publish data on both successful and unsuc-
cessful applications,115 while others publish the former only.116 One statistic 
stands out from the report for Finland, however: in 2011 and 2012, applica-
tions for permanent residence amounted to just 0.5% ‘of all alien licenses and 
permits’.117 
4.3. Question 4 – emerging issues and themes 
The issues discussed in connection with the right of permanent residence 
provide an interesting bridge between Q4 and the preceding questions, on the 
one hand, and Qs5-8 below, on the other, in two key respects. First, the pat-
terns and themes that emerge from the national reports on the transposition, 
application, and interpretation of Articles 16-21 mirror in several respects 
the patterns and themes already established for Qs1-3. For example, it is 
confirmed once again that detailed legislative provisions do not preclude 
transposition anomalies altogether – whether these result from clearly diver-
gent (and thus presumably deliberate) national transposition choices or ambi-
guities inherent in the EU measure itself. However, where a greater degree of 
                                                        
111. See similarly, the report for Hungary. 
112. In the report for Greece, it is noted that data on applications for permanent residence 
submitted by EU citizens are not published, in contrast to applications from third 
country national family members; the author traces this distinction to the ‘fragmenta-
tion of powers and competencies’ for the two groups between two different national 
authorities. 
113. See e.g. the report for Hungary. 
114. See e.g. the report for the Czech Republic, referring to the publication of monthly sta-
tistics online; and the report for Spain (‘every three months’). 
115. See e.g. the report for Finland, and the report for the UK (which also discusses statis-
tics on ‘invalid’ applications). 
116. See e.g. the report for Spain. 
117. In the report for Slovenia, it is reported that EEA residence permits amounted to 
‘slightly over 3% of all permanent residence permits issued in 2012’. 
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detail is specified in the EU provisions, a correspondingly higher degree of 
transposition compliance can generally be seen too. 
 Second, the responses to Q4 also raised the importance of the interpre-
tative guidance provided by the Court of Justice. This becomes the focus 
of attention in Qs5-7, where we first explore the interplay between case law 
and certain provisions of the Directive (on equal treatment and expulsion) but 
then move on to consider how national authorities receive and apply case law 
guidance on citizenship rights beyond the Directive altogether – looking, in 
that context, at case law that draws directly from the rights conferred by Arti-
cles 20-21 TFEU in connection with, first, residence rights for third country 
national family members – on which various concerns have already been 
raised under most of the questions discussed thus far – and, second, the shap-
ing of national rules on loss (and acquisition) of nationality. 
Question 5 
How has Article 24(2) of the Directive been transposed into national law? 
Does national law distinguish between the categories specified in Article 
24(2) and jobseekers in terms of entitlement to social benefits? Has Arti-
cle 24(2) displaced the Court of Justice’s ‘real link’ case law before na-
tional courts or tribunals? 
Article 24: Equal treatment 
1. Subject to such specific provisions as are expressly provided for in the Treaty and sec-
ondary law, all Union citizens residing on the basis of this Directive in the territory of the 
host Member State shall enjoy equal treatment with the nationals of that Member State 
within the scope of the Treaty. The benefit of this right shall be extended to family mem-
bers who are not nationals of a Member State and who have the right of residence or per-
manent residence. 
2. By way of derogation from paragraph 1, the host Member State shall not be obliged to 
confer entitlement to social assistance during the first three months of residence or, where 
appropriate, the longer period provided for in Article 14(4)(b), nor shall it be obliged, prior 
to acquisition of the right of permanent residence, to grant maintenance aid for studies, in-
cluding vocational training, consisting in student grants or student loans to persons other 





Article 24(1) of the Directive confirms the fundamental commitment to equal 
treatment expressed in Article 18 TFEU: a principle of non-discrimination on 
the grounds of nationality, with host State nationals as the relevant compara-
tor group. Importantly, and again mapping the Directive’s incremental en-
hancement of rights beyond the derived rights paradigm, Article 24(1) also 
establishes that ‘[t]he benefit of this right shall be extended to family mem-
bers who are not nationals of a Member State and who have the right of resi-
dence or permanent residence’. 
 By focusing here on the derogation outlined in Article 24(2), however, we 
sought, in particular, to gain greater understanding of, first, how case law 
shapes the application and interpretation of the Directive, and, second, how 
national authorities actually manage the resulting hybridity of legal sources.  
 The wording of Article 24(2) is clear. It establishes that a Member State is 
not obliged to confer any entitlement to social assistance (1) during the first 
three months of residence; or (2) cross-referencing to Article 14(4)(b), where 
‘the Union citizens entered the territory of the host Member State in order to 
seek employment’ and noting that ‘the Union citizens and their family mem-
bers may not be expelled for as long as the Union citizens can provide evi-
dence that they are continuing to seek employment and that they have a genu-
ine change of being engaged’. Article 24(2) further provides that prior to the 
acquisition of permanent residence, a Member State is not obliged to provide 
maintenance aid for studies ‘to persons other than workers, self-employed 
persons, persons who retain such status and members of their families’. How-
ever, case law – both prior to and after the entry into force of the Directive – 
has established broader principles.  
 First, with respect to social assistance generally, the Court held in Trojani 
that while Member State nationals who are neither economically active nor 
self-sufficient could not derive a right to reside in another State from Union 
law ‘for want of sufficient resources ... a citizen of the Union who is not eco-
nomically active may rely on [Article 18 TFEU] where he has been lawfully 
resident in the host Member State for a certain time or possesses a residence 
permit.118 On that basis, the Court concluded that ‘national legislation 
[which] does not grant the social assistance benefit to citizens of the Europe-
an Union, non-nationals of the Member State, who reside there lawfully even 
though they satisfy the conditions required of nationals of that Member State, 
                                                        
118. Case C-456/02 Trojani [2004] ECR I-7573, paras 36 and 43 respectively. 
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constitutes discrimination on grounds of nationality prohibited by Article 
[18]’.119 
 Second, the position of jobseekers has long been – and continues to be – 
treated distinctively. Their status under EU law can be traced in three key 
stages. Before the adoption of the Directive, the test captured by Article 
14(4)(b) was developed by the Court in Antonissen, which established that 
jobseekers came within the personal scope of what is now Article 45 
TFEU.120 Next, following the creation of Union citizenship but before the 
adoption of the Directive, the Court took a mixed approach to personal scope 
in Collins, finding that: 
In view of the establishment of citizenship of the Union and the interpretation in the case-
law of the right to equal treatment enjoyed by citizens of the Union, it is no longer possible 
to exclude from the scope of Article [45](2) [TFEU] – which expresses the fundamental 
principle of equal treatment, guaranteed by Article [18 TFEU] – a benefit of a financial 
nature intended to facilitate access to employment in the labour market of a Member 
State.121 
The Court confirmed that a test linking entitlement to jobseeker’s allowance 
with a habitual residence requirement amounted to indirect discrimination 
and could be justified ‘only if it is based on objective considerations that are 
independent of the nationality of the persons concerned and proportionate to 
the legitimate aim of the national provisions’.122 On the first point, the Court 
confirmed that ‘it may be regarded as legitimate for a Member State to grant 
such an allowance only after it has been possible to establish that a genuine 
link exists between the person seeking work and the employment market of 
that State’.123 The Court also provided a framework for assessing the propor-
tionality of such a test: 
[I]ts application by the national authorities must rest on clear criteria known in advance 
and provision must be made for the possibility of a means of redress of a judicial nature. In 
any event, if compliance with the requirement demands a period of residence, the period 
must not exceed what is necessary in order for the national authorities to be able to satisfy 
                                                        
119. Trojani, para. 44. 
120. Case C-292/89 Antonissen [1991] ECR I-745. 
121. Case C-138/02 Collins [2004] ECR I-2703, para. 63 (emphasis added). 
122. Collins, para. 65. 
123. Collins, para. 69. 
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themselves that the person concerned is genuinely seeking work in the employment market 
of the host Member State.124 
The referring court in Vatsouras and Koupatantze explicitly queried the com-
patibility of the restriction laid down in Article 24(2) of the Directive with 
Article 18 TFEU, bearing in mind the case law summarised above. Affirming 
the principles established in Collins, the Court held that ‘the derogation pro-
vided for in Article 24(2) of Directive 2004/38 must be interpreted in accord-
ance with Article [45(2) TFEU]’ – with the result that, in its view, ‘[b]enefits 
of a financial nature which, independently of their status under national law, 
are intended to facilitate access to the labour market cannot be regarded as 
constituting “social assistance” within the meaning of Article 24(2) of Di-
rective 2004/38’.125 
 Finally, third, the granting of maintenance aid to students can be linked to 
two different lines of case law. When migrant students who are lawfully resi-
dent in accordance with national law claim entitlement to the general social 
assistance system of a host State, they fall under the Trojani framework, as 
summarised above.126 Additionally, however, the Court confirmed in Bidar 
that the creation of Union citizenship means that ‘the situation of a citizen of 
the Union who is lawfully resident in another Member State falls within the 
scope of application of the Treaty within the meaning of [Article 18 TFEU] 
for the purposes of obtaining assistance for students, whether in the form of a 
subsidised loan or a grant, intended to cover his maintenance costs’.127 Here, 
the Court focused on a different kind of ‘genuine link’ when compared to the 
labour market connections relevant for jobseekers, confirming that ‘it is thus 
legitimate for a Member State to grant such assistance only to students who 
have demonstrated a certain degree of integration into the society of that 
State’.128 
 Soon after the adoption of the Directive, but before its entry into force, it 
appeared that the Court was abandoning this qualitative understanding of in-
tegration – necessarily assessed on a case-by-case basis – to a more rigid five-
                                                        
124. Collins, para. 72. 
125. Joined Cases C-22/08 and C-23/08 Vatsouras and Koupatantze [2009] ECR I-
4585, paras 44-45 (emphasis added). 
126. See e.g. Case C-184/99 Grzelczyk [2001] ECR I 6193. 
127. Case C-209/03 Bidar [2005] ECR I-2119. 
128. Bidar, para. 57; the Court also held that residence requirements could capture the 
relevant ‘guarantee of sufficient integration into the society of the host Member 
State’ (para. 60). 
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year rule, mapping the text of Article 24(2).129 However, when national rules 
do not fit directly with the express exclusions listed in that provision, the 
‘genuine link’ approach will still be applied. Indeed, in Prinz and Seeberger, 
the Court recently expanded on both the meaning of this test and how to 
demonstrate its fulfilment: 
[T]he proof required ... must not be too exclusive in nature or unduly favour one element 
which is not necessarily representative of the real and effective degree of connection be-
tween the claimant and this Member State, to the exclusion of all other representative ele-
ments ... Although the existence of a certain level of integration may be regarded as estab-
lished by the finding that a student has resided in the Member State where he may apply 
for an education or training grant for a certain period, a sole condition of residence ... risks 
... excluding from funding students who, despite not having resided for an uninterrupted 
period of three years in [the State] immediately prior to studying abroad, are nevertheless 
sufficiently connected to [that] society. That may be the case where the student is a nation-
al of the State concerned and was educated there for a significant period or on account of 
other factors such as, in particular, his family, employment, language skills or the existence 
of other social and economic factors.130 
Relatedly, the Court has stressed that Article 24(2), as a derogation from the 
principle of equal treatment, must be interpreted narrowly. It therefore held in 
Commission v Austria that while reduced transport fares granted to certain 
students did ‘constitute maintenance aid for them, only maintenance aid for 
studies “consisting in student grants or student loans” come within the dero-
gation from ... equal treatment provided for in Article 24(2)’.131 The Court 
has also adopted a generous approach to the definition of a worker in this 
context, preserving the special position created by Article 24(2) for the eco-
nomically active vis-à-vis entitlement to study grants.132 
 All in all, by layering the multiplicity of principles established through 
case law over the wording of Article 24(2) of the Directive, a complicated 
picture of entitlement to social assistance is constructed. Social security sys-
tems across the Member States already differ in fundamental respects. Rules 
                                                        
129. Case C-158/07 Förster [2008] ECR I-8507. 
130. Joined Cases C-523/11 & C-585/11 Prinz and Seeberger, para. 42, paras 37-38. 
131. Case C-75/11 Commission v Austria, judgment of 4 October 2012, paras 54-55. 
132. See e.g. Case C-413/01 Ninni-Orasche [2003] ECR I-13187; and Case C-46/12 LN, 
judgment of 21 February 2013. The latter was described as a ‘shock for politicians’ 
in the report for Denmark, which also notes that the ruling ‘reactivated in the media 
fears of social tourism with its waves of students especially from Eastern EU-
countries invading Danish universities’ – these issues are picked up again in the 
discussion on Q15 below. 
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on access to benefits that qualify as ‘social assistance’ are scattered across 
different measures and different processes within those systems. The national 
legal frameworks that are relevant or potentially relevant here can therefore 
seem maze-like even when taken on their own; aiming to compare them 
brings an additional challenge. We have thus focused our remarks in this sec-
tion on specific issues connected to Article 24(2) only, exploring the extent to 
which the complexity of the blended Directive/case law framework also af-
fects the application and implementation of the provision in national practice. 
5.2. Transposition, application, and interpretation of Article 24(2) 
Many reports suggest that while there is no specific transposition of Article 
24(2) into national law, the limitations on access to social assistance that the 
provision establishes can be identified across fragmented pockets of national 
rules.133 We also found evidence of understandable (in our view) confusion, 
as national lawmakers and other national authorities try to grapple with both 
the implications and the outer parameters of the Court’s case law. 
5.2.1. First three months of residence (and beyond) 
Reports that address the first three months of residence normally do so to 
confirm that any entitlement to social assistance for Union citizens is exclud-
ed.134 However, some States provide for temporary assistance during this 
time period if exceptional circumstances materialise – e.g. ‘if their living cir-
cumstances so require’ (report for Croatia); ‘anyone in need of urgent sup-
port’ (report for Finland). These examples provide another illustration of the 
reasonable burden that a certain degree of financial solidarity could be said 
to require.135 In the same context, but sending a rather different message, the 
report for Denmark notes that national law provides ‘financial help to get 
back home’ for short-term residents and jobseekers.  
 Another example discussed in the report for Denmark provides an apt il-
lustration of disconnect in Union citizenship law between residence rights 
                                                        
133. See e.g. the reports for Bulgaria, Croatia, Denmark, Estonia, and the UK. 
134. See e.g. the reports for Denmark, and France. Some reports do distinguish between 
an exclusion of entitlement for citizens who are not economically active and con-
firmation of entitlement for workers or the self-employed (see e.g. the report for 
Germany). 
135. See again, Grzelczyk, para. 44. 
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and self-sufficiency, on the one hand, and support in exceptional circum-
stances, on the other. The issue concerns access to shelter homes for home-
less persons who are nationals of other Member States. The report establishes 
that, according to Danish law, shelter homes ‘which are to some extent State-
funded shall only accept persons who are legally residing in the country’ – a 
status that has been ‘interpreted restrictively as excluding undocumented citi-
zens (i.e. those who do not have a registration certificate, a residence card or 
a Danish health card)’. But the report points out that, first, Member State na-
tionals have an unconditional right to reside in Denmark for three months (or 
longer if seeking employment) without a registration document; and, second, 
that registration documents are not, in any event, constitutive of the residence 
rights conferred by EU law. The limitations on access to State-funded shelter 
would appear to be justifiable, however, in light of Article 24(2) regarding 
the first three months of residence (or longer for jobseekers, recalling that 
Vatsouras and Kouptantze privileges benefits that ‘facilitate access to the la-
bour market’ only) and in light of the Article 7(1) self-sufficiency require-
ment for residence longer than three months. But a technically lawful out-
come does not always sit well with broader commitments to dignity and soli-
darity that underpin the Directive and the idea of Union citizenship. 
 The significance of lawful residence appears in the report for Estonia in a 
different way, noting that access to social benefits is granted to ‘Union citi-
zens and their family members who have the right of residence in Estonia’ 
(emphasis in original). That right is, in turn, linked to registration of the place 
of residence. Significantly, the author notes that while there is ‘no require-
ment to register a place of residence during the first three months of a per-
son’s stay in Estonia, there is nothing to prevent a Union citizen from doing 
so. Consequently, there do not seem to be any exceptions that would specifi-
cally limit access to social assistance’ during that period.  
 A similar framework – emphasising residence registration – is outlined in 
the report for Hungary. Interestingly, the report notes that the obligation not 
to become an unreasonable burden applies to ‘all groups’ i.e. including the 
economically active. Linking back to the discussion in Section 2.3 above, it is 
also noted that recourse to social benefits for more than three months must be 
reported to the immigration authorities, who then ‘decide on a case by case 
basis whether the person has sufficient resources in order not to become an 
unreasonable burden on the social assistance system of Hungary’. But it is al-
so reported that ‘in practice not a single case has ever been reported in which 
the right to [free movement] was withheld because of lack of financial re-
sources and recourse to the social protection system’. 
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5.2.2. A special position for jobseekers? 
Few reports outline a clear distinction in national law between access to so-
cial assistance generally and access to jobseeker’s allowance specifically.136 
This does not necessarily mean that jobseekers are treated less favourably 
than the case law requires.137 However, that outcome138 or the risk of such an 
outcome139 is explicitly alluded to in some reports. 
 The situation is more tangled in most States. For example, the report for 
Germany distinguishes between jobseekers qua EU law and persons who do 
not meet those criteria – e.g. persons who are not looking for a job, such as 
pensioners, persons with illnesses, or parents focusing on childcare; or per-
sons who do not meet the Antonissen criteria because of absence of genuine 
willingness to commence work or sustained failure to secure employment be-
cause of lack of skills – but may still be eligible for certain social benefits if 
they are in a position to work as a matter of principle. In the report for the 
Netherlands, it is stated that ‘[n]ational law does not distinguish between the 
categories specified in Article 24(2) and jobseekers. Just like the categories 
specified in [that provision], job seekers do not have a right to receive social 
benefits’. However, it is also confirmed there that ‘the ‘real link’ test is still 
used as an additional test, in order to verify whether there are grounds on 
which a right to social benefits ... may not be denied to an EU citizen under 
Article 18 TFEU’ – and alongside national decisions on maintenance aid for 
studies, case law applying the test to the situation of (inter alia) jobseekers is 
also referenced.  
 In contrast, in the report for Germany, it is observed that domestic courts 
have mostly ignored the EU law requirement that applicants must demon-
strate a real link with the German labour market. Rather, the question that is 
outlined in detail in the report concerns a hangover from Vatsouras and Kou-
patantze i.e. whether or not the Court intended to draw a distinction between 
the entitlement of jobseekers to benefits specifically aimed at ‘facilitating ac-
                                                        
136. But see e.g. the report for Cyprus (however, a more nuanced position emerges from 
the discussion of national practices). See also, the reports for Ireland, and Sweden 
(which also references case law on the scope of the status of jobseeker); and the re-
port for the UK, noting the consequential implications outlined vis-à-vis access to 
other social benefits. 
137. See e.g. the discussion in the report for Finland. 
138. See e.g. the report for Italy: ‘jobseekers do not enjoy the right to social assistance 
and are equated to EU citizens during the first three months of residence’. 
139. See e.g. the report for Greece. 
NIAMH NIC SHUIBHNE & JO SHAW 
 118 
cess to the labour market’ – clearly outwith the scope of the derogation in Ar-
ticle 24(2) – and their entitlement to more general subsistence benefits. In 
that context, the report traces the background in national case law to a prelim-
inary reference seeking clarification of this point that is currently pending be-
fore the Court of Justice.140 It is noted in the report for Denmark that first-
time jobseekers are excluded from ‘entitlement to a non-contributory benefit 
ensuring a minimum means of subsistence’ – a restriction that the rapporteur 
queries in light of the Court of Justice’s case law as ‘this benefit can be as-
similated to a jobseeker allowance since it is conditional upon the person be-
ing available to work and actively looking for employment’ (emphasis add-
ed).141 These contrasting examples underscore the need for clear guidance 
from Luxembourg. 
5.2.3. Access to maintenance aid for studies 
In a minority of States, Union citizens have full access to maintenance aid for 
studies either without any apparent restrictions142 or subject to conditions 
lower than the five-year threshold in Article 24(2).143 In most reports, howev-
er, the exclusion permitted by Article 24(2) has been transposed into national 
rules.144 The converse of this position could be expressed, more positively, as 
confirming entitlement to study grants for workers, self-employed persons, 
persons who retain such status and members of their families, as well as for 
permanently resident Union citizens.145 
 However, even where formal rules specify a five-year rule, the require-
ment to evaluate the degree to which applicants for study grants can demon-
strate a genuine link to the society of the host State appears to be recognised 
in parallel in some States146 – interestingly, the report for France suggests a 
more successful embedding of this test with respect to students than is the 
case for jobseekers. 
 But we can also find examples of unduly restrictive practices. For exam-
ple, linking back to the decision of the Court of Justice in LN – in which it 
                                                        
140. Case C-333/13 Dano, pending; [2013] OJ C226/9. 
141. See relatedly, the decision in Case C-367/11 Prete, judgment of 25 October 2012. 
142. See e.g. the report for Bulgaria. 
143. See e.g. the reports for Hungary, and the UK. 
144. See e.g. the reports for Denmark, and Germany. 
145. See e.g. the report for Finland. 
146. See e.g. the report for Sweden – in this case, however, the ‘real link’ test originates 
from national rather than EU law; see also, the report for the UK. 
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was confirmed that even ‘[t]he fact that the person entered the territory of the 
host Member State with the principal intention of pursuing a course of study 
is not relevant for determining whether he is a “worker” within the meaning 
of Article 45 TFEU’ (para. 51) – the ability to apply for study loans in Esto-
nia is nevertheless restricted to Union citizens (and their family members) 
who have acquired a right to permanent residence, ‘regardless of whether the 
Union citizens simultaneously fall under the category or worker, self-
employed person or someone who has retained such status’. 
5.3. Question 5 – emerging issues and themes 
The transposition, application, and interpretation of Article 24(2) exemplifies 
the acute and persistent tension in Union citizenship law between limits 
expressly placed on movement and residence rights by legislation, on the one 
hand, and an ambition to give meaningful effect to the rights conferred by the 
Treaty through case law, on the other. 
 The significance of the shaping of the Directive by the Court of Justice 
cannot be overstated. That judicial work guides the realisation of Union citi-
zenship rights and also the national practices that deliver those rights in reali-
ty. But the functions and purposes of interpretation can become frustrat-
ed when case law becomes unduly complex, potentially endangering rather 
than supporting the implementation of rights. 
 Another facet of the relationship between codification and interpretation 
concerns the mechanisms and priorities of enforcement. Broadly speaking, 
the wording of Article 24(2) is, when transposed at all, transposed correctly. 
However, when national measures or practices are measured against the pe-
numbra of related case law, a different reading of compliance with EU law 
materialises. How should these dynamics be managed? 
Question 6 
Please describe how the national courts and tribunals have understood, 
applied and differentiated between the concepts of ‘public policy, public 
security or public health‘ (Article 27), ‘serious grounds of public policy or 
public security’ and ‘imperative grounds of public security’ (Article 28). 
How has the principle of proportionality been understood and applied in 
these contexts? How have the national courts and tribunals taken account 
of considerations such as how long the individual concerned has resided 
on its territory, his/her age, state of health, family and economic situation, 
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social and cultural integration into the host Member State and the extent 
of his/her links with the country of origin? 
Restrictions on the right of entry and the right of residence on grounds of public poli-
cy, public security or public health 
Article 27: General principles 
1. Subject to the provisions of this Chapter, Member States may restrict the freedom of 
movement and residence of Union citizens and their family members, irrespective of na-
tionality, on grounds of public policy, public security or public health. These grounds shall 
not be invoked to serve economic ends. 
2. Measures taken on grounds of public policy or public security shall comply with the 
principle of proportionality and shall be based exclusively on the personal conduct of the 
individual concerned. Previous criminal convictions shall not in themselves constitute 
grounds for taking such measures. 
The personal conduct of the individual concerned must represent a genuine, present and 
sufficiently serious threat affecting one of the fundamental interests of society. Justifica-
tions that are isolated from the particulars of the case or that rely on considerations of gen-
eral prevention shall not be accepted. 
... 
Article 28: Protection against expulsion 
1. Before taking an expulsion decision on grounds of public policy or public security, the 
host Member State shall take account of considerations such as how long the individual 
concerned has resided on its territory, his/her age, state of health, family and economic sit-
uation, social and cultural integration into the host Member State and the extent of his/her 
links with the country of origin. 
2. The host Member State may not take an expulsion decision against Union citizens or 
their family members, irrespective of nationality, who have the right of permanent resi-
dence on its territory, except on serious grounds of public policy or public security. 
3. An expulsion decision may not be taken against Union citizens, except if the decision is 
based on imperative grounds of public security, as defined by Member States, if they: 
(a) have resided in the host Member State for the previous ten years; or 
(b) are a minor, except if the expulsion is necessary for the best interests of the child, as 





Chapter IV of Directive 2004/38 establishes the framework within which 
Member States may ‘restrict the freedom of movement and residence of Un-
ion citizens and their family members’ i.e. on grounds of public policy (better 
captured by the French term, ordre public), public security, or public health 
(Article 27). Additionally, Article 28 confirms that States may take an expul-
sion decision against Union citizens or their family members on the same (or 
versions of the same) grounds.147  
 These provisions provide an excellent example of judicial/legislative syn-
ergy, since several of the phrases and tests now codified in the Directive 
come from classic (and now repealed) legislative measures as interpreted by 
the case law. In particular, Article 3(1) of Directive 64/221 had provided that 
‘[m]easures taken on grounds of public policy or of public security shall be 
based exclusively on the personal conduct of the individual concerned’. This 
phrase is restated in Article 27(2) of Directive 2004/38, but it is followed by 
the explanation that, first, such conduct ‘must represent a genuine, present 
and sufficiently serious threat affecting one of the fundamental interests of 
society’ and, second, conversely, measures relying on ‘considerations of gen-
eral prevention shall not be accepted’ – principles developed by the Court.148  
 The discretion accorded to Member States in this context is further cur-
tailed by more general interpretive principles. First, the basic convention that 
free movement rights must be interpreted broadly whereas derogations must 
be construed strictly is obviously relevant here.149 The implications of this 
approach were explained in Jipa: 
                                                        
147. Article 29(1) outlines the scope of public health in this context: ‘diseases with epi-
demic potential as defined by ... the World Health Organisation and other infectious 
diseases or contagious parasitic diseases if they are the subject of protection provi-
sions applying to nationals of the host Member State’. It is important also to note the 
protection contained in Article 29(2): ‘[d]iseases occurring after a three-month period 
from the date of arrival shall not constitute ground for expulsion from the territory’. 
Given the limited parameters of Article 29, we did not pursue its application further 
through the questionnaire. For an example provided in the area of public health, see 
the report for Cyprus on OFU v Republic, Case Number 857/2010, judgment of 24 
April 2013. 
148. See e.g. Case 30/77 Bouchereau [1977] ECR 1999, para. 35; Case 67/74 Bonsignore 
[1975] ECR 297, para. 7. 
149. See e.g. Case 41/74 Van Duyn [1974] ECR 1337, para. 18; Case 36/75 Rutili [1975] 
ECR 1219, paras 26-27. 
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[W]hile Member States essentially retain the freedom to determine the requirements of 
public policy and public security in accordance with their national needs, which can vary 
from one Member State to another and from one era to another, the fact still remains that, 
in the [Union] context and particularly as justification for a derogation from the fundamen-
tal principle of free movement of persons, those requirements must be interpreted strictly, 
so that their scope cannot be determined unilaterally by each Member State without any 
control by the [Union] institutions.150 
The finding was amplified even further by citizenship: ‘a particularly restric-
tive interpretation of the derogations from that freedom is required by virtue 
of a person’s status as a citizen of the Union’ (para. 41, emphasis added). Af-
ter all, as the Court has frequently asserted, Union citizenship is ‘destined to 
be the fundamental status of nationals of the Member States’.151  
 Second, the importance of taking any restriction or expulsion decisions in 
line with the requirements of proportionality is reinforced both by the general 
reference to the principle in Article 27(2) and in the more specific instructions 
about consideration of individual circumstances detailed in Article 28(1) – a 
template for which the origins can, once again, be traced in the case law.152 
 It is also important to emphasise the statement in Article 27(2) that 
‘[p]revious criminal convictions shall not in themselves constitute grounds 
for the taking of such measures’. In Orfanopoulos and Oliveri, the Court in-
terpreted this limit (which comes from Article 3(2) of Directive 64/221) as 
part of the general scheme of public policy: 
While it is true that a Member State may consider that the use of drugs constitutes a danger 
for society such as to justify special measures against foreign nationals who contravene its 
laws on drugs, the public policy exception must, however, be interpreted restrictively, with 
the result that the existence of a previous criminal conviction can justify an expulsion only 
in so far as the circumstances which gave rise to that conviction are evidence of personal 
conduct constituting a present threat to the requirements of public policy ...153 
The Court thus held that national systems where an expulsion measure ‘au-
tomatically follows a criminal conviction, without any account being taken of 
the personal conduct of the offender or of the danger which that person repre-
                                                        
150. Case C-33/07 Jipa [2008] ECR I-5157, para. 23. 
151. Joined Cases C-482/01 and C-493/01 Orfanopoulos and Oliveri [2004] ECR I-5257, 
para. 65. 
152. See e.g. Orfanopoulos and Oliveri, paras 95-99. 
153. Orfanopoulos and Oliveri, para. 67 (emphasis added), citing Case C-348/96 Calfa 
[1999] ECR I-11, paras 22-24. 
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sents for the requirements of public policy’ are contrary to EU law.154 More 
specifically, national authorities must remember that ‘the previous criminal 
conviction of the person concerned is not by itself sufficient to permit the 
view to be taken, automatically, that he represents a genuine, present and suf-
ficiently serious threat to one of the fundamental interests of society, that be-
ing the sole possible justification for a restriction on the rights conferred on 
him by European Union law’.155 
 Chapter IV also establishes relevant procedural safeguards.156 First, while 
the Directive does not deal expressly with how Member States should frame 
exclusion orders in terms of duration, Article 32(1) provides that ‘[p]ersons 
excluded on grounds of public policy or public security may submit an appli-
cation for lifting of the exclusion order after a reasonable period, depending 
on the circumstances, and in any event after three years from enforcement of 
the final exclusion order ... by putting forward arguments to establish that 
there has been a material change in the circumstances which justified the de-
cision ordering their exclusion’. Second, and again reflecting the ruling in 
Orfanopoulos and Oliveri, Article 33(1) prohibits the issuing of expulsion 
orders ‘as a penalty or legal consequence of a custodial penalty, unless they 
conform to the requirements of Articles 27, 28 and 29’ of the Directive. 
 Finally, it is significant that Article 28 of the Directive introduces distinc-
tions vis-à-vis the level of protection provided to different categories of per-
sons for the first time. According to Article 28(2), Union citizens (or their 
family members) who have the right of permanent residence may only be ex-
pelled from the host State on ‘serious’ grounds of public policy or public se-
curity. Article 28(3) then establishes that only decisions based on ‘imperative 
grounds of public security’ may be taken against Union citizens who have re-
sided in the host State for the previous ten years, or are minors (unless the 
expulsion is necessary for their best interests). The Court interpreted the 
scope of ‘imperative grounds of public security’ in Tsakouridis: 
It follows from the wording and scheme of Article 28 ... that by subjecting all expulsion 
measures in the cases referred to in Article 28(3) ... to the existence of ‘imperative 
grounds’ of public security, a concept which is considerably stricter than that of ‘serious 
grounds’ within the meaning of Article 28(2), the European Union legislature clearly in-
tended to limit measures based on Article 28(3) to ‘exceptional circumstances’, as set out 
in recital 24 in the preamble to that directive. The concept of ‘imperative grounds of public 
security’ presupposes not only the existence of a threat to public security, but also that such 
                                                        
154. Orfanopoulos and Oliveri, para. 68. 
155. Case C-430/10 Gaydarov [2011] ECR I-11637, para. 38 (emphasis added). 
156. On which, see more generally, Case C-300/11 ZZ, judgment of 4 June 2013. 
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a threat is of a particularly high degree of seriousness ... As regards public security, the 
Court has held that this covers both a Member State’s internal and its external security ... 
The Court has also held that a threat to the functioning of the institutions and essential pub-
lic services and the survival of the population, as well as the risk of a serious disturbance to 
foreign relations or to peaceful coexistence of nations, or a risk to military interests, may 
affect public security ...157 
The Court held that ‘objectives such as the fight against crime in connection 
with dealing in narcotics as part of an organised group’ could fall within that 
definition.158 However, its framing of the test in PI around conduct ‘constitut-
ing a particularly serious threat to one of the fundamental interests of society, 
which might pose a direct threat to the calm and physical security of the pop-
ulation and thus be covered by the concept of “imperative grounds of public 
security”’ has been criticised.159  
 Finally, and mirroring the discussion in Section 4.1 above, the Court has 
also held that ‘periods of imprisonment cannot be taken into account for the 
purposes of granting the enhanced protection provided for in Article 28(3)(a) 
... and that, in principle, such periods interrupt the continuity of the period of 
residence for the purposes of that provision’.160 
 Being permitted to enter and/or remain in a host State is the very crux of 
free movement – these are the gateway points to most of the other rights con-
ferred by the Treaties and by relevant legislation. In consequence, the frame-
work established by the Directive, read in light of the case law interpreting 
the relevant principles and tests, sets a deliberately high threshold of protec-
tion for Union citizens and their family members against restrictions of their 
free movement rights, up to and including expulsion measures. But it is, of 
course, a palpable intrusion into and adjustment of the national immigration 
sovereignty otherwise practised by States.161 
 In this part of the questionnaire, we sought to examine the extent to which 
the high standards intended by EU law are applied by national authorities in 
                                                        
157. Case C-145/09 Tsakouridis [2010] ECR I-11979, paras 40-44 (emphasis added). 
158. Tsakouridis, para. 45. 
159. Case C-348/09 PI, judgment of 22 May 2012, para. 28; for comment, see D. 
Kochenov and B. Pirker, ‘Deporting citizens within the European Union: a counter-
intuitive trend in Case C-348/09 PI v Oberbürgermeisterin der Stadt Remscheid’ 
(2013) Columbia Journal of European Law 369. 
160. Case C-400/12 MG, judgment of 16 January 2014, para. 33. 
161. A statement from the Supreme Court of Cyprus noted in that report captures this 
point well: ‘the deportation order, especially in cases where public order is affected, 
does not have a punitive character but is rather an expression of state sovereignty’ 
(Krisztian Bekefi v Republic, Case Number 293/2012, judgment of 7 March 2012). 
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practice. It can be noted from the outset that, regrettably, the gap between the 
articulation of citizenship law in principle and the application of citizenship 
law in practice is perhaps wider here than we found for any other part of the 
questionnaire.  
6.2. Restrictions on free movement law: the gap(s) between principle and 
practice 
The national reports provided extensive responses to Q6, which are summa-
rised here as follows. First, we tend to think about public policy or public se-
curity primarily in connection with expulsion measures, but it is important to 
recognise that States restrict free movement rights at the points of entry to or 
exit from their territories too (Section 6.2.1). We then present the data rele-
vant to expulsion measures (Section 6.2.2), aiming to compare the threshold 
applied in practice with the framework communicated by the Directive. Three 
issues are outlined in more detail – bans on re-entry; where abuse of rights 
concerns fit in the restriction framework; and whether or not the three levels 
of protection indicated by Articles 27 and 28 are materialising in practice. 
The application of proportionality/consideration of individual circumstances 
is examined separately in Section 6.3.  
6.2.1. Restrictions on entry to and exit from Member States 
The standards that we normally think about in the context of expulsion apply 
to restrictions on movement and residence more generally too, as confirmed 
by the general ‘restriction’ language in Article 27(1) and (2) of the Directive 
in particular. The language used in several national reports conveys this point 
clearly too.162 For example, in the report for Estonia, the quashing by the 
court of appeal of a ban on entry addressed to a Finnish citizen is connected 
to the prohibition of measures taken on ‘considerations of general prevention’ 
in Article 27(2) of the Directive.  
 This unified approach contrasts with the distinction drawn between refus-
ing entry and requiring deportation in the report for Finland, where it is noted 
that: 
[T]he threshold for the former is far lower than for the latter. In practice, EU citizens, their 
family members or other relatives have been refused entry on the basis of fairly minor of-
                                                        
162. See e.g. the report for Denmark. 
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fences. According to the information obtained from the Finnish Immigration Service, even 
the suspicion of having committed an offence has led to refusing entry into Finland. Repet-
itive petty theft and shoplifting, drug offences (other than for minor self-use) and multiple 
cases of driving while seriously intoxicated have, also led to the refusal of entry. Such 
criminal behaviour and the refusal of entry related thereto are justified under ‘public order 
and security’ [emphasis added]. 
The practices outlined above are explained as applying more specifically to 
‘EU citizens whose residence has not been registered and their family mem-
bers or other relatives who have not been issued with a residence card’. Even 
so, however, while such decisions may be limited to that specific context and 
be based on the personal conduct of the individual concerned, they appear to 
take little account of either the proportionality or ‘genuine, present and suffi-
ciently serious threat to one of the fundamental interest of society’ tests that 
must pervade all national measures taken on grounds of public policy or pub-
lic security according to Article 27(1).163 
 In the report for Greece, reference is made to a case in which a Polish na-
tional was ‘denied a registration certificate on the sole ground that she had 
been recently convicted to a minor sentence for insulting a police officer’ – 
here, the Council of State overturned that decision. However, the Council of 
State upheld a similar decision taken in 2008 ‘on the sole ground that [the ap-
plicant, a Romanian national] had been convicted for committing a series of 
burglaries over a long period of time and for illegally entering Greece’ – but 
the convictions dated ‘back from 1998-2002’, raising doubts about the extent 
to which the applicant was really a present threat. 
 Restricting the right to leave a Member State is discussed in detail in the 
report for Bulgaria, outlining cases challenging the legality under EU law of 
restrictions placed on Bulgarian citizens because of the commission of a 
criminal offence while residing in another State, or having a tax, social secu-
rity, or private debt of more than approx. €2500. In a related preliminary rul-
ing, the Court of Justice held that ‘the right of free movement of Union citi-
zens is not unconditional but may be subject to the limitations and conditions 
imposed by the Treaty and by the measures adopted to give it effect’.164 Arti-
cle 4 of the Directive, which articulates the right of exit, does not 
acknowledge the permissibility of national restrictions on that right. How-
ever, the Court noted that relevant ‘limitations and conditions stem, in partic-
                                                        
163. Cf. the report for Slovenia, noting consideration of these grounds by courts reviewing 
decisions denying temporary residence permits for family members. 
164. Gayadarov, para. 39. 
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ular, from Article 27(1) of Directive 2004/38’,165 going on to emphasise the 
general principles that should guide the application of that provision as well 
as the right to effective judicial review of related national decisions. The dis-
cussion in the national report also provides a useful illustration of cases 
where national, EU, and ECHR law overlap, yet lead to different outcomes in 
substance. 
6.2.2. Deporting Union citizens and their family members: is the framework 
of the Directive being applied in practice? 
It should first be noted that in some of the national reports, a finding that na-
tional practice is closely aligned to the case law of the Court of Justice is 
clearly presented.166 Additionally, even where more problematic aspects of 
national case law are discussed below, it should be pointed out that there are 
also examples of case law – including in the same States – where compliance 
with EU legal standards is clear.167 However, there are multiple examples in 
the national reports that illustrate a profoundly problematic understanding 
and/or application of the EU legal framework on expulsion. Most expulsion 
decisions are taken in connection with criminal convictions,168 and reports 
point to difficulties in connection with demonstrating a present threat on the 
basis of past convictions;169 as well as the question of managing cumulative 
convictions.170  
 On the first point, we did find evidence of efforts to establish patterns of 
behaviour that would fit with the ‘genuine, present and sufficiently serious 
threat’ test in Article 27(2) of the Directive, as well as its statement that pre-
                                                        
165. Gayadarov, para. 30; on the legality of debt-linked restrictions, see Case C-434/10 
Aladzhov [2011] ECR I-11659 (public debt) and Case C-249/11 Byankov, judgment 
of 4 October 2012 (private debt). 
166. See e.g. the report for Austria, where the Court’s interpretation of public security, in 
particular, is clearly traced within national case law. 
167. See e.g. the text in the report for Denmark linked to notes 49-52. 
168. See statements to the same effect in e.g. the reports for France, Germany, and the UK. 
169. See e.g. decisions of the Regional Administrative Court in Warsaw on this point out-
lined in the report for Poland. 
170. See e.g. the report for Sweden. 
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vious criminal convictions shall not in themselves constitute grounds for ex-
pulsion.171 In the report for the UK, for example, it was noted that: 
The risk of re-offending is often central to the question of whether the appellant poses a 
present threat and to whether deportation is proportionate. Following Tsakouridis, this risk 
is increasingly assessed by reference to the potential impact of deportation on the rehabili-
tation and social integration of the EU citizen/family member concerned. The ‘European’ 
dimension to this question is acknowledged. Thus, the Court of Appeal has stated that 
‘common sense would suggest a degree of shared interest between the EEA countries in 
helping progress towards a better form of life’.172 
More typically, however, we find evidence of what could be described as 
‘expulsion reflex’. Also in the report for the UK, for example, the authors 
acknowledge that ‘national courts consistently take into account factors such 
as the applicant’s social, familial and cultural links in the UK and compare 
them with, for instance, the individual’s knowledge of the language of his/her 
Member State of origin, and the availability (or not) of familial and financial 
support in that State’. However, they also provide ‘examples of a potentially 
tokenistic consideration of these questions resulting from a possible tendency 
by the national courts to overlook personal circumstances or use a one size 
fits all approach to personal wealth’. 
 Examples of cases where the expectations set by EU law made scant im-
pact also include the discussion in the report for Cyprus of the Vorel case – 
where a deportation order was issued following the Romanian applicant’s ar-
rest even though he had ‘no criminal record; had no prior conviction and no 
criminal proceedings were pending against him’.173 In the report for Den-
mark, the expulsion and exclusion for five years of two Polish nationals 
‘convicted of stealing in a supermarket and sentenced to 60 days [in] prison’ 
is noted – with the Supreme Court confirming that the offences committed 
‘were a serious threat to the public order and security’.174 
                                                        
171. See e.g. the text in the report for Denmark linked to notes 53 and 56-58; linking ques-
tions about ‘whether there is a tangible risk of repetition of criminal offences’ to pro-
portionality assessments, see the report for Germany. 
172. Report for the UK (emphasis in original), citing Flaneur’s Application for Judicial 
Review, Re [2011] NICA 72. 
173. Anghel Vorel v Republic, Case Number 1064/2012, judgment of 2 August 2012; the 
order preventing the applicant from re-entering Cyprus was subsequently suspended 
by the Supreme Court. 




 In the majority of cases, courts – and mainly higher courts175 – have over-
turned unsubstantiated (from the EU law perspective) expulsion decisions 
taken by administrative authorities. But how many applicants do not chal-
lenge an expulsion measure; and of those who do, how many persist through 
the appellate chain? 
 On the second point, about cumulative offences, the report for the Nether-
lands highlights a ministerial statement from 2011 that ‘the accumulation of 
offences (that individually would not reach the threshold of constituting a 
threat to a fundamental interest of society) could together be considered to 
meet that threshold’. Interestingly, it is observed that the Commission ‘did 
not raise any objections to this new approach, whereas the judiciary has been 
careful to check whether the behaviour of the individual concerned still con-
stitutes a genuine and sufficiently serious threat to a fundamental interest of 
society’. The report cites the decision of the Court of Justice in Polat on this 
point, which reaffirms that an expulsion measure is justified only if the rele-
vant ‘personal conduct indicates a specific risk of new and serious prejudice 
to the requirements of public policy’.176 
 The report for Denmark outlines a starkly formalistic approach to the con-
nection between criminal convictions and expulsion that the rapporteur de-
scribes as being ‘contrary to the Directive’ i.e. rules specifying types of of-
fences that can justify expulsion are included in the national transposition 
measure – a system that plainly contravenes several of the principles set out 
in Articles 27 and 28, and is discussed further in Section 6.2.4 with respect to 
its transgression of the different levels of protection expected under Articles 
27, 28(2) and 28(3).  
 Finally, the discussion in Section 2.2 above should also be recalled, on the 
point that ‘the rationales underpinning deportation decisions can be blurred 
together’. There, we cited examples of expulsion decisions taken ostensibly 
on grounds of protecting the public order for minor offences that, according 
to the report for Denmark, are ‘are inherently linked to economic considera-
tions’ (Q2). In the report for Cyrpus, it is noted similarly that cases involving 
restrictions on free movement rights have clustered around three issues – re-
verse discrimination, marriages of convenience, and the non-recognition of 
                                                        
175. For a rare example of a higher court taking a narrower view on appeal, see the report 
for Sweden’s discussion of MIG 2009:21; the rapporteurs point out that the narrow-
ness of the decision also runs counter to the general approach of the appellate crimi-
nal courts. 
176. Case C-349/06 Polat [2007] ECR I-8167, para. 35 (emphasis added). 
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registered partnerships – rather than being linked directly to Articles 27-33 of 
the Directive.  
 Overall, therefore, it would seem that the idea of stability of residence – a 
concept that surely befits an area without frontiers with its own citizenship 
status – is being severely impinged on several fronts by national practices on 
expulsion and exclusion.  
6.2.3. Bans on re-entry 
The permitted duration of an expulsion order – of, in other words, a ban on 
re-entering the State in question – is not something that has arisen frequently 
in the case law of the Court of Justice aside from the point noted in Section 
6.1 above: that EU free movement law precludes national legislation in which 
expulsion from the State automatically follow a criminal conviction, without 
any account being taken of the personal conduct of the offender or of the 
danger which that person represents for the requirements of public policy; the 
duration of the expulsion order is also subject to proportionality review in a 
more general sense.177 
 We were struck, however, by the frequency with which bans on re-entry 
were discussed in the national reports – an obvious yet perhaps under-
explored facet of the legitimacy of national expulsion orders: no doubt be-
cause EU lawyers tend to focus mainly on ‘central’ sources of EU law. Un-
surprisingly, the question of exclusion orders was almost always raised in 
connection with expulsion decisions linked to criminal convictions, and ex-
amples of the kinds of bans imposed are included across several parts of this 
Section (e.g. from the report for Denmark, a ban on re-entry for six years for 
the use of false identity documents that constituted the basis of a claim for 
residence and a right to work, outlined further in Section 6.2.5 below). 
6.2.4. Articles 27 and 28: three levels of protection? 
Generally, national transposition measures are reported to effect the distinc-
tions set out in Articles 27 and 28 of the Directive.178 We also found particu-
lar awareness of the specific gravity of imperative grounds of public security, 
often in connection with the trafficking of narcotics and closely reflecting the 
                                                        
177. See again, Orfanopoulos and Oliveri, para. 67, citing Calfa, paras 22-24. 




reasoning of the Court in Tsakouridis in this respect.179 In the report for Bul-
garia, it is noted that the requirement of ‘serious’ grounds of public policy or 
public security for cases involving citizens who have acquired the right of 
permanent residence seems to have been transposed also for citizens who 
have resided there for less than five years – providing an example of more na-
tional favourable treatment than EU law requires. There are also, however, 
some notable instances of transposition transgression.  
 Recalling the approach to criminal convictions operating in Danish law, 
introduced in Section 6.2.1 above, the illustrations noted in that report show 
that the relevant national rules link the expulsion of a foreigner who has lived 
for more than nine years in Denmark to offences punishable by more than 
three years in prison – since most of these cases will in fact involve residence 
for more than ten years, can we really say that this is a correct understanding 
of ‘imperative grounds of public security’ in accordance with Article 28(3)? 
When a foreigner has lived there for between five and nine years, offences 
that are punishable by just one year in prison will be sufficient – again, very 
unlikely to align with serious grounds of public policy or public security 
within the meaning of Article 28(2). And it is perhaps even more striking that 
in all other cases – which necessarily involves situations where Union citi-
zens or their family members have not yet acquired permanent residence in 
Denmark – ‘offences which are punished by a prison sentence are sufficient, 
or where the person otherwise constitutes a threat to the public order, security 
or health’ (emphasis added). This sentence-driven system skirts close to a 
presumption of expulsion: something that is, as we have seen, consistently 
censured by the Court of Justice in its case law.180 
 In the same report, a problematic decision of the Appeal Court from 2008 
is also outlined.181 In that case, a Slovakian national who had resided in 
Denmark for more than ten years had been sentenced to four years and six 
months in prison for offences that included theft and violence against per-
sons. The Appeal Court ‘considered that he should be expelled for life relying 
essentially on the serious nature of the committed offences’ alongside the fact 
that he had previously been sentenced to five years in prison ‘for similar of-
                                                        
179. See e.g. the reports for Finland, and the Netherlands. 
180. For another example of a system that links the application of the Directive’s concepts 
to the gravity of the offences committed rather than to a timeline of residence per se, 
see the report for France; but note also, the emphasis placed on proportionality and 
individual circumstances in the same report. See further, the report for Italy. 
181. Judgment of the Western Appeal Court of 13 November 2008, S-1421/08, reported in 
U.2009.581V. 
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fences’. However, ‘[i]t was not disputed that he had strong links to Denmark, 
had three sisters living there and spoke the language. In contrast he had no 
link to Slovakia and could barely speak th[at] language’.  
 Ironically, the Appeal Court counted his previous term in prison as lawful 
residence – something that is not required by EU law, we learned subsequent-
ly, according to the decision of the Court of Justice in MG. However, follow-
ing its more generous reasoning on that point, and while the situation was ad-
dressed by the Appeal Court under Article 28(3)(a) of the Directive – impera-
tive grounds of public security – it concluded that the seriousness of the of-
fences committed met that threshold, a finding patently at odds with the rea-
soning in Tsakouridis and PI, as outlined in Section 6.1 above (and with the 
reasoning applied later by the Danish Supreme Court in a 2012 case on the 
same provision that is also outlined in the report). The fact that the order 
mandated expulsion for life added another layer of dis-proportionality. 
 The report for the UK provides comprehensive discussion of the preva-
lence in national case law of questions connected to the calculation of periods 
of residence, which in turn determines the level of expulsion protection that 
should be applied. However, the intensity of that case law is premised on an-
other point made in the report: ‘[a]t the administrative level, a lack of con-
sistency as to whether a person will be considered to have resided in the UK 
for [the] past ten years, despite a period of imprisonment prior to the deporta-
tion order, has led to a “luck of the draw” application of [Article 28(3)(a)] 
protection’. The Court of Justice does, as noted above, exclude periods of 
imprisonment. But the theme of administrative inconsistency redressed 
through the process of judicial review is, by now, a familiar one. 
 The report for the UK also states that national courts have ‘openly ques-
tioned whether administrative guidance adequately distinguishes between dif-
ferent levels of protection, especially in light of the case law of the Court of 
Justice. As a result, differentiation based on “severity” of the conduct or cus-
todial sentence length alone has been rejected’. Nonetheless, the Report goes 
on to outline a series of offences that have been held to constitute ‘serious’ or 
‘imperative’ grounds in both administrative guidance and national case 
law.182 
                                                        
182. See the text in the report for the UK linked to notes 132-147. 
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6.2.5. Abuse of rights 
The national reports highlight an important question that has not yet been ad-
dressed definitively by the Court of Justice: do situations of abuse of free 
movement rights preclude the application of free movement law altogether, 
or are the underlying issues better considered when restrictions placed on 
those rights are being evaluated at the stage of State justification arguments? 
Article 35 of the Directive appears to leave room for the operation of both 
approaches: 
Member States may adopt the necessary measures to refuse, terminate or withdraw any 
right conferred by this Directive in the case of abuse of rights or fraud, such as marriages 
of convenience. Any such measure shall be proportionate and subject to the procedural 
safeguards provided for in Articles 30 and 31 [emphasis added]. 
In a memo published on 15 January 2014, the Commission outlines a dual 
expulsion/exclusion approach: 
National authorities may investigate individual cases where they have a well-founded sus-
picion of abuse and, if they conclude that there is indeed an instance of abuse, they may 
withdraw the person's right of residence and expel him/her from the territory. 
 In addition, after assessing all relevant circumstances and depending on the gravity of 
the offence (for instance, forgery of a document, marriage of convenience with involve-
ment of organised crime), national authorities may also conclude that the person repre-
sents a genuine, continuous and sufficiently serious threat to public order and, on this ba-
sis, also issue an exclusion order in addition to expelling him/her – thus prohibiting his/her 
re-entry into the territory for a certain period of time.183 
Through this method, the Directive’s requirements on public policy become 
relevant only if a Member State intends to attach an exclusion order to an ex-
pulsion measure – with the latter being justifiable solely on the basis that a 
finding of abuse has been made. Does national practice reflect or differ from 
the Commission’s proposed framework? And does it shed any light on the 
merits, or otherwise, of that approach? 
                                                        
183. ‘European Commission upholds free movement of people’ (emphasis added), availa-
ble at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-14-9_en.htm. The Commission al-
so stated that it will ‘will help national authorities implement EU rules which allow 
them to fight potential abuses of the right to free movement by preparing a Handbook 
on addressing marriages of convenience by spring 2014’; that publication remains 
forthcoming at the time of writing. 
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 There are signs that national authorities do separate out the application of 
Articles 27/28 and Article 35 in certain respects. But the consequences of do-
ing so can differ significantly. In the report for the Czech Republic, for ex-
ample, reference is made to a decision of the supreme administrative court in 
which it was confirmed that ‘illegal stay or entry to the Czech Republic’ 
could not of itself constitute a genuine, present and sufficiently serious threat 
to public order, with the court making particular reference to protecting fami-
ly members in this respect. The report also notes that the court distinguished 
between the expulsion system set out in Articles 27-33 of the Directive and 
the notion of ‘abusing rights or deception’ laid down in Article 35, using the 
examples of fictitious marriages and fictitious declarations of paternity to il-
lustrate the latter concept.  
 Interestingly, however, precisely because ‘fictitious marriage could [not] 
be subsumed under the concept of “public order”’, the court concluded that 
an expulsion decision made on that basis could not be considered to be a 
‘proportionate intervention’. The national court thus extended more protec-
tion to the individuals concerned than would seem to be required by a literal 
reading of Article 35 of the Directive – which makes reference only to the 
procedural safeguards specified in Articles 30 and 31, and recalling that the 
proportionality and individual circumstances review requirements of Articles 
27 and 28 refer to expulsion decisions based on public policy, public security 
or public health only. This national interpretation thus illustrates a lacuna in 
the Commission’s proposed approach, when read against the scheme and 
general principles of the Directive as a whole. 
 The view of the national court in the Czech Republic contrasts with cases 
outlined in the report for Denmark, where – linking also to the proportionality 
requirements considered in Section 6.3 below – the author comments that in 
cases where it is found that a Union citizen’s family member is residing ille-
gally there, ‘it seems very difficult to prove that deportation ... is dispropor-
tionate, the argument being that the link to Denmark has been established il-
legally’. The cases discussed concern the use of false identity cards ‘in order 
to manufacture a right of residence and work’. The Danish Supreme Court 
has ruled that such activities – as well as the practice of illegal residence and 
work – ‘make the person a genuine, present and sufficiently serious threat to 
one of the fundamental interests of society pursuant to the Directive which 
can justify expulsion for six years’.’  
 The fact that the applicant (an Iraqi national) had a child with a national of 
another State residing in Denmark and that the couple was expecting a second 
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child at the time ‘did not alter this finding’.184 The Supreme Court’s approach 
thus conflated the application of Article 35, on the one hand, with the tests set 
out in Articles 27 and 28, on the other – but without actually seeking to apply 
the principles and protections that frame the latter set of provisions. It is espe-
cially remarkable that the prison sentence that had been imposed in this case 
was just 60 days. 
6.3. Proportionality and individual circumstances  
The relevance – or, regrettably, otherwise – of proportionality has already 
been mentioned in several parts of Section 6.2, but it is worth drawing atten-
tion to this dimension of the expulsion system more specifically too. There is, 
once again, a clear division in the national reports on this aspect of Q6.  
 It is clear that national authorities in some States carefully apply the prin-
ciples of the Directive in this respect – described, for example, as ‘a funda-
mental part of the [expulsion] decision’ in the report for Austria.185 In the re-
port for the Netherlands, it is pointed out that the burden of proof for propor-
tionality considerations lies with the individual challenging an expulsion de-
cision: ‘[i]f no elements linking the individual to Dutch society are brought 
forward, or if the individual explicitly stated that there is no reason for stay-
ing in the Netherlands, national courts generally accept that the principle of 
proportionality was respected. When elements are brought forward individu-
als must provide sufficient evidence to support the claim’. 
 Respect for family life is the interest specified most often with respect to 
consideration of individual circumstances.186 Some reports suggest, however, 
that strong links to the State or to family members residing there will be nec-
                                                        
184. This part of the case is also discussed in the report for Denmark under Q1; judgment 
of the Supreme Court of 24 August 2012 in case 58/2012, reported in U.2012.3399H. 
185. See further, the discussion of proportionality vis-à-vis national case law and the prac-
tices of national administrative authorities in the report for Portugal. See also, the re-
ports for Finland (‘the court’s reasoning emphasises proportionality’), and Greece. 
186. See e.g. the reports for Austria, Cyprus (where it is noted, however, that consideration 
of this right is ‘almost exclusively done in relation to Article 8 ECHR, and not (yet) 
the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, at least in a manner that has a practical effect 
for the outcome of the review’), Finland (‘[e]mphasis is placed on the best interests of 
the child as well as the protection of family life’), France, and Italy (where it is again 
pointed out that Article 8 ECHR remains, for now at least, the key touchstone in this 
respect). 
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essary in order to overturn an expulsion decision on that basis.187 In the report 
for the Netherlands, for example, a list of considerations that have not been 
accepted as sufficient to displace expulsion decisions include ‘having a rela-
tionship with a person living in the Netherlands’; ‘good behaviour in prison’; 
‘birth of a child/back on the right path’; and ‘economic situation in country of 
origin’. 
 However, we found several examples on the basis of which it could be 
claimed that national authorities might recite the principles codified in the Di-
rective but that does not necessarily mean that they apply them in line with 
EU legal standards in reality. Interestingly, the report for Cyprus draws a dis-
tinction between the application of proportionality by the Supreme Court 
when reviewing administrative decisions generally (‘applied vigorously’) and 
reviewing expulsion decisions where, in contrast, ‘the application of the test 
seems to be deferential to the discretion of the decision-making body’.188  
 In a case outlined in the report for Denmark – based on Article 28(3)(a) 
i.e. legal residence exceeding ten years – it was noted that ‘[t]he convicted 
person’s personal situation and his link to Denmark could not outweigh the 
seriousness of the criminality committed. This was despite the fact that it was 
not disputed that he grew up in Denmark where his family was living, that he 
had no link to Croatia and could only speak Roma besides Danish’. And what 
were the imperative grounds of public security at issue? – A five-year sen-
tence for robbery, in the light of previous conviction and imprisonment for 
similar offences.  
6.4. Question 6 – emerging issues and themes 
In the Institutional Report, post-Directive case law is characterised as fol-
lows: ‘[a]dmittedly, the Court of Justice was at pains to qualify most of the 
rules established in [its] judgments but one thing stands out from those rul-
                                                        
187. See e.g. the report for Denmark (‘[p]ersonal circumstance are unlikely to make the 
balance tip in another direction’). 
188. See e.g. the discussion on Krisztian Bekefi v Republic, Case Number 293/2012, 
judgment of 7 March 2012. The report points also, however, to the manner in which 
the Supreme Court resolves cases for the benefit of the individual by applying the 
principle of equal treatment, thus characterizing concerns about the approach to pro-
portionality as ‘of secondary value as long as the approach of the [Supreme] Court 
remains focused on safeguarding the intensity of review of the administrative actions 
in this field’. 
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ings – the Court of Justice was meticulously ensuring that it cannot be seen as 
an insurmountable obstacle to expulsion by interpreting the enhanced protec-
tion against expulsion as any sort of an absolute prohibition’ (emphasis add-
ed). Even so, the evidence presented in national reports suggests that, in con-
trast to most of the preceding findings in this Report, there is a systemic 
problem with the application of EU legal standards in the area of expul-
sion.  
 EU law establishes a high threshold of protection against restrictions on 
free movement rights and against expulsion for all Union citizens who reside 
in other States. The relevant provisions of Directive 2004/38 are relatively 
detailed and have, on the whole, been properly transposed into national law. 
The extensive case law of the Court of Justice has explained and reinforced 
the principles that those provisions capture. And national courts have been 
notably willing to refer questions about the new thresholds created by the Di-
rective. We saw, for example, that the decision in Tsakouridis has already left 
a clear imprint on national judicial consciousness.  
 However, national practices consistently fall short of the citizen-centric 
framework established by EU law. The national reports, taken together, ev-
idence a troubling degree of disconnect from what should be happening if the 
EU legal framework were correctly applied – demonstrating powerfully that 
transposition is just the first step towards building up the national im-
plementation matrix. 
 A particularly strong theme of expulsion as punishment for criminal ac-
tivity emerges from the national reports. Linking back to the discussion on 
permanent residence in Section 4.1, we see further fleshing out of ‘good’ and 
‘bad’ citizenship narratives. Who shapes that narrative, and on what basis? 
The Institutional Report raises a general question about how the conserva-
tism of the Member States feeds upwards to the Court of Justice. To put 
it another way, without saying so directly, the Institutional Report is ac-
knowledging that in many if not all States, the deportation of foreign national 
prisoners – whether EU citizens or third country nationals – is an issue of 
high political salience, representing one of the key tests that governments 
have to pass in order to be seen as effective in the area of immigration policy. 
But there is a dangerous line between appropriate and dynamic political 
pragmatism and mutual institutional engagement, on the one hand, and undue 
political influence, on the other. The challenges raised by expulsion are not 
easy to resolve. But, for now at least, the Member States have chosen to man-
age these challenges within a rights-based citizenship framework – not a 
privilege-focused immigration mindset that is shaped by permissions.  
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 The Institutional Report states that ‘[t]he strong attachment of the Member 
States to the possibility of restricting free movement on the grounds of public 
policy or public security and the Court of Justice’s willingness not to stand as 
an obstacle to this means that no absolute protection against expulsion is like-
ly for the foreseeable future’. But it also emphasises that the ‘procedural 
safeguards of EU citizens that help them to fight arbitrary or incorrect deci-
sions restricting their rights are being strengthened by the Court of Justice’. 
The procedural dimension of the Directive is critical. But it should not be 
seen as a substitute for appropriate decision-making in the first place. After 
all, most individuals never seek judicial review of ‘arbitrary or incorrect 
decisions’ in the first place.  
 In our view, further legislation at EU level may be needed – especially 
to elaborate on how to manage criminal convictions within the framework of 
expulsion. Legislation cannot account for every twist that will arise in nation-
al practice, but the breadth of the principles that we have at present – notwith-
standing their interpretation over several decades by the Court of Justice – is 
just not working. This point also bridges well to Q7 and Q8, both of which 
address the application of principles of EU law at national level where there 
is no legislative underpinning of those principles in Directive 2004/38 at all. 
EU citizenship beyond Directive 2004/38/EC – Exploring 
national application of primary EU law 
Thinking especially of the decisions in Rottmann and Ruiz Zambrano,189 it is 
clear that the adoption of Directive 2004/38 did not diminish the interpreta-
tive powers of the Court of Justice with respect to the primary citizenship 
rights conferred directly by the Treaties. Our questions here were constructed 
to elicit information about the extent to which national authorities are re-
sponding to that jurisprudence and are willing to go beyond the boundaries of 
the Directive in appropriate cases. We highlighted two key areas in this re-
spect: 
(1) Purely internal situations and the issue of reverse discrimination, espe-
cially in cases involving family reunification claims; and 
                                                        




(2) The extent to which national rules on the acquisition and loss of citi-
zenship accommodate, or otherwise, the specific implications of those 
rules for acquisition and/or loss of the status of Union citizenship. 
Question 7 
To what extent do national courts and tribunals tend to reject arguments 
based on EU citizenship rights on the grounds that the dispute involves a 
‘purely internal situation’? To what extent has the Court of Justice’s case 
law grounded directly on the TFEU’s citizenship provisions (e.g. Chen, 
Ruiz Zambrano and subsequent decisions) been effectively implemented 
and applied at the national level? Does the case law distinguish clearly be-
tween rights acquired under Directive 2004/38 and under Articles 20 
and/or 21 TFEU when EU citizens are seeking family reunification rights 
from their home Member States? Have legislative or specific administra-
tive changes been put in place? How are these matters being dealt with by 
the national courts? 
7.1. Introduction  
In Section 1.7, the complexity of EU citizenship law was illustrated by outlin-
ing the different categories of Member State nationals that come within the 
scope of either the Directive or the primary rights conferred by the Treaty. In 
this part of the questionnaire, the focus falls on two of those categories in par-
ticular: migrant Union citizens who have returned to their home States; and 
static Union citizens residing in their home States for whom EU legal protec-
tion applies in exceptional circumstances.  
 The scope of Directive 2004/38 is tied expressly to situations where a 
Member State national (1) exercises movement, and (2) is in a host State. 
Since the decision in Singh, however, we know that a shield of EU legal pro-
tection continues to attach to the migrant citizen – and by extension to his or 
her family members – when s/he returns to the home State. Responding to a 
question about whether a third country national spouse could claim residence 
rights after the couple had returned to the (formerly) migrant citizen’s home 
State, the Court concluded:  
A national of a Member State might be deterred from leaving his country of origin in order 
to pursue an activity as an employed or self-employed person as envisaged by the Treaty in 
the territory of another Member State if, on returning to the Member State of which he is a 
national in order to pursue an activity there as an employed or self-employed person, the 
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conditions of his entry and residence were not at least equivalent to those which he would 
enjoy under the Treaty or secondary law in the territory of another Member State. He 
would in particular be deterred from so doing if his spouse and children were not also per-
mitted to enter and reside in the territory of his Member State of origin under conditions at 
least equivalent to those granted them by Community law in the territory of another Mem-
ber State.190 
The same reasoning was extended in D’Hoop to the refusal of a tideover al-
lowance to a Belgian national on the grounds that she had completed her sec-
ondary education in another Member State. Again, within a broader context 
of effectiveness, the Court emphasised that ‘it would be incompatible with 
the right of freedom of movement were a citizen, in the Member State of 
which he is a national, to receive treatment less favourable than he would en-
joy if he had not availed himself of the opportunities offered by the Treaty in 
relation to freedom of movement’.191 As noted in Section 1 above, the Court 
has ruled in O that the conditions for lawful residence laid down in Directive 
2004/38 also apply by analogy to claims for family reunification that an ap-
plicant makes once back in the home State – a ruling that was described as 
‘nervously awaited’ in the report for Denmark.192 In the same case, the Court 
also imposed, in effect, a minimum duration for the exercise of free move-
ment rights that needs to be met before the protective EU shield can be gen-
erated, by aligning the idea of ‘genuine residence’ with residence established 
under Article 7(1) – and not Article 6(1) – of the Directive i.e. residence for 
more than three months.193 
 In Chen, the Court had confirmed that a minor Union citizen had a right 
under EU law to reside in a host Member State; and that the parent who was 
her primary carer derived residence rights there on the same basis. It was 
pointed out, however, that the child was ‘covered by appropriate sickness in-
surance and is in the care of a parent who is a third-country national having 
sufficient resources for that minor not to become a burden on the public fi-
nances of the host Member State’.194 Another point is also important to note 
from the decision – the child had acquired an Irish passport, in accordance 
                                                        
190. Case C-370/90 Singh [1992] ECR I-4265, paras 19-20. 
191. Case C-224/98 D’Hoop [2002] ECR I-6191, para. 30. 
192. Case C-456/12 O, judgment of 12 March 2014. The case stems from proceedings in 
the Netherlands, and is discussed in that report around the text in notes 60-63 and af-
ter the text at note 65. See also, the discussion of the cases outlined at notes 62-63 in 
the report for Denmark, and at notes 45-46 in the report for Germany. 
193. O, esp. paras 52-53. 
194. Case C-200/02 Zhu and Chen [2004] ECR I-9925, para. 47. 
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with Irish nationality law, by virtue of being born in Northern Ireland. The 
intention was always to live in the United Kingdom; crucially, the holding of 
an Irish passport was sufficient to trigger a sufficient connection to EU law, 
even in the absence of physical movement between the two States.  
 For static citizens, the general position was that EU law has no bearing on 
matters that are purely internal to one State, and that Union citizenship had 
not altered this limitation.195 However, building on the ruling in Rottmann – 
considered separately under Q8 below – the Court created a revolutionary 
new test in Ruiz Zambrano:  
As the Court has stated several times, citizenship of the Union is intended to be the funda-
mental status of nationals of the Member States ... In those circumstances, Article 20 
TFEU precludes national measures which have the effect of depriving citizens of the Union 
of the genuine enjoyment of the substance of the rights conferred by virtue of their status as 
citizens of the Union.196 
Addressing the particular circumstances of the case, the Court held that a ‘re-
fusal to grant a right of residence to a third country national with dependent 
minor children in the Member State where those children are nationals and 
reside, and also a refusal to grant such a person a work permit, has such an 
effect’,197 since ‘such a refusal would lead to a situation where those children, 
citizens of the Union, would have to leave the territory of the Union in order 
to accompany their parents’.198 The Court extended the same assumption to 
the refusal to grant a work permit on the grounds that ‘if a work permit were 
not granted to such a person, he would risk not having sufficient resources to 
provide for himself and his family, which would also result in the children, 
citizens of the Union, having to leave the territory of the Union’.199 
 The resulting intervention of EU law in purely internal situations is a truly 
ground-breaking constitutional development, widely discussed in the aca-
demic literature.200 In subsequent case law, however, the Court placed firm 
                                                        
195. See e.g. Joined Cases C-64/96 and C-65/96 Uecker and Jacquet [1997] ECR I-3171. 
196. Ruiz Zambrano, paras 41-42 (emphasis added). 
197. Ruiz Zambrano, para. 43.  
198. Ruiz Zambrano, para. 44. 
199. Ruiz Zambrano, para. 44. 
200. See e.g. K. Hailbronner and D. Thym, ‘Comment on Case C-34/09 Ruiz Zambrano’ 
(2011) 48 CMLRev 1253; D. Kochenov and R. Plender, ‘EU Citizenship: From an 
incipient form to an incipient substance? The discovery of the Treaty text’ (2012) 37 
ELRev 369; H. van Eijken and SA. de Vries, ‘A new route into the Promised Land? 
Being a European citizen after Ruiz Zambrano’ (2011) 36 ELRev 704; and F. Wol-
lenschläger, ‘A new fundamental freedom beyond market integration: Union citizen-
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emphasis on the exceptional nature of that intervention, stressing a threshold 
of forced departure from the territory of the Union before the genuine enjoy-
ment of the substance of citizenship rights could be considered at risk. In De-
reci, for example, the Court distinguished such a situation from a claim for 
family reunification per se: 
[T]he mere fact that it might appear desirable to a national of a Member State, for econom-
ic reasons or in order to keep his family together in the territory of the Union, for the 
members of his family who do not have the nationality of a Member State to be able to re-
side with him in the territory of the Union, is not sufficient in itself to support the view that 
the Union citizen will be forced to leave Union territory if such a right is not granted.201 
Additionally, in McCarthy, the Court drew a line under the Chen judgment: 
holding a second Member State passport does not alter the legal situation of a 
static citizen who has never left their home State – only an obstacle to that cit-
izen’s freedom of movement within the Union or forced departure from the 
territory of the Union will engage the rights conferred by Articles 20 and 21 
TFEU.202 
 The Court thus articulated the limits of the Ruiz Zambrano test relatively 
quickly. However, an as yet unresolved issue concerns whether residence 
rights should be granted to a primary carer only, or also to others e.g. the 
parents of minor citizens who qualify for EU protection. The final part of the 
Ruiz Zambrano judgment refers to ‘a third country national upon whom his 
minor children, who are European Union citizens, are dependent’.203 In O 
and S – a ruling delivered just under two years after Ruiz Zambrano – the 
phrasing is slightly different; and it differs also from the Chen language of 
primary carer: ‘a third country national in the Member State of residence of 
his minor children, nationals of that Member State, who are dependent on 
him and of whom he and his spouse have joint custody, the Court has held 
that the refusal to grant a right of residence would have the consequence that 
those children, who are citizens of the Union, would have to leave the territo-
ry of the Union in order to accompany their parents’.204 Does this expression 
                                                        
ship and its dynamics for shifting the economic paradigm of European integration’ 
(2011) 17 ELJ 34. 
201. Case C-256/11 Dereci, judgment of 15 November 2011, para. 68. 
202. Case C-434/09 McCarthy [2011] ECR I-3375. 
203. Ruiz Zambrano, para. 46. 
204. Joined Cases C-356/11 and C-357/11 O and S, judgment of 6 December 2012, para. 
46 (emphasis added). 
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of things intentionally soften the harder consequences of Ruiz Zambrano 
when read in the light of McCarthy and Dereci?  
 Additionally, the Court stressed in O and S that ‘while the principles stat-
ed in the Ruiz Zambrano judgment apply only in exceptional circumstances, 
it does not follow from the Court’s case-law that their application is confined 
to situations in which there is a blood relationship between the third country 
national for whom a right of residence is sought and the Union citizen who is 
a minor from whom that right of residence might be derived’ – therefore, ‘the 
fact that the third country nationals for whom a right of residence is sought 
are not persons on whom those citizens are legally, financially or emotionally 
dependent must be taken into consideration when examining the question 
whether, as a result of the refusal of a right of residence, those citizens would 
be unable to exercise the substance of the rights conferred by their status’.205  
 Later in the judgment, the Court turned its analysis to family reunification 
for third country nationals under Directive 2003/86, emphasising the im-
portance of Article 7 of the Charter, which ‘must also be read in conjunction 
with the obligation to have regard to the child’s best interests, recognised in 
Article 24(2) of the Charter, and with account being taken of the need, ex-
pressed in Article 24(3), for a child to maintain on a regular basis a personal 
relationship with both parents’.206 What does the same obligation require in 
the context of Articles 20 and 21 TFEU?  
 We were keen to understand how national authorities – and national courts 
and tribunals in particular – have responded to the initial fundamental shift in 
the scope of Union law brought about by Ruiz Zambrano, but also the confu-
sion that might be caused by the different tones of subsequent judgments, es-
pecially in the absence of more detailed legislative guidance. Linking back to 
the map included in Section 1.2.2 above, the discussion below relates pri-
marily to the States in which the protection of Directive 2004/38 has not been 
extended, under national law, to static citizens. 
                                                        
205. O and S, paras 55 and 56 (emphasis added). See similarly, the report for Ireland (cas-
es outlined at notes 59-62, applying Ruiz Zambrano where ‘refusal to grant a right of 
residence or a work permit causing the absence of a family member required for care 
and social and/or financial support’). 
206. O and S, para. 76; referring to Directive 2003/86/EC on the right to family reunifica-
tion, [2003] OJ L251/12. 
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7.2. Responding to the evolving interpretation of primary rights: judicial 
engagement 
Two broad themes are addressed in turn in this Section: first, national judicial 
absorption of the limits of the Ruiz Zambrano case law; and, second, the am-
biguities in this area that are still emerging through these national cases.  
7.2.1. Adhering to the case law: and its limits 
On the whole, we found that national courts and tribunals have absorbed the 
case law on primary rights and its distinctiveness vis-à-vis claims that fall, by 
contrast, within the scope of the Directive.207 In the report for the Nether-
lands, an interesting decision of the District Court of Arnhem is noteworthy 
for its expansive application of the sufficient resources dimension of Ruiz 
Zambrano – granting not a work permit to the Venezuelan mother of a Dutch 
child but, rather, entitlement to a social allowance.208 This issue arises also in 
the report for the UK, where it is observed that the intervention of the Home 
Secretary in a case on this question ‘suggests that the question of a Ruiz Zam-
brano-based right to social welfare has arisen frequently at the administrative 
level’. The report distinguishes two kinds of situation in this context: entitle-
ment to social welfare assistance after a residence right has been established 
on the basis of Ruiz Zambrano; and whether or not denial of social welfare 
can itself establish such a right on the basis of forced departure. 
 But we found that particular emphasis has been placed on implementing 
the strictness of the limits that followed in subsequent ruling such as McCar-
                                                        
207. See e.g. the report for the Netherlands (cases outlined at notes 56 and 57 applying 
Ruiz Zambrano, and case outlined at note 65 applying Chen); the report for Sweden 
(on MIG 2009:22 applying Chen); and the report for the UK (cases outlined at notes 
161-164 applying Chen). National case law on citizenship rights extends beyond fam-
ily reunification too: see e.g. the report for Poland, outlining cases in the areas of tax 
discrimination and access to benefits. Cf. the report for Bulgaria, where the author 
suggests that national courts, first, ‘do not distinguish clearly between rights acquired 
under Directive 2004/38 and under Arts 20 and/or 21 TFEU; secondly, that they do 
not fully apprehend the Court’s case-law; thirdly, that there is a general unease when 
having to address “purely internal situations”’ (providing case law examples to illus-
trate this critique). 
208. Report for the Netherlands, text at note 54. Cf. the approach noted in the report for 
Ireland, case outlined at note 66. 
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thy and Dereci.209 We also suggest, however, that these national disputes 
have, in turn, highlighted uncertainties about the intended scope of those lim-
its.  
 As a somewhat technical but important point, it is worth noting the refer-
ence in the report for Germany to a judicial revolution discourse that devel-
oped immediately after the judgment in Ruiz Zambrano, with the authors not-
ing that German courts and also academics quickly understood the fundamen-
tal implications of the ruling and were keen to test its implications. It was 
shown in Section 7.1 above, however, that the Court of Justice quickly closed 
down the revolutionary potential of the judgment – something not easily pre-
dictable at the time and which could, therefore, have had complex repercus-
sions within quickly reactive national systems.  
 Addressing the subsequently determined limits of the genuine enjoyment 
test raises some difficult questions. First, there is uncertainty about how the 
‘new’ case law relates to the framework constructed in previous decisions. 
For example, in the report for Sweden, an expulsion case involving a Colom-
bian mother and her Spanish minor daughter turned on the absence of sick-
ness insurance, with the Migration Court of Appeal ruling that expulsion 
from Sweden to Spain would not breach the Ruiz Zambrano forced departure 
from the Union threshold. This is certainly correct; and comprehensive sick-
ness insurance is clearly required by Article 7 of the Directive. But how does 
the decision sit with the ruling in Baumbast that ‘the competent authorities 
and, where necessary, the national courts must ensure that those limitations 
and conditions are applied in compliance with the general principles of 
Community law and, in particular, the principle of proportionality’?210 In 
Baumbast, an element of sickness insurance was missing from the family’s 
cover – is that the point of material difference? 
 Picking up on the potentially softening effects of the decision in O and S, 
a case concerning a national of Kosovo who did not have a residence permit 
in the Netherlands is discussed in that report.211 She gave birth there to two 
                                                        
209. See e.g. the report for Finland (on KHO 2013:97, emphasising the significance of 
having custodial rights); the report for France (cases outlined at notes 108-110, apply-
ing Ruiz Zambrano); the report for Germany (cases outlined at notes 43-44); the re-
port for the Netherlands (case outlined at note 62, where the exercise of free move-
ment rights precluded the applicant from claiming that he had been deprived of the 
genuine enjoyment of the substance of his citizenship rights); the report for Sweden 
(on MIG 2011:17, applying McCarthy); and the report for the UK (cases outlined at 
notes 166-170, applying Ruiz Zambrano plus Dereci). 
210. Case C-413/99 Baumbast [2002] ECR I-7091, para. 94. 
211. Rechtbank ’s-Gravenhage, zittingsplaats Roermond, 28 March 2011. 
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children of Dutch nationality; her partner is also a Dutch national. However, 
the national court rejected her claim for a residence permit based on Ruiz 
Zambrano on the grounds that her children ‘could still enjoy residency in the 
EU, with their father, who had Dutch nationality’. Again, this decision fits 
with the clarification of Ruiz Zambrano that we find in Dereci. But does it fit 
with the ethos of citizenship when read in the light of respect for family life 
or the best interests of the child more generally?  
 Second, and perhaps most fundamentally, there is the issue of unintended 
consequences of the strictness of the genuine enjoyment test. Cases discussed 
in the report for the Netherlands illustrate this concern very starkly; for ex-
ample: 
It was ruled that a Moroccan father did not have a derived right to stay in the Netherlands, 
because the Dutch mother could not take care of the children and the children were forced 
to stay in a foster home. The Court ruled that in these circumstances, the children were not 
obliged to leave the territory of the EU. Another example is a case where the Dutch parent 
was mentally ill and could not take care of her children. It was also held that there was no 
derived residence right [for] the other parent with the third country nationality. 
Again, these decisions are ‘correct’ in the sense of being in line with the 
Court of Justice’s forced departure test. Moreover, it is fitting that a test acti-
vating a role for EU law in otherwise sheltered national regulatory space 
should be a delimited one. But could the Court really have intended these 
troubling consequences, and is the outcome really compatible with genuine 
enjoyment of Union citizenship?  
7.2.2. Managing ambiguities: the particular challenge of scope-in-motion 
In other cases discussed in the report for the Netherlands, a different decision 
was reached – for example: 
The Dutch mother was in the position to take care of her child. Nevertheless, due to the 
mental illness of the father, the Council of State ruled that the Turkish father had a derived 
right to reside in the Netherlands. There were indications that a deportation to Turkey 
would lead to so much psychological suffering that his Dutch spouse and child had no oth-
er choice than to join the father and thus to reside outside the EU. 
Linking back to the discussion under Q1 on the meaning and nature of de-
pendency, this extract fits with the wider understanding of dependency con-
veyed in O and S. At one level, then, this national case perhaps shows an ap-
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propriate correction of prior restrictiveness that maps how the trajectory of 
Court of Justice case law evolved.212 But an approach concerned with de-
grees of emotional dependency suggests potential for subjective decisions. In 
the UK, national courts have distinguished between the fact that ‘strong emo-
tional and psychological ties within the family would be significantly likely 
to rupture in instances of separation, diminishing enjoyment of life in the UK’ 
(emphasis added) and the Ruiz Zambrano forced departure threshold i.e. 
‘when quality of life is so diminished that an individual is effectively com-
pelled to leave Union territory’. But how is that distinction to be determined 
in practice? 
 Case law twists also affect the work of national administrative authorities. 
For example, that the scope of the Ruiz Zambrano test is ‘very narrow’ was 
confirmed in a ministerial Briefing Note on the judgment discussed in the re-
port for Denmark; it was also noted that the Note has been updated following 
McCarthy, Dereci, and O and S. The Note prescribes a series of conditions 
that have to be taken into account in such family reunification cases, includ-
ing that the case ‘must concern the right of residence of a parent to a Danish 
child’ – but in line with the O and S benchmark of ‘persons on whom those 
citizens are legally, financially or emotionally dependent’, the Note goes on 
to clarify that ‘the parent does not need to be the biological parent, but can be 
another adult on whom the child is dependent’.  
 The point that forced departure of a Danish child who has a third country 
national parent, broadly understood, from the Union territory is ‘most likely 
where there is no other parent with whom the child can live’ (emphasis add-
ed) would seem to avoid some of the more difficult outcomes discussed earli-
er with respect to case law in the Netherlands, where foster care, for example, 
was deemed to be an appropriate alternative to granting a parental residence 
permit.213 But, as the author points out, restrictiveness taints other elements of 
the Danish system: for example, ‘a right of residence pursuant to Art 20 
might also arise in cases where the Union citizen is not a child, but an adult 
who is dependent on another person for his financial and emotional needs’.214 
                                                        
212. See also, the report for Germany, reflecting this point through the comparison be-
tween the narrow approach applied in Dereci and a greater flexibility presumed after 
the O and S ruling. 
213. See also, the report for the UK, cases outlined in notes 169-170; including a decision 
in which it was recognised that ‘Union citizen could not be cared for by their abusive 
Italian father if their Argentine mother were deported’. 
214. This question is also raised in the Institutional Report. 
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 Interestingly, the author also queries the compatibility of Danish rules 
with EU law on the point about ‘refusal to give a right of residence under EU 
law to the other parent who is also a third-country national (Mrs Zambrano)’. 
As noted in Section 7.1, it is not clear from the decision in Ruiz Zambrano 
what the status of the children’s mother actually is. Could she be considered 
to be a primary carer alongside the father’s position as a parent on whom the 
children are dependent in a different i.e. material way? In the report for the 
UK, national regulations provide that ‘where a Union citizen minor has two 
primary carers ... both primary carers must be required to leave the UK before 
a derivative right can be enjoyed’ by the person who has primary responsibil-
ity for care. The position of parents alongside or as opposed to primary carers 
is clearly something that needs to be clarified.215  
 As a final point, and linking back to the discussion in Section 4.2.1 above, 
it is still unclear whether family members who derive their rights of residence 
from the primary rights of Union citizens can also acquire permanent resi-
dence rights on that basis.216 It is suggested here that a distinction may be 
drawn between rights claimed on the basis of Ruiz Zambrano – i.e. cases that 
involve residence rights in a Union citizen’s home State and so do not fall 
within the scope of Directive 2004/38, the sole repository of the status of 
permanent residence217 – and rights based on the decision in Chen. In the lat-
ter case, self-sufficiency was a critical factor in the granting of the residence 
right under EU law, and it is difficult to see how periods of residence accrued 
on that basis could be deemed not to meet the requirements of Article 7 of the 
Directive – and thus the requirements of ‘legal residence’ under Article 16 
too. 
                                                        
215. The case law on residence rights derived from the children of migrant workers in host 
State education opens a window here: ‘where children enjoy ... the right to continue 
their education in the host Member State, although the parents who are their careers 
are at risk of losing their rights of residence, a refusal to allow those parents to remain 
in the host Member State during the period of their children’s education might de-
prive those children of a right which has been granted to them by the legislature of the 
European Union’ (Case C-529/11 Alarape and Tijani, judgment of 8 May 2013, para. 
26, emphasis added). 
216. This question is also raised in the Institutional Report. 
217. A point reflected in national regulations discussed in the report for the UK. 
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7.3. Responding to the evolving interpretation of primary rights: legislative 
and administrative change 
Our questions focused primarily on how national courts and tribunals are 
managing the Court of Justice’s case law, but some authors raised issues 
about how family reunification issues are covered by national legislation – 
and/or whether developments such as Ruiz Zambrano prompted amendments 
to national rules, some of which have already been outlined in Section 7.2.218 
 In the report for the Netherlands, it was noted that discussions about 
whether or not the developments in Court of Justice case law require legisla-
tive change at national level are ongoing. The same point was made in the re-
port for Ireland, but here, pointing to specific concerns that have been raised 
because of the absence of a ‘comprehensive approach to family reunification’ 
– in fact, it was noted that ‘Ireland is the only EU Member State not to have 
such rules enshrined in legislation’ at all. 
7.4. Question 7 – emerging issues and themes 
On the whole, the examples discussed in this section show a national judici-
ary trying hard to discern and to follow the twists and turns of jurisprudence-
in-progress at EU level. The openness of national courts and tribunals to case 
law change and, more particularly, the implications at national level of rap-
id EU-level case law correction can be seen in several of the national cases 
discussed.  
 At one level, it is an entirely natural and expected characteristic of case 
law that subsequent decisions sharpen the scope of relevant principles 
and tests. It is often only through later cases that the layers inherent in prin-
ciples and test are revealed through the lens of different facts-sets.  
 The difficulty here is simply that the judgment in Ruiz Zambrano initiated 
such an intensive wave of responses, at all levels: not just through litigation 
but also, as pointed out in the Institutional Report, ‘an increasing number of 
citizens’ complaints, petitions and parliamentary questions on this new line of 
jurisprudence’. That Report attributes the force of this ‘stimulating effect’ to 
the fact that the judgment in Ruiz Zambrano ‘appeared to offer a whole new 
world of EU law-argumentation to long-standing constellations and issues 
                                                        
218. See e.g. the reports for Denmark, France, and the UK. 
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that were considered problematic or unsatisfactory but for which no EU law 
remedy seemed traditionally in reach’.  
 Additionally, the discussion has revealed several examples of questions 
and ambiguities that need still to be resolved – e.g. what rights beyond res-
idence and the right to work attach to a residence right grounded in Ruiz 
Zambrano? Are parents or only primary carers – whether parents or not – 
protected under EU law in these kinds of internal situations? And finally, 
linking back to the discussion under Q1, what does dependency really mean 
in non-conventional situations? A continuing stream of preliminary refer-
ences is inevitable in this regard. 
 The responses received to this question also reflect earlier discussions 
about the pioneering capacity of EU law – about when that function should 
kick in; but also, when it should not. This point also revives questions about 
the role(s) of the legislature(s): at national level, on the one hand – to cite 
AG Sharpston on this point, as the Institutional Report does, ‘[w]hy a Mem-
ber State would wish ... to treat its own nationals less favourably than other 
EU citizens ... is curious’219 – but also at EU level: specifically, when critical 
developments occur through case law, at what point is a responsibility to step 
in established, in order to provide framing and unifying legislative guidance 
on questions where there is clear inconsistency of approach; or does case law 
in fact serve its own autonomous purpose? 
Question 8  
In the context of the judgment in Rottmann, to what extent do rules on the 
acquisition and/or loss of national citizenship reflect the implications of 
the particular requirements of EU citizenship? Please consider the EUDO 
Citizenship Observatory data on acquisition and loss of citizenship in an-
swering this question. 
Article 9 TEU 
In all its activities, the Union shall observe the principle of the equality of its citizens, who 
shall receive equal attention from its institutions, bodies, offices and agencies. Every na-
tional of a Member State shall be a citizen of the Union. Citizenship of the Union shall be 
additional to and not replace national citizenship. 
                                                        
219. AG Sharpston, Joint Opinion for Case C-456/12 O and Case C-457/12 S, judgments 
delivered on 12 March 2014, para. 86 of the Opinion. 
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Article 20 TFEU 
1. Citizenship of the Union is hereby established. Every person holding the nationality of a 
Member State shall be a citizen of the Union. Citizenship of the Union shall be additional 
to and not replace national citizenship. 
8.1. Introduction – the interdependency of national laws and EU law on 
citizenship 
Through Question 8, we wanted to interrogate more closely the relationship 
between national citizenship – and, specifically, national rules on the acquisi-
tion and loss of citizenship – and EU citizenship. EU citizenship, as is well 
known, only attaches to those who have the nationality or (in some language 
versions, e.g. Italian or Spanish) the ‘citizenship’ of a Member State. What is 
meant by this is that the group of EU citizens is the same group as those who 
are recognised by law, both internally and externally, as being members of a 
particular national polity (i.e. a Member State), whether they have acquired 
that citizenship at birth or afterwards.  
 Some Member States have strengthened that link, by making it easier for 
EU citizens from other Member States to acquire national citizenship when 
resident in the host State (e.g. Czech Republic (from 2014), Hungary, Ireland, 
and Italy220). This can offer an important complement to the benefits of per-
manent residence under Directive 2004/38, because it also ensures that, as a 
citizen, that person can vote in national elections and does not suffer possible 
disenfranchisement.221 
 The interdependency of national laws on citizenship and EU law has be-
come more complex over the years. This is a result of the development of the 
constitutional concept of EU citizenship, complementing and building upon 
the free movement rights established in the founding Treaties. It also owes 
much to the case law of the Court of Justice, which has established a number 
of principles regarding the implications of EU law for what one might expect 
– prima facie – to be the freedom of Member States to apply their own citi-
zenship laws, subject only to the strictures of international law.  
                                                        
220. This typically involves shorter residence periods. 
221. Commission Communication, Addressing the consequences of disenfranchisement of 
Union citizens exercising their right to free movement, COM(2014) 33; this initiative 
is discussed in detail under Q12 below. 
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 In a first step, the Court established a principle of mutual recognition. Al-
ready, in the pre-EU citizenship era, the Court concluded in Micheletti that as 
regards a dual citizen, a Member State was not at liberty to treat that person 
as a third country national if he or she also held the citizenship of a Member 
State.222 The Court held that ‘it is not permissible for the legislation of a 
Member State to restrict the effects of the grant of the nationality of another 
Member State by imposing an additional condition for recognition of that na-
tionality with a view to the exercise of the fundamental freedoms provided 
for in the Treaty’.223  
 The specifics of national citizenship laws returned to the Court in the Chen 
case,224 where a third country national family had relied upon the particulari-
ties of Ireland’s (then) rules on ius soli acquisition of citizenship by all chil-
dren born on the island of Ireland to ensure that their child acquired Irish na-
tionality without leaving the territory of the UK. Again, the UK was required 
to recognise the legitimate acquisition of the citizenship of another Member 
State, which gave the child (and thus her mother, as her primary carer) a right 
of residence in the UK. It is well known that it was cases such as this that lay 
behind a change to the law in Ireland in 2004, on the basis of a constitutional 
referendum.225 
 By the time the Rottmann case came before the Court,226 its formulation of 
the interaction between EU law and national law in relation to citizenship had 
moved on yet further. It now comprised, on the one hand, the assurance from 
the Court to the Member States that the rules of acquisition and loss of citi-
zenship were in principle a matter for national law (subject to international 
law, of course), but, on the other hand, a familiar assertion that ‘the fact that a 
matter falls within the competence of the Member States does not alter the 
fact that, in situations covered by European Union law, the national rules 
concerned must have due regard to the latter’.227  
 Operating the national rules of acquisition – or, in Rottmann more particu-
larly, of loss – with due regard to EU law means seeing in the first place 
                                                        
222. Case C-369/90 Micheletti [1992] ECR I-4239. 
223. Micheletti, para. 10. 
224. Case C-200/02 Zhu and Chen [2004] ECR I-9925. 
225. See the report for Ireland at note 69 et seq. 
226. Case C-135/08 Rottmann [2010] ECR I-1449. For extended discussion by a number 
of commentators, see J. Shaw (ed.), Has the European Court of Justice Challenged 
Member State Sovereignty in Nationality Law?, EUI RSCAS Working Paper 
2011/62, available at http://cadmus.eui.eu/bitstream/handle/1814/19654/RSCAS_ 
2011_62.corr.pdf?sequence=3.  
227. Rottmann, para. 41. 
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whether this is a matter that falls within the ambit of EU law. Taking a deci-
sion to withdraw a naturalisation decision, even one procured by fraud, where 
this means that the person ceases to be a citizen of the Union because he or 
she has also lost the citizenship of the original state on acquisition of another 
citizenship, is a situation which ‘by reason of its nature and consequences’ 
falls within the ambit of EU law.228 For losing EU citizenship means losing 
all the rights attached to that status.229 Thus, in the circumstances, it is rea-
sonable to subject even a decision to withdraw a naturalisation decision to ju-
dicial review carried out in the light of EU law.230 
 It is not unreasonable in principle for Member States to protect the public 
interest by withdrawing a naturalisation decision obtained by means of fraud 
or deception, in order to protect ‘the special relationship of solidarity and 
good faith between it and its nationals and also the reciprocity of rights and 
duties, which form the bedrock of the bond of nationality’.231 Withdrawing 
nationality obtained by deception would not be – in the Court’s reading of in-
ternational law – an arbitrary act, and thus it would, in principle, be in ac-
cordance with the requirements of international law. But losing EU citizen-
ship as a consequence of the withdrawal decision does add a further element 
to the argument, according to the Court, because of ‘the importance which 
primary law attaches to the status of citizen of the Union’ (i.e. ‘destined to be 
the fundamental status of the nationals of the Member States’, etc.).232 
 In practice, what EU law demands is a test of proportionality, which takes 
into account both the nature of the deception and the consequences that the 
decision entails for the person in question and for the members of his or her 
family. The issue as to whether it is possible for the person affected to recov-
er his or her original nationality would also be a matter to take into account – 
and whether, perhaps, he or she might be afforded a period of time in order to 
achieve this challenge – although the fact that the person affected has not 
(yet) recovered the original nationality is not in and of itself a reason to re-
frain from withdrawing nationality. 
                                                        
228. Rottmann, para. 42. 
229. Rottmann, para. 46. 
230. Rottmann, para. 48. 
231. Rottmann, para. 51. 
232. Rottmann, para. 56. 
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8.2. Implementation of the Rottmann judgment 
As regards the implementation of the judgment in Rottmann at national level, 
we found little evidence in the national reports that the ruling has had a major 
disruptive effect upon national law or national procedures. Sweden offers a 
rare case where there has been a specific endeavour to review how EU law 
impacts upon citizenship law in the context of the work of a Commission of 
Inquiry on Swedish Citizenship.233 For some States (e.g. the Netherlands), the 
principle of proportionality is already part of national law so far as concerns 
citizenship, and the Guide to the Netherlands Nationality Act has long re-
ferred to the role of proportionality in decisions withdrawing citizenship.234  
 There are very rare instances of specific reference being made to Rott-
mann in national law.235 It is possible that this is because these types of situa-
tions arise relatively rarely (and even more rarely come before the courts); 
additionally, so far, there has been a tendency to confine the Rottmann judg-
ment to its rather specific facts.236 In other words, the issue would only arise 
in circumstances where the person affected had been required to renounce 
their previous citizenship in order to acquire the host State citizenship, or had 
lost their home State citizenship by operation of law when they acquired the 
citizenship of another state. Where states do not require surrender of the pre-
vious citizenship, it is already less likely that a Rottmann-type case will 
arise.237 It will also not arise if there is a rule in national law prohibiting the 
withdrawal of citizenship (even in cases of fraud, e.g. Sweden) where this 
renders a person stateless (e.g. Bulgaria, Slovenia) or restricts the withdrawal 
of nationality to cases where the person acquires another citizenship or acts 
contrary to the interests of the State (Greece); where there is a prohibition on 
withdrawing citizenship, even if obtained by fraud (e.g. Croatia); or where 
there is no requirement to surrender the first citizenship if a person is acquir-
ing a second one (e.g. Croatia).  
                                                        
233. See the report for Sweden at note 20. 
234. See the report for the Netherlands at note 66. 
235. See e.g. in the report for Estonia, where the updated commentary to the Constitution 
refers to the requirement that conditions of acquisition and loss of citizenship must 
have due regard to EU law. 
236. One Member State where these sorts of situations have arisen because of the insulari-
ty of citizenship law (which requires surrender of the previous citizenship) is Den-
mark, and its pre-Rottmann case law does seem questionable in this light; see that re-
port at note 74. 
237. On this point, see e.g. the reports for France, and Ireland. 
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 Quite a number of States also provide for citizens who have voluntarily 
surrendered their citizenship to re-acquire it (e.g. Croatia, Finland, Hungary, 
Slovenia, UK).238 Increased toleration of dual citizenship, exemplified by re-
cent changes in the Czech Republic and Latvia, further closes the risk that 
another Rottmann-type case could arise in a purely intra-EU context. Howev-
er, that leaves open the question of loss of citizenship where the national citi-
zenship at issue is the only EU citizenship that the person affected has, re-
gardless of whether it otherwise renders the person stateless. 
 There seems to have been little appetite in national courts to explore these 
and related issues. Thus no further analogous or complementary cases have 
been referred to the Court of Justice. For instance, in Ireland, the case of Mal-
lak239 saw the High Court insisting firmly that Rottmann only applied to loss 
and not to decisions on acquisition of citizenship. A Dutch court decided that 
the withdrawal of a grant of citizenship to a Somali citizen who had given 
false identity information did not trigger the Rottmann case because the So-
mali national had never properly acquired Dutch, and therefore EU, citizen-
ship.240  
 The UK’s rather broad provisions on deprivation of citizenship in circum-
stances where this is ‘conducive to the public good’ seem in principle to be 
defensible by reference to the comment in Rottmann that Member States are 
allowed to justify revocation decisions by reference to reasons ‘relating to the 
public interest’.241 That said, as the UK has now extended its legislative pro-
visions to make it possible for a person to be deprived of citizenship in these 
circumstances (e.g. if suspected of serious terrorist offences) even if that ren-
ders him or her stateless, it seems difficult to see how the argument put for-
ward by the Court of Appeal in G1 v Secretary of State denying a cross bor-
der element in the circumstances where a person was deprived of their UK 
citizenship can continue to be justified.242 Since the majority of the depriva-
tion decisions taken by the UK authorities in recent years have been taken 
specifically when the person concerned is not in the UK (and usually not 
                                                        
238. Or rather, in some cases, the release granted (in order to obtain another citizenship) 
does not come into effect because the person does not provide evidence that he or she 
has acquired another foreign citizenship; see e.g. the reports for Croatia, and Slove-
nia. 
239. Mallak v Minister for justice, Equality and Law Reform [2011] IEHC 306, paras 25-
61. 
240. See the report for the Netherlands at note 67. This would mean applying the Kaur 
case rather than the Rottmann case: Case C-192/99 Kaur [2001] ECR I-1237. 
241. Rottmann, para. 51. 
242. G1 v Secretary of State [2012] EWCA Civ 867. 
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elsewhere in the EU), the likelihood that they will thereby be deprived of the 
substance of their rights as EU citizens seems very high. 
8.3. The wider implications of Rottmann 
There also seems to be little evidence of national courts exploring further 
some of the wider implications of Rottmann, such as whether the references 
to the role of judicial review in decisions on the loss of citizenship could also 
be extended to require judicial review in relation to decisions refusing the ac-
quisition of citizenship (e.g. in the case of decisions refusing ordinary natural-
isation). And yet, the Institutional Report highlights, in particular, that the 
Court’s judgment in Rottmann may open up new avenues to explore the 
bringing of other aspects of access to national citizenship under judicial con-
trol, under the optic of having ‘due regard’ to EU law; although it suggests 
that Rottmann alone might provide a weak basis for this, since what is needed 
is a wider impact upon EU citizenship to trigger a broader EU interest.  
 As yet unpublished research by de Groot and Vonk243 charting national 
practices on judicial review and the reasoning of citizenship decisions is 
premised on the significance of Rottmann for national citizenship law prac-
tices, when combined with Articles 11 and 12 of the European Convention on 
Nationality (which does not bind all of the Member States but which sets a 
useful international benchmark) – which provide for the reasoning and judi-
cial review of citizenship decisions – as well as the 2011 European Court on 
Human Rights judgment in Genovese v Malta.244 This case establishes for the 
first time that measures relating to citizenship can be brought within the 
scope of the ECHR if they affect fundamental rights such as the right to non-
discrimination affecting a person’s social identity. In their work, de Groot and 
Vonk show that, at present, 27 of 35 European States surveyed provide for 
judicial review of negative decisions refusing ordinary residence-based natu-
ralisation.  
                                                        
243. G-R. de Groot and O. Vonk, ‘Scrutinising Citizenship Decisions: Analysing Judicial 
Review in Europe’, Paper presented at the ACIT Mid-Term Workshop on Comparing 
Citizenship Across Europe: Law, Implementation and Impact, EUI Florence, June 
2012 (held on file by J. Shaw).  
244. Genovese v Malta, Application Nr. 53124/09, 11 October 2011. The case involved a 
challenge to a Maltese law that discriminated between children born out of wedlock 
between Maltese mothers and Maltese fathers. 
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 It is interesting to note that at least one additional Member State has begun 
to permit judicial review of naturalisation decisions since this survey was 
conducted (Denmark), specifically on the grounds that there is a need to al-
low judicial review to ensure that in naturalisation decisions Denmark’s in-
ternational obligations are respected.245 There is perhaps more scope for 
courts to explore possible conflicts between EU law and the Danish National-
ity Act, which draws distinctions between children born in Denmark and 
those born in another country. As nationality law issues are a hot topic in 
Denmark at the present time, as that report notes, there may be potential for 
the courts to become more involved in the future, applying the Rottmann 
principle of proportionality. We could also expect further litigation if the 
commentary on the Estonian Constitution noted above comes into play in that 
State. As with Denmark, Estonia does not permit dual citizenship in the con-
text of naturalisation. 
 Another legal issue that may be explored in the future is the situation of 
dual citizens by birth (e.g. by ius sanguinis from both parents, or by a combi-
nation of ius soli through birth in the territory to settled parents and ius san-
guinis through the parents), where one or more of the states requires the child 
to make a choice at the age of 18. This could theoretically be an issue in Es-
tonia; but since Estonian law makes no provision for depriving a person who 
acquires citizenship by birth of that citizenship, then there is no procedure to 
enforce the theoretical choice.  
 The issue has already arisen in Germany, where children who acquire dual 
citizenship at birth are supposed to make a choice within five years of reach-
ing 18 as to which they choose. This so-called Optionspflicht does not apply 
where the other citizenship that the child holds is that of another Member 
State. Enforcing the option thus means that the child has to choose between 
EU citizenship (via German citizenship) and third country citizenship. The 
option has been criticised for imposing an unreasonable choice on the chil-
dren in question (the first cohort of whom reached 23 in 2013), and for forc-
ing a choice that many do not have to make. For example, while (legally 
speaking) Germany is still in principle hostile to dual citizenship, in practice 
it is widespread, both because of the exception allowed for citizens of other 
Member States to hold that citizenship with German citizenship, and because 
it does not require those who naturalise to renounce the citizenship of another 
                                                        
245. Judgment of the Danish Supreme Court of 13 September 2013 in Case 306/2012; see 
also the note in the EUDO Citizenship Observatory case law database available at 
http://eudo-citizenship.eu/databases/citizenship-case-law/?search=1&name=&year 
=&country=Denmark&national=1).  
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state if it is impossible so to do.246 Not least because of the increased political 
saliency of the issue in 2013, the latest German coalition government agreed 
in November of that year to abolish this controversial provision, this being 
one of the prices exacted by the Social Democratic Party as a condition for 
entering government with the Christian Democratic Union.247 
8.4. Rottmann and citizenship by investment  
The potentially wider significance of Rottmann was brought into the public 
eye in 2013 and 2014 by the controversy surrounding the proposal by Malta 
to ‘sell’ national citizenship to investors and other wealthy persons. This 
brings us back to the question raised in the Institutional Report, whether the 
case for applying Rottmann also to the acquisition of citizenship is premised 
upon being able to point to some negative impact upon rights protected by 
EU law or the status of EU citizenship more generally.248 This would mean 
giving such persons automatic access to Union citizenship and thus to all its 
rights and duties – notably, rights of free movement and residence throughout 
the territory of the Union (Article 21 TFEU).  
 Unsurprisingly, the Maltese proposal attracted a great deal of comment – 
most of it negative in character – about the ethics of ‘selling’ citizenship,249 
with a minority of comments focused more specifically on the question of the 
                                                        
246. C. Morehouse, ‘Although legally an exception, dual nationality has become the rule 
in Germany’, EUDO Citizenship Observatory, 7 March 2012, available at 
http://eudo-citizenship.eu/news/citizenship-news/606-although-legally-an-exception-
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247. L. Block, ‘Germany: Coalition government parties agree to scrap ‘option model’ for 
ius soli children’, 28 November 2013, available at http://eudo-citizenship.eu/news/ 
citizenship-news/998-germany-coalition-government-parties-agree-to-scrap-option-
model-for-ius-soli-children.  
248. Institutional Report, notes 175-176. 
249. A. Shachar and R. Bauböck (Eds), Should Citizenship be for Sale?, EUI Working Pa-
per RSCAS 2014/01 (available at http://eudo-citizenship.eu/images/docs/Citizenship-
for-Sale-RSCAS_2014_01.pdf); S Peers, ‘Want to be a EU citizen? Show me the 
money!’, available at http://eulawanalysis.blogspot.co.uk/2014/01/want-to-be-eu-
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taries, and also to news reports, see the work of the European Parliamentary Research 
Service (http://epthinktank.eu/2014/01/15/eu-citizenship-and-residence-permits-for-
sale/) or visit the EUDO Citizenship Observatory country profile page for Malta and 




interface with EU law. The original proposal was to grant citizenship based 
on a donation to the State treasury of €650k. Subsequent amendments raised 
this to €1.15m, including the acquisition of government bonds and property, 
at least for a certain period of time. Finally, after pressure was brought to bear 
by the European Commission, which announced that it intended to bring in-
fringement proceedings against Malta, and by the European Parliament, 
which agreed a resolution condemning citizenship for sale because of the im-
plications for Union citizenship,250 the Government conceded that more 
needed to be done to demonstrate a real link between the State and the indi-
vidual investor seeking citizenship before the grant of citizenship, and so in-
stituted a one-year residency rule.251 This decision leaves open, however, the 
question of how the Member State might interpret the residency requirement. 
 This entire story leaves many questions unanswered, for the Maltese 
scheme is by no means unique, as the European Parliament’s ThinkTank’s 
own research demonstrates, and as has been fully analysed by writers such as 
Jelena Džankić.252 ‘Investor citizenship’ or so-called ‘golden residence’ 
schemes (which give investors residence permits, and often Schengen visas, 
and a rapid pathway to citizenship for them and their families) are common in 
the EU Member States. Greece, Hungary, Latvia, Portugal, Spain, and the 
UK have the latter. Austria, Bulgaria, Cyprus, and now Malta have versions 
of the former. Furthermore, if residence is to be the key issue in scrutinising 
of the granting of national citizenship given its implications for Union citi-
zenship, what then of the external citizenship programmes of numerous EU 
Member States, including Croatia, Hungary, and Italy, which see the de-
scendants of former emigrants (re)acquiring national citizenship on the basis 
of rather tenuous historic or ethnic ties across multiple generations? 
 The crucial EU law question seems, therefore, to be whether ‘due regard 
to EU law’ in relation to the operation of national citizenship laws triggers, in 
                                                        
250. European Parliament Resolution of 16 January 2014, P7_TA-PROV(2014)0038, vot-
ed on after a debate in plenary on 15 January where parliamentarians queued up to 
condemn the Maltese scheme. 
251. See the joint press release of the Maltese Government and the European Commission, 
MEMO 14-70, 29 January 2014, available at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-
release_MEMO-14-70_en.htm.  
252. For a shorter summary of Džankić’s reflections, see ‘Can Money Buy Citizenship?’, 
Citizenship in South East Europe, 6 February 2012, available at http://www.citsee.eu/ 
citsee-story/can-money-buy-citizenship. See also, Džankić’s full paper on ‘The Pros 
and Cons of Ius Pecuniae: Investor Citizenship in Comparative Perspective’, EUI 
Working Papers, RSCAS 2012/14, available at http://cadmus.eui.eu/handle/ 
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turn, the duty of loyalty in Article 4(3) TEU, which provides that ‘the Union 
and the Member States shall, in full mutual respect, assist each other in carry-
ing out tasks which flow from the Treaties. [...] Member States shall refrain 
from any measure which could jeopardise the attainment of the Union’s ob-
jectives’. It is clear that the intertwining not only of national citizenship and 
EU citizenship, as exemplified in the previous paragraphs, but also of the cit-
izenship regimes of the Member States inter se, could trigger the principle of 
sincere cooperation. Whether it could do so to the extent that the Commission 
could successfully bring a Member State before the Court of Justice in re-
spect of its creation of a new scheme for naturalisations where there appears 
to be a weak link between the putative citizens and their new State is a moot 
point, and the Maltese case is not now going to test it. But the point remains, 
as the Institutional Report rightly states that the Member States could and 
should work together more closely in the area of nationality, in order to 
‘share knowledge and experience on conditions and procedures for obtaining 
Member States’ nationality.’ 
8.5. Question 8 – emerging issues and themes: the ‘value’ of citizenship  
What emerges from the discussion above is one of the paradoxes of EU citi-
zenship. We can see how the value of (national) citizenship is enhanced as 
a status by operation of EU law and by the rights attaching to EU citi-
zenship. It is hence an attractive status, a point recognised in some of the 
post-2004 Member States (such as Poland253), as well as being explicit in re-
actions to the Maltese investor scheme.  
 And yet, as many have noted, as a rights-status, national citizenship has 
been hollowed out by EU citizenship, with very few rights reserved by 
States for national citizens alone. This is partly because of the operation of 
EU law, but in a few cases it is because of national choices made by Member 
States (e.g. the intertwining of citizenship and citizenship rights in Ireland 
and the UK). This has led commentators such as Gareth Davies to wonder 
what is left of national citizenship, if residence is the new reference point.254 
It seems likely, as the Institutional Report notes, that the intertwining of these 
two statuses is likely, in the future, to lead to more, not less, cooperation be-
                                                        
253. See the analysis of the Constitutional Tribunal decision on Article 30 of the Act on 
Polish Citizenship in the report for Poland. 
254. G. Davies, ‘‘Any Place I Hang My Hat?’ or: Residence is the New Nationality’ 
(2005) 11 ELJ 43. 
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tween the institutions and the Member States, and amongst the Member 
States themselves. 
Political rights of EU citizens 
This section of the Report deals with the political rights of EU citizens under 
EU law. Notwithstanding the emphasis in the Lisbon Treaty on the participa-
tory and representative nature of democracy in the Union legal order, the 
Member States continue to lag behind the vision spelled out in the Treaties 
and by the EU legislature with respect to the realisation of appropriate elec-
toral rights for Union citizens. This set of questions examines: 
 (1) The implementation of Directive 93/109 on European Parliament elec-
tions;255 
(2) The implementation of Directive 94/8 on local elections;256 
(3) The extent to which Union citizens residing in a host State are granted 
electoral rights for regional and other elections under national law i.e. 
above and beyond the threshold requirements set out in the Treaties; and 
(4) National restrictions imposed on access to the electoral rights ap-
plied to Union citizens, including those imposed on their own citizens 
that may be affected by EU law. 
Through these questions, we were asking national rapporteurs to explore how 
each Member State integrates these rights into the domestic political system. 
We wanted to know not only how well the two key Directives giving effect to 
Articles 20(2)(b) and 22 TFEU have been implemented at national level, but 
also whether the Member States have chosen in any way to go beyond the 
scope of current EU law in the granting of electoral rights. It was important 
too to see how the Member States have gone about using the derogations 
provided for in the Directives. This was one way in which we could open up 
the question of how EU electoral rights might develop in the future. 
                                                        
255. Directive 93/109/EC laying down detailed arrangements for the exercise of the right 
to vote and stand as a candidate in elections to the European Parliament for citizens of 
the Union residing in a Member State of which they are not nationals, [1993] OJ 
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 Although drafted in the same way in the Treaty, the two sets of rights have 
slightly different purposes and rather different roots. While it is partly the 
purpose of the European Parliamentary electoral rights to make migrant EU 
citizens feel at home and better integrated in their host State, these rights are 
also underpinned by a sense of the significance, for the EU, of the direct elec-
tions to its own parliamentary body introduced in 1979257 and of the need to 
ensure that all EU citizens resident in the Union should have the right to vote 
in these elections. D’Oliveira called these twin roots ‘the emergence of a 
Community or Union collectivity’ and ‘the principles of democracy’.258  
 Of course, one of the paradoxes of European Parliament elections is that 
they are in large measure still regulated by national law, notwithstanding the 
existence of the Act on Direct Elections, so that the rules concerning, for ex-
ample, EU citizens resident outside the territory of the Union fall to be decid-
ed by each individual State in respect of their own citizens.259 In addition, in 
the political sphere, it is still the case, 35 years after the first direct elections, 
that there is little evidence of Europe-wide electoral campaigning based on 
transnational party programmes, or of key political figures who are seeking 
the approval of the electorate on a the basis of an identifiable political pro-
gramme.  
 This has changed somewhat in the 2014 European Parliament elections 
with several (but not all) of the transnational parties selecting in advance a 
candidate for the position of Commission President who would expect to be 
endorsed by the European Council as a single name proposal for approval by 
the European Parliament under Article 17(7) TEU, assuming it was their par-
                                                        
257. The original Act on Direct Elections dates from 1976, and – as with the most signifi-
cant and recent amendment in 2002 to ensure that all elections are conducted accord-
ing to some form of proportional representation system – had to be ratified by the 
Member States in accordance with their respective constitutional requirements. See 
Council Decision 2002/772 amending the Act concerning the election of the repre-
sentatives of the European Parliament by direct universal suffrage annexed to Deci-
sion 76/787, [2002] OJ L283/1. Article 223 TFEU continues to require a unanimous 
vote in the Council, the consent of the Parliament, and ratification by the Member 
States of any provisions necessary for the elections of the Members of the Parliament 
by direct universal suffrage. 
258. HUJ d’Oliveira, ‘European Citizenship: its Meaning, Its Potential’, in R. Dehousse 
(ed.), Europe After Maastricht: An Ever Closer Union? (Sweet & Maxwell, 1994) 
126 at 142. This point is discussed in more detail in J Shaw, The Transformation of 
Citizenship in the European Union. Electoral Rights and the Restructuring of Politi-
cal Space, (Cambridge University Press, 2007) Chapter 4. 
259. Case C-300/04 Eman and Sevinger [2006] ECR I-8055. 
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ticular party group which won most seats in the EP elections.260 But even the 
Court of Justice has acknowledged that what we have had so far have been 
(now 28) separate national elections, in which national issues predominate 
over EU ones.261 We still stand a long way away from truly ‘federal’ Europe-
an Parliament elections. 
 The grant of local voting rights, meanwhile, was very much the expression 
of the idea of giving mobile EU citizens certain participation rights that re-
flect their residence, and these rights find a reflection, more generally, in the 
Council of Europe’s Convention on the Political Participation of Foreigners 
in Local Life,262 which obviously extends beyond the confines of the Union. 
These political rights represent one response to the challenge of integrating 
migrant EU citizens in the communities where they find themselves as a re-
sult of exercising their free movement rights. They do not differ, in that re-
spect, from the local electoral rights granted for many decades to all non-
citizens by a number of States (e.g. the Nordic countries, Ireland, and the 
Netherlands) or established more recently by a number of older and newer 
Member States (e.g. Belgium, Hungary, Luxembourg, and Slovenia). How-
ever, they do remove discriminatory residence requirements, which those 
States that enfranchise third country nationals usually include (when com-
pared to the treatment of citizens).263  
 In some cases, the reasons for recent extension of rights have been related 
to the particular position of one non-citizen group (e.g. see the reports for Es-
tonia and Lithuania, as regards Russians and other ex-USSR citizens). In fact, 
because EU electoral rights specifically privilege certain groups of ‘second 
country nationals’, they could be said to have more in common with those 
measures in place in States that only enfranchise certain groups on the basis 
of historical ties (e.g. the UK, with its electoral rights for Irish and Common-
wealth citizens) and/or reciprocity (e.g. Portugal and Spain).  
                                                        
260. See, for the European Parliament’s wish list around the 2014 EP elections, its resolu-
tion of 22 November 2012, on the elections to the European Parliament in 2014, 
P7_TA(2012)0462. This includes urging the European political parties to nominate 
candidates for the Presidency of the Commission and calling for as many members of 
the next Commission as possible to be drawn from Members of the European Parlia-
ment, to reflect the balance between the two chambers of the legislature. 
261. Case C-145/04 Spain v UK (Gibraltar) [2006] ECR I-7917. 
262. ETS No. 144. 
263. For example, the 1996 implementation of the municipal elections Directive by the 
Netherlands involved only the removal of the requirement that a non-national should 
have resided in the Netherlands for five years before being able to vote in local elec-
tions. 
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 At the same time, however, the EU provisions are a constitutional novelty 
for many States that would otherwise have a constitutionally-based prohibi-
tion on allowing any person who was not formally a member of the polity 
(i.e. a citizen who is part of the demos) to vote in any elections. This is the 
case in Germany and Austria, where previous constitutional court cases had 
struck down attempts at local or city level to introduce voting rights for third 
country nationals.264 Numerous other States had to change their constitutions 
to accommodate EU electoral rights (e.g. Portugal). Interesting tests of the 
constitutionality of EU electoral rights – albeit within a framework where 
none of the courts involved appeared to be questioning the primacy of EU 
law – came in France and Poland,265 producing reflections upon the concept 
of the ‘national people’, in its various guises, in the post-EU citizenship era.  
 We also wanted to gather data on whether, were the Court of Justice to 
confirm a substantive (citizens’) right to vote in European Parliament elec-
tions under EU law, buttressed by Article 39(2) of the Charter of Fundamen-
tal Rights, there is substantial scope for conflict between national law and EU 
law in this context. This might mean, for example, reading across case law on 
Article 3 of Protocol 1 to the ECHR, such as Hirst (No 2) (on the disenfran-
chisement of prisoners)266 and Kiss (on the disenfranchisement of persons 
with mental disabilities)267 into fact situations that fall within the scope of EU 
law. Such a move would, however, require a decisive extension of the 
Court’s previous case law on the scope of the right to vote in European Par-
liament elections in Eman and Sevinger, which was, at best, ambiguous on 
this point.  
 This is one of the areas in which the Charter may have a substantive im-
pact upon the exercise of the rights of EU citizenship in the future (see also 
Q14). We directed the attention of the national rapporteurs to a line of case 
law in the UK in which the applicants argued inter alia that the total ban in 
national law on prisoners’ voting rights in relation to the prospective Europe-
an Parliament elections in June 2014 was disproportionate, although, in the 
                                                        
264. For discussion of these cases, see Shaw, The Transformation of Citizenship, Chapter 
9. 
265. See respectively, Conseil Constitutionnel, judgment of 9 April 1992, available at 
http://www.conseil-constitutionnel.fr/conseil-constitutionnel/francais/les-
decisions/depuis-1958/decisions-par-date/1992/92-308-dc/decision-n-92-308-dc-du-
09-avril-1992.8798.html; and Judgment of 31 May 2004, K 15/04, available at 
http://www.trybunal.gov.pl/eng/summaries/documents/K_15_04_GB.pdf 
266. Hirst v United Kingdom (No 2) App no 74025/01 (2006). 
267. Kiss v Hungary App no 38832/06 (2010). 
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event, all such arguments were rejected by the UK Supreme Court in an Oc-
tober 2013 judgment.268 This was perhaps unsurprising, in view of the politi-
cisation of prisoners’ voting rights in the UK at present and the ongoing re-
fusal by the UK Parliament to take steps to ensure Convention-conformity of 
UK law in this area by amending the current blanket disenfranchisement.269 
Questions 9 and 10270 
Since when has Directive 93/109/EC on European Parliament elections 
been fully implemented? Have there been any derogations? Are there any 
additional conditions imposed on EU citizens compared to national citi-
zens (special registration or residence requirements)? Has there been rel-
evant case law in domestic courts? 
 
Since when has Directive 94/80/EC on local elections been fully imple-
mented? Have there been any derogations? Are there any additional con-
ditions imposed on EU citizens compared to national citizens (special reg-
istration or residence requirements)? Has there been relevant case law in 
domestic courts? 
Article 20(2) TEU 
Citizens of the Union shall enjoy the rights and be subject to the duties provided for in the 
Treaties. They shall have, inter alia: 
... 
(b) the right to vote and to stand as candidates in elections to the European Parliament and 
in municipal elections in their Member State of residence, under the same conditions as 
nationals of that State; 
                                                        
268. The Scottish case of McGeoch v Lord President of the Council [2011] CSIH 67 and 
the English case of Chester v Secretary of State for Justice [2010] EWCA Civ 1439 
were conjoined before the Supreme Court. A seven-member Supreme Court bench 
unanimously rejected all the applicants’ contentions (which related to the ECHR as 
well as to EU law); see [2013] UKSC 63. 
269. For full details of the debate on prisoner voting in the UK, see House of Commons 
Library Standard Note SN/PC/01764, Prisoners’ Voting Rights, last updated 15 Janu-
ary 2014. 
270. In this section of the Report, we treat the responses to and discussion of Questions 9 
and 10 together – resulting in Sections numbered 9.2/10.2 etc in order to maintain 
consistency. We also draw on data from the FRACIT reports, especially in cases 
where there was not FIDE report for a particular State. 
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Article 22 TEU 
1. Every citizen of the Union residing in a Member State of which he is not a national shall 
have the right to vote and to stand as a candidate at municipal elections in the Member 
State in which he resides, under the same conditions as nationals of that State. This right 
shall be exercised subject to detailed arrangements adopted by the Council, acting unani-
mously in accordance with a special legislative procedure and after consulting the Europe-
an Parliament; these arrangements may provide for derogations where warranted by prob-
lems specific to a Member State. 
2. Without prejudice to Article 223(1) and to the provisions adopted for its implementa-
tion, every citizen of the Union residing in a Member State of which he is not a national 
shall have the right to vote and to stand as a candidate in elections to the European Parlia-
ment in the Member State in which he resides, under the same conditions as nationals of 
that State. This right shall be exercised subject to detailed arrangements adopted by the 
Council, acting unanimously in accordance with a special legislative procedure and after 
consulting the European Parliament; these arrangements may provide for derogations 
where warranted by problems specific to a Member State. 
Article 223(1) TFEU 
The European Parliament shall draw up a proposal to lay down the provisions necessary 
for the election of its Members by direct universal suffrage in accordance with a uniform 
procedure in all Member States or in accordance with principles common to all Member 
States. 
The Council, acting unanimously in accordance with a special legislative procedure and 
after obtaining the consent of the European Parliament, which shall act by a majority of its 
component Members, shall lay down the necessary provisions. These provisions shall enter 
into force following their approval by the Member States in accordance with their respec-
tive constitutional requirements. 
9.1./10.1. Introduction – EU electoral rights 
In 1993 and 1994, the EU legislature adopted the measures necessary to give 
effect to the electoral rights for resident EU citizens introduced into what was 
then the EC Treaty by the Treaty of Maastricht. The timescale for the imple-
mentation of the 1993 EP Elections Directive was tight: it was adopted on 9 
December 1993, and the first elections to be conducted under its provisions 
were held in June 1994. All 12 then Member States were able to do so in 
time, and indeed every acceding Member State has successfully implemented 
Directive 93/109 since then.  
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 The 1994 Local Elections Directive, adopted in December 1994, allowed 
for a more relaxed implementation timetable of one year; but, in fact, only 
four of the 12 Member States managed to implement the Directive on time. 
Gradually, each of the Member States introduced implementing provisions as 
they held local elections (which, of course, are held on different timetables in 
every Member State) and it was not until 2001 that the Directive was first ap-
plied in France. Belgium was the slowest Member State to comply, partly be-
cause of internal difficulties within the complex Belgian quasi-federal system 
connected to obtaining all of the necessary consents to the implementing leg-
islation; it only finally complied after an enforcement action was brought by 
the Commission before the Court of Justice.271 
 The key to the equal treatment rights contained in both Directives is 
providing for equivalence of residence. For example, Article 5 of Directive 
93/109 provides: 
If, in order to vote or to stand as candidates, nationals of the Member State or residence 
must have spent a certain minimum period as a resident in the electoral territory of that 
State, Community voters and Community nationals entitled to stand as candidates shall be 
deemed to have fulfilled that condition where they have resided for an equivalent period in 
other Member States. 
In addition, the Directives set out various principles giving substantial leeway 
in implementation by the Member States. In practice, because of the diversity 
of practices among the Member States – e.g. in relation to registration prac-
tices – the reality of ‘Union voting’ is perhaps more complex than the sim-
plicity of the Treaty provisions would at first blush suggest. For example, in 
relation to European Parliament elections, so-called ‘Union voters’ have free-
dom of choice to vote in the host State or in the home State (where this is 
possible – it is not in all Member States272), but they may only vote in one 
Member State. Likewise, they may only stand as a candidate in one Member 
State. Operationalising this option can become complicated: the Directive is 
predicated upon some quite complex arrangements for the exchange of in-
                                                        
271. Case C-323/97 Commission v Belgium [1998] ECR I-4281. 
272. Franchise and Electoral Participation of Third Country Citizens Residing in the Eu-
ropean Union and of European Citizens Residing in Third Countries, Study for the 
European Parliament, Policy Department of Citizens’ Rights and Constitutional Af-
fairs, 2013, prepared by the EUDO Citizenship Observatory, available at 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/etudes/join/2013/474441/IPOL-AF 
CO_ET%282013%29474441_EN.pdf, Table 1, at pp. 22-23 (EUDO FRACIT Re-
port). 
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formation between the Member States to try to ensure that persons do not 
vote twice. 
 Member States must also, under both Directives, take the ‘necessary 
measures’ to ensure that EU citizens expressing the wish to vote are entered 
in the register sufficiently far in advance of polling day. The general tenor of 
the approach to registering to vote is that while this will require some action 
or expression of willingness in the first instance, those who have been regis-
tered once should stay registered until they cease to be entitled to vote. Those 
seeking to vote, or standing as candidates, are only required to produce the 
same documentation that nationals are required to produce, although they 
may be required to produce identity cards.  
 The EP Elections Directive allows the Member State of residence to re-
quire a Union voter to show that he has not been deprived of the right to vote 
in his Member State of origin. Both Directives allow Member States to pre-
vent persons deprived of the right to stand as a candidate in their home State 
from standing as candidates. The 2013 amending Directive replaces the re-
quirement to produce an attestation from the home State that the person wish-
ing to stand as a candidate has not been deprived of his or her right to stand as 
a candidate with a simple statement to that effect submitted along with other 
paperwork, whilst at the same time placing additional onus on the Member 
States to cooperate and on the home State to provide the State of residence 
with information when requested. Austria can be cited as an example of early 
implementation of these very principles. Already in the 2009 European Par-
liament elections, the relevant Ministry contacted the authorities in the other 
Member States to obtain confirmation about the right to vote. 
 Widespread and effective compliance had not necessarily been assured, 
however, in time for the 2014 EP elections. It is noted in the Institutional Re-
port that only half of the Member States had notified their transposition 
measures by the date of implementation (January 2014). In line with its gen-
eral trend towards automatically beginning enforcement proceedings against 
Member States for failure to notify implementing measures, by February 
2014 the Commission had already begun actions against all non-complying 
States.273 But it is likely that these actions will be discontinued before they 
reach the Court of Justice , as Member States are pushed towards compliance 
by the Commission’s actions. 
                                                        
273. See http://ec.europa.eu/eu_law/eulaw/decisions/dec_20140205.htm.  
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9.2./10.2. Key findings on transposition, application, and interpretation 
National reports set out in detail the sometimes complex implementation ar-
rangements for the relatively straightforward equal treatment rights first in-
troduced by the Treaty of Maastricht and by the two Directives. The key to 
implementing these rights is to give resident EU citizens the right to vote in 
European Parliamentary and municipal elections in the host State on the same 
basis as nationals. In practice, unless there is some form of automatic regis-
tration of both nationals and EU citizens, this is quite hard to bring about, 
which is one reason why registration levels amongst EU citizens are much 
lower than for the citizens of the host State. 
 Challenges faced by EU citizens include not only difficulties in becoming 
and staying registered to vote, but also restrictions on membership of or the 
right to found political parties. For the broader context of EU electoral rights 
concerns political culture and not just individual rights to vote on the basis of 
residence. Political parties are important gateways for those wishing to be 
elected in the State of residence; and, moreover, it is important that political 
parties and political elites communicate the message to resident EU citizens 
that they are valued members of the electoral community for the purposes of 
these two types of elections where the right to participate is regulated at the 
EU level. In reality, as the Commission has acknowledged, awareness has 
gradually risen over the years.274 But there are still not that many examples of 
good practice in relation to the provision of information. Moreover, it is well 
known that political party engagement with EU electoral rights has been 
patchy in many Member States (as has, indeed, been political party engage-
ment with immigrant origin voters more generally).275 
 The latest data on local elections is contained in a 2012 Commission re-
port on the implementation and application of Directive 94/80.276 Turnout – 
discerned on the basis of levels of registration – continues to be generally ex-
                                                        
274. This is demonstrated by the 2010 Flash Eurobarometer Report concentrating on vot-
ing rights, although in fact knowledge is not precise because many people think that 
resident ES citizens can vote in the national elections of the host State: see 
http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/flash/fl_292_sum_en.pdf. 
275. For examples, see Shaw, The Transformation of Citizenship, at pp. 269-272. Use-
ful, if now somewhat outdated, information about the political activism of immi-
grants can be found in the findings of the Politis Project, see http://www.politis-
europe.uni-oldenburg.de/index.html.  
276. Report on the application of Directive 94/80/EC on  the right to vote and to stand as 
a candidate in municipal elections by citizens of the Union residing in a Member 
State of which they are not nationals, COM(2012) 99 final at para. 2.1. 
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tremely low (even in the context of general trends towards low turnout in lo-
cal elections in many Member States). Generally, Member States do not col-
lect data that make it possible to ascertain turnout levels by EU citizens spe-
cifically. The exceptions – where there seems to be greater activation of EU 
citizens towards registration (and therefore, it is assumed, towards voting) – 
tend to map onto those cases where EU citizen groups in the host State are 
dominated by one nationality.277 Numbers of EU citizens running as candi-
dates (and being elected) are also very low.  
 The evidence does not, therefore, indicate a high level of political integra-
tion of EU citizen countries into their host States.278 The issue of registration 
becomes particularly urgent every five years with impending European Par-
liament elections, staggered over several days for May 2014. At that point, 
awareness arises of the fact that registration deadlines vary across the Mem-
ber States, although with the increased use of the internet and social media 
for political information purposes (#EP2014 on twitter), there seems to be 
relatively little reason why EU citizens should struggle to find out what their 
deadline would be.279 
 While the Commission report on the 2009 European Parliament elec-
tions280 emphasised that the number of EU citizens registering was rising in 
most Member States, it also highlighted that these were not rising in propor-
tion to the increase in the numbers of resident EU citizens. In other words, 
free movement rights are being exercised, but EU citizens are not using the 
associated political rights. The Commission’s Communication and Recom-
mendation for 2014 emphasised the importance of connecting the national 
debates and campaigns (and the role of political parties) to European level 
debates and parties, and also of using the European Parliament electoral pro-
                                                        
277. COM(2012) 99, at Section 2.3. 
278. See further, the press release on the independent study on integration of mobile EU 
citizens in six cities, published on 11 February 2014, available at  
 http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-14-137_en.htm. 
279. A recent article in euobserver contains a list of all the deadlines highlighting the vari-
ation very clearly: see further, the report at 
 http://euobserver.com/eu-elections/123291. 
280. COM(2010) 605 final, Report on the election of Members of the European Parlia-
ment (1976 Act as amended by Decision 2002/772/EC, Euratom) and on the partici-
pation of European Union citizens in elections for the European Parliament in the 
Member State of residence (Directive 93/109/EC, at p. 5. 
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cess in order to assist in the identification of who the next Commission Presi-
dent will be.281 
 Yet overall, in formal terms, the implementation of electoral rights has 
been satisfactory. The Institutional Report sketches areas of action for the 
Commission, and we discuss these further in Section 9.3/10.3 below. It was 
interesting to see that only one case had to be brought before the Court of Jus-
tice in order to ensure basic formal compliance by all Member States (the lo-
cal elections case brought against Belgium, noted above) despite the fact that 
electoral rights are so closely associated with the exercise of national sover-
eignty. These rights are not (any more) seen as major constitutional challeng-
es to the Member States, even now during a period in the history of the Euro-
pean Union when EU ‘immigration’ (often not ‘free movement’) is seen by a 
number of States as a challenge to the domestic capacity to control the bor-
der. 
 This level of acceptance may be, in part, of course because the ‘European-
ness’ of European Parliamentary elections is on the whole gradually becom-
ing better understood in the Member States, making it obvious to any observ-
er that all EU citizens resident in the Member States should be able to vote 
whether in the home or the host State; and because – unfortunately – for the 
most part, local electoral rights are regarded as politically relatively unim-
portant. This point is re-emphasised by reference to the case of Luxembourg, 
which is the only State to hold a derogation based on the numbers of resident 
EU citizens being above a certain threshold. In that case, the Member State is 
permitted to set residence requirements which ensure that EU citizens want-
ing to exercise electoral rights (active and passive) must have been resident 
for a certain period of time.  
 In other words, the assumption has been, since the inception of the Di-
rective, that where voting rights might in fact matter, because non-national 
EU citizens are a sufficiently large constituency to affect outcomes, they can 
be restricted by hard-to-satisfy residence requirements. We return to the issue 
of derogations in Section 9.5/10.5 below, when we consider the implicit 
claim in the Institutional Report that derogations have had their time.  
 Equally, there can be difficulties with determining the ‘basic unit of local 
government’ for the purposes of the Local Elections Directive. The fact that 
                                                        
281. Commission Communication, Preparing for the 2014 European elections: further en-
hancing their democratic and efficient conduct, COM(2013) 126 final; and Commission 
Recommendation on enhancing the democratic and efficient conduct of the elections to 
the European Parliament, C(2013) 1303. This is also reflected in the European Parlia-
ment’s November 2012 resolution on the same topic (P7_TA (2012)0462). 
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in those federal States where there are ‘city states’ (i.e. Germany and Aus-
tria), the Member States do not allow voting in ‘city state’ elections but only 
in elections for very low level communal authorities (which have very few 
powers) continues to reinforce the marginality of these rights. 
 The national reports have also emphasised the almost complete absence of 
examples of individual citizens using the law to enforce their rights.282 The 
only example of litigation given in the reports dates back to the 1995 local 
elections in Valencia, where two French residents excluded from the fran-
chise successfully sought the annulment of an election and its re-running with 
them exercising their right to vote. In that sense, it would seem that these are 
EU rights that are generally accepted and properly applied by the Member 
State administrations, even if there is sometimes evidence of a lack of 
knowledge and training at the lower levels of administration.283  
 It is surely the case that, from time to time, EU citizens try but fail to ob-
tain timely registration and thus the right to vote, or fall foul of a requirement 
to register on the roll. But while there has been, in some areas, an increased 
litigation culture in relation to electoral rights (one thinks of the case of pris-
oner voting rights in particular, especially in the two States where the right to 
vote is completely excluded, namely Estonia and the UK), litigation has ob-
viously not been the chosen avenue of disappointed EU citizens seeking to 
vote in local or European Parliamentary elections in their State of residence. 
Moreover, as we shall see in the next Section, the Commission approach to 
enforcement and to the task of addressing actual or potential infringements 
has primarily been through the use of dialogues with Member States, involv-
ing very limited public statements about non-compliance in the context of pe-
riodic reports. This has been judged, one must assume, to have been thought 
to be the most effective way of improving the level of compliance overall. 
9.3./10.3. Areas for Commission action 
Details of the areas where implementation and application of the electoral 
rights Directives may be thought to be lacking can be gleaned from the Insti-
                                                        
282. The Reports for Estonia, France, and Poland highlight meta level ‘constitutional’ 
challenges testing out the ‘fit’ between the electoral rights and the national constitu-
tions. 
283. See the complaints-based evidence presented in European Commission, EU Citi-




tutional Report, read in conjunction with the Commission’s previously pub-
lished reports focusing on the implementation of the two Directives. They 
pertain in particular to the additional requirements that Member States may 
impose on EU voters.  
 Three particular areas of concern can be picked out for brief comment. 
The first is the possibility in the Directives for Member States to require EU 
citizens to prove their identity in order to exercise the right to vote. It was on-
ly in 2012 that the Maltese authorities, for example, amended their national 
provisions to remove the obligation on EU citizens to show a Maltese identity 
card in order to prove identity. 
 The second concerns the residence issues that emerge in some Member 
States, especially in central and eastern Europe, which make it hard for EU 
citizens who do not go through a relatively heavy and bureaucratic residence 
registration process at the local level (which would not necessarily be strictly 
required for the EU citizen still to be resident lawfully in the territory) to be-
come registered to vote. The report for the Czech Republic (echoing also the 
FRACIT Report for the same State284) notes the requirement of ‘permanent 
residence’. Only 40% of EU citizens resident in the Czech Republic have this 
form of ‘permanent residence’.  
 In like manner, there appears to be a similar restriction in Estonia; and in 
Bulgaria, where the Commission has indeed taken action. However, the cases 
concerned with the requirement of ‘durable or permanent residence in Bul-
garia’ referred to in the report for Bulgaria were closed in September 2013.285 
As the Commission notes in its 2012 report,286 it is good practice to enrol cit-
izens automatically in the register once they have expressed an initial wish to 
be registered. 
 The third area of concern relates to the right to found and to become a 
member of a political party. Perhaps one of the most notable examples of this 
– and an example of legislative responsiveness in the face of challenges in the 
national courts as well as questions being raised by the Commission – is that 
of Estonia, which amended its legislation to allow foreigners to participate in 
political parties in 2006. The reports for Greece and Spain also note that only 
citizens can found political parties. In the Institutional Report, the Commis-
                                                        
284. P. Kandalec, Access to Electoral Rights. Czech Republic, EUDO Citizenship Obser-
vatory, FRACIT Report, June 2013, available at http://eudo-citizenship.eu/admin/ 
?p=file&appl=countryProfiles&f=136-Chech-FRACIT.pdf. 
285. See the record of Commission enforcement action decisions at  
 http://ec.europa.eu/eu_law/eulaw/decisions/dec_20130926.htm. 
286. COM(2012) 99, p. 13.  
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sion makes it clear that it regards restrictions on accessing political parties as 
important obstacles to the enjoyment of political participation rights. 
9.4./10.4. Special problems and limitations 
Article 1(2) of Directive 93/109 places clear limits on the EU level regulation 
of the right to vote in EP elections at present. It provides that: 
Nothing in this Directive shall affect each Member State's provisions concerning the right 
to vote or to stand as a candidate of its nationals who reside outside its electoral territory. 
In similar terms, Article 1(2) of Directive 94/80 provides: 
Nothing in this Directive shall affect each Member State's provisions concerning the right 
to vote or to stand as a candidate either of its nationals who reside outside its territory or of 
third country nationals who reside in that State. 
The absence of a savings clause for resident third country national voters was, 
of course, one of the focus points that have arisen regarding the character of 
EU electoral rights. In Spain v UK,287 after the UK had sought to implement 
the human rights mandate arising from the earlier ECtHR Matthews case – 
according to which those EU citizens resident in Gibraltar must also be in-
cluded in the franchise for European Parliament elections288 – Spain suggest-
ed that the UK should not extend its normal inclusive franchise to Gibraltar 
and thus should not include Commonwealth citizens in the franchise for Eu-
ropean Parliament elections. It sought, by various means, to encourage the 
Court of Justice to find that the franchise for EP elections should be a Euro-
pean franchise – i.e. covering EU citizens, wherever resident, but not non-EU 
citizens. In Spain v UK, the Court of Justice specifically recognised that al-
lowing Commonwealth citizens the right to vote was one of the constitutional 
traditions of the UK, and confirmed that it was ‘within the competence of 
each Member State in compliance with [Union] law’ to define the persons en-
titled to vote and stand in EP elections.289 We return in the discussion under 
Q12 to the implications of the Court’s ruling on the scope of EU citizenship 
and the right to vote in Spain v UK and the related Eman and Sevinger case.  
                                                        
287. Case C-145/04 Spain v UK [2006] ECR I-7917. 
288. Matthews v United Kingdom App no 24833/94 (1999). 
289. Spain v UK, paras 78 and 79. 
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 The EUDO FRACIT report shows that there remains uneven coverage 
amongst the Member States in respect of external voting in European Parlia-
ment elections – albeit an inclusive approach is more common than an exclu-
sive one, and there have been a number of cases (e.g. Germany290) where 
States have become more inclusive in recent years on the voting rights of 
non-resident citizens more generally. The Eman and Sevinger case demon-
strates that the general principle of non-discrimination is still relevant in the 
field of external voting, if Member States have established what might be de-
scribed as an irrational scheme.291 In that case, problems arose because, nor-
mally, Netherlands citizens may vote abroad in European Parliament elec-
tions, but not if they reside in or have moved to Aruba, which is an island ter-
ritory that is part of the broader Kingdom of the Netherlands, but subject to 
specific self-governing arrangements. The Court of Justice concluded that 
there was a difficulty with the scheme applied by the Dutch state, because it 
failed to treat groups of similarly situated Dutch citizens (i.e. those not resid-
ing in ‘mainland’ Netherlands) in the same way, but distinguished between 
those residing in another part of the Kingdom and those residing outside the 
Kingdom altogether.  
 The report for Denmark, building also on the FRACIT Report on Den-
mark, suggests that Denmark may have a similar problem. Here, the compari-
son is as regards the external voting rights of those Danish citizens moving to 
the Faroe Islands and Greenland (both self-governing territories within the 
Kingdom of Denmark but outside the EU) when compared with the situation 
of Danish citizens who move out of Denmark but intend to return within two 
years, who can vote as external voters.292 
 It is worth noting two other cases where the electoral arrangements for Eu-
ropean Parliament elections are not wholly consolidated. The first case is Cy-
prus, where there are considerable difficulties around the participation of 
Turkish Cypriots – who are EU citizens – in EP elections. It has been an-
nounced that the Cyprus Government intends to ease their path to participa-
                                                        
290. BVerfG, 2 BvC 1/11 from July 4 2012, available at http://www.bverfg.de/entschei 
dungen/ cs20120704_2bvc000111.html. See further, L. Pedroza, Access to Electoral 
Rights. Germany, FRACIT Report, June 2013, at p. 4, available at http://eudo-
citizenship.eu/admin/?p=file&appl=countryProfiles&f=1313-Germany-FRACIT.pdf. 
291. Case C-300/04 Eman and Sevinger [2006] ECR I-8055. 
292. Discussed in more detail in E. Ersbøll, Access to Electoral Rights. Denmark, FRACIT 
Report, June 2013, at p. 9, available at http://eudo-citizenship.eu/admin/?p=file &appl 
=countryProfiles&f=137-DK-FRACIT.pdf. 
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tion in the 2014 EP elections.293 It is worth noting – since this is a group of 
citizens resident in a territory that is not controlled by the Greek Cypriot 
Government – that Cyprus is another Member State with restrictive rules on 
external voting.  
 Finally, to Croatia – a state with inclusive external voting arrangements, 
but an electoral register that continues to be marked by anomalies which 
arose as a result of the violent disintegration of Yugoslavia in the 1990s and 
the access to Croatian citizenship on the part of ethnic Croats (and indeed 
others) resident in Bosnia and Herzegovina. As the FRACIT Report on Croa-
tia shows in detail, Croatia is now completing the process of consolidating its 
electoral framework including dealing with problems of an outdated and 
probably over-inclusive electoral register.294 
9.5./10.5. Questions 9 and 10 – emerging issues and themes 
The Institutional Report suggests that while the derogations provided for in 
the Directives are legally compatible with the Treaties, they ‘seem at odds 
with the very objectives of EU citizenship and are likely to be eroded in the 
future’. There are two derogations currently in place allowing Member States 
to impose residence criteria and protecting national specificities: first, for 
Belgium, for local elections, responding to sensibilities around language (Ar-
ticle 12(2) of Directive 94/80); and, second, for those States with a resident 
non-national EU citizen population of voting age of more than 20% (i.e. in 
practice, just Luxembourg) in respect of both local and EP elections (Article 
12 of Directive 94/80 and Article 14 of Directive 93/109). The Institutional 
Report notes, however, that Luxembourg has eased its residence requirements 
to make it easier for EU citizens to exercise their right to vote, whilst main-
taining the essence of the derogation in place. 
 There are also restrictions that Member States are able to apply in Articles 
5(3) and (4) in respect of certain posts or offices (e.g. elections for Mayor or 
Deputy Mayor), or roles where local elected representatives take part in the 
election or designation of members of national parliamentary assemblies. 
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These latter restrictions chime very much with a continued respect in the 
scheme of EU electoral rights for the prerogatives of sovereignty and na-
tionality in the Member States, and here, too, the Institutional Report fore-
sees a possibility that a deepening of the Union in a federalist direction – or 
indeed a separate cultural trend resulting from the intermingling of the Mem-
ber State societies and peoples – could lead to the dropping away of these re-
strictions.  
 Aggregated data published in the Annual Report of the Fundamental 
Rights Agency for all Member States in 2012, drawing also on the Commis-
sion’s own work in this area as well as on national reports,295 indicated that of 
27 Member States at that time, 14 have essentially no restrictions, and 11 
have restrictions to a greater or lesser degree. Austria and Germany are not 
covered, as here the restrictions (which do exist) are applied at the state, not 
the federal, level. Croatia, which has joined the EU since that survey, does 
have restrictions. Thus it would seem that in this domain of EU electoral 
rights, the Member States are more or less equally split between re-
strictions/no restrictions. 
 The future of EU electoral rights is undoubtedly intimately connected to 
broader questions about the future of European Parliament elections. 2014 
is seeing a watershed of campaigning on social media (e.g. #EP2014 on 
Twitter), allowing more widespread citizen engagement for those active 
online.  
 But even here the picture is mixed – the comments earlier in this Report 
about the potential to use citizens’ concerns about the identity of the Europe-
an Commission President as a trigger in relation to increased transnational 
campaigns for EP elections need to be offset by the concerns raised by the 
judgment of the German Federal Constitutional Court in February 2014 
to abolish a proposed 3% threshold for parties seeking election to the EP in 
Germany.296 This ruling followed an earlier judgment declaring that a previ-
ous 5% threshold – still in force for national elections in Germany – was con-
trary to the constitutional guarantee of electoral equality. Some concerns have 
been raised in initial commentary about this (majority) judgment because the 
                                                        
295. Luxembourg: Publications Office of the EU, 2013; available from the FRA website at 
http://fra.europa.eu/en/press-release/2013/eu-agency-fundamental-rights-fra-presents-
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296. Judgment of the Federal Constitutional Court of 26 February 2014, summary available 
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Court expressed the view that there were no reasons related to the need for 
stability of the EP which would offset the argument that such a threshold cre-
ates – in a proportional system – electoral inequalities with respect to indi-
vidual voter choices. This judgment runs directly counter to the European 
Parliament’s November 2012 resolution on the 2014 EP elections, where 
it explicitly asked the Member States to introduce such thresholds in order to 
reinforce the stability of the Parliament, stemming from the fear of the in-
creased representativeness of small and splinter parties.297 
 Discussion of the unsuccessful LetMeVote European Citizens’ Initiative298 
is reserved until later in this Report, when we turn directly to issues of en-
franchisement and disenfranchisement under Questions 11 and 12; but other 
civil society initiatives have emerged in the run up to #EP2014 such as the 
campaign of Europeans Abroad299 to help Europeans living outside the EU to 
find out if or how to exercise their vote in the EP elections (and to campaign 
for those States which do not grant external voting rights to do so).  
 Direct activation of citizens’ concerns and social media responses to 
such activation may, in the longer term, be game changers for EU elec-
toral rights. For example, recognising the complexities of national external 
voting rights provisions for EP elections – which may differ depending upon 
whether a citizen is resident in the EU (and thus may have the option to vote 
in the State of residence or the home State) or a third state – does not prevent 
the presentation online of exceptionally attractive visualisations that give EU 
citizens a first point of reference when considering their rights.300 
Question 11 
Briefly report on regional and other elections in which EU citizens resid-
ing in the country are granted electoral rights under national law. Is there 
a franchise for EU citizens that goes beyond the local and EP electoral 
                                                        
297. It should be noted that not all commentary is hostile to this approach; indeed, there 
are some arguing that, in the name of equality, the national parliamentary election 
threshold should be removed: S-C. Lenski, ‘Wer hat Angst vor Franken und Rent-
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come. 
298. See http://www.letmevote.eu.  
299. See http://www.europeansabroadvote2014.eu/. 
300. See, for example, http://www.europeancitizensabroad.eu/can-you-vote.html.  
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rights required under EU law? What have been the reasons for extending 
such rights specifically to EU citizens? 
Article 25 TFEU 
The Commission shall report to the European Parliament, to the Council and to the Eco-
nomic and Social Committee every three years on the application of the provisions of this 
Part. This report shall take account of the development of the Union. 
On this basis, and without prejudice to the other provisions of the Treaties, the Council, 
acting unanimously in accordance with a special legislative procedure and after obtaining 
the consent of the European Parliament, may adopt provisions to strengthen or to add to 
the rights listed in Article 20(2). These provisions shall enter into force after their approval 
by the Member States in accordance with their respective constitutional requirements. 
11.1. Introduction 
By definition, there is no formal EU law in existence that underpins this ques-
tion. By asking the question, we were therefore looking specifically at where 
Member States go beyond EU law; and, in doing so, we also opened up the 
opportunity for more general speculation about the prospects for and desira-
bility of such a development based on the dynamic nature of Article 25 
TFEU.  
 Given the peculiarities of the UK’s approach to EU electoral rights, which 
has seen the local electoral register on which EU citizens are included also 
used for a range of other elections and referendums, it is perhaps inevitable 
that the UK’s experience could dominate the discussion of existing practices. 
This is all the more so because the UK has in place extensive electoral rights 
for Irish and (settled) Commonwealth citizens, predating EU law and EU citi-
zenship and derived from the UK’s imperial past and its continued relation-
ships with those states. Since the 1980s, Ireland has reciprocated the UK po-
sition by allowing UK citizens resident in Ireland to vote for the Irish Lower 
House or Dáil. Perhaps most remarkable from the perspective of those ob-
serving the UK from a position of the constitutional exclusivity of the demos, 
EU citizens will be able to vote in the Scottish referendum on independence 
on 18 September 2014, just as they did in the referendum on devolution in 
1997 and as they have done in every Scottish Parliament election since. It is 
interesting to note that the Scottish independence referendum franchise legis-
lation includes an explicit reference to European Union citizens as voters. 
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This differs from previous arrangements, e.g. for Scottish Parliament elec-
tions, where, as noted in the report for the UK, EU citizens have been al-
lowed to vote by default because the register on which they appeared (the lo-
cal elections register) was the one used also for those elections (as it was for 
elections to assemblies in Wales and Northern Ireland too). 
 Beyond these instances, the national reports report on patchy extensions of 
the strict letter of EU law on local electoral rights. The report for the Czech 
Republic points out that EU citizens can vote in city commune elections in 
Prague even though, as well as being a commune and thus a basic local gov-
ernment unit, Prague is also considered to be on the same level as the other 
13 Czech regions. The report for Denmark notes that EU citizens can also 
vote for five regional councils. Finally, some of the recent statutes of Auton-
omy in Spain provide for specific measures to promote the active participa-
tion of EU citizens in regional political life and in the political affairs of the 
autonomous communities, although this could not be extended to a right to 
vote unless Article 13 of the Spanish Constitution were amended. 
 In sum, there are few examples across the EU of Member States enfran-
chising citizens of other Member States to vote in national or regional elec-
tions, especially where the latter are elections for bodies that have legislative 
powers under the national constitutional settlement. On the contrary, to gain 
the right to vote in these elections – which many might regard as the gold 
standard of political participation in a state – EU citizens would need to natu-
ralise as citizens of the host State, on the basis of accrued residence and after 
passing whatever citizenship tests the host State applies. 
11.2. The possibilities for enfranchisement 
The case for the broader enfranchisement of mobile EU citizens remains a 
consistent question within the framework of European integration, emerging 
regularly in Commission reports on EU citizenship. This concern is also re-
flected in public opinion and in complaints that come before the Commission. 
 Thus, in its 2013 Report on citizenship, the Commission highlighted pub-
lic opinion findings on perceptions about electoral rights: 
In the 2012 public consultation on EU citizenship and in the 2013 Eurobarometer on elec-
toral rights, 72% and 67 % of respondents respectively thought that non-national EU 
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citizens should be allowed to vote in the national elections of their host country. This rep-
resents a significant increase since 2010 (+17 percentage points).301 
Similarly, in its 2010 Citizenship Report, the Commission noted the letters 
that it receives about the loss of the right to vote in any national elections, 
which some mobile EU citizens experience if their State does not give the 
right to vote to external voters (or curtails it after a certain period of time, as 
in the case of the UK).302 It was this report that triggered the Commission’s 
engagement with the area or enfranchisement and disenfranchisement, as the 
Commission committed itself to working with the Member States to try and 
eliminate such gaps in the coverage of suffrage that result from free move-
ment. We return to the issue of disenfranchisement in the discussion under 
Q12. 
 Referring specifically to Article 25 TFEU, and including in the discussion 
both regional and national elections, the Commission in its 2013 Report 
committed itself to engage with the admittedly more difficult issue of enfran-
chisement in the future: 
In the context of the broader reflections on the shape of the future of the European Union, 
the Commission will examine ways to enable EU citizens to participate in national and re-
gional elections in their country of residence.303 
But any such endeavour would inevitably run up against the immediate prob-
lems of, for example, the constitutional entrenchment of the right to vote in 
national elections for citizens only in States such as Austria and Germany, 
which would be extremely hard to alter even if there were political will to 
grant such rights to vote. For example, in the report for Austria, it is noted 
there would probably need to be a referendum as this is a core principle of the 
Constitution.  
 The 2014 Commission Communication on disenfranchisement does ad-
dress the alternatives to the disenfranchisement route that it adopts (in the ini-
tial form of a recommendation to the Member States) and dismisses all of 
them as less attractive.304 It dismisses the idea of encouraging resident EU 
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citizens to naturalise as contrary to the spirit of EU citizenship, and notes the 
possibility that EU citizens may have successive, shorter periods of residence 
in a variety of Member States where the naturalisation option would not be 
feasible. The Communication also dismisses a proposal, developed by one of 
the authors of this Report, to create an EU level framework convention as a 
‘laboratory of integration’ within which Member States might proceed on the 
basis of reciprocity, as in the case of the UK and Ireland they already do.305 
This would lead, suggests the Commission, to a fragmentation of outcomes. It 
also accepts that political participation in the host State, while desirable, is 
very much a long-term option. 
 One reason is because of the complexity of the issues that it raises. These 
were fully canvassed in a EUDO Citizenship forum debate which generated a 
dialogue between a group of citizens proposing a European Citizens’ Initia-
tive seeking the enfranchisement of resident EU citizens in host country na-
tional elections (LetMeVote) and various academic and political/civil society 
interlocutors.306 While the LetMeVote Citizens’ Initiative was not ultimately 
successful in terms of the ECI framework, which requires one million signa-
tures, it was certainly successful in raising the profile of the issues; and espe-
cially in highlighting the relationship between naturalisation, voting in the 
country of origin, and voting in the host country. Bauböck, in particular, has 
argued in favour of portable voting rights – the solution adopted by the 
Commission as its preferred first step and discussed at the end of the next 
Section (along with making national citizenship much more open to mobile 
EU citizens). For Bauböck, three reasons buttress the case for portable exter-
nal voting rights. First, the idea can be linked to the core of EU citizenship, 
which is the right of free movement; second, it respects the principle that EU 
citizenship is derived from Member State nationality rather than from resi-
dence; and, third, it ensures that free movers will not lose their indirect repre-
sentation in EU legislation through the vote of their national government in 
the Council.307 
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 Meanwhile, as one of the authors of this Report argued in her contribution 
to the forum dialogue, the debate should not just focus on the Member States 
– which, after all, would be the entities required to instantiate any necessary 
legal and/or constitutional changes – but, rather, on the nature of the bonds of 
solidarity that exist (or do not (yet) exist) across the EU’s common citizen-
ship area.308 For it is only if such bonds were in place that there would be a 
genuine political will to engage, on a transnational basis, with challenges 
faced by all Member States such as the financial crisis, youth unemployment 
and climate change.  
 We assess the treatment of EU citizenship at the national level more close-
ly below, when we look at the responses to Question 13. 
Question 12 
Are there any specific areas where tensions exist between EU law and na-
tional provisions limiting the scope of the franchise (e.g. in relation to the 
voting rights of persons convicted of criminal offences or persons with 
mental impairments)?  
Article 10(2) TEU 
Citizens are directly represented at Union level in the European Parliament. 
Article 14(3) TEU 
The members of the European Parliament shall be elected for a term of five years by direct 
universal suffrage in a free and secret ballot. 
Article 39(2) Charter of Fundamental Rights 
Members of the European Parliament shall be elected by direct universal suffrage in a free 
and secret ballot. 
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Article 1 of the Act on Direct Elections 
The representatives in the Assembly of the peoples of the States brought together in the 
Community shall be elected by direct universal suffrage. 
Article 3 of Protocol No 1 to the ECHR: Right to free elections 
The High Contracting Parties undertake to hold free elections at reasonable intervals by 
secret ballot, under conditions which will ensure the free expression of the opinion of the 
people in the choice of the legislature. 
12.1. Introduction – national rules on disenfranchisement 
All states restrict the ‘right to vote’ in some way. All apply (minimum) age 
criteria and (some form of) citizenship criteria. Some apply residence criteria, 
a point we explore in Section 12.2 below. Many states also apply criteria 
based on mental capacity, and in relation to the deprivation of liberty or some 
form of probity criterion (e.g. disenfranchising prisoners or – as in many 
states of the US – disenfranchising those convicted of felonies for life). 
 The hypothesis explored in Question 12 was whether there was any trac-
tion in Article 39(2) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights.309 According to 
the explanations attached to the Charter,310 this is one of those rights that are 
mentioned in the Treaties and it applies under the conditions – and, as such, is 
subject to the limitations laid down – in the Treaties and under Article 52(2) 
of the Charter. Clearly, this provision must also be subject to Article 51(1) of 
the Charter – that is, it only applies to the Member States when they are im-
plementing EU law. However, as to content, Article 39(2), according to the 
explanations, ‘takes over the basic principles of the electoral system in a 
democratic State.’ 
 We can find evidence of what these principles might be from Article 3 of 
Protocol No 1 to the ECHR. This provision, which was long neglected in the 
context of the development of the interpretation and application of the ECHR, 
is now understood to contain both passive and active elements, including the 
individual right to vote, but it is subject to implicit limitations, such as those 
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discussed above.311 Two particular pinch points concern the disenfranchise-
ment of persons deprived of their liberty following criminal proceedings and 
of those declared to have a mental impairment. In its case law, the ECtHR has 
repeatedly argued that the right to vote is not a privilege, and that the pre-
sumption in a democratic society must be in favour of inclusion.312 In case 
law that has not been uncontested at the national level,313 the ECtHR has 
concluded that the UK’s blanket ban on prisoner voting (with the exception 
of prisoners held on remand) fell outside the margin of appreciation given to 
contracting states in the implementation of the rights contained in Article 3 of 
Protocol No 1 pursuant to the obligation to hold free and fair elections.314 In 
similar terms, the same Court concluded that the Italian restrictions at issue in 
Scoppola, which entailed a lifetime ban from voting for someone convicted 
of murder and other serious offences, was not proportionate.315 In Kiss v 
Hungary, the ECtHR concluded that there was a violation of Article 3 of Pro-
tocol No 1 in a blanket disenfranchisement of all those subject to a partial 
guardianship procedure, regardless of their particular mental capacities.316 
 A Resolution of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe in 
2012 included a call for the abolition of ‘legal provisions providing for gen-
eral, automatic and indiscriminate disenfranchisement of all serving prisoners 
irrespective of the nature or gravity of their offences’.317 In 2011, the EU it-
self ratified the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, the 
first time that the EU had become a party to an international human rights 
treaty.318 The Convention is concerned with ensuring that disabled persons 
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enjoy their rights without restriction, including the right to vote.319 The press 
release on ratification notes that ratifying countries have to make sure that 
disabled persons enjoy their right to vote, but it is clear that, with respect to 
European Parliament elections, this obligation may be hedged around in some 
respects by EU law obligations on those States as well. 
 The national reports (backed up where appropriate by data from the 
FRACIT reports) provide some important contextualisations of these provi-
sions and reveal a wide variety of practice as regards different elections. For 
example, it is clear from the FRACIT report for Luxembourg that there is 
strict disenfranchisement of those subject to a guardianship order by a 
court.320 The report for Ireland queries whether national arrangements fall be-
low the bar set for individualised assessment in Kiss. In the report for Cyprus, 
we see that there is quite strict disenfranchisement for those deprived of liber-
ty but also for those declared to be persons with mental impairment. Denmark 
disenfranchises those who have been declared legally incompetent. The 
Czech Republic only disenfranchises prisoners in local elections. Difficulties 
with obtaining an ID card in some cases for prisoners also represent a practi-
cal obstacle to voting. There appears to be a high level of restriction on voting 
rights for those who have been incapacitated according to the civil law, even 
though this has been criticised by the Constitutional Court.321 Other States 
disenfranchise prisoners from candidacy rights, but not from the right to vote 
(e.g. Spain). 
 In some States, there have recently been moves towards enfranchisement. 
For example, Croatia has recently enfranchised mentally disabled persons. In 
2008, the Netherlands withdrew a provision from the Constitution removing 
the right to vote from persons deemed legally incompetent by irrevocable 
court judgment. 
 Aside from the UK, to which we turn below, only one other Member State 
has had significant litigation on the issue of voting rights, in particular pris-
oner voting rights, and that is Estonia. The Estonian Supreme Court has 
found that Articles 39 and 40 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights only ap-
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ply to the rights of non-national EU citizens to participate in municipal and 
European Parliamentary elections under the same conditions as nationals. In 
other words, that court has not found a freestanding right in relation to uni-
versal suffrage – even in relation to European parliamentary elections, which 
are the European Union’s ‘own’ elections. The Estonian rapporteur doubts, 
however, whether Article 39(2) can be so easily dismissed as regards its im-
portation of universal suffrage principles into EU law for the purposes of reg-
ulating how Member States manage elections. 
 There are, of course, advantages to using EU law as the legal basis for 
contesting an exclusion from the franchise, compared to relying on ECHR 
law, as the UK example shows. The UK provides an illustration of a State 
where there may be no effective remedies for individuals arising at national 
level through the courts, just because the ECtHR has made a finding that the 
national legislature is not in compliance with the ECHR (as it has done in 
Hirst) and notwithstanding the fact that national courts themselves have made 
declarations of incompatibility between national law and the ECHR rights in-
stantiated in the Human Rights Act 1998. However, so far, these declarations 
have not given rise to any individual remedies for prisoners (e.g. granting of 
the right to vote, or damages) who have argued that they have been deprived 
of their right to vote. The situation is aggravated by the refusal of the UK leg-
islature to come into compliance with the ECHR, by introducing, for exam-
ple, a differentiation that would allow perhaps some prisoners with short sen-
tences to be excluded from the general ban on prisoner voting. 
 The question of whether EU law changes the situation – at least as regards 
the issue of voting in European Parliament elections – was canvassed in the 
UK cases of Chester and McGeoch.322 It is clear that the EU law principles of 
direct effect and primacy could be of assistance in national challenges, in 
combination with the principle of effective remedies. For example, were a na-
tional court to conclude that a situation had arisen where a national law – in a 
case where the Member State was ‘implementing’ EU law – was contrary to a 
right contained in the Charter, then this should lead it to set aside the national 
law and apply EU law instead (in this case, ‘the basic principles of the elec-
toral system in a democratic State’ as suggested in the Charter and thus, one 
assumes, ECtHR case law on Article 3 of Protocol No 1). 
 In fact, the UK Supreme Court found nothing in EU law that conferred an 
individual right to vote in the European Parliament elections on EU citizens, 
                                                        
322. R (on the application of Chester) v Secretary of State for Justice; McGeoch (AP) v 
The Lord President of the Council and another (Scotland) [2013] UKSC 63. For dis-
cussion in the report for the UK, see at fn.235 and following. 
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relying for its conclusions on the approach taken by the Court of Justice in 
Eman and Sevinger. The Supreme Court further doubted that the Strasbourg 
case law had been incorporated into EU law. It was certain that Articles 39 
and 40 of the Charter were only concerned with the equal treatment right, that 
is, the right of EU citizens to vote in the State in which they are resident if 
they are not citizens of that State.  
 In considering the approach taken by the Supreme Court, the contested-
ness of the issue of prisoner voting, and notably of the stance taken by the 
judges of the ECtHR, needs to be taken into account. As what is needed in 
the UK to ensure compliance is a legislative scheme ensuring that some pris-
oners can vote, UK judges are anxious to defer in that respect to Parliament 
and not to take on the decision for themselves as to who might qualify and 
who might not. It should be noted, in that context, that both applicants in 
Chester and McGeoch were convicted of very serious crimes and were serv-
ing life sentences.323 
 It is clear that some confusion does appear to arise because of the juxtapo-
sition of Article 39(2) of the Charter with the right in Article 39(1), which 
replicates the right of EU citizens to vote in European Parliament elections in 
the State in which they are resident provided for in Article 22(2) TFEU, dis-
cussed above in relation to Qs 9 and 10. Nonetheless, there is one interpreta-
tion of the judgment in Eman and Sevinger that does create the necessary 
connection to EU law in order to bring the Charter into play: namely, that the 
Member States are ‘implementing’ EU law because they are seeking to limit 
the process by which the European Parliament is elected ‘by direct universal 
suffrage in a free and secret ballot’, as set out in Article 14(3) TEU. This 
connection is akin to the proposition developed by the Court of Justice in 
ERT,324 whereby Member States are, when seeking to rely upon an exception 
laid down in the Treaty (in that case, to a free movement right), bound by 
general principles of EU law, including fundamental rights – a line of case 
law that has now been taken up in relation to the applicability of the Charter 
in the review of national measures. 
 While the case of prisoners’ voting rights is likely to run on inconclusively 
– at least in the UK – it is possible that there might be more scope for running 
a similar argument challenging national restrictions on EU citizens’ right to 
vote in European Parliament elections on grounds of mental disability or im-
pairment, when this is read in conjunction with the EU’s explicit commitment 
                                                        
323. For further discussion, see A. Lansbergen, ‘Prisoner disenfranchisement in the United 
Kingdom and the scope of EU law’ (2014) ECLRev (forthcoming). 
324. Case C-260/89 ERT [1991] ECR I-2925. 
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to the principle of non-discrimination on the grounds of (inter alia) disability, 
reflected in Article 21(1) of the Charter, and its ratification of the UN Con-
vention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities. The years to come may see 
such cases come before the Court of Justice, and indeed the issue has already 
been raised in Poland as regards access to the franchise for the 2014 EP elec-
tions.325 
12.2. The Commission’s disenfranchisement proposal 
An unexpected offshoot of our Q12 emerged when the Commission issued a 
Communication in January 2014 recommending that Member States who 
currently do not grant voting rights to citizens who move outside their Mem-
ber State but within the European Union should review their policies in the 
light of the principles of European citizenship and free movement.326 As this 
was a new development, national reporters did not have the opportunity to re-
spond to it and to assess its internal implications. 
 The Commission terms this a ‘disenfranchisement’ situation, although this 
presupposes that the default scenario is that a residence criterion for voting in 
elections is (no longer) a normal condition for the exercise of the franchise, 
especially in (national and European) parliamentary elections. Although the 
ECtHR has acknowledged that a good majority of ECHR contracting states 
do give such votes to their non-resident citizens (reflecting a wider interna-
tional trend327), that Court has also confirmed that Article 3 of Protocol No 1 
to the ECHR does not oblige contracting parties to take steps to make it pos-
                                                        
325. See A. Bodnar, ‘European Parliament elections without legally incapacitated persons: 
Trouble ahead for Poland’,Verfassungsblog, 9 March 2014,  http://www.verfassungs 
blog.de/en/wahlrechtsausschluss-fuer-entmuendigte-auf-polen-kommt-aerger-zu/#. 
UyGm_17eP0s. 
326. Commission Communication, Addressing the consequences of disenfranchisement of 
Union citizens exercising their right to free movement, COM(2014) 33 final, 29 Jan-
uary 2014; Commission Recommendation of January 29 2014, Addressing the con-
sequences of disenfranchisement of Union citizens exercising their rights to free 
movement, C(2014) 391. 
327. IDEA and IFE, Voting from Abroad. The international IDEA handbook, Stockholm 
and Mexico City, International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance and 
Instituto Federal Electoral de Mexico, 2007. Extended data on EU Member States and 
selected third countries is also available in the EUDO FRACIT Report, distinguishing 
between different elections (local, regional, national, European, executive, referen-
dums, etc.). 
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sible for expatriate citizens to vote in parliamentary elections,328 and that it is 
legitimate for states to distinguish between resident and non-resident citizens 
on the grounds of their respective connection with the home polity.329 Most 
recently, in the Shindler case,330 it also upheld the UK’s 15-year rule for non-
resident voters, limiting external voting to 15 years after the last date on 
which a person was registered to vote at an address in the UK; this rule has 
also survived a challenge in the national courts in the light of EU law.331 
 The key to the Commission’s argument – and its recommendation for 
change by certain Member States – is that it poses the problem as one where 
disenfranchisement arises by virtue of the exercise of free movement rights 
under the EU Treaties. Mobile EU citizens are quite likely to lose voting 
rights in national (and often regional) elections because of a combination of 
the following factors: (1) some States do not allow external voting (or limit it 
to a considerable degree); (2) very few States allow non-citizens to vote in 
such elections on the basis of residence; and (3) there are few incentives for 
EU citizens to naturalise in the host State. In relation to the latter point, all the 
usual issues regarding naturalisation will arise with a national of a Member 
State who resides in another Member State. That is, she or he must balance 
the benefits of naturalising against the restrictions imposed by either the host 
State or the State of origin (e.g. if either or both States do not allow dual citi-
zenship) and the ‘costs’ (fees, tests, oaths of allegiance, etc) of naturalising. 
This point links back to the points made under Q1 about the blurred border-
line between equal treatment and special treatment. 
 In addition, and linking back to the discussion under Q6 in particular, the 
status of EU permanent residence, acquired after five years of legal residence, 
and the enhanced protections against deportation achieved after ten years of 
residence, narrow the ‘distance’ between the legal status of settled resident 
EU citizens and national citizens to an extent that is unusual even in the con-
                                                        
328. Sitaropoulos and Others v Greece (No 1) App no 42202/07 (2010) (confirmed in 
Sitaropoulos and Others v Greece (No 2) App no 42202/07 (2012). 
329. Hilbe v Liechtenstein App no 31981/96, 7 September 1999. 
330. Shindler v UK App no 19840/09, 7 May 2013. 
331. R. (on the application of Preston) v Wandsworth LBC [2012] EWCA Civ 1378, dis-
cussed in the report for the UK. The Court of Appeal rejected the possibility of the 
rule having a deterrent effect on those wishing to exercise their free movement rights. 
Another challenge that may emerge in the UK courts is one against the scope of the 
franchise that has been defined for the referendum on Scottish independence on 18 
September 2014. An argument has been raised that the exclusion of those born in 
Scotland (or previously resident there) who are now resident elsewhere in the UK 
would be an infringement of their EU citizenship rights. 
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text of systems of regional integration.332 And finally, it seems reasonable to 
argue that EU free movement is more often ‘circular’ or ‘multipolar’ than 
‘ordinary’ international migration. Many mobile EU citizens intend to return 
to their home country or move to another Member State (or to a third coun-
try) after a period of time residing in the host State, and so have no intention 
of acquiring the citizenship of that State. 
 The Commission picks up a logic based on free movement and citizenship 
in its Communication that underpins the Recommendation. It argues that EU 
citizenship being additional to national citizenship should mean that ‘one 
would not expect that the exercise of the rights attached to Union citizenship 
results in the loss of the right to vote in national elections, which is generally 
linked to national citizenship.’333 Second, it points out that EU citizens may 
be affected in their behaviour in relation to free movement as a result of na-
tional disenfranchisement policies. Note that the Commission does not sug-
gest that such policies may dissuade EU citizens from moving – the argument 
rejected as spurious in the UK court – but rather, that it might affect their 
practices, so that they may not declare their presence in an administrative 
process in order to protect their registration in the home State. To put it an-
other way, they will not formalise their move in case this affects rights such as 
the right to vote in the home State, and the unstated assumption is that this 
may have other consequences at a later stage (perhaps in relation to the claim-
ing of benefits – although benefits in the host State are not supposed to be de-
pendent upon engaging in any specific bureaucratic process – or the acquisi-
tion of permanent residence). Finally, the Commission suggests that it is in-
consistent with efforts to encourage citizen engagement with the political pro-
cess to have gaps such as that caused by uneven disenfranchisement policies. 
 The Communication and Recommendation only address, in effect, the five 
States that disenfranchise, or place restrictions on the franchise, i.e. Cyprus, 
Denmark, Ireland, Malta, and the UK. The Commission does not engage with 
                                                        
332. In fact, as the Institutional Report points out at fn. 5 (drawing on data at 
http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/statistics_explained/index.php/Acquisition_of_citizen
ship_statistics), there are a number of Member States where citizens of other Member 
States rank among the top recipients of citizenship of the host State, suggesting that 
there is still some way to go before EU citizenship is perceived as a substitute for nat-
uralization in all cases. The point made in the Institutional Report is as follows: 
‘[l]ooking at top five nationalities which acquired nationality of a Member State in 
2012, nationals of at least one other Member States feature in 14 Member States 
(Belgium, Czech Republic, Germany, Estonia, France, Italy, Cyprus, Luxembourg, 
Hungary, Malta, Slovenia, Slovakia, Finland and Sweden).’  
333. COM(2014) 33, at p. 7. 
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the restriction on voting except by accessing the ballot ‘in country’ in relation 
to Greece (the ECtHR Sitaropoulos case). It is worth noting, when consider-
ing the options for change, that restrictions in Denmark are constitutionally 
grounded; the legislature there has already gone as far as it can without 
changing the Constitution.334 
 The Commission’s Recommendation is not that Member States should 
simply reverse their existing policies. On the contrary, what it recommends is 
that those states that currently do not provide unrestricted external votes 
could draw on what it sees as best practice, evidenced by the good practice 
outlined in the report for Austria – where external voters have to renew their 
registration in the Wählerevidenz every ten years in order to demonstrate on-
going commitment to the voting in elections. So the Commission suggests 
only that Member States change the rules for citizens resident elsewhere in 
the EU who demonstrate a continuing interest in the politics of the home 
State by some form of proportional step such as periodic re-registration 
(which the Commission states should always be possible online).  
 In practice, distinguishing between external voters living elsewhere in the 
EU and those living in third countries may be a step too far for some States, 
so it is likely that if they felt pressured by the Commission’s Recommenda-
tion – only a soft law measure, it must be noted – to change the national prac-
tice, they may make blanket changes for all external voters. In practice, it 
seems unlikely that we will see widespread changes to national law any time 
soon as a result of this Recommendation. But what it does is establish a 
benchmark that may have traction in the future, for example, if the Member 
States decide they want to add to the corpus of rights using Article 25 TFEU, 
and they may therefore bring political rights back to the table for discussion. 
12.3. Political rights of EU citizens – emerging issues and themes 
In sum, we should note that while the introduction of political rights for EU 
citizens in the Treaty of Maastricht was intended to contribute a major ele-
ment of the newly constitutionalised form of EU citizenship, in practice 
the exercise of these rights has often been a damp squib, because of diffi-
culties in exercising these rights for mobile EU citizens. That said, political 
rights continue to offer points of reference around which EU citizens may mo-
bilise, especially but not only if they are resident in another EU Member State.  
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 Questions have also been raised by EU citizens resident in third coun-
tries. In some states, the issue of whether Member States make provision for 
universal suffrage for European Parliament elections has become salient. The 
fact that EU citizens have political rights remains an important dimension of 
the (as yet incomplete) common citizenship area. 
Culture(s) of citizenship 
For this set of questions, our intention was to chart the emerging cultures of 
(Union) citizenship in three key respects: 
 (1) The status of Union citizenship is constructed around the paradigm 
of individual rights; but immigration law more generally is tradi-
tionally grounded in an ethos of permission – do national actors (ad-
ministrative, legislative, and judicial) tend to apply that distinction ap-
propriately in their application and interpretation of Union citizenship? 
(2) To what extent has the culture of rights been strengthened by the 
changed legal status of the Charter of Fundamental Rights? Are 
rights-based arguments intensifying, in other words, since the Lisbon 
Treaty came into effect in 2009? 
(3) What is the general tone of the national debate, in the media and civil 
society more broadly, on the status of or rights attached to Union citizen-
ship? 
Question 13 
On the basis of your findings from the above questions, do you consider 
that the implementation of EU citizenship in your Member State is un-
derstood at the national level as part of a rights-based EU ‘free move-
ment’ and ‘constitutional’ culture, or as an adjunct to national immigra-
tion systems based on ‘permissions’ to non-nationals to be present in the 
territory? 
Article 9 TEU 
In all its activities, the Union shall observe the principle of the equality of its citizens, who 
shall receive equal attention from its institutions, bodies, offices and agencies. Every na-
tional of a Member State shall be a citizen of the Union. Citizenship of the Union shall be 
additional to and not replace national citizenship. 
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Article 20(2) TFEU 
Citizens of the Union shall enjoy the rights and be subject to the duties provided for in the 
Treaties ... 
Article 26(2) TFEU 
The internal market shall comprise an area without internal frontiers in which the free 
movement of goods, persons, services and capital is ensured in accordance with the provi-
sions of the Treaties. 
Article 67 TFEU 
1. The Union shall constitute an area of freedom, security and justice with respect for fun-
damental rights and the different legal systems and traditions of the Member States. 
2. It shall ensure the absence of internal border controls for persons and shall frame a 
common policy on asylum, immigration and external border control, based on solidarity 
between Member States, which is fair towards third-country nationals. For the purpose of 
this Title, stateless persons shall be treated as third-country nationals.335 
... 
13.1. Introduction 
The objective of this question was to ask national rapporteurs to reflect back 
on the responses they had already given to previous questions, in order to try 
to discern what type of ‘culture(s) of citizenship’ they felt might be revealed 
by those answers as regards the ‘fit’ between EU law and immigration law. 
We were aware, on the basis of previous research on the UK in which both of 
this Report’s authors were involved,336 of the complexities involved in as-
                                                        
335. This provision is drawn from Title V of Part Three of the TFEU. Neither the UK nor 
Ireland takes part in the adoption of measures under this Title, except under arrange-
ments for ‘opt in’. The provision is used here as the basis for a generalised observa-
tion about the differences in legal treatment between EU citizens and third country 
nationals. 
336. J. Shaw, N. Miller and M. Fletcher, Getting to grips with EU citizenship: understand-
ing the friction between UK immigration law and EU free movement law, (2013) Ed-
inburgh Law School Citizenship Studies (available at http://www.frictionandoverlap. 
ed.ac.uk/) and J Shaw and N Miller, ‘When legal worlds collide: an exploration of 




sessing the fit between national immigration law and EU free movement law, 
and it was clearly beyond the scope of this exercise to undertake a wide-
ranging assessment based on a scientific body of empirical evidence. In that 
earlier research, however, it was found that problems of ‘friction’ and ‘misfit’ 
between the systems existed at the edges of free movement law, and, in par-
ticular: 
(a) As regards the first entry and residence stability of third country national 
family members; 
(b) As regards the use of residence tests (‘right to reside’) in relation to ac-
cess to certain social welfare benefits; 
(c) As regards those who may be deemed not to benefit (any longer) from 
EU free movement rights, such as those who have committed crimes and 
may be subject to deportation proceedings or those who are not deemed 
to be (sufficiently) economically self-sufficient and thus who are said to 
be an unreasonable burden on the state; and 
(d) As regards those in transitional or partial regimes of free movement or 
equal treatment, such as citizens of Member States that joined the EU af-
ter 2004 and Turkish citizens. 
The research found that, in many of these situations, there was a mindset 
amongst decision-makers, especially those responsible for taking what are 
called in the UK EEA decision (i.e. decisions under the EEA Regulations, 
which implement Directive 2004/38) but also, in some cases, in parts of the 
judiciary responsible for hearing appeals against decisions, which reflected a 
failure to grasp the rights-based nature of EU free movement rights. There 
was also evidence that reasoning to be found in immigration law, where there 
is an onus on the applicant to demonstrate why they should be given leave to 
enter or leave to remain, also seeps into the field of free movement law. The 
negative findings of this research were replicated in further studies contained 
in the report for the UK, which identifies additional cases where, reflecting a 
trend that has arisen in different parts of this Report, the courts have been 
obliged to correct decisions taken by UK Border Agency officials – now the 
Visas and Immigration section of the Home Office, which continues to be 
tasked with applying EU free movement law – because they had erred in their 
understanding of EU law. 
 As the texts highlighted in the box above show, EU law itself draws a dis-
tinction between citizens and third country nationals. Under the TEU, citizen-
ship now has a constitutional status in the EU; and under Article 20 TFEU, 
Union citizens have rights to free movement and equal treatment. Free 
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movement is, as Article 26 TFEU shows, fundamental to the very character 
of the EU, and the Union must pursue this as an objective. But according to 
Article 67 TFEU, third country nationals should be treated ‘fairly’, and the 
notion of the area of freedom, security and justice, within which EU immigra-
tion law is nested, rests on the proposition that freedom, justice, and security 
are things that should be protected and pursued primarily in the interests of 
the (EU) citizen.  
 In reality, as even a cursory familiarity with many national systems of 
immigration will show, such an ideal of fair treatment is not fully achieved at 
the national level in many cases. EU measures – e.g. on long term residence 
or family reunification for third country nationals – have had an impact in 
terms of levelling up at the national level in many States (although these are 
measures that Denmark, Ireland, and the UK opt out of) – but that immigra-
tion/free movement distinction is still clearly a central one within which EU 
law works, and indeed it remains fully visible within the political rhetoric of 
the Union and its institutions. 
13.2. Key findings from the national reports 
The prevailing view within the national reports is that there are often some 
elements in the national systems that involve EU free movement issues being 
treated as an adjunct to the national immigration systems.337 In legal terms, 
this can be seen, for example, where Member States take a more restrictive 
approach to the treatment of registered partnerships, creating gaps in cover-
age;338 or where the emphasis is placed more on repression and control than 
on rights.339  
 In Denmark, which takes a formalistic approach to the application of EU 
law, and where judges and administrators thus use the national legal frame-
work and culture as a starting point, this generates a clear impression that na-
tional law is somehow being given priority. The example is given of expul-
sion decisions where cases are first decided by reference to the Aliens Act 
and its formal categories, and only afterwards is compliance with EU law 
checked. The Aliens Act is, moreover, very much aimed at the administration 
rather than the citizen, with a complex structure and non-transparent vocabu-
lary. These points recur at several points in the discussions earlier in this Re-
                                                        
337. See e.g. the reports for the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Malta. 
338. See e.g. the report for Cyprus. 
339. See e.g. the report for Italy. 
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port, but it is worth noting in particular that Denmark has a restrictive inter-
pretation in place for important areas such as social benefits and family reuni-
fication, affecting both EU citizens’ rights and also the rights of Denmark’s 
own citizens who might be covered by the Ruiz Zambrano doctrine. It is pos-
sible that Denmark’s culture is further buttressed by its isolationist character, 
noting the absence of references for a preliminary ruling from the Court of 
Justice with the exception of a case on student grants and loans.340 It is inter-
esting to note that the character of Danish exceptionalism, noted not only in 
the report for Denmark but also in other secondary literatures on the weak-
nesses in the implementation of Directive 2004/38 viewed from the political 
science perspective of adaptation and Europeanisation,341 is reflected in the 
comparatively insular character of Danish citizenship law, as highlighted in 
the comparative analyses of European citizenship regimes carried out by 
Maarten Vink and Rainer Bauböck.342 
 Domestic legal culture is also emphasised as a factor in another Nordic 
state, Finland. Here, too, there is a dualist system and a positivist legal cul-
ture, which sees judges much preferring to interpret and apply national 
norms. Even so, that does not always mean that they are not aware of and re-
spectful of EU law and the case law of the Court of Justice. A contrasting 
case, where the national rapporteur felt confident about the domestic ‘consti-
tutionalisation’ of EU law was that of France. Here, the courts are felt to be 
ahead of the legislature in recognising the right of residence as one of the 
‘droits ‘constitutionnels’ français’ and in the introduction of an effective pro-
portionality test in order to assess deportation measures where there may be 
family life issues at play. Even so, the report for France acknowledges some 
cases, notably the right to welfare benefits for jobseekers, where the national 
courts have failed to take the relevant Court of Justice case law into consider-
ation. 
 There are some other counter examples visible in the national reports, such 
as the presumption of lawful residence by EU citizens that municipalities 
must apply in the Netherlands unless the IND (the Dutch national immigra-
tion authority) has decided otherwise.343 Even in Sweden, however, where a 
                                                        
340. Case C-46/12 LN, judgment of 21 February 2013, discussed under Q5 above. 
341. M Wind, ‘The European 'rights revolution' and the (non) implementation of the cit-
izenship directive in Denmark’, in L Miles and A Wivel (Eds), Denmark and the 
European Union, (Routledge, 2013), pp. 159-174. 
342. M. Vink and R. Bauböck, ‘Citizenship configurations: Analysing the multiple pur-
poses of citizenship regimes in Europe’ (2013) 11 CEP 621-648. 
343. See the report for the Netherlands, response to Q2. 
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generally positive balance sheet of implementation and application of EU free 
movement law and of the rights of EU citizens can be reported, with a high 
level of understanding of the issues within the administration,344 problems 
can arise because the question of assessing whether an EU citizen’s residence 
is lawful or not is one to be decided separately by each individual local au-
thority, resulting in deviations in practice in the approaches taken.345 Here, 
the need for a unified approach to EU citizenship runs up against the tradi-
tional Swedish respect for the autonomy and independence of local authori-
ties and administrations. 
 Some cases suggest a bifurcation in approach, so that where EU citizens 
themselves are affected, a rights-based system prevails; but where the rights 
of EU citizens with respect to their third country national family members are 
at stake, the issues are more readily treated as an adjunct to the immigration 
system.346 In Bulgaria a different preoccupation has emerged – not over im-
migration, but over emigration, and over controls placed on certain citizens 
who have been convicted of offences, preventing them from leaving the 
country.347  
 It is quite common for States to have an approach where, in principle, free 
movement is acknowledged as a cornerstone of membership of the EU; but, 
in practice, there is a high degree of hostility because it is assimilated in pub-
lic discourse or the popular imagination to ‘ordinary’ migration. This is clear-
ly the case in the UK, where the 2010-2015 Coalition Government has set it-
self a target of reducing net migration – into which it has included EU free 
movement – to less than 100,000 by the date of the 2015 general election. 
This is just one reason why so much of the press coverage in the UK, which 
will be discussed in more detail under Q15, is extremely hostile to EU free 
movement at the present time. In the UK, as in Ireland,348 the language that 
dominates the debate at present is of ‘EU migrant workers’ and ‘EU immi-
gration – not mobile EU citizens. This language has become pervasive in the 
UK. A bifurcation of theoretical approval and practical resistance is also re-
ported in Austria. 
 In Estonia, a different set of pressures is reported around the institution of 
citizenship. There, the Supreme Court emphasised in 2008 that citizenship by 
                                                        
344. See the report for Sweden at fn. 23. 
345. See the report for Sweden at fn. 22. 
346. See e.g. the reports for Bulgaria, and Slovenia. 
347. See Section 6.2.1 above. 
348. Report for Ireland, discussing the title of a report of the Oireachtas Joint Committee 
on European Affairs of 2006, noted at fn. 97. 
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naturalisation is not a fundamental right, but a privilege.349 This context is set 
by a wider set of concerns within politics and society about the constitutional 
status of Estonia as a rather recently reconstituted independent state, and the 
position of the Russian minority therein, many of whom do not have Estonian 
citizenship. Set against that background, EU citizenship issues in fact provide 
a backdrop of a Western ideal for self-determination and independence, 
which is set – in the Estonian national imaginary – against the history of So-
viet occupation and domination from the Second World War until the 
breakup of the Soviet Union. Tying EU citizenship to Estonian citizenship 
thus provides an important symbolic way of filling out national citizenship. 
 A similar ‘move’ can be seen in an even newer Member State, Croatia, 
which is the only State to report having a constitutional provision on EU citi-
zenship effectively replicating Article 20 TFEU.350 This provision helps to 
reinforce Croatia’s European future as part of its accession story, suggesting a 
future that goes beyond an exclusively nationally-based story of belonging 
which emerged during and after the wars of the Yugoslav secession and 
which involved Croatia for several years during the 1990s. This ‘top down’ 
move is clearly aspirational in character, and can come into conflict with oth-
er definitions of what it means to be Croatian and European. For example, on 
the initiative of a conservative and religious ‘pro-family’ organisation, a ref-
erendum was held in Croatia in December 2013 on enshrining in the Consti-
tution a definition of marriage as being between a man and a woman, 
‘goldplating’ the existing legislative provision that already limits marriage in 
this way. The initiative occurred as a reaction to a government proposal to le-
galise same sex partnerships – a move that would have brought Croatia into 
the European mainstream more generally, since the majority of Member 
States now recognise some form of same sex union.351 On a turnout of 38%, 
however, 66% of voters approved the constitutional amendment. 
 Historical factors also come into play in Greece, where the effect of Bul-
garia and Romania acceding to the EU in 2007 has been to move two of the 
largest groups of immigrants resident in Greece (after Albanians) into a new 
and, of course, more favourable legal category. Despite the best efforts of the 
Greek Government to implement Directive 2004/38 effectively, this has not 
                                                        
349. Judgment No. 3-3-1-42-08 – discussed in more detail in the response to Q8 in the re-
port for Estonia. 
350. For further discussion, see T. Orsolic Dalessio, ‘The constitutional provision on EU 
citizenship: the case of Croatia’, 2012, Citizenship in South East Europe, available at 
http://www.citsee.eu/node/87. 
351. For more details, see the discussion above at Section 1.2.1.  
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necessarily translated into an effective communication of a new rights-based 
approach to these groups of non-citizens resident in Greece. 
 But some national reports also show that, away from the field of free 
movement in its ‘immigration’ guise, there are good examples at national 
level of the culture of Union citizenship as a rights-based structure being fully 
embraced. A good example concerns the electoral rights given to EU citizens 
in the UK, which go well beyond the strict requirements of EU law. 
13.3. The institutional reaction 
As the Institutional Report notes, the baseline for the Commission, in particu-
lar, is the rigorous enforcement of EU law. There is plenty of evidence from 
regular reports, and from a number of enforcement actions that have been 
started against the Member States in respect of Directive 2004/38, that the 
Commission is well aware of the divergences that exist between the Directive 
and national laws. In the Commission’s first report on the implementation of 
Directive 2004/38,352 profound disappointment was expressed about the 
transposition effort: 
Not one Member State has transposed the Directive effectively and correctly in its entirety. 
Not one Article of the Directive has been transposed effectively and correctly by all Mem-
ber States. 
The Institutional Report comments that issues arise from ‘a lack of under-
standing of national administrations of the fundamental difference between 
the subjective rights of EU citizens stemming directly from the Treaty, and 
the broad discretion national administrations traditionally have in the area of 
migration law relating to non-EU nationals.’353  
 The Commission, though, likes to use dialogue to solve cases. Not one 
single case on what might be termed the ‘immigration’-related aspects of Di-
rective 2004/38 initiated by the Commission against the Member States has 
yet to reach the Court of Justice.354 Indeed, in the Institutional Report, the 
Commission notes that it does not believe that there is ‘a generalized unwill-
                                                        
352. Report from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament on the ap-
plication of Directive 2004/38/EC, COM(2008) 840 final, at p. 4. 
353. Institutional Report, Section 5.1. 
354. See Shaw and Miller, ‘When Legal Worlds Collide’, where details of actions initiated 
by the Commission are given at fn. 5. 
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ingness of front-line administrations or judiciaries in Member States to grant 
EU citizens’ their rights. On the contrary, it believes – although it is not clear 
that this assertion is evidenced completely by the national data discussed in 
this Report – that Member States do make an effort to separate out the two 
issues in national implementing legislation, through separate laws/regulations 
or at least separate chapters within those measures. 
 Finally, it is interesting to note the comment in the Institutional Report that 
the separation between free movement law and immigration law is fully rec-
ognised in the manner in which the relevant fields of law are taught in univer-
sities. This is a question that merits closer examination before a firm conclu-
sion can be reached. For example, in the report for Greece, it is specifically 
noted that the two topics are in fact dealt with side by side in university law 
schools.  
13.4. Question 13 – emerging issues and themes 
EU free movement law is under pressure from a number of sides.355 While 
we will return to this issue in more detail when considering media coverage 
of free movement under Q15, and in our General Conclusions, it is important 
to note a number of emerging trends in this Section. 
 The report for Ireland highlights in some detail how the language of im-
migration has entered the field of EU free movement. It quotes a paradox-
ical comment from a previous Minister noting that ‘it is difficult in EU law, 
for a Member State to impede the free movement of EU citizens’ and ex-
pressing a desire that this ‘privilege’ should not be abused. In similar vein, we 
can note a collaboration between the Dutch Minister of Social Affairs, Lode-
wijk Asscher and a British commentator, David Goodhart, arguing for limits 
to EU free movement – an approach which seems to be premised on the idea 
that abuses of free movement are rife and that a new ‘code’ (the ‘code or-
ange’356) is needed because of the excessive burden on the national systems 
of EU free movement.357 The report for Spain notes a bifurcation between 
                                                        
355. For an excellent short review, see R. Barbulescu, ‘EU freedom of movement is com-
ing under increasing pressure in the UK and other European states’, LSE EUROPP 
blog, 20 February 2014, available at http://bit.ly/1jI6XOG. 
356. See the report for the Netherlands at note 87. 
357. L. Asscher and D. Goodhart, ’Code Oranje voor vrij werknemersverkeer binnen EU’ 
De Volkskrant, 17 August 2013 and ’So much migration puts Europe’s dykes in dan-
ger of bursting’, The Independent, 18 August 2013. 
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elite political or legal perceptions of EU free movement and its culture of 
(EU) citizenship, on the one hand, and a wider popular view that may be 
dominated by a sense that EU free movement is simply ‘an artificial door 
opened to other EU nationals in order to avoid application of immigration 
law’, on the other. 
 As the Commission has commented on many occasions, fraud and abuse 
do represent limitations upon free movement law.358 But the Commission 
has also tried to call out Member States that seek to take adopt a lazy ap-
proach to these matters by claiming that abuse and fraud are rife, whilst being 
unable to prove this through robust evidence.359 Even so, the UK, in particu-
lar, is constantly trying to test the limits of free movement law, most recently 
through a restriction that will subject all EU citizens on low incomes falling 
below £150 per week to an individual assessment in order to determine 
whether they have work that is ‘genuine and effective’. If not, they will be 
denied the status of ‘worker’ and thus the in-work benefits that bring the 
UK’s poverty wages in some sectors up to a living wage.360 EU citizens are 
thus, arguably, discriminated against unfairly compared to British low paid 
workers, and they will also be vulnerable to removal. 
 As the Commission notes in the Institutional Report, the difference be-
tween the politicisation of EU free movement today and how it was treated in 
previous years concerns both the nature and scope of the claims being 
made. Strong claims are made by politicians, and even ministers, about the 
nature of free movement and free movers that are simply not backed up by 
evidence. A good example is to be found in a report in the Financial Times, a 
newspaper that deserves plaudits for its balanced and sober approach to re-
porting, but which does, sometimes, do precisely that, namely report a view 
but without contesting it. Thus in a report in February 2014 about the extent 
to which the numbers of EU citizens resident in the UK are balanced by UK 
citizens resident abroad, the following comment appears: 
                                                        
358. Commission Communication, Free movement of EU citizens and their families: Five 
actions to make a difference, COM(2013) 837, at pp. 7-8. 
359. The Institutional Report refers at note 248 to note 43 of Five actions to make a differ-
ence, which charts Member State responses to requests from the Commission for evi-
dence about the scale of abuse. 
360. S. Peers, ‘Is the UK's restriction on EU workers’ access to benefits legal – and if not, 
should it be?’, EU Law Analysis, 19 February 2014, available at http://eulawanalysis. 
blogspot.co.uk/2014/02/is-uks-restriction-on-eu-workers-access.html, and D Flynn, 
‘New rules threaten EU migrant workers with discrimination’, Migrants’ Rights Net-




Mark Field, Conservative MP for the Cities of London and Westminster, said comparison 
was difficult. ‘These [figures] are not like for like: Lots of Brits abroad are successful peo-
ple living in second homes in Spain or France. Most Brits living abroad are not aggressive 
beggars or sleeping rough on the streets: just comparing headline figures doesn’t tell the 
whole story.’361 
We return to the issue of press coverage in more detail in our discussion of 
Q15. 
Question 14 
Has the binding effect of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the Euro-
pean Union, following the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty in 2009, 
played any role in how the rights of EU citizens are being interpreted by 
the national courts and/or tribunals? 
14.1. Introduction 
Article 6(1) TEU reflects a milestone constitutional step achieved through the 
ratification of the Lisbon Treaty: 
The Union recognises the rights, freedoms and principles set out in the Charter of Funda-
mental Rights of the European Union of 7 December 2000, as adapted at Strasbourg, on 12 
December 2007, which shall have the same legal value as the Treaties. 
Respect for fundamental rights was already a well-entrenched dimension of 
the case law on Union citizenship, primarily in the context of the right to re-
spect for family life as a general principle of Union law.362 And even before 
the Lisbon-driven amendments to Article 6 TEU, Recital 31 of the preamble 
to Directive 2004/38 made it clear that the measure ‘respects the fundamental 
rights and freedoms and observes the principles recognised in particular by 
the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union’. 
 But the binding effect now attributed to the Charter brings two important 
twists with it: first, the explicit depiction of certain citizenship rights as sub-
                                                        
361. E. Rigby, ‘EU migrants moving to UK balanced by Britons living abroad’, Financial 
Times, 10 February 2014, available at http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/5cd640f6-9025-
11e3-a776-00144feab7de.html#axzz2vAcJoYV8. 
362. See e.g. Case C-459/99 MRAX [2002] ECR I-6591. 
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stantive fundamental rights included in the Charter too;363and, second, the 
fact that the limits placed on the scope of the Charter receive binding primary 
law effect too. On the second point, Article 51(2) is particularly relevant: its 
statement that the Charter ‘does not extend the field of application of Union 
law beyond the powers of the Union or establish any new power or task for 
the Union, or modify powers and tasks as defined in the Treaties’ was ex-
pressly cited by the Court in Dereci, for example, a judgment in which the 
potentially expansionist effects of Ruiz Zambrano were deliberately, as we 
have seen, reined in.364 
 Noting the relatively short time frame between the ratification of the Lis-
bon Treaty and the completion of the national reports, we chose to place a 
question about the impact of the Charter in our discussion of the cultures of 
citizenship. Essentially, and drawing from the Institutional Report’s depiction 
of the impact of the Ruiz Zambrano jurisprudence, we wanted to see if a simi-
lar ‘stimulating effect’ could be detected in national case law from this per-
spective – fundamental rights could previously have been raised in citizen-
ship cases at national level already, but does the particular legal change con-
cerning the Charter bring something new to the discourse? 
14.2. The Charter and national case law 
The dominant message in the majority of the responses received is that the 
legal status of the Charter since Lisbon has not (yet?) made any substantive 
impact in national case law.365 In many of these reports, it is clear that this is 
purely because there have been no relevant cases; a persisting tendency to 
have first recourse to more familiar national or other international (mainly, 
the ECHR) instruments that protect fundamental rights is also apparent.366  
 Where the Charter is discussed in more detail, however, its potential sig-
nificance for reinforcing the fundamental rights of Union citizens is expressly 
                                                        
363. See Articles 15(2) (freedom to seek employment, to work, to exercise the right of es-
tablishment and to provide services in any Member State), 39 (right to vote and stand 
as a candidate in European Parliament elections), 40 (right to vote and stand as a can-
didate in municipal elections), 45 (right to move and reside), and 46 (diplomatic and 
consular protection in third countries) of the Charter. 
364. Dereci, para. 71. 
365. See the reports for Croatia, Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Hungary, Italy, 
Malta, Poland, Slovenia, and Sweden. This point is also confirmed in the Institutional 
Report. 
366. See e.g. the reports for Cyprus, France, Germany, and Ireland. 
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noted – in the reports for Austria, Greece, and Portugal, for example, on ef-
fective judicial protection and the administrative and procedural safeguards 
that form a critical dimension of citizenship rights. Similarly, we saw the po-
tential relevance of the Charter to national restrictions placed on the voting 
rights conferred by Union citizenship in the discussion on Q12, especially in 
connection with restrictions on prisoners’ voting rights and the voting rights 
of persons with a mental impairment. 
 The report for the UK presents perhaps the most palpable evidence of a 
‘stimulating Charter effect’ at national level to date, noting that ‘[l]egal prac-
titioners increasingly make reference to the Charter to support arguments 
concerning the interpretation of the rights of Union citizens before national 
courts’. 
 More generally, three thematic points link the responses given under Q14. 
First, some reports note that references to the Charter were already a typical 
feature of national case law on citizenship rights i.e. even before the legal 
change effected by Lisbon. For example, in the report for Estonia, it is noted 
that ‘the Supreme Court was rather forward thinking in that it repeatedly 
made reference to the [Charter] before its entry into force as a binding in-
strument’. Similarly, it was confirmed in the report for Finland that the Char-
ter ‘has received judicial attention ... well before the entry into force of the 
Lisbon Treaty’ – including case examples that demonstrate that the Charter 
was ‘legally relevant’.367  
 Second, a parallel emphasis on the limits as well as the rights contained in 
the Charter can be seen.368 For example, the report for Finland notes that rel-
evant post-Lisbon national cases include ‘explanations for why particular 
rights in the [Charter] are not an obstacle to the application of national law’, 
mainly in cases on deportation and expulsion. A similar point is made in the 
report for the Netherlands.369 The problems identified in this sphere of citi-
zenship law in the discussion on Q6 demonstrate that the absence of reflec-
tion on the Charter may well be linked to the systemic harshness shaping 
these decisions that is evident across the EU Member States. Perhaps reflect-
ing a similar theme, it is also noted in the report for the Netherlands that 
‘[t]he binding effect of the Charter has played a role in how rights of EU na-
tional are being interpreted, although it rarely as led to a more favourable re-
sult for the claimant’. 
                                                        
367. See the report for Finland, with case examples in note 126. 
368. See e.g. the report for Ireland, with case examples at notes 110-111. 
369. See the report for the Netherlands, with case examples at note 91. 
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 But the report for Finland does emphasise that national courts have en-
gaged with the Court of Justice on the meaning and scope of various Charter 
rights through the preliminary rulings procedure.370 The report thus reflects 
the balance inherent in the Charter itself in the statement that ‘it is clear that 
some lower courts also have a clear appreciation of the significance of the 
Charter, and are prepared to refer questions that concern its outer limits’. 
 Third, a degree of confusion with respect to the respective relevance of na-
tional law, the Charter, and/or the ECHR was mentioned in the report for 
Bulgaria, where it is suggested that the Court’s instruction in Dereci on this 
point – i.e. ‘if the referring court considers, in the light of the circumstances 
of the disputes in the main proceedings, that the situation of the applicants in 
the main proceedings is covered by European Union law, it must examine 
whether the refusal of their right of residence undermines the right to respect 
for private and family life provided for in Article 7 of the Charter. On the 
other hand, if it takes the view that that situation is not covered by European 
Union law, it must undertake that examination in the light of Article 8(1) of 
the ECHR’371 – ‘does not appear to have been fully understood’ by the na-
tional courts.  
 However, the discussion in the reports for the Netherlands and the UK 
present an alternative picture on this issue, with a series of cases confirming 
that the Charter can only apply if the applicant’s situation falls within the 
scope of Union law; following Dereci very closely, it has been emphasised 
that fundamental rights contained in the Charter do not themselves form part 
of the ‘substance’ of citizenship rights under the Ruiz Zambrano test.372 
 On the other hand, reflecting the ambition of substantive convergence 
conveyed by Article 52(2) and (3) of the Charter, it is noted in the report for 
Ireland that ‘[t]here is evidence that the courts, while acknowledging that 
these three sources are not identical in their obligations, will in practice con-
sider claims invoking these various provisions as substantially equivalent’.373 
                                                        
370. See similarly on that point, the report for Germany. 
371. Dereci, para. 72. 
372. See the report for the Netherlands, with case examples outlined at note 88; and the 
report for the UK, with case examples outlined at notes 272-275 (where it is also not-
ed, however, that ‘national courts have also remarked that Dereci is not entirely clear 
on whether the separation of family members can ever trigger the [genuine enjoy-
ment] test’). 
373. See the report for Ireland, with case examples outlined at notes 105-106. 
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14.3. Question 14 – emerging issues and themes 
Perhaps somewhat surprisingly, any stimulating effect that might have been 
expected to be attributed to the Charter in terms of providing a route for new 
arguments at national level that are pinned to EU law and its powerful – and 
often speedy, compared to ECHR law – remedies is not yet apparent in the 
specific field of citizenship rights. Instead, national legal activity remains 
focused on the substantive development of citizenship rights per se, whether 
within or beyond the scope of Directive 2004/38. It is a little disquieting, 
however, to ponder the absence to date of a more concerted Charter-linked 
fundamental rights discourse in national case law. 
Question 15 
Please describe the extent to which issues connected to EU citizenship 
have been a salient issue in the national media and how this issue has been 
dealt with in the national media. Are there any particularly dominant 
themes within media reporting (e.g., expulsion; access to state benefits; 
derived rights for third country nationals)? How accurate is national re-
porting of EU citizenship issues? Can you detect evidence of the influence 
of the media on national public discourse? 
15.1. Introduction 
Recent years have witnessed an increase in attention directed towards EU cit-
izenship, prompted in part by events such as the rulings of the Court of Jus-
tice on crucial citizenship issues. These cases include Metock, Ruiz Zambra-
no, McCarthy, Dereci, and Rottmann. But other factors have raised the sali-
ence of citizenship and free movement issues too, including the accession of 
Romania and Bulgaria to the EU, and the subsequent lifting of transitional re-
strictions in January 2014. Some useful reference points from recent citizen-
ship history can be drawn from the European Commission’s 2013 Communi-
cation on free movement.374 Starting at around 1.6% of the total population at 
the end of 2004, the proportion of mobile EU citizens increased to 2.4% four 
years later and then more slowly (to 2.8% by the end of 2012), due to both 
                                                        
374. European Commission, Free movement of EU citizens and their families: Five ac-
tions to make a difference, COM(2013) 837 final, at p. 3. 
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the economic recession and the gradual reduction in the mobility potential 
from central and eastern Member States. 
 Of course, as both the percentages and the overall population numbers 
have increased (as there are more EU Member States in 2014 than in 2004), 
this has been a considerable increase overall, although it is still a very small 
percentage of the EU population. But because the exercise of free movement 
rights and patterns of mobility are not even across the EU, perceptions tend to 
be distorted. It is perceptions – as much as facts – which have driven other 
developments such as the letter sent in April 2013 by the Interior ministers of 
Austria, Germany, the Netherlands, and the UK to the Presidency of the 
Council of Ministers on the burdens imposed by free movement and on the 
purported abuse of the social welfare systems of some Member States by na-
tionals of some other Member States.375 It is also worth noting the various 
events and programmes associated with the designation of 2013 as the Euro-
pean Year of Citizens, which sought to increase the visibility of EU citizen-
ship and of the rights associated with it – and, conversely, of the obstacles 
experienced by those seeking to exercise those rights.376 
 Responding to all these factors, we were interested to discover the manner 
and the frequency of the reporting of issues related to EU citizenship in the 
national media across the Union. We wanted to know which issues received 
particular attention, and we asked national rapporteurs to indicate their im-
pressions of the general tone or tenor of those national debates. Our questions 
were rather broad, and did not mandate a specific methodology. Some au-
thors approached the issue by using databases and by searching the internet; 
others focused on specific issues and provided narrative data about how these 
have been treated.377 
 It was interesting to observe from the national reports that despite its pro-
file at the supranational level, Union citizenship as a general concept, and the 
full range of rights and liberties that it implies, does not appear to be a partic-
ularly salient issue for the national media of most of the Member States; or – 
                                                        
375. The letter received significant attention from the media and the European institutions, 
as discussed in Section 15.2 below. For the text of the letter, see:  
 http://docs.dpaq.de/3604-130415_letter_to_presidency_final_1_2.pdf.  
376. For further details, see http://europa.eu/citizens-2013/en.  
377. There are, of course, plenty of examples in political science research of more scien-
tific approaches to the use of media discourse in order to assess the trajectory of Eu-
ropean integration. One example is the work of Ulrike Liebert, e.g. U. Liebert, ‘Intro-
duction: Structuring Political Conflict about Europe: National Media in Transnational 
Discourse Analysis’ (2007) 8 Perspectives on European Politics and Society 235. 
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if it is – it is in the guise of ‘EU migration’ and ‘EU migrant workers’, per-
ceived as a burden not a benefit of EU membership. But very few of the na-
tional reports make reference to any sustained discussion of the idea or impli-
cations of EU citizenship at this general level.378 On the other hand, there was 
a range of particular issues in which elements of EU citizenship were impli-
cated; some common to a number of States, others indicative of more indi-
vidualised concerns. As will be discussed in more detail below, the media 
tend to focus at present on the economic problems stemming from the Euro-
zone crisis. Where national media do cover matters relevant to Union citizen-
ship, they usually focus on issues close to their own national (political, eco-
nomic or cultural) interests or circumstances. Reporting is often inaccurate, 
sensationalist, and riddled with loaded terminology; and this is almost always 
correlated with a generally Euro-sceptic outlook or bias. There are, however, 
a number of exceptions to this across the Union, where the media have been 
used to educate and promote a better understanding of the genuine implica-
tions of EU citizenship for national political and economic systems. 
15.2. Is EU citizenship a salient issue in the national media? 
As reported by several national rapporteurs, EU citizenship issues in general 
seem to attract little media interest in the majority of Member States, with re-
porting usually focusing on topics that tend to draw more attention or are per-
ceived to have a greater impact on the everyday lives of the general public – 
such as the EU economic and financial crisis, or political issues relevant to 
membership negotiations. The under-reporting of EU citizenship is often ex-
plained on the basis that the lack of interest in some States stems from the 
lower number of EU citizens living there (e.g. Greece, Bulgaria, and Hunga-
ry) or because of a generally Euro-sceptic approach driven by main political 
parties (e.g. Finland, and pre-accession Croatia) especially in the aftermath of 
the Eurozone crisis. Of course, these reasons tend to change over time: both 
with the constant and progressive transformation of the European Union, and 
also with the different developments taking place in each Member State. For 
example, the lack of interest in (and reporting of) EU citizenship issues in 
Greece was traditionally attributed to the absence of significant numbers of 
EU citizens living there; however, with the accession of Romania and Bulgar-
ia, this explanation no longer seems applicable. 
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 A small number of national reports provide concrete data on media report-
ing. In Finland, for example, the concept of EU citizenship figures in the 
mainstream media at least once a fortnight.379 There are relatively frequent 
reports within the mainstream media on issues relevant to EU citizens also in 
Denmark, Sweden, and the UK although these are usually framed in terms of 
the general ‘immigration’ debate and tend to be characterised in predominant-
ly negative terms (with the exception of Sweden). The significant outlier here 
appears to be Croatia, in which the mainstream media began reporting about 
EU citizenship and its benefits on a near daily basis, unpacking the rights and 
their meaning, and thus raising awareness of the relevant issues amongst the 
general public. This, it is thought, had a significant impact in terms of lower-
ing the rate of Euro-scepticism apparent in the country prior to accession. 
Two further points are apparent from the reports in general: media coverage 
of EU citizenship issues increases during, first, election periods (both local 
and European Parliamentary); and, second, immediately following decisions 
in major cases by the Court of Justice. 
15.3. The main issues addressed by the national media 
One tendency observed throughout the reports is that, even though EU citi-
zenship and related issues do not have much prominence in the mainstream 
media in general, each Member State seems to have one hot ‘citizenship is-
sue’ that figures regularly in the media and political discourse. Some of these 
are shared and some are specific to individual States. The result is a media 
discourse on citizenship that is at once disaggregated and nationalised, leav-
ing us with a fragmented picture overall.  
 As already noted in the analysis of other issues raised in the national re-
ports, countries/governments tend to focus on issues ‘close to their hearts’ 
and thus the media reports more regularly and more intensely on these mat-
ters rather than on issues that might be equally relevant, but are not perceived 
as impacting upon the Member State in question in the same way or to the 
same extent. Some of these more particular issues will be mentioned briefly 
                                                        
379. The report for Finland notes that ‘[b]y submitting search words ‘EU-citizen’, ‘Union 
citizen’, ‘Union citizenship’, ‘Union citizens’ to the data archive (1994 to mid-2013) 
of the highest circulating Finnish daily newspaper (Helsingin Sanomat), some 200 re-
sults are returned. That is, on average the concept has been employed less than fort-
nightly. Some 30 ‘hits’ were published on the opinions pages, focusing mainly on 
personal accounts or concerns on work, mobility, and family life’. 
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in the analysis below; however, there are certain topics common to several (or 
most) Member States that are regularly quoted by the media and thus deserv-
ing of special consideration.  
15.3.1. Benefit tourism, social dumping, and poverty migration 
A group of issues that prevails in the media discourses of the majority of 
Member States relates to benefit or welfare tourism, social dumping and pov-
erty migration. The notion that these practices are common (and indeed more 
common than is actually the truth) is generated by the economic inequalities 
between the Member States, which apparently incentivise individuals to 
move in order to enjoy a better standard of living elsewhere, perhaps by bene-
fiting from a more generous welfare state. In reality, of course, the figures 
show that the majority of EU citizens move for work or work-related rea-
sons,380 but the perception is otherwise as the quotation from Mark Field cit-
ed at the conclusion of the discussion on Q13 shows very well. Here, a line 
dividing the ’new’ from the ‘old’ Member States is palpably clear, especially 
following the 2004 enlargement and, more currently, in connection with the 
lifting of transitional restrictions on Romanian and Bulgarian citizens in Jan-
uary 2014. In Denmark, for example, the issue of ‘social tourism’ has been on 
the media (and political) radar since before the 2004 enlargement,381 directed 
at the ‘distinction between ‘us’ and ‘them’ where EU-nationals – especially 
those from the Eastern European countries – are portrayed as people who 
mainly come to Denmark to benefit from its generous social system, such as 
family and employment benefits’. 
 Several reports noted that the letter to the Council Presidency referred to 
above, on the alleged abuse of welfare systems by Union citizens, caught the 
attention of quite a few national media organisations across the EU.382 This 
group of countries feared ever-increasing and systematic levels of welfare 
tourism, and applied pressure on the Commission to adopt restrictive 
measures (in particular, with regard to the then forthcoming lifting of the re-
strictions on the free movement of workers from Romania and Bulgaria in 
January 2014). Denmark later associated itself with this initiative and the is-
sue was subsequently reported on regularly in the Danish media. Despite – or 
                                                        
380. Data can to be found in COM(2013) 837 at p. 3 et seq. 
381. In 2003, the Danish Government published a report on Danish social benefits (‘Dan-
ske sociale ydelser I lyset af udvidelsen af EU’), which was heavily discussed in the 
media. 
382. For examples, see the reports for Denmark, and the Netherlands. 
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perhaps because of – the lack of quantitative data provided by these Member 
States in support of their claims, and despite the evidence to the contrary set 
out in reports by the Commission383 and other organisations,384 the prospect 
of welfare tourism became an important issue in the national (e.g. Denmark) 
and international media by the end of 2013. The Commission reasoned that 
‘economically non-active EU mobile citizens account for a very small share 
of beneficiaries’.385 Even though it recognised that ‘there can be regional or 
local problems created by a large, sudden influx of people from other EU 
States into a particular geographical area’,386 it noted that these could be dealt 
with by different sets of measures387 rather than by restricting the rights of 
EU citizens, such as free movement and access to benefits. Moreover, differ-
ent national media emphasised different elements of the general social dump-
ing problem e.g. ‘health tourism’ in Andalucía (where EU citizens undergo 
expensive health treatment free of charge for which they would have to pay 
in their respective home States), or access to state-funded education in the 
UK. 
                                                        
383. Immediately upon receipt of the letter, the Commission noted the lack of statistical 
evidence supporting the claims made, and requested clearer data (see http://www. 
euractiv.com/socialeurope/commission-gets-cold-feet-push-l-news-519366). It then 
published, in October 2013, a report it had commissioned into the issue, which pro-
vided evidence that challenged the idea that social tourism was, or was likely to be-
come, a significant burden on Member States. See the final report submitted by ICF 
GHK in association with Milieu Ltd, A fact finding analysis on the impact on the 
Member States' social security systems of the entitlements of non-active intra-EU mi-
grants to special non-contributory cash benefits and healthcare granted on the basis 
of residence, 2013. 
384. See, for example, the OECD’s International Migration Outlook 2013 (http://www. 
oecd.org/els/mig/imo2013.htm ); Centre for Research and Analysis of Migration, As-
sessing the Fiscal Costs and Benefits of A8 Migration to the UK (http://www.cream 
migration.org/publ_uploads/CDP_18_09.pdf ); and Centre for European Reform, Is 
Immigration a reason for Britain to Leave EU? (http://www.cer.org.uk/sites/default/ 
files/publications/pb_imm_uk_27sept13.pdf ) 
385. According to Commission’s report, ‘they represent less than 1% of all such benefi-
ciaries (of EU nationality) in six countries studied (Austria, Bulgaria, Estonia, Greece, 
Malta and Portugal) and between 1% and 5% in five other countries (Germany, Fin-
land, France, The Netherlands and Sweden).’ See again, A fact finding analysis on the 
impact on the Member States' social security systems, 2013. 
386. László Andor, Commissioner for Employment, Social Affairs and Inclusion, see: 
http://ec.europa.eu/social/main.jsp?langId=en&catId=89&newsId=1980&furtherNew
s=yes 
387. For example, by using the financial aid of European Social Fund. 
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 The media (and political) discourse in Member States across the ‘EU 
Channel’ (central, eastern, and southern Europe), on the other hand, have 
tended to concern themselves mainly with the other side of the economic as-
pects of the free-movement coin. The Hungarian media, for instance, have 
not been particularly concerned with (and thus have not reported on) the so-
cial dumping or benefits abuse issues discussed above; here, the major issues 
featuring regularly in the media relate to the posting of workers and the brain-
drain of (in particular, healthcare) professionals. 
15.3.2. Criminality and expulsions 
The criminality of foreigners, including EU citizens, is another significant 
subject of media reporting noted in the majority of national reports (in partic-
ular, Austria, Bulgaria, Denmark, France, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands, and 
the UK). This includes the debate on tighter border control measures imposed 
as a prevention mechanism and the very low threshold of criminal acts for 
which an EU citizen can be expelled (as discussed in detail earlier in relation 
to Q6). For example, the ruling of Court of Justice in Commission v Nether-
lands388 triggered a debate on expulsion of EU citizens in the Netherlands, 
and, in particular, on ‘the connection between criminal conviction and meas-
ure of expulsion’. 
 However, the topic most commonly reported on in terms of alleged crimi-
nality and EU citizenship is the situation of the Roma minority and, in partic-
ular, the expulsion of EU citizens of Roma origin. In France, this issue has 
featured regularly on television, in the written press, and on the internet; and 
the tone of such reporting is generally very negative, highlighting controver-
sial issues that further adversely influence the general discourse on EU citi-
zenship rights and thus perpetuate negative feelings towards certain EU coun-
tries as a whole (e.g. recently, towards Romania and Bulgaria, and previously 
towards Slovakia, the Czech Republic, and Hungary). As a result, the report 
for France concludes that public opinion is often significantly biased; for ex-
ample, in a recent survey, ‘47% of French people considered Roma not to be 
the same as other European citizens’.389 The expulsion of Union citizens of 
Roma origin from Italy was the subject of media reporting in several other 
Member States (mainly, Denmark, France, Italy, and the Netherlands). In the 
UK, the centre-right press has branded the Roma minority as ‘bad migrants’ 
                                                        
388. Case C-50/06 Commission v Netherlands [2007] ECR I-4383. 
389. See the report for France at note 183, reporting Sondage Newsring, 2013. 
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and the press has been responsible for a negative campaign against Romani-
ans (who are regularly conflated in the popular press with the Roma) by pub-
lishing articles under titles such as ‘The Roma invasion of Paris ... next stop 
Britain’.390 
 It is interesting to observe how the media use examples from other coun-
tries in order to claim to present an ‘objective’ picture on a particular issue, 
often resulting in an outcome which is anything but objective. According to 
the Danish report, for example, the national media, in order to draw an ‘ob-
jective’ picture on the Roma minority, selects negative examples or problems 
involving Roma not only in Denmark but also in other Member States. Such 
negative perceptions and strategic reporting seem to ‘fuel public indignation 
and thereby confirm all the stereotypes around the Roma people.’ In contrast, 
and on a more positive note described in the report for Sweden, one of the 
major national newspapers – Dagens Nyheter – took great care to report ob-
jectively and fairly on this topic, considering the issue also from the Roma 
perspective. As the report for Sweden notes, the coverage explained ‘the un-
derlying ideas of the EU citizenship as well as travelling down to Romania to 
give the readers a broad understanding of the complexity of the EU-
solidarity, free movement for persons and the economic incentives to travel to 
Sweden’. 
15.3.3. Acquisition of EU citizenship 
Finally, one of the most noteworthy and controversial political issues relevant 
to Union citizenship that has emerged in recent years concerns the acquisition 
of citizenship and, in particular, the controversial plans to sell Maltese citi-
zenship and thus EU citizenship to wealthy third country nationals.391 Not 
unique to Malta, this issue has also been reported in other States, albeit in a 
slightly different form. In Bulgaria, for example, the fact that third country 
nationals (from Macedonia, Moldova, Serbia, Albania, or Ukraine) can re-
ceive citizenship via a simplified fast-track procedure (due to various cultural 
and historic links) is increasingly suspected of being open to abuse in order to 
obtain Union citizenship, and is thus receiving an increasing amount of media 
and political attention. The situation is very similar in Spain, where the in-
creased ease with which nationals of Latin American countries can acquire 
                                                        
390. See report for the UK at note 284, quoting The Daily Telegraph, 6 October 2013. 
391. For more information on this issue, see the analysis under Q8 above. 
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Italian citizenship and thus Union citizenship prior to migrating for linguistic 
reasons to Spain has aroused parallel concerns. 
15.3.4. Major cases before the Court of Justice 
Another notable trend is for media (and political) interest in EU citizenship to 
increase dramatically whenever the Court of Justice hands down a significant 
judgment in the field. Many of these decisions are widely discussed, in par-
ticular in States that are directly affected by their conclusions. For example, 
the LN case on student workers in Denmark; the Chen case on the primary 
right of residence based on ius soli in Ireland (which led, indeed, to a referen-
dum and ultimately constitutional change); or the Solyom case392 on freedom 
of movement of State representatives in Hungary. Other rulings (such as Ruiz 
Zambrano, Baumbast, Bidar, Dereci, Teixeira,393 Metock and Rottmann) af-
fect the policies of the majority of Member States and tend to receive more 
media coverage across the Union – and more direct response from national 
courts or governments. 
15.3.5. Issues particular to certain Member States 
The effects, both economic (rising prices of properties and services) and so-
cial (integration, language, custom), generated by the residence of citizens 
from ‘richer’ EU countries in certain popular tourist regions of ‘poorer’ EU 
countries (such as Bulgaria) have been reported as subjects of significant pub-
lic debate. Furthermore, in the report for Netherlands, for example, language 
requirements and integration courses for EU citizens were identified as part 
of national political debate (both driven by and reflected subsequently in the 
national media). In Greece, a major topic debated in recent years in the media 
concerned the poor living conditions of foreigners, which would improve 
significantly if they were given access to social and other State benefits (alt-
hough, debates on this and other issues were quickly superseded by the onset 
of the national debt crisis in Greece). 
 Other topics more particular to the concerns of individual Member States 
(and thus reflected in their respective national media) are, for example, the 
verification of the transcripts of working qualifications (Croatia) and national 
rules or regulations discriminating against EU citizens (such as higher rates 
                                                        
392. Case C-364/10 Hungary v Slovak Republic, judgment of 16 October 2012. 
393. Case C-480/08 Teixeira v London Borough of Lambeth and Secretary of State for the 
Home Department [2010] ECR I-1107. 
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on bus fares or utility bills in Malta). Political issues relating to Union citi-
zenship that can be identified from national reports include active and passive 
suffrage in local elections, the voting rights of EU citizens in other Member 
States (from both perspectives, e.g. Slovenian citizens abroad and EU citizens 
in Slovenia), elections to the European Parliament, and the adoption of the 
Lisbon Treaty. Below, we present a single figure that brings all of these is-
sues together in a useful visualisation: 
15.4. Tenor, accuracy, and influence of reporting 
A significant number of the national reports criticise the media for using in-
accurate terminology when referring to issues relevant to EU citizenship. 
This most probably stems from the fact that, in a majority of EU Member 
States, official government policy assimilates EU citizenship to general im-
migration issues to a greater or lesser degree. In that respect, the media are 
simply following and copying this trend and tend to use – instead of the legal-
ly correct EU citizenship-related concepts and terms – terms more familiar to 
their readers such as immigrants, migrants, foreigners, and non-nationals, on 
a daily basis and without differentiating between, for example, third country 
nationals and EU citizens. 
 In Ireland, for example, the terminology used by the media when reporting 
on any non-Irish nationals tends to be very general, adopting terms like ‘im-
migration’, ‘immigrants’, ‘non-nationals’, ‘foreign-born population’, or ‘for-
eign nationals’ without specifically distinguishing between EU citizens and 
third country nationals. A similar situation has been reported in Denmark, 
where the media, apart from not distinguishing between EU citizens and mi-
grants from third countries, tend to refer to the former by their individual na-
tionalities. Furthermore, many negative and sensationalist terms like ‘loop-
hole’, ‘influx’, ‘abuse’, ‘exploitation’, ‘social dumping’, or ‘foreign crimi-
nals’ feature habitually in the rhetoric of media; and even terms like ‘tourism’ 
that usually have more positive connotations are often given a negative shad-
ing when used in conjunction with EU citizenship issues, such as ‘benefits 
tourism’, ‘welfare tourism’, ‘health tourism’, and so on.  
 An example of inaccuracy in media reporting observed in the report for 
the UK is the confusion between the concept of EU citizenship and the rights 
attached to it based on instruments adopted at the EU level, on the one hand, 





norms, adopted at national, regional (ECHR) or international level (ICCPR): 
UK reporting is often misleading. For instance, there is still a tendency to 
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under the ECHR/Human Rights Act. The UK office of the European Com-
mission publishes official clarifying responses to such instances of misreport-
ing on EU issues on a near daily basis.394 
 There is often, of course, a close connection between the biases of particu-
lar media outlets and the accuracy of information or choice of terminology. 
Much of the tabloid press and some right-wing media tend to use shocking or 
sensationalist terminology in order to attract audiences and readers, often both 
driven by and contributing to the negative views of the general public on cer-
tain issues. On the other hand, there now exist an abundance of alternative 
media sources, such as online blogs or rights-focused internet portals that offer 
a far more balanced analysis of issues relevant to EU citizenship.395 However, 
as noted also in the reports for Spain and the UK, these tend to attract a far 
more limited (and often specialised) audience. There are also fact-checking 
websites that test the accuracy of politicians’ statements or press reports.396 
 On a positive note, there are countries (such as Finland, Slovenia, and 
Sweden) in which the general view of media reporting on citizenship issues is 
that it has been relatively accurate, with little bias, aiming at objectivity (i.e. 
based on factual data and in-depth research of circumstances397) and tending 
to include explanation of the key concepts on which the phenomenon of EU 
citizenship is based. In Sweden, for example, the media have tried to show 
objectively ‘the tension that the Union citizenship might cause vis-à-vis the 
national welfare state’ without employing overstated terminology in this re-
gard. Similarly, in the UK, some media outlets have started to counter nega-
tive claims about the costs of EU migration to UK taxpayers, emphasising in-
stead the rights-enhancing character of decisions such as Metock.398 
                                                        
394. See also, Shaw et al, Getting to grips with EU citizenship, at pp. 53-54 and pp. 29-30, 
and the European Commission Office for the UK blog at  
 http://ec.europa.eu/unitedkingdom/blog/. 
395. Examples include the Croatian internet portal ‘Danas.hr’, which has published a 
number of newspaper articles informing Croatian nationals on EU citizenship rights 
and explaining the fundamental terms and their meanings. 
396. The first fact-checking website – based on crowd sourcing – which focused specifi-
cally on EU affairs was established in early 2014: https://factcheckeu.org/.  
397. See, for example, the above mentioned example of Swedish newspaper Dagens Ny-
heter, which published a detailed report on situation of Romanian beggars of Roma 
origin in Stockholm. The report was based on extensive research into the situation of 
Roma in Romania and the explanation of related concepts such as free movement of 
persons, EU solidarity, and the economic incentives for travel to Sweden. 
398. See the reports by the Guardian, 6 March 2013, available at http://www.theguardian. 
com/commentisfree/2013/mar/06/uk-benefits-eu-migrants-what-crisis, or the BBC, 
25 July 2008, at http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/7525472.stm.  
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 It would be interesting to test whether there is a correlation between the 
accuracy of the data used by the media and the nature of media rhetoric rele-
vant to EU citizenship. Is it the case, for example, that inaccurate data goes 
hand in hand with negative reporting? Or is the pro-European media just as 
likely to rely on incorrect factual claims in the pursuit of their editorial agen-
das? Further research would be required on this issue as the national reports 
do not contain enough detail to enable any firm conclusions to be drawn 
across all Member States. This being said, there does appear to be a correla-
tion (observed among the reports that did provide data on the accuracy of re-
porting and the type of rhetoric used) between the use of inaccurate data and 
negatively loaded terminology. These tactics are most often employed in the 
context of media reports seeking to undermine the legitimacy or desirability 
of EU citizenship and its related rights and freedoms.399 On the other hand, 
the few reports that did not find that the media generally resorted to abusive, 
sensationalist, or negative terminology highlighted that media reporting on 
EU citizenship was accurate, positive, rights-centred, and focused on tech-
nical issues.400 However, as noted above, much more detailed research is re-
quired before any robust or confident conclusions of this sort can be reached. 
 As most of the national reports conclude, the influence of the media on 
public opinion in relation to Union citizenship issues cannot readily be de-
nied. Several examples illustrate this phenomenon. In France, the angle of re-
porting employed by some sectors of the media – by emphasising only the 
controversial issues attached to the concept of Union citizenship – seem to 
have an influence on the tone of public debate with regard to the balancing of 
national interests with EU citizenship rights. Furthermore, as presented in the 
report for the UK, the media rarely report on the economically active and 
therefore self-sufficient EU citizens that live and work there. Moreover, even 
if this does occur, the reporting generally ignores the contribution of these cit-
izens to the national economy, instead playing up the perceived negatives of 
even these migrants, such as noting the contribution of EU citizens ‘to an 
overall increase in demand for the UK public services’ (such as primary 
school places).401 
 In Ireland, media coverage of the 2004 citizenship referendum (which was 
related to the Chen judgment) and the subsequent constitutional amendment 
                                                        
399. As observed in the reports for Denmark, Ireland, the Netherlands, Spain, and the UK. 
400. See e.g. the reports for Croatia, Finland, Slovenia, and Sweden. 
401. See BBC News Online, 15 March 2013: Urgent need for 250,000 school places, 
spending watchdog warns Daily Mail; 1 September 2013: EU influx leaves 3,000 
children without primary places for the new term. 
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presented a mixed picture: ‘[w]hile editorial treatment (and opinion pieces) 
was balanced, the dissemination of unanalysed and unchallenged quotations 
of politicians, mainly in favour of the referendum, led to a flawed, prejudiced 
and inadequate debate on the issue. ‘Loophole’ became part of the normal-
ized vocabulary... ‘Loophole’ and ‘‘abuse of Irish citizenship’ were used in 
tandem.’402 
15.5. Good practices in media reporting 
There are also several examples of good practices evidenced across the re-
ports. For example, some national media outlets have taken upon themselves 
the role of ‘educator’ and have been viewed as actively participating in the 
general education of the public on the issues relevant to EU citizenship. This 
has involved various educational campaigns, involving explanatory articles 
on citizenship rights and the provision of information on the topics that are 
closest to the interests of the population (although it is clear that the media do 
not merely react to public interests, but also to a significant degree shape 
them). Topics covered include the free movement of workers, the right of es-
tablishment, the recognition of working qualifications, and voting rights in 
other Member States. These initiatives can provide the general public with an 
incentive to travel, to work in other Member States, or simply to take an in-
terest in European political life and discourse.  
 This theme is, as expected, more apparent in the newer Member States, 
and in particular in Croatia, Estonia, and Slovenia. In the Estonian media, for 
example, attention was paid to the participation of EU citizens in the munici-
pal elections in October 2013 (which resulted in the successful election of a 
UK citizen of African descent). This was portrayed by the media as ‘a posi-
tive step towards expanding Estonian society, providing recent immigrants 
with a voice in politics and making the Estonian capital of Tallinn a more 
cosmopolitan city.’ Various initiatives developed in Croatia further illustrate 
this trend, such as public information campaigns on the citizenship rights; the 
‘Education for Democratic Citizenship and Human Rights’ programme estab-
                                                        
402. See M. Breen, A. Haynes and E. Devereux, Citizens, Loopholes and Maternity Tour-







lished by Platform 112, which included a curriculum for civic education and 
a number of national programmes on the implementation of European stand-
ards on human rights and democratic citizenship;403 and the production of a 
‘TV programme called ‘EU-classroom’ which gathers experts from certain 
related institutions discussing and analysing the rights emerging from EU cit-
izenship.’  
 Similarly, in Slovenia, during 2013 – the European Year of Citizens – a 
range of newspaper articles were published with titles such as ‘EU citizenship 
offers a lot. Take advantage of it’. The media were reported as providing ac-
curate information on various rights stemming from EU citizenship, including 
on voting rights, especially in connection with the upcoming elections to EP 
in 2014 – e.g. an online application MyVote2014 – to promote the elections 
and raise awareness among EU citizens. 
15.6. Question 15 – emerging issues and themes 
The concept of EU citizenship is not, at a general level at least, viewed as 
being of particular importance by the national media across the majority 
of Member States. Legal aspects, including the rights attached to Union citi-
zenship, receive for the most part little attention in the media – although there 
are exceptions. Where attention is paid to the implications of EU citizenship, 
the analysis tends to focus on the free movement of workers or voting rights 
(e.g. European Parliamentary elections). Quite often, the emphasis within 
press reports or analysis is on challenging the legitimacy of these rights ra-
ther than the clarifying how they may benefit the public at large.  
 As emerges from a range of reports, the opinions presented by media and 
the politicians, and their subsequent influence on public opinion, are intricate-
ly interlinked, feeding dynamically off each other. Right-wing political par-
ties, in particular, appear to use press campaigns and supportive media outlets 
in order to create a negative image of EU migrants. This one-sided analysis 
coupled with negative terminology and inaccurate (or indeed, simply absent) 
supporting data together have a powerful influence in shaping public dis-
course and political agendas, which then feed back into the political system 
in terms of popular support for placing restrictions on EU citizenship rights 
and freedoms and a generally Euro-sceptic outlook, both at the national and 
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the EU levels. In all of this, the media seem to be a powerful ally and often a 
tool in the hands of politicians. 
 Finally, like so much else in the current climate, discussions of EU citi-
zenship in the media have been overshadowed of late by the current eco-
nomic crisis within the EU, so that even where citizenship issues are raised, 
this tends to be filtered through the lens of their impact on or in relation to the 
crisis. This creates a climate of uncertainty, anxiety even, so that when citi-
zenship issues do come to the fore for whatever reason, whether on the front 
pages of newspapers or on television, reporting is often negative, sensational-
ist and inaccurate – and, not infrequently, outright politically biased. 
General conclusions 
It would be hard to sum up the conclusions to be drawn just from this lengthy 
General Report, never mind the rich Institutional Report, for which we were 
very grateful, and the many excellent national reports. In lieu of a single con-
clusion, what we offer in this final section are some short reflections about 
where we think the particular pressure points might lie both now and in the 
future. Our conclusions are more in the way of questions than concluding – 
and closing off – statements. We intend, in other words, to open the dialogue 
rather than to close it. 
 Overall, we found a complex ecology of Union citizenship of densely con-
sisting enmeshed national/Union, as well as legislative/administrative/judicial 
practices and synergies. Union citizenship is a shared EU/Member State 
competence and it is an ‘additional’ status vis-à-vis Member State nationality. 
But the comparative work that this project has enabled suggests that while an 
awareness of the significance of national context and difference is already 
visible just from a review of the EU Treaty, the legislative framework, and 
the case law of the Court of Justice (i.e. the usual materials of the EU law 
scholar), what we need in reality is a much more decentralised and differen-
tiated understanding of the application and implementation of Union citizen-
ship in order to gain a fuller picture. 
 In that light, the extent to which an immigration or permission-based cul-
ture has been superseded by a more ‘centralised’ sense of citizenship, as a 
status based on supranational rights, is lower than we might have thought 
would be the case. We also saw a significant range of regulatory and practice-
based diversity. Such variation is sometimes provided for expressly at EU 
level, recalling, for example, the scope attributed to national legislatures to 
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determine what practices will be applied with respect to the implementation 
of Article 3(2) of Directive 2004/38.  
 However, we also suggested that the allocation of national discretion – 
both understandable and valuable in several respects – can potentially lead to 
the compromising of equal treatment for certain Union citizens and their fam-
ily members. The Institutional Report emphasises that the existence of free 
movement rights per se and the mere possibility of exercising them are just as 
critical as the extent to which they have actually been exercised, raising ques-
tions about the responsibility of the EU institutions to pioneer substantive 
change – without waiting for the impetus of individual complaints or litiga-
tion. The achievements of EU law in the combating of nationality discrimina-
tion have been remarkable. But perhaps tackling discrimination beyond na-
tionality is a new frontier? 
 In a related sense, we also uncovered a transposition, application, and in-
terpretation picture that features multiple pockets of diverse practices or 
points of concern, a fragmented picture that then raises a different order of 
enforcement challenge than outright systemic transposition failure. It is im-
portant to realise that accurate transposition does not, in and of itself, guard 
against problems with the application of either EU level or national level 
measures. The discussion on expulsion provided a stark exposition of this 
point, and we suggested that the work of the legislatures, at EU and national 
levels, clearly should not end with adoption/transposition of Directive 
2004/38. When principles develop predominantly through case law, and es-
pecially where they develop rapidly through that medium, we saw a range of 
related challenges for national authorities, and for national courts and tribu-
nals in particular. Perhaps the emerging consensus between the European 
Parliament and the Council of Ministers on a draft directive (COM(2013) 
236)) containing new enforcement mechanisms for some aspects of the free 
movement of workers, including the setting up of bodies to promote those 
free movement rights offers some hope for a more positive future at least in 
that restricted field. 
 We also wish to emphasise a nascent but, we believe, increasingly signifi-
cant issue that cuts across so many parts of this Report – i.e. the construction 
of narratives about ‘good’ and ‘bad’ citizens: whether in the context of other-
ness generally, or of economic self-sufficiency particularly; in the context of 
criminal behaviour, which can be ‘punished’ by expulsion or through the 
withholding of deeper citizenship connections such as permanent residence; 
and through political debates on and media reporting of EU issues. We are 
interested primarily here in trying to understand how the dynamics of these 
narratives flow backwards and forwards from the Member States to the EU 
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level – and vice versa – especially where Member State messages are clearly 
conservative and rights-narrowing.  
 This phenomenon raises a broader question too: if we accept (and the 
Treaty does) that Member States control the acquisition of Union citizenship 
through their competence to grant nationality (subject only to a potentially 
limited review against general principles of EU law), to what extent do – and 
to what extent should – the Member States also control the broader culture 
that shapes the exercise of this supranational status? And what does this tell 
us about the extent to which Union citizenship really has become a ‘funda-
mental’ rights-based status rather than an increasingly conditional privilege? 
 We sought to enter this research process with a minimum of preconcep-
tions about the evolution of Union citizenship right across the EU and its 
Member States. We knew quite a lot about our own national cases and about 
developments at the EU level (especially the complex twists and turns of 
some of the recent case law of the Court of Justice), but there was much that 
we knew we stood to learn from the national reports. And indeed, this has 
proved to be the case. Unfortunately, however, much of what we have 
learned has reinforced a sense that EU citizenship – especially in its ‘free 
movement guise’ – is very much under pressure.404  
 This much is clear from the referendum on immigration quotas that was 
held in Switzerland as we were writing this General Report. Billed as a citi-
zens’ initiative ‘Against Mass Immigration’, the referendum was targeted 
against EU free movement, a regime by which Switzerland had been bound 
through bilateral treaties since 2007. Although the majority of mainstream 
parties opposed it, the initiative was passed on 9 February 2014 by the re-
quired combination of popular and cantonal approval, and commits the Fed-
eral Government to work towards the implementation of the initiative within 
three years. Switzerland immediately withdrew from a transitional arrange-
ment opening its labour market to citizens of Croatia and, meanwhile, the Eu-
ropean Commission has indicated that Switzerland is no longer participating 
as it was previously in research funding programmes such as Horizon 2020 
and the student mobility scheme ERASMUS+. This is because under the ar-
rangements between Switzerland and the European Union, a package deal 
approach is used – Switzerland may not pick and choose and it must accept 
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free movement if it wants, for example, to benefit from Horizon 2020 fund-
ing.  
 The longer term implications of this vote lie beyond the scope of this Re-
port, but the public hostility to free movement – despite the fact that the 
Swiss themselves gain from this through their own mobility and also because 
of the reliance of many of their advanced industries (including universities 
and finance) and technologies upon mobile EU labour – is clearly a factor 
that has to be taken into account right across the EU. Euro-sceptic and anti-
immigration parties from within the EU reacted with pleasure at the news 
from Switzerland, seeing it as a harbinger for the future. 
 We noted earlier that 2013 was designated as the European Year of Citi-
zens. However, in that initiative’s closing conference, and worlds away from 
the conceptualisation of Union citizenship as the fundamental status of Mem-
ber State nationals, the European Ombudsman stated bluntly: ‘we must con-
front the reality ... that “EU citizenship is now in crisis”.’405 What is particu-
larly concerning about recent migration debates is that, as we have empha-
sised, the lack of a credible empirical evidence-base that might actually vali-
date concerns about alleged abuse of free movement rights has made little 
difference. What these debates also show, then, is that political and public 
discourse on intra EU migration has intensified to the point where a basic 
question needs to be asked very directly: what role does the concept of Union 
citizenship contribute in all of this?  
 The pan-EU responses provoked by current inflammations of migration 
fear do remind us that the narrowing of citizenship rights is not the preoccu-
pation of all of the Member States at present.406 For example, a letter sent in 
January 2014 to the Financial Times in the UK from ministers in Finland, 
Norway, and Sweden stands out in this context; even its opening line – ‘[f]ree 
movement of persons is the essence of European citizenship’ – provides wel-
come relief from the political scaremongering outlined above.407 The letter 
goes on to argue that ‘the only actual problem is the “widespread belief that 
                                                        
405. The full text of the Ombudsman’s speech, delivered on 13 December 2013, is availa-
ble at http://www.ombudsman.europa.eu/en/activities/speech.faces/en/52763/html. 
bookmark. 
406. See e.g. ‘Poland attacks Cameron view on migrants’, 23 December 2013, Financial 
Times, available at http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/21f36df8-6c01-11e3-a216-00144fe 
abdc0.html#axzz2tmI0I8NT; ‘Roma are EU citizens too, Romanian President says’, 
31 January 2014, available at http://euobserver.com/social/122960. 
407. ‘In times of crisis, we must safeguard free movement’, 16 January 2014, Financial 
Times, available at: http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/c13711ee-7ec6-11e3-8642-00144fe 
abdc0.html#axzz2tmI0I8NT. 
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EU migrants are a burden”. Prejudiced arguments have no place in political 
debate. EU migrants who work and contribute financially to building our so-
cieties should not be made scapegoats for loopholes in national benefit 
schemes’. 
 But do the principles established for EEC6 still hold for EU28? This is a 
difficult question to ask, and a difficult question to discuss in a balanced and 
sensible way at present, but it is also a question that has to be asked. Com-
mission President Barroso continues to reconfirm the expected response: that 
the principle of free movement is non-negotiable.408 And in its response to 
the April 2013 letter on welfare tourism concerns discussed earlier, the Coun-
cil responded that free movement is a ‘core value of the European Union’.409 
However, it also invited the Commission to issue guidance on fighting abuse 
of those rules – guidance that, as we have seen, is due to be published in 
spring 2014.  
 This example illustrates that rights come with certain responsibilities, and 
that reflecting on that dimension of things is not inherently reductive of the 
rights in question. However, as we completed this Report, the Court of Jus-
tice delivered its rulings in the O and S preliminary references; those judg-
ments continue the trend seen in more recent case law to develop the rights-
narrowing concepts of citizenship, such as genuine residence, limits on rights, 
and abuse of rights. The ‘fundamental status’ of Union citizenship is not re-
cited in either judgment. 
 The trajectory of Union citizenship mapped in this Report shows a range 
of extraordinary achievements. But it also suggests a worrying note of frailty 
– and one that is being stretched because of rather than against the prevailing 
political momentum. Will the Member States stand by their own creation, or 
not? 
 
                                                        
408. See e.g. http://www.europeanvoice.com/article/2014/february/free-movement-non-ne 
gotiable-barroso-tells-swiss/79697.aspx. 
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Institutional report 
The topic, as outlined by the General Rapporteurs, is focused primarily on the 
comparative development and application of EU citizenship rights within the 
legal orders of the Member States. At the secondary level, the General Report 
addresses how EU citizenship develops within the culture of national citizen-
ship, and how it influences national citizenship. 
 The focus is, therefore, on what is happening at national level. This leaves 
us with a greater degree of freedom as to what should be the focus of our Re-
port, without duplicating the work of national rapporteurs. 
 We will follow the guidelines provided by the General Rapporteurs to the 
extent possible, but we will also pursue parallel strands that we deem relevant 
to the topic. 
 Although all the authors work in the Commission, the views expressed in 
this contribution are entirely personal, and do not necessarily reflect the offi-
cial position of the Commission. While the authors largely share the report’s 
general direction, they do not necessarily agree with all its conclusions. 
1. Introduction 
The citizenship ‘common to nationals of their countries’2 marks the progress 
from a state centred community to a citizens’ centred European Union. Art-
icle 25(2) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) 
makes it clear that the concept of an EU citizenship, endowed with rights, is 
open to further dynamic development beyond just the free movement of 
                                                        
1. All authors work in the European Commission’s Directorate-General Justice. They 
wish to thank their colleagues Giancarlo Defazio, Christel Mercade Piqueras, 
Georgia Georgiadou, Linda Ravo and Francis Svilans for their valuable comments 
on earlier versions. Any errors are attributable to the authors alone. 
2. Recital 10 of the Preamble and Article 9 of the Treaty on the European Union. 
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workers,3 secondary law, and the important jurisprudence, all of which have 
already shaped the substance of EU citizenship rights. 
 Beyond rights, however, citizenship requires mutual acceptance and readi-
ness to engage with each other. It requires a state which sees citizens as key 
actors in society, which encourages interaction and cooperation among citi-
zens and with the state, rather than only seeing citizens as subjects of the law. 
The rule of law as regards citizenship rights cannot, by itself, guarantee full 
enjoyment citizenship rights – whether national or European.4  
 EU citizenship today competes with a trend in Member States to facilitate 
access to nationality specifically for citizens of other Member States and with 
a corresponding specific tolerance of double nationality among Member 
States. This may be a positive side effect of European integration. It may also 
simply be linked to a better understanding of the needs of integrating people 
in an increasingly globalized world, or to the end of the cold war, which 
made obligatory military service obsolete, and with this a key traditional im-
petus to avoid double nationality.  
 Whatever the reason is, we need to understand that EU citizenship is not 
the only vehicle when it comes to ensuring equal rights. We need to see this 
competition as positive in terms of opening up choices for individual EU citi-
zens. The fact that in some Member States the nationals of other Member 
States rank among the top recipients of a new nationality5 may also give us 
some indication of the deficiencies of EU citizenship in terms of providing 
equality of treatment and full integration in the host society.  
 EU citizenship also suffers from a lack of a coherent narrative on mobility 
in Europe. There is no real time holistic approach to facilitating and encour-
aging mobility of people in Europe. Rather, different approaches, grown out 
of varying perspectives and often portfolio-based, have developed alongside 
each other – mobility of students through exchanges under the Erasmus, 
recognition of professional qualifications, workers mobility and related social 
                                                        
3. Wollenschläger, ‘Grundfreiheit ohne Markt: Die Herausbildung der Unionsbürger-
schaft im unionsrechtlichen Freizügigkeitsregime’ Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck (2007). 
4. Höffe, Wirtschaftsbürger, Staatsbürger, Weltbürger: Politische Ethik im Zeitalter der 
Globalisierung’ C.H.Beck (2004). 
5. http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/statistics_explained/index.php/Acquisition_of_citi 
zenship_statistics (March 2013 Eurostat data). Looking at top five nationalities 
which acquired nationality of a Member State in 2012, nationals of at least one other 
Member States feature in 14 Member States (Belgium, Czech Republic, Germany, 
Estonia, France, Italy, Cyprus, Luxembourg, Hungary, Malta, Slovenia, Slovakia, 
Finland and Sweden). 
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rights, mobility in the context of establishment or provision of services, free 
movement policies or Schengen, to mention just a few.  
 While the Commission has in its recent successive reports on EU citizen-
ship6 addressed key obstacles to the exercise of citizenship rights from many 
of these fields of EU law, the responsibility for delivering on EU citizenship 
remains fragmented. The fragmentation makes the holistic approach to EU 
citizenship rights, demographical developments and mobility within the EU 
more challenging. It can also hamper the ability to respond to populist chal-
lenges to EU citizenship and free movement rights. EU free movement rights 
are doubly doomed by standing at the intersection of two topics that are sure 
to animate the general public – immigration and the European Union ...  
 Challenges such as the sale of EU citizenship7 or the generalised attempts 
to restrict free movement rights to EU citizens from Romania and Bulgaria 
with allegations of misuse of social systems or marriages of convenience, of-
ten not underpinned by facts, and sometimes even against facts, can be better 
answered within a holistic approach to EU citizenship.  
 These challenges show that the concept of EU citizenship, limited exclu-
sively to Part II of the TFEU on Non-discrimination and Citizenship of the 
Union, is out of time with the needs of the continent. With decline in popula-
tion and at the same time ageing above average in the global comparison, an 
economic crisis with important imbalances in labour markets between Mem-
ber States, and the resulting negative impacts of lives, families, the young, 
removing the practical obstacles to mobility is a key prerequisite for Europe.  
 A comprehensive approach to mobility in Europe is necessary not only to 
address the obstacles those on the move encounter, but also, most important-
ly, to explain to those who ‘stay home’ why increased mobility in Europe is 
good for them and their communities.  
 If Europe is to continue to compete in terms of creativity, openness, trade 
and growth, if it is to continue to provide for happiness of its peoples to the 
greatest extent possible under a European social model, if it is to maintain 
and translate even more into daily live the values of enlightenment it has 
signed up to in the Treaties and the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the 
European Union (EU Charter), then it needs a coherent explanation why EU 
citizenship and the related rights, including the rights to free movement, are 
                                                        
6. Dismantling the obstacles to EU citizen’s rights, COM(2010)603 final of 27 October 
2010; EU Citizenship Report 2013 EU citizens: your rights, your future, COM(2013) 
269 final of 8 May 2013. 
7. ‘Should Citizenship be for Sale?’ EUI Working Paper, RSCAS 2014/1, edited by 
Shachar and Bauböck. 
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good for all of Europe and all Europeans, and not only those who make use of 
them.8 
 Even with increased mobility, the large majority of EU citizens will never 
leave the Member State where they were born to settle abroad, but the ac-
ceptance of the core rights and values of the EU also by those who do not 
avail themselves of these rights becomes ever more important. 
2. Citizenship within Directive 2004/38/EC – stability of 
residence for EU citizens and their family members 
EU citizenship may have been born as a weak baby whom majority of aca-
demics9 foresaw to wither quickly,10 but twenty years after its conception in 
the Maastricht Treaty, it is alive and kicking and is surprising everyone. 
Maybe not everyone, as some commentators glimpsed its potential. As 
O’Keeffe11 put it – the importance of the EU citizenship provisions lies not in 
their content, but rather in the promise they hold out for the future. 
 The new born baby was endowed with several ‘talents’, the most im-
portant one to be able to move and live freely within the EU. Not only as a 
labourer, not only as a scholar, but just as an EU citizen. 
 Article 21(1) TFEU stipulates that every EU citizen shall have the right to 
move and reside freely within the territory of the Member States, subject to 
the limitations and conditions laid down in the Treaties and by the measures 
adopted to give them effect. The respective limitations and conditions are to 
be found in Directive 2004/38/EC.12 
                                                        
8. Maas, ‘Democratic Citizenship and the Free Movement of People’, Martinus Nijhoff 
(2013). 
9. See, in particular, Kostakopoulou, ‘European Union Citizenship: Writing the Future’ 
ELJ 2007/13, page 623 seq. 
10. Joseph Weiler considered that the introduction of EU citizenship was ‘little more than 
a cynical exercise in public relations’ on the part of the Member States, in ‘The Sel-
ling of Europe: The Discourse of European Citizenship in the IGC 1996’, Harvard 
Law School Cambridge Jean Monet Working Papers No. 3(1996). 
  Laurence Gormley considered it a ‘flag that fails to cover its cargo’, in Kapteyn 
and VerLoren Van Themaat, ‘Introduction to the Law of the EC’ Kluwer, 3rd edition 
(1999), page 174. 
11. O’Keeffe, ‘Union Citizenship’, in O’Keeffe and Twomey, ‘Legal Issues of the Maas-
tricht Treaty’, Chancery Law Publishing (1994). 
12. Directive 2004/38/EC on the right of citizens of the Union and their family members 




 The adoption of Directive 2004/38/EC represented an important milestone 
for EU citizens. It matters for every EU citizen, not only those who have 
settled abroad. There are currently around 14 million13 EU citizens residing in 
a Member State of which they are not a national. EU citizens make more than 
1.25 billion intra-EU journeys every year.14 Even EU citizens who stay at 
home are affected – there are not many EU citizens who have never met an 
EU citizen from another Member State. 
 In addition and independent of this, even the mere possibility of using the 
right to free movement is a right inherent in EU citizenship and as such a 
manifestation of individual freedom and choice. In fact, one could argue that 
precisely this ‘stand-by mode’ is a classic characteristic of any citizenship 
right inherent in citizenship status. Take, for instance, the right to stand as 
candidate for national elections. Although only a tiny fraction of those enti-
tled to stand make actual use of it, no one would argue that it would therefore 
be of no relevance for those citizens who chose not to run for elections. 
Therefore, free movement matters simply because every EU citizen is entitled 
to activate this right at any moment in time dependent solely on a personal 
decision to do so. 
 EU free movement rules affect not only those who have moved, but also 
those who have not moved. Hence, it is important that it offers protection and 
guarantees to both groups of EU citizens. 
 The right to move and reside freely is of a primary importance. According 
to the 2013 Eurobarometer survey on EU citizenship,15 almost nine out of ten 
EU citizens know that they have a right to reside in another Member State. 
 From this perspective, free movement matters a lot and making sure that 
EU citizens can exercise this right is of an utmost importance, not only for the 
EU and its Member States, but also for EU citizens themselves.  
 It is remarkable that the September 2013 Eurobarometer survey16 found 
that EU citizens value this particular right above other rights and achieve-
                                                        
13. http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/statistics_explained/index.php/EU_citizenship_ 
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ments of the European integration (56 %, 4 % up since August 2012), with 
peace coming second (53 %, 3 % up). 
 It is not surprising that there is a close connection between freedom of 
movement and peace. John F. Kennedy famously said17 that peace was a dai-
ly, a weekly, a monthly process, gradually changing opinions, slowly eroding 
old barriers, quietly building new structures.  
 Just replace peace with free movement in his quote and it still sounds very 
relevant ... but regardless of how much peace/free movement is treasured, it 
does not mean that conflict is not brewing in the background. The last several 
years (including 2013, designated as the European Year of Citizens) have 
brought the most serious threat to the free movement and its basic principles 
since its conception. 
 EU free movement law has been challenged by rhetoric based on percep-
tions arguing with the economic crisis, high levels of unemployment, and 
wider anxieties linked to globalisation and continued European integration. 
The ugly spectre of ‘welfare tourism’ hangs heavily over intra-EU mobility. 
It emerges not only in tough economic times, but also, as Groenendijk says, 
‘each extension of the geographic or personal scope of the rules on free 
movement appears to provoke the same debate and fears.’18 
 Not only media and public opinions are divided, Member States are as 
well. Some go as far as asserting that free movement within Europe should be 
less free19 and assimilating EU free movement with migration of non-EU na-
tionals,20 other Member States are voicing their support to the principles of 
                                                        
17. Address to the UN General Assembly on 20 September 20 1963, available at 
http://www.state.gov/p/io/potusunga/207201.htm.  
18. Groenendijk, ‘Access for Migrants to Social Assistance: Closing the frontiers or re-
ducing citizenship?’, page 19 – in Guild, Carrera and Eisele, ‘Social Benefits and Mi-
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19. Article by UK Prime Minister Cameron in the Financial Times, 26 November 2013.  
  YouGov, a pollster, found in November 2013 that in the UK 72 % say the rules on 
immigration from countries inside the EU are not tight enough and should be 
strengthened. When asked what should be done about immigration from the EU, by 
far the biggest group, 42 %, want the UK to break EU laws and change the rules. The 
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20. Letter to Mr Shatter of 23 April 2013 by the Ministers of Interior of Austria, Germa-
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study or set up a business’ (no mention of economically non-active EU citizens). For 




free movement,21 being strongly backed by the Commission22 and the Par-
liament.23 
 Directive 2004/38/EC is not the final piece of EU legislation on the right 
of EU citizens to move and reside freely. It is just merely a last link in the 
chain which will become a penultimate link at some point in the future. 
 Neither is it the first EU legislative instrument adopted in this area. Since 
the beginning of the European integration, there were some legislative rules 
on intra-EU mobility of nationals of Member States, although they have not 
yet been EU citizens.24  
 This section of the report opted not to approach the stability of residence – 
the thematic concern of the General Report – from the perspective of the sta-
bility of residence of individual EU citizens who have made use of their EU 
right to move and reside freely. Instead, it will examine the stability of the 
right of residence in selected EU legislative proposals preceding Directive 
2004/38/EC and then Directive 2004/38/EC itself, starting from its legislative 
proposal, tabled by the Commission on 23 May 2001.25 
 The historical emphasis will not be on legislative proposals brought for-
ward by the Commission that were ultimately adopted by the EU legislator 
before 2004 (such as Directive 90/364/EEC on the right of residence), but ra-
ther on the fate of unsuccessful pre-2004 attempts to bring forward EU free 
movement legislation which were later abandoned by the Commission for 
lack of enthusiasm on the part of the Member States. 
 This approach will enable us to draw lessons for today and tomorrow of 
the EU free movement law. 
                                                        
ment of EU citizens: turning back the clock’ EPC Commentary (2013), available at 
http://www.epc.eu/pub_details.php?pub_id=3491.  
21. Joint Statement by the Foreign Ministers of the Visegrad countries – Czech Republic, 
Hungary, Poland and Slovakia – on the free movements of persons, Council docu-
ment 17395/13. 
22. Letter from the Commissioners Reding, Ándor and Malmström to Mr Shatter, 24 
May 2013. 
23. Resolution on the respect for the fundamental right of free movement in the EU of 16 
January 2014 (2013/2960(RSP)).  
24. This report will repeatedly commit the sin of careless drafting by using anachronisms, 
such as referring to nationals of Member States as EU citizens even in relation to peri-
ods where the EU citizenship was not yet created or using the term ‘European Union’ 
for the pre-Maastricht times. We are guided by the readability of the text rather than 
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25. Proposal for a European Parliament and Council Directive on the right of citizens of 
the Union and their family members to move and reside freely within the territory of 
the Member States, COM(2001)257 final of 23 May 2001. 
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 In the above context, this section will place a particular focus on primary 
materials rather than academic literature. 
 This section will cover all the issues raised in the first six questions by the 
General Rapporteurs – rights of family members of EU citizens (question 1), 
protection of public funds and equal treatment (questions 2 and 5), right to 
remain (question 3), right of permanent residence (question 4), and enhanced 
protection against expulsion (question 6). However, the main focus will be on 
two topical issues – family members (question 1) and access to social benefits 
by mobile economically non-active EU citizens (questions 2 and 5). 
2.1. 1979 proposal on a right of residence for nationals of Member 
States in the territory of another Member State 
Several weeks after the first direct European Parliament elections in 1979, the 
Commission presented a proposal26 that would extend the right of free 
movement to (then not yet existent) EU citizens who were not working or 
self-employed in the host Member State. 
 At that point, the EU legislative landscape on free movement consisted of 
two regulations and six directives27 which covered only those EU citizens 
who were employed or self-employed in the host Member State or providing 
or receiving services there. EU legislation also conferred a right of residence 
to ex-workers who retired in the host Member State or became permanently 
incapable to work. 
 Students or economically non-active persons, in the absence of EU legisla-
tion laying down harmonised EU rules, were treated by the host Member 
States in accordance with their general laws applicable to non-EU nationals. 
 The Commission made the proposal to fill this gap and to remove the ob-
stacles to the free movement of EU citizens who were not economically ac-
tive. The Commission also wanted to strengthen the feeling of belonging to 
the Community for all citizens and to make sure that ‘European Union will 
become for them a discernible reality’. 
 Under the proposed directive, Member States had to abolish restrictions on 
movement and residence of EU citizens not falling under any existing in-
                                                        
26. Proposal for a Council Directive on a Right of Residence for Nationals of Member 
States in the Territory of another Member State, COM(1979)215 final of 26 July 
1979. 
27. Regulations (EEC) No. 1612/68 and No. 1251/70, Directives 64/221/EEC, 
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strument of EU free movement law. Restrictions should also be abolished in 
relation to family members, defined as: 
– the spouse; 
– relatives in the descending line who are either dependent or under 18 and 
their spouses; 
– the dependent relatives in the ascending line and those of their spouse. 
The proposed personal scope should be compared with the personal scope of 
the most relevant EU legislative instruments applicable in 1979.  
 Article 10(1)(a) of Regulation (EEC) No. 1612/68 referred to ‘descendants 
who are under the age of 21 years or are dependants’, and Articles 1(c) and 
(d) of Directive 73/148/EEC covered ‘children of the EU citizen under twen-
ty-one years of age and dependent relatives of the EU citizen or his/her 
spouse’. 
 The 1979 proposal had a stricter different age limit, but also it extended to 
spouses of relatives in the descending line. This novel approach vis-à-vis 
spouses of dependent descendants was more generous than anything existing 
before or adopted afterwards. Even Directive 2004/38/EC does not include 
spouses of dependent descendants of EU citizens in the personal scope of 
family member (under certain conditions, they could qualify under Article 
3(2)(a) of Directive 2004/38/EC to have their entry and residence facilitated). 
 The Member States were also obliged to favour the admission of any other 
family members who were dependent or living under the same roof in the 
country of origin.  
 The 1979 proposal in relation to family reunification is pretty much the 
same as current Articles 2(2) and 3(2) of Directive 2004/38/EC (with the ex-
ception of registered and unmarried partners), but it extended the right of res-
idence only to those family members who resided in the host Member State – 
the first entry of non-EU family members was covered by national law, not 
by EU law. 
 Under Article 4 of the proposed directive beneficiaries were to be granted 
a right of permanent residence provided they had sufficient resources for 
themselves and their family members to cover their needs.  
 The unconditional right of permanent residence to reward ‘de-facto inte-
gration in the host society’ was, however, foreseen only after five years of 
uninterrupted residence as the first renewal of the residence permit after five 
years was subject to a check whether the requirement of sufficient resources 
had been met. 
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 The Explanatory Memorandum accompanying the proposal noted in rela-
tion to the condition of means of subsistence that the laws of some Member 
States automatically granted social security to nationals of other Member 
States without their own means of subsistence. The Memorandum further 
stressed that although Member States considered it reasonable to provide 
economic assistance by way of solidarity to those who have contributed to the 
economic and social development through their work, they did not consider 
that such assistance should be granted to others who do not pursue an occupa-
tion.  
 For these reasons, the Commission accepted that Member States can make 
the right of residence of economically non-active EU citizens subject to hav-
ing adequate means of subsistence which, to avoid arbitrary decisions, could 
be the minimum subsistence level laid down for own nationals. 
 In the context of today’s heated discussions in some Member States about 
the alleged dangers of healthcare tourism, it should be highlighted that the 
1979 proposal – unlike Directive 2004/38/EC – did not require economically 
non-active EU citizens to have any sort of sickness insurance cover. 
 The Economic and Social Committee (ECOSOC) recognised in its opin-
ion28 that the requirement of proof of minimum subsistence level might be 
used to discriminate against the economically weaker groups of society or to 
implement discriminatory policies of restricting immigration to particular 
groups. It was, however, ‘anxious to ensure that 'unwelcome wanderers' are 
not admitted, such as those who might go from country to country to secure, 
for example, better minimum subsistence.’  
 The notion of ‘unwelcome wanderers’, however inappropriate, seems al-
most as a loving word, compared to today’s discourse on welfare tourism 
which uses much more loaded expressions, such as abusers, cheaters, fraud-
sters or scroungers. 
 ECOSOC also contemplated how the proposed directive could affect gen-
eral tendencies in migration movements within the EU. It assumed that some 
persons would wish to move to another, more economically developed, 
Member State in order, for example, to take advantage of more progressive 
social legislation. The Committee stressed that the root cause of such migra-
tion movements lies, among other matters, in the grave inadequacies within 
the EU. If such migration movements are to be reduced, the structurally un-
derdeveloped regions of Europe, where employment opportunities are few 
and social deprivations are common, must be made more attractive. Being 
                                                        
28. Opinion of 26 March 1980, OJ 1980 C 182, page 10. 
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part of the EU must also mean an increase of solidarity with citizens of other 
Member States who have contributed to the economic, social and cultural de-
velopment of the EU as a whole.29 
 The Parliament welcomed30 the 1979 proposal as the first step towards the 
creation of a ‘European citizenship’, but requested that the proposal should 
not grant Member States the power to make the exercise of the right of resi-
dence subject to proof that the applicant has sufficient resources. The Parlia-
ment believed that such a condition would amount to social discrimination 
and that differences in the levels of national social assistance should be com-
pensated in other ways.  
 The Parliament also adopted an amendment that would abolish the re-
quirement of facilitation of entry and residence and that would put on par 
with core family members any person whom the EU citizen had an obligation 
to support or who was in practice dependent. 
 In 1980, the Commission presented its modified proposal31 which took ac-
count of the suggestions made by the ECOSOC and the Parliament. 
 The Commission expressed its understanding of the amendment of the 
personal scope of family members that would prevent splitting up of families 
simply because of the change of domicile of the EU citizen, but, in the light 
of development of the EU, decided to keep the narrower definition of family 
members. Nevertheless the Commission stated that it had no doubts that in 
the future it would be possible to complete EU law in the sense proposed by 
the Parliament. 
 Against this background, it is remarkable that the Commission in several 
months adopted another amended proposal which fully accepted the Parlia-
ment request. It is probably not surprising that EU law has not yet been com-
pleted, as the Commission foresaw in 1980. 
 The modified proposal clarified that the requirement of sufficient re-
sources – which has been criticised by the Parliament – explicitly confirmed 
that the requirement was proposed to avoid ‘population migrations being un-
dertaken with the sole aim of obtaining the most favourable social benefits’. 
 While the Commission in principle agreed with the Parliament and con-
sidered that the population movements feared by the Member States would 
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not emerge, it decided to retain the requirement of sufficient resources, but 
made it subject to an assessment after six years since the adoption of the pro-
posal. 
 This never came to happen as the 1979 proposal and its amendments were 
not formally approved by the Council that was unable to agree on the person-
al scope of family members and on whether students would have to provide a 
proof of sufficient resources.32 
 After Gravier,33 which the Commission interpreted as recognising that 
students have a right of residence, the Commission excluded students from its 
proposal by adopting an amended proposal34 in 1985, but the Council was 
still unwilling to adopt the proposal. 
 The Commission finally withdrew the proposal in May 1989, split it up 
and put forward three new proposals in July 1989, which fared better (maybe 
also because the legislative procedure – with the exception of Directive 
90/364/EEC on the right of residence – no longer required unanimity ...). 
They were adopted in June 1990.35 
 In many aspects, the 1979 proposal heralded Directive 2004/38/EC. It 
contained novel provisions which have not been carried in the Directives 
from the nineties and were introduced only in Directive 2004/38/EC. 
 Article 5 of the 1979 proposal provided for residence permits to be issued 
to the beneficiaries of the directive with validity of five years which were to 
be automatically renewed except where it was proved at the date of expiry 
that the condition of sufficient resources was no longer satisfied. 
 The proposal, which provided for a distinctive right of permanent resi-
dence, where the condition of sufficient resources had to be met at the begin-
ning of the residence and once again after five years. In the proposal the 
Commission underlined that a change of residence by economically non-
active EU citizens is a sort of ‘leap of faith’ on the part of the mobile EU citi-
zen with a number of commitments, some of them of an economic nature, 
                                                        
32. For more on the Council negotiations, see Taschner, ‘Free Movement of Students, 
Retired Persons and other European Citizens – A Difficult Legislative Process’ in 
Schermers and others (eds), ‘Free Movement of Persons in Europe’ Asser Insti-
tute/Martinus Nijhoff (1993). 
33. Case 293/83 Gravier, judgment of 13 February 1985. 
34. Amended Proposal for a Council Directive on a Right of Residence for Nationals of 
Member States in the Territory of another Member State, COM(1985)292 final of 10 
July 1985. 




which, as the Proposal put it, ‘should be balanced by a minimum guarantee of 
stability even in the event of a temporary reversal of fortunes.’ 
 This certain degree of solidarity between the host Member State and EU 
citizens who were unlucky to cease to meet the requirement of having suffi-
cient resources was later confirmed in Grzelczyk36 and carried over to Art-
icles 14(2) and (3) of Directive 2004/38/EC. 
 It is worth noting that the 1979 proposal also stated that economically non-
active EU citizens ‘should be spared from repeated checks on their means of 
subsistence which would constitute an affront to their dignity’.  
 Actually, the possibility on the part of the host Member State to check 
whether the conditions EU law attaches to the right of residence of economi-
cally non-active EU citizens continue to be met have been explicitly intro-
duced only in Article 14(2) of Directive 2004/38/EC, upon the amendment 
tabled by the Council in 2003. 
 Driven by humanitarian reasons, the 1979 proposal foresaw the possibility 
to retain the right of residence in the event of the death of the EU citizen. In-
terestingly enough, there was no provision in the proposal to cater to the 
event of divorce. Family members had to wait until 2004 to have a right to 
retain their right of residence when the link with the primary source of the 
right of residence, the EU citizen, has been severed. 
2.2. 1989 proposal amending Regulation (EEC) No. 1612/68 and 
Directive 68/360/EEC 
Ten years after the first doomed proposal by the Commission, two months 
before its withdrawal and four months before the ultimately successful pack-
age on legislative proposals on economically non-active EU citizen, the 
Commission proposed37 an amendment of EU legislation applicable to work-
ers.38 
                                                        
36. Case C-184/99 Grzelczyk, judgment of 20 September 2001. 
37. Proposal for a Council Regulation (EEC) amending Regulation (EEC) No. 1612/68 
on freedom of movement for workers within the Community, COM(1988)815 final of 
29 March 1989. 
38. Regulation (EEC) No. 1612/68 on freedom of movement for workers within the 
Community and amendment of Directive 68/360/EEC on the abolition of restrictions 
on movement and residence within the Community for workers of Member States 
and their families. 
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 The 1989 proposal was made to enhance the protection of mobile workers 
by, inter alia, extending the personal scope of the notion of family members 
and, in the context of contracting labour markets, by strengthening the possi-
bility to retain the right of residence for workers who were unemployed or 
who had accepted short-term employment. 
 From the perspective of this paper, the 1989 proposal included an amend-
ment of Article 10 of Regulation (EEC) No. 1612/68 in relation to family 
members of the EU worker. Under the proposed amendment, the requirement 
of dependence from relatives in direct line was abolished and the extended 
family members were placed on the same footing as core family members, so 
they acquired an enforceable right of residence, not only a right to have their 
admission facilitated.  
 The Commission considered this change justified on the ground of the en-
deavours to complete the internal marker as an area without internal borders 
which demonstrated the will not to restrict the internal market to the purely 
economic sphere, but to move towards a ‘People's Europe’. 
 Similarly, as in the 1979 proposal, but this time also covering the loss of 
the right of residence in the event of divorce, the 1989 proposal provided for 
a possibility to retain a right of residence for family members in the event of 
divorce and death, as the Commission put it, to prevent social and moral con-
sequences for family members. 
 The 1989 proposal also repealed Article 7(2) of Directive 68/360/EEC 
which, under certain conditions, authorised the host Member State to termi-
nate residence of EU workers who have been involuntarily unemployed at the 
moment their first 5-year residence card expired.  
 Given that no re-entry ban could be imposed on such workers, the Com-
mission considered in its 1989 proposal that such unemployed EU citizens 
should, in the light of their integration in the host society during their resi-
dence of more than five years, have the right to remain regardless of the fact 
that they may even have access to social assistance after the unemployment 
benefit expired. 
 The Parliament was consulted on the proposal and asked39 the Commis-
sion to introduce 19 amendments of Regulation (EEC) No. 1612/68 and 14 
amendments of Directive 68/360/EEC. 
 In relation to family members, the Parliament proposed to extend the per-
sonal scope of family members with an enforceable right of residence also to 
                                                        
39. Legislative resolution of 14 February 1990, OJ 1990 C 69, page 88. 
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partners living in a de facto union recognised as such for administrative and 
legal purposes either by the Member State of origin or the host Member State. 
 The Parliament also proposed to protect such unmarried partners in the 
event of the relationship ending and de facto separation of the couple. 
 An interesting curio from the Parliament’s amendments was the request to 
grant the rights EU citizens enjoyed to political refugees and stateless persons 
resident in a Member State. 
 Having regard to the Parliament’s resolution, the Commission presented 
its modified proposal40 in 1990. The modified proposal accepted most of the 
requests of the Parliament, but not in relation to family members or refugees. 
 The 1989 proposal met the same fate as the 1979 proposal – after several 
years of inactivity on the part of the Council – the Commission withdrew it 
on 14 October 1998.  
2.3. 1998 proposal amending Regulation (EEC) No. 1612/68 and 
Directive 68/360/EEC 
The first genuine attempt to amend EU legislation on free movement in the 
context of already existing EU citizenship was made by the Commission in 
July 1998 where it presented a package41 of two proposals aimed again at 
workers, job-seekers and trainees – amendment of Regulation (EEC) No. 
1612/68 and of Directive 68/360/EEC. 
 As the 1989 proposal, the 1998 attempt pursued the objective of adapting 
the legal situation of workers to the progress of the European integration and 
adjusting it to the new socioeconomic and political conditions of the EU, as 
Recitals 1 and 3 put it. 
 The package was presented in tandem with the Commission communica-
tion on the follow-up to the recommendations of the High-Level Panel on the 
                                                        
40. Modified proposal for a Council Regulation (EEC) amending Directive 68/360/EEC 
on the abolition of restrictions on movement and residence of workers of Member 
States and their families within the Community and Modified proposal for a Council 
Regulation (EEC) amending Regulation (EEC) No. 1612/68 on freedom of movement 
for workers within the Community, COM(1990)108 final of 9 April 1990. 
41. Proposal for a European Parliament and Council Regulation amending Council 
Regulation (EEC) No. 1612/68 on freedom of movement for workers within the Com-
munity and Proposal for a European Parliament and Council Directive amending Di-
rective 68/360/EEC on the abolition of restrictions on movement and residence within 
the Community for workers of Member States and their families, COM(1998)394 final 
of 22 July 1998. 
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Free Movement of Persons42 which announced the creation of a single set of 
rules on free movement for all EU citizens and their family members, which 
was finally made in 2001 and culminated in Directive 2004/38/EC. 
 The Commission justified the worker-only scope of the 1998 proposal by 
the need of immediate and targeted action to support Member States’ em-
ployment policies.  
1998 Regulation proposal 
The 1998 proposal sought to enhance the family reunification to ensure that 
the mobile worker’s family is not broken up as a result of free movement.  
 It was again proposed not to make the right of direct relatives in ascending 
and descending line to join the EU worker conditional upon being dependent. 
According to the Commission, the requirement of dependence was not com-
patible with the dual objective of safeguarding the family unit and reunifying 
families in the host country, a requirement which is part and parcel of the free 
movement of people.  
 The Proposal added that the extension of the personal scope to non-depen-
dent family members was consistent with demographic and sociological pat-
terns within the EU. It seemed incompatible with free movement that a fami-
ly household established by an EU worker in the Member State of origin 
should disintegrate just because a basic right is claimed, namely that of mov-
ing freely within the EU. 
 The scheme based on dependence of family members (which essentially 
persists until today) contained, as the Commission considered, some contra-
dictions in that the members of the family who are not dependants and who 
are therefore less likely to become a burden for the host country, cannot take 
advantage of family reunification. However, members of the family who are 
dependent on the worker and who could possibly oblige the worker to claim 
social assistance from the host country, do benefit from all the advantages of-
fered by family reunification. 
 As in the modified proposal of 1989, the 1998 proposal placed all other 
family members who are dependent, or members of the household on the 
same footing as core family members – thus, no distinction between core 
family members and extended family members, as it existed under previous 
Regulation (EEC) No. 1612/68 and as it ultimately exists under Directive 
2004/38/EC. 
                                                        
42. Communication on the follow-up to the recommendations of the High-Level Panel of 
the Free Movement of Persons, COM(1998)403 final of 1 July 1998. 
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 As finally adopted in Article 24(1) of Directive 2004/38/EC, the 1998 
proposal placed family members at the same level when it comes to the right 
to equal treatment, as it was proposed already in the 1989 proposal. This 
means that non-EU family members of EU citizens have the same rights as 
nationals of the host Member State (and not as non-EU family members of 
such nationals). 
 The 1998 proposal also built on the idea of previous proposals to make it 
possible for family members to retain their right of residence in the event of a 
divorce. However, this right was granted only after having lived in the host 
Member State for three years. 
 Regarding job-seekers, one of the aims of the 1998 proposal was to re-
spond to the criticism by the Court of Justice concerning the unclear scope of 
the rights of job-seekers to look for work, as the proposal puts it, ‘for the 
length of time this takes, without the need to hold a residence permit’.  
 Under a proposed amendment of Article 8(1)(d) of Directive 68/360/EEC, 
job-seekers had a right of residence without any need to obtain a residence 
permit. Yet, where they have been seeking employment for longer than six 
months, the host Member State was entitled to ask the job-seeker to prove 
that he is actively looking for work and that he has a reasonable chance of be-
ing offered employment. 
 The proposal also envisaged rules on the retention of the status of worker 
to cater for temporary relocations within the labour market. 
 The proposal provided for the right of permanent residence after five years 
of residence. It also heralded the enhanced protection against expulsion, pro-
vided for later in Article 28 of Directive 2004/38/EC. 
 Ultimately, only the Parliament formally considered the proposal. As the 
Council had yet again failed to follow the Parliament’s example, the proposal 
was withdrawn by the Commission as obsolete43 in 2004, after Directive 
2004/38/EC had been adopted. 
                                                        
43. Withdrawal of Commission Proposals which are no longer of topical interest, 
COM(2004)542 final of 6 August 2004. 
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2.4. 2001 proposal for a directive on the right of citizens of the 
Union and their family members to move and reside freely 
within the territory of the Member States 
The codification of existing EU legislation on free movement was announced 
already in 1993 in the Commission’s first report on the citizenship of the 
Union44 and in the Commission report to the European Council on the adap-
tation of Community legislation to the subsidiarity principle.45 
 At that time, two regulations and nine directives46 which covered EU citi-
zens and their family members, regardless of whether in gainful employment 
or not, constituted the legislative landscape. 
 In January 1996, the Commission requested the High Level Panel on the 
free movement of persons to identify the problems still arising in the area of 
free movement, to evaluate them, and to propose solutions.  
 The High Level Panel presented its report47 in March 1997. One of the key 
findings was to bring free movement rights in line with the new concept of 
EU citizenship by replacing the piecemeal approach to residence with consol-
idated legislation treating all EU citizens as equal. 
 In July 1998, the Commission adopted a communication48 on the follow-
up to the recommendations of the High-Level Panel in which it confirmed 
that the introduction of EU citizenship generalised, for the benefit of all EU 
citizens, the right to enter, to reside and to remain in another Member State.  
 The Commission considered that the free movement rights were becoming 
an integral part of the legal heritage of every EU citizen and should be for-
malised in a common legislative corpus to harmonise the legal status of all 
EU citizens, regardless of whether they work or not. 
 In the second Commission report on the citizenship of the Union,49 the 
Commission reiterated that EU citizenship raised citizens’ expectations as to 
the rights that they expect to see conferred and protected.  
                                                        
44. Report on the Citizenship of the Union, COM(1993)702 final of 21 December 1993. 
45. Report on the Adaptation of Community Legislation to the Subsidiarity Principle, 
COM(1993)545 final of 24 November 1993. 
46. Regulations (EEC) No. 1612/68 and No. 1251/70, Directives 64/221/EEC, 68/360/ 
EEC, 72/194/EEC, 73/148/EEC, 75/34/EEC, 75/35/EEC, 90/364/EEC, 90/365/EEC 
and 93/96/EC. 
47. Report of the High Level Panel on the free movement of persons, chaired by Mrs. 
Simone Veil, presented to the Commission on 18 March 1997. 
48. Communication on the follow-up to the recommendations of the High-Level Panel of 
the Free Movement of Persons, COM(1998)403 final of 1 July 1998. 
49. Second report on citizenship of the Union, COM(1997)230 final of 27 May 1997. 
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 The Commission, when proposing the Directive, was mindful of the wider 
context of EU citizenship in which EU free movement law exists. The basic 
starting point for the Commission was that EU citizens should be able to 
move between Member States on similar terms as nationals of a Member 
State moving around or changing their place of residence or job in their own 
country. Additional administrative or legal obligations stemming from the 
non-nationality should be kept to the bare minimum. 
 In the words of the proposal, it served several purposes:50 
to take the form of a single instrument in the interests of reader-friendliness 
and clarity; 
to streamline the arrangements for exercising freedom of movement which, 
depending on the level of integration in the host Member State, range from 
extending the right of residence without formalities to six months, to re-
moving any conditions or differential treatment and to putting non-
nationals on an equal footing with nationals after four years of residence in 
the host Member State; 
to tighten up the definitions of restrictions on the right of residence; and 
to facilitate the right to free movement and residence of family members of 
an EU citizen, irrespective of nationality. 
The legislative procedure unfolded as follows: 
– May 2001 – legislative proposal51 adopted by the Commission; 
– January 2002 – the Council concluded the first reading52; 
– February 2002 – the ECOSOC adopted its opinion53; 
– March 2002 – the Committee of Regions adopted its opinion54; 
– June 2002 – the Council concluded the second reading55; 
– February 2003 – the Parliament concluded its first reading56; 
                                                        
50. For a more detailed summary, see Ana Herrera de la Casa and Michal Meduna, ‘The 
New Directive on the Right of Citizens of the Union and their Family Members to 
Move and Reside Freely within the Territory of the Member States – What Changes 
does it bring?’ CESifo Dice Report, Volume 4, No. 4 (2006), page 3. 
51. Proposal for a European Parliament and Council Directive on the right of citizens of 
the Union and their family members to move and reside freely within the territory of 
the Member States, COM(2001)257 final of 23 May 2001. 
52. Council document 5758/02 of 30 January 2002. 
53. Opinion of 27 February 2002, OJ 2002 C 149, page 46. 
54. Opinion of 14 March 2002, OJ 2002 C 192, page 17. 
55. Council document 10572/02 of 10 July 2002. 
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– April 2003 – the Commission presented its amended proposal57; 
– September 2003 - the Council reached the political agreement on the draft 
proposal by qualified majority; 
– December 2003 – the Council adopted common position58; 
– December 2003 – the Commission adopted Communication to the Parlia-
ment concerning the common position59; 
– March 2004 – the Parliament concluded the second reading60 and ap-
proved the Council common position; 
– April 2004 – Directive 2004/38/EC was finally adopted and published in 
the Official Journal. 
The EU legislature took 1,072 days to consider the proposal, spanning over 
seven presidencies.  
 In that time, the Parliament made two formal readings of the proposal, 
while the Council did three readings. As adopted, Directive 2004/38/EC has 
9,300 words which take around 62 minutes to read aloud and 34 minutes to 
read silently.61 In the time it took to adopt the proposal, it would be possible 
to do almost 25,000 loud readings and more than 45,000 silent readings. One 
could say that it could have been adopted sooner.  
 However, the political agreement was reached in the Council only after 
the Italian Presidency threatened that the presented compromise wording of 
the proposal was its final proposal and that should the compromise fail, it 
would leave the job for the Irish Presidency (which started on 1 January 
2004). The perspective of yet another delay finally forced Member States to 
conclude the reading in the Council and adopt its Common position. This 
‘change of gear’ was partly due to the fact that more delay was likely to mean 
that the 1999-2004 Parliament would be unable to adopt the proposal and – 
                                                        
56. Legislative resolution of 11 February 2003, OJ 2003 C 43E, page 42. 
57. Amended proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on 
the right of citizens of the Union and their family members to move and reside freely 
within the territory of the Member States, COM(2003)199 final of 15 April 2003. 
58. Common Position (EC) No. 6/2004, adopted by the Council on 5 December 2003, OJ 
2004 C 54E, page 12. 
59. Communication pursuant to the second subparagraph of Article 251 (2) of the EC 
Treaty concerning the common position of the Council on the adoption of a European 
Parliament and Council Directive on the right of citizens of the Union and their fami-
ly members to move and reside freely within the territory of the Member States, 
SEC(2003)1293 final of 30 December 2003. 




maybe more significantly – that the failure to adopt the proposal before the 
2004 enlargement would enfranchise new Member States. This would very 
likely have led to further substantial delays and changes in the substance of 
proposed EU legislation. After all, the fact that Directive 2004/38/EC was 
adopted and published just two days before the 2004 enlargement shows the 
importance EU-15 Member States attached to the possibility to conclude the 
legislative process before the changes brought by the 2004 enlargement. 
2.4.1. Family members 
Technically speaking, the EU Treaties do not explicitly refer to the right of 
family members to move and reside freely in connection with the fundamen-
tal right of free movement of EU citizens, but this right intrinsically flows 
from the right for respect to family life (preserving the family unity), which 
forms a part of common constitutional traditions of the Member States and is 
protected by Article 7 of the EU Charter. 
2.4.1.1. Legislative process 
2001 proposal 
The 2001 proposal defined a family member as: 
a) the spouse; 
b) the unmarried partner, if the legislation of the host Member State treats 
unmarried couples as equivalent to married couples; 
c) the direct descendants and those of the spouse or unmarried partner. 
As underlined in the Explanatory Memorandum, the definition of ‘family 
member’ was introduced not only to accommodate case-law of the Court of 
Justice, but also to acknowledge changes in the law of the Member States re-
lated to ‘de facto’ unmarried couples, often with children.  
 Inspired by the report of the High Level Panel, the proposal dropped the 
requirement for family members to be dependent, arguing that ‘there is no 
good reason to deny children over 21 who are not dependent on their parents, 
or relatives in the ascending line who are not dependent on their children, the 
right to join their family in another Member State’. 
 The proposal also intended to get rid of the differences between family 
members of student and non-student EU citizens, but this was in the end re-
quested to be retained by the Council. It makes little sense, as there seems to 
be nothing in EU law that would prevent EU citizens who are studying in the 
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host Member State to invoke their rights as economically non-active EU citi-
zens, who have to meet essentially the same conditions.  
 As the Explanatory Memorandum clearly stated, there was no specifica-
tions as to the purpose of the movement or residence in Article 3 of the 2001 
proposal.  
 Directive 2004/38/EC does not exclude that EU citizens can reside in 
more than one capacity, as confirmed by the Court of Justice in LN62 where 
the Court of Justice ruled that EU citizens who are working and studying in 
the host Member State at the same time may not only be considered students 
(for the purposes of determining whether or not the EU citizen is entitled to 
maintenance aid under Article 24 of Directive 2004/38/EC). 
The Economic and Social Committee 
The Committee approved the Commission’s decision to enlarge the scope of 
the definition of family member and considered that a wider definition was 
more in tune with the realities of the modern world and showed greater sensi-
tivity to circumstances affecting all EU citizens. 
The Committee of Regions 
The Committee welcomed the extension of the definition of family member 
to unmarried partners which it considered to respect the crucial principle of 
family unity, while at the same time respecting the legislative options of those 
Member States which had not decided to treat unmarried couples as spouses. 
The Parliament 
In the first reading the Parliament proposed 89 amendments (some of them 
did not affect all language versions). Three of them were related to the per-
sonal scope of the notion of a family member – firstly, to extend the notion of 
spouse to cover married couples of any sex, secondly, to include registered 
partners in the personal scope of the 2001 proposal and, thirdly, to include 
unmarried partners of the same sex. 
 The Parliament saw the justification for these amendments in the need to 
widen the definition of family member for all persons entitled to the right of 
residence so that the diversity of family relationships that exist in the society, 
whether in the form or marriage, registered partnerships or unmarried part-
nerships, are recognised and respected. On the grounds of equality and fair 
                                                        
62. Case C-46/12 LN, judgment of 21 February 2013.  
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treatment, the Parliament considered that the fundamental right to family life 
should not be made dependent on individuals choosing to enter into marriage. 
 In relation to the Commission’s proposal to remove the requirement of de-
pendence for all family members, Mr Santini, the Rapporteur, added his per-
sonal opinion in the Explanatory statement accompanying his report63 on the 
proposal to remove the conditions related to age and dependence: 
‘This could generate fears of a massive rise in the numbers of people seeking to join their 
relatives, with possible financial implications for the Member States. The rapporteur con-
siders that a fair compromise would be to consider direct descendants to be full members 
of the family of a Community citizen, with no conditions attached, while direct relatives in 
the ascending line would be subject to the requirement of being dependent, so as to prevent 
abuses.’ 
The final text, adopted by the Parliament in the first reading, did not question 
the Commission’s proposal to remove the dependence requirement. 
2003 amended proposal 
The Commission, however, was disinclined to accept to place same-sex cou-
ples on par with different-sex couples as it felt that the Directive should not 
result in the imposition on Member States of amendments to family law legis-
lation, an area which does not fall within the EU’s legislative jurisdiction. 
 With regard to marriage, the Commission noted that case-law64 made it 
quite evident that the notion of spouse should be interpreted as meaning a 
union between two persons of different sex, given the progress – or, more 
aptly, a lack of it – of social developments in all Member States in relation to 
the unions between persons of same sex.  
The Council 
Same-sex couples 
The Council decided to drop all references to formal relationships (i.e. mar-
riages and registered partnerships) being made ‘irrespective of sex’ and modi-
fied the position of registered and unmarried partners.  
 According to the common position, registered partners should have an au-
tomatic right to move and reside freely only in those Member States that treat 
registered partnership as equivalent to marriage. The Council also demoted 
                                                        
63. Parliament document A5-0009/2003, page 54. 
64. Joined cases C-122/99 D and C-125/99 Sweden v the Council, judgment of 31 May 
2001, paragraph 34. 
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unmarried partners, alongside with registered partners in Member States that 
do not treat registered partnership on par with marriage, to Article 3(2)(b) of 
Directive 2004/38/EC, granting them a mere right to have their entry and res-
idence facilitated. 
 The broader issue of the protection Directive 2004/38/EC should afford to 
same-sex relationship and unmarried partners was the most divisive issue 
during the discussions in the Council.  
 At that time, there was no genuine pan-European possibility of extending 
‘hard’ free movement rights beyond the traditional scope of family, i.e. the 
union between two persons of the opposite sex. The compromise which di-
vided the Member States in two groups – ‘same-sex friendly’ countries and 
the rest – seemed the only possible option for free movement then; a sort of 
enhanced cooperation approach. 
Age and dependence 
Regarding the conditions of age and dependence of family members in direct 
line, the Council refused to follow the proposal made by the Commission and 
supported by the Parliament to remove these conditions. The refusal was 
backed by all Member States65 that wanted to maintain these conditions,66 as 
they existed in the legislative instruments replaced by the proposed directive. 
 Already during the first reading,67 several Member States have voiced 
their concerns as regards the social costs which could ensue for the host 
Member State. During the discussion in the Council Working Party the Com-
mission highlighted68 that the original proposal omitting the dependence had 
to be seen together with other provisions which required economically non-
active EU citizens to have sufficient resources for all family members.  
2.4.1.2. Family members today and tomorrow 
In 2003, one of the main arguments against granting of automatic rights to 
same-sex couples was that only two Member States had legislation on same-
sex marriages.  
                                                        
65. Apart from Italy in relation to the age limit in the Working Party on Free Movement 
of Persons. However, all delegations were in favour of reintroducing the age and de-
pendence condition in the Competitiveness Council of 14 November 2002. 
66. Council documents 12519/02 (points II.4.4 and II.4.5) and 6147/03 (footnote 18). 
67. Council document 15380/01 (footnote 6). 
68. Council document 10572/02 (footnote 17). 
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 In relation to the notion of spouse, the Council argued69 just before reach-
ing political agreement on the text of the Directive that according to the case-
law of the Court of Justice, when contained in an EU act, the notion of spouse 
has to be interpreted by reference to the situation in the large majority of 
Member States, meaning spouse of the opposite sex in the framework of the 
traditional marriage. 
 Today however, nine Member States legally recognise same-sex mar-
riages70 and new law on same-sex marriages will take effect in England and 
Wales in 2014. Eight Member States provide for same-sex registered partner-
ship.71 At the same time, constitutions of five Member States define marriage 
as a union between a man and a woman.72 
 Despite some hiccups (such as the recent December 2013 referendum in 
Croatia where two-thirds of those who voted approved changes to Croatia’s 
constitution to define marriage as a union between a man and a woman), 
there is a clear trend towards the recognition of same-sex relationships. Yet, it 
is not so clear whether the number of Member States supporting same-sex 
couples has already reached the critical mass to ‘switch’ the interpretation of 
the notion of spouse.  
 This change is likely to be complicated73 by the fact that Directive 
2004/38/EC provides for certain rights same-sex couples can enjoy when ex-
ercising their right to move and reside freely in the EU, including full equali-
ty in those Member States that consider same-sex relationships as equivalent 
to marriage for the purposes of Directive 2004/38/EC. 
 At the practical level of the application of Directive 2004/38/EC on the 
ground, there seem to be only few problems as the Commission has not re-
ceived any substantial number of complaints in this respect. Following the in-
tervention by the Commission, Malta amended its legislation transposing Di-
rective 2004/38/EC which made the rights of couples in durable relationship 
                                                        
69. Council document 12218/03 (point III.1). 
70. Belgium, Denmark, France, Iceland, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain and 
Sweden. 
71. Austria, Czech Republic, Finland, Germany, Hungary, Ireland, Luxembourg and Slo-
venia. 
72. Bulgaria, Croatia, Latvia, Lithuania and Poland. 
73. It could be more complicated in the sense that when it comes to the free movement 
right, Directive 2004/38/EC is not ‘everything-or-nothing’ in all Member State. It 
may be easier to argue that the interpretation should be changed against the back-
ground of no recognition of free movement rights in EU law on free movement. 
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conditional upon the relationship not being ‘in conflict with the public policy 
in Malta.’74 
 Regarding the requirement of dependence, the transposition of this con-
cept by Member States has been largely uncontroversial. There were some 
problems related mostly to the relevance of dependence of the grounds other 
than material or financial (such as emotional), and to material dependence of 
adult and able-bodied family members, notably when they are extended fami-
ly members and come under Article 3(2)(a) of Directive 2004/38/EC. 
 The Commission provided its interpretation of the notion of dependence in 
2009 guidelines75 for better transposition and application of Directive 
2004/38/EC.  
 Since 2009, two judgments of the Court of Justice provided further guid-
ance as to the notion of dependence.  
 In relation to the requirement of dependence that must be met before ex-
tended family members may invoke the right to have their entry and resi-
dence facilitated under Article 3(2)(a) of Directive 2004/38/EC, the Court of 
Justice ruled in Rahman76 that the Member States may, when exercising the 
discretion which forms basis of the facilitation rule of Article 3(2), to lay 
down legislative rules as to the nature and duration of dependence. The justi-
fication for this qualification of dependence was, for the Court of Justice, to 
enable Member States facilitate entry and residence of those extended family 
members whose dependence was genuine and stable and, at the same time, to 
guard against family members abusively relying on artificial dependence to 
obtain the right of residence. 
 It remains unclear whether the notion of dependence under Article 3(2)(a) 
of Directive 2004/38/EC, as interpreted in Rahman, can actually be applied to 
dependence of core family members falling under Article 2(2) of Directive 
2004/38/EC (i.e. direct relatives in the ascending and descending lines). 
There is no evidence of such possibility in the case-law on dependence that 
preceded77 Rahman and which followed78 it. Furthermore, the fact that the 
                                                        
74. Article 2 of the Free Movement of European Union Nationals and their Family Mem-
bers Order 2007 (LN 191/07). 
75. Communication on guidance for better transposition and application of Directive 
2004/38/EC on the right of citizens of the Union and their family members to move 
and reside freely within the territory of the Member States, COM(2009)313 final of 2 
July 2009, section 2.1.4. 
76. Case C-83/11 Rahman, judgment of 5 September 2012, paragraph 36 (seq). 
77. Case 316/85 Lebon, judgment of 18 June 1987, paragraph 22, and case C-1/05 Jia, 
judgment of 9 January 2007, paragraphs 36 and 37. 
78. Case C-423/12 Reyes, judgment of 16 January 2014, paragraph 21 (seq). 
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Court of Justice in Rahman was at pains to diligently refer to the notion of 
dependence always with reference to Article 3(2)(a) of Directive 2004/38/EC 
and that fact that this provision of Directive 2004/38/EC – unlike the concept 
of dependence under Article 2(2) – makes reference to national laws (and 
thus, a certain margin of discretion) weigh heavily against the possibility to 
extend Rahman to core family members. 
 In Reyes,79 the Court of Justice emphatically rejected an option that core 
family members could – in addition to being dependent under the Jia inter-
pretation – be required to have tried unsuccessfully to obtain employment or 
subsistence support from the authorities in the country of origin.  
 The Court of Justice also ruled that the fact that the family member con-
cerned has to be dependent to acquire a right of residence, but may start 
working in the host Member State, thus ceasing to be dependent, without af-
fecting the right of residence. This conclusion (which goes well with the right 
under Article 23 of Directive 2004/38/EC of all family members, dependent 
or not, to engage in gainful activity in the host Member State) is important 
against the background of the fact that Directive 2004/38/EC (notably Article 
7(2), read in conjunction with Articles 3(1) and 2(2)) could have been inter-
preted that family members who have to be dependent to fall under the per-
sonal scope of Directive 2004/38/EC, would lose any right the moment they 
stop being dependent.80 
 Another interesting facet of the notion of dependence is whether other 
types of dependence, such as emotional, may bring the family member con-
cerned under Directive 2004/38/EC. 
 In relation to core family members falling under Article 2(2) of Directive 
2004/38/EC, case-law of the Court of Justice repeatedly refers to material de-
pendence (factual situation characterised by the fact that material support for 
that family member is provided by the EU citizen). The notion of dependence 
under Article 3(2) of Directive 2004/38/EC also encompasses physical de-
pendence (Recital 6) which supports the conclusion that the two notions are 
not exactly the same.  
 There may even be a third kind of dependence under EU law on free 
movement, namely in relation to the rights EU citizens have in the Member 
                                                        
79. Case C-423/12 Reyes, judgment of 16 January 2014, paragraph 25 (seq). 
80. Compare with case C-291/05 Eind, judgment of 11 December 2007, where the Court 
of Justice in paragraph 40 concluded that a dependent daughter may enjoy the right of 
residence so long as she has not reached the age of 21 years or remains a dependant 
of her father. 
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State of their nationality under Article 20 TFEU. In O and S,81 the Court of 
Justice alluded to legal, financial and emotional dependence. However, at 
least emotional dependence has been found irrelevant by Advocate General 
Tizzano in Zhu and Chen82 but, admittedly, not in the context of classical set-
ting of Article 2(2) of Directive 2004/38/EC (i.e. EU citizen and dependent 
family member), but in the reversed setting where the EU citizen is depend-
ent on the non-EU family member. 
 The requirement of dependence is likely to stay as a condition for family 
reunification under Directive 2004/38/EC for the foreseeable future. 
 The decision to keep the dependence requirement also raises some ques-
tions in relation to the way in which Member States want to protect their pub-
lic funds. It is not far-stretched to consider that the Member States may be 
fiscally shooting themselves in the leg by preferring family members who are 
financially dependent on EU citizens (who are granted an automatic right of 
residence) over family members who are not dependent and are thus more 
likely to work in the host Member State or be able to work. Independent fam-
ily members are in a much better position to pay to the public purse in their 
taxes and insurance contributions. 
 Previous attempts to abandon this requirement, described above, were not 
accepted by Member States (i.e. the Council) despite the fact that it could 
make a lot of sense not to exclude independent family members. 
 Economic or fiscal arguments will not sell well in the current heated cli-
mate with a lot of anxiety about the pressures migration brings on static EU 
citizens.  
 The public debate is riddled by inconsistencies – take, for example, the re-
cent article in the Economist83 which concluded that ‘Britons loathe immigra-
tion in principle, but quite like immigrants in practice.’ The two strongest 
fears the general public has in relation to free movement is that mobile EU 
citizens are after jobs and that they are also after social benefits. Those two 
concerns are largely mutually exclusive – those in work do not get benefits 
and those on benefits are mostly out of work. 
 Against the background of such debate, supporters of intra-EU mobility 
cannot rely on economic arguments on the benefits of free movement. They 
must also be able to engage with another line of argument against (increased) 
intra-EU mobility that is not based on GDP per capita, the importance of 
                                                        
81. Joined cases C-356/11 O and S and C-357/11 L, judgment of 6 December 2012, 
paragraph 56. 
82. Case C-200/02 Zhu and Chen, opinion of 18 May 2004, paragraph 84. 
83. ‘The Polish Paradox’, the Economist, 14 December 2013. 
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growth and the need to do everything to succeed in the globalised world. The 
non-economic argument has been eloquently formulated in a TV programme 
about migration84 by Nigel Farage who said:  
‘[i]f you said to me, do you want to see another 5 million people come to Britain, and if 
that happened we would all be slightly richer, I would say, do you know what? I would ra-
ther we were not slightly richer ... I do think the social side of this matters more than the 
pure market economics.’ 
This again reminds us that people are not mindless automata driven purely by 
economic considerations. The supporters of free movement must equip them-
selves with ability to connect with people and their concerns based on cultur-
al and emotional values, such as identity, pride in the history, sense of be-
longing, or feeling of security.85  
 Free movement may be the fundamental right of EU citizens and an inte-
gral part of their legal heritage, but it ‘is not hermetically sealed off from 
broader debates about immigration, and so is affected by policy changes and 
popular perceptions about immigration and immigrants.’86 
2.4.2. Sufficient resources and protection of public funds 
2.4.2.1. Legislative proposal 
2001 proposal 
In its first report87 on the implementation of directives on economically non-
active EU citizens (Directives 90/364/EEC, 90/365/EEC and 93/96/EC), the 
Commission emphasised that the right of residence was extended to EU citi-
zens who were not economically active only after a lengthy process which the 
Commission attributed to ‘the legacy of the past’ when the freedom of 
movement was managed from an economic perspective.  
                                                        
84. ‘The Truth about Immigration’, BBC2, 7 January 2014. 
85. ‘It’s not about the money: what Ed Miliband and David Cameron can learn from Ni-
gel Farage’, the Guardian, 10 January 2014. 
86. Shaw, Miller and Fletcher, ‘Getting to grips with EU citizenship: Understanding the 
friction between UK immigration law and EU free movement law’ Edinburgh Law 
School Citizenship Studies (2013), page iv – available at  
 http://www.frictionandoverlap.ed.ac.uk/files/1693_fullreportlowres.pdf. 
87. Report on the implementation of Directives 90/364, 90/365 and 93/96 – (Right of res-
idence), COM(1999)127 final of 17 March 1999. 
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 The Commission noted that the transposition process of the three relevant 
directives was ‘long drawn out’ and that only three Member States88 have 
transposed the directives by the end of the transposition deadline and that in-
fringement proceedings for incorrect transposition (non-compliance) had to 
be launched against fourteen89 Member States. 
 Neither the first report on the implementation of the directive on economi-
cally non-active EU citizens, not the second,90 or the third91 reports mention 
any particular concerns as to welfare or health-care tourism.  
 The 2001 proposal stipulated in Article 7 that economically non-active EU 
citizens have the right to reside in the host Member State for a period of long-
er than six months if they: 
– have sufficient resources to avoid becoming a burden on the social assis-
tance system of the host Member State during their stay and that they have 
sickness insurance covering all risks in the host Member State; or 
– are students admitted to a course of vocational training. 
The Explanatory Memorandum asserted that making the right of residence 
subject to having sufficient resources and sickness insurance is to ensure that 
EU citizens do not have recourse to public funds in the host Member State. 
 Explanation on Article 7 of the proposal stated that ‘while the exercise of 
this right is to be facilitated, the fact that, at the present stage, social assis-
tance provision is not covered by EU law and is not, as a rule, ‘exportable’, 
entails that a completely equal treatment as regards social benefits is not pos-
sible without running the risk of certain categories of people entitled to the 
right of residence, in particular those not engaged in gainful activity, becom-
                                                        
88. Denmark, the Netherlands and Spain. 
89. At the material time, the EU consisted of fifteen Member States so essentially all 
Member States encountered problems transposing the directives into national laws, an 
abnormally high number dispute rate, as the Commission noted in its first report. It is 
interesting that the only Member State with regard to which the infringement pro-
ceedings had not been launched was Belgium, which later was subject to infringe-
ment proceedings in relation to the source of sufficient resources – see judgment of 
the Court of 23 March 2006 in case C-408/03 Commission v Belgium (Rec. 2006, p. 
I-2647).  
90. Second Report on the implementation of Directives 90/364, 90/365 and 93/96 (right 
of residence), COM(2003)101 final of 5 March 2003. 
91. Third Report on the application of Directives 93/96, 90/364, 90/365 on the right of res-
idence for students, economically inactive and retired Union citizens, COM(2006)156 
final of 5 April 2006. 
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ing an unreasonable [burden] on the public finances of the host Member 
State.’ 
 The provision has to be seen in the wider context of the 2001 proposal, no-
tably Article 21(2) which authorised Member States not to confer entitlement 
to social assistance to resident economically non-active EU citizens before 
the acquisition of the right of permanent residence (which was obtained after 
four years of residence). 
 The Commission announced already in 1999 in its implementation report 
of the directives on economically non-active EU citizens that it would ex-
plore the idea that economically non-active EU citizens could not be obliged 
to present a proof of sufficient resources or sickness insurance when applying 
for a residence document. They would be merely required to assure the rele-
vant national authorities by means of a declaration92 that they meet those 
conditions, similar to those students could make under Directive 93/96/EC. 
 This solution was incorporated in the 2001 proposal. Economically non-
active EU citizens could only be required to present a proof when actually 
seeking recourse to public funds, as stated in the Explanatory Memorandum 
under Article 8(3) of the proposal.93 
 The proposal did not provide for any requirement to have sufficient re-
sources and sickness insurance for students, but foresaw the requirement for 
students to assure the national authorities at the moment of requesting a resi-
dence certificate that they actually have sufficient resources and sickness in-
surance.  
 According to the Commission’s interpretation made in the context of the 
first reading94 in the Council, it wished to go beyond existing law, as inter-
preted by the Court of Justice,95 by not making the possession of sickness in-
                                                        
92. Proving the requirement of sufficient resources can be difficult in practice. The Court 
of Justice found in its judgment of 10 April 2008 in case C-398/06 Commission v the 
Netherlands that the Dutch requirement that economically non-active EU citizens 
must show sufficient resources for at least one year was unlawful. The judgment was 
given in the context of EU law on economically non-active EU citizens (Directives 
90/364/EEC and 90/365/EEC), but the conditions of these directives were carried 
over in Directive 2004/38/EC. 
93. Clearly, while this solution may be better than the others, it is far from being perfect. 
It is not clear how economically non-active EU citizens having recourse to social as-
sistance (i.e. being in need and thus clearly in breach of the conditions attached to the 
right of residence) should present a proof of sufficient resources. 
94. Council document 15380/01 (footnote 23). 
95. Case C-424/98 Commission v Italy, judgment of 25 May 2000. 
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surance a condition for exercising the right of residence, but to retain it in the 
framework of administrative formalities for residence. 
 In addition, the Commission proposed to take away from the Member 
States the possibility to put a figure on the amount of resources deemed suffi-
cient for the purposes of having a right of residence. The Commission con-
sidered that this would fail to allow for the variety of possible situations.96 
The Economic and Social Committee 
The Committee endorsed the general thrust of the proposal and praised the 
abolition of the Member States’ right to fix the minimum amount of resources 
economically non-active EU citizens must possess. The Committee consid-
ered that establishing minimum resources in each Member State affects free-
dom of movement and puts some parts of the EU off limits to certain EU citi-
zens just because they lack the means. 
The Committee of Regions 
The Committee welcomed the self-certification on the part of EU citizens to 
provide evidence of certain personal circumstances which, according to the 
Committee, was adopted in many Member States where it was significantly 
speeding up administrative procedures. 
 Regarding specific residence arrangements for students and economically 
non-active EU citizens, the Committee considered that such EU citizens must 
have sufficient economic resources and health insurance cover. This would 
safeguard the host Member State’s right not to have to support their social or 
health care expenses. 
The Parliament 
In the framework of the discussions in the Parliament in the first reading of 
the proposal, several committees have been consulted. Opinion of the Com-
mittee on Legal Affairs and the Internal Market, adopted by 19 votes to one, 
with one abstention, offers an interesting perspective on the possibility how 
the rights of economically non-active EU citizens could evolve.  
 The Committee proposed to fully abolish the requirement to have suffi-
cient resources for economically non-active EU citizens, including when it 
comes to the conditions attached to the right of residence and to the adminis-
trative procedures. These amendments were meant to reflect the develop-
                                                        
96. However, in the absence of any guidance from individual Member States, it may be 
difficult in practice for economically non-active EU citizens to ascertain whether they 
actually meet the condition of having sufficient resources.  
INSTITUTIONAL REPORT 
 259 
ments of the EU legal system towards the area of freedom, security and jus-
tice and to do away with the difference in treatment between own nationals 
and EU citizens, which was, in the eyes of the Committee, discriminatory and 
incompatible with the principles of EU free movement law. 
 At the end, these proposals were not included by the Rapporteur in his re-
port. The Parliament did not adopt any amendment on sufficient resources. 
2003 amended proposal 
The amended proposal partly scaled back in relation to the conditions stu-
dents must meet to acquire a right of residence and re-introduced the re-
quirement to have comprehensive sickness insurance cover. As for the suffi-
cient resources, this is not required for students to enjoy a right of residence – 
the declaration should be enough. 
The Council 
The Council introduced a number of changes to the proposal. 
 In relation to students, it re-introduced the requirement of comprehensive 
sickness insurance cover as a condition for having the right of residence. 
 In the discussions in the Council, Member States were wary to ensure that 
they are entitled to remove economically non-active EU citizens who have re-
course to public funds. Already in the second reading97 some Member States 
were keen to make it clear that a recourse to social assistance during the ini-
tial period of residence could lead to termination of the right of residence and 
wanted to make it explicit that it was possible to terminate the right of resi-
dence where the conditions were not or were no longer met. The Commission 
at that stage confirmed that this was the purpose of Article 24 of the proposal 
(later 13a of the proposal and now 14 of Directive 2004/38/EC). 
 In June 2003, the UK requested98 adding a condition for the initial right of 
residence that economically non-active EU citizens should not become an un-
reasonable charge on public finances.  
 This was later included in the proposal99 and formed basis for current Art-
icle 14(1) of Directive 2004/38/EC. According to the Council,100 the condi-
tion that economically non-active EU citizens do not become a burden on its 
social assistance system (note that the original UK request referred to burden 
on public finances, not only on social assistance) was added to avoid an im-
                                                        
97. Council document 10572/02 (footnotes 28 and 30). 
98. Council document 10945/03 (footnote 25). 
99. Council document 11807/03 (Article 6a(1)). 
100. Council document 12218/03 (point III.2). 
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pact on the public finances of the host Member State resulting from the ex-
tension of the right of residence without conditions from three to six months. 
At the end of the legislative process, the condition on the burden was includ-
ed in the final text while the reason for its inclusion (i.e. the extension of the 
initial right of residence from three to six months) was ultimately abandoned.  
 Against this background, the Commission stressed several weeks before 
the Council reached political agreement on the proposal that should Member 
States prefer to maintain the three months period, the conditions could be un-
acceptable, as it would constitute a step backward from existing acquis. 
 The concept of unreasonable burden to social assistance was introduced 
by the Council and developed in Recital 16 of Directive 2004/38/EC. 
 The Council deliberations contained an interesting provision in Article 
13a(1) of the 2001 proposal which was introduced in June 2003,101 but ulti-
mately dropped in September 2003.102  
 The provision essentially provided that as long as economically non-active 
EU citizens did not become an unreasonable burden on the public finances,103 
the condition of resources would be considered to be met. 
 A fairly intensely discussed issue during the Council deliberations was the 
threshold to consider the requirement of sufficient resources as met. The 
Commission considered that putting a figure on the amount of resources to be 
deemed sufficient would fail to allow for the variety of possible situations. 
 Already in the first reading,104 several Member States considered that 
Member States should be able to decide what sufficient resources were. The 
Commission replied that it could not share their views and added that the 
concept of ‘sufficient resources’ depended on numerous factors (free accom-
modation, benefits arising from links with other people, etc.) and could not be 
assessed by the EU citizen alone. 
 There was a big fight on the threshold in the Council without a clear ma-
jority.105 The Commission’s proposal was amended only in the very late stag-
es of the discussions in the Council.106 
                                                        
101. Council document 10945/03 (footnote 46). 
102. Council document 12218/03. 
103. Changed from ‘public finances’ to ‘social assistance’ in Council document 11807/03 
(Article 13a(2)).  
104. Council document 15380/01 (footnote 29). 
105. Council documents 6147/03 (footnotes 38 and 39) and 10945/03 (footnote 32). 
106. Council document 12218/03 (Article 8(5)). 
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2.4.2.2. Sufficient resources today and tomorrow 
According to the Commission’s 2009 guidelines,107 the notion of sufficient 
resources should be assessed against the national criteria to be granted basic 
social assistance benefit, not any social assistance benefit Member States may 
provide for in their national laws. 
 Admittedly, this is not clearly spelled out anywhere in Directive 
2004/38/EC but it can be derived from Article 8(4) which stipulates that the 
condition of sufficient resources is automatically met when the resources are 
higher than the threshold below which nationals of the host Member State be-
come eligible for social assistance, or, where this criterion is not applicable, 
higher than the minimum social security pension paid by the host Member 
State. 
 All Member States provide for means-tested social assistance benefits. 
The reference to ‘the threshold below which nationals of the host Member 
State become eligible for social assistance’ must not be interpreted as refer-
ring to any social assistance benefit, otherwise the alternative condition of 
Article 8(4) of Directive 2004/38/EC would never apply. 
 This conclusion is supported by the fact that an interpretation that eco-
nomically non-active EU citizens must have resources sufficient not to quali-
fy for any social assistance benefit may lead to an effective exclusion of most 
economically non-active EU citizens by providing for a social benefit with 
very high resource threshold in national laws.108 
 Regarding the interplay between the facilitation of free movement and 
protection of public funds, Directive 2004/38/EC, as clearly elucidated by the 
                                                        
107. Communication on guidance for better transposition and application of Directive 
2004/38/EC on the right of citizens of the Union and their family members to move 
and reside freely within the territory of the Member States, COM(2009)313 final of 2 
July 2009, section 2.3.1. 
108. Compare with case C-578/08 Chakroun, judgment of 4 March 2010, where the Court 
of Justice in relation to the Family Reunification Directive (Directive 2003/86/EC) 
ruled that the Netherlands violated EU law by refusing family reunification on the 
grounds that the sponsor who has proved that he has stable and regular resources 
which are sufficient to maintain himself and the members of his family, but who, giv-
en the level of his resources, will nevertheless be entitled to claim special assistance 
in order to meet exceptional, individually determined, essential living costs. Article 
7(1)(c) of Directive 2003/86/EC requires that the sponsors have resources which are 
sufficient to maintain themselves and the members of their families, without recourse 
to social assistance. This provision is similar to that of Directive 2004/38/EC and both 
follow the same objective – to afford a certain degree of protection to public funds of 
the host Member State. 
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Court of Justice,109 far from pursuing a purely economic objective, aims to 
facilitate the exercise of the primary and individual right to move and reside 
freely within the territory of the Member States that is conferred directly on 
EU citizens by the Treaty. 
 But some consider that EU free movement law benefits the mobile middle 
class EU citizens at the expense of those who are poor or marginalised, for 
whom solidarity may be as important as equal treatment.110 
 As the ECOSOC remarked when considering the 2001 proposal – estab-
lishing minimum resources may put some parts of the EU off limits to certain 
EU citizens just because they lack the means. 
 This is a very relevant remark, alarming today even more than in 2002. 
With the accession of eleven Member States from central and eastern Europe 
in 2004, 2007 and 2013, there are bigger differences between wages, social 
protection, labour costs or GDP per capita. 
 Consider Romanian pensioners, for example. Their average old-age pen-
sion in 2012 was 773 lei111 which was around 175 EUR at 2012 exchange 
rate. Assuming this is the only income and assuming that the requirement of 
sufficient resources for the purposes of the right of residence under Directive 
2004/38/EC is met when the income is below the threshold under which EU 
countries grant guaranteed minimum income benefit,112 such pensioner 
would meet the requirement of sufficient resources basically in only eight113 
of twenty-seven Member States. The area of free movement, in which such 
Romanian pensioners may exercise their fundamental right to move and re-
side freely, shrinks to less than 1/3 of the EU. 
 Even richer EU countries are not necessarily better off. Czech Republic 
was sitting 81 % of average EU GDP per capita in 2012. The Czech average 
                                                        
109. Case C-371/08 Ziebell, judgment of 8 December 2001, paragraph 69. 
110. Shaw, Miller and Fletcher, ‘Getting to grips with EU citizenship: Understanding the 
friction between UK immigration law and EU free movement law’ Edinburgh Law 
School Citizenship Studies (2013), page 5 – available at  
 http://www.frictionandoverlap.ed.ac.uk/files/1693_fullreportlowres.pdf.  
111. Press release 72 of 1 April 2013, National Institute of Statistics, available at  
 http://www.insse.ro/cms/files/statistici/comunicate/com_anuale/nr_pensionari/pens
ii_2012e.pdf. 
112. MISSOC comparative tables on guaranteed minimum resources, situation on 1 July 
2013, available at http://ec.europa.eu/social/main.jsp?catId=815&langId=en.  
113. Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland and Slovakia. 
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old-age pension114 in September 2013 was 10 957 Czech crowns, around 425 
EUR. Under the same assumptions as above, an average Czech old-age pen-
sioner would not have a right of residence in 11 Member States.115 
 As van der Mei succinctly put it, ‘When taken seriously, Union citizenship 
ought to be developed in such a way both the ‘rich’ and the ‘poor’ can enjoy 
the rights that come with it.’116 
Protection of public finances 
The legislative discussions on the 2001 proposal have been dominated by the 
efforts to find an acceptable compromise on the access of economically non-
active EU citizens to social assistance in the host Member State. It should be 
repeated (with certain simplification) how the approach of the three most im-
portant players evolved in time: 
2001 – the Commission proposes that economically non-active EU citizens 
should be excluded from social assistance before the right of permanent 
residence is acquired (= 4 years in the proposal); 
2002 – the Council deliberates on the proposal and, to protect public funds, 
adds (quite superfluously) that economically non-active EU citizens 
should also be excluded from social assistance during the initial period of 
residence which is not subject to any conditions (= 6 months in the pro-
posal); 
February 2003 – the Parliament requests that economically non-active EU 
citizens have unconditional access to social assistance; 
April 2003 – the Commission amends its 2001 proposal and follows the Par-
liament’s request; 
December 2003 – the Council, without much fight, partly accepts the amended 
proposal, but authorises Member States to exclude economically non-
active EU citizens from social assistance during the initial period of resi-
dence which is not subject to any conditions (= 3 months in the final text). 




115. Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Denmark, Finland, France, Ireland, Luxembourg, Malta, 
Netherlands and the United Kingdom. 
116. van der Mei, ‘Free Movement of Persons within the European Community – Cross-
border Access to Public Benefits’ Hart Publishing (2003), page 220. 
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The issue of the protection of public funds was settled in the Council relative-
ly quickly – in an event, it was not one of the four issues on which the final 
compromise had to be found in the Competitiveness Council of 22 October 
2013 (concept of family members, the length of initial period of residence, 
the length of residence needed for permanent residence and enhanced protec-
tion against expulsion). 
 There was hardly a reference to possible social tourism in the discussions 
of the Working Party. This is in a clear contrast with current discussion where 
some Member States are obsessed with the possibility of social tourism and 
the need to guard against it and request that EU law is amended.  
 However, it were the Member States that at the end had the final say on 
the legislative text (the second reading in the Parliament was symbolic rather 
than on the substance). It were the Member States that introduced the possi-
bility to exclude economically non-active EU citizens from welfare during 
the first three months – a restriction that is new in the Directive and which the 
Commission considered as retrograde. 
 Directive 2004/38/EC offers effective tools to Member States to protect 
their public funds against social tourism.117 The existing legal framework 
makes it possible to tackle abuse and fraud – this view is shared by the 
Commission,118 the Council119 and the Parliament.120 
 There will always be a certain tension between solidarity (based on the so-
cial bond that unites all people) and justice (based on the respect for the dif-
ferences that set every person apart from the others). These two interests need 
to be balanced by solidaristic communities and, as Habermas puts it, in the 
Judeo-Christian tradition ‘solidarity and justice are two sides of the same 
                                                        
117. For more on social tourism, see van der Mei, ‘Free Movement of Persons within the 
European Community – Cross-border Access to Public Benefits’ Hart Publishing 
(2003) or, more recently, Groenendijk, ‘Access for Migrants to Social Assistance: 
Closing the frontiers or reducing citizenship?’ in Guild, Carrera and Eisele, ‘Social 
Benefits and Migration – A Contested Relationship and Policy Challenge in the EU’ 
CEPS (2013). Groenendijk also analyses available data on welfare tourism in the 
Netherlands, Germany and the UK. 
118. Free movement of EU citizens and their families: Five actions to make a difference, 
COM(2013)837 final, 25 November 2013. 
119. Council document 17342/13 (press release on the Justice and Home Affairs Council 
of 5 and 6 December 2013). 
120. Resolution on the respect for the fundamental right of free movement in the EU of 16 
January 2014 (2013/2960(RSP)).  
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coin: they provide two different perspectives on the same communication 
structure’.121 
 Against this background, Directive 2004/38/EC and its solution in relation 
to the right of residence of economically non-active EU citizens has been de-
scribed as ‘a balancing act between the interest of awarding social rights as a 
consequence of the right of free movement against the interest of safeguard-
ing the national welfare systems’.122 
 The balancing act will always be difficult, regardless of whether it is done 
at the legislative level or in the context of application of the rules in individu-
al cases – the principle of proportionality requires nothing less.123 
 Regarding the requirement of sufficient resources, the only major problem 
on the ground is related to the social legislation of some Member States that 
automatically exclude economically non-active EU citizens from social assis-
tance on the strength of assumption that recourse to social assistance by eco-
nomically non-active EU citizens (whose right of residence is conditional 
upon having sufficient resources not to become a burden on the social 
assistance – see Article 7(1)(b) of Directive 2004/38/EC). This was recently 
addressed in Brey,124 but the real consequences of this judgment will surely 
have to be further clarified by the Court of Justice in the judgments to come. 
                                                        
121. More on the tension in Habermas, ‘The Inclusion of the Other: Studies in Political 
Theory’ Cambridge Polity Press (2002), page 7 (seq).  
122. Lenaerts and Heremans, ‘Contours of a European social union in the case-law of the 
European Court of Justice’ European Constitutional Law Review (2006), pp. 101-
115, cited in Minderhoud, ‘Access to social assistance benefits for EU citizens in an-
other Member State’ FMW – Online Journal on Free Movement of Workers within 
the European Union, No. 6 (2013), page 26. 
123. For criticism that the use of the principle of proportionality brings into equation ad-
ministrative costs, legal uncertainty and arbitrariness, see Dougan, ‘The Constitution-
al Dimension to the Case Law on Union Citizenship’ 31 ELRev. (2006), page 615. 
124. Case C-140/12 Brey, judgment of 19 September 2013. For a perspective on Brey, see 
Cornelissen, ‘EU Regulations on the Coordination of Social Security Systems and 
Special Non-Contributory Benefits: A Source of Never-Ending Controversy’, page 
82 (seq) – in Guild, Carrera and Eisele, ‘Social Benefits and Migration – A Contested 
Relationship and Policy Challenge in the EU’ CEPS (2013). 
MICHAL MEDUNA 
 266 
2.4.3. Derogations from equal treatment 
2.4.3.1. Legislative proposal 
2001 proposal 
The Commission in Article 21(2) of its 2001 proposal laid down the follow-
ing derogations from the principle of equal treatment on the grounds of na-
tionality: 
Until they have acquired the right of permanent residence, the host Member 
State shall not be obliged to: 
– confer entitlement to social assistance on persons other than those en-
gaged in gainful activity in an employed or self-employed capacity or the 
members of their families; or 
– award maintenance grants to persons having the right of residence who 
have come to the country to study. 
The Explanatory Memorandum made it clear that the derogation was intro-
duced not to entail undue financial burdens on host Member States in relation 
to EU citizens who were not engaged in gainful activity there.  
 In the 2001 proposal the Commission stressed that the derogation had to 
be read in conjunction with Article 7 of the 2001 proposal which stipulated 
that economically non-active EU citizens must have sufficient resources and 
sickness insurance. Recourse to social assistance may challenge their right of 
residence. The Commission explicitly stressed in the proposal that the notion 
of social assistance also included free medical benefits provided in national 
legislations for destitute persons. 
 The Commission further highlighted that, in the same vein, host Member 
States were not required to provide maintenance grants to EU citizens coming 
to the country to study as their principal occupation.  
 Maintenance grants count as social assistance in the broad sense of the 
term and, therefore, students should not be eligible for it under the terms of 
the proposal, since they were required to assure the relevant national authori-
ties that they have sufficient resources to avoid being a burden on the public 
finances of the host Member State. 
 It should also be underlined that the proposal authorised Member States 
not to give social assistance to economically non-active EU citizens during 




The Economic and Social Committee 
The Committee considered that the Commission’s proposal authorised Mem-
ber States to exclude EU citizens from health care during the pre-permanent 
residence and concluded that the provision violated the fundamental right to 
health care. 
The Parliament 
The Parliament’s Committee on Citizens’ Freedoms and Rights, Justice and 
Home Affairs proposed to the Plenary to shorten this period of disentitlement 
down to six months (which was linked to the duration of the period of resi-
dence without any conditions or formalities – which was further reduced to 
three months in the final version of the Directive).  
 The justification invoked by the Committee seems somehow shaky (e.g. 
by stating that maintenance aid falls outside the scope of the Treaty and then 
continuing on legislating on the duration during which maintenance aid can 
be denied to EU students).  
 However, this proposal was ultimately not adopted by the Plenary and was 
replaced by an alternative amendment tabled by the Verts/ALE group that 
fully removed the possibility for Member States to deny social assistance to 
economically non-active EU citizens. 
2003 amended proposal 
The Commission, in its amended proposal, agreed with the amendment. The 
restriction, which the Commission noted was not provided for in EU law that 
was replaced by the proposed directive, was considered as retrogressive in re-
lation to the acquis communautaire as it stood in 2003, notably in the light of 
Grzelczyk, given some six months after the Commission’s initial proposal. 
The Commission considered that Grzelczyk confirmed the entitlement to so-
cial assistance of legally resident economically non-active EU citizens. 
The Council 
Discussions in the Council have been affected by the huge difference be-
tween the original proposal of May 2001 and the amended proposal of April 
2003. The former authorised Member States not to confer social assistance to 
economically non-active EU citizens essentially during the first four years of 
residence; the latter obliged Member States to grant social assistance to eco-
nomically non-active EU citizens without any derogation. 
 Taking into the account the amendments brought forward by the Parlia-
ment and the Commission in its 2003 amended proposal, the Council in the 
end adopted a compromise solution that reintroduced the derogation from the 
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principle of equal treatment that authorised the host Member State not to 
grant entitlement to social assistance to economically non-active EU citizens, 
but only during the first three months of residence, i.e. during the period of 
residence which is not subject to any conditions or formalities, as stipulated 
in Article 6(1) of Directive 2004/38/EC. 
 There is preciously little explanation for this decision to be found in the 
documents of the Council. The common position offers little justification for 
this decision other than stating that the requirement was made ‘in line with 
new Article 6a’ which is related to current Articles 6(1) and 14(1) of Di-
rective 2004/38/EC.125  
 The final decision by the Council should be seen against the background 
of the keenness of the Council in February 2003126 (i.e. before the first read-
ing in the Parliament) to explicitly reiterate that economically non-active EU 
citizens had to right to access to social assistance not only before they have 
acquired a right of permanent residence (as the proposal provided at that 
time), but also during the initial period of residence which was not subject to 
any conditions (i.e. not even the requirement to have sufficient resources). 
 One issue considered by the Council, but ultimately not featuring in the 
common position is of importance in relation to current discussions on social 
tourism and the wider relationship between EU law on free movement of EU 
citizens and EU law on coordination of social security schemes. 
 As late as on 29 July 2003 (less than two months before the Council 
reached the political agreement on the proposal), the Council text127 of the 
proposal contained Article 33a of the 2001 proposal that stipulated that the 
Directive should not affect measures on social security taken in accordance 
with the Treaty. This proposal by the Commission was tabled at the meeting 
of the Working Party of 23-24 April 2003128 (meeting document 7) to address 
Austrian problems with the extent of the right to equal treatment.  
 In the second reading by the Council, Austria proposed129 an amendment 
of Article 21 of the 2001 proposal to expressly provide that the principle of 
equal treatment established by the Directive shall not apply to social security 
                                                        
125. For more details on the debate in the Council, see Guild, ‘The Legal Elements of 
European Identity: EU Citizenship and Migration Law’ Kluwer Law International 
(2004), page 33. 
126. Council document 6147/03 (footnote 73). 
127. Council document 11807/03. 
128. Council document 10945/03 (footnote 88). 
129. Council document 10572/02 – Annex II.  
INSTITUTIONAL REPORT 
 269 
benefits covered by the non-discrimination clause in EU law on coordination 
of social security schemes. 
 The Austrian delegation clarified that EU law on coordination of social 
security schemes contained a wide-ranging non-discrimination clause. Aus-
tria considered that Article 21, as proposed, would make for considerable le-
gal uncertainty and that application of the non-discrimination clause in cases 
not as yet covered by EU law on coordination of social security schemes (e.g. 
economically non-active EU citizens) must be brought about within the over-
all regulatory framework of that EU law.  
 In May 2013, the Greek Presidency informed130 the Competitiveness 
Council that the clarification in Article 33a of the 2001 proposal was part of 
substantial progress achieved on the sensitive issue of equal treatment. 
2.4.3.2. Equal treatment today and tomorrow 
Being a fundamental principle of the Single Market, the principle of non-
discrimination on the grounds of nationality is safe as such.  
 In the current climate, however, it is being challenged more and more by 
Member States seeking to inject a new dose of protectionism in their plans, 
ranging from straightforward unlawful (such as the calls by some UK politi-
cians to extend the application of transitional arrangements on Bulgarian and 
Romanian workers) to very likely unlawful (UK plans to exclude newcomers 
from social housing before they are resident for five years) to possible (plans 
to make use of Article 24(2) of Directive 2004/38/EC and exclude economi-
cally non-active EU citizens from social assistance during the first three 
months of residence). 
2.4.4. Right to remain 
2.4.4.1. Legislative proposal 
2001 proposal 
The Commission was mindful of the serious gap in EU free movement law 
that foresaw no possibility to retain a right of residence for family members 
who find themselves unable to continue to derive their right of residence in 
the host Member State from being family members of an EU citizen who is 
exercising his or her EU right to move and reside freely in the event of death, 
departure or divorce. This right is doubly important for family members who 
                                                        
130. Council document 8901/03 – point II.7. 
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are not EU citizens themselves as they cannot rely on their personal right to 
move and reside freely, guaranteed by EU law. 
 All three failed proposals of 1979, 1989 and 1998 provided for some sort 
of protection but they never made it to be adopted.  
 Articles 12(2) and 13(2) of the 2001 proposal provided the following in 
relation to non-EU family members: 
– the EU citizen’s death or departure from the host Member State shall not 
entail loss of the right of residence; 
– divorce shall not entail the loss of the right of residence where: 
a) prior to the initiation of the divorce proceedings, the marriage has 
lasted at least five years, including one year in the host Member State; 
or 
b) by agreement between the spouses or by court order, the spouse has 
custody of the EU citizen’s children; or 
c) this is warranted by particularly difficult circumstances. 
Before acquiring the right of permanent residence, the non-EU family mem-
bers wishing to retain their residence would essentially have to be engaged in 
gainful activity or have sufficient resources to avoid becoming a burden on 
the social assistance system for the duration of their stay and have sickness 
insurance cover covering all risks in the host Member State. 
 The Explanatory Memorandum stated that the rationale behind the intro-
duction of the right to remain was that under EU law as it stood in 2001 the 
right of residence might have been taken away from divorced spouses and 
from children who are no longer minors or dependent on the EU citizen, re-
gardless of their nationality. The Proposal placed emphasis on dignity and 
prevention of blackmail of non-EU family members with threats of divorce. 
The Committee of Regions 
The Committee was pleased that non-EU family members would not have 
their right of residence taken away from them. 
The Economic and Social Committee 
The Committee regarded the wording of the possibility to retain the right of 
residence in the event of divorce when ‘warranted by particularly difficult 
circumstances’ as ambiguous and imprecise and asked the wording to be 
made more explicit by referring, inter alia, to family, domestic and gender vi-




The Parliament introduced Amendment 45 that provided for a protection on 
social grounds of all EU citizens and their family members who were no 
longer meeting the conditions the Directive attaches to the right of residence 
in the event of serious sickness, accident or other humanitarian reasons.  
 The 2001 proposal foresaw five years duration of the marriage to prevent 
marriages of convenience that would get round the residence entitlement 
rules. The Parliament shortened the period down to two years as it considered 
five years to be too long.  
2003 amended proposal 
The Commission in its 2003 amended Proposal did not accept the Parlia-
ment’s Amendment 45 as inconsistent with the Commission proposal. 
The Council 
Current Article 14(1) of Directive 2004/38/EC was essentially formally in-
troduced only in 2003 by the Parliament in its first reading. However, already 
in the first Council reading131 in 2001, some Member States requested to 
make it apparent that there is possibility of refusing/terminating the right of 
residence when the conditions for exercising that right are not or are no long-
er fulfilled, which the Commission considered as covered by Article 24 of the 
original 2001 proposal. 
 The introduction of this right did not represent a difficult issue during the 
deliberations in the Council and there have only been relatively minor chang-
es introduced by it. Upon a Greek proposal, the Council introduced the possi-
bility to retain the right of residence in the event of divorce where the non-EU 
spouse or registered partner has the right of access to a minor child in the host 
Member State by agreement between the spouses or by court order. 
 The Council also introduced the requirement of one-year residence in the 
host Member State to retain the right of residence in the event of death and 
three-year residence in the event of divorce. 
2.4.4.2. Right to remain today and tomorrow 
The transposition of the right to remain provisions of Directive 2004/38/EC 
has been mostly free of problems. 
 This was not the case for the EFTA countries where Directive 2004/38/EC 
also applies by virtue of the EEA Agreement, being a part of the Single Mar-
                                                        
131. Council document 15380/01 (footnote 17). 
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ket. In the process of negotiating the adaptation of the relevant annexes to the 
EEA Agreement following the adoption of Directive 2004/38/EC, EFTA 
countries considered that the independent right of residence for non-EU fami-
ly members goes beyond the Single Market rules and that these rights ema-
nate from EU citizenship which is not covered by the EEA Agreement. Only 
after the Commission threatened to suspend the whole Agreement, the EFTA 
countries have agreed not to derogate from these provisions of Directive 
2004/38/EC.  
 The Commission launched infringement proceedings against the Czech 
Republic132 that has not fully transposed Article 13(2)(c) of Directive 
2004/38/EC by referring to domestic violence only in an administrative circu-
lar, and not in the legislation transposing Directive 2004/38/EC. The Com-
mission considered that it is of utmost importance to have explicit rules in na-
tional legislation (which, unlike the administrative circular, is public) to in-
form victims of domestic violence that they do not have to be afraid to initiate 
divorce proceedings for fear of losing their right of residence. 
 While the transposition of the right to remain has been fairly smooth (leav-
ing aside the well-known case-law133 of the Court of Justice on Article 12(3) 
of Directive 2004/38/EC), there are some problems of practical application. 
 In the event of divorce where the ex-spouses are not on friendly terms, 
non-EU family members wishing to rely on Article 13(2)(a) of Directive 
2004/38/EC may encounter challenges when having to demonstrate that the 
EU ex-spouse has been lawfully residing in the host Member State at the day 
when divorce became final. 
 Under Article 13(2)(a) of Directive 2004/38/EC, non-EU family members 
may retain the right of residence where the marriage has lasted at least three 
years prior to initiation of the divorce proceedings. However, to be able to re-
tain the right of residence at the moment when the family tie is finally sev-
ered, it is necessary that the EU citizen has not in the meanwhile stopped to 
exercise the EU free movement rights in the host Member State, otherwise 
there would be no right to retain (in the event of departure of the EU citizen 
from the host Member State, there is no possibility for non-EU family mem-
bers to retain their right of residence under Article 12(2) of Directive 
2004/38/EC).134 
                                                        
132. The Commission’s press release, http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-12-75_en.htm.  
133. Cases C-310/08 Ibrahim and C-480/08 Teixeira, judgments of 23 February 2010. 
134. This issue was addressed by UK courts – see Amos v Secretary of State for the Home 
Department [2011] EWCA Civ 552. 
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 As the burden of proof lies on the non-EU family member to provide all 
the necessary evidence that the conditions of Directive 2004/38/EC have been 
met, it is sometimes extremely difficult for the non-EU family member con-
cerned to provide the evidence where the EU ex-spouse refuses to cooperate. 
In such situation, while it may be nigh impossible for the non-EU family 
member to provide the required evidence, all the necessary evidence may be 
easily available to the national authorities, (but not necessarily the same as 
those deciding on whether the right of residence has been retained).  
 Regardless of whether the procedure aiming to establish whether the right 
of residence has been retained is adversarial in its nature or not, Member 
States should not act in a way that would frustrate the aims of Directive 
2004/38/EC and try to find a solution. In the UK, for example, the Asylum 
and Immigration Tribunal (Procedure) Rules 2005 authorise the applicants to 
seek a direction requiring the national authorities to provide any information 
necessary for the determination of their appeals. 
2.4.5. Right of permanent residence 
2.4.5.1. Legislative proposal 
2001 proposal 
Concerning the right of permanent residence, one of the greatest innovations 
of the 2001 proposal, Article 14 stipulated that 
– An EU citizen who has resided legally and continuously for four years in 
the host Member State shall have the right of permanent residence there.  
– This right shall apply also to non-EU family members who have resided 
with the EU citizen in the host Member State for four years. 
The Explanatory Memorandum stressed that the right of permanent residence 
after four years of continuous legal residence there was a new right intro-
duced as a corollary of the fundamental personal right conferred by the Trea-
ty on every EU citizen. 
 The proposal conceded that there already existed a certain right of perma-
nent residence (right to remain), but this right was narrow and subject to re-
strictive conditions. The proposal itself labelled the newly introduced right of 
permanent residence as ‘an upgraded right of residence’. 
MICHAL MEDUNA 
 274 
 The original duration of four years was proposed against the background 
of the proposal for the Long-term Residence Directive135 that foresaw a right 
of permanent residence for non-EU nationals after five years of residence. 
The Commission intended to make the acquisition of the permanent residence 
easier for EU citizens than to non-EU nationals. 
The Committee of Regions 
The Committee welcomed the establishment of the right of permanent resi-
dence and considered that the four-year qualification period was sufficient to 
provide an acceptable level of integration in the host Member State. 
The Economic and Social Committee 
The Committee regarded the introduction of this right as one of the most 
noteworthy improvements and asked to allow for the possibility to acquire 
this right without the need to prove a specified period of residence. 
The Parliament 
The report on the proposal labelled the right of permanent residence as the 
most important new provision contained in the proposal. In the first reading 
the Parliament proposed only a minor amendment on the continuity of resi-
dence for the purposes of acquiring the right of permanent residence. 
The Council 
The right of permanent residence, as a new concept, was welcomed by the 
Council and the discussions revolved mainly around two issues – whether the 
right of permanent residence should also be offered to students and whether 
this right should be acquired after four years of residence. 
 In the first Council reading,136 Greece, Germany, and Austria wanted to 
exclude students from the possibility to acquire a right of permanent resi-
dence. Denmark, the Netherlands and Finland joined this request in the sec-
ond reading.137 Their objections were resolved only at the very end of the 
                                                        
135. Directive 2003/109/EC concerning the status of third-country nationals who are long-
term residents, OJ 2004 L 16, pp. 44-53. 
136. Council document 15380/01 (footnote 47). 
137. Council document 10572/02 (footnote 65). 
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process138 in the Council in September 2003 where the duration of residence 
was prolonged to five years from the initially proposed four years. 
 The question of the duration of the residence needed to acquire the right of 
permanent residence was indeed one of the last issues to be resolved by the 
Council and was agreed only by the Competitiveness Council that reached 
the political agreement on the text.139 
2.4.5.2. Permanent residence today and tomorrow 
In a sharp contrast with the way in which the Member States approached the 
introduction of a new right of permanent residence, there were remarkably 
many problems in the transposition of Article 16 of Directive 2004/38/EC to 
EU citizens in non-standard situations. 
 In Dias,140 the Court of Justice ruled on the right of permanent residence 
of Ms Dias, a Portuguese national residing in the UK for more than 19 years. 
The Court of Justice was looking into the periods of residence when Ms Dias 
was issued with a valid residence document under EU law (Directive 
68/360/EEC), but without meeting the conditions attached to the right of resi-
dence under EU law. Having considered the question whether residence doc-
uments are declaratory in nature or whether they create rights, the Court of 
Justice analysed its previous case-law on the nature of residence documents, 
and concluded that residence documents were indeed declaratory. 
 The Court of Justice added that the declaratory character of residence doc-
uments meant that the periods of residence completed without meeting the 
underlying conditions attached to the right of residence cannot count towards 
the right of permanent residence (which requires lawful residence – i.e. resi-
dence in accordance with the conditions of Directive 2004/38/EC). 
 This is not a fully satisfactory outcome – valid residence documents issued 
under EU law must have more value than being merely declaratory. In at least 
one Member State the competent national authorities consider that the judg-
ment has vindicated their opinion that residence documents issued under Di-
                                                        
138. Firstly proposed in Council document 12538/03 which included the text of the pro-
posal on which the Council reached the political agreement by qualified majority on 
22 September 2003. 
139. Compare Council document 12218/03 of 5 September 2003 (according to which a 
majority of delegations agreed with the 4-year proposal (Denmark, Germany, Lux-
embourg, the Netherlands and Austria preferred five years) with Council document 
12538/03 of 16 September 2003 (in which the Italian presidency proposed to extend 
the period of residence to five years). 
140. Case C-32/09 Dias, judgment of 21 July 2011. 
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rective 2004/38/EC confirm that the right of residence under Directive 
2004/38/EC has existed only on the date on which the document was issued 
(given the declaratory nature of the document, it cannot be assumed that the 
conditions attached to the right of residence continue to be met in the future). 
 Such interpretation strips much of the added value of registration certifi-
cates under Directive 2004/38/EC. Who would ever apply for it, knowing that 
the document is next to useless already the next day? Why would ever Mem-
ber States introduce the registration scheme under Article 8(1) of Directive 
2004/38/EC, investing a lot of resources and creating red tape, just to issue 
registration certificates with effective validity of one day?  
 Moreover, holders of a valid registration certificate may reside legitimate-
ly expecting that their residence is lawful just on strength of a valid and un-
contested registration certificate or, like in the case of Ms Dias, residing in 
the UK for 19 years without her residence ever being contested by the nation-
al authorities. 
 The UK practice of tolerated residence (where EU citizens are allowed to 
stay and their residence is not contested by the UK immigration authorities, 
but other authorities – such as authorities responsible for income support, as 
was the case in Dias – refuse to grant any rights stemming from the right of 
residence) leaves much to be desired, notably in relation to the principle of 
legitimate expectations. 
 Report by the Commission on the application of Directive 2004/38/EC141 
flagged, in particular, that some Member States (UK and Belgium) incorrect-
ly took no account of periods of residence acquired by EU citizens before 
their countries acceded to the EU.  
 This issue was partly addressed by the Court of Justice in Lassal142 where 
it was confirmed that periods of residence completed before the date of trans-
position of Directive 2004/38/EC in accordance with earlier EU law instru-
ments, must be taken into account for the purposes of the acquisition of the 
right of permanent residence. In Ziolkowski and Szeja,143 the Court of Justice 
ruled that periods of residence completed before the accession must be taken 
into account for the purpose of the acquisition of the right of permanent resi-
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142. Case C-162/09 Lassal, judgment of 7 October 2010. 




dence, provided those periods were completed in compliance with the condi-
tions laid down in Article 7(1) of Directive 2004/38/EC. 
 Another ‘edge’ of Directive 2004/38/EC was resolved by the Court of Jus-
tice in Alarape144 where it held that periods of lawful residence under Article 
12 of Regulation (EEC) 1612/68 completed by the parent of a child in educa-
tion do not count toward the right of permanent residence under Directive 
2004/38/EC, despite the ruling in Lassal which confirmed relevance of peri-
ods of residence under EU legislation instruments. The Court of Justice ex-
panded on this in paragraph 41s seq. of Alarape where it stressed that the ref-
erence to earlier EU law instruments, used in Lassal, must be understood as 
referring to the instruments which Directive 2004/38/EC codified, revised 
and repealed. 
 Alarape is not the final piece of the puzzle of which kind of residence is 
good for the purposes of permanent residence. One more piece was added in 
Onuekwere145 which confirmed that the periods of imprisonment in the host 
Member State of non-EU family members do not count in the context of the 
acquisition of the right of permanent residence.  
 Another piece will surely be added in the years to come and answer a 
tricky question of whether another category of persons could claim perma-
nent residence under Directive 2004/38/EC – notably parent/primary carers 
of minor EU citizens falling under Zhu and Chen146 ruling. Such parents re-
side under EU legislation which was replaced by Directive 2004/38/EC (in 
the operative part of the judgment in Zhu and Chen the Court of Justice un-
derlined that Directive 90/364/EEC allows the parent to reside in the host 
Member State) so Lassal, as interpreted in Alarape, would appear to apply. 
Yet, the right of residence of such parents/primary carers is derived from the 
temporary need to allow the minor EU citizen to reside (as was in Zhu and 
Chen) or to allow the EU student to finish the studies (as was in Alarape). 
 For the future proposals amending Directive 2004/38/EC, it may be possi-
ble to shorten the period of residence needed to qualify for permanent resi-
dence down to four years. The current situation, where there is no difference 
between the qualification periods for EU citizens and non-EU nationals under 
the Long-Term Residence Directive. 
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2.4.6. Enhanced protection against expulsion 
2.4.6.1. Legislative proposal 
2001 proposal 
Strictly speaking, the 2001 proposal foresaw no enhanced protection of EU 
citizens against expulsion of the grounds of public policy or public security. 
Article 26(2) of the 2001 proposal provided for absolute protection against 
expulsion in relation to the beneficiaries of the right of permanent residence 
and all family members who were minors. It provided that: 
The host Member State may not take an expulsion decision on grounds of public policy or 
public security against EU citizens or their family members, irrespective of nationality, 
who have the right of permanent residence on its territory or against family members who 
are minors. 
The Explanatory Memorandum stated that one of the aims of the proposal 
was to provide a tighter definition of the circumstances under which the right 
of residence right of EU citizens and their family members may be restricted. 
 The proposal did not envisage any sort of enhanced protection against ex-
pulsion – Member States were entitled to restrict the right to move and reside 
freely on the grounds of public policy or public security in relation to EU citi-
zens and their non-EU family members who have not yet acquired a right of 
permanent residence, but were absolutely prohibited from expelling those 
who had a right of permanent residence or who are minors.  
 The first group was protected on the strength of their ties with the host 
Member State where they have integrated. An expulsion was described by the 
proposal as measure with a very serious impact on the person concerned, de-
stroying the emotional and family ties they have developed in the host coun-
try. Minors were protected on humanitarian grounds. 
The Committee of Regions 
The Committee considered that the protection against expulsion was especial-
ly important for minors with family ties in the host Member State. 
The Economic and Social Committee 
The Committee was concerned about the proposed prohibition of restrictions 
on the right to move and reside freely taken solely on the grounds of a previ-
ous criminal conviction. It considered that some grave crimes (such as terror-
ism, trafficking in weapons or drugs and crimes against the person) should be 




In relation to the Commission’s proposal to introduce an absolute ban on the 
expulsion in some cases, the Rapporteur, in his personal capacity, noted in the 
Explanatory statement accompanying his report that such a ban puts an end to 
the historic national sovereignty in this area. He considered this to be a con-
sequence of the creation of a border-free area of freedom, security and jus-
tice, in which expulsion is a thing of the past and freedom of movement has 
become a reality for all. 
 At the end, the Parliament decided not to introduce any amendments in re-
lation to the enhanced protection against expulsion. 
The Council 
In the first reading,147 the Council expressly confirmed that one of the main 
objectives of the new directive was to restrict the possibility for Member 
States to restrict right of residence on the grounds of public policy. 
 However, one right the Member States did not want to see restricted, was 
the possibility to expel EU citizens on the grounds of public policy or public 
security. Already in the first reading almost all Member States148 (with the 
exception of Italy and even the Italian defence of the Commission’s proposal 
was half-hearted) did not want to abandon the possibility of expelling a per-
son altogether, notably if that person was a non-EU family member. 
 In October 2002, the Danish presidency proposed149 to Coreper and then 
to the Competitiveness Council a compromise proposal that would allow the 
host Member State to expel those who have acquired permanent residence or 
were minors only in exceptional circumstances, on particularly serious 
grounds of public policy or public security. 
 In the next months, the compromise proposal was further tweaked (some 
versions offering an absolute protection to minors or those who were born in 
the host Member State, where they have resided their whole life (apart from 
absences due to military service and studies, not exceeding six years in to-
tal),150 others adding vocational training to the list151). 
 One noteworthy late proposal did not make it to the adopted text. Council 
document 12538/03 of 16 September 2002 contained a text of Recital 22, 
submitted by the German delegation that clarified the concept of ‘imperative’ 
                                                        
147. Council document 5758/02 of 30 January 2002. 
148. Council document 5758/02, footnote 15. 
149. Council document 13298/08, part 3. 
150. Council document 10945/03 (Article 26(3)). 
151. Council document 12218/03 (Article 26(3)). 
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grounds. According to the proposal, which did not survive in the next Council 
document, this concept may apply to persons proven to be members of an or-
ganisation which supports international terrorism, who support such an or-
ganisation, who have committed a crime against peace, a war crime or a 
crime against humanity, or who have incited racist hatred.  
 Regarding the question of whether non-EU family members are covered 
by the enhanced protection against expulsion under Article 29(3) of Directive 
2004/38/EC, which – unlike Articles 29(1) and (2) of Directive 2004/38/EC – 
does not refer to family members, the Council document expressly con-
firmed152 that non-EU family members should not be covered. 
2.4.6.2. Enhanced protection today and tomorrow 
The intersection between fundamental right to move and reside freely, on the 
one hand, and entitlement on the part of the Member States to restrict that 
right on the grounds of public policy and public security has been around for 
decades. There is no shortage of case-law in the area, with many aspects set-
tled and widely accepted. 
 Against this background, it does not come as a surprise that the develop-
ments in case-law concerned mainly the innovations introduced by Directive 
2004/38/EC, primarily the enhanced protection against expulsion linked to 
the duration of residence (five years for the first enhancement and ten years 
for the second one). 
 The ability to restrict free movement rights seems to be dear to the Mem-
ber States. This is not only demonstrated by their almost unanimous rejection 
of the Commission’s proposal introducing absolute protection against expul-
sion for some categories of EU citizen, but also by the number of cases on the 
interpretation of this entitlement under Directive 2004/38/EC by the Court of 
Justice. 
 There seem to be two major trends emerging from the recent case-law on 
Directive 2004/38/EC. The first strand comes from the following cases where 
the Court of Justice found that: 
– Directive 2004/38/EC does not preclude national laws that allow for re-
strictions on exit of own nationals who have previously been repatriated 
from another Member State on account of their ‘illegal residence’ there.153 
                                                        
152. Case C-249/11 Byankov, judgment of 4 October 2012. 
153. Case C-33/07 Jipa, judgment of 10 July 2008. 
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– Dealing in narcotics as part of an organised group is capable of being cov-
ered by the concept of ‘imperative grounds of public security’ which may 
justify a measure expelling an EU citizen who has resided in the host 
Member State for the preceding 10 years.154 
– It is open to the Member States to regard criminal offences listed in Art-
icle 83(1) TFEU as constituting a particularly serious threat to one of the 
fundamental interests of society, which might pose a direct threat to the 
calm and physical security of the population and thus be covered by the 
concept of ‘imperative grounds of public security’, as long as the manner 
in which such offences were committed discloses particularly serious 
characteristics.155 
– Directive 2004/38/EC does not preclude national laws that permit the re-
striction on exit of own nationals who have been convicted of narcotic 
drug trafficking in another Member State.156 
– Directive 2004/38/EC does not preclude national laws that permit the re-
striction on exit of own nationals where tax liability of a company of 
which they are one of the managers has not been settled.157 
– A period of imprisonment is capable both of interrupting the continuity of 
the period of residence for the purposes of Article 28(3)(a) of Directive 
2004/38/EC and of affecting the decision regarding the grant of the en-
hanced protection provided for thereunder, even where the person con-
cerned resided in the host Member State for the 10 years prior to impris-
onment.158 
– A period of imprisonment breaks the continuity of residence required for 
the acquisition of the right of permanent residence, and thus also the en-
hanced protection against expulsion under Article 28(2) of Directive 
2004/38/EC.159 
Admittedly, the Court of Justice was at pains to qualify most of the rules es-
tablished in the above judgments, but one thing stands out from those rulings 
– the Court of Justice was meticulously ensuring that it cannot be seen as an 
insurmountable obstacle to expulsion by interpreting the enhanced protection 
against expulsion as any sort of an absolute prohibition.  
                                                        
154. Case C-145/09 Tsakouridis, judgment of 23 November 2010. 
155. Case C-348/09 P.I., judgment of 22 May 2012. 
156. Case C-430/10 Gaydarov, judgment of 17 November 2011. 
157. Case C-434/10 Aladzhov, judgment of 17 November 2011. 
158. Case C-400/12 MG, judgment of 16 January 2014. 
159. Case C-378/12 Onuekwere, judgment of 16 January 2014. 
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 This willingness is best demonstrated in the last judgment rendered by the 
Court of Justice in MG where it essentially ruled that EU citizens residing for 
more than ten years in the host Member State may be disqualified from the 
protection of Article 28(3)(a) of Directive 2004/38/EC (i.e. being able to be 
removed only on the imperative grounds of public security) just because they 
were imprisoned after the qualifying period was acquired. Given that impris-
onment quite naturally follows any criminal conduct, it would appear that the 
enhanced protection against expulsion is not so enhanced after all. It may 
very well be that it is no protection at all ... 
 This approach should be seen against the background of the case-law on 
the actual procedural safeguards EU citizen enjoy under Directive 2004/38/ 
EC where the Court of Justice is a strong defender of EU citizens.  
 In Byankov,160 the Court of Justice emphatically demolished Bulgarian 
rules that made it impossible to reopen a decision which was adopted in 
breach of EU free movement law. In ZZ,161 the Court of Justice did the same 
job in relation to ‘secret’ court proceedings where the EU citizen was not told 
about the grounds for restrictive decision because of public security grounds. 
 The strong attachment of the Member States to the possibility of restrict-
ing free movement on the grounds of public policy or public security and the 
Court of Justice’s willingness not to stand as an obstacle to this means that no 
absolute protection against expulsion is likely for the foreseeable future. 
However, procedural safeguards of EU citizens that help them fight arbitrary 
or incorrect decisions restricting their rights are being strengthened by the 
Court of Justice. 
 In this forge, between the ever-moving hammer of public interests and the 
constant anvil of free movement rights and safeguards, the delicate balance 
between those often competing rights is being made. 
3. EU citizenship beyond Directive 2004/38/EC – exploring 
national application of primary EU law 
Recent case-law such as Ruiz Zambrano162 and Rottmann163 not only revived 
the academic debate surrounding EU citizenship and free movement, but also 
                                                        
160. Case C-300/11 ZZ, judgment of 4 June 2013. 
161. Council document 12218/03 (point III.4). 
162. Case C-34/09 Ruiz Zambrano, judgment of 8 March 2011. 
163. Case C-135/08 Rottmann, judgment of 2 March 2010. 
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had considerable effects on the work of EU institutions, and namely the 
Commission as guardian of the Treaties.  
 The national legal professions swiftly took up this new case-law,164 and 
Ruiz Zambrano in particular, in view of ‘testing’ its boundaries and opportu-
nities for counselling and litigation. In this process, also an increasing number 
of citizens’ complaints, petitions and parliamentary questions on the conse-
quences of this new line of jurisprudence were brought to the institutions. 
 This stimulating effect can be explained by the fact that it appeared to of-
fer a whole new world of EU law-argumentation to long-standing constella-
tions and issues that were considered problematic or unsatisfactory, but for 
which no EU law remedy seemed traditionally in reach. This is namely the 
case for issues such as ‘purely internal situations’, ‘reverse discrimination’165 
(see section 3.1 below) and, as far as Rottmann is concerned, the question 
how free Member States actually are when acting within their purely national 
competence of laying down the conditions of acquisition and loss of their na-
tionality (see section 3.2 below).  
                                                        
164. Case C-434/09 McCarthy, judgment of 5 May 2011; case C-256/11 Dereci, judgment 
of 15 November 2011; case C-40/11 Iida, judgment of 8 November 2012; joined cases 
C-356/11 and C-357/11 O & S, judgment of 6 December 2012; case C-87/12 Ymera-
ga, judgment of 8 May 2013; case C-86/12 Alokpa, judgment of 10 October 2013; 
Advocate General Sharpston in case C-456/12 O and case C-457/12 S, opinion of 12 
December 2013. 
165. See e.g. Oosterom-Staples, ‘To what extent has reverse discrimination been re-
versed?’ European Journal of Migration and Law 14 (2012), pp. 151-172.  
  See also, Opinion of Advocate General Sharpston in case C-456/12 O and case C-
457/12 S, 12 December 2013 at paragraph 86, 87: ‘Why a Member State would wish 
thus to treat its own nationals less favourably than other EU citizens (who, except for 
their nationality, might very well be in identical or similar circumstances) is curious. 
So is the fact that, by denying residence, that Member State might be at risk of de fac-
to ‘expelling’ its own nationals, forcing them either to move to another Member State 
where EU law will guarantee that they can reside with their family members or per-
haps to leave the European Union altogether. Such a measure sits oddly with the soli-
darity that is presumed to underlie the relationship between a Member State and its 
own nationals. It is also difficult to reconcile with the principle of sincere cooperation 
that, in my view, applies between Member States just as it does between Member 
States and the Union. (...). Yet, the written observations and the oral submissions in 
the present cases show that a considerable number of Member States consider that 
EU law does not preclude them from doing exactly that.’ 
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3.1. The Ruiz Zambrano case line: where do we stand?  
It does not come as surprise that the most interesting practical questions of 
the Ruiz Zambrano case line are linked to the status of non-EU national fami-
ly members of EU citizens. Their situation has been in the overwhelming ma-
jority of cases, i.e. in case of non-mobile EU citizens, been regulated by pure-
ly national migration law and not by EU law, the latter being the case for mo-
bile EU citizens and for family reunifications amongst non-EU nationals.  
 In some Member States purely national migration rules have traditionally 
been more restrictive than related EU laws which are the result of negotiation 
and compromise, reflecting different views on and experiences with ‘migra-
tion management’. Therefore, the emergence of an EU law-avenue in nation-
al, entrenched legal battle-zones is always an invigorating experience, for 
both academia, practitioners and, of course, the concerned individuals: Union 
light at the end of a national tunnel. 
 In this respect, it is not without irony to observe that what has been de-
scribed as the emancipation of EU citizenship ‘from the constraints inherent 
in its free movement origins’166 which ‘demonstrates the paramount constitu-
tional importance of EU citizenship’167 takes it, origin from a classical migra-
tion law constellation and that the ‘fundamental status of the nationals of the 
Member States’ is manifested and gains autonomy via case-law that has it 
most practical implications for rights which are only ‘derived’ from EU citi-
zens.168 
 This emancipation of EU citizenship from its free movement origins was 
not only accompanied with excitement, but also with confusion and uncer-
tainty. Did we witness the beginning of a new era, or was Ruiz Zambrano an 
exceptional one-off, unnecessarily constructed around a wider Überbau?169 
                                                        
166. Lenaerts, ‘The concept of EU citizenship in the case law of the European Court of 
Justice’ ERA Forum 13 (2013), pp. 569-583 at p. 570. 
167. Ibid. p. 582.  
168. With details on this derived rights, see Opinion of Advocate General Sharpston in 
case C-456/12 O and case C-457/12 S, 12 December 2013, paragraph 45 (seq). 
169. See Oosterom-Staples, ‘To what extent has reverse discrimination been reversed?’ 
European Journal of Migration and Law 14 (2012), pp. 151-172 at p. 171: ‘Fair 
enough, the protection of dependent minors is a goal worth pursuing, but if the genu-
ine enjoyment-test was only designed to provide an adequate solution for the Ruiz 




 Three years into the discovery of EU citizenship as an ‘autonomous con-
cept’170 and a whole series of judgments later, one can safely say that more 
clarity is gradually emerging. 
 Indeed, despite several argumentative attempts, the Court of Justice has so 
far refused to apply the Ruiz Zambrano solution to any other constellation 
than that of minor children who would be forced to leave the territory of the 
EU ‘as a whole’.171 The Court of Justice regularly underlines the ‘exceptional 
circumstances’172 and the ‘very specific situations’ of its initial finding. As 
one commentator said, an ‘expansionist phase’ was quickly succeeded by a 
‘rationalising phase’, criticising ‘the Court’s reticence in exploring the real 
potential of the status of Union citizenship’.173 However within this frame, 
the Court of Justice also confirmed that the Ruiz Zambrano logic is by no 
means limited to mere blood relationship between the minor EU citizen and 
his non-EU national parent(s), nor is it necessary that the family is actually 
living together under the same roof174 (patchwork families).  
 Furthermore, the Court of Justice has also contributed in clarifying how to 
practically handle a case involving residence rights of non-EU national fami-
ly members of EU citizens, combining previous case-law with the Ruiz Zam-
brano-line175 as well as secondary law with a direct application of primary 
law (Articles 20 and 21 TFEU). 
 A check of applicability of secondary EU law as laid down in Directive 
2004/38/EC is the first step. In doing so, national courts will have to go be-
yond a literal interpretation of Articles 3 and 7 of Directive 2004/38/EC when 
ascertaining ‘who his dependent of whom?‘ and who has ‘sufficient re-
                                                        
170. Lenaerts, ‘The concept of EU citizenship in the case law of the European Court of 
Justice’ ERA Forum 13 (2013), pp. 569-583 at p. 582. 
171. Dereci, judgment of 15 November 2011, paragraph 66. 
172. Joined cases C-356/11 and C-357/11 O & S, judgment of 6 December 2012, para-
graph 55. 
173. Tryfonidou, ‘Case Note – (Further) Signs of a Turn of the Tide on the CJEU’s Citi-
zenship jurisprudence, Case C-40/11 Iida, judgment of 8 November 2012, not yet re-
ported’ Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law (2013), pp. 302-320 at 
p. 320. 
174. Joined cases C-356/11 and C-357/11 O & S, judgment of 6 December 2012, para-
graphs 54, 55. See on this, Tewocht, ‘Von Zambrano bis O. und S. – Zur (Weiter-
)entwicklung der Kernbereichsrechtsprechung des EuGH’ Zeitschrift für europarecht-
liche Studien, 16 (2013), pp. 219-237. 
175. Case C-86/12 Alokpa, judgment of 10 October 2013. 
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sources’ by having due regard to yet another line of important case-law, i.e. 
Zhu and Chen176 and Article 21 TFEU.  
 In Alokpa, the Court of Justice held  
‘(...) that a refusal to allow a parent, whether a national of a Member State or of a third 
country, who is the carer of a minor child who is a Union citizen to reside with that child in 
the host Member State would deprive the child’s right of residence of any useful effect, 
since enjoyment by a young child of a right of residence necessarily implies that the child 
is entitled to be accompanied by the person who is his primary carer and accordingly that 
the carer must be in a position to reside with the child in the host Member State for the du-
ration of such residence (see Zhu and Chen, paragraph 45, and Iida, paragraph 69).  
 Thus, while Article 21 TFEU and Directive 2004/38 grant a right to reside in the host 
Member State to a minor child who is a national of another Member State and who satis-
fies the conditions of Article 7(1)(b) of that directive, the same provisions allow a parent 
who is that minor’s primary carer to reside with the child in the host Member State (see, to 
that effect, Zhu and Chen, paragraphs 46 and 47).’177 
Only once the conditions of Directive 2004/38/EC read literally and in light 
of Zhu and Chen are not fulfilled, there is space to consider a direct applica-
tion of Article 20 TFEU in line with the Ruiz Zambrano logic and as illustrat-
ed in the Alokpa case: 
‘(...) Therefore, if the referring court holds that Article 21 TFEU does not preclude Mrs 
Alokpa from being refused a right of residence in Luxembourg, that court must still deter-
mine whether such a right of residence may nevertheless be granted to her, exceptionally – 
if the effectiveness of the Union citizenship that her children enjoy is not to be undermined 
– in light of the fact that, as a consequence of such a refusal, those children would find 
themselves obliged in practice to leave the territory of the EU altogether, thus denying 
them the genuine enjoyment of the substance of the rights conferred by virtue of that sta-
tus.’178 
It has to be noted that this latest clarification in the Alokpa case concerned 
minor children born and residing in Luxembourg which, however, held 
French nationality, although they never resided in France. Although this case 
concerned not a ‘purely internal situation’ as was the case in Ruiz Zambrano, 
the Court of Justice nevertheless combined and synthesised the different ap-
plicable strands of its jurisprudence. 
 Coming back to where we started: ‘Ruiz Zambrano: where do we stand’? 
The welcome discovery of EU citizenship as an autonomous concept has ini-
                                                        
176. Case C-200/02 Zhu and Chen, judgment of 19 October 2004. 
177. Case C-86/12 Alokpa, judgment of 10 October 2013, paragraphs 28 and 29. 
178. Case C-86/12 Alokpa, judgment of 10 October 2013, paragraph 33. 
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tially led to excitement and confusion. The growing subsequent case-law has 
contributed in clarifying issues of substance and of practical application. The 
achieved state of emancipation of EU citizenship has been defended and up-
held, but the Court of Justice, so far, refused to extending it further. There 
remains room for exploring the depth of the Ruiz Zambrano jurisprudence 
even within its confided boundaries, as illustrated by its application to patch-
work families. One can question, for example, whether legal minority is a de-
cisive criterion or whether also grown-up EU citizens that are otherwise ‘de-
pendent’ on a non-EU national parent (e.g. due to disability) could benefit 
from the Ruiz Zambrano jurisprudence.179  
 Finally, there remains also room for further clarification, in particular, 
subsequent case-law would benefit from further clarifying the references, in-
troduced in Dereci180 (one of the first follow-up cases to Ruiz Zambrano) to 
the EU Charter and the European Convention on Human Rights, its precise 
meaning and delineation.181 
3.2. The Rottmann case line: new answers to a recurring issue? 
In contrast to litigation and academic debates triggered by Ruiz Zambrano 
which mainly aimed at testing its practical effects and limitations182 to en-
hance individual rights, the discussions around Rottmann took the debate well 
beyond the issue of the deprivation of an individual’s status as EU citizen and 
                                                        
179. See on this, e.g. Tewocht, ‘Von Zambrano bis O. und S. – Zur (Weiter-)entwicklung 
der Kernbereichsrechtsprechung des EuGH’ Zeitschrift für europarechtliche Studien, 
16 (2013), pp. 219-237 at p. 236. 
180. Case C-256/11 Dereci, judgment of 15 November 2011. 
181. See, in this respect also Opinion of Advocate General Sharpston in case C-456/12 O 
and case C-457/12 S, 12 December 2013, paragraphs 57, 58: ‘(...) I find that passage 
puzzling as it might be read as suggesting that there the Court recognised three sepa-
rate bases under EU law: the right to respect for private and family life (Article 7 of 
the EU Charter); the right of free movement and residence (Article 21(1) TFEU) and 
the denial of the genuine enjoyment of the substance of the rights conferred on an EU 
citizen (Article 20 TFEU). For situations not falling within the scope of EU law, the 
right to respect for private and family life under Article 8 of the ECHR might form 
another basis for establishing a right of residence. (...) If that is what the Court intend-
ed, the Court has yet to resolve whether one applies the same test in order to deter-
mine both whether EU law (and thus also the EU Charter) applies and whether a 
measure denying residence is contrary to Article 20 or 21 TFEU. (...)’. 
182. Case C-40/11 Iida, judgment of 8 November 2012, paragraph 71; case C-87/12 
Ymeraga, judgment of 8 May 2013, paragraph 36. 
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of the rights attached to it. Findings were used for public policy considera-
tions aimed at challenging the traditional understanding that Member States 
are free to act autonomously in the field of acquisition of nationality (and 
thus, EU citizenship). 
 The most prominent recent example of controversy concerns the so called 
‘investor citizenship schemes’ which offer Member State nationality – and 
therefore EU citizenship – in return for financial investment alone. These 
schemes have attracted wide public attention and culminated in a plenary de-
bate in the Parliament in January 2014. The main question posed: is there an 
EU law case for questioning Member States’ autonomy when granting natu-
ralisation?183 
 States have the sovereign right to determine who their nationals are and to 
define the conditions for the acquisition of their nationality. This principle is 
enshrined in Article 3 of the European Convention on Nationality184 and was 
underlined at the Maastricht negotiations where, as a counterpart to the crea-
tion of EU citizenship, Member States declared ‘that the question whether an 
individual possesses the nationality of a Member state shall be settled solely 
by reference to the national law of the Member State concerned’.185  
 This principle is fully respected by Article 20 TFEU and the Court of Jus-
tice regularly recalls that ‘it is for each Member State, having due regard to 
EU law, to lay down the conditions for acquisition and loss of nationality’.186 
The proviso ‘having due regard to EU law’ is central to the discussion. By 
including it in its rulings the Court of Justice makes clear that even when a 
matter falls within the competence of the Member States, this does not alter 
the fact that, where there is a nexus with EU law, the national rules concerned 
must have due regard to the latter. 
 In Rottmann, the Court of Justice indicated that, in respect of EU citizens, 
the exercise by Member States of their power to lay down the conditions for 
the acquisition and loss of nationality, in so far as it affects the rights con-
ferred and protected by the legal order of the European Union (as is in partic-
ular the case of a decision effectively resulting in loss of EU citizenship), is 
amenable to judicial review carried out in the light of EU law. 
                                                        
183. ‘Should Citizenship be for Sale?’ EUI Working Paper, RSCAS 2014/1, edited by 
Shachar and Bauböck, and in particular Shaw, ‘Citizenship for sale: could and should 
the EU intervene?’, page 33 seq. 
184. European Convention on Nationality, Strasbourg, 6 November 1997. 
185. Declaration n°2 annexed to the Treaty of Maastricht. 
186. See case C-369/90 Micheletti, judgment of 7 July 1992, case C-192/99 Kaur, judg-
ment of 20 February 2001 and case C-135/08 Rottmann, judgment of 2 March 2010. 
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 Although Rottmann concerned a withdrawal of a national citizenship ac-
quired by deception, it is however interpreted by part of the literature187 as 
paving the way for further aspects of Member States’ nationality laws to be 
potentially considered as falling by reason of their nature and consequences 
within the ambit of EU law.  
 It is notably argued that the Court’s approach could potentially also apply 
to refusals to grant nationality of a Member State to non-EU nationals in the 
first place, preventing for instance refusals for disproportionate reasons. It is 
contended, in particular, that to the extent that it implies that a refusal by Aus-
tria to re-instate Mr Rottmann’s original nationality might be challengeable 
under EU law, this judgment suggests that it is not just the act of withdrawal 
of nationality that is governed by EU law. Others188 even go a step further 
and support the view that national measures determining the scope of national 
citizenship, such as could be the case for naturalisation conditions, also affect 
the scope of EU citizenship and of EU rights.  
 Since the Rottmann judgment brings under judicial review in the light of 
EU law the exercise by Member States of their power to lay down the condi-
tions for the acquisition and loss of nationality in general, it seems to leave 
open the above possibilities and it cannot be excluded that the Court of Jus-
tice might extend its reasoning to aspects relating to access to national citi-
zenship in the future.  
 However, the Court of Justice took care to circumscribe the scope of its 
approach: it made a point of distinguishing this case from Kaur, an earlier 
case in which a refusal to grant full British nationality was challenged.189 It 
indicated that Mr Rottmann was deprived of EU citizenship and the rights at-
taching thereto which he had previously enjoyed, whereas in Kaur the appli-
cant had never enjoyed such rights and therefore ‘could not be deprived of 
                                                        
187. See contributions by De Groot and Seling, Shaw, Kochenov and Davies, published on 
the EUDO Forum following the Rottmann judgment http://eudo-citizenship. 
eu/citizenship-forum/254-has-the-european-court-of-justice-challenged-member-
state-sovereignty-in-nationality-law.  
188. See in particular Davies, ‘The entirely conventional supremacy of Union citizenship 
and rights’ (EUDO Forum) http://eudo-citizenship.eu/citizenship-forum/254-has-
the-european-court-of-justice-challenged-member-state-sovereignty-in-nationality-
law?start=2. He argues that Member States have the primary competence to deter-
mine their own laws concerning access to national citizenship, but nevertheless sub-
ject to the principle that where this competence impacts on EU law rights – which it 
does, since every national citizen is an EU citizen – they must respect EU law and its 
rules and principles.  
189. Case C-192/99 Kaur, judgment of 20 February 2001. 
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them’. It made clear that it is only the deprivation of EU citizenship rights 
which in its view can bring the situation within the scope of EU law.  
 Even though the Rottmann jurisprudence alone may not constitute a suffi-
cient basis for contesting the compatibility with EU law of controversial natu-
ralisation schemes, such as those offering EU citizenship in return for finan-
cial investment, by imposing on national courts the task of following a strict 
scrutiny of proportionality, Rottmann may nevertheless have marked a turn-
ing point in nationality matters, also at national level. In the years to come we 
might witness a shift from loose to strict judicial scrutiny in nationality mat-
ters at domestic level. 
3.3. The principle of sincere cooperation in matters of EU citizen-
ship 
In light of their impact on EU citizenship and given the strong EU rights at-
tached to that status, naturalisation decisions taken by a Member State might 
no longer be regarded as neutral with regards to other Member States and to 
the EU as a whole.190 The assumption made in the Nottebohm case in 1955 
that ‘nationality has its most immediate, its most far-reaching and, for most 
people, its only effects within the legal system conferring it’ is no longer valid, 
at least not within the EU. As mentioned by Advocate General Poiares Madu-
ro in Rottmann: ‘Tel est le miracle de la citoyenneté de l'Union: elle renforce 
les liens qui nous unissent à nos Etats (dans la mesure où nous sommes à pré-
sent des citoyens européens précisément parce que nous sommes des natio-
naux de nos Etats) et, en même temps, elle nous en émancipe (dans la mesure 
où nous sommes à présent des citoyens au-delà de nos Etats)’.191  
 Given the diversity of nationality laws in the Member States and the ab-
sence of harmonisation and cooperation on these questions, decisions by 
Member States in this field can lead to tensions as shown not only in the con-
troversies surrounding the citizenship investor schemes, but also in other in-
stances such as that of the naturalisation of certain groups by Member States 
(e.g. Moldovan or Ukrainian citizens in Bulgaria and Moldovan citizens in 
Romania).  
 In an EU based on trust, solidarity and cooperation between the Member 
States, there is a case for arguing that there is need for having rules and prin-
                                                        
190. Pascouau ‘La politique migratoire de l'Union européenne. De Schengen à Lisbonne’, 
LGDJ, Fondation Varenne (2011). 
191. Paragraph 23. 
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ciples in place regulating potential conflicts between them.192 One of the 
principles which can perform this important task is the principle of sincere 
cooperation enshrined in Article 4(3) TEU which provides that ‘Member 
States shall refrain from any measure which could jeopardise the attainment 
of the Union’s objectives.’ 
 The most important area in which the principle of sincere cooperation dis-
plays its full impact is the securing of the unity of the European legal order.193 
This unity can be challenged by the autonomy of the Member States. The po-
litical and legal conflicts between the Member States arising from the tension 
created by the need for unity – and thus the need for cooperation – and the 
need to respect their respective autonomy require mechanisms for the resolu-
tion of these disputes. Mutually ensuring each other’s autonomy obliges the 
involved actors to take the competencies of the other actors into account. 
 In the absence of harmonisation of nationality laws of the Member States, 
this principle could serve as a basis for questioning Member States’ practices 
which would clearly go against the norms and obligations by which they are 
bound under international law.194 This for instance lead to the resolution of 
the Maltese issue where the Investors Scheme was eventually aligned – 
through the introduction of an effective residence condition – with the criteria 
upon which Member States traditionally build their nationality laws, namely 
the existence of a bond, a genuine link195 with the country or its nationals. 
                                                        
192. See Kochenov, ‘Rounding up the circle: the mutation of Member States’ nationalities 
under pressure from EU citizenship’ EUI RSCAS Paper 2010/23, p. 20: ‘Precisely 
because EU citizenship is ultimately a secondary status, the power of the Member 
States is severely weakened, since while each one of them taken separately can have 
an illusion that it controls access to EU citizenship, taken together they do not, as long 
as the naturalisation regimes are not harmonised, at least to some extent. Huge dispar-
ities between the citizenship laws of all the Member States all lead to the multiplica-
tion of the routes to acquisition of the same status of European citizenship which, as 
has been demonstrated above, has effectively overtaken the majority of the main at-
tributes of nationality from national level’. 
193. Neframi ‘Le principe de coopération loyale comme fondemant identitaire de l'Union 
européenne’ Revue de l'Union européenne, n° 556, mars 2012, pp. 198 and 201; Hu-
omo-Kettunen, ‘Heterarchical constitutional structures in the European legal space’, Eu-
ropean Journal of Legal Studies, Volume 6, Issue 1 (Spring/Summer 2013), pp. 47-65. 
194. Which, as reminded by Advocate General Poiares Maduro in Rottmann, form part of 
the EU legal order – paragraph 29. 
195. The principle of a bond/genuine connection with relation to nationality was expressed 
by the International Court of Justice in its judgement of 6 April 1955, Nottebohm, The 
Court held that ‘nationality is a legal bond having as its basis a social fact of attach-




 This principle can also serve as a common ground to foster cooperation in 
a domain which impacts on different legal orders. Such cooperation between 
the Member States is advocated by a number of academics which see this as a 
way to move forward in an area of Member State competence.196 
 The Rottmann judgment also points to the need for Member States to work 
more closely together in the area of nationality. The call to the national courts 
and authorities to examine whether it is possible for Mr Rottmann to recover 
the original nationality, and whether he should be afforded a reasonable peri-
od of time in order to try to recover it, indeed implies a certain degree of co-
operation and coordination between the Member States concerned.  
 Increased cooperation would also enable to balance the conclusions which 
can be drawn from Micheletti or Garcia Avello.197 The impossibility for a 
Member State to restrict the effects of the granting of nationality by another 
Member State by imposing additional conditions for recognition of that na-
tionality indeed calls for exchanges between the Member States on the wider 
implications of their decisions in the field of nationality.198  
                                                        
istence of reciprocal rights and duties. It may be said to constitute the juridical expres-
sion of the fact that the individual upon whom it is conferred, either directly by the law 
or as a result of an act of the authorities, is in fact more closely connected with the 
population of the State conferring nationality than with that of any other State’.  
  The European Convention on Nationality provides in its Article 2 (definitions) that 
nationality means the legal bond between a person and a state. Further articles also 
point to the fact that states should take into account the existence of a bond when de-
signing their nationality laws.  
  The Court of Justice highlighted in the Rottmann case that ‘solidarity and good 
faith between it [the Member State] and its nationals and also the reciprocity of rights 
and duties [...] form the bedrock of the bond of nationality’. The importance of a 
tie/bond was further underlined by the European Parliament in its Resolution of 16 
January 2014 ‘EU citizenship implies the holding of a stake with the Union and de-
pends on a person’s ties with Europe, its Member States or on personal ties with EU 
citizens. It should never become a tradable commodity.’ 
196. de Groot, ‘Towards a European nationality law’, Electronic Journal of Comparative 
Law, Vol.8.3 (October 2004); Vonk, ‘Dual nationality in the EU’ (2012), p. 334. 
197. Case C-148/02 Garcia Avello, judgment of 2 October 2003. 
198. Wollenschläger, ‘Grundfreiheit ohne Markt: Die Herausbildung der Unionsbürgerschaft 
im unionsrechtlichen Freizügigkeitsregime’ Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck (2007), p. 147. 
See also de Groot, op. cit., p. 12. He argues that the principle of sincere cooperation 
could be used if a Member State were for example to grant its nationality to an im-
portant part of the population of a non EU-Member State, without prior consultation 
with the EU (e.g. the Netherlands to the entire population of Surinam). This approach 
was also supported by Advocate-General Poiares Maduro in the Rottmann case where 
he saw grounds for applying the sincere cooperation principle in such cases (para. 30). 
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 Although, for the reasons cited above, EU action to harmonise nationality 
laws would not be possible under the current Treaties, it would be in the 
Member States’ own interest to achieve greater synergy in this area. A first 
step could be to mutually share knowledge and experience on conditions and 
procedures for obtaining Member States’ nationality. The expertise of the 
Council of Europe can be called upon, as it is the forum where relevant inter-
national conventions are adopted and such issues are regularly discussed. 
4. Political rights of EU citizens 
The political rights of EU citizens under the Treaties include the possibility 
for EU citizens to express their political will by exercising their right to stand 
as a candidate and vote in the European and local elections in the Member 
States where they reside, under the same conditions as nationals of that 
State.199  
 The political rights, firstly introduced in the Maastricht Treaty as one of 
the fundamental set of rights substantiating the status of EU citizenship, con-
tribute to the very construction of democracy upon which the EU is founded 
and are defined in secondary law instruments as ‘an instance of the applica-
tion of the principle of equality and non-discrimination between nationals 
and non-nationals and a corollary of the right to move and reside freely’.200 
 As described above, the very essence of EU citizenship is to ensure that 
EU citizens feel at home wherever they are in the EU. Further, the enfran-
chisement of EU citizens in their State of residence is typically seen as part of 
a process contributing to creating an even closer Union among the peoples of 
Europe201 and a means to enable EU citizens to better integrate in the host 
society.  
                                                        
199. Article 22 TFEU. 
200. Directive 93/109/EC laying down detailed arrangements for the exercise of the right 
to vote and stand as a candidate in elections to the European Parliament for citizens of 
the Union residing in a Member State of which they are not nationals OJ 1993 L 329, 
page 34; Directive 94/80/EC laying down detailed arrangements for the exercise of 
the right to vote and to stand as a candidate in municipal elections by citizens of the 
Union residing in a Member State of which they are not nationals, OJ 1994 L 368, 
page 38. 
201. Preamble of the Treaty on European Union.  
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4.1. Derogations to the principle of equal treatment in the EU 
acquis 
Regarding derogations from the principle of equal treatment, some condi-
tions and derogations to the equality of treatment subsist in EU secondary 
law. They have been justified as covering circumstances linked to national 
specificities (for example, the linguistic situation in Belgium) or to avoid ‘any 
polarisation between lists of nationals and non-nationals’ (in Luxembourg, 
where non-nationals form more than 20 % of the electorate and where, for 
this reason, a minimum period of prior residence is allowed).202  
 Other differences in treatment regard the possibility for Member States to 
restrict access by non-nationals to public offices, such as the position of 
mayor or member of the local government. The latter have been justified on 
grounds that ‘the duties of the leadership of basic local government units may 
involve taking part in the exercise of the official authority and in the safe-
guarding of the general interest’.203  
 While remaining legally compatible with the Treaties and related case-
law, such derogations seem at odds with the very objectives of EU citizenship 
and are likely to be eroded in the future, particularly with regard to the evolu-
tion of increasingly multi-cultural societies and the gradual deepening of 
European integration, including through the exercise of free movement.  
 These derogations originate from the traditional citizenship-based ap-
proach whereby ‘nationality’, based on the Staatsvolk (state people),204 re-
mains the indispensable condition for fully-fledged political rights. The un-
derlying assumption is that only citizens holding the nationality of a given 
Member State can possess the necessary bond and allegiance to ensure that 
‘general interests of the state’ would not be put at risk.  
 It has been argued that a change in policy in this area would logically de-
rive from a deepening of EU integration toward a federalist approach. Inde-
pendently from the future path of European integration, it might also simply 
be destined to become a natural process in Member States, due to the gradual 
                                                        
202. Article 14 of Directive 93/109/EC; Article 12 of Directive 94/80/EC. 
203. Article 5 and Preamble of Directive 94/80/EC. 
204. Lansbergen and Shaw, ‘National membership models in a multilevel Europe’ Oxford 
University Press and New York University School of Law (2010). German Constitu-
tional Court BVerfG 63, 37 (Schleswig-Holstein); BVerfG 63;60 (Hamburg) – deci-
sions of 31 October 1990; Austrian Constitutional Court VfGH G218/03 – decision 
of 20 June 2004. 
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multi-cultural change and intertwining of societies and peoples; a process 
which is encouraged by the freedom of movement itself.  
 In this context, it will be crucial to observe new trends of national laws 
and practices in the Member States. For example, in Luxembourg – a Mem-
ber State which can be considered as a laboratory in this field given the im-
portant percentage of non-nationals residing there – the residence conditions 
imposed to EU citizens from other countries to be entitled to vote and to 
stand as candidates in elections to Parliament and in local elections were re-
cently lowered and the access to public offices, namely the restriction to the 
post of mayor and member of the executive local government provided by the 
Luxembourgish legislation, lifted. 
4.2. European Parliament elections 
Directive 93/109/EC lays down detailed arrangements for EU citizens resid-
ing in an EU country of which they are not nationals to exercise the right to 
vote and to stand as a candidate in European Parliament elections in that 
country. 
 Regarding its implementation, Member States were obliged to transpose 
Directive 93/109/EC into national law by 1 February 1994 so that it would be 
in force by the June 1994 EP elections, as stipulated in Article 17 of Directive 
93/109/EC. 
 The compatibility of national legislation with Directive 93/109/EC in the 
States that were members of the EU on 1 May 2004 has been assessed by the 
Commission in its reports of 1998 and 2000 on the application of Directive 
93/109/EC.205  
 All twelve States which were members of the EU at the time of the adop-
tion of Directive 93/109/EC206 had implemented its provisions of within the 
prescribed deadline (national implementing legislation was adopted between 
                                                        
205. Report on the application of Directive 93/109/EC – Voting rights of EU citizens living 
in a Member State of which they are not nationals in European Parliament elections, 
COM(97)731 final of 7 January 1998 and Communication on the application of Di-
rective 93/109/EC to the June 1999 elections to the European Parliament – Right of 
Union citizens residing in a Member State of which they are not nationals to vote and 
stand in elections to the European Parliament, COM(2000) 843 final of 18 Decem-
ber 2000. 
206. Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Greece, Spain, France, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the 
Netherlands, Portugal and the United Kingdom. 
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22 December 1993 and 11 April 1994) and in time to apply them to the June 
1994 EP elections, although in many cases the date of implementation was 
very close to the elections.  
 Sweden, Austria and Finland, which subsequently acceded to the EU, 
adopted the necessary provisions by 1996 and applied them in their first EP 
elections held in the course of 1995 and 1996.  
 To tackle the main application issues regarded as unsatisfactory by the 
Commission in its 2000 report207 (such as unsatisfactory operation of the in-
formation exchange system), various infringement proceedings were launched 
which led to correct transposition and implementation of EU law by Member 
States (Austria, Belgium, Germany, Spain, Italy, Luxembourg, the Nether-
lands, and Sweden). 
 Member States that acceded to the EU in 2004 and 2007 put in place legal 
rules transposing Directive 93/109/EC at the date of their accession.  
 On the whole, the legal conditions allowing EU citizens to exercise their 
right to vote and to stand as a candidate in their Member State of residence 
were fulfilled.208  
 Certain obstacles to EU citizens’ political participation however existed, 
namely on the occasion of the 2009 EP elections, such as disproportionate 
residence requirements (Slovenia),209 administrative formalities discriminat-
ing against EU citizens (Malta),210 additional requirements for EU citizens 
seeking to be enrolled to vote or to stand as a candidate, such as the require-
ment to provide a registration document for proving residence or the obliga-
tion to renew registration for each European election (Bulgaria, Czech Re-
                                                        
207. Communication on the application of Directive 93/109/EC to the June 1999 elections 
to the European Parliament – Right of Union citizens residing in a Member State of 
which they are not nationals to vote and stand in elections to the European Parlia-
ment, COM(2000) 843 final of 18 December 2000. 
208. Report on the election of Members of the European Parliament (1976 Act as amend-
ed by Decision 2002/772/EC, Euratom) and on the participation of European Union 
citizens in elections for the European Parliament in the Member State of residence 
(Directive 93/109/EC), COM(2010)605 final of 27 October. 
209. According to previous Slovenian legislation in place at the time, EU citizens from 
other Member States were granted the right to vote and to stand in European elections 
only after a minimum of five years’ residence in that Member State. 
210. Malta’s legislation initially provided that for registering on the electoral roll EU citi-
zens from other Member States had to present a ‘Maltese ID card’. Furthermore, the 
electoral authority, ‘whenever it deems necessary’, could require EU citizens to re-
new their declaration made when registering on the electoral roll. As a consequence, 
EU citizens from other Member States might be excluded from participating in the 
elections in Malta even if already enrolled on the electoral lists. 
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public, Cyprus, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Roma-
nia, Slovakia and Slovenia).  
 In most cases, irregular limitations were subsequently amended and the 
national legislations of the Member States concerned were brought in line 
with EU law.211 Three cases remain to be definitely solved.212  
 In addition, the Commission reported that a number of Member States213 
seemed to have failed to correctly transpose the obligation to provide infor-
mation to citizens on the detailed arrangements for exercising their right to 
vote and to stand in elections, contributing to determine low participation in 
the elections. All these cases were solved thanks to the measures taken and 
clarifications provided by the Member States concerned. 
 As regards Croatia, the legislative framework for transposing Directive 
93/109/EC, applicable on the date of Croatian accession to the EU (1 July 
2013), seems in principle to be in line with its provisions. 
 Directive 93/109/EC permits the introduction of exceptions to the princi-
ple of equal treatment between national and non-national voters where this is 
justified by problems specific to a Member State. Article 14(1) of Directive 
93/109/EC provides that if, in a given EU country, the proportion of non-
national resident EU citizens of voting age exceeds 20 % of the total number 
of EU citizens of voting age residing there, that EU country may apply for 
derogation.  
 The only Member State that has availed itself of such derogation is Lux-
embourg. Luxembourg restricts the right to vote to non-national EU citizens 
who have resided in its territory two years before registration. Regarding the 
right to stand as a candidate, Luxembourg requires non-national EU citizens 
to have their legal domicile in the territory of Luxembourg and to have resid-
ed there for five years before submitting the application.214 The previous leg-
islative framework provided for more restrictive conditions of residence.215  
                                                        
211. For example, Maltese legislation was amended in November 2012, when the Elec-
toral Commission reformed the registration system for EU citizen residents in Malta 
following a complaint filed to the Commission and a petition received by the Parlia-
ment in 2011. 
212. Slovenia, Slovakia and Czech Republic announced legislative measures to address 
the problem of compliance with EU law.  
213. All the 12 Member States acceding in 2004 and 2007 with the exception of Cyprus, 
Czech Republic, Estonia and Lithuania. 
214. Law of 18 February 2003, as modified by law of 13 February 2011. 
215. Article 1, Act of 25 February 1979 on the direct election of the representatives of the 
Grand Duchy of Luxembourg to the European Parliament, amended by Act of 28 




 The reasons for granting the derogation to Luxembourg were verified by 
the Commission ahead of both the 2004 and the 2009 EP elections by the 
Commission which concluded that the circumstances warranting the granting 
to Luxembourg of such derogation still applied (the proportion of non-nation-
al EU citizens of voting age residing in Luxembourg was almost 38 % of the 
total number of EU citizens of voting age residing there at 1 January 2007216). 
According to an update ahead of the 2014 EP elections, this proportion was 
more than 39 %.217 
 In addition, Article 14(2) of Directive 93/109/EC provides for another 
derogation, which allows Member States to refrain from applying Articles 6 
to 13 of Directive 93/109/EC and dispense from registration formalities na-
tionals of another Member State who reside in the Member State concerned 
and have the right to vote for the national parliament there.  
 The UK took advantage of such derogation with respect of Irish nationals, 
as the citizens of this Member State were already able to take part in national 
elections in the UK and so were already on the electoral register on account 
of the special arrangements for Irish citizens living in the UK who are permit-
ted to vote in all forms of elections. 
4.2.1. Are there any additional conditions imposed on EU citizens compared 
to national citizens (special registration or residence requirements)? 
Regarding additional conditions imposed on EU citizens compared to nation-
al citizens, there are several conditions that Member States require EU citi-
zens to meet. These conditions may directly or indirectly disfavour EU citi-
zens with respect to nationals.  
                                                        
the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg to the European Parliament. It required to non-
nationals five of the last six years of residence to exercise the right to vote and ten of 
the last twelve to stand as candidates.  
216. Report on granting a derogation pursuant to Article 19(2) of the EC Treaty, present-
ed under Article 14(3) of Directive 93/109/EC on the right to vote and to stand as a 
candidate in elections to the European Parliament, COM(2003)31 final of 27 Janu-
ary 2003 and Report on granting a derogation pursuant to Article 19(2) of the EC 
Treaty, presented under Article 14(3) of Directive 93/109/EC on the right to vote and 
to stand as a candidate in elections to the European Parliament, COM(2007)846 fi-
nal of 20 December 2007. 
217. Preparing for the 2014 European elections: further enhancing their democratic and 
efficient conduct, COM(2013)126 final of 12 March 2013. 
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4.2.1.1. Proof of identity 
Articles 9(3) and 10(3) of Directive 93/109/EC allow Member States to in-
troduce the option of requesting the production of a valid identity document 
for enrolment of voters and application for candidates.  
 The concern of the Commission was geared toward ensuring that EU citi-
zens were effectively allowed to enter in the electoral roll simply by produc-
ing a valid identity document issued by their own national authorities. An ex-
ample of the above is the adoption by Spain of Royal Decree 157/1996 that 
removed the obligation for EU citizens to produce a Spanish residence permit 
to gain entry on the electoral roll.  
 In September 2012, the Maltese authorities amended their national legisla-
tion218 and removed the obligation for EU citizens to present a valid identity 
card issued by the Maltese authorities for being registered on the electoral 
rolls.  
4.2.1.2. Registration requirements 
It should be noted that the requirement imposed by Member States to apply 
for registration on the electoral rolls constitutes a measure of implementation 
of Article 9(1) of Directive 93/109/EC, according to which Member States 
are under an obligation to take the necessary measures to enable an EU voter 
who has expressed the wish for such to be entered on the electoral roll suffi-
ciently in advance of the polling day.  
 Even where such obligation is not imposed to nationals, as the latter are 
automatically entered into the electoral registry (as it happens for instance in 
Austria, Belgium, the Netherlands, Slovenia, and Spain), it cannot be consid-
ered discriminatory as in fact it safeguards the EU citizen’s freedom to 
choose whether or not to participate in the electoral process of his/her Mem-
ber State of residence. 
4.2.1.3. Residence requirements 
In the absence of a definition of residence either in the Treaty or in Directive 
93/109/EC, it is up to Member States themselves to apply, in a non-
discriminatory way, to their nationals and to EU citizens alike, the residence 
concept as it flows from their own national legislation.  
                                                        
218. ‘Identity Card and other Identity Documents Act Order’ (LN 308/12), published on 
28 September 2012. 
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 According to a recent study,219 in the Netherlands a special regime was in 
force until 2008, according to which EU citizens must, unlike Dutch nation-
als, have been resident in the European part of the Netherlands on the day of 
nomination. EU citizens living in non-European parts of the Netherlands 
were not allowed to participate in the Dutch election of the European Parlia-
ment, as residence in the non-European parts of the Netherlands was not pre-
sumed to be residence ‘in a Member State of which he is not a national’ that 
would give entitlement to participate in elections to the European Parliament 
under the same conditions as Dutch nationals.  
 This regime was amended in 2008 following a judgement of the Court of 
Justice in Eman and Sevinger.220 
 Residence requirements may also apply to EU citizens willing to stand as 
candidates for EP elections in the home Member State. A recent study221 re-
ports that in Poland, for example, running in European Parliament elections is 
conditioned for Polish citizens on the residence requirement according to 
which the candidate needs to reside in Poland and to document five year resi-
dence within the EU prior to elections. EU citizens must only prove their res-
idence in Poland. 
4.2.1.4. Language skills 
Some Member States also impose language requirements. According to re-
cent studies,222 Greece requires elementary or sufficient knowledge of Greek 
language for voters and candidates respectively; nevertheless, the law does 
not foresee any formal procedure for testing the linguistic skills of the candi-
dates. Belgium requires that candidates speak the language of the constituen-
cy in which they stand as candidates (Dutch, French, and German). 
4.2.1.5. Participation in political parties 
In addition to the criteria above, the Commission already had the occasion to 
identify another obstacle to EU citizens’ enjoyment of their right to partici-
                                                        
219. Schrauwen, ‘Access to Electoral Rights – The Netherlands’, EUDO Citizenship Ob-
servatory, June 2013. 
220. Case C-300/04 Eman and Sevinger, judgment of 12 September 2006. 
221. Korzec and Pudzianowska, ‘Access to Electoral Rights – Poland’, EUDO Citizenship 
Observatory, June 2013. 
222. Christopoulos, ‘Access to Electoral Rights – Greece’, EUDO Citizenship Observato-
ry, June 2013 and Lafleur, ‘Access to Electoral Rights – Belgium’, EUDO Citizen-
ship Observatory, June 2013. 
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pate in the European elections,223 which is linked to discriminatory re-
strictions regarding membership of political parties and the conditions for 
founding political parties.  
 Member States’ laws restricting membership of political parties to their 
own nationals prevent other EU citizens from running in the European Par-
liament elections as members of political parties; furthermore, if non-national 
EU citizens do not have the right to found political parties, but can only join 
existing ones, they are denied the chance of representing platforms not repre-
sented by the existing parties. 
 The assessment of the national laws conducted by the Commission in 
2010 shows that in the Czech Republic, Lithuania, Poland and Slovakia, EU 
citizens from other Member States do not have the right to found political 
parties nor to become members of the existing parties. 
 In the Czech Republic and Lithuania the political parties can also put for-
ward on their lists independent candidates. In Poland, apart from the political 
parties, a group of voters have the right to put forward candidates. Nonethe-
less, this possibility does not remedy the discrimination against EU citizens 
from other Member States who are prevented under such legislation from ex-
ercising their right to stand as a candidate under the same conditions as na-
tionals. In Greece, Latvia and Spain, EU citizens from other Member States 
have the right to become members of the existing parties, but do not have the 
right to found a party.  
 The Commission launched infringement procedures against all seven 
abovementioned Member States.224  
 In Finland a quota of national citizens is fixed for founding a political par-
ty and thus non-national EU citizens can only found new political parties 
when acting together with nationals of these two Member States. Following 
the action of the Commission, Finland amended its legislation in 2012 and 
removed such quota. 
                                                        
223. Report on the election of Members of the European Parliament (1976 Act as amend-
ed by Decision 2002/772/EC, Euratom) and on the participation of European Union 
citizens in elections for the European Parliament in the Member State of residence 
(Directive 93/109/EC), COM(2010)605 final of 27 October 2010, p. 9. 
224. This Report takes account of the situation at the time of writing (early 2014). A swift 
evolution in some of the Member States’ laws and practice is likely to occur. 
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4.2.2. What additional changes will be required by the December 2012 
amendments to Directive 93/109/EC? 
Directive 93/109/EC was amended by Council Directive 2013/1/EU,225 
which provides for detailed arrangements concerning the right to stand as a 
candidate. The deadline for the transposition of the Directive was 28 January 
2014, with a view of the 2014 EP elections. At that date, roughly half of the 
Member States had notified transposition in its national law. 
 The amending Directive concentrates on alleviating some of the burden 
placed on national authorities in verifying whether or not somebody has been 
disbarred from standing as a candidate in their own state, in order to simplify 
the procedure and abolish those formalities acting as a barrier to the exercise 
of the right to stand as a candidate and contributing to the low number of EU 
citizens standing as candidates in EP elections in their Member State of resi-
dence. The main changes are the following: 
– The requirement for EU citizens submitting their application to stand as 
candidates to the European Parliament in a Member State of which they 
are not a national to produce an attestation from the competent administra-
tive authorities of the home Member State certifying that the person con-
cerned has not been deprived of the right to stand as a candidate in the 
home Member State or that no such disqualification is known to them, 
which was imposed by Article 10(2) of Directive 93/109/EC, is abolished.  
 Article 1(2) of Directive 2013/1/EU replaces it by a statement confirming 
that the person concerned has not been deprived of the right to stand in the 
elections to the European Parliament to be included in the formal declara-
tion that those citizens are required to produce as part of their application. 
– In order to verify whether the EU citizen has in fact been deprived of the 
right to stand in elections to the European Parliament in the home Member 
State, Article 1(1) of Directive 2013/1/EU amends Article 6 of the Di-
rective providing that the Member State of residence shall check whether 
the EU citizens who have expressed a desire to exercise their right to stand 
as a candidate there have not been deprived of that right in the home 
Member State through an individual judicial decision or an administrative 
decision provided that the latter can be subject to judicial remedies.  
                                                        
225. Directive 2013/1/EU amending Directive 93/109/EC as regards certain detailed ar-
rangements for the exercise of the right to stand as a candidate in elections to the Eu-
ropean Parliament for citizens of the Union residing in a Member State of which they 
are not nationals, OJ 2013 L 26, page 27. 
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 For that purpose, such Member State shall notify the home Member State 
of the declaration referred above. Relevant information available from the 
home Member State shall be provided in any appropriate manner within 
five working days from the reception of the notification or, where possi-
ble, within a shorter time-limit, if so requested by the Member State of 
residence.  
– In order to facilitate transmission and reception of such information, 
Member States are required to designate contact points whose list will be 
made available by the Commission to the Member States. It is provided 
that, if the information is not received by the Member State of residence 
within the time-limit, the candidate shall none the less be admitted. If the 
information provided invalidates the content of the declaration, the Mem-
ber State of residence, irrespective of whether it receives the information 
within the time-limit or at a later stage, shall take the appropriate steps in 
accordance with its national law to prevent the person concerned from 
standing as a candidate, or where this is not possible, to prevent this per-
son either from being elected or from exercising the mandate. 
4.3. Disenfranchisement and enfranchisement issues 
EU citizenship adds to national citizenship and does not replace it.226  
 This very concept emancipates the exercise of the EU citizenship status – 
destined to become the fundamental status of EU citizens227 – from a strict 
citizenship-based logic. This status is additional since the set of rights deriv-
ing from it are characteristic to it. Interestingly, these rights are currently not 
all limited to EU citizens, but in some instances are also ‘derived rights’, 
meaning that they extend to the family members, whose inclusion proves 
necessary for the EU citizens – primary beneficiaries of the rights – to be able 
to enjoy their rights in concreto.228 In addition, it can be noted that all citizens 
who reside in a given territory – and not only those possessing the nationality 
of a given Member State – are naturally destined to integrate and contribute 
                                                        
226. Article 20 TFEU.  
227. See for instance case C-184/99 Grzelczyk, judgment of 20 September 2001, para-
graph 31. 
228. See Directive 2004/38/EC (cited supra). See also Proposal for a directive on consular 




to that society and public life in an equal way (when such possibilities are 
granted to them).  
 Ironically, a more inclusive ‘residence-based approach’ seems to be invol-
untarily justified by the reasoning behind disenfranchisement policies exist-
ing in several Member States for own nationals. The rationale of disenfran-
chising own nationals, who either never resided there or exercised their right 
of free movement and residence to live abroad, is predominantly that that 
person’s ties with the society of origin loosens with time. However, this also 
means that the integration ties with the host society gradually strengthen.  
 It is interesting to note that if the political rights granted by EU citizenship 
under the Treaties are a means to encourage integration in the host society, 
maintaining integration in the society of origin is the condition to keep politi-
cal rights back home. 
 Most Member States have rules in place depriving their citizens of their 
voting rights based on criminal convictions for serious offences or on 
grounds of loss of the legal capacity linked to mental health problems and in-
tellectual disabilities.  
 Also, some Member States disenfranchise their citizens depriving them 
from the right to vote in national elections on the grounds that they have been 
residing abroad for a certain period of time229 – while others if they do not 
demonstrate that they have maintained ties with the society of origin.230  
 More specifically, the Member States which automatically disenfranchise 
their citizens on the grounds that they have been residing abroad for a certain 
period of time are currently Cyprus, Denmark, Ireland, Malta and the United 
Kingdom). Two Member States impose certain conditions for maintaining the 
right to vote in national elections: Germany, where citizens must show that 
they have become familiar, personally and directly, with the political situa-
tion in Germany and are affected by it; and Austria, which requires citizens 
residing abroad to apply before leaving the country to remain registered on 
the electoral rolls, and to renew this application every ten years – a renewal 
which can be done by electronic means).  
 The European Court of Human Rights has maintained that automatic dis-
enfranchisement of citizens who reside abroad for a certain period of time is 
not, in principle, an arbitrary restriction of the right to vote enshrined in Art-
icle 3 of Protocol No. 1, outlining a series of factors which may justify such 
conditions. It is interesting to note, however, that European Court of Human 
                                                        
229. Cyprus, Denmark, Ireland, Malta and the United Kingdom. 
230. Austria and Germany. 
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Rights recently reviewed Member States’ practices in allowing non-resident 
citizens to vote, concluding that, even though no common European approach 
exists yet, there is a clear trend in favour of allowing voting by non-resident 
citizens. 
 In the current state of EU law, as the Court of Justice had the occasion to 
clarify, the definition of the persons entitled to vote and to stand for election 
falls within the competence of each Member State in compliance with EU 
law, since the Treaty contains no rule defining expressly and precisely who 
are to be entitled to the right to vote and to stand as a candidate. 
 Within the EU context, the issue may be examined, in particular, for the 
negative impact that national disenfranchisement policies may have on the 
exercise by EU citizens of their right to free movement, enshrined both in 
Article 21 TFEU and in Article 45 of the EU Charter, and of their right to 
participate in the democratic life of the EU, enshrined in Article 10(3) TEU.  
 Whilst EU law does not detract from the powers of the Member States in 
areas falling under their competence, according to settled case-law of the 
Court of Justice, in situations covered by EU law, national rules must have 
due regard to EU law where the exercise of this competence impacts on rights 
conferred by EU law.231 
 As regards disenfranchisement, this means that, although the personal 
scope of the right to vote in national elections is a matter for each Member 
State to determine, national competence in this area should not be exercised 
in a way which negatively impacts the exercise of rights conferred by EU law 
or which results in violation of the general principles of EU law.232  
                                                        
231. This principle has notably been affirmed regarding national rules in the sphere of 
criminal legislation and procedure (case C-274/96 Bickel and Franz, judgement of 24 
November 1998), governing a person’s name (case C-148/02 Garcia Avello, judge-
ment of 2 October 2003), direct taxation (case C-403/03 Schempp, judgement of 12 
July 2005), the content and the organisation of education systems (case C-76/05 
Schwarz and Gootjes-Schwarz, judgement of 10 September 2007) and nationality 
(case C-135/08 Rottmann, judgement of 2 March 2010). See also the previous section 
of this paper. 
232. The Court of Justice has already maintained this principle as regards national rules 
determining the persons entitled to vote and to stand as candidates in elections to the 
European Parliament in the case C-145/04 Spain v United Kingdom, judgment of 12 
September 2006: whilst acknowledging Member States’ competence in determining 
criteria for establishing who has the right to vote and stand as candidate in European 
elections, it has made clear that the application of such a criterion should not result in 
violation of the general principles of EU law, in particular of the principle of non-
discrimination (paragraph 66). 
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 In this respect, some scholars and the Commission have argued that depri-
vation of political rights of EU citizens in the Member States of origin may 
influence in a negative way the willingness of EU citizens to exercise the 
right of free movement. It can also be argued that disenfranchisement policies 
put mobile EU citizens in a less favourable situation compared to nationals 
who did not exercise this right. 
 In January 2014, the Commission presented a Communication233 and 
Recommendation234 building on three main arguments: 
a) the consequences of national policies restricting the right to vote are out of 
keeping with the founding premises of EU citizenship. If Article 20 TFEU 
introduces an additional set of rights, one would not expect that the exer-
cise of such rights result in the loss of the right to vote in national elec-
tions; 
b) national disenfranchisement policies may create difficulties in practice for 
EU citizens exercising their right to freely move and reside with the terri-
tory of the member States; 
c) disenfranchising policies lead to a gap in the political rights of the EU citi-
zens concerned that is inconsistent with the efforts to promote citizens’ 
participation in the democratic life of the EU. Disenfranchised EU citizens 
do not have the right to participate in national processes leading to the 
composition of national governments, the members of which compose the 
Council, the EU’s other co-legislator, which conflicts with the general ob-
jective of enhancing citizens’ involvement in the national and European 
public sphere. 
In this context, the Commission recommends the Member States concerned 
to ‘explore inclusive and proportionate approaches to their disenfranchise-
ment practices in the general elections’. It namely suggests empowering EU 
citizens to determine for themselves whether they maintain a strong interest 
in the political life of the home country.  
 The Austrian practice could be taken as a model; each citizen can demon-
strate his/her continuing interest in the political process of the Member State 
                                                        
233. Addressing the consequences of disenfranchisement of Union citizens exercising their 
right to free movement, COM(2014)33 final of 29 January 2014. 
234. Recommendation on Addressing the consequences of disenfranchisement of Union 




of origin by applying to remain registered on the electoral roll at appropriate 
intervals.235 
 By proposing this approach the Commission endorses the logic that the 
citizen needs to be ‘at the centre-stage’. The Commission approach also 
seems to be based on the conviction that the concept of ‘integration’ in a so-
ciety is not a static one, which can be easily predetermined.  
 Similar considerations could underpin the debate around ‘enfranchise-
ment’. The possibility to enable EU citizens to be enfranchised in their coun-
try of residence as regards national and regional elections is put forward in 
current debates and in particular in the European Citizens’ Initiative ‘Let 
me/us vote’, which aimed at collecting one million signatures calling for ex-
tending the electoral rights of EU citizens residing in another Member State 
than their own to national and regional elections there, by using Article 25 
TFEU.236  
 In that respect, the Commission announced in the 2013 EU Citizenship 
Report237 that the issue of enfranchisement would be examined in the context 
of the upcoming reflections on the shape of the future of the EU as part of a 
long-term reflection on fostering inclusive political participation across the 
EU and remedying the gap in political participation for EU citizens living in 
another Member State as regards important levels of political participation, 
i.e. the national and, where applicable, the regional level. 
 Enfranchisement is a much broader issue than disenfranchisement. It 
would not only have the potential to remedy the current gaps in participation 
for EU citizens living in another Member State. Enfranchisement would be a 
logical next step in the evolution of the current set of EU citizenship rights 
and would give full effect to the right of every citizen to participate in the 
democratic life of the EU. If the political rights of EU citizens’ in the country 
of residence are an instance of the application of the principle of equality and 
non-discrimination, the completion of such rights is a pre-condition to give 
full meaning to the status of EU citizenship and ensure that citizens truly feel 
at home wherever they are in the EU. 
 Many scholars take a ‘citizenship-based approach’ and argue that natural-
isation and enfranchisement should go hand in hand. But naturalisation 
                                                        
235. In the Austrian system, the re-application takes place every ten years. 
236. According to http://www.letmevote.eu/en, the time period for the collections of sig-
natures ended on the 28 January 2014 without succeeding to collect the necessary 
1 million signatures. 




should no longer be seen as the necessary condition to obtaining voting 
rights. Promoting naturalisation as the only means to achieve enfranchise-
ment would in fact be disproportionate and cumbersome, as well as at odds 
with the role of EU citizenship as the primary vehicle for promoting respect 
for national identity and diversity, and ensuring equality of treatment irre-
spective of nationality. There is a strong case for EU citizens to enjoy the 
fundamental status. 
 Moreover, enfranchisement by naturalisation fails to take into full consid-
eration the fluidity of possibilities and movements in modern societies where 
citizens can successively settle in different Member States in the course of 
their life. Also, in principle the ‘bond and allegiance’ of a person towards a 
society can be equally felt for the country of origin (the motherland) than the 
host country (country of adoption). 
 Since national and regional elections currently fall outside the realm of EU 
law, such an evolution would require the use of the passerelle clause of Art-
icle 25 TFEU (which allows adding to the current rights) or, given the com-
plexity and constitutional nature of such procedure, the modification of the 
EU citizenship part of the Treaties in the next reform. The achievement of 
this policy objective is arduous, since it would be submitted to unanimous 
consensus and constitutional modifications. It should, however, not be ex-
cluded, particularly in the present state of European integration, where bridg-
ing the democratic deficit and bringing citizens closer to the EU and its deci-
sion-making should be the key priority, alongside the deepening of the fiscal 
and banking union.  
 A first issue to examine is whether EU citizens should be required to oper-
ate a choice.  
 Voting in both the Member State of nationality and residence would 
amount to double representation in the Council. On the other hand, EU citi-
zens could legitimately maintain ties and be affected by the acts of national 
legislatures in both countries.  
 Considering the current EU rules on enfranchisement, participating in the 
European elections in both countries is prohibited and double voting actively 
fought. Voting for the European elections twice would in fact mean to cast 
two votes for a same assembly. For the local elections, where the vote influ-
ences the composition of two different assemblies, it is theoretically possible 
under EU law to cast two votes.  
 For the national elections, in case it was opted for imposing a choice, a 
second issue is whether enfranchisement should be granted under the same 
conditions as nationals.  
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 Considering that this is the case for the European and local elections under 
the Treaty, it could be argued that introducing conditions for the enfran-
chisement to national and regional elections would not be in line within the 
rationale of the political rights already granted by the Treaty.  
 Fully and automatically enfranchising EU citizens in their Member State 
of residence, i.e. granting them the right to vote in national elections under 
the same conditions as nationals, would be an important step towards the re-
alisation of equality of treatment, whilst at the same time promoting the full 
integration of EU citizens in their Member State of residence and enhance the 
value of EU citizenship.  
 It is also true, that certain caution with a view to ensuring and safeguard-
ing the ‘bond and allegiance’ provided by residence as described above 
would be necessary. A reference criterion to determine as of how and/or 
when EU citizens would have acquired sufficient and genuine ties with the 
host society where they cast their vote should be considered. 
 In this context, a positive action by the EU citizen to demonstrate his/her 
interest and acquired integration in the political process of the host Member 
State, such as a declaration, in a similar way to the disenfranchisement rea-
soning presented above, could be evaluated.  
 It can also be argued that, differently from the disenfranchisement ap-
proach, in the enfranchisement context a person does not only have to prove 
that he/she has kept existing integration ties, but that he/she has acquired such 
ties in a host society ex novo. This would a fortiori require an additional safe-
guard, a specific timeframe which – while bearing certain arbitrariness – 
could be considered as an indication of a certain degree of integration in the 
host Member State.  
 A ten year threshold could be invoked by some as an appropriate cut-off 
point, as a ten years period of residence can generally be considered as ena-
bling a high degree of integration in the host Member State.238 For example, 
Directive 2004/38/EC reserves the highest degree of protection against expul-
sion to EU citizens who have resided in another Member State then their own 
for ten years: they may be expelled solely on the basis of imperative grounds 
of public security.239 However, after a ten year period of residence in another 
Member State than their own, the EU citizens concerned can usually apply to 
obtain the nationality – and thus also the right to vote in national elections – 
                                                        
238. See also the Austrian model in the context of the disenfranchisement section. 
239. Articles 28(3) and Recital 24 of Directive 2004/38/EC.  
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of the host Member State.240 Yet, enfranchisement with this threshold would 
bear little added value in case of long-term residence in a Member State and 
completely ignore the current realities of fluidity of movements within the 
EU. 
 The five year residence period required by Directive 2004/38/EC for the 
acquisition of the status of permanent resident241 might serve as an appropri-
ate threshold in this context. Indeed, this ‘privileged’ status conferred on EU 
citizens residing for at least five years in another Member State than their 
own is meant to exempt them from the initially applicable conditions of resi-
dence and to guarantee their equal treatment with nationals as regards any 
matter falling within the scope of EU law. Granting those who obtain perma-
nent resident status the right to vote in national elections would similarly both 
attest and contribute to their integration in the host Member State. In the same 
vein, Directive 2003/109/EC provides that, after a five year period of resi-
dence in a Member State, non-EU nationals can acquire long-term resident 
status and enjoy equality of treatment with citizens of the Member State in a 
wide range of economic and social matters.  
 Another possibility that could be envisaged as part of an incremental ap-
proach towards full enfranchisement would be to grant, as a first step, voting 
rights in regional elections, rather than moving on directly to national ones.  
 In some of the Member States where regions are vested with legislative 
capacities domestic law actually permits, in one way or another, the participa-
tion of foreign residents. Nevertheless, in some Member States this would 
prove constitutionally as problematic as granting the right to participate in the 
national elections and such a partial extension would only have limited im-
pact. 
                                                        
240. A 10 year period of residence is required in Spain, Italy, Slovenia, Austria and Lithu-
ania. In the remaining Member States, the length of this period varies between nine in 
Denmark and three in Belgium (the European University Institute in Florence 
http://eudo-citizenship.eu/docitizens/policy_brief_naturalisation.pdf).  
241. Articles 16 and 24 of Directive 2004/38/EC. 
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5. Culture(s) of citizenship 
5.1. Implementation of EU citizenship  
Since 2006, the Commission has pursued a rigorous enforcement policy in 
order to ensure the full implementation by Member States of EU citizens’ 
rights, and in particular free movement rules.  
 It has reported on these activities regularly242 with statistics on the nature 
of complaints received, description of specific issues taken up with Member 
States and the action taken.  
 It is fair to say that many of the issues encountered were stemming from a 
lack of understanding of national administrations of the fundamental differ-
ence between the subjective rights of EU citizens stemming directly from the 
Treaty, and the broad discretion national administrations traditionally have in 
the area of migration law relating to non-EU nationals.  
 At the same time, it was possible to solve most cases by way of dialogue. 
Only in a minority of cases pursued was it eventually necessary to launch in-
fringement proceedings under the Treaty. 
 Against this background, we cannot detect a generalized unwillingness of 
front-line administrations or judiciaries in Member States to grant EU citizens 
in effect the rights which are provided for by the Treaties and secondary law.  
 As to the implementation of the secondary law pertaining to EU citizen’s 
rights in national legislation, Member States make more effort to clearly sep-
arate, either through different acts, or at least through different chapters, pro-
visions on substantial rights and procedures relating to EU citizens, on the 
one hand, and provisions relating to non-EU immigrants, on the other hand.  
 In some Member States where own nationals have to register with the ad-
ministration the change of their residence, the administrations responsible for 
registration of nationals have been made responsible for contacts with EU citi-
                                                        
242. For recent reports, see 2012 Report on the Application of the EU Charter of Funda-
mental Rights, European Union (2013), pages 14 (France, Malta) 78, 83 (the Nether-
lands, Denmark, Sweden, and Belgium); 2011 Report on the Application of the EU 
Charter of Fundamental Rights, European Union (2012), page 12 (France and Den-
mark), page 70. More details also in the Commission’s press releases IP 11/981 of 25 
August 2011 and IP 12/646 of 21 June 2012.  
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zens rather than administrations dealing with aliens and immigration, even if 
these remain competent on the substance.243 
 And also in the teaching of the law, the clear difference between the sub-
jective rights created for EU citizens, and the broad discretion of public ad-
ministrations relating to immigration from non-EU countries, is clearly rec-
ognized.244 
5.2. The EU Charter and national courts 
While the Commission is following the systematic analysis of national juris-
prudence applying or referring to the EU Charter carried out by the Associa-
tion of the Councils of State and the Supreme administrative jurisdictions of 
the EU,245 no specific impact on the interpretation of citizen’s rights of the 
binding effect of the EU Charter has been identified in national jurisprudence 
so far.  
5.3. EU citizens in national media 
Already before the special focus on free movement of EU citizens from Bul-
garia and Romania in the discourse of some political parties and even gov-
ernments of some Member States, there have been media campaigns by gov-
ernments and political parties, often in the same Member States, criticizing 
certain aspects of free movement of EU citizens and ‘othering’ this group of 
persons.246  
 Some of these campaigns went beyond the tolerable in democratic socie-
ties who signed up to the values of enlightenment and tolerance as they are 
                                                        
243. See, for Germany, Article 5(2)(2) of the ‘Gesetz über die allgemeine Freizügigkeit 
von Unionsbürgern’ (Law on the general free movement of EU citizens) of 30 July 
2004 (BGBl I p. 1950, 1968), last modified by Article 8 of the law of 17. June 2013 
(BGBl. I, p. 1555).  
244. For a detailed analysis see Thym, ‘Migrationsverwaltungsrecht’ Mohr Siebeck 
(2010), pp. 84-89; specifically relating to expulsions see pp. 231. 
245. 2012 Report on the Application of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, European 
Union (2013), chapter 3.2., page 14 and footnote 25. 
246. For the UK, by the way of example, see the 2012 Lord Leveson Inquiry into the Cul-




enshrined in the Treaties and the EU Charter.247 All of them were largely de-
void of factual underpinning.  
 For years the Commission worked with Member States to try to establish 
facts on alleged large scale misuse of free movement rights combined with 
family unification in the form of marriage of convenience. Only very few 
cases were eventually reported by Member States.248 A similar process was 
conducted in relation to alleged abuse of free movement rights in order to 
make fraudulent use of national social benefit systems. 
 What is new in today’s campaigns is that some governments, or in some 
cases certain ministers, in particular Ministers of Interior, are actually drivers 
of these campaigns. Government in these cases does not try to fulfil the pub-
lic policy function of educating the public on facts, calming down popular 
and contra-factual excitement, and pleading for respect of commitments made 
under EU law, as one would expect.  
 Rather, in some cases, it was ministers themselves who started, or at least 
further fuelled, demagogic, beer table discourse around unproven allegations 
and stereotyped prejudice relating to EU citizens, in particular from Poland, 
Romania and Bulgaria.  
 These campaigns by governments and political parties certainly had an 
impact on the public debate. It can also not be excluded that they had an im-
pact on the readiness of government front line services to treat EU citizens 
concerned fairly and according to the law. And it cannot be excluded that 
they incite people to violence against people from other countries. 
 On a more positive note, within all countries in which these phenomena 
occur, there are also important voices, often from within the same govern-
ment, and certainly from the public and important groups of civil society and 
business, who recall the benefits for the polity of EU citizenship, free move-
ment, and more generally, tolerance and a welcoming openness towards peo-
ple from other countries. 
 The Commission has demonstrated that a proper implementation of the 
rights of EU citizens is not only in the interest of those EU citizens that avail 
themselves of these rights, in particular the free movement rights, but, more 
importantly, it is also in the interest of the large majority of EU citizens who 
never make use of these rights.  
                                                        
247. Wilders’ campaign in the Netherlands, which opened a website to complain against 
Poles; statement of Vice-President Reding in the Parliament on 13 March 2012.  
248. See footnote 43 of Free movement of EU citizens and their families: Five actions to 
make a difference, COM(2013)837 final, 25 November 2013. 
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 Indeed, as a recent study of the Commission shows, those cities in Europe 
which are investing into not only granting the rights EU law provides for, but 
indeed go further in terms of establishing a real welcome and friendly inte-
gration culture for new arrivals, are among the most successful in terms of at-
tractiveness for their inhabitants and economic prosperity.249 
 Equally, the macroeconomic benefits of mobility of people in Europe ac-
crue to all of the population in Europe.250 Increasing mobility of people in 
Europe is key to compensate for the negative economic impacts and the so-
cial consequences of the decline of population in Europe due to low birth 
rates, the ageing of population and the imbalances in the labour market.  
 Looking beyond Europe, and beyond EU Citizenship, the benefits for a 
polity of investing in the welcoming culture towards people from other coun-
tries, has been best documented in relation to the ‘melting pot’ of the United 
States.  
 In his bestseller ‘Arrival City’251 Saunders recalls the success story of cit-
ies all over the world which welcome immigrants and provide them with op-
portunities to be integrated, for their own good and for that of the community. 
He emphasizes the important positive example the United Kingdom gives in 
this respect, moving on from racial tensions to full and productive integration 
of populations from Bangladesh and other parts of the world. Still today, the 
United Kingdom sets an example of openness and successful integration for 
EU citizens from many Member States and for people from around the world, 
and this not only in the City of London. Indeed, the UK leads EU statistics 
when it comes to conferring national citizenship – and thus also EU citizen-
ship.252 This shows that the UK understands that citizenship rights are key to 
integration.  
 It should be normal that any Member State which confers national citizen-
ship in great numbers, and thus EU citizenship, should also respect the law 
relating to citizenship – whether national or European.  
                                                        
249. ‘Evaluation of the impact of the free movement of EU citizens at local level’, EY for 
the Commission (2014) – http://ec.europa.eu/justice/citizen/files/dg_just_eva_free_ 
mov_final_report_27.01.14.pdf.  
250. Free movement of EU citizens and their families: Five actions to make a difference, 
COM(2013)837 final, 25 November 2013, p. 1-3. 
251. Saunders, ‘Arrival City – How the Largest Migration in the History is Reshaping Our 
World’ First Vintage Books Edition (2012) - http://arrivalcity.net. 
252. In 2011, most new citizenships were granted by the United Kingdom (177 565 = 23 
% of the EU), http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/statistics_explained/index.php/ 
Acquisition_of_citizenship_statistics (March 2013 Eurostat data). 
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 Governments have the obligation to ensure the respect of the law, preserve 
public order and peace in the land. The recent public discourses relating to 
alleged abuse of free movement rules by EU citizens with slogans such as 
‘Wer betrügt der fliegt’ (‘Fraudsters will be fired’ meaning: sent out of the 
country)253 has been considered by some commentators as the underlying 
cause for acts of violence against foreign populations.254 While these may be 
overstatements, all who carry responsibility in Europe, whether on local, re-
gional, national or EU level, should keep in mind that Europe needs to be 
careful not to fuel resentment and prejudice against people who are different, 
whether EU citizens or others.255 
6. Conclusion 
The way Member States apply the rules on EU Citizenship, and the way the 
discourse in Member States is fertilized by governments and political actors 
on the rights of EU citizens, may be one of the decisive questions for the fu-
ture of European integration.  
 In this public discourse, it will be important to remember that the quest for 
homogeneity, combined with the denial of citizenship rights and human 
rights to groups of people, was at the outset of the great catastrophe of the 
20th century. And it will be important to remember that the strength of Europe 
is to bring together its diversity of cultures, languages, and backgrounds, 
combined with the tolerance for difference and a respect for fundamental 
rights, democracy and the rule of law. It is within these parameters, and with 
the recognition that the individual is at the centre of all politics, that a respon-
sible discourse on the shaping of the reality of EU citizenship based on citi-
zenship rights combined with positive measures of governments should pro-
ceed.  
 In fine, the question remains as to what is the royal way to full integration 
and equal treatment in all Member States – a further development of EU citi-
zenship rights, based on Article 25(2) TFEU, or a more systematic facilitation 
of acquisition of nationality, combined with acceptance of double nationality, 
among Member States for citizens of another Member State, based on EU citi-
                                                        
253. Germany – http://www.faz.net/aktuell/politik/klausurtagung-in-kreuth-csu-verteidigt-
wer-betruegt-der-fliegt-12742612.html.  
254. Süddeutsche Zeitung, 13 January 2014, page 24. 
255. Framework Decision 2008/913/JHA on combating certain forms and expressions of 
racism and xenophobia by means of criminal law, OJ 2008 L 328, page 55. 
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zens-friendly development of national laws, whether fully autonomously or 
based on a dialogue for coordination (which presently does not exist yet).  
 This competition of systems and approaches on the way to equal rights is 
good, and in an ideal case, the individual is granted the freedom to choose the 
preferred path. 
 Article 25(2) TFEU also invites reflection beyond just equal treatment. 
Could EU citizenship in the future grant more rights and more protection than 
national citizenship, even in the Member State of one’s own nationality?256  
 The perspective of Europe that can give more to its citizens than nation 
states alone should drive our reflections on the citizenship, in general, and on 
how to make the best of Article 25(2) TFEU, in particular. 
 
                                                        
256. Armin Von Bogdandy and others, ‘Reverse Solange – Protecting the essence of fun-
























Unionsbürgerschaft im Rahmen der Richtlinie 2004/38/EG – Be-
ständigkeit des Aufenthalts von Unionsbürgern und ihren Familien-
angehörigen 
Frage 1 
Allgemein ist anzumerken, dass die Richtlinie 2004/38/EG ihre Umsetzung 
in Österreich aus aufenthaltsrechtlicher Sicht im Niederlassungs- und Aufent-
haltsgesetz,2 einem Gesetz, welches ausschließlich die Bestimmungen über 
die Aufenthaltsrechte von Personen mit nichtösterreichischer Staatsangehö-
rigkeit beinhaltet, und im Fremdenpolizeigesetz 2005,3 einem Gesetz, wel-
ches vorwiegend Bestimmungen über die Überwachung der Einreise und die 
Beendigung des rechtswidrigen Aufenthaltes von Personen mit nichtösterrei-
chischer Staatsangehörigkeit trifft, erfahren hat. 
 So wurde die Begriffsbestimmung des Familienangehörigen gemäß Art. 2 
der Richtlinie in § 52 Abs. 1 NAG umgesetzt, der dazu dient, das Aufent-
haltsrecht von Unionsbürgern,4 die Angehörige eines Unionsbürgers sind. 
festzulegen. Für drittstaatszugehörige Familienangehörige wird in § 54 NAG, 
                                                        
1. Mag. Dr., Leiter der Sektion III – Recht im Bundesministerium für Inneres. 
  Ich danke Jeanette Benndorf, Ass. Iur., Mag. Elisabeth Graff, Mag. Doris Petz, Dr. 
Eva Pfleger, Mag. Carina Royer, Mag. Robert Stein, Mag. Tamara Völker, Mag. 
Gregor Wenda MBA, MMag. Dr. Stephan Wiener LL.M., alle Bundesministerium 
für Inneres, für die umfassende Mitwirkung und Unterstützung bei der Abfassung des 
nationalen Reports für Österreich zum Generalthema 2. 
2. Bundesgesetz über die Niederlassung und den Aufenthalt in Österreich (Niederlas-
sungs- und Aufenthaltsgesetz – NAG), BGBl. I Nr. 100/2005). 
3. Bundesgesetz über die Ausübung der Fremdenpolizei, die Ausstellung von Doku-
menten für Fremde und die Erteilung von Einreisetiteln (Fremdenpolizeigesetz 2005 
– FPG), BGBl. I Nr. 100/2005). 
4. Soweit auf natürliche Personen bezogene Bezeichungen nur in männlicher Form 
angeführt sind, bezichen sie sich auf Männer und Frauen in gleicher Weise. 
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der das Aufenthaltsrecht von diesen Familienangehörigen regelt, auf die De-
finition des § 52 NAG zurückgegriffen. 
 Der Begriff des Berechtigten gemäß Art. 3 der Richtlinie findet hauptsäch-
lich im 4. Hauptstück des NAG (§§ 51 bis 57 NAG) Niederschlag, welches 
sich gänzlich dem Aufenthaltsrecht von Unionsbürgern widmet, die ihr Frei-
zügigkeitsrecht ausgeübt haben, und erstreckt sich auch auf deren Angehôri-
gen. So wurde in § 52 NAG das Aufenthaltsrecht von Angehörigen eines 
Unionsbürgers normiert, die selbst Unionsbürger sind sowie in § 54 NAG das 
Aufenthaltsrecht von Angehörigen eines EWR-Bürgers, die Drittstaatsange-
hörige sind. 
 Das Recht auf Einreise gemäß Art. 5 der Richtlinie in Bezug auf Fami-
lienangehörige wurde mit § 15 Abs. 1 und 2 FPG und § 32 FPG umgesetzt, 
zwei Bestimmungen, die die Voraussetzungen für die rechtmäßige Einreise 
und den rechtmäßigen Aufenthalt regeln. Im Hinblick auf den Umgang der 
nationalen Gerichte und Rechtsinstanzen mit Verwandtschaftsgraden ist an-
zumerken, dass laut Judikatur des österreichischen Verwaltungsgerichtshofes 
(vgl. VwGH vom 25. März 2010, Zl. 2008/21/0362), einem Höchstgericht, 
unter den Personenkreis des § 52 Z 2 NAG (Verwandte des EWR-Bürgers, 
seines Ehegatten oder eingetragenen Partners in gerader absteigender Linie 
bis zur Vollendung des 21. Lebensjahres und darüber hinaus, sofern ihnen 
von diesen Unterhalt tatsächlich gewährt wird) jedenfalls auch Enkelkinder 
fallen. Diese Auslegung sei auch vor dem Hintergrund der RL 2004/38/EG 
geboten (Hinweis E 13. März 2007, 2006/18/0010; E 13. Dezember 2007, 
2007/09/0228). 
 Die Verfahrensvorschriften des Art. 5 der Richtlinie haben sich in der Pra-
xis als wertvoll und angemessen erwiesen und bieten damit einen wirksamen 
Schutz. 
Frage 2 
Die Möglichkeit der Ausweisung eines Unionsbürgers wurde im FPG unter 
Einhaltung der strengen Vorgaben der Richtlinie wortlautgetreu umgesetzt. 
Derzeit sind weder eine Ausweisungsentscheidung, die sich ausschließlich 
auf die finanzielle Situation des Unionsbürgers stützt, noch innerstaatliche 
Judikatur zu dieser Thematik bekannt. 
Frage 3 
In Umsetzung der Art. 12 und 13 der Richtlinie wurde mit §§ 52 Abs. 2 und 
54 Abs. 4 NAG normiert, dass sowohl der Tod oder Wegzug des Unionsbür-
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gers als auch die Scheidung, Aufhebung der Ehe und Auflösung der eingetra-
genen Partnerschaft von diesem nicht das Aufenthaltsrecht des Familienan-
gehörigen berührt. 
 Die Voraussetzungen für die Aufrechterhaltung des Aufenthaltsrechtes 
gemäß Art. 14 der Richtlinie wurden mit den §§ 51 Abs. 1, 53 und 55 NAG 
umgesetzt, die Tatbestände für die Beibehaltung des Aufenthaltsrechtes nor-
mieren und auf diese Bezug nehmen. 
 Die Verfahrensgarantien des Art. 15 der Richtlinie wurden mit den §§ 66 
bis 69 FPG umgesetzt, aus denen hervorgeht, dass aufenthaltsbeendende 
Maßnahmen in einer bescheidmäßigen Erledigung mit Rechtsmittelbelehrung 
erfolgen. In dieser wird über die Möglichkeit der Einlegung eines Rechtsmit-
tels bei einem Tribunal belehrt. Seit dem 1. Jänner 2014 erfolgt der Rechts-
zug zu einem Verwaltungsgericht.5 
 Verfahren in Bezug auf die Auslegung von Art. 12 bis 15 der Richlinie 
vor den nationalen Gerichten oder Rechtsinstanzen sind nicht bekannt. 
Frage 4 
Das Recht auf Daueraufenthalt des Kapitels 4 der Richtlinie (Art. 16 bis 21) 
wurde in den §§ 53a und 54a NAG umgesetzt. § 53a NAG betrifft dabei das 
Daueraufenthaltsrecht von Unionsbürgern und deren Familienangehörigen, 
die ebenfalls Unionsbürger sind und § 54a NAG das Daueraufenthaltsrecht 
für drittstaatszugehörige Familienangehörige von Unionsbürgern. Eine ge-
setzliche Aufzählung, auf welche Art die Kontinuität des Aufenthaltes 
(Art. 21 der Richtlinie) nachgewiesen werden kann, ist nicht vorhanden, so-
dass die herkömmlichen Beweismittel, wie beispielsweise Melderegisterbe-
stätigungen, Arbeitsverträge, Mietverträge oder Erklärungen als Nachweis 
dienen können. 
 Verfahren in Bezug auf die Auslegung dieser Bestimmungen vor nationa-
len Gerichten oder Rechtsinstanzen sind nicht bekannt. 
                                                        
5. Siehe dazu insbesondere die Verwaltungsgerichtsbarkeits-Novelle 2012, BGBl. I 
Nr. 51/2012, mit der eine Verwaltungsgerichtsbarkeit erster Instanz bestehend aus 
einem Bundesverwaltungsgericht, einem Bundesfinanzgericht und neun Landes-
verwaltungsgerichten bei gleichzeitigem Entfall der administrativen Instanzen und 
gleichzeitiger Auflösung verschiedener Tribunale und sonstiger weisungsfreier 




Im Bereich der Sozialhilfe sind die Mindestsicherungs- bzw. die Sozialhilfe-
gesetze der einzelnen Bundesländer der Republik Österreich ausschlagge-
bend. 
 Diese Gesetze folgen grundsätzlich den Unterscheidungen in Art. 24 
Abs. 2 der Richtlinie und nehmen Arbeitssuchende in den anspruchsberech-
tigten Personenkreis unter Bezugnahme auf das NAG auf. § 51 Abs. 2 NAG 
regelt, dass die Erwerbstätigeneigenschaft als Arbeitnehmer oder Selbständi-
ger unter bestimmten Vorrausetzungen auch für Arbeitssuchende erhalten 
bleibt. 
Frage 6 
Die österreichische Rechtsprechung orientiert sich eng an den vom Gerichts-
hof der Europäischen Gemeinschaften (EuGH) aufgestellten Grundsätzen. 
Eine Einzelfallprüfung muss ergeben, dass das persönliche Verhalten eine 
tatsächliche, gegenwärtige und erhebliche Gefahr darstellt, die ein Grundinte-
resse der Gesellschaft berührt, um eine Ausweisung rechtfertigen zu können. 
Strafrechtliche Verurteilungen allein können nicht ohne weiteres diese Maß-
nahmen begründen. Vom Einzelfall losgelöste oder auf Generalprävention 
verweisende Begründungen sind somit nicht zulässig. 
 Betreffend das Konzept der Gefährdung der öffentlichen Ordnung, Si-
cherheit und Gesundheit ist es nach der Rechtsprechung nicht ausreichend, 
auf das Bestehen einer strafrechtlichen Verurteilung hinzuweisen, sondern 
muss vielmehr auf das zu Grunde liegende Verhalten Bezug genommen wer-
den. 
 Schwerwiegende Gründe der öffentlichen Ordnung und Sicherheit stellen 
zumeist strafrechtliche Verurteilungen mit einem hohen Strafmaß dar. Zu 
diesem Themenbereich gibt es jedoch nur wenig Rechtsprechung. 
 Auch bei der Umschreibung zwingender Gründe der öffentlichen Sicher-
heit wird auf die Rechtsprechung des EuGH abgestellt. Dementsprechend 
umfasst der Begriff öffentliche Sicherheit zunächst die Gefährdung des Funk-
tionierens der Einrichtungen des Staates und seiner wichtigen öffentlichen 
Dienste sowie das Überleben der Bevölkerung; ebenso wird die Gefahr einer 
erheblichen Störung der auswärtigen Beziehungen oder des friedlichen Zu-
sammenlebens der Völker oder eine Beeinträchtigung der militärischen Inte-
ressen darunter verstanden. Darüber hinaus kann ein Aufenthaltsverbot im 
Einzelfall aber auch auf Grund schwerwiegender Straftaten – etwa banden-
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mäßiger Suchtmittelhandel (vgl VwGH 13. Dezember 2012, 2012/21/0181) 
oder sexueller Missbrauch von Minderjährigen – gerechtfertigt sein. 
 Dem Grundsatz der Verhältnismäßigkeit wird mehrfach Rechnung getra-
gen. Zunächst ist er bei der Frage der Zulässigkeit der aufenthaltsbeendenden 
Maßnahme iZm der Prüfung des Rechts auf Privat- und Familienleben zu be-
achten. Auch für die Frage der Dauer eines Aufenthaltsverbotes ist die Frage 
der Verhältnismäßigkeit der Maßnahme zu berücksichtigen. Hier sind die In-
teressen des Fremden gegen die öffentlichen Interessen abzuwägen. 
 Die in der Richtlinie genannten Umstände, wie Aufenthaltsdauer, Alter 
etc. wurden wortlautgetreu in einer demonstrativen Aufzählung im FPG ab-
gebildet. Daher werden diese im Rahmen der zwingend vorzunehmenden 
Einzelfallprüfung durch die zuständige Behörde bei Erlassung der Auswei-
sung bzw des Aufenthaltsverbots umfassend berücksichtigt. Diese Prüfung ist 
ein grundlegender Teil der Entscheidung. Droht eine Verletzung der Rechte 
bzw. führt die Einzelfallprüfung zu einem Überwiegen der zu berücksichti-
genden Umstände, wird von einer Ausweisung bzw. einem Aufenthaltsverbot 
Abstand genommen. 
Unionsbürgerschaft außerhalb der Richtlinie 2004/38/EG – Unter-
suchung der nationalen Anwendung von primärem EU-Recht 
Frage 7 
Nationale Gerichte und Rechtsinstanzen lagern der Beurteilung des zu prü-
fenden Einzelfalles stets die Frage vor, ob die vorliegende Konstellation in 
den Anwendungsbereich des Unionsrechtes fällt. Ist dies zu verneinen, wer-
den Argumente in diese Richtung nicht weiter verfolgt. 
 Statistiken zum Ausmaß dieser Entscheidungen wurden vom Bundesmi-
nister für Inneres, welches bis zum 31. Dezember 2013 in Angelegenheiten 
des NAG in zweiter Instanz entschied, nicht geführt. Seit 1. Jänner 2014 ent-
scheiden Verwaltungsgerichte (siehe Fn. 4). 
 Die nationale Rechtsprechung und nationale Rechtsinstanzen entscheiden 
anhand der Judikatur des EuGH zu den Vorschriften des AEUV6 über die 
Unionsbürgerschaft (z.B. Rechtssachen Chen, Ruiz Zambrano und Folgeur-
                                                        
6. Vertrag über die Arbeitsweise der Europäischen Union, Abl. C 236/47 2012. 
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teile), sofern die gesetzlichen Voraussetzungen bzw. die von der Judikatur 
vorgegebenen Kriterien dafür vorliegen. 
 Seitens des Bundesministeriums für Inneres werden die diesem administ-
rativ untergeordneten erstinstanzlichen Niederlassungs- und Aufenthaltsbe-
hörden in Form von Rundschreiben und Erlässen laufend informiert und an-
gewiesen, sodass sich der Vollzug u.a. des Niederlassungs- und Aufenthalts-
rechtes an der genannten Judikatur des EuGH orientiert. 
 Die nationale Rechtsprechung unterscheidet strikt zwischen Rechten ge-
mäß der Freizügigkeitsrichtlinie und jenen, welche aus Art. 20 oder 21 
AEUV ableitbar sind. Dies erschließt sich aus der ständigen Rechtsprechung 
des VwGH, der bis dato ausschließlich zu Sachverhalten bezüglich des Auf-
enthaltsrechtes von mit österreichischen Staatsbürgern verwandten Dritt-
staatsangehörigen abgesprochen hat, wobei die österreichischen Staatsbürger 
jeweils ihr Recht auf Freizügigkeit nicht in Anspruch genommen haben. 
 Aus dieser Judikatur ist ableitbar, dass auch in Konstellationen, in denen 
die Freizügigkeitsrichtlinie nicht zur Anwendung gelangt, die nationalen 
Rechtsinstanzen zu prüfen haben, ob für die Partei des Verfahrens Rechte aus 
Art. 20 oder 21 AEUV ableitbar sind, da gewisse Fallkonstellationen nicht 
einer rein internen Situation gleichgestellt werden dürfen. 
 Der VwGH entschied nach der Verkündung des EuGH-Urteils in der 
Rechtssache Dereci u.a. mehrere Beschwerden von Drittstaatsangehörigen, 
die entweder eine Familienzusammenführung mit ihrem nicht gewanderten, 
die österreichische Staatsbürgerschaft besitzenden Ehepartner begehrten oder 
eine aufenthaltsbeendigende Maßnahme bekämpften: 
1.) Beispiel 
VwGH vom 26. Februar 2013, Zl. 2012/22/0224 (ein serbischer Staatsange-
höriger bekämpft im Instanzenzug das gegen ihn nach dem FPG erlassene 
Aufenthaltsverbot): 
(...) Letztlich hat zwar der Gerichtshof der Europäischen Union (EuGH) – aufbauend auf 
dem Urteil vom 8. März 2011, C-34/09 »Zambrano« – im Urteil vom 15. November 2011, 
C-256/11 »Dereci u.a.«, ausgesprochen, dass Art. 20 AEUV nationalen Maßnahmen ent-
gegensteht, die bewirken, dass den Unionsbürgern der tatsächliche Genuss des Kernbe-
stands der Rechte, die ihnen dieser Status verleiht, verwehrt wird. Das Kriterium der Ver-
wehrung des Kernbestands der Rechte, die der Unionsbürgerstatus verleiht, bezieht sich 
auf Sachverhalte, die dadurch gekennzeichnet sind, dass sich der Unionsbürger de facto 
gezwungen sieht, nicht nur das Gebiet des Mitgliedstaates, dem er angehört, zu verlassen, 
sondern das Gebiet der Union als Ganzes. Es betrifft Sachverhalte, in denen – obwohl das 
das Aufenthaltsrecht von Drittstaatsangehörigen betreffende aus der RL 2004/38/EG abge-
leitete Recht nicht anwendbar ist – einem Drittstaatsangehörigen, der Familienangehöriger 
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eines Staatsbürgers eines Mitgliedstaates ist, ein Aufenthaltsrecht ausnahmsweise nicht 
verweigert werden darf, weil sonst die Unionsbürgerschaft der letztgenannten Person ihrer 
praktischen Wirksamkeit beraubt würde (...) 
2.) Beispiel 
VwGH vom 21. Dezember 2011, Zl. 2009/22/0054 (ein Staatsangehöriger 
aus Bangladesch begehrt die Familienzusammenführung mit seiner die öster-
reichische Staatsbürgerschaft besitzenden Ehefrau im Rahmen eines Verfah-
rens nach dem NAG): 
(...) Da der Beschwerdeführer jedoch mit einer österreichischen Staatsbürgerin und nicht 
mit einer sonstigen Unionsbürgerin verheiratet ist, weiters keine Anhaltspunkte dafür vor-
liegen, dass die österreichische Ehefrau des Beschwerdeführers einen Freizügigkeitssach-
verhalt verwirklicht hätte und letztlich der Verfassungsgerichtshof im Urteil vom 16. De-
zember 2009, G 244/09 u.a., gleichheitsrechtliche Bedenken in Bezug auf § 57 NAG nicht 
geteilt hat, vermag der Beschwerdeführer Rechte nach §§ 52 ff NAG7 nicht geltend zu ma-
chen. 
 Der EuGH hat im Urteil vom 15. November 2011, Rechtssache C- 256/11, Dereci u.a., 
unter Hinweis auf das Urteil vom 8. März 2011, Rechtssache C-34/09, Zambrano, ausge-
sprochen, dass Art. 20 AEUV nationalen Maßnahmen entgegensteht, die bewirken, dass 
den Unionsbürgern der tatsächliche Genuss des Kernbestands der Rechte, die ihnen dieser 
Status verleiht, verwehrt wird (Randnummer 64). Das Kriterium der Verwehrung des 
Kernbestands der Rechte, die der Unionsbürgerstatus verleiht, bezieht sich auf Sachverhal-
te, die dadurch gekennzeichnet sind, dass sich der Unionsbürger de facto gezwungen sieht, 
nicht nur das Gebiet des Mitgliedstaats, dem er angehört, zu verlassen, sondern das Gebiet 
der Union als Ganzes (Randnummer 66). Es betrifft Sachverhalte, in denen – obwohl das 
das Aufenthaltsrecht von Drittstaatsangehörigen betreffende abgeleitete Recht nicht an-
wendbar ist – einem Drittstaatsangehörigen, der Familienangehöriger eines Staatsbürgers 
eines Mitgliedstaats ist, ein Aufenthaltsrecht ausnahmsweise nicht verweigert werden darf, 
da sonst die Unionsbürgerschaft der letztgenannten Person ihrer praktischen Wirksamkeit 
beraubt würde (Randnummer 67). Konkretisierend hat der EuGH dargelegt, die bloße Tat-
sache, dass es für einen Staatsbürger eines Mitgliedstaats aus wirtschaftlichen Gründen o-
der zur Aufrechterhaltung der Familiengemeinschaft im Gebiet der Union wünschenswert 
erscheinen könnte, dass sich Familienangehörige, die nicht die Staatsbürgerschaft eines 
Mitgliedstaats besitzen, mit ihm zusammen im Gebiet der Union aufhalten können, recht-
fertige für sich genommen nicht die Annahme, dass der Unionsbürger gezwungen wäre, 
das Gebiet der Union zu verlassen, wenn kein Aufenthaltsrecht gewährt würde (Rand-
nummer 68). 
 Angesichts dieses unionsrechtlichen Maßstabs ist festzuhalten, dass die belangte Be-
hörde in Verkennung der Rechtslage nicht geprüft hat, ob der vorliegende Fall einen sol-
                                                        
7. Durch die Bestimmungen der §§ 51 ff NAG, die das unionsrechtliche Aufenthalts-
recht von EWR-Bürgern, Schweizer Bürgern und deren Familienangehörigen regeln, 
wurde die Freizügigkeitsrichtlinie umgesetzt. 
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cherart beschriebenen Ausnahmefall darstellt. Sie wird dazu im fortzusetzenden Verfahren 
nach Einräumung von Parteiengehör – diese Frage war bisher nicht Gegenstand des be-
hördlichen Verfahrens – entsprechende Feststellungen zu treffen haben (...). 
3.) Beispiel 
VwGH vom 26. Juni 2012, Zl. 2008/22/0775 (ein afghanischer Staatsangehö-
riger begehrt erfolglos die Ausstellung einer Daueraufenthaltskarte im Hin-
blick auf seine nicht gewanderten, österreichischen Wahleltern): 
(...) Soweit der Beschwerdeführer die Freizügigkeitsrichtlinie 2004/38/EG anspricht, ge-
steht er selbst in seiner Beschwerde zu, dass kein Anhaltspunkt dafür besteht, dass seine 
Wahleltern ihr Freizügigkeitsrecht in Anspruch genommen hätten; eine Anwendbarkeit 
dieser Richtlinie im Beschwerdefall ist daher ausgeschlossen (vgl. dazu schon die Urteile 
des Gerichtshofes der Europäischen Union vom 8. März 2011, Rechtssache C-34/09, 
Zambrano, Randnummer 39, und vom 15. November 2011, Rechtssache C-256/11, Dere-
ci u.a., Randnummer 52 ff.), sodass sich der Beschwerdeführer nicht darauf berufen kann, 
um die Anwendbarkeit des NAG zu begründen. 
 Auch der Unionsbürgerstatus der Wahleltern des Beschwerdeführers macht den ange-
fochtenen Bescheid noch nicht rechtswidrig. Da nämlich der Beschwerdeführer als sub-
sidiär Schutzberechtigter ein asylrechtliches befristetes (nicht: »vorläufiges«) und bei Vor-
liegen der maßgeblichen Voraussetzungen stets verlängerbares Aufenthaltsrecht gemäß § 8 
Abs. 4 Asylgesetz 20058 innehat, wird jedenfalls nicht in den Kernbestand der Rechte, die 
der Unionsbürgerstatus verleiht, eingegriffen, weil sich die Unionsbürger (konkret: die 
Wahleltern des Beschwerdeführers) in solchen Konstellationen nicht de facto gezwungen 
sehen, das Gebiet der Union zu verlassen (vgl. dazu die hg. Erkenntnisse vom 
19. Jänner 2012, Zl. 2008/22/0837, und vom 26. Jänner 2012, Zl. 2008/21/0162). (...) 
Mittelbar erschließt sich die vom VwGH vorgenommene Unterscheidung 
zwischen Rechten aus der Richtlinie und jenen aus Art. 20 und 21 AEUV 
auch aus jenen Kriterien, die nach Auffassung des VwGH eine Verweigerung 
eines Aufenthaltsrechtes selbst dann rechtfertigen, wenn die Partei zwar keine 
Rechte aus der Freizügigkeitsrichtlinie selbst, wohl aber aus Art 20 bzw. 21 
AEUV ableiten kann: 
                                                        
8. Bundesgesetz über die Gewährung von Asyl (Asylgesetz 2005 – AsylG 2005), BGBl. 




VwGH vom 15. Mai 2012, Zl. 2011/18/0147 (ein kosovarischer Staatsange-
höriger begehrt erfolglos die Aufhebung eines gegen ihn gemäß § 65 FPG er-
lassenen Aufenthaltsverbotes): 
(...) Im Anwendungsbereich der Unionsbürgerrichtlinie ist es zulässig, gegenüber einem 
Fremden, auch einem Unionsbürger – weil er durch sein persönliches Verhalten eine tat-
sächliche, gegenwärtige und erhebliche Gefahr darstellt, die ein Grundinteresse der Gesell-
schaft berührt (vgl. § 86 Abs. 1 FrPolG 2005) – ein Aufenthaltsverbot zu erlassen. Dersel-
be Maßstab ist für die Beurteilung, ob der Fremde die Trennung von seiner die österreichi-
sche Staatsbürgerschaft besitzenden Familie oder jene die Beeinträchtigung der mit der 
Unionsbürgerschaft verbundenen Rechte hinnehmen muss, anzuwenden, wenn dem Frem-
den unter dem Blickwinkel des Art. 20 AEUV grundsätzlich ein Aufenthaltsrecht einzu-
räumen wäre (vgl. E 28. März 2012, 2008/22/0140, zu der Frage, unter welchen Voraus-
setzungen einem Fremden, der mit einer österreichischen Staatsbürgerin, die ihr Recht auf 
Freizügigkeit nicht in Anspruch genommen hat, verheiratet ist, sich auf Art. 20 AEUV be-
rufen kann, demnach ein Aufenthaltstitel aus Gründen der Gefährdung der öffentlichen 
Ordnung und Sicherheit verweigert werden kann). (...)  
5.) Beispiel 
VwGH vom 28. März 2012, Zl. 2008/22/0140 (eine nigerianische Staatsan-
gehörige begehrt die Erteilung eines Aufenthaltstitels nach dem NAG zum 
Zweck der Aufrechterhaltung der Familiengemeinschaft mit ihrem die öster-
reichische Staatsbürgerschaft besitzenden, nicht gewanderten Ehemann): 
(...) Die belangte Behörde wird jedenfalls für den Fall, dass Gründe im soeben genannten 
Sinn vorliegen sollten, bei ihrer Beurteilung, ob der Aufenthalt der Beschwerdeführerin 
eine Gefahr für die öffentliche Ordnung oder Sicherheit darstellen könnte, zu beachten ha-
ben, dass die Verweigerung des Aufenthaltstitels an die Beschwerdeführerin nur dann zu-
lässig wäre, wenn die Trennung der Beschwerdeführerin von ihrem die österreichische 
Staatsbürgerschaft – und somit auch die Unionsbürgerschaft – besitzenden Ehemann hin-
zunehmen wäre. Da es sich hiebei um die Einschränkung von aus der Unionsbürgerschaft 
herrührender Rechte handelt, ist es nunmehr unzweifelhaft, dass bei der Beurteilung kein 
geringerer Maßstab angelegt werden kann, als es das Unionsrecht auch im Fall eines An-
gehörigen eines sonstigen (»gewanderten«) Unionsbürgers vorgibt, unter denen auch die-
ser die Trennung von seinen Angehörigen und somit allenfalls damit verbunden die Ein-
schränkung der Rechte aus der Unionsbürgerschaft – etwa weil dem Unionsbürger durch 
Weigerung des Mitgliedstaates, seinem Angehörigen den Aufenthalt (weiterhin) zu gewäh-
ren, die (weitere) Inanspruchnahme seines Rechtes auf Freizügigkeit erschwert oder ver-
unmöglicht wird – hinzunehmen hat. (...) 
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Es wurden keine rechtlichen Veränderungen eingeführt. Die erstinstanzlichen 
Niederlassungs- und Aufenthaltsbehörden wurden in Form von Rundschrei-
ben angewiesen, die maßgebliche Judikatur zu beachten, sofern die gesetzli-
chen Voraussetzungen dafür vorliegen. 
 Nationale Gerichte entscheiden – bei Vorliegen der gesetzlichen Voraus-
setzungen – anhand der Rechtsprechung des EuGH. 
 Der VwGH hatte sich bis dato jedoch noch nie mit einem Sachverhalt zu 
befassen, der unter dem Blickwinkel der Art. 20 oder 21 AEUV ein von dort 
ableitbares Aufenthaltsrecht beinhaltete. 
 Der VwGH verneint die Anwendbarkeit der sich aus Art. 20 oder 21 
AEUV ergebenden Maßstäbe, wenn der Partei des Niederlassungs- und Auf-
enthaltsverfahrens ohnehin bereits ein Aufenthaltsrecht zukommt.9 
 Der VwGH behebt Entscheidungen der nationalen Rechtsinstanz, wenn 
sich diese mit den Fragen des Vorliegens eines aus Art. 21 oder 21 AEUV 
ableitbaren Rechts gar nicht oder zu wenig befasst hat.10 
 Der VwGH lässt es in bestimmten Konstellationen überhaupt dahinge-
stellt, ob ein direkt etwa aus Art. 20 AEUV ableitbares Aufenthaltsrecht vor-
liegt, sofern das Fehlverhalten des Fremden gemessen an einem unionsrecht-
lichen Maßstab ohnehin von so großem Gewicht ist, dass dieser eine Tren-
nung von seinem österreichischen Ehegatten hinzunehmen und selbst ein 
nichtösterreichischer Unionsbürger die (allfällige) Beeinträchtigung der aus 
der Unionsbürgerschaft herrührenden Rechte zu gewärtigen hätte. 
 In einer solchen Konstellation ist eine aufenthaltsbeendigende Maßnahme 
auch nicht unter dem Blickwinkel des Art. 20 AEUV aufzuheben.11 
                                                        
9. VwGH vom 26. Juni 2012, Zl. 2008/22/0775: Das Höchstgericht bestätigte die 
Rechtsansicht des Bundesministeriums für Inneres als nationale Rechtsinstanz, wo-
nach der Antrag eines Drittstaatsangehörigen auf Ausstellung einer Daueraufenthalts-
karte im Hinblick auf seine österreichischen, nicht gewanderten Wahleltern deswegen 
zurückgewiesen wurde, weil das NAG gemäß § 1 Abs. 2 Z 1 nicht für Fremde gilt, 
die nach dem Asylgesetz oder nach vorigen asylgesetzlichen Bestimmungen zum 
Aufenthalt berechtigt sind. 
10. VwGH vom 19. Jänner 2012, Zl. 2011/22/0313; Zl. 2011/22/0309; Zl. 2011/22/0311; 
Zl. 2011/22/0312, Zl. 2011/22/0310; Ausweisung: VwGH vom 23. Februar 2012, Zl. 
2009/22/0158 (in diesen Fällen ergingen die Entscheidungen der nationalen Rechtsin-
stanzen zeitlich vor Verkündung des Urteiles Dereci u.a.). 




Ein Österreicher, der eine andere Staatsangehörigkeit erhält, verliert schon 
mit der Annahme der fremden Staatsangehörigkeit die Staatsbürgerschaft 
(§ 27 Staatsbürgerschaftsgesetz12), außer ihm wurde zuvor die Beibehaltung 
seiner Staatsbürgerschaft von der Landesregierung mit schriftlichem Be-
scheid nach § 28 StbG bewilligt. 
 Voraussetzungen für die Bewilligung der Beibehaltung der österreichi-
schen Staatsbürgerschaft nach § 28 StbG ist, dass einerseits sowohl das Vor-
liegen der Zustimmung des anderen Staates als auch die Unbescholtenheit 
des Antragstellers gegeben sein müssen. Im Fall von Minderjährigen ist das 
Kindeswohl entscheidend. In allen anderen Fällen wird das Interesse der Re-
publik Österreich an der Beibehaltung der Staatsbürgerschaft geprüft. Erfolg-
te der Erwerb der Staatsbürgerschaft durch Abstammung und liegen für die 
Beibehaltung besonders berücksichtigungswürdige Gründe im Privat- und 
Familienleben vor, so stellt dies eine taugliche Begründung für die Bewilli-
gung der Beibehaltung dar. 
 Bei der Entscheidung über die Beibehaltung der Staatsbürgerschaft kommt 
es nunmehr zu einer zwingend vorzunehmenden unionsrechtlichen Verhält-
nismäßigkeitsprüfung für die Statuierung von Verlusttatbeständen im natio-
nalen Staatsbürgerschaftsrecht aufgrund der Rechtsprechung des EuGH im 
Urteil vom 2. März 2010 in der Rechtssache Rottmann, C 135/08: Wenn eine 
Entscheidung über die Rücknahme der Einbürgerung zur Folge hat, dass der 
Betroffene neben der Staatsangehörigkeit des Mitgliedstaates der Einbürge-
rung die Unionsbürgerschaft verliert, ist zu prüfen, ob die Rücknahmeent-
scheidung hinsichtlich ihrer Auswirkungen auf die unionsrechtliche Stellung 
des Betroffenen den Grundsatz der Verhältnismäßigkeit wahrt (Randnum-
mern 54, 55 und 59). 
 Bei der Prüfung einer Entscheidung über die Rücknahme der Einbürge-
rung sind die möglichen Folgen zu berücksichtigen, die diese Entscheidung 
für den Betroffenen und gegebenenfalls für seine Familienangehörigen in Be-
zug auf den Verlust der Rechte, die jeder Unionsbürger genießt, mit sich 
bringt. Hierbei ist insbesondere zu prüfen, ob dieser Verlust im Verhältnis zur 
Schwere des vom Betroffenen begangenen Verstoßes zur Zeit, die zwischen 
der Einbürgerungsentscheidung und der Rücknahmeentscheidung vergangen 
ist, und zur Möglichkeit für den Betroffenen, seine ursprüngliche Staatsange-
                                                        
12. Bundesgesetz über die österreichische Staatsbürgerschaft (Staatsbürgerschaftsgesetz 
1985 – StbG), BGBl. Nr. 311/1985 (Wiederverlautbarung). 
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hörigkeit wieder zu erlangen, gerechtfertigt ist (Randnummer 56 EuGH 
Rechtssache Rottmann). 
 Ein Mitgliedstaat, dessen Staatsangehörigkeit durch Täuschung erschli-
chen wurde, kann nicht nach Art. 17 EG13 verpflichtet sein, von der Rück-
nahme der Einbürgerung allein deshalb abzusehen, weil der Betroffene die 
Staatsangehörigkeit seines Herkunftsstaats nicht wieder erlangt hat (Rand-
nummer 57 EuGH Rechtssache Rottmann). Jedoch ist zu beurteilen, ob die 
Beachtung des Grundsatzes der Verhältnismäßigkeit es unter Berücksichti-
gung sämtlicher relevanter Umstände verlangt, dass dem Betroffenen vor 
Wirksamwerden einer derartigen Entscheidung über die Rücknahme der Ein-
bürgerung eine angemessene Frist eingeräumt wird, damit er versuchen kann, 
die Staatsangehörigkeit seines Herkunftsmitgliedstaats wieder zu erlangen 
(Randnummer 58 EuGH Rechtssache Rottmann). 
Politische Rechte von Unionsbürgern 
Frage 9 
Die Richtlinie 93/109/EG über Wahlen zum Europäischen Parlament ist in 
Österreich noch vor seinem Beitritt vollständig umgesetzt worden. Österreich 
hatte den Vorteil, im Jahr 1993 in die Entwicklungsphase der Richtlinie be-
reits eingebunden gewesen zu sein. Mit dem neu zu schaffenden Europa-
Wählerevidenzgesetz14 ist es Österreich leichter gefallen, die Richtlinie voll-
inhaltlich umzusetzen, als dies in Mitgliedstaaten der Fall war, in denen die 
Durchführung von Europawahlen schon zuvor in der Rechtsordnung imple-
mentiert war. 
 Für Auslandsösterreicher mit Hauptwohnsitz in der Europäischen Union 
wie für Unionsbürger im Inland ist richtlinienbedingt insofern eine von den 
Regelungen für Österreicherinnen und Österreichern mit Hauptwohnsitz im 
Inland abweichende Regelung in der Rechtsordnung verankert, als für die 
Eintragung in die Europa-Wählerevidenz die Abgabe einer förmlichen Erklä-
                                                        
13. Art 17 des Vertrages zur Gründung der Europäischen Gemeinschaft, ABl. 1997 C 
340/1 1997, behandelte die Unionsbürgerschaft; siehe nunmehr Art 20 AEUV. 
14. Bundesgesetz über die Führung ständiger Evidenzen der Wahl- und Stimmberechtig-
ten bei Wahlen zum Europäischen Parlament (Europa-Wählerevidenzgesetz – Eu-
WEG), BGBl. Nr. 118/1996. 
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rung vorgesehen ist.15 Mangels Meldepflicht für Auslandsösterreicher ist es 
für diesen Personenkreis notwendig, diese Eintragung alle zehn Jahre zu er-
neuern,16 in gleicher Weise, wie bei der Eintragung in die Wählerevidenz, die 
zur Teilnahme an anderen bundesweiten Wahlereignissen berechtigt. 
 Die Änderungen der Richtlinie 93/109/EG vom Dezember 2012 wurden 
annähernd fristgerecht umgesetzt.17 Die sich aus den neuen Regelungen für 
Bewerber aus einem nicht-österreichischen Herkunfts-Mitgliedstaat ergeben-
den Vorteile wurden in der Praxis bei den zurückliegenden Europawahlen 
durch das Bundesministerium für Inneres auf freiwilliger Basis gegebenen-
falls ohnedies schon gewährt.18 So hat die Fachabteilung des Bundesministe-
riums für Inneres die Kontaktaufnahme zur Erlangung der Bestätigung über 
die Wahlberechtigung im Herkunfts-Mitgliedsstaat nicht dem betroffenen 
Bewerber überantwortet; vielmehr ist das Bundesministerium von sich aus 
auf die Ansprechpartner in anderen Mitgliedstaaten zugegangen, um die er-
forderlichen Bestätigungen übermittelt zu bekommen. 
Frage 10 
Die Richtlinie 94/80/EG über Kommunalwahlen (»Kommunalwahl-
Richtlinie«) ist an sich von Anfang an vollständig umgesetzt worden. Bezüg-
lich des Zweifelfalls der Zulässigkeit des Erfordernisses einer speziellen Re-
gistrierung dieses Personenkreises wurde ein möglicher Kritikpunkt insofern 
gegenstandslos, als man mittlerweile in allen Wahlrechtskodifikationen der 
Länder dazu übergegangen ist, Unionsbürgern automatisch für eine Stimm-
abgabe auf der Ebene der lokalen Gebietskörperschaften der Grundstufe 
(grundsätzlich für den Gemeinderat, in Wien für die Bezirksvertretung) zu 
ermöglichen. Zuständig ist für die diesbezüglichen innerstaatlichen Regelun-
gen das jeweilige Land, der zentrale Ansprechpartner für die Europäische 
Union in dieser Rechtsfrage ist das Bundeskanzleramt. Unabhängig davon 
hat das Bundesministerium für Inneres stets eine koordinierende Funktion 
wahrgenommen. 
 Einschlägige Urteile nationaler Gerichte sind nicht bekannt. 
                                                        
15. § 2 Abs. 4 sowie § 5 Abs. 2 EuWEG. 
16. § 4 Abs. 4 EuWEG. 
17. Siehe die Änderung der EuWO mit BGBl. I Nr. 9/2014, in Kraft getreten mit 18. 
Februar 2014. 
18. Vgl. Art. 7 der Richtlinie 93/109/EG in der alten sowie in der geltenden Fassung so-
wie § 31 Abs. 3 und 4 des Bundesgesetzes über die Wahl der Mitglieder des Europäi-




In Bezug auf das Wahlrecht für Gebietskörperschaften besteht in Österreich 
für Unionsbürger ausschließlich das Wahlrecht zum Europäischen Parlament 
und das Wahlrecht für die Vertretung auf der Ebene der lokalen Gebietskör-
perschaften der Grundstufe (an sich die Ebene der Gemeinde, in Wien die 
Ebene der Bezirke). Darüber hinausgehende Möglichkeiten gibt es in Öster-
reich nicht. 
 Für eine Implementierung des Wahlrechts auf nationaler Ebene (für den 
Nationalrat oder auf Ebene der Länder für die Landtage) müsste, da es sich 
bei den gewählten Gremien um gesetzgebende Körperschaften handelt, nicht 
nur Artikel 1 Bundes-Verfassungsgesetz19 geändert werden, allgemein vertre-
tener Auffassung wäre für so eine solche Anpassung sogar eine Änderung des 
B-VG durch Volksabstimmung unabdingbar, weil Artikel 1 B-VG ein Ele-
ment der Bauprinzipien der österreichischen Bundesverfassung ist.20 
Frage 12 
Mit den Änderungen, die sich aus dem Wahlrechtsänderungsgesetz 201121 
ergeben haben, sollten Konflikte mit der Rechtsprechung des Europäischen 
Gerichtshofs für Menschenrechte (EGMR) weitestgehend ausgeräumt sein. 
Bei zu einer Strafe in einer bestimmten Höhe verurteilten Rechtsbrechern ist 
für einen Ausschluss vom Wahlrecht nunmehr unbedingt der Ausspruch ei-
nes Gerichtes erforderlich. Eine solche Einzelfallentscheidung kann nur bei 
Verurteilung zu einer unbedingten Freiheitsstrafe von mehr als 5 Jahren er-
folgen. Bei bestimmten Delikten, die sich in einer gewissen Form gegen den 
Staat richten, ist die Grenze schon mit einer unbedingten Strafe von einem 
Jahr festgelegt worden. Bei diesen Delikten handelt es sich insbesondere um 
Delikte im Bereich des Wahlrechts sowie um die Wiederbetätigung nach dem 
Verbotsgesetz 1947.22 23 
                                                        
19. Bundes-Verfassungsgesetz (B-VG), BGBl. Nr. 1/1930 (Wiederverlautbarung). 
20. Art. 1 B-VG: »Österreich ist eine demokratische Republik. Ihr Recht geht vom Volk 
aus.« 
21. BGBl. I Nr. 43/2011. 
22. Verfassungsgesetz vom 8. Mai 1945 über das Verbot der NSDAP (Verbotsgesetz 
1947), BGBl Nr. 13/1945. 
23. Vgl. § 22 des Bundesgesetzes über die Wahl des Nationalrats (Nationalrats-
Wahlordnung 1992 – NRWO), BGBl. Nr. 471/1992, sowie § 3 EuWEG. 
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Kultur(en) der Staatsbürgerschaft 
Frage 13 
Die Unionsbürgerschaft und die damit einhergehenden Freizügigkeitsrechte 
werden durchaus kontrovers behandelt. Grundsätzlich wird die Freizügigkeit 
von Unionsbürgern inklusive der Ausübung von Freizügigkeitsrechten von 
österreichischen Staatsbürgern in anderen EU-Mitgliedstaaten als Errungen-
schaft der Mitgliedschaft Österreichs in der Europäischen Union gesehen. Im 
Gegensatz dazu wird sie jedoch im politischen Diskurs mitunter auch als zu-
sätzliche Schiene im österreichischen Zuwanderungssystem gesehen und so-
mit auch als Einwanderungsmöglichkeit verstanden. 
Frage 14 
Die bindende Wirkung der EU-Grundrechtecharta24 wurde von den österrei-
chischen Höchstgerichten anerkannt. Aus dem richtungsweisenden Erkennt-
nis des österreichischen Verfassungsgerichtshofes (VfGH) vom 14. März 
2012, U 466/11, sowie weiteren Folgejudikaten erschließt sich, dass der 
VfGH in bestimmten Konstellationen nunmehr die EU-GRC in ihrem An-
wendungsbereich als Maßstab für die »Verfassungskonformität« von nationa-
lem Recht heranzieht und entgegenstehende Normen aufhebt.25 
 Der VfGH hat seinen Prüfungsmaßstab sowohl im Bescheidprüfungsver-
fahren als auch im Normenkontrollverfahren um die Garantien der EU-GRC 
erweitert, wobei die Einschränkung der Anwendung durch die Charta selbst 
erfolgt, da diese »ausschließlich bei der Durchführung des Rechts der Union« 
gilt, wonach sich auch ihr Anwendungsbereich bestimmt.26 Die Garantien der 
EU-GRC können nach dem VfGH als verfassungsgesetzlich gewährleistete 
Rechte demnach nur im »Anwendungsbereich des Unionsrechts« geltend 
gemacht werden.27 
 In Konstellationen des österreichischen Fremdenrechts, in denen u.a. »ge-
wanderte Unionsbürger« Rechte aus der Freizügigkeitsrichtlinie geltend ma-
                                                        
24. Charta der Grundrechte der Europäischen Union (im Folgenden EU-GRC), ABl. C 
326/391 2012. 
25. VfGH vom 14. März 2012, U 466/11, RZ 47 zu Art. 47 Abs. 2 GRC; VfGH vom 
29.06.2013, U 2465/2012-14, unter Hinweis auf Art. 24 Abs. 2 GRC. 
26. VfGH vom 14. März 2012, U 466/11, RZ 35. 
27. VfGH vom 14. März 2012, U 466/11, RZ 47. 
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chen,28 entschied bis 31. Dezember 2013 im Instanzenzug grundsätzlich ein 
Tribunal (Unabhängiger Verwaltungssenat [UVS] des jeweiligen Bundeslan-
des),29 seit 1. Jänner 2014 entscheiden Verwaltungsgerichte. 
 Bis dato ist nicht bekannt, dass Entscheidungen dieser Tribunale zu Rech-
ten von Unionsbürgern unter dem Blickwinkel der EU-GRC vor dem VwGH 
beleuchtet worden wären. 
 Der VwGH überprüft jedoch Verfahren zu aufenthaltsbeendigenden Maß-
nahmen betreffend Drittstaatsangehöriger, wenn die belangte Behörde in 
Durchführung des Rechts der Union im Sinn des Art. 51 Abs. 1 EU-GRC ge-
handelt hat, am Maßstab der EU-GRC. 
1.) Beispiel 
VwGH vom 19. März 2013, Zl. 2011/21/0267 (der VwGH behebt den Be-
scheid des UVS des Landes Oberösterreich unter Hinweis auf Art. 47 Abs. 2 
EU-Grundrechtecharta. Der UVS bestätigte eine von einer erstinstanzlichen 
Behörde erlassene Rückkehrentscheidung bezüglich eines vietnamesischen 
Staatsangehörigen ohne vorhergehende Abhaltung einer mündlichen Beru-
fungsverhandlung. Der Beschwerdeführer brachte vor, dass die belangte Be-
hörde sich ein persönliches Bild von ihm im Rahmen der Durchführung einer 
mündlichen Berufungsverhandlung hätte machen müssen):  
(...) Nach Art. 3 Z 4 der Richtlinie 2008/115/EG (Rückführungsrichtlinie) ist eine »Rück-
kehrentscheidung« die behördliche oder richterliche Entscheidung oder Maßnahme, mit 
der der illegale Aufenthalt von Drittstaatsangehörigen festgestellt und eine Rückkehrver-
pflichtung auferlegt oder festgestellt wird. Gemäß Art. 6 Abs. 1 der genannten Richtlinie 
haben die Mitgliedstaaten – abgesehen von hier nicht in Betracht kommenden Ausnahme-
fällen – gegen alle illegal in ihrem Hoheitsgebiet aufhältigen Drittstaatsangehörigen eine 
Rückkehrentscheidung zu erlassen. Dem entsprechend ordnet der erste Satz des geltenden 
§ 52 Abs. 1 FPG in Umsetzung der genannten Richtlinienbestimmungen an, dass gegen 
einen Drittstaatsangehörigen mit Bescheid eine Rückkehrentscheidung zu erlassen ist, 
wenn er sich nicht rechtmäßig im Bundesgebiet aufhält. 
 Dem zufolge hat die belangte Behörde in »Durchführung des Rechts der Union« im 
Sinn des Art. 51 Abs. 1 der Grundrechte-Charta (GRC) gehandelt, weil die Vollziehung 
von durch die Mitgliedstaaten in innerstaatliches Recht umgesetztem Richtlinienrecht 
zweifellos zum zentralen Teil des Anwendungsbereichs des Unionsrechts gehört (siehe das 
hg. Erkenntnis vom 23. Jänner 2013, Zl. 2010/15/0196, mit Hinweisen auf die Rechtspre-
                                                        
28. NAG: siehe § 51 ff, welche in Umsetzung der Freizügigkeitsrichtlinie ergangen sind. 
29. UVS der Länder entscheiden auch über Berufungen von begünstigten Drittstaatsan-
gehörigen gegen Entscheidungen nach dem FPG sowie über Berufungen gegen 
Rückkehrentscheidungen nach dem FPG (§ 9 FPG). 
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chung des EuGH; vgl. dazu auch das Erkenntnis des Verfassungsgerichtshofes vom 
14. März 2012, U 466/11 u.a., Punkt II. 6. der Entscheidungsgründe mit weiteren Nach-
weisen). Daher wäre von der belangten Behörde insbesondere auf Art. 47 Abs. 2 GRC Be-
dacht zu nehmen gewesen, nach dessen ersten Satz »jede Person ein Recht darauf hat, dass 
ihre Sache von einem unabhängigen, unparteiischen und zuvor durch Gesetz errichteten 
Gericht in einem fairen Verfahren, öffentlich und innerhalb angemessener Frist verhandelt 
wird.«(...) 
(...) Das Unterbleiben der nach dem Gesagten gebotenen Durchführung einer Berufungs-
verhandlung belastet den bekämpften Bescheid mit Rechtswidrigkeit infolge Verletzung 
von Verfahrensvorschriften (vgl. in diesem Sinn zuletzt auch das schon genannte 
hg. Erkenntnis vom 23. Jänner 2013, Zl. 2010/15/0196). Er war daher gemäß § 42 Abs. 2 
Z 3 lit b und c VwGG aufzuheben. 
2.) Beispiel 
VwGH vom 14. Juni 2012, Zl. 2011/21/0278 (ein ukrainischer Staatsangehö-
riger bekämpft ein gegen ihn im Instanzenzug erlassenes Aufenthaltsverbot 
und begehrt die Durchführung einer mündlichen Berufungsverhandlung; der 
VwGH folgt diesem Argument unter Hinweis auf Art. 47 Abs. 2 EU-
Grundrechtecharta und behebt den Bescheid des UVS des Landes Oberöster-
reich): 
(...) Im gegebenen Zusammenhang ist unter nochmaliger Bezugnahme auf das schon er-
wähnte hg. Erkenntnis Zl. 2011/22/0097 ergänzend darauf hinzuweisen, dass die Verhän-
gung des gegenständlichen Aufenthaltsverbotes als Maßnahme im Sinn der Richtli-
nie 2008/115/EG (Rückführungs-RL) – und außerdem auch als eine solche nach der Richt-
linie 2003/109/EG – zu verstehen ist. Damit hat die belangte Behörde jedenfalls in 
»Durchführung des Rechts der Union« im Sinn des Art. 51 Abs. 1 der Grundrechte-
Charta (GRC) gehandelt, weshalb auch auf die Verbürgungen der GRC Bedacht zu neh-
men ist. Konkret ist damit Art. 47 Abs. 2 GRC angesprochen, wonach – so der erste Satz 
dieser Bestimmung – jede Person ein Recht darauf hat, dass ihre Sache von einem unab-
hängigen, unparteiischen und zuvor durch Gesetz errichteten Gericht in einem fairen Ver-
fahren, öffentlich und innerhalb angemessener Frist verhandelt wird. Grundsätzlich besteht 
daher in fremdenpolizeilichen Berufungsverfahren der vorliegenden Art – jedenfalls nach 
Maßgabe des § 67d AVG und allenfalls auch des § 9 Abs. 7 FPG (zur Unbedenklichkeit 
der ähnlich formulierten Bestimmung des § 41 Abs. 7 AsylG 2005 vgl. das Erkenntnis des 
Verfassungsgerichtshofes vom 14. März 2012, U 466/11-18 und U 1836/11-13) – ein An-
spruch auf Durchführung einer öffentlichen mündlichen Berufungsverhandlung (so der Sa-
che nach schon das hg. Erkenntnis vom 20. März 2012, Zl. 2011/21/0298). 
 Im Einzelnen muss hier im Hinblick auf das Vorgesagte nicht näher auf die Auslegung 
von Art. 47 Abs. 2 GRC eingegangen werden. Festgehalten sei nur, dass Art. 47 Abs. 2 
GRC im Anwendungsbereich von Art. 6 EMRK die gleiche Tragweite und Bedeutung wie 
die genannte Konventionsbestimmung hat. Jenseits dessen gelten die Garantien des 
Art. 6 EMRK für den Anwendungsbereich des Art. 47 Abs. 2 GRC entsprechend (vgl. das 
eben erwähnte Erkenntnis des Verfassungsgerichtshofes, Punkt II.7.2. der Entscheidungs-
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gründe). Was das Verhandlungsgebot anlangt, ist davon ausgehend darauf hinzuweisen, 
dass auch im Anwendungsbereich des Art. 47 Abs. 2 GRC bei einer unvertretenen Partei 
nur dann vom Vorliegen eines schlüssigen Verzichts auf die Durchführung einer Verhand-
lung ausgegangen werden kann, wenn sie über die ihr nach § 67d Abs. 1 AVG eingeräum-
te Möglichkeit einer Antragstellung auf Durchführung einer solchen Verhandlung belehrt 
wurde oder wenn Anhaltspunkte dafür bestehen, dass sie von dieser Möglichkeit hätte wis-
sen müssen (so vor dem Hintergrund des Art. 6 EMRK in einer Streitigkeit betreffend Zi-
vilrechte das hg. Erkenntnis vom 12. August 2010, Zl. 2008/10/0315). Im vorliegenden 
Fall des im Berufungsverfahren noch unvertretenen Beschwerdeführers ist weder das eine 
noch das andere ersichtlich. 
 Vorliegend ergibt sich aber schon aus den obigen Ausführungen, dass die belangte Be-
hörde ihr Verfahren mit einem wesentlichen Mangel belastet hat, weshalb der bekämpfte 
Bescheid gemäß § 42 Abs. 2 Z 3 VwGG wegen Rechtswidrigkeit infolge Verletzung von 
Verfahrensvorschriften aufzuheben war. (...) 
Im Niederlassungs- und Aufenthaltsverfahren betreffend Drittstaatsangehöri-
ger, welchen kein unionsrechtliches Aufenthaltsrecht zukommt, bei denen 
vielmehr das Aufenthaltsrecht erst durch rechtsbegründende Erteilung eines 
Aufenthaltstitels eingeräumt wird, entschied bis 31. Dezember 2013 der Bun-
desminister für Inneres als zweite Rechtsinstanz. Dessen Entscheidungen 
konnten einer Überprüfung durch die Gerichtshöfe des öffentlichen Rechts 
(VfGH und VwGH) zugeführt werden. 
 In Überprüfung derartiger Entscheidungen des Bundesministers für Inne-
res in Angelegenheiten des Niederlassungs- und Aufenthaltsrechtes begegnet 
der VwGH bis dato Vorbringen drittstaatszugehöriger Beschwerdeführer in 
Hinblick auf Rechte aus der EU-GRC bereits im Vorfeld seiner Entscheidun-
gen.30 Das Höchstgericht verweist dabei entweder auf die verfassungs- und 
unionsrechtliche Unbedenklichkeit der Entscheidungen des Bundesministers 
für Inneres oder behebt den zu prüfenden Bescheid wegen eines anderen 
Mangels. 
 Seit 1. Jänner 2014 ist der administrative Instanzenzug abgeschafft. Nun-
mehr entscheidet ein Verwaltungsgericht erster Instanz (siehe Fn. 4) unter 
Beibehaltung der Beschwerdemöglichkeiten an den VfGH und VwGH. Da-
mit ändert sich zwar die Rechtsmittelinstanz im Niederlassungs- und Aufent-
haltswesen, die volle Beachtung der EU-GRC ist dadurch aber umso mehr 
sichergestellt. Die EU-GRC findet somit volle Beachtung in der innerstaatli-
chen Rechtsprechung, in der Rechtssetzung durch den österreichischen Ge-
setzgeber und verordnungserlassende Stellen sowie in der Rechtsausübung 
durch Behörden und Gerichte. 
                                                        





Grundsätzlich sind Fragen rund um die Freizügigkeit von Unionsbürgern Teil 
der Berichterstattung der österreichischen Medien. Diese wird jedoch eher 
dominiert durch Themen wie etwa die Teilnahme von Unionsbürgern am ös-
terreichischen Arbeitsmarkt, die Delinquenz von Unionsbürgern oder »Sozi-
almissbrauch« durch diese. Oftmals erfolgt eine anlassbezogene Reaktion der 
Medien auf richtungsweisende EuGH-Urteile, die als Schlagzeilen in den ak-
tuellen politischen Diskurs einfließen (z.B. in der Rechtssache Zambrano zur 
Ableitung des Aufenthaltsrechtes für Drittstaatsangehörige). In diesem Zu-
sammenhang ist erkennbar, dass die Protagonisten der österreichischen Me-
dienlandschaft aufgrund ihrer Berichterstattung einem »pro« oder »contra Eu-
ropa«-Lager zuordenbar sind und somit zumindest indirekt auf die Mei-
nungsbildung der Gesellschaft Einfluss zu nehmen versuchen. Ansonsten er-
scheint die mediale Auseinandersetzung im Besonderen mit der Unionsbür-
gerschaft eher als gering einzustufen zu sein. Ebenso findet keine breite wis-
senschaftliche Auseinandersetzung mit einschlägigen rechtlichen Themen-
stellungen statt. Zusammenfassend kann festgestellt werden, dass Themen-
stellungen rund um die Unionsbürgerschaft und den Freizügigkeitsrechten in 
der Vergangenheit nicht im besonderen Fokus der Medien Österreichs ge-
standen haben, sondern thematisch von der europäischen Wirtschafts- und 













Citizenship within Directive 2004/38/EC – stability of residence for 
Union citizens and their family members 
Question 1 
The question of how and to what extent Directive 2004/38/EC has been 
transposed into Bulgarian law has caused a great deal of confusion in national 
administrative and judicial authorities. Generally speaking, the Directive was 
transposed with the adoption of the Entry, Residence and Exit of EU Citizens, 
and Members of Their Families Act (hereafter the ‘EU Citizens Act’).2 How-
ever, the scope of application of this Act is restricted only to Union citizens 
and their family members, who are not Bulgarian citizens.3 Apparently, the 
national legislator’s understanding of the Directive was that the latter did not 
apply to nationals with regard to their own Member State. This understanding 
turned out to be wrong in the light of the Court of Justice’s subsequent case-
law, according to which the Directive is also applicable to nationals wishing 
to leave their own Member State.4 The legal framework governing the right 
of free movement of Bulgarian citizens is laid down in the Constitution5 and 
a number of legislative acts, in particular the Bulgarian Identity Documents 
Act (hereafter ‘ZBLD’).6 In addition, the right of free movement of a Bulgar-
ian citizen’s family members who are third country nationals is governed by 
                                                        
1. Dr, Référendaire at the Court of Justice of the EU. The views expressed in this report 
are personal. 
2. Закон за влизането, пребиваването и напускането на Република България на 
гражданите на Европейския съюз и членовете на техните семейства (ДВ, бр. 80, 
30.10.2006, последно изм. и доп. бр. 21, 13.03.2012). 
3. See e.g. order No. 2414 from 11 November 2010 of the Sofia City Administrative 
Court in case No. 6758/2009. 
4. E.g. case C-33/07, Jipa, ECR I-5157. 
5. See, in particular, Art 35. 
6. Закон за българските лични документи (ДВ, бр. 93, 11.08.1998, последно изм. и 
доп. бр. 70 от 9.08.2013). 
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the Foreigners Act.7 Neither the Constitution, nor these acts have however 
been drafted with the Directive in mind. Therefore it appears that the Di-
rective, in so far as it is applicable to nationals wishing to exercise their right 
to free movement, has not been transposed into national law. This matter in 
particular has generated a substantial body of case-law (see, in particular, the 
reply to Question 6).  
 The following analysis will mainly focus on the Union Citizens Act, un-
less it is otherwise stated. Paragraph 1 of its additional provisions contains the 
definition of a ‘member of the family of a EU citizen’. This definition is 
broader than the one provided for under Art 2 of the Directive in so far as: 
– it generally covers the dependant ‘descendants’, as well as ‘relatives in the 
ascending order’8 and not only, as required under Art 2(2)(c) and d), the 
direct descendants and relatives in the ascending line; 
– it covers persons in ‘factual cohabitation’ with a Union citizen.9 Accord-
ing to Art 2(2)(b) of the Directive, partners in ‘registered partnerships’ are 
to be considered as members of the family of a Union citizen, ‘if the legis-
lation of the host Member State treats registered partnerships as equivalent 
to marriage’. In Bulgaria registered partnerships, other than marriage, are 
not formally recognised10 and are certainly not considered as ‘equivalent’ 
to marriage. Moreover, the term ‘factual cohabitation’ appears broader 
than a ‘registered partnership’.  
Art 3 of the Directive has also been transposed in broader terms. Whereas Art 
3(2) of the Directive requires Member States only to ‘facilitate’ entry and res-
idence for the persons defined therein, Art 5 of the Union Citizens Act pro-
vides that these persons ‘have the right’ to enter and reside in Bulgaria. This, 
together with the broad definition of a Union citizen’s family member men-
tioned above, practically eliminates the different status of the persons men-
tioned, respectively, in Arts 2 and 3 of the Directive. Bulgarian law thus 
seems to provide, as a whole, a much more liberal legal framework for family 
members of Union citizens than the one required under the Directive. By vir-
                                                        
7. Закон за чужденците в Република България (ДВ, бр. 153 от 23.12.1998, 
последно изм. и доп. бр. 70 от 9.08.2013). 
8. §1(1)(b) and (c) of the Union Citizens Act. 
9. §1(1)(a) of the Union Citizens Act. 
10. Even though national law sporadically attaches certain legal consequences to the so-
called ‘factual cohabitation’, there is no formal definition thereof, nor a possibility to 
formally register it. 
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tue of Art 37 of the Directive, the latter does not affect more favourable na-
tional provisions.  
 As far as Art 5 of the Directive is concerned, it has been almost literally 
transposed into the Union Citizens Act.11  
 No relevant case-law of the domestic courts regarding the aforementioned 
legal provisions could be identified. 
Question 2 
There is no such evidence in the decisions of national courts and tribunals. 
Question 3 
The national provisions that are meant to transpose Arts 12-15 of the Di-
rective have been placed in different parts of the Union Citizens Act. This 
technique makes it difficult to evaluate to what extent Arts 12-15 of the Di-
rective have been correctly transposed into national law. Even if it seems that, 
overall, most of the rules laid down in Arts 12-15 have been properly reflect-
ed into national law, some inconsistencies remain, namely: 
– Art 12(3) of the Directive has been transposed incorrectly. Art 15(2) of the 
Union Citizens Act, read in conjunction with paragraph 4 of the same art-
icle, suggests that the Union citizen’s children or the parent who has actual 
custody of the children retain the right of residence in Bulgaria after the 
Union citizen’s departure or death, if they are enrolled in an education es-
tablishment, and if ‘they are able to show that they are workers or self-
employed persons or that they have sufficient resources for themselves 
and their family members not to become a burden on the social assistance 
system of the host Member State during their period of residence and have 
comprehensive sickness insurance cover in the host Member State, or that 
they are members of the family, already constituted in the host Member 
State, of a person satisfying these requirements’. This results from an ill-
placed renvoi which seems to suggest that the above-mentioned require-
ment is applicable to all family members finding themselves in one of the 
situations described in Arts 12(2) and (3), and 13(2) of the Directive. This 
looks like a legislative error given that, first, Art 12(3) of the Directive 
imposes no such requirement and, second, the rationale behind the right of 
                                                        
11. Art 4. 
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residence of the Union citizen’s children or of the parent having actual 
custody rights manifestly stands at odds with the aforementioned require-
ment. 
– The requirement, under Art 14(2) of the Directive, that the verifications, 
by national authorities, of whether the conditions set out in Arts 7, 12, and 
13 of the Directive are satisfied, shall not be carried systematically, does 
not appear as such in the Union Citizens Act. Still, the general scheme of 
the Act suggests that such systematic verifications should not occur in 
practice. Indeed, pursuant to Art 9(8) of the Act, national authorities may 
verify whether the said conditions are satisfied when ‘a reasoned conclu-
sion may be made that the rules on the right of residence have been 
breached’. Nonetheless, a clear prohibition of systematic verifications 
might have been preferable. 
– The Bulgarian legislator has merged the requirements of Arts 14(3) and 
(4)(b), 15(2) and the last sentence of Art 27(1) of the Directive into one 
single provision of the Union Citizens Act.12 Such an approach, while jus-
tifiable for reasons of legislative economy, is questionable since it blurs 
the differences between the abovementioned articles of the Directive and 
their respective scope. In addition, there is no explicit transposition of Arts 
14(4)(a) and 15(3) of the Directive.  
No relevant case-law of the domestic courts on the above-mentioned provi-
sions could be identified.  
Question 4 
Arts 16-18 of the Directive have been almost literally transposed into the 
Union Citizens Act. With respect to the administrative formalities laid down 
in Arts 19 and 20 of the Directive, the Union Citizens Act has put into place a 
more rapid procedure that the one required under the Directive. Indeed, a 
permanent residence card is issued the same day for Union citizens and with-
in one month for family members who are not Union citizens.13 The Act does 
not lay down specific sanctions for failing to apply for a permanent residence 
card, but stipulates instead, in general terms, that ‘minor’ violations of the 
                                                        
12. Art 23(4).  
13. Arts 16(5) and 19(3) of the Union Citizens Act. Compare with Arts 19(2) and 20(1) 
of the Directive, which require that the document be issued ‘as soon as possible’ for 
Union citizens and ‘within six months of the submission of the application’ for family 
members who are not Union citizens. 
BULGARIA 
 343 
Act shall be subject to a fine of 20 BGL.14 Finally, Art 21 of the Directive has 
not been explicitly transposed into national law.  
 No relevant case-law of the domestic courts concerning the above-
mentioned provisions could be identified. 
Question 5 
The Union Citizens Act contains no provision similar to Art 24(2) of the Di-
rective. In order to evaluate whether and to what extent Bulgaria has made 
use of that derogation, one has to examine the national legislation governing 
social assistance and aid for studies, which is scattered between various laws 
and regulations. The national legislator, as will be demonstrated below, has 
not followed a common approach to the matter, but has rather dealt with it in 
a fragmentary fashion.  
 Thus, Bulgarian and Union citizens are entitled to student scholarships15 
and loans16 subject to the same conditions. There is no requirement in that re-
gard for Union citizens to have acquired the right of permanent residence or, 
for that matter, of any residence whatsoever. The Bulgarian legislator has en-
titled Union citizens to the respective benefit, irrespective of the length of 
their residence in the country.  
 As far as entitlement to social assistance is concerned, the Social Assis-
tance Act provides that foreigners are entitled to social assistance, if, in par-
ticular, they have acquired the right of ‘durable or permanent residence’.17 
That same provision also stipulates that are entitled to social assistance ‘the 
individuals who are so entitled under an international treaty, to which Bulgar-
ia is a party’. This latter category of beneficiaries is not clearly defined; in 
particular, it is uncertain whether Union citizens come within this category or 
not, especially in the light of Art 24(2) of the Directive. Alternatively, if the 
condition of ‘durable or permanent residence’ is to be considered as applica-
ble to Union citizens, and given that the right of ‘durable’ residence for 
Union citizens is acquired after a period of 3 months, it can be deduced that 
they cannot obtain social assistance during their first 3 months of residence in 
                                                        
14. Approx. 10 EUR, see Art 33 of the Union Citizens Act. This seems in line with Art 
20(2) of the Directive. 
15. § 6b of Regulation No. 90 of the Council of Ministers (Наредба №90 на МС) of 26th 
May 2000, as modified ДВ, бр. 70 от 2006. 
16. Art 3 of the Student and Doctoral Loans Act (Закон за кредитиране на студенти и 
докторанти, обн., ДВ, бр. 69 от 5.08.2008 г.). 
17. Art 2(6) (Закон за социално подпомагане, обн., ДВ, бр. 56 от 19.05.1998 г.). 
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Bulgaria. In this respect, it may be argued that Bulgaria has implicitly made 
use of Art 24(2) of the Directive. It is a different matter that, as a rule, if 
Member States wish to make use of a derogation, they should do so explicit-
ly. 
 There are also a number of other more specific national laws governing 
various particular social benefits, such as, for example, the Family Assistance 
for Children Act, which lays down the rules on social (non-contributive) ben-
efits during pregnancy, birth, and for raising children. This Act provides that 
foreigners may claim such benefits, if they have acquired the right of perma-
nent residence and ‘if the right to such a benefit results from an international 
treaty to which Bulgaria is a party’.18 The requirement for permanent resi-
dence seems however, in any event, incompatible with Art 24(2) of the Di-
rective.  
 No relevant case-law of the domestic courts concerning Union citizens 
could be identified. 
Question 6 
1. 
There is a substantial body of case-law concerning the concept of ‘public pol-
icy’ and the application of the principle of proportionality within the context 
of Art 27 of the Directive. Most of the case law concerns Bulgarian citizens 
who were banned from leaving the country on one of the following grounds: 
i) the person concerned had committed an offence, while residing in anoth-
er State;19 or  
ii) the person concerned had a tax or a social security liability of more than 
5000 BGN;20 or 
iii) the person concerned had a private debt of the same amount.21  
The legality of these grounds has been challenged as being contrary to the 
Constitution, to the ECHR and to EU law (Directive 2004/38). However, it is 
noteworthy that the right to free movement is not guaranteed in identical 
terms under these three instruments. In particular:  
                                                        
18. Art 3(5) (Закон за семейни помощи за деца, обн., ДВ, бр. 32 от 29.03.2002 г.). 
19. Art 76(5) ZBLD. 
20. Approx. 2500 EUR; Art 75(5) ZBLD. 
21. Art 76(3) ZBLD, later replaced by Art 75(6) of the same law. 
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– According to the Constitution, the freedom of movement may be restricted 
‘for the protection of constitutionally recognised values, such as national 
security, public health and the rights and freedoms of other citizens’ (Art 
35); 
– Pursuant to Art 2 of Protocol 4 of the ECHR, which Bulgaria has signed 
and ratified, ‘no restrictions shall be placed on the exercise of these rights 
other than such as are in accordance with law and are necessary in a dem-
ocratic society in the interests of national security or public safety, for the 
maintenance of ordre public, for the prevention of crime, for the protec-
tion of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of 
others’. 
It follows, first, that unlike Art 27 of the Directive, Art 35 of the Constitution 
makes no mention of ‘public policy’, but instead allows restrictions for the 
protection of the ‘rights and freedoms of other citizens’. The interesting query 
here is whether the two concepts overlap or whether they are different. Sec-
ondly, Art 27 of the Directive expressly provides that the grounds mentioned 
in that article cannot be invoked ‘to serve economic ends’. Such a condition 
is absent from the Constitution. Thirdly, the list of grounds on which the 
freedom of movement may be restricted under Art 35 of the Constitution, 
seems not to be exhaustive, which is illustrated by the use of ‘such as’. The 
contrast here with Art 27 of the Directive is manifest. Similarly, Art 2 of Pro-
tocol 4 of the ECHR provides, like the Constitution, that the freedom of 
movement may be restricted for the protection of the rights and freedoms of 
others, and adds as possible grounds the prevention of crime and the protec-
tion of morals. There is no equivalent of the prohibition to restrict the free-
dom of movement on economic grounds either.  
 Thus Bulgarian courts had the difficult task of distinguishing between, or 
as the case may be, conciliating these different legal instruments and their 
subtle differences. The matter was eventually brought before the Supreme 
Administrative Court (hereafter the ‘SAC’), the Constitutional Court (hereaf-
ter the ‘CC’), the European Court of Human Rights (hereafter the ‘ECtHR’), 
and the Court of Justice.22  
                                                        
22. For a comprehensive overview of these developments, see N. Angelova, Freedom of 
Movement of Bulgarian Citizens as Citizens of the European Union and Measures for 





The first query that had to be resolved was whether EU law and, in particular, 
Art 27 of the Directive, was applicable to nationals in respect of their own 
State of origin. The query gave rise to the preliminary reference in Gayda-
rov,23 which concerned a ban imposed on a Bulgarian citizen following an 
offence committed in a third state. The Court of Justice held, first, that the Di-
rective was applicable in such a situation, and second, that national law 
seemed to allow the imposition of such bans solely on the basis of a previous 
offence without further evaluating whether the person concerned represented 
a genuine, present, and sufficiently serious threat affecting a fundamental in-
terest of society. 
3. 
Secondly, national courts wondered whether the failure to pay a public or a 
private debt could at all serve as a ground to restrict the right to free move-
ment of Union citizens. After having initially confirmed the legality of such 
bans, the matter was brought to the ECtHR in Riener v Bulgaria. The Stras-
bourg court held that a ban on leaving the country as a consequence of a fail-
ure to pay a public debt of 5000 BGN or more (tax or social security liabili-
ties) pursued a legitimate aim, namely, maintaining the ordre public and the 
protection of the rights of others within the meaning of Art 2 of Protocol 4 of 
the ECHR, without further elaborating on the matter.24 Later, in Ignatov v 
Bulgaria, the ECtHR held that banning a person who had failed to pay a pri-
vate debt from leaving the country also pursued a legitimate aim, namely, the 
protection of the rights of others.25 In both cases, the ban was found to be dis-
proportionate, given that it did not provide for periodic reassessment in the 
light of factors such as whether or not reasonable efforts to collect the debt 
had been made and whether the debtor’s leaving the country was likely to 
undermine the chances to collect the money. The ECtHR also pointed out that 
the ban had an automatic character and could thus remain in force over 
lengthy periods of time without taking into consideration the debtor’s person-
al conduct.  
 The matter was also considered by the CC. It found that a ban on leaving 
the country as a consequence of a failure to pay a public debt was, in princi-
                                                        
23. Case C-430/10, nyr. 
24. Appl. No. 46343/99.  
25. Appl. No. 50/02.  
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ple, justified on grounds pertaining to the ‘protection of the rights and free-
doms of other citizens’ within the meaning of Art 35 of the Constitution.26 It 
pointed out that such a failure ‘undermines the economic foundations of the 
State, creates a risk for the timely and effective payments and services, neces-
sary for guaranteeing some constitutionally recognised fundamental rights, 
such as the right to social security and social assistance, medical insurance 
and free medical care, education, healthy and favourable environment, etc.’ A 
ban on leaving the country on grounds of a failure to pay a private debt was, 
according to the CC, also justified in the name of the ‘protection of the rights 
and freedoms of other citizens’, since such a failure breached the creditor’s 
right to private property. Nevertheless, the CC declared both bans unconstitu-
tional, because, in substance, they took no account of the debtor’s personal 
behaviour (e.g. whether he or she cooperated with the authorities or obstruct-
ed the reimbursement of the debt),27 nor did they conform with the principle 
of proportionality, given that, according to the Bulgarian penal code, only 
certain serious and intentional failures to pay a public liability, amounting to 
a criminal offence, may be punished by a ban on leaving the country. It is 
noteworthy that the CC reasoned exclusively on the basis of Art 35 of the 
Constitution. It did mention, in a sort of an obiter dicta, some of the differ-
ences between the text of that provision and Art 27 of the Directive, but drew 
no conclusion from this, other than stating that the declaration of unconstitu-
tionality would facilitate the transposition of Art 27. In a dissenting opinion, 
three of the judges added that the bans in question should not be considered 
as serving economic ends within the meaning of Art 27(1) of the Directive, 
because they contributed to the ‘stability of the public order and legal certain-
ty, given that they are based on a final national judgement or a definitve in-
junction to pay’.28  
4. 
Therefore it was because of their failure to respect the principle of propor-
tionality that these bans were found to violate the ECHR and the Constitu-
tion. The case-law discussed above did not address the question of whether 
the imposition of such bans is compatible with EU law and, in particular, 
whether they can be justified on grounds of ‘public policy’ within the mean-
                                                        
26. Judgment No. 2 in case No. 2/2011. 
27. See also the opinion of judges P. Kirov and S. Stoeva, who underline the automatic 
character of the ban. 
28. See the dissenting opinion of judges D. Tokushev, K. Stoichev and V. Angusheva. 
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ing of Art 27 of the Directive. That question remained relevant since, if the 
bans could not be justified on that ground, they were illegal per se. By con-
trast, if they were only disproportionate, they could be maintained as such, 
subject to certain legislative amendments allowing for the particularities of 
each case to be taken into consideration.  
 In that regard, national courts considered that a ban following a failure to 
pay a public debt pursued a ‘just objective’, underlining the public interest 
involved in the responsibility of the authorities to ensure budgetary revenue.29 
The question was eventually referred to the Court of Justice in Aladzhov.30 
The Court pointed out that ‘the possibility cannot be ruled out as a matter of 
principle’ that non-recovery of tax liabilities may fall within the scope of 
‘public policy’ within the meaning of Article 27(1) of the Directive, and that 
the resulting ban cannot be considered, as a matter of principle, to serve ex-
clusively economic ends.31 The Court hemphasised that the concept of public 
policy presupposes the existence, in addition to the perturbation of the social 
order which any infringement of the law involves, of a ‘genuine, present, and 
sufficiently serious threat affecting one of the fundamental interests of socie-
ty’, related, for example, to the amount of the sums at stake, or to what is re-
quired to combat tax fraud.32 The Court also addressed the issue of the differ-
ences between Art 27(1) of the Directive and Art 35 of the Constitution, 
pointing out that these differences were ‘of no relevance’ since ‘all that mat-
ters’ was whether the ban was based on a ground which could be regarded as 
within the scope of public policy, within the meaning of EU law.33 As regards 
the proportionality of the measure, the Court noted that such measures are 
founded solely on the existence of the tax liability without any specific as-
sessment of the personal conduct of the person concerned and with no refer-
ence to any threat of any kind which he represents to public policy. It also in-
vited the national court to verify whether there existed other less intrusive 
measures, suggesting strongly that, even if the ban at issue were to be consid-
ered as adopted under the conditions laid down in Art 27(1) of the Directive, 
it looked like it failed to satisfy the conditions of the second paragraph there-
of.  
                                                        
29. E.g. judgment No. 15760 in case No. 9700/2012 of the SAC; judgment No. 15087 in 
case No. 12509/2011 of the SAC. 
30. C-434/10. 
31. Paras 37 and 38, ibid. 
32. Paras 35 and 37, ibid. 
33. Para. 33, ibid. 
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 With regard to bans imposed as a consequence of a failure to pay a private 
debt, however, national courts were much more hesitant. Parts of the case-law 
considered that such bans cannot be justified on grounds of public policy 
within the meaning of Art 27(1) of the Directive, but served purely economic 
ends.34 In one case, such a ban was even held to be of a sufficiently serious 
nature as to give rise to State liability.35 Yet, another part of the case-law yet 
seems to suggest that a failure to pay a private debt can, in principle, consti-
tute a ground of public policy, ‘if the financial interest at issue amounts to a 
fundamental interest of society’.36 The contradictions in the case-law gave 
rise to an interpretative judgment of the SAC,37 where it held that such a ban 
was contrary to the Directive, because of the automatic and disproportionate 
character of the measure. The judgment did not address the issue of whether 
such a ban was to be considered as pursuing one of the grounds spelled out in 
Art 27 of the Directive. This was noted in two dissenting opinions, one of 
which argued that the matter should have been referred to the Court of Justice 
in order for the latter to assess whether a ban for a failure to pay a private 
debt can be justified on grounds of public policy. 
 The matter was indeed eventually brought to the attention of the Court of 
Justice by a lower court in Byankov.38 The Court appeared rather sceptical 
about whether a failure to pay a private debt was a matter of public policy, 
noting that ‘even if the view could reasonably be taken that some notion of 
safeguarding the requirements of public policy underlies such an objective, it 
cannot be ruled out (...), that the prohibition on leaving the territory at issue in 
the main proceedings pursues an exclusively economic objective, (which) 
Article 27(1) of Directive 2004/38 expressly excludes (...)’.39 As regards the 
requirement of taking into consideration the personal conduct and the propor-
tionality of the measure, the Court’s considerations were analogous to those 
spelled out in Aladzhov. 
5. 
What conclusions can be drawn from the different currents of case-law out-
lined above? Whereas the assessment of the principle of proportionality car-
                                                        
34. E.g. judgment No. 7776 in case No. 8814/2012 of the SAC. 
35. Ibid. 
36. Judgment No. 11100 in case No. 4890/2011 of the SAC. 
37. Interpretative judgment No. 2/2011 of the SAC. 
38. Case C-249/11. 
39. Para. 39. 
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ried out by the SAC, CC, ECtHR, and the Court of Justice was not dissimilar, 
this was not necessarily the case with regard to the notion of ‘public policy’. 
While the CC and the ECtHR had no problem concluding that a ban on leav-
ing the country in the event of a failure to pay a public and/or a private debt 
of a certain amount can be justified on grounds of maintaining the public or-
der (ECtHR) or of protecting the rights and freedoms of others (ECtHR and 
the CC), the Court of Justice was much less affirmative and manifestly dubi-
ous in that regard.  
 More generally, national courts seemed confused as to the respective 
scope of application of the Constitution, the ECtHR and EU law, and their 
underlying principles and rationale. Given the importance of free movement 
in Union law, it is only logical that the Directive be less permissive of re-
strictions on the freedom of movement than international treaties, or, as the 
case may be, national constitutions. This consideration may become even 
more relevant after EU’s accession to the ECHR.  
6. 
As far as Art 28 of the Directive is concerned, the Bulgarian legislator has not 
transposed it verbatim. Art 25 of the Union Citizens Act distinguishes only 
between two categories of Union citizens – those who have resided in Bulgar-
ia for 10 or more years and all other Union citizens, irrespective of whether 
they have acquired the right of permanent residence or not. With regard to the 
first category, expulsion may be ordered ‘only in exceptional circumstances 
on grounds of national security’.40 This seems to reflect, albeit in different 
terms, the ‘imperative grounds of public security’ of Art 28(3) of the Di-
rective. With regard to the second category, expulsion is allowed where the 
Union citizen ‘represents a genuine, present, and serious threat to national se-
curity or public order’.41 Thus, the same – higher – threshold pertaining to the 
serious character of the threat to public order or national security is applicable 
to all Union citizens having resided in the country for less than 10 years, irre-
spective of whether they have acquired the right of permanent residence or 
not. Therefore it appears that the Union Citizens Acts lays down a more fa-
vourable régime, at least with regard to Union citizens who have not yet ac-
quired the right of permanent residence. By virtue of Art 37 of the Directive, 
the latter does not affect more favourable national provisions.  
                                                        
40. Art 25(2) of the Union Citizens Act. 
41. Art 25(1) of the Union Citizens Act. 
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 There is little domestic case-law on expulsion of Union citizens or their 
family members. In one case, the national court interpreted the notions of se-
rious and imperative grounds of public policy and public security.42 Con-
fronted with difficulties in establishing the precise length of time of the per-
son’s residence in the country, the court decided to examine whether the facts 
of the case amounted both to serious and imperative grounds of public policy 
and public security capable of justifying his expulsion. In that regard the 
court took into consideration the following circumstances: the person was 
sentenced to more than 5 years in prison for drug trafficking in an organised 
group, has been presenting himself with a false identity over a long period of 
time, has resided illegally in the country, and has not culturally and socially 
integrated into Bulgarian society. It concluded, after quoting the Court’s 
judgment in Tsakouridis, that the abovementioned facts suffice to consider 
that the grounds on which the expulsion decision had been taken amount both 
to serious and imperative grounds of national security. 
EU citizenship beyond Directive 2004/38/EC – exploring national 
application of primary EU Law 
Question 7 
The analysis of the existent case-law suggests, first, that national courts do 
not distinguish clearly between rights acquired under Directive 2004/38 and 
under Arts 20 and/or 21 TFEU; secondly, that they do not fully apprehend the 
Court’s case-law; thirdly, that there is a general unease when having to ad-
dress ‘purely internal situations’: national courts either make no mention of 
Arts 20 and 21 TFEU at all, or, conversely, refer quasi-automatically to this 
provision or to Art 21 TEUF without fully taking into account the conditions 
for their application as spelled out by the Court of Justice in its case-law.  
 The following examples illustrate this. In Nalbandian, an Armenian adult, 
legally residing in Bulgaria for many years, was ordered to leave the country, 
because of the expiry of the duration of his residence permit. Mr. Nalbandi-
                                                        
42. Judgment No. 13042 in case No. 6600/2012 of the SAC. Interestingly, the person 
whose expulsion was ordered was a Turkish national and it was not alleged that he 
was a family member of a Union citizen. Yet, probably because there were doubts 
about his true identity, the court decided to examine, in any event, whether the re-
quirements of the Directive were met.  
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an’s mother, who was suffering from a serious disease which required daily 
care, had in the meantime acquired Bulgarian citizenship. Mr. Nalbandian 
challenged the order before the administrative court in Dobrich. The latter re-
jected the action, pointing out that the applicant’s right to family life within 
the meaning of Art 8 ECHR was not breached since the contested order was 
imposed by law, was justified by the ‘need to protect the rights and freedoms 
of the others’, and was proportionate in that Mr. Nalbandian’s father was re-
siding in Bulgaria and could therefore take care of his wife.43 In its judgment 
the administrative court made no mention of EU law whatsoever. On appeal, 
the SAC annulled that judgment on a number of grounds, one of which con-
cerned the failure of the lower court to take account of the applicable Union 
law.44 It noted that the applicant has a continuous link with Bulgaria, where 
his parents live, has property in the country, has had recourse to medical ser-
vices in the context of his mother’s treatment, is culturally and socially inte-
grated and is unlikely to become a burden for the Bulgarian social assistance 
system. The SAC also mentioned that the applicant’s father was suffered 
from a heart disease. Further, it held that although the applicant’s mother, a 
Union citizen, has never exercised her freedom of movement, that circum-
stance ‘had no bearing on the applicability of Directive 2004/38 and Arts 20 
and 21 TFEU’, a conclusion it supported by referring to the Court’s judg-
ments in Zhu and Chen45 and Carpenter.46 In its opinion, by virtue of Art 
3(2)(a) of the Directive, ‘as interpreted in the light of para. 45 of the Court’s 
judgment in Chen’, the Directive was applicable to Mr. Nalbandian’s situa-
tion. After mentioning that Mr. Nalbandian’s expulsion would affect ‘unfa-
vourably’ his mother’s family relations with her son and would also ‘inter-
fere’ with her right to a life of dignity and independence within the meaning 
of Art 25 of the Charter, the SAC concluded that Mr. Nalbandian’s removal 
would deprive his mother of the ‘genuine enjoyment of the substance’ of her 
rights as Union citizen. On the basis of these considerations, the SAC found 
that the contested order breached Art 7 of the Charter, Arts 20 and 21 TFEU, 
Directive 2004/38 and Art 8 ECHR and, consequently, annulled it. 
 The SAC’s judgment in Nalbandian is a good example of the difficulties 
national courts have experienced in the application of EU rules on citizen-
ship. First, it shows a general misunderstanding of the scope of application of 
Directive 2004/38. Contrary to what was held in that judgment, the Directive 
                                                        
43. Judgment n° 210 from 08.12.2009 in case n° 447/2009. 
44. Judgment n° 15906 from 23.12.2010 in case n° 3284/2010. 
45. Case C-200/02. 
46. Case C-60/00. 
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is not applicable to a third country national who is a family member of a 
Union citizen that has never exercised his or her right to free movement and 
that has always resided in the Member State of which he or she is a nation-
al.47 Secondly, the judgment in Nalbandian demonstrates the practical diffi-
culties in understanding and applying the ‘denial of the genuine enjoyment of 
the substance of a Union citizen’s rights’ test. In particular, the SAC did not 
examine the question of whether Mr. Nalbandian’s removal would lead to a 
situation where his mother would have to leave the territory of the Union.48 In 
that respect, the SAC did not examine whether Mr. Nalbandian was personal-
ly taking care of his sick mother, whether she was economically dependent 
on him, etc. Thirdly, the judgment in Nalbandian also shows the difficulties 
national courts face when having to apply the Court of Justice’s citizenship 
case-law. SAC’s referral to Zhu and Chen and Carpenter appears ill-placed. 
Last, but not least, it is unclear what relevance the SAC attached to Mr. Nal-
bandian’s degree of integration into Bulgarian society or to the fact that he 
was unlikely to become a burden to the social assistance system. These cir-
cumstances are generally relevant in the context of Directive 2004/38, but not 
for the purposes of applying Art 20 TFUE. 
 Another example of the national courts’ misapprehension of the Court of 
Justice’s citizenship case-law can be found in the Singh case. Mr. Singh, an 
Indian national, was ordered to leave the national territory and was banned 
from re-entering for a period of 5 years on the ground that he was illegally 
residing in the country. Mr. Singh argued that he had a durable relationship 
with a Bulgarian citizen for over four years and had a son, who was a Bulgar-
ian citizen himself. Mr. Singh successfully sought the annulment of the order 
in front of the Administrative court in the region of Sofia, which pointed out, 
referring to the Court’s judgment in Zambrano,49 that the contested order was 
not sufficiently motivated in that it failed to take account of the applicable 
Union law.50 It did not however further discuss the exact application of Union 
law in the situation at hand. The judgment was however subsequently 
quashed on appeal by the SAC, which pointed out, first, that the Court’s 
judgment in Zambrano was irrelevant, since, unlike Mr. Singh, the third 
country national in Zambrano had legally entered the territory of the Union.51 
Secondly, it held that Mr. Singh cannot be considered a member of a  
                                                        
47. E.g. case C-256/11, Dereci, paras 50-58. 
48. Ibid., para. 66. 
49. Case C-34/09. 
50. Judgment n° 56 from 27.01.2012 in case n° 1152/2011. 
51. Judgment n° 5699 from 20.04.2012 in case n° 2713/2012. 
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Union citizen’s family since there was no evidence of his relationship with a 
Bulgarian citizen, nor did it credit the mother’s notary declaration that Mr. 
Singh was the father of her son since the said declaration did not respect the 
form required by law. Putting aside the question of whether there was suffi-
cient evidence of Mr. Singh being a Union citizen’s family member, the in-
teresting aspect of this judgment is the way the SAC interpreted the Court’s 
judgment in Zambrano. The SAC seemed to suggest that what was decisive 
in that case was the fact that Mr. Zambrano had legally entered the territory 
of the Union and that the Court’s solution would be inapplicable in a situation 
where the third country national had illegally entered the EU. This under-
standing does not find support in the Court’s subsequent case-law.52  
 There is also evidence of cases where national courts did not at all discuss 
whether Art 20 TFEU was applicable in a ‘purely internal situation’. The 
Shishich case concerned a Bosnian national who had been living in Bulgaria 
for about 15 years, had a durable relationship with a Bulgarian citizen and 
was the father of a Bulgarian citizen. Mr. Shishich, whose family members 
had apparently not exercised their rights of free movement, was ordered to 
leave the country because he was found to be residing there illegally. The 
Hashani case concerned another ‘purely internal situation’ where a Kosovo 
national was ordered to leave the country, despite the fact that he had a dura-
ble relationship with a Bulgarian citizen, with whom he had three minor chil-
dren, also Bulgarian citizens. In neither of these cases did the SAC refer to 
Art 20 TFEU. Instead, in Shishich it relied exclusively on Directive 
2008/11553 and annulled, on that ground, the contested order.54 In Hashani, it 
annulled the order on the basis of Art 8 ECHR, because it failed to take into 
account all the relevant circumstances of the case and was, in any event, dis-
proportionate.55 
Question 8 
Where Bulgarian citizenship has been acquired by naturalisation, it may be 
revoked if, in particular, the naturalised person has withheld any data or facts 
                                                        
52. See for example, the judgment in Dereci, cited at note 47 supra, para. 23 read in con-
junction with paras 59-69. 
53. Directive 2008/115/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 Decem-
ber 2008 on common standards and procedures in Member States for returning ille-
gally staying third-country nationals, OJ L 348, 24.12.2008, pp. 98-107. 
54. Judgment n° 11056 from 05.08.2011 in case n° 13868/2010. 
55. Judgment n° 13422 from 19.10.2011 in case n° 14875/2010. 
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which, had they been known, would have served as grounds to refuse acquisi-
tion of Bulgarian citizenship.56 However, the decision to grant Bulgarian citi-
zenship can be revoked no later than ten years after it has been granted and 
only if the person does not, as a result of the revocation, become stateless. 
The latter condition was added in February 2012,57 i.e. after the Court’s 
judgment in Rottmann.58 It is unclear whether this amendment sought to give 
effect to the Court’s judgment. In addition, Art 24 of the said Act stipulates 
that any person who has acquired Bulgarian citizenship by naturalisation may 
be deprived thereof, if sentenced by an enforceable conviction for a serious 
offence against the Republic, subject to the condition that the said person is 
abroad, and does not become stateless. It thus seems that a situation like the 
one in Rottmann cannot arise under Bulgarian law.  
Political rights of EU citizens 
Question 9 
Directive 93/109/EC was first transposed in national law in March 2007 (3 
months after accession) through the adoption of the Election of Members of 
the European Parliament from the Republic of Bulgaria Act.59 In 2011, the 
relevant provisions were merged into the Electoral Code60 which governs all 
matters related to the organisation of elections in Bulgaria. The latter has not 
made use of any of the derogations provided for under Arts 14 and 15 of the 
Directive.  
 With regard to the conditions imposed on EU citizens, they are mostly 
identical with those imposed on national citizens: age requirements (18 years 
by polling day for the right to vote and 21 years for the right to be elected); 
absence of indictment and ongoing custodial sentence; residence in Bulgaria 
or in another EU Member State at least during the last 3 months (for the right 
to vote) or 6 months (for the right to be elected); lack of citizenship of any 
State which is not a EU Member State (for the right to be elected). EU citi-
                                                        
56. Art 22 of the Bulgarian Citizenship Act [Закон за българското гражданство (ДВ, 
бр. 136, 18.11.1998, последно изм. бр. 68, 02.08.2013)]. 
57. ДВ, бр. 11, 07.02.2012. 
58. Case C-135/08, ECR I-1449. 
59. ДВ, бр. 20, 06.03.2007. 
60. ДВ, бр. 9, 28.01.2011. 
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zens’ electoral franchise has also been subjected to three additional condi-
tions, two of which result from the Directive (i.e. that he or she is not de-
prived of his or her electoral franchise in the home Member State and that he 
or she has stated in advance, in a written declaration, his or her desire to exer-
cise his or her voting rights or to run as candidate in Bulgaria).61 The third 
condition, specific to EU citizens, is the requirement that they enjoy a ‘dura-
ble or permanent residence status’ in Bulgaria.62  
 With regard to the latter requirement, the European Commission noted in 
its 2010 report on the election of MEPs that the ‘requirement [for EU citi-
zens] to provide a registration document for proving residence’ is contrary to 
the Directive.63 In the meantime, the Commission initiated infringement pro-
ceedings against Bulgaria concerning the implementation of the Directive.64 
It is interesting to note that the ‘durable or permanent residence’ requirement 
applicable to Union citizens only, seems to complement the condition – also 
applicable to Bulgarian citizens – that, in order to vote, they must have resid-
ed in ‘Bulgaria or another EU Member State’ at least during the last three 
months prior to polling day. These two conditions, read together, recall the 
legal framework laid down by Directive 2004/38, whereby Member States 
may require Union citizens to register with the local authorities for periods of 
residence longer than three months.65 Yet, the ‘durable or permanent resi-
dence’ requirement applicable only to Union citizens seems problematic at 
least from two angles. First, whereas Union citizens residing in Bulgaria for 
periods longer than three months may indeed be expected to have registered 
with the local authorities, failure to do so may, according to Directive 
2004/38, give rise to ‘proportionate and non-discriminatory sanctions’.66 The 
query here would be whether depriving the Union citizen of his electoral 
franchise is a proportionate and non-discriminatory sanction for failing to 
                                                        
61. Arts 8, 9 and 10 of the Directive. 
62. Art 3(3) of the Electoral Code. 
63. Report on the election of Members of the European Parliament (1976 Act as amended 
by Decision 2002/772/EC, Euratom) and on the participation of European Union citi-
zens in elections for the European Parliament in the Member State of residence (Di-
rective 93/109/EC), 27.10.2010, COM(2010) 605 final. 
64. http://ec.europa.eu/eu_law/eulaw/decisions/dec_20121024.htm. The complaints put 
forward by the Commission in this letter have however not been publicly disclosed.  
65. Art 8(1) of the Citizen Directive. 
66. Art 8(2) of the Citizen Directive. 
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produce a residence card.67 Second, a Union citizen who has only recently 
settled in Bulgaria – for example one month before polling day – and who has 
therefore had no obligation to apply for a residence card, will be unable to 
vote, even though he had resided for the last three and more months in anoth-
er EU Member State, thus fulfilling the requirement of Art 5 of Directive 
93/109. By contrast, a Bulgarian citizen in a similar situation would be eligi-
ble to vote.  
 In its 2010 report, the European Commission also noted that Bulgaria had 
failed to correctly transpose the obligation to provide information to Union 
citizens on the detailed arrangements for exercising their right to vote and 
stand in elections.68 
 The December 2012 amendments to Directive 93/109/EC may require cer-
tain amendments to the Electoral Code. Art 118, para. 2, point 7, of the latter 
provides that an EU citizen who is not a Bulgarian citizen and who wishes to 
run for MEP, shall produce an attestation from the competent authorities in 
the home MS certifying that that person has not been deprived of the right to 
stand as a candidate in the home MS or that no such disqualification is known 
to them; however, if he or she is unable to produce such an attestation, it suf-
fices that he or she declares that he or she has not been deprived of the right 
to be elected in his or her home MS.69 While this second option seems to be 
already in compliance with the latest amendments of Directive 93/109/EC, 
the first proviso (the attestation requirement) should eventually be deleted in 
order to remove potential administrative hurdles.  
 No relevant case-law of domestic courts could be identified. 
Question 10 
Directive 94/80/EC was first transposed in national law in October 2007 (10 
months after accession) through the adoption of the Municipal Elections 
Act.70 In 2011, the relevant provisions were merged into the Electoral Code. 
Bulgaria has made use of the derogation provided for under Art 5(3) of the 
                                                        
67. According to the instructions of the Central electoral committee, EU citizens must 
produce a residence card in order to be able to exercise their electoral franchise: 
www.europe.bg/htmls/page.php?id=21089&category=354. 
68. See note 64 supra. 
69. For the 2009 EP elections that second option was inexistent : see Decision No. 11 of 
7 April 2009 of the Central Electoral Commission which expressly requires that EU 
citizens produce such an attestation (Part II, point 1 (d)): http://izboriep.bta.bg/. 
70. ДВ, бр. 78, 28.09.2007. 
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Directive by allowing Union citizens to stand only for municipal councillors, 
but not for mayors.  
 The Electoral Code imposes some additional conditions on EU citizens in 
order to vote or be elected in municipal elections, which are analogous to 
those mentioned in the reply to the previous question.71 The European Com-
mission has also initiated infringement proceedings against Bulgaria concern-
ing the implementation of Directive 94/80.72  
 No relevant case-law of domestic courts could be identified. 
Question 11 
There is no franchise for EU citizens that goes beyond the local and EP elec-
toral rights required under EU law. 
Question 12 
Persons serving a custodial sentence or interdicted are deprived of electoral 
franchise. To our knowledge, the question of whether such limitations are 
compatible with EU law, and in particular with the Charter, has not so far 
been raised in domestic courts. For other possible tensions with EU law, 
please refer to the reply to Question 9. 
Culture(s) of citizenship 
Question 13 
Given the relatively limited scope of the issues so far considered by national 
administrative and judicial authorities, it would be premature to evaluate 
whether the implementation of EU citizenship in Bulgaria is understood as 
part of a rights-based EU culture or as an adjunct to national immigration sys-
tems. It could nonetheless be noted that parts of the case-law and most recent 
                                                        
71. Arts 3(4)(5) and 4(5)(6) of the Electoral Code. In addition to the conditions men-
tioned in the reply to Question 9, Bulgarian and Union citizens are also required, in 
the context of municipal elections, to have resided in the respective municipal elec-
toral territory at least during the last 6 months. 
72. http://ec.europa.eu/eu_law/eulaw/decisions/dec_20121024.htm. The complaints put 
forward by the Commission in this letter have however not been publicly disclosed. 
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administrative practice have shown a clear preference for a ‘rights-based’ ap-
proach, in particular in cases where Bulgarian citizens have relied on their 
rights as Union citizens. By contrast, as far as third country nationals, mem-
bers of the family of a Union citizen are concerned, the ‘immigration’-based 
approach appears dominant. For examples, please refer to the replies to Ques-
tions 6 and 7.  
Question 14 
The Charter has not had a notable effect on how the rights of EU citizens are 
being interpreted by national courts. The latter have referred to the Charter in 
more general terms in a couple of judgments concerning EU citizenship, but 
do not seem to have drawn particular legal consequences from it. The case-
law is still marred by confusion with regard to the scope of application of the 
Charter and that of the ECHR, whose Art 8 has been systematically quoted 
alongside Art 7 of the Charter, without distinguishing between the two. In 
that regard, the Court’s judgment in Dereci73 does not appear to have been 
fully understood by domestic courts. 
Question 15 
Issues connected to EU citizenship have not been a particularly salient issue 
in the national media. This is probably mainly due to the fact that immigra-
tion from other EU Member States has so far been limited. That being said, 
several themes directly or indirectly linked with Union citizenship have re-
currently appeared in local media. A common feature of most of these reports 
is that they generally pay little attention to the legal aspects of Union citizen-
ship. 
 One such recurring theme is the ongoing trend of Union citizens, mainly 
from the UK, settling down in certain regions of the country. Media reports 
on the matter have mainly focused either on the economic (e.g. how the pric-
es of local real estate and services have been affected) or social (integration, 
language, customs, etc.) aspects of this trend, without necessarily taking ac-
count of Union citizenship as such.  
 Another frequently reported theme concerns the periodic group expulsions 
from France and occasionally from other EU Member States of Bulgarian citi-
zens of Roma origin. These group expulsions have been condemned as con-
                                                        
73. Cited note 47 supra. 
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trary to EU law by the European Commission74 and the European Parlia-
ment.75 The former even initiated infringement proceedings against France.76 
However, media reports in Bulgaria have paid little attention to the illegality 
of such expulsions and the associated aspects of Union citizenship.77 Some 
have, instead, either exposed the ‘hypocrisy’ of the ‘old’ EU Member States 
(who call for the integration of the Roma minority, while at the same time 
subjecting them to group expulsions)78 or emphasised the fact that such inci-
dents generate negative coverage for Bulgaria as a whole.79  
 There have also been a number of media reports on the ever-increasing 
number of citizens of third States (mostly Macedonia, Moldova, Serbia, Al-
bania, and the Ukraine), who have acquired Bulgarian citizenship in a fast-
track simplified procedure. This procedure is available for citizens of third 
States of Bulgarian origin and has been designed with a view to reintegrating 
the Bulgarian minorities living – for historical reasons – abroad.80 Media re-
ports have suggested that some applicants have sought not so much to 
                                                        
74. http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-10-384_en.htm. In that regard, com-
missioner Reding declared: ‘I personally have been appalled by a situation which 
gave the impression that people are being removed from a Member State of the Euro-
pean Union just because they belong to a certain ethnic minority. This is a situation I 





76. See Viviane Reding’s speech at the XXV Congress of FIDE, 31 May 2012, Tallinn, 
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-12-403_en.htm. 
77. E.g. ‘Френската сага с ромите’, в. ‘Монитор’, 13.09.2012, ‘Франция е 
депортирала 9800 румънски и български роми’, http://dnes.dir.bg/news/frantzia-
romi-deportirane-6944046, 20.08.2010, ‘Европа се гаври с България заради 
шушумигите’, в. ‘Сега’, 16.08.2012. For an exception however, see ‘Франция 
наруши антирасистките директиви на ЕС’, в. ‘Сега’, 02.09.2010.  
78. E.g. ‘Ромите ни заразиха с лицемерие Европа’, сп. ‘Тема’, http://www.tema 
news.com/index.php?p=tema&iid=620&aid=14643, ‘Комунизма ли да върнем 
заради ромите?’, в. ‘Сега’, 17.08.2010. 
79. E.g. ‘620 000 000 печелят ромските кланове’, в. ‘24 часа’, 10.09.2010. 
80. For more details on this procedure and some statistical data, see V. Paskalev, Natural-
isation Procedures for Immigrants, Bulgaria, and D. Smilov and E. Jileva, Country 
Report: Bulgaria, both available on the EUDO Citizenship Observatory’s website. 
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reestablish their link with the Bulgarian state, but rather to take advantage of 
the Union citizenship that comes along with it.81 
 Local media have also reported on some of the infamous campaigns that 
certain Member States have launched in the context of a presumed influx of 
Bulgarian and Romanian migrant workers after the end of the transitional pe-
riod (1 January 2014). These reports have rarely touched upon the legal as-
pects of free movement within the Union.82  
 It is not clear whether the media has had any influence on national public 
discourse. However, the absence of condemnation in the media of the group 
expulsions mentioned above might have had a certain impact on the rather 
passive stance of the Bulgarian government on this matter. Similarly, the fact 
that local media have not been particularly critical of certain Member States’ 
campaigns aiming at discouraging or even restricting the rights of Bulgarian 
migrant workers might also have contributed to the government’s very low 
profile approach to the matter as well as lack of official reaction.  
 
                                                        
81. E.g., ‘Седем хиляди македонци са получили българско гражданство само за 
месец’, в. ‘Капитал’, 30.12.2011, ‘Македонците стават българи по икономически 
причини’, в. ‘Преса’, 07.12.2012. 
82. ‘Заплаха ли са българите за Албиона?’, в. ‘Монитор’, 09.03.2013, ‘Холандия ни 
спира от работа в ЕС’, в. ‘Стандарт’, 19.08.2013, ‘Холандия иска да удължи 
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Croatia 
Citizenship within Directive 2004/38/EC – stability of residence for 
Union citizens and their family members 
Question 1 
With respect to family members of Union citizens, Articles 2 and 3 of the Di-
rective 2004/38 have been transposed into the Croatian legislation through 
Article 162 of the Aliens Act.3 This provision came into force on the date of 
Croatia’s entry into the EU, July 1, 2013, along with the other provisions of 
the Aliens Act implementing the Directive 2004/38. For the most part, the na-
tional implementing provisions are identical to the provisions of the Directive 
in question. There are, however, some clarifications in the Aliens Act regard-
ing Articles 2 and 3 of the Directive worth mentioning.  
 In implementing Article 2(2)(b) of the Citizens’ Rights Directive, Article 
162(2) of the Aliens Act list as family members ‘the common law partner, in 
line with Croatian legislation, and persons in a durable relationship which can 
be demonstrated by shared residence at the same address in the duration of at 
least three years, and if the intention of continuing to live together is evident’. 
Thus, unlike Article 2(2)(b) of the Directive 2004/38, which makes reference 
to partners in a registered partnership, the Croatian legislation lists as family 
members common law partners, as well as those in a durable relationship un-
der the stated conditions. This difference between the Directive and the na-
                                                        
1. Associate professor, the University of Zagreb, Faculty of Law. 
2. Senior lecturer, the University of Zagreb, Faculty of Law. 
3. Zakon o strancima, Official Gazette 130/11 and 74/13 (hereinafter ‘the Aliens Act’). 
English text is available at http://ec.europa.eu/ewsi/UDRW/images/items/docl_ 
36590_190259219.pdf. It is worth noting that unlike the Directive 2004/38, which 
refers to Union citizens and their family members, the Aliens Act in the part that im-
plements this Directive refers to nationals of the member states of the European Eco-
nomic Area (EEA) and their family members. This terminology will thus be used in 
the follow up. 
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tional implementing legislation can be explained by the fact that there are no 
registers provided for the partners under the current Croatian laws.4 Yet, 
while the source of this distinction is rather clear, the legal consequences that 
it may produce are not. Namely, the chosen formulation in Article 162(2) 
causes uncertainty regarding the status of registered partners, especially 
same-sex partners, of nationals of EEA member states in Croatia. It is not 
clear from Article 162(2) whether such partners should be treated as family 
members in the context of application of the Croatian Aliens Act. What espe-
cially causes concern in this regard are paragraphs 3 to 6 of Article 162 of the 
Aliens Act, which in implementing Article 2(2)(c) and (d) of Directive 
2004/38 make reference to descendants, adopted children, step-children, and 
dependants in the ascending line only of spouses or common law partners. 
This essentially excludes the possibility of granting the status of family mem-
ber to these categories of descendants or dependants of same-sex partners, or 
heterosexual partners who do not satisfy conditions for a common law mar-
riage.5  
 On the bright side, in implementing Article 3(2)(a) of Directive 2004/38, 
the Croatian legislator opted for a more inclusive national provision. In Art-
icle 162(7) of the Aliens Act, it listed as ‘family members’ persons who are 
listed as ‘beneficiaries’ in Article 3(2)(a) of Directive 2004/38. It could be in-
ferred that beneficiaries listed in Article 3(2)(b) of Directive 2004/38 are cov-
ered as ‘family members’ under Article 162(2) – since in addition to common 
law partners this Article recognizes as family members ‘persons in a durable 
relationship’ under the previously mentioned conditions. Such a reading 
could leave room for the recognition of same-sex partners in durable relation-
ships (registered or unregistered), as well as their descendants and depend-
ants, as ‘family members’. Since the date of Croatia’s entry into the EU, there 
has not yet been any case law dealing with different types of family relation-
ships outlined in Articles 2 and 3 of the Directive 2004/38.  
                                                        
4. On September 6, 2012, the Parliamnetary Committee for the preparation of the Law 
on Registered Partnerships has started with its work. See http://www.vlada.hr/ 
hr/naslovnica/novosti_i_najave/2012/rujan/radna_skupina_za_izradu_zakona_o_regi 
striranom_partnerstvu_zapocela_s_radom. A public debate on this Law is expected to 
be held at the end of the year. 
5. A common law marriage according to Article 56(5) of the Aliens Act constitutes ‘the 
union of life of an unmarried woman and an unmarried man at least three years in du-
ration or shorter if a child was born into such union.’ Emphasis added. This corres-
ponds to the indirect definition of common law marriage as stated in Croatian Family 




 As far as the transposition of Article 5 of the Directive 2004/38 is con-
cerned, this provision was implemented into the national legislation through 
Articles 154, 166, 167, 183, and 221 of the Aliens Act. The only apparent 
specifications come in relation to Article 5(5) of the Citizens’ Directive. 
Namely, Article 183(5) of the Aliens Act provides that an EEA member state 
national and a member of his/her family have to ‘register their address, tem-
porary residence, or permanent residence at the latest eight days from the date 
of arrival to the Republic of Croatia or from the change of address, temporary 
residence, or permanent residence.’ Article 221(2) of the Aliens Act pre-
scribes that ‘A fine in the amount of HRK 100,00 shall be issued against a na-
tional of an EEA Member State and a member of his family’ who fails to 
comply with the Article 183(5) requirement. The required period of time for 
registration seems reasonable and the sanction proportionate. It is yet to be seen 
how effective the procedural safeguards provided by Article 5 of the Directive 
will prove in practice. 
Question 2 
To this date, there has been no evidence of the expulsion of EU citizens 
and/or their family members on purely economic grounds. 
Question 3 
Article 12 of the Directive 2004/38 has been fully transposed into the national 
law through paragraphs 1, 2 and 3, of Article 171 of the Aliens Act. Para-
graphs 4 and 5 of Article 171 of the Aliens Act implement Article 13 of the 
Directive 2004/38 in the part that concerns marital partners. Article 171(6) 
adds that ‘The provisions of this Article shall apply accordingly to common-
law partners and persons in a durable relationship.’ The chosen formulation 
again raises some doubts regarding the personal scope of this provision. That 
is to say, it is not clear whether homosexual partners in durable relationships 
(registered or unregistered) can rely on the guarantees provided for by Article 
171 of the Aliens Act. So far, no disputes on the interpretation and applica-
tion of these provisions have been addressed within national courts or tribu-
nals.  
 As far as Article 14 is concerned, paragraph 1 does not seem to be imple-
mented into the national legislation. Article 155 of the Aliens Act merely pre-
scribes that ‘A national of an EEA Member State shall have the right to stay 
in the Republic of Croatia for a period which shall not exceed three months 
from the day of entry into the Republic of Croatia, provided that he holds a 
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valid travel document or personal identity card.’ Neither this nor the other 
provisions of the Aliens Act mention the Article 14(1) requirement of not be-
coming ‘an unreasonable burden on the social assistance system’ of Croatia 
during the first three months of residence. This requirement does, however, 
exist in relation to a temporary stay of nationals of EEA Member States (that is, 
a stay for more than three months). Specifically, Article 156(1) of the Aliens 
Act which implements Article 14(2) of the Directive 2004/38 prescribes that ‘A 
national of an EEA Member State is entitled to stay in the Republic of Croa-
tia for more than three months of the day of entry into the Republic of Croa-
tia, provided that: 1. he is employed or self-employed, 2. he has sufficient re-
sources to maintain himself and members of his family, so that during their 
stay in the Republic of Croatia they would not become a burden to the social 
welfare system, and he has health insurance, 3. he is enrolled as a university 
student or occupational trainee and has adequate health insurance, and by is-
suing a statement proves that he has sufficient resources to support himself 
and members of his family, so that during their stay in the Republic of Croa-
tia they would not become a burden to the social welfare system, 4. he is a 
member of a family joining a national of an EEA Member State who meets 
the criteria referred to in items 1, 2, and 3 of this paragraph.’ Paragraph 2 of 
Article 156 adds that ‘At the time of an evaluation whether the funds for sup-
porting oneself referred to in paragraph 1, items 2 and 3 of this Article are 
sufficient, the personal position of a national of an EEA Member State and 
his family members shall be taken into account and they shall not be required 
to amount to more than the amount of funds required for the realisation of 
rights under the social welfare system in the Republic of Croatia in accord-
ance with special regulations.’ Paragraph 3 of Article 14 of the Directive 
2004/38 has not been explicitly transposed in the Aliens Act. Yet, the re-
quirement contained in it can be inferred from the fact that none of the provi-
sions of this Act regulating the expulsion of EEA member states nationals or 
their family members list recourse to the social assistance system of Croatia 
as one of the reasons for expulsion. Finally, paragraph 4 of Article 14 of the 
Directive is partially implemented through the provision of Article 165(3), 
which provides that ‘Temporary stay of a national of an EEA Member State 
and of a member of his family shall not terminate if he does not have suffi-
cient funds for supporting himself during his stay in the Republic of Croatia, 
provided that the national of such EEA Member State is employed or self-
employed or provided that he arrived with the intention of employment, and 
proves that he continues to actively seek a job, and it can reasonably be ex-
pected that he will find employment.’ It is worth noting that Article 165(3) 
makes no mention of other conditions for temporary residence of EEA mem-
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ber states nationals in Croatia, such as the requirement to have health insur-
ance. This omission by the legislator could be interpreted as a requirement to 
terminate a temporary stay of the categories of people covered by Article 
165(3) who do not have health insurance in accordance with Article 156 of 
the Aliens Act. This, in turn, would be contrary to the Directive 2004/38.  
 Finally, the various procedural safeguards provided for by Article 15 of 
the Directive are either directly transposed or can be inferred from the provi-
sions of the Aliens Act contained in Articles 180, 181, 183, and Title VI to 
which Article 182 refers. The only provision that does not seem to be trans-
posed is that of Article 15(3) of the Directive 2004/38. There has not yet been 
any case law within the national courts or tribunals regarding the interpreta-
tion or application of these provisions. 
Question 4 
Article 16 of the Directive 2004/38 has been fully transposed into national 
legislation. Paragraph 1 of Article 16 is implemented in Article 173(1) of the 
Aliens Act in the part that concerns an EEA member state national, while 
paragraph 2 is implemented in Article 176(1) of the same Act in the part that 
concerns a family member who is not a national of an EEA member state. In 
the same manner, paragraph 3 of Article 16 of the Directive is implemented 
in Articles 173(2) and 176(2) of the Aliens Act, while paragraph 4 is imple-
mented in Articles 175(1) and 179(1) of the same Act. In addition to prescrib-
ing that a permanent stay will be terminated in case of absences from Croatia 
exceeding two consecutive years, Articles 175(1) and 179(1) stipulate another 
reason for its termination. They prescribe that a permanent stay of a national 
of an EEA Member State or his family member will be terminated if ‘he is 
barred by the prohibition of entry and stay’. As far as Article 17 of the Dir-
ective 2004/38 is concerned, its paragraphs 1 and 2 are implemented in Art-
icle 174 of the Aliens Act.  
 With regards to the implementation of Article 17(2) of the Directive in Art-
icle 174(4) of the Aliens Act, we again witness certain issues regarding the 
personal scope of these provisions. Specifically, Article 174(4) of the Aliens 
Act grants the right to permanent stay before the completion of the 5 year resi-
dence requirement only to an EEA member state national whose ‘spouse or 
common-law partner with whom he is staying in the Republic of Croatia 
holds Croatian nationality or whose Croatian nationality terminated after 
conclusion of marriage’. This would seem to deprive from the enjoyment of 
the right in question those partners who are in durable relationships (mainly 
same-sex unions) with Croatian nationals in Croatia, where such relationships 
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do not qualify as common law partnerships. As far as the remaining para-
graphs 3 and 4 of Article 17 are concerned, the national implementing provi-
sions can be found in Article 177 of the Croatian Aliens Act.  
 Articles 19, 20, and 21 are fully implemented through provisions of Art-
icle 173, 176, and 178 of the Aliens Act. Article 18 of the Directive 2004/38, 
however, does not seem to be implemented in the national legislation. It does 
not even seem possible to infer the right contained in it from the general pro-
vision of the right to permanent stay of family members who are not EEA 
member states nationals, that is, Article 176 of the Aliens Act. This follows 
from the wording of Article 176(1), which provides the right to permanent 
stay only to those family members who have been legally residing in the Re-
public of Croatia with a national of an EEA Member State for at least five 
years without interruptions. Such a wording would seem to exclude family 
members covered by Articles 12(2) and 13(2) of the Directive as potential 
beneficiaries of the right to permanent stay and could thus lead to unfortunate 
consequences. National court or tribunals have so far not addressed any dis-
putes regarding the application or interpretation of these provisions, so it is 
yet to be seen how Croatian judges and officials will deal the identified prob-
lems.  
Question 5 
Article 24(1) of the Directive 2004/38 has been transposed into national law 
through Article 153(1) of the Aliens Act which provides: ‘A national of an 
EEA Member State and members of his family, regardless whether they are 
nationals of an EEA Member State or not, provided that they are entitled to 
stay in the Republic of Croatia, shall have equal rights as nationals of the 
Republic of Croatia in accordance with the Treaty on of Functioning of the 
European Union.’  
 Article 24(2) of the Directive has not been explicitly implemented into na-
tional legislation. Yet, in defining potential beneficiaries of social assistance 
benefits, the provisions of the Croatian Social Welfare Act implicitly seem to 
open the door for its application in Croatia. In particular, Article 29 of the So-
cial Welfare Act prescribes that the right to social assistance benefits have 
Croatian citizens with a residence in Croatia as well as foreigners and state-
less persons with a permanent residence. Regarding foreigners with an ap-
proved temporary residence (as well as some other specified groups of for-
eigners such as asylees etc.) and their family members, it is provided that they 
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can also acquire benefits from the Croatian social assistance system under the 
conditions specified in the Social Welfare Act and other laws.6 Other foreign-
ers (e.g. those on a short stay of up to 3 months) could be approved of tem-
porary use of social assistance benefits only if their living circumstances so 
require. This would seem to suggest that, while Article 24(2) of the Directive 
has not been explicitly transposed, the derogation to the equal treatment guar-
antee provided in it would seem to be possible under the current Croatian 
laws. Since Croatia’s entry into the EU, there has not been any relevant na-
tional case law in this regard. 
Question 6 
Since Croatia’s entry into the EU, there has not yet been any relevant national 
case law in this respect. 
EU citizenship beyond Directive 2004/38/EC – exploring national 
application of primary EU Law 
Question 7 
To our best knowledge, no legislative or specific administrative changes were 
introduced in Croatia pursuant to Chen, Ruiz Zambrano, and subsequent de-
cisions of the Court of Justice of the European Union. This does not seem to 
cause any difficulties in terms of potential enjoyment of EU citizenship 
rights, since Croatian legislation is already inclusive enough not to give rise 
to the kinds of issues witnesses in the mentioned CJEU’s case law. According 
to Article 55 of the Aliens Act, ‘temporary stay for the purpose of family reu-
nification may be granted to an alien who is a member of the immediate fam-
ily of: 1. a Croatian national, 2. an alien having approved permanent stay, 3. 
an alien having approved temporary stay, 4. an alien granted protection under 
the Asylum Act.’  
 Pursuant to Article 56(1) of the Aliens Act, ‘(1) Members of the immedi-
ate family within the meaning of this Act are the following: 1. spouse, 2. 
common law partners, 3. the underage children of married couples and com-
                                                        
6. See Article 29 of the Croatian Welfare Act (Zakon o socijalnoj skrbi), Official Ga-
zette 33/12, 46/13, 49/13. 
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mon law partners, their underage adopted children, and the underage children 
of each of them, who have not formed families of their own, 4. parents or 
adoptive parents of underage children.’7 Furthermore, according to Article 
56(2) and ‘By way of derogation from paragraph 1 of this Article, some other 
relatives may also be regarded as a member of the immediate family of a 
Croatian national, an alien granted temporary or permanent stay and an alien 
holding asylee status, provided that there are special personal or serious hu-
manitarian grounds for family reunification in the Republic of Croatia.’8  
 Finally, Article 61 of the Aliens Act prescribes that an alien granted tem-
porary stay for the purpose of family reunification shall exercise his/her right 
to education, professional development, work; and self-employment in ac-
cordance with the provisions of this Act. In all, taken together, these provi-
sions of the Aliens Act seem to provide immediate family members of EU 
citizens (including parents of underage children) not only with the right to 
temporary residence, but also with the right to work and pursue education 
within the Croatian territory. Alternatively, even if these provisions happen to 
provide insufficient guarantees, there is also the previously discussed Article 
162(7) of the Aliens Act. As mentioned before, this provision lists as family 
members of EEA Member States nationals: ‘other members of the family of a 
national of an EEA Member State for whom an individual assessment 
showed that in view of their material and social position in the country from 
which they arrived they are dependent on the national of an EEA Member 
State in terms of providing for their basic needs, or are members of his house-
hold, or for whom in view of serious health-related reasons special personal 
care of the national of an EEA Member State is required.’9 According to Art-
icle 169 of the Aliens Act, such family members are entitled to stay in the ter-
ritory of the Republic of Croatia for a period over three months of the date of 
entry if they are accompanying a national of an EEA Member State or joining 
such national of an EEA Member State, provided that the national of an EEA 
Member State meets the residence requirements. Pursuant to Article 153(4) 
of the Aliens Act, the provisions relating to the family members of a national 
of an EEA Member State also apply to aliens-family members of Croatian 
nationals. This would seem to entitle EU citizens’ family members who are 
third country nationals with the right to temporary residence, even in purely 
internal situations. Since Croatia’s entry into the EU, there was no relevant na-
                                                        
7. Emphasis added. 
8. Emphasis added. 
9. Emphasis added. 
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tional case law in this regard, so it is yet to be seen how the national courts 
will approach these matters. 
Question 8 
In the context of the judgment Rottmann, two main issues were discussed. 
The first one concerns the possibility of withdrawal of nationality, when 
fraudulently obtained in the naturalization procedure. The second one con-
cerns the possibility of recovery of the original nationality – in order to pre-
vent statelessness and a consequent loss of EU citizenship – in cases where 
the newly acquired nationality is withdrawn. As it now stands, the Croatian 
legislation would seem to give rise to neither of these issues. This derives 
from the constitutional guarantee providing that a citizen of the Republic of 
Croatia may not be deprived of his/her citizenship status.10 This means that 
(unlike in Germany), once acquired, Croatian citizenship cannot be with-
drawn even if obtained by fraud.11 Moreover, this means that (unlike in Aus-
tria) the acquisition of another country’s citizenship does not imply the loss 
of Croatian citizenship. Thus, unless a Croatian citizen voluntarily requests a 
dismissal from Croatian citizenship for the purpose of the acquisition of an-
other country’s citizenship,12 he/she will retain Croatian citizenship. Even in 
                                                        
10. See Article 9 of the Constitution of the Republic of Croatia, Official Gazette 85/2010 
(hereinafter ‘the Croatian Constitution’). English text of the Croatian Constitution is 
available at http://www.sabor.hr/fgs.axd?id=17074. Also see the judgment of the 
Croatian Constitutional Court U-III / 2914 / 2002, from May 16, 2007, available at 
http://sljeme.usud.hr/usud/praksaw.nsf/Ustav/C12570D30061CE53C12572DF002
EC577?OpenDocument. 
11. See Gerard René de Groot and Maarten Vink and Iseult Honohan, ‘Loss of Citizne-
ship’, EUDO CITIZENSHIP Policy Brief No. 3, available at 
 http://eudo-citizenship.eu/docs/policy_brief_loss.pdf, p. 3. 
12. A Croatian citizen can request a dismissal from Croatian citizenship provided that the 
following requirements are fulfilled: ‘1. he is at least 18 years old; 2. there are no imped-
iments for dismissal from the citizenship by reason of military conscription; 3. he has 
paid taxes due, fees, and other public charges, and has fulfilled obligations towards legal 
entities and natural persons in the Republic of Croatia that have been imposed by an ex-
ecutive body; 4. he has fulfilled any such financial obligations that he might have to-
wards his spouse, parents, and children who are Croatian citizens, and towards persons 
who remain to live in the Republic of Croatia; 5. he is a foreign citizen, or that he has 
proved that he will acquire foreign citizenship’. See Article 18 of the Law on Croatian 
Citizenship, Official Gazette 53/91., 70/91., 28/92., 113/93., 4/94., 130/11. Emphasis 
added. English text of the Law on Croatian Citizneship is available at http://eudo-
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the case of voluntary dismissal, the Law on Croatian Citizenship provides for 
certain guarantees that enable the recovery of Croatian citizenship. According 
to Article 19 of the Law on Croatian Citizneship, ‘The decision on dismissal 
from Croatian citizenship will be repudiated upon the request of the person 
who has acquired the dismissal if he does not acquire foreign citizenship 
within three years, and has informed a diplomatic mission or consular office 
of the Republic of Croatia abroad, or a body directly competent to enact a de-
cision on the dismissal within three years about this.’ In addition, Article 15 
of the Law on Croatian Citizenship provides that ‘A Croatian citizen who has 
requested and received dismissal from Croatian citizenship in order to acquire 
foreign citizenship, which was imposed on him as a requirement in order to 
be able to exercise a profession or activity by the foreign state wherein he has 
a domicile, may again acquire Croatian citizenship, even if he does not fulfil 
the requirements of Article 8, Paragraph 1, Points 1-4 of this Act, and if he 
lives in the Republic of Croatia and has been granted residence.’ These provi-
sions, at least up until a certain point, prevent statelessness and consequently 
the loss of the EU citizenship status in cases of voluntary dismissal from Cro-
atian citizenship. 
Political rights of EU citizens 
In the process of preparation for the EU membership, Croatia has recently in-
troduced a number of legal reforms in order to fulfill the membership criteria. 
One of these concerns the amendments made to the Croatian Constitution in 
June 2010.13 These amendments include, amongst others, Article 146 of the 
Croatian Constitution on EU citizenship rights. Essentially, this provision 
represents a domestic counterpart of one of the fundamental provisions of 
primary EU law, Article 20(2) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the Euro-
pean Union, which provides a number of rights to EU citizens. Croatia is the 
first State to adopt a provision concerning European citizenship in its Consti-
tution – none of the current Member States’ Constitutions include such an art-
icle. 
                                                        
citizenship.eu/admin/?p=file&appl=currentCitizenshipLaws&f=CRO%20Law%20on 
%20Croatian%20Citizenship_consolidated%2028_10_2011_ENGLISH.pdf. 




The right of every citizen of the Union to vote and to stand as a candidate in 
elections to the European Parliament in his/her Member State of residence is 
recognised under Article 20(2)(b) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the Euro-
pean Union and under Article 39(1) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of 
the EU. In the accession process, one of the obligations within the context of 
European citizenship was to adjust the Croatian legislation with the Council 
Directive 93/109 which regards the exercise of the right to vote and stand as 
candidate in elections to the European Parliament for citizens of the Union 
residing in a Member State of which they are not nationals. In 2008, the 
Croatian government suggested the ‘Action Plan for Adjustment of National 
Law with EU law in 2008’,14 which corresponds with the rights stated in the 
Directive 93/109/EC.15 In parliamentary sitting in March 2008, the Croatian 
Parliament adopted the previous governmental suggestion and drafted the two 
electoral laws. In order to fulfill its future obligations set out in the European 
Treaties, in July 2010 the Croatian Parliament adopted two laws: the Act on 
Electoral Rights of Citizens of Other EU Member States in Regional and Local 
Legislative Elections and the Act on Elections of MEPs from Croatia. The first 
act entered into force on the date of Croatian accession to the EU, while the 
second act entered into force on 1 March 2013.  
 The Croatian Parliament, at its session held on 15 July 2010 passed the 
Act on Election of Croatian Members of the European Parliament,16 which 
sets out the procedure and method of electing representatives to the European 
Parliament. The law is in full compliance with the Directive in prescribing 
active and passive voting rights equally for national and other EU citizens. 
The directive lays down detailed arrangements under which EU citizens re-
siding in an EU country of which they are not nationals may exercise the 
right to vote and to stand as a candidate in European Parliament elections in 
that country. These arrangements are fully incorporated into Croatian Act on 
Election of Croatian Members of the European Parliament. The Directive does 
not affect the rights of an EU country’s nationals at elections to the European 
Parliament in their own country, whether or not those nationals reside in that 
country. According to the requirement set by the Directive, the Croatian Act 
                                                        
14. Action Plan for Adjustment of national law with EU law in 2008, Official Gazette 
30/08. 
15. More info is available at: http://www.cpi.hr/download/links/hr/11608.pdf. 
16. Law on Election of Croatian Members of the European Parliament, Official Gazette 
92/10 and 23/13.  
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on Election of Croatian Members of the European Parliament defines the re-
quirements a national of another EU country must satisfy to vote or to stand 
as a candidate in his/her country of residence. Such a person must: be a citi-
zen of the Union; be resident in the EU country in which s/he proposed to vote 
or to stand as a candidate; satisfy the same conditions as a national of that EU 
country who wishes to vote or to stand as a candidate (the principle of equality 
between national and non-national voters). EU citizens may exercise their 
right to vote and to stand as a candidate either in the EU country of residence 
or in their home country. Accordingly, the Croatian Act on the Election of 
Croatian Members of the European Parliament prescribes that no one may 
vote more than once or stand as a candidate in more than one EU country. To 
prevent double voting and double candidacy, EU countries must exchange in-
formation on citizens registered to vote or to stand as a candidate.17 
 Furthermore, the Act on the Election of Croatian Members of the Euro-
pean Parliament from 2013, introduced for the first time in Croatia's election 
practice 'open slates', which means that apart from voting for the slate of their 
favorite party, voters can allocate their preferential vote. The elections of 
Croatian representatives in the European Parliament were held on 15 April 
2013, according to general, secret, and equal voting rights which are held by 
all Croatian citizens with the right to vote. Under Croatia's Treaty of Acces-
sion to the European Union, Croatia elected its 12 members in the European 
Parliament upon entering the bloc. Members of the European Parliament are 
elected according to the proportional model and the preferential voting sys-
tem. It is important to emphasise that the whole territory of the Republic of 
Croatia, including voting stations abroad (Diaspora), formed one constituen-
cy. Voters could only allocate one vote for one list of candidates. A voter 
may use the method of preferential vote, which means that the Croatian citi-
zen can indicate one candidate who has preference over other candidates on 
the voting list. Preferential voting in this election showed it to be rather in-
complete and without proper purpose because the allocation of seats takes in-
to account preferential votes only with candidates that have received a mini-
mum of 10 percent of the list’s votes. The list of candidates for the European 
Parliament elections had to pass a 5 percent threshold, in order to participate 
in the distribution of parliamentary seats. It is currently uncertain whether the 
government will advocate changes to these problems in election laws. In the 
                                                        
17. Article 5 of the Council Directive 93/109/EC of 6 December 1993 laying down de-
tailed arrangements for the exercise of the right to vote and stand as a candidate in 
elections to the European Pariament for citizens of the Union residing in a Member 
State of which they are not nationals, OJ L 329, 30.12.1993, p. 34-38. 
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current system, leaders of political parties have the final word in the ranking 
of candidates, in which case the preferential vote is of secondary importance. 
 During the negotiation process between Croatia and the EU, under Chap-
ter 34, it was decided that 12 seats will be allocated in the European Parlia-
ment for representatives from Croatia. The first elections for the European 
Parliament will be remembered by the low turnout. Some of the reasons were 
that the campaigning was too short and not organised in a structured way; the 
citizens did not have enough time to properly inform themselves, public media 
did not live up to its duty to inform citizens seriously, and the majority of the 
parties did not take this election seriously enough. The government’s argu-
ment for separating the dates of European and local elections came as a con-
sequence of their desire to separate European and local political issues. The 
experience of other countries demonstrates that this is nearly impossible.  
 The Act on Election of Croatian Members of the European Parliament im-
poses one additional condition to citizens of the Union who are not Croatian 
nationals in Article 4 of the Act: ‘Under the same conditions which apply to 
Croatian citizens, members of the European Parliament may be elected by the 
citizens of other member states of the European Union who have registered 
domicile or temporary residence in the Republic of Croatia in compliance 
with the Aliens Act (hereinafter: citizens of other European Union member 
states), in as much as they submit a request to the relevant authority which 
maintains the voter rolls no later than 30 days prior to the election date.’ 
 However, the current Act on the Election of Croatian Members of the Euro-
pean Parliament is not completely in accordance with the Directive 
2013/1/EU.18 By the end of November 2013, the Croatian Parliament will 
adopt changes to the current Act on the Election of Croatian Members of the 
European Parliament in order to secure its full compliance with the new Dir-
ective. Following the interpretation of the Directive 2013/1/EU proclaimed in 
its Preamble that ‘imposing the requirement on citizens of the Union to pro-
duce an attestation from the competent administrative authorities of the home 
Member State certifying that the person concerned has not been deprived of 
the right to stand as a candidate in the home Member State or that no such 
disqualification is known to them, acts as a barrier to the exercise of the right 
to stand as a candidate and contribute to the low number of citizens of the 
Union standing as candidates in elections to the European Parliament in their 
                                                        
18. Directive 2013/1/EU of 20 December 2012 amending Directive 93/109/EC as re-
gards certain detailed arrangements for the exercise of the right to stand as a candi-
date in elections to the European Parliament for citizens of the Union residing in a 
Member State of which they are not nationals [2013], OJ L 26/27. 
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Member State of residence’, the new amendment to the Croatian the Act on 
the Election of Croatian Members of the European Parliament is added in the 
Article 4.19 By adopting this new amendment, the requirement for those citi-
zens to submit such an attestation is abolished and replaced by a statement 
confirming that the person concerned has not been deprived of the right to 
stand in elections to the European Parliament thorough an individual judicial 
decision or an administrative decision provided that the latter can be subject 
to judicial remedies, which has to be included in the formal declaration that 
those citizens are required to produce as part of their application.  
 The Member State of residence should be required to notify the home 
Member State of such declarations, in order to verify whether the citizen of 
the Union has in fact been deprived of the right to stand in elections to the 
European Parliament in the home Member State. In the Croatian case, ac-
cording to the Draft Act on the Election of Croatian Members of the Euro-
pean Parliament, the relevant authority for delivering the notification is the 
State Election Commission acting through the Ministry of Public Administra-
tion. Failure by the home Member State to provide that information on time 
should not result in the deprivation of the right to stand as a candidate in the 
Member State of residence. If the State Election Commission receives 21 
days before elections, the notification of the home Member State which is 
opposite to the declaration given by the candidate, political parties or electors 
who nominated the registered candidate can nominate another candidate. If 
the State Election Commission receives the notification in the period less than 
21 days before elections, the candidate list shall be considered valid without 
the nominated candidate (Article 16 of Act on the Election of Croatian Mem-
bers of the European Parliament). In other words, if the information provided 
invalidates the content of the declaration, the Member State of residence, irre-
spective of whether it receives the information within the time limit or at later 
stage, shall take the appropriate steps in accordance with its national law to 
prevent the person concerned from standing as a candidate or where this is 
not possible, to prevent this person either from being elected or from exercis-
ing mandate. To ensure a more efficient identification of candidates regis-
tered both on the list of their home Member State and that of the Member 
State of residence, the list of data to be required from citizens of the Union 
when submitting an application to stand as candidates in the Member State of 
residence should include their nationality, date and place of birth, and the last 
                                                        
19. The Draft Law amending the Act on the Election of Croatian Members of the Euro-
pean Parliament. Available at: http://www.sabor.hr. 
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address of residence in their home Member State (Article 16, Para. 1 of Act 
on the Election of Croatian Members of the European Parliament).  
 There are some additional changes to the existing Act on the Election of 
Croatian Members of the European Parliament. The Article 20, Para. 1, says: 
‘if one of the candidates for the election of members of the European Parlia-
ment dies after the date of publication duly proposed candidate lists, political 
parties, or electors who have proposed that candidate, may instead propose a 
new candidate without special conditions for the validity of nomination under 
this Act until 21 days before election day.’ The proposed period of 21 days is 
longer than in the existing Act (which is now 10 days). 
 Furthermore, instead of using the ballot with Braille letters (which is rather 
inconvenient), blind people have the right to vote with the help of another per-
son (personal assistant) to be at his instructions who will circle the number of 
the candidate according to the his/her instructions. The voting period in the 
diplomatic services is limited to the same conditions as in the Republic Croa-
tia, instead of the existing provision providing the possibility of two voting 
days (Article 46).  
 Since Croatia’s entry into the EU, there has not yet been any national case 
in this regard.  
Question 10 
The Directive 94/80/EC20 has been fully implemented since 15 July 2010 by 
adopting the Act on Electoral Rights of Citizens of Other EU Member States 
in Regional and Local Legislative Elections.21 The new Act on Local Elec-
tions,22 adopted in December 2012, inter alia implemented the electoral rights 
of EU citizens at the local level. During the negotiation process (correspond-
ing to Negotiation Chapter 23), the Constitution, the Act on Electoral Rights 
of Citizens of Other EU Member States in Regional and Local Legislative 
Elections and the Act on Electoral Registers have been amended in order to 
implement this Directive. Unfortunately, during the last local elections in 
May 2013, there were too many examples of playing dirty, growing number 
of irregularities at polling stations, the problem of unregistered voters, and 
                                                        
20. Directive 94/80/EC, laying down detailed arrangements for the exercise of the right to 
vote and to stand as a candidate in municipal elections by citizens of the Union resid-
ing in a Member State of which they are not nationals, [1994] OJ L 368/38.  
21. Act on Electoral Rights of Citizens of Other EU Member States in Regional and Lo-
cal Legislative Elections, Official Gazette 92/10.  
22. Act on Local Elections, Official Gazette 144/12.  
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violations of electoral science. According to Directive 94/80/EC, the Member 
States have the possibility to restrict a number of offices in the local admin-
istration to its own nationals, namely those related to the executive of the 
municipality (head, deputy, or member of the governing college of the execu-
tive of a basic local government unit). Such restrictions would be in line with 
EU law if they are appropriate, necessary, and proportionate. In Croatia, EU 
citizens cannot exercise their electoral rights on local mayoral and regional 
presidential elections or local referenda. On the other hand, third country na-
tionals still not enjoy any electoral rights in the Republic of Croatia.  
 The Act on Electoral Rights of Citizens of Other EU Member States in 
Regional and Local Legislative Elections does not provide for derogations for 
the reasons set by the Directive 94/80/EC, but imposes an additional condi-
tion for citizens of other Member States provided in Article 3:’Nationals of 
other Member States that are temporarily or permanently residing in Croatia 
have the right to vote and stand as candidates in municipal elections. How-
ever, they are obliged to submit a request to the relevant authority which 
maintains the voter rolls by the place of their residing not later than 30 days 
prior to the election date.’  
 According to Directive 94/80/EC, the Act on Electoral Rights of Citizens 
of Other EU Member States in Regional and Local Legislative Elections im-
poses the restrictions on the right to stand as a candidate. Pursuant to Article 
6 of the Act, Community citizens may be refused the right to stand as a can-
didate if they have lost the right to stand as a candidate under the law of their 
Member State of origin as a result of an individual decision under civil or 
criminal law or cannot produce a declaration as referred to in Article 9 of the 
Directive (nationality and residence declaration, declaration of non-depriva-
tion of the right to stand as a candidate and, in certain cases, an attestation 
from the competent administrative authorities, production of an identity doc-
ument, etc.).  
 Since Croatia’s entry into the EU, there has not yet been any national case 
in this regard.  
Question 11 
According to the new Council Directive 2013/19/EU of 13 May 2013,23 pur-
suant to Article 50 of the Act of Accession to Croatia,24 ‘Member States shall 
                                                        
23. Directive 2013/19/EU of 13 May 2013 adapting Directive 94/80/EC laying down de-
tailed arrangements for the exercise of the right to vote and to stand as a candidtate in 




adopt and publish, by the date of accession of Croatia to the Union at latest, 
the laws, regulations, and administrative provisions necessary to comply with 
this Directive. They shall apply those provisions from the date of accession of 
Croatia to the Union.’ 
 Since Croatia is a new member state, municipal elections based on new 
regulations have only been held in ‘Općina Karlobag’and ‘Općina Ivanska i 
Skopje’on 13 October 2013.25 
 According to the Act on electoral rights of citizens of other EU Member 
States in regional and local legislative elections, after joining the EU, ‘an EU 
citizen shall have the right to vote and stand as a candidate for local or re-
gional legislative bodies if he or she is a resident of a particular municipality 
or region (Article 2). EU citizens who wish to vote on local and regional elec-
tions will have to go through a one-off registration process, which will remain 
valid for future elections. The request for registration should be submitted at 
least 30 days before the elections (Article 3).’26 The statement which is de-
claring the applicant's citizenship and address in Croatia and stating that the 
applicant is not deprived of the right to vote in his/her country of origin 
should be enclosed to the request for registration and verified by a public no-
tary (Article 3 of the Act on electoral rights of citizens of other EU Member 
States in regional and local legislative elections). According to the principle 
of non-discrimination, if EU citizens wish to exercise their active electoral 
right, they should be able to do so under the same conditions as Croatian citi-
zens. European citizens should also enclose a similar statement as the one re-
quired for the right to vote, together with the evidence of not being deprived 
of the right to run as a candidate in their country of origin (Articles 6 and 7 of 
the Act on electoral rights of citizens of other EU Member States in regional 
and local legislative elections). A residence requirement applies to candidates 
for local and regional legislative bodies. 
                                                        
they are not nationals, by reason of the accession oft he Republic of Croatia, [2013] 
OJ L 158/231.  
24. The Act concerning the conditions of accession of the Republic of Croatia and the 
adjustments to the Treaty on European Union, the Treaty on the Functioning of the 
European Union, and the Treaty eastablishing the European Atomic Energy Commu-
nity of 24 April 2012, OJ L 112/21.  
25. More info available at: 
 http://www.izbori.hr/izbori/dip_ws.nsf/0/98A7B1D8AA037F88C1257BDD004A9
A3D/$File/Priopcenje_1.pdf.  
26. Sajfert, J. 2013. EUDO Citizenship Observatory: Access to Electoral Rights Croa-
tia. European University Institute & Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies.  
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 After more than 20 years, Croatia is modernising its electoral law. Some 
of the old issues of Croatian elections, such as the outdated electoral register, 
have been resolved. The Ministry of Public Administration created the online 
system of registered voters according to the Act on the Register of Voters.27 
In addition, the active registration of citizens abroad might diminish the pos-
sibility of manipulating the ballots which are kept away from observers and 
public scrutiny in Croatian diplomatic services. There is still some place for 
improvement of the current electoral system. More should be done in terms 
of modernising the existing technical system of voting by adopting proxy vot-
ing or e-voting.  
Question 12 
For this question it is relevant to stress out that Croatian citizens residing on 
the Croatian territory are representing the first and broadest category of en-
franchised persons. All such persons over eighteen years of age have the right 
to vote and stand as a candidate in all types of elections (subject to the resi-
dence criteria on local elections).  
 According to the EUDO Citizenship Observatory data ‘mentally disabled 
persons were disenfranchised, but only if they were deprived of their full le-
gal capacity.’28 In 2011, the Croatian CSO’s initiative (Platforma 112)29 
called for amendments to the procedure of full legal capacity deprivation and 
a wider franchise for mentally disabled persons, in accordance with the UN 
Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities.30 In December 2012, 
the Act on the Register of Voters enfranchised this group of citizens as well.31 
 Prisoners and persons convicted of criminal offences enjoy full electoral 
rights without any restriction. 
                                                        
27. Act on the Register of Voters, Official Gazette 144/2012.  
28. Sajfert, J. 2013. EUDO Citizenship Observatory. Ibid. 6.  
29. The Platform of human rights organisations in Croatia: for Croatia governed by the 
rule of law. Their 112 demands can be retrieved at:  
 http://kucaljudskihprava.hr/system/attachment/file/5/Platforma_112_za_Hrvatsku__v
ladavine_prava.pdf.  
30. UN General Assembly, Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities: resolu-
tion / adopted by the General Assembly, 24 January 2007, A/RES/61/106, available at: 
http://www.refworld.org/docid/45f973632.html [accessed 5 November 2013].  
31. Sajfert, J. 2013. EUDO Citizenship Observatory. Ibid. 7.  
CROATIA 
 381 
Culture(s) of citizenship 
Question 13 
The implementation of EU citizenship in legislation of Croatia is understood 
more as part of a rights-based EU ‘free movement’ and ‘constitutional’ cul-
ture than as an adjunct to the national immigration systems based on ‘permis-
sion’ for non-nationals to be present in the territory. The ‘free-movement ap-
proach’ is regulated through the Aliens Act32 and is not an adjunct to national 
immigration systems. EU citizenship rights are directly implemented in and 
guaranteed by the Croatian Constitution which gives them an adjective of a 
‘constitutional’ culture.33 Article 146 of the Croatian Constitution starts by 
listing a number of rights guaranteed by EU law to Croatian Nationals once 
they become EU citizens. Under equality principle, only the last paragraph of 
this Article provides that Union citizens will enjoy these same rights in the 
territory of the Republic of Croatia. The guarantee of an efficient exercise of 
EU citizens’ rights in Croatia seems to have represented only a secondary 
concern. Orsolic Dalessio and Rodin argue that there are three principal and 
intertwined reasons for introducing this provision. The first is purely educa-
tional, in that the provision aims to inform Croatian nationals about the rights 
that they will gain with Croatia’s entry into the EU. The second has to do 
with achieving political symmetry. To be precise, it was considered unac-
ceptable to simply declare that EU citizens will acquire certain rights in Croa-
tia’s territory upon entry to the EU, without clarifying that equivalent rights 
would equally be granted to Croatian nationals in other EU Member States. 
This relates to the final reason, which can be described as creating ‘carrot on 
a stick’ with a primary purpose of educating Croatian nationals about their 
future status as EU citizens and, in that sense, creating an impetus for them to 
vote in favour of joining the EU at the referendum held last January.’34  
 The European citizenship is a revolutionary concept from a Croatian his-
torical and cultural perspective. Throughout the conflict and post-conflict pe-
riod, Croatia developed its own conception of national belonging, which con-
firmed ethnic Croats as the primary bearers of the right to citizenship status. 
At the same time, the Croatian accession to the EU immediately created sev-
                                                        
32. Aliens Act, Official Gazette 130/11.  
33. Constitution of the Republic of Croatia, Article 141.  
34. Orsolic Dalessio, T. 2013. The Constitutional Provision on EU Citizenship: the 
Case of Croatia. CITSEE Studies Blog. Available at: http://www.citsee.eu/node/87.  
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eral hundred thousand new EU citizens, residing outside the borders of the 
EU. This includes not only Croatian citizens in Bosnia and Herzegovina (the 
number of which exceeds the number of ethnic Croats living there) and the 
Croatian Diaspora, but also at least 200,000 former Serbian refugees who set-
tled in neighbouring republics after the war, but kept Croatian citizenship. 
Today, the building of Croatian identity is inextricably linked to Europe.35  
Question 14 
The binding effect of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European 
Union, following the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty in 2009, has not 
yet played any role in how the rights of EU citizens are being interpreted by 
the national courts/tribunals. 
Question 15 
Through the process of EU membership negotiations and the process of entry 
into the EU, the Croatian media has dealt more with political issues than with 
issues regarding the EU citizenship and related rights. There was a lack of in-
formation during first elections for the European Parliament. Namely, there 
was no comprehensive, quality campaigns on the importance of the European 
Parliament, the role of MPs and the system of voting, which could contribute 
to a better voter turnout. One gets the impression that people were for the 
most part denied information about the competencies of the European Par-
liament and the role of MPs in it. 
 Yet, there are some activities and initiatives worth mentioning. First, there 
is an interesting ongoing media project which is funded by the EU from the 
Programme IPA INFO 2011 and organised under the Croatian Legal Center 
called ‘Towards European Citizenship’.36 GONG is another CSO whose pur-
pose is primarily educational in terms of informing the public about their citi-
zenship rights. Croatia, under CSO’s initiatives for active citizenship, is un-
dergoing a trial curriculum of Education for Democratic Citizenship and 
Human Rights which should become an integral part of the school curricu-
                                                        
35. Topic, M., Rodin, S., & Vasiljevic, S. 2011. ‘Consolidation of the Croatian case 
study’, Identities and Modernities in Europe (IME), European Commission & Sev-
enth Framework Programme. 
36. Croatian Law Centre, 2013. Towards European Citizenship.  
 Avalable at: http://www.hpc.hr/news.aspx?newsID=9&pageID=41.  
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lum.37 Also, ‘the Education for Democratic Citizenship and Human Rights’ is 
one of the major advocacy activities of Platform 112 – a coalition of civil so-
ciety organizations which has for many years engaged in the protection of 
human rights, democratization, and peace-building.38 It is important to note 
that the curriculum of civic education in the educational system integrated a 
number of implementing measures of national programs for human rights and 
democratic citizenship, and ensures the implementation of European stand-
ards, in particular the Council of Europe Charter on Education for Education 
for Democratic Citizenship and Human Rights (CoE Charter on EDC/HRE, 
CM/Rec (2010) and the implementation of Europe’s Growth Strategy 2020. 
There is still ongoing debate over how civic education is taught in the class-
room. There is a clash between left and right wing parties in terms of misun-
derstanding necessity for improvement of the current concept of education. 
 In addition to media participation in civic education on democratic citizen-
ship, newspaper articles informing Croatian nationals on EU citizenship 
rights and issues are constantly posted on the internet portal ‘Danas.hr’.39 The 
national media information on EU citizenship rights is mainly based on ex-
plaining fundamental terms and their meanings so that the lay person can un-
derstand them. Moreover, the media is trying to educate people and introduce 
the current EU citizenship issues and rights deriving from the concept of EU 
citizenship.40 One of the dominant themes in the media is free movement of 
workers41 and verification of transcripts for working qualifications.42 The 
                                                        
37. In particular, the Law on Upbringing and Education in Elementary and Secondary 
School stipulates that schools should educate students in line with human rights and 
the rights of the child, and that they should prepare them for a multicultural world, as 
well as for active and responsible participation. The Law on Scientific Work and 
Higher Education proclaims that respect for, and affirmation of human rights as well 
as of social responsibility of the academic community, are the foundations of higher 
education in Croatia. Similarly, the Law on Adult Education (2007) requires that 
adult education in Croatia prepares adults for active citizenship.  
38. GONG, 2013. Defence of education for democratic citizenship and human rights. 
Available at: http://gong.hr/en/active-citizens/citizen-education/defence-of-education-
for-democratic-citizenship-an/.  
39. http://www.hpc.hr/news.aspx?newsID=9&pageID=41.  
40. Written article available at: http://danas.net.hr/hrvatska/bugarska-iskustva-o-slobodi-
kretanja-u-eu.  
41. Written article available at: http://danas.net.hr/hrvatska/s-kojim-se-to-zanimanjima-
odmah-mozete-zaposliti-u-eu.  
42. Written article available at: http://danas.net.hr/hrvatska/vrijede-li-kvalifikacije-
stecene-u-hrvatskoj-u-nekoj-od-zemlja-eu.  
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media is also covering the topic of the freedom of establishment.43 This es-
sentially means that the media is informing on demand, what the people are 
most interested in. By informing on the European Citizens' Initiative,44 ex-
plaining how it works, and providing information on the initiatives that have 
been started, the media is trying to encourage people to get involved in Euro-
pean political life. Finally, there is TV programme called ‘EU-classroom’ 
which gathers experts from certain related institutions discussing and analys-
ing the rights emerging from EU citizenship.45  
 Overall, the national media is engaged in informing citizens about their 
rights on an everyday basis. Although Euroscepticism was strongly felt in the 
media before Croatia formally became a Member State, today it seems that 
the main subject of the national media is no longer criticism of the EU, but 
information on EU rights and how to exercise them. In other words, the me-
dia is now more focused on the benefits of the EU membership than on criti-
cising the EU as a whole. Bearing this in mind, one can conclude that this 
process affected the public discourse in such a way that it lowered the rate of 
Euroscepticism. Consequently, informed citizens increasingly understand that 
they have a role to play in the European project.  
                                                        
43. Written article available at: http://danas.net.hr/hrvatska/gdje-i-kako-otvoriti-posao-u-
eu-kako-se-priznaju-strucne-kvalifikacije.  
44. Written article available at: http://danas.net.hr/hrvatska/iako-barroso-baca-gradjanske 
-inicijative-u-smece-evo-zasto-se-treba-ukljuciti.  










The concept of European citizenship has proved to be inherently controver-
sial, yet constantly dynamic and transformative in nature.2 The study of the 
establishment of European citizenship and of its subsequent evolution must 
take place in a methodological framework that acknowledges the interde-
pendency between European citizenship and National citizenship.3 Therefore, 
it is considered to be useful for enhancing the clarity and coherence of the 
present report to clarify from the outset certain methodological and substan-
tively specific issues that relate to the concept of citizenship and also to the 
legal system of the Republic of Cyprus. 
 In terms of methodology, the present report aims to describe and critically 
reflect on the status and quality of protection that the legal order of the Repub-
lic of Cyprus4 reserves for rights that are specifically related to Union citizen-
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(2011) Transitions Vol 51 pp. 43-57; Shaw, J., ‘Citizenship: contrasting dynamics at 
the interface of integration and constitutionalism’, in Craig, P. and De Burca, G., 
(eds), The Evolution of EU Law, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), pp. 575-
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ship. The approach adopted is founded on the acknowledgment and subse-
quent adoption of the concept of overlapping citizenship statuses (citizenship 
coins/currency) that result from the plurality5 of types of citizenships in the 
European legal sphere. In this sense, the organisational idea of overlapping 
citizenship6 statuses is reflective of the symbiotic relationship of participating 
legal systems,7 both national and supranational in origin. There are certain 
significant parameters and characteristics of the preceding symbiotic relation-
ship.  
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stitutional Regulation and the Evolution of the Law of Necessity (in Greek), (Ath-
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Conflict’, (1975) 10 Texas International Law Journal 227. 
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 Firstly, the National citizenship predates and is an essential prerequisite 
for the emergence of the European citizenship.8 Secondly, the concept of citi-
zenship is not value neutral, but rather has a significant ethnocentric weight 
and specific symbolism that is the derivative of the highly contentious and 
constitutionally heated dogma of sovereignty.9 On this basis, the national le-
gal orders have seen the formation of immigration law as an automatic exten-
sion and expression of national sovereignty. 10 Thirdly, the relationship be-
tween citizenships seems to have been intended to be a ‘long distance rela-
tionship’, whereby the two coins of citizenship would exist in parallel and 
with safe distance between them so that no crossover point would arise, apart 
from situations of where the European citizenship would be adding rights to 
the already existing ones under National citizenship. This complementary one 
way relationship, alas idealistic and impractical, could have prevented friction 
and tension between the two coins of citizenship.11 In other words, the ap-
proach to the European citizenship is, at least in the early stages, one of dif-
ferentiated indifference. This means as an approach similar to the traditional 
national approach to ‘any other citizenship’, yet with a slight differentiation 
and added sensitivity due to the partly complementary nature of European citi-
zenship. This bundle of factors result in a distorted perception: National citi-
zenship is perceived as hierarchically superior to European citizenship, which 
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is just attributive of additional rights to the nationals of a State when they are 
in another Member State.  
 Therefore, the complexity of the relationship between European and Na-
tional citizenship is deeply rooted in history, emotion, constitutional patriot-
ism, and inherent hierarchy. This uneasy relationship has had a profound im-
pact on the effective exercise of a fundamental human right, namely the right 
to family life.12 This has been the case, since the limitations associated with 
the nationally centred immigration policy13 are bound to have an impact on 
the unification of family members, especially when the European citizenship 
element promotes the unhindered exercise of free movement.14 The conse-
quent welfare cost renders the unknotting of the bungled citizenships ex-
tremely difficult.15  
Surmising, the methodological approach adopted approaches the concept of 
citizenship as constitutionally sensitive and the coexistence of the National 
and the European citizenship is forming overlapping citizenship statuses (cit-
izenship coins/currency). The demarcation between those statuses is unclear, 
complex, and influenced by existing preconceptions that impact on the effec-
tiveness of exercise of the resulting from citizenships rights: an uneasy rela-
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13. See for example Carrera, S. and F. Geyer, ‘The reform treaty and justice and home 
affairs: implications for the common area of freedom, security and justice’ in Guild, 
E. and Geyer, F. (Eds), Security versus justice? Police and judicial cooperation in the 
European Union (Hampshire: Ashgate, 2008), pp. 289-307. 
14. Carlier, J.Y. and Guild, E. (Eds), The Future of Free Movement of Persons in the EU, 
Collection du Centre des Droits de L’Homme de l’Université Catholique de Louvain, 
(Brussels: Bruylant, 2006); Carrera, S., ‘What does free movement mean in theory 
and practice in an enlarged EU?’, (2005) 11 (6) European Law Journal, pp. 699-721. 
15. Minderhoud, P., ‘Access to Social Assistance Benefits and Directive 2004/38’, in E. 
Guild, K. Groenendijk and S. Carrera (eds), Illiberal Liberal States: Immigration, Cit-
izenship and Integration in the EU, (Ashgate Publishing, 2009), pp. 221-241. 
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tionship. The task must therefore be to ensure that citizenship rights are 
brought home.  
  Accordingly, the Cypriot constitutional order is examined under the scope 
of the preceding methodological approach, thus perceived as another para-
digm of a national constitutional approach to citizenships that result from the 
entanglement with other national and supranational constitutional/legal or-
ders. In terms of substantive issues that need to be clarified, it is useful to of-
fer a brief exegesis of those specific characteristics of the legal order of the 
Republic of Cyprus that impact on the perceptions and approach to citizen-
ships.  
 Historically, the presence of migrants in Cyprus has been linked with the 
impetus for economic growth whereby the overall restrictive approach to 
immigration is at certain periods relaxed with reference to specific classes of 
economically contributing migrants.16 In terms of general background pro-
accession to the EU, ‘immigrant workers were employed in manual, un-
skilled, low-paid, and low-prestige jobs’,17 with the origins of the workers be-
ing varied and with their integration in the society being limited.18 The source 
of the problems in fully implementing EU law provisions on free movement 
of workers and their families that are analysed infra is to be found in the pre-
existing formation of a perception that saw immigration as a ‘temporary phe-
nomenon’.19 Therefore, the immigration policies originally seemed to make 
an incomplete attempt to differentiate positively between EU citizens and 
third country citizens. This results in the general position where the ‘immi-
gration employment policy continues to be characterised by impermanence 
and elasticity’.20 On a more critical line of reasoning, Trimiklioniotis argues 
that the gaps in the implementation of Directive 2004/38 (hereafter, the Di-
rective)21 can be fully appreciated only after understanding the specific posi-
                                                        
16. Georgiades, O., ‘National Report for Cyprus’, in Comparative study of the laws in the 
25 EU Member States for legal immigration including an assessment of the condi-
tions and formalities imposed by each Member State for newcomers (2008), Interna-
tional Organisation for Migration/ European Parliament, pp. 169-181, at p. 169.  
17. Ibid. 
18. Trimikliniotis, N., ‘Migrant workers and industrial relations’ (2003) Industrial Rela-
tions Observatory on-line, http://www.eurofound.europa.eu/eiro/2003/11/feature/cy 
0311103f.htm. 
19. Georgiades, op. cit., n. 16, at p. 169. 
20. Ibid.  
21. OJ, L 158/77, 29 April 2004, <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUri Serv. 
do?uri=OJ:L:2004:158:0077:0123:EN:PDF>. 
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tion flowing from the partition of the island.22 Therefore, the notion of re-
verse discrimination that is to be found in the implementation of the Directive 
in relation to the exclusion of Cypriot citizens and their third country family 
members from the scope of the Directive (analysed infra) is to approached 
from the scope of the specific political and constitutional concerns of the Re-
public of Cyprus that relate to the Cypriot problem. Specifically, the concern 
relates to the real possibility of members of the Turkish-Cypriot community, 
that on the basis of art. 2 of the Constitution are citizens of the Republic, be-
ing able to move and reside in the areas under the control of the Government 
accompanied by their family members that are often Turkish citizens. The va-
lidity of such a concern is considerable, yet the blanket exclusion of all Cyp-
riot citizens is perhaps a heavy-handed measure. Another element of the spe-
cific position that is unjustifiable, relates to the discriminatory approach to-
wards members of the Lesbian and Gay Community (LBC) and their family 
members, as well as against EU citizens that have entered in a cohabitation 
agreement with their partners. The explanation for this unsatisfactory ap-
proach is one that is founded on the margin of appreciation and the existence 
of specific religious and moral values that each Member States is possible to 
pursue.23 Nonetheless, such an approach is in violation of the spirit and the 
letter of not only the Directive, but also of provisions on fundamental human 
rights.24 
 In conclusion, the European experience shows that the symbiosis of the 
citizenships has been affected by pre-existing perceptions about citizenship 
being the outcome of the concluded social contract between the State and its 
subjects, from which the State attracts legitimacy to govern and the subject is 
transformed to citizen. In the rather complex Cypriot constitutional setting, 
the concept of citizenship even has specific symbolic significance that is re-
                                                        
22. Trimikliniotis., N., ‘Free Movement of Workers in Cyprus and the EU’ Critical Stud-
ies on Fundamental Rights in Cyprus, the EU and Beyond 1.1 (2010): pp. 1-192,  
 http://www.prio.no/Global/upload/Cyprus/Publications/Free%20Movement%20of%20
Workers%20in%20Cyprus%20and%20the%20EU%20series%2012010.pdf, at p. 31.  
23. See generally with discussion to ‘state of exception’ Trimikliniotis, N., ‘Migration 
and Freedom of Movement of Workers: EU Law, Crisis and the Cypriot States of Ex-
ception’, (2013) Laws 2, no. 4: 440-468, available at http://www.mdpi.com/2075-
471X/2/4/440. 
24. Ibid. See also Report by the Ombudsman 2007. < http://www.ombudsman.gov. 
cy/Ombudsman/ombudsman.nsf/index_gr/index_gr?OpenDocument#. 





lated to the sovereignty issue. On this basis, the complexity of the symbiotic 
relationship between the European and National citizenship becomes highly 
sensitive and the degree of effective compliance with the provisions of the 
Directive has not remained unaffected. The response to the specific questions 
set by the questionnaire follows.  
Citizenship within Directive 2004/38/EC – stability of residence for 
Union citizens and their family members 
Question 1 
General Legislative Framework: Characteristics and Shortcomings 
Prior to the entry into force of Directive 38/2004, the legislative framework in 
Cyprus relating to matters of immigration in general was the Aliens and 
Immigration Law, Chapter 105 (as amended).25 The legislation distin-
guishes between third country nationals and third country nationals who are 
family members of EU nationals.  
 In addition, the free movement principle was applied though Law 92 
(I)/2003 on the free movement and residence of EU nationals and their 
families. This primary legislative measure was supplemented by the Admin-
istrative Directive 460/2004 concerning the free movement and stay of EU 
nationals and their families, which entered into force simultaneously with the 
accession of the Republic to the Union and which provided for the adminis-
trative forms that had been submitted by the residence applicants. The 
framework was later amended through Law 126 (I)/2004 for the free move-
ment and residence of EU nationals and their family members (amendments). 
 At the moment, the relevant framework in force consists of Law 7(I)/2007 
(as amended)26 that transposed Directive 38/2004. The implementation, 
                                                        
25. For analysis see Georgiades op. cit., n. 16. 
26. Legal act: Νόμος, number: N.7(I)/2007; Official Journal: Cyprus Gazette, number: 
4110, Publication date: 09/02/2007, Page: 00109-00167, Entry into force: 09/02/ 
2007; Reference: (MNE(2007)51431). The legislation has been amended since as fol-
lows: Ο Περί του Δικαιώματος των Πολιτών της Ένωσης και των Μελών των 
Οικογενειών τους να Κυκλοφορούν και να Διαμένουν Ελεύθερα στη Δημοκρατία 
(Τροποποιητικός) Νόμος του 2011. 
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therefore, took place via primary legislation that was voted unanimously by 
the House of Representative and which in general terms follows the Greek 
translation of the Directive. The general approach to implementation of the 
provisions of the Directive has been mixed, with certain significant discrep-
ancies from the aims of the Directive and with certain other per verbatim 
transfers of the text in the Law 7 (I)/2007. In specific, the legislation trans-
posed verbatim the provisions of the Directive as regards: article 7 (1a) of the 
Directive through section 9 (1) of the Law, article 7 (3a-d) through section 
9(4) (a-d), article 8 (3a) through section 10 (4), article 14 (4a-b) through sec-
tion 27 (4a-b), article 17 through section 15, and article 24 (2) through section 
22 (2).27  
 The implementation of the Directive has been perceived to be gradually 
improved, yet with a number of significant problems remaining. Firstly, there 
have been considerable backlogs as a result of the implementation of the Di-
rective that manifested in delays in administrative procedures relating to ap-
pointments to obtain a registration certificate, with delays being close to 12 
months.28 Moreover, there has been, at least in the initial stages, an overall of 
procedures whereby Union citizens who had obtained a permit issued under 
the previous regime of Law 92 (I)/2003 and Law 126 (I)/2004, were unnec-
essarily required to reapply under the new comprehensive Law 7 (I)/2007 for 
a registration certificate. According to the views of the trade unions the con-
                                                        
  Legal act: Νόμος, number: Ν.181(Ι)/2011; Official Journal: Cyprus Gazette, num-
ber: 4313, Publication date: 23/12/2011, Page: 01507-01514; Reference: (MNE(2012) 
51399).  
  Ο περί του Δικαιώματος των Πολιτών της της Ένωσης και των Μελών των 
Οικογενειών τους να Kυκλοφορούν και να Διαμένουν Eλεύθερα στη Δημοκρατία 
(Τροποποιητικός) Νόμος του 2013. 
  Legal act: Νόμος, number: Ν. 8(Ι)/2013; Official Journal: Cyprus Gazette, number: 
4377, Publication date: 01/02/2013, Page: 00015-00017, Entry into force: 
01/02/2013; Reference: (MNE(2013)51330). Ο περί του Δικαιώματος των Πολιτών 
της Ένωσης και των Μελών των Οικογενειών τους να Kυκλοφορούν και να 
Διαμένουν Eλεύθερα στη Δημοκρατία (Τροποποιητικός) (Αρ.2) Νόμος του 2013. 
  Legal act: Νόμος, number: Ν. 67(Ι)/2013; Official Journal: Cyprus Gazette, num-
ber: 4399, Publication date: 15/07/2013, Page: 00573-00574, Entry into force: 
15/07/2013; Reference: (MNE(2013)56757).  
27. Trimikliniotis, N., ‘Report on the Free Movement of Workers in Cyprus in 2010-2011’, 
2011, available at: http://www.google.co.uk/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&frm=1& 
source=web&cd=3&cad=rja&ved=0CDgQFjAC&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.ru.nl%2
Fpublish%2Fpages%2F608499%2Fcyprus_2011-12_def.pdf&ei=CXvbUuXbNon 
EtQak2oDIAw&usg=AFQjCNH2jIl04IUObjXrHoGlILa_AIfZWQ, p. 6. 
28. Trimikliniotis., op. cit., n. 22, at p. 4. 
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sequent delays resulted in forms of discrimination that disrupted the ability to 
move freely and take up employment.29  
 Moreover, the implementation created a problem of reverse discrimination 
against Cypriot citizens and their third country family members by imposing 
on them the more stringent conditions of the Aliens and Immigration Law, 
Chapter 105 (as amended). This issue is analysed fully infra, as is the unsat-
isfactory approach of the Supreme Court that endorsed after several incon-
sistent decisions the approach favoured by the Republic.  
 In addition, there is the issue of territoriality whereby the application of 
Law 7 (I)/2007 is, in the view of the reporter, by necessity limited to the are-
as under the control of the government.  
 The situation arises out of the unfortunate reality in Cyprus where the 
ceasefire line (Green line) separates the island in the southern area under the 
effective control of the Government, and the illegally occupied under interna-
tional law northern areas that have no international status.30 Therefore, the 
Green line creates a complex situation where a non border in the international 
law sense has been accepted as the practical separating line between areas 
under the control of the Government in which the acquis communautaire 
applies on the basis of article 1 of Protocol 10 attached to the Treaty of Ac-
cession of Cyprus to the EU.31 The provision in article 1 (1) stipulates that 
‘The application of the acquis shall be suspended in those areas of the Repub-
lic of Cyprus in which the Government of the Republic of Cyprus does not 
exercise effective control’. From this situation arise certain issues relating to 
the exercise of the rights of free movement of workers who are Union citi-
zens and reside in the northern territories, where the Republic of Cyprus 
Government exercises no effective control. In specific, the combined effect of 
articles 2, 20, 22 of Law 7 (I)/2007 limit the scope of application of the im-
plementation of the Directive to the areas under the effective control of the 
Government. Therefore, according to Trimiklioniotis,32 this results in an ex-
                                                        
29. Ibid. 
30. See the policy statement of the European Parliament, 25/1/2005 http://www.europarl. 
europa.eu/meetdocs/2004_2009/documents/nt/553/553930/553930en.pdf.  
31. Act concerning the conditions of accession of the Czech Republic, the Republic of Es-
tonia, the Republic of Cyprus, the Republic of Latvia, the Republic of Lithuania, the 
Republic of Hungary, the Republic of Malta, the Republic of Poland, the Republic of 
Slovenia, and the Slovak Republic and the adjustments to the Treaties on which the 
European Union is founded – Protocol No. 10 on Cyprus, OJ L 236, 23.9.2003, p. 955-
95, available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri= CELEX: 
12003T/PRO/10:EN:NOT.  
32. Trimikliniotis., op. cit., n. 27, p. 42. 
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pansion of the discretionary powers of the administrative authorities that are 
able to refuse the application of the protective scope of the Directive to EU 
citizens and their families that are residing in the occupied areas.33 In prac-
tice, it has been argued that ‘applications for a registration certificate submit-
ted by Union citizens not residing in the areas under the effective control of 
the Republic are routinely rejected ... [and] the practice as regards partners of 
Union citizens residing in the northern part of Cyprus is to allow them to 
travel or use the legal ports and airports the first time they enter the country, 
but to subsequently enter them on the ‘stop list’ once they have entered the 
territories of the Republic of Cyprus.’ 34 
 This approach, if it can be conclusively documented, could result in dis-
crimination against EU citizens residing in the occupied areas and EU citi-
zens residing in the areas under the effective control of the Republic’s author-
ities.35 
 This creates certain gaps in the application of the Directive, as EU citizens 
residing in the northern occupied areas are in effect excluded from the scope 
of protection for the free movement under the Directive. This has resulted, 
according to some commentators, in the creation of a dual system of applica-
bility for the Directive and concerns have been expressed36 as regards the im-
proper implementation of article 22 of the Directive since there is no express 
reference in Law 7 (I)/2007 to the derogation provisions of the Directive (art-
icles 27-33) and which relate to grounds of public policy in general. It is 
submitted that by necessity arising out of the political situation in Cyprus and 
in order to protect the public interest and maintain public order, the derogato-
ry approach adopted under Law 7 (I)/2007 is justifiable. Yet, the process of 
justification could have been clearer and more complete if reference was 
made to the available exceptional provisions of the Directive (articles 27-33).  
In terms of the definition of the term ‘Union citizen’, article 2 Law 7 (I)/2007 
states: ‘that that any person that is citizen of a Member State of the Union, 
other than the Republic of Cyprus, in accordance with art. 17 of the Treaty, as 
well as any person that is citizen of a State that is party to the EEA’. In addi-
tion, in the same article, ‘Treaty’ is defined as the Treaty on the Establish-
ment of the European Community. This approach was perhaps justifiable in 
2007 when the Law was adopted, but at this moment it is incomplete as re-




36. Ibid.; also Trimikliniotis., op. cit., n. 27, pp. 43-44. 
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gards the effects that the Treaty of Lisbon has had on the Treaties. For exam-
ple, from the above outdated definition/reference there seems to result an ex-
clusion of the various provisions contained in the TEU and which relate to 
the concept of citizenship.37 Therefore, reference can be made to art. 3 (2) (ex 
art. 2 TEU); essentially article 9 TEU; art. 10 TEU (on democracy, represen-
tation, and political rights); art. 11 TEU (citizens’ initiative). 
 The exclusion is perhaps merely technical, yet symbolic in effect and giv-
en the subsequent amendments to Law 7 (I)/2007, with the most recent tak-
ing place in 2013, it is argued that there was opportunity for addressing the 
issue. It is also interesting to note that even in the pre Lisbon situation, the 
TEU made references of a symbolic importance to the concept of citizenship 
and/or citizens.  
 Returning to the definitions that Law 7 (I)/2007 makes, art. 2 states that 
family members of an EU citizen include the spouse, the direct descendants 
who are under the age of 21 or are dependants and those of the spouse; the 
dependent direct relatives in the ascending line, and those of the spouse. It is 
notable that the definition is per verbatim adopting the wording of article 2 of 
the Directive, yet with one significant exclusion: that of article 2 (2) (b) Di-
rective that refers ‘to the partner with whom the Union citizen has contracted 
a registered partnership, on the basis of the legislation of a Member State, if 
the legislation of the host Member State treats registered partnerships as 
equivalent to marriage and in accordance with the conditions laid down in the 
relevant legislation of the host Member State’.  
 The rationale is founded on the room for discretion that the Directive 
grants to Member States when implementing the relevant provision and 
which imposes an obligation to include in the definition of family registered 
partnerships, but only if these are legally recognised under national law. In 
Cyprus there is no such legal recognition for registered partnerships, hence 
Law 7 (I)/2007 excludes art. 2 (2) (b) and subsequently all the inclusions that 
art. 2 Directive adopts in relation to registered partnerships in articles 2 (2) (c) 
and 2 (2) (d).  
Nonetheless, the analysis must surely take into account article 4 (2) of Law 7 
(I)/2007 that states: ‘Without prejudice to any right to free movement and 
residence the persons concerned may have in their own right, the Republic 
                                                        
37. Art. 3 (2) (ex art. 2 TEU); essentially article 9; art. 10 (on democracy, representation, 
and political rights); art. 11 (citizens initiative). 
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facilitates entry and residence on the basis of the Aliens and Immigration 
Law, Chapter 105 (as amended) for the following persons: 
(a) any other family members, irrespective of their nationality, not falling 
under the definition of ‘family member’ under article 2, provided that 
they are dependants of the Union citizen having the primary right of resi-
dence, or cohabitates in the same household with the Union citizen hav-
ing the primary right of residence, or where serious health grounds strict-
ly require the personal care of the family member by the Union citizen; 
and 
(b) the partner with whom the Union citizen has a durable relationship, duly 
attested’. 
Hence, there is at the first level exclusion of registered partnerships and on 
second level a broadening of the term ‘family member’ in order to afford pro-
tection to individuals living under the partnership regime, provided that the 
said relationship is adequately documented (per article 4 (2) (b)).  
 In connection to the ‘adequately documented requirement’, article 4 (3) 
and (4) provide that the responsible administrative authority shall undertake 
an extensive examination of the personal circumstances of the interested par-
ties, including personal interviews where necessary and shall justify any de-
nial of entry or residence to these people. The primary concern in this case is 
documented with reference to article 2 where it is clearly stated that ‘spouse’ 
excludes a party to a marriage of convenience (sham marriage). The approach 
to implementation reflects a concern that the immigration authorities of Cy-
prus have had for decades and which refers to the high number of marriages 
of convenience that have taken place in the past. The problem with this ap-
proach is that although a legitimate aim of protecting the public interest is 
pursued, the result could be unsatisfactory. This is the case since there is a 
risk when assessing the term ‘family members’ of approaching relationships 
that fall outside the narrow margin of marriage as being prima facie suspect. 
Such an approach would be a direct reflection of a pre-existing dominance 
among immigration officials of the perception about the elevated danger re-
sulting from marriages of convenience. Thus, there is a risk that in the appli-
cation of the legislation the immigration officials, that are granted a wide 
margin of discretion when applying certain provisions of Law 7 (I)/2007, 
will exercise their discretion on the basis of the traditional problems that im-
migration officials have faced. This would result in the application of a spe-
cifically sceptic and stricter approach towards registered partnerships that are 
not legally recognised in the Cypriot legal order. Needless to say, the attain-
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ment of the goal of protecting the public interest is paramount, yet while pur-
suing that legitimate aim priority must be given to the aims of the Directive, 
especially as regards classes of potential applicants that are excluded from the 
full protection of the provisions of Law 7 (I)/2007.  
 The issues relating to same sex couples that fall within article 3(2) of the 
Directive and their implementation in Law 7(I)/2007 was one of the matters 
for which the Republic was questioned about by the European Commission. 
In this context, the problems in the implementation method have been high-
lighted in the letter dated 22.3.2012 that the European Commission addressed 
to the Cypriot Government regarding the incorrect general transposition and 
implementation of Directive 2004/37/EC. This step was the last in a series of 
previous measures that intended to raise questions about the implementa-
tion’s completeness. In specific, there were the previous letters of 22.09.2009 
and 20.05.2011, which had been responded to by the Cypriot government on 
27.01.2011 and 25.07.2011, respectively.38 The first warning letter to the Re-
public of Cyprus by the Commission (20/5/2011) noted 14 matters alleging 
violations of the principles underpinning free movement. One of the matters 
raised related to same sex couples, with the European Commission arguing 
that the formal transposition of article 3(2) of the Directive by articles 2 and 5 
(now relevant is also article 4, after amendment by Law 18 (I)/2011) of Law 
7(I)/2007, was not supported by adequate administrative practices. In effect, 
the European Commission inquired as to the adopted procedures of ‘facilita-
tion’ of family members that art. 3 (2) of the Directive requires.  
 The Cypriot Government responded by stating that certain factors must be 
taken into account when assessing the effectiveness of the administrative 
practices intending to facilitate the free movement of family members. In 
specific, one such factor is the existing national legal framework that does not 
recognise registered partnerships and given that the Directive expressly al-
lows for such legislative frameworks (article 2 (b)), there is no prima facie 
violation. In addition, the Government argued that the existing administrative 
procedures are facilitative in the sense that art. 3 (2) of the Directive requires. 
This argument was based on an interpretation of the Directive whereby ‘the 
Directive does not clarify whether a third country national needs a visa in the 
host state’.39 It is therefore possible to impose such requirement since ‘Regu-
lation 265/2010 (amending the Schengen Treaty and Regulation 562/2006) 
comes into play’.40 Thus, in the event that no visa was acquired before arrival 
                                                        
38. Trimikliniotis., op. cit., n. 22, at p. 1. 
39. Trimikliniotis., op. cit., n. 22, at p. 22. 
40. Ibid. 
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to the point of entry, by way of exception and as a facilitative measure, in ac-
cordance with the circular of 18.07.2011 the visa requirements are partly 
qualified on the basis of accepting an unrecognised marriage or registered 
partnership certificate as evidence of a stable and permanent relationship. 
This ‘facilitation’ is subject to two conditions: ‘(a) the certificate is duly apos-
tilled and (b) a visa is acquired via the consular point or at point of entry if 
this allowed by Regulation 810/2009’.41 The visa requirement is maintained, 
but its discharge is by way of exception facilitated by accepting under condi-
tions the existence of evidence of a stable and permanent relationship. Natu-
rally, this approach grants broad discretionary powers to the immigration of-
ficer at the point of entry, which is in a way problematic.  
 Moreover, it can be argued that by the preceding administrative process an 
identical approach is applied when there is no recognised marriage and that 
unified approach applies equally to same sex partners and heterosexual part-
ners. In that way, the discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation is at-
tempted to be avoided. However, there are views that see this attempt as part-
ly successful at best.42 This conclusion is based on two grounds. Firstly, there 
is possibly discrimination and disproportionate treatment on the grounds on 
nationality, in the form of demanding standards applying to EU citizens that 
could form an important preventive and pre-emptive barrier to the exercise of 
free movement due to the requirements that apply to family members that are 
of third country origin. Nonetheless, this argument is surprisingly inaccurate 
on the basis that the nationality criterion is not favouring Cypriot nationals, 
since they are expressly excluded from the scope of Law 7 (I)/2007 altogeth-
er. This reverse discrimination has the unwelcome effect of weakening the 
nationality discrimination argument in relation to EU citizens simply because 
the overall approach to same sex couples is problematic to start with.43  
 Secondly, there have been important findings by the Cypriot Equality 
Body that found discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation and nation-
ality and which findings are linked to the umbrella problem of non recogni-
tion of registered partnerships. In specific, those reports conclude that the dis-
criminatory effect of the approach of the immigration authorities has a direct 
                                                        
41. Ibid. 
42. Ibid., at p. 23. 
43. See Trimikliniotis, N. and Demetriou, C., ‘Thematic Legal Study on Homophobia 




negative and pre-emptive impact on the effective exercise of free movement 
and on the proper enjoyment of family rights.44  
A notable example of the approach of the Cypriot Equality Body is to be 
found in the first ever complaint that it examined on grounds of sexual orien-
tation discrimination.45 The complaint concerned the approach of the immi-
gration authorities to an application for enforcement of the rights of move-
ment and residence afforded to partners of EU citizens under Directive 
2004/38/EC. The application by a third country national who had registered a 
civil partnership in the U.K. with a U.K. national was rejected by the immi-
gration authorities. The main reason justifying the rejection was that the na-
tional legislative framework does not recognise same sex marriages. In its 
Report the Cypriot Equality Body46 stated that an unqualified obligation ex-
ists to secure enjoyment of legally guaranteed rights without discrimination, 
in accordance with article 14 of the ECHR and article 28 of the Cypriot Con-
stitution (principle of equality). The Cypriot Equality Body cited ECtHR case 
law to state that the principle of equality is violated when there is differential 
treatment of similar cases, which is not justified objectively and logically, or 
where the means used are disproportionate to the aim pursued.47 The exten-
sive analysis of the Strasbourg Court’s case-law on the evolving notion and 
meaning of ‘family’ and ‘marriage’ and on same-sex couples was supported 
by the specific reference to Recommendation No. 1470 (2000) of the Parlia-
mentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE).48  
 Therefore, the decision of the immigration authority was found to be un-
justified discrimination on the ground of sexual orientation. Moreover, this 
finding was adopted despite the fact that the report acknowledged that Di-
rective 2004/38/EC grants a considerable margin of appreciation to Member 
States (article 2 (b)) to decide whether to recognise same sex marriages and 
registered partnerships. It was stated that the non-discrimination principle is 
broader than the scope of the Directive and its content is formulated by the 
                                                        
44. Trimikliniotis., op. cit., n. 22, at p. 23. 




46. Which is in effect the Office of the Ombudsman.  
47. Trimikliniotis., op. cit., n. 22, at p. 23, note 61. 
48. ‘Situation of gays and lesbians and their partners in respect of asylum and immigra-
tion in the member states of the Council of Europe’, adopted on 30th June 2000. 
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ECHR, the ECtHR case law, EU law general principles, primary provisions 
of EU law, and the case law of the CJEU. The application of Law 7 (I)/2007 
is to be governed by those broader considerations that bridge over the provi-
sions of the Directive. In addition, according to the Ombudsman, the adverse 
implications of such discrimination on the private and family life of same-sex 
couples did not seem to accord with the principle of proportionality. She ex-
pressed the view that the introduction of same-sex partnerships in the legal 
order of Cyprus should become a matter for public debate and study in the 
light of international and European practice and expressed her intention to is-
sue a Recommendation to the competent authorities to that effect. She also 
forwarded her Report to the Director of the CRMD, the Minister of Interior, 
and the Attorney-General of the Republic.49 
 The Ombudsman’s report was followed by a complaint filed in July 2008 
by Mr. S.S., a Cypriot citizen, on behalf of his Canadian spouse, Mr. T.C.50 
The couple had gotten married in Ontario, Canada in July 2006 and moved 
permanently to Cyprus in July 2007. T.C. requested a residence permit as a 
‘family member’ of S.S. in accordance with Directive 2004/38/EC. His re-
quest was rejected by the CRMD on the ground that he was not considered a 
family member of a Cypriot citizen because their marriage was not recog-
nized by Cypriot legislation. Both S.S. and T.C. filed an application before 
the Supreme Court, which is examined in paragraph 13.3.2.3. 
 T.C. was granted a temporary residence permit as a visitor for one year. 
On 21st October 2008, S.S. filed a fresh complaint on behalf of T.C. concern-
ing the latter’s visitor’s permit.51 As a visitor, T.C. did not have the right to 
work or open his own bank account (he could only have a special bank ac-
count for visitors), which was a source of numerous problems in his daily life. 
 The Ombudsman’s report of 10th December 2008 referred to the EC rules 
on discrimination against homosexuals, including the Proposal for a Directive 
of 2nd July 2008 on implementing the principle of equal treatment between 
persons irrespective of religion or belief, disability, age, or sexual orientation 
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(which has however remained a Proposal at the time of writing).52 She also 
referred to the comparative legal analysis of homophobia, transphobia, and 
discrimination on grounds of sexual orientation and gender identity published 
by the EU Fundamental Rights Agency in June 2008, and emphasized that 18 
out of the 27 EU Member States had introduced measures that went beyond 
the minimum standard required under EU legislation on combating discrimi-
nation on the ground of sexual orientation in labor, access to goods and ser-
vices, housing, and social benefits. She finally referred to the conclusions of 
the study that the rights and privileges accorded to married couples, including 
those rights relating to freedom of movement and family reunification, should 
be extended to same-sex couples. 
 In her own conclusions, the Ombudsman felt the need to clarify that regu-
lation of same-sex marriage in Cyprus fell within the exclusive competence 
of the legislature. That said, she held the view that the complainant did not 
receive equal treatment because his right to work was directly linked with the 
non-recognition of same-sex marriage under Cyprus law. She added that the 
Cypriot legal order, as part of the EU legal order, should grant full protection 
to homosexuals; a blanket exclusion of same-sex partners from the rights 
granted to different-sex spouses of EU citizens as ‘family members’ was an 
unjustified discrimination on the grounds of sexual orientation and a clear 
discrimination against same-sex couples. Consequently, the Ombudsman held 
that the denial of Mr. T.C.’s right to work was an unjustified adverse treat-
ment that was directly linked to his sexual orientation and recommended that 
the CMRD re-examine his request with a view to granting him the right to 
work. 
 Similar arguments and conclusions were reiterated in a third report dated 
3rd August 2009, which was triggered by two fresh complaints and by the 
negative reaction of the CMRD to the Ombudsman’s previous reports. In par-
ticular, the CMRD insisted that their interpretation of the Directive was cor-
rect and that they had acted within the law; hence, the Ombudsman should 
have refrained from addressing any recommendation to the Department to act 
in a different way. The CMRD also invoked a Legal Opinion issued by the 
Law Office of the Republic of Cyprus in July 2008, which had similarly con-
cluded that the Republic had no legal obligation, but mere discretion to re-
ceive the (non-EU nationals) same-sex partners of persons legally residing in 
Cyprus. 
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 In the third report, the Ombudsman remained firm in her reading of the 
Directive within the broader legal framework, as articulated in her previous 
reports. In addition, she referred to the European Parliament Resolution of 2nd 
April 2009 on the application of Directive 2004/38/EC,53 which, inter alia, 
call[ed] on member states to fully implement the rights granted under [the Di-
rective] not only to different sex spouses, but also to the registered partner, 
member of the household and the partner, including same-sex couples recog-
nized by a Member State, irrespective of nationality and without prejudice to 
their non-recognition in civil law by another Member State, on the basis of 
the principles of mutual recognition, equality, non-discrimination, dignity, 
and private and family life and call[ed] on member states to bear in mind that 
the Directive imposes an obligation to recognize freedom of movement to all 
Union citizens (including same-sex partners) without imposing the recogni-
tion of same-sex marriages.54 
 In line with this Resolution, the Ombudsman reiterated that the CMRD’s 
restrictive interpretation of all relevant provisions was to the detriment of EU 
citizens who had registered partnerships – especially same-sex ones – in their 
country of origin. Such restrictive interpretation would make it virtually im-
possible for this category of EU citizens to exercise their freedom of move-
ment and establishment. She concluded that the blanket exclusion of same-
sex partners of EU citizens from the rights deriving from the EU acquis on 
the mere ground that same-sex marriage was not recognized in Cyprus 
amounted to an unjustified discrimination and was incompatible with the 
spirit of the Directive and basic principles of EU Law; at the very least, there 
should have been some examination of the individual circumstances sur-
rounding each case. 
Reports of the Ombudsman: recommending the introduction of civil 
partnership for both opposite-sex and same-sex couples 
The first three reports aimed at urging the State to adopt measures towards 
equal treatment of same-sex couples and full respect of their right to private 
life, but fell short of linking such measures to recognition of same-sex mar-
riage or partnership in the legal order of Cyprus. The Ombudsman was in-
deed cautious to keep the two issues apart. However, in a fourth report dated 
31st March 2010 she moved a step further towards recommending that Par-
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liament introduce civil or registered partnerships for both opposite-sex and 
same-sex couples. The report was triggered by two complaints concerning the 
legislative gap on the civil marriage or registered partnership of same-sex 
couples.55 One of the complainants had received a clear reply by the Ministry 
of Interior informing him that the Cypriot law only provided for marriage be-
tween persons of different sex; since same-sex marriage was not recognized, 
any such marriage celebrated abroad had no legal basis in Cyprus.  
 The Ombudsman identified a gap in the law of Cyprus since cohabitation 
outside of marriage of either different-sex or same-sex couples, even if long 
and stable, did not give rise to any rights for the partners and was not subject 
to any regulation whatsoever. She stressed that new types of living together 
and cohabitation between such couples were a reality that required revisiting 
the traditional concept of marriage and the introduction of legal rules that 
would fill in the gap. The Ombudsman was cognizant that societal consensus 
would be broader for the legal recognition of different-sex partnerships out-
side of marriage than for same-sex ones, but she was also mindful of every-
one’s right not to be subjected to discrimination on the ground of sexual ori-
entation. In her view, the continuing legal non-recognition of the social reali-
ty of same-sex partnerships reinforced negative stereotypes and prejudices 
against homosexuals and deprived them of the possibility to claim their 
rights. On the other hand, legal recognition would be a realistic response to an 
existing social need and essential for the realization of equal treatment. It 
would also bring Cyprus fully in line with the fundamental EU principle of 
free movement of people. 
 The Ombudsman also underlined that legal regulation of civil unions 
would not undermine traditional marriage, which would continue to be the 
prevalent basis for establishing a family. In any case, the legitimate aim of 
protecting traditional marriage and family should not be achieved by ignoring 
or refusing to regulate existent (same-sex) partnerships. The State should se-
cure the same respect and protection to all citizens irrespective of their sexual 
orientation. It thus fell on Parliament to introduce relevant legislation. In do-
ing so, Parliament could be guided by the legislative provisions of other Euro-
pean countries as well as by the obligations of states under European and in-
ternational law to eliminate any form of discrimination.  
 These views were reiterated in a Position Paper issued on 22nd December 
2011 in the Ombudsman’s capacity as Equality Authority. The Ombudsman 
once again stressed that there was a legal gap in regulating cohabitation out-
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side marriage of both different-sex and same-sex couples, and that Cyprus 
was one of the few EU Member States that had not introduced civil partner-
ships. She also noted that there was no constitutional obstacle for doing so 
since this was an issue to be regulated by the legislature. Finally, she pointed 
out that legal recognition of civil partnerships would have a positive impact 
on public attitudes towards same-sex couples and would contribute to elimi-
nating negative stereotypes against them, as experience in other countries has 
shown. 
 The publicity given to this series of reports in the local press and media, as 
well as the growing number of other initiatives and public debates in mass 
and social media have raised some public awareness in an issue that was con-
sidered taboo until less than a decade ago. Such initiatives and the on-going 
integration of Cyprus in the EU seem quite likely to counterweight – to some 
extent at least – deeply embedded negative public attitudes and stereotypes, 
including sporadic homophobic statements by prominent figures of public 
life. This improved climate has made it easier for a small group of parliamen-
tarians stemming from various political parties to initiate informal discussions 
within Parliament with a view to introducing civil partnerships, including for 
same-sex couples. It is noteworthy, however, that neither the Ombudsman 
nor any other public figure has suggested the extension of marriage to same-
sex couples; they have invariably called for introducing civil partner-
ship/union for both opposite-sex and same-sex couples and keeping marriage 
for opposite-sex couples. Indeed, any other proposal would be extremely un-
likely to find wider public support. 
The Supreme Court’s Approach 
The approach of the Supreme Court to the Directive and to Law 7 (I)/2007, 
specifically as regards the scope of application, the key definitions of EU na-
tional and family members, and finally the effectiveness of the granted pro-
tection has been mixed. In specific, the case law focused primarily on the 
matter of reverse discrimination for Cypriot citizens and also on the definition 
of family members. It must be noted that the jurisprudence has shown a re-
markable inconsistency as regards the reverse discrimination issue. The evo-
lution of the case law has been summarised in the case of Irina Levacheva v 
Republic.56 The case concerned a Russian citizen that married a Cypriot citi-
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zen in 2009 and was granted visitor status in 2010. After carefully scrutiny of 
the nature of the relationship, it was concluded that the marriage was genuine, 
hence the permit/status as visitor was subsequently supplemented with the 
granting of a status of employee. This was subject to the express statement 
that ‘such a status is granted for the purpose of staying in Cyprus with the 
Cypriot spouse and for the specified employment’. Upon further visits by the 
immigration authorities, it transpired that the couple were no longer living to-
gether and that the Cypriot husband filed for divorce in November 2010. 
Subsequently, the Immigration Authority revoked the stay and work permit 
on the basis that it was granted exclusively on the basis of the marriage that 
was no longer a consideration and also asked her to immediately depart from 
the Republic. Against this administrative decision, the affected party Mrs 
Levacheva filed an action for annulment under article 146 Constitution rely-
ing primarily on the Directive and Law 7 (I)/2007.   
 Judge Erotokritou described the inconsistency in the case law by stating 
that ‘After accession of the Republic to the EU, Directive 2004/38/EC was 
implemented, initially, through Law 92(Ι)/2003. In the application of the 
Law, there were decisions of judges at first instance,57 where it was held that 
Law 92(Ι)/2003 applies also to family members of Cypriot citizens’.58 Ex-
amples of such instances were cited and included Saiedi v Republic,59 Petro-
sian ν. Republic,60 Shalaeva v Republic (first instance),61 and on appeal the 
decision of the majority in Shalaeva v Republic.62  
 The unifying thread that connects the preceding decisions is the argument 
that was subtly put by Judge Nicolaides in Shalaeva v Republic (first in-
stance)63 where it was held that ‘it is self-evident that the same rights afford-
ed to citizens of other Member States of the Union, are afforded also to Cyp-
riot citizens. We would be led to unreasonable results if the Greek-Cypriot 
spouse of the applicant could live with her in any other Member State of the 
EU, but could not do the same in his own country. Despite the filing for di-
vorce or even the separation of the couple, until a final decision as to the di-
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vorce is being made, they remain married’.64 Therefore, the application of an 
approach that would amount to reverse discrimination was initially held to be 
unreasonable and would as such result to a protection founded on double 
standards.  
 Interestingly enough, that approach was endorsed by the majority of the 
Supreme Court (3:2) in the appeal in Shalaeva v Republic,65 which was a de-
cision of an extended panel of five judges instead of the normal composition 
of three judges hearing appeals under article 146 Constitution. It must be clar-
ified that the appeal was based on a different setting than that of the first in-
stance decision that concerned the revocation of the permit to stay and work 
in Cyprus, whereas the appeal concerned a different action for annulment that 
concerned the decision of the Secretary of State for Interior to re-examine her 
application. In the appeal, in which Judge Nicolaides gave the decision of the 
majority, the identical argument that was cited above was repeated66 and was 
supplemented by the argument the principle of equality requires identical 
handling of such cases with cases involving family members of citizens of 
other Member States of the EU.67 In addition, it was held that ‘the Directive’s 
purpose is obvious and it includes the protection of the right to family and its 
provisions assist in preserving the unity of the family ... and since the provi-
sions of the implementing Law are reflecting the aims of the Directive, any 
opposing interpretation would violate the right in question for Cypriot citi-
zens’.68 Without question, this approach is closer to giving effective and 
fuller application of not only the provisions of the Directive, but also of its 
spirit and purposes. 
 The view of the minority adopted per verbatim the rationale of the earlier 
decision in Sari Tekin ν. Republic,69 where Judge Konstantinides held that 
‘The matter of the right of residence of a third country national that is the 
spouse of a Cypriot citizen is a matter that comes within the scope of the reg-
ulation of the internal state of affairs of a Member State of the Union ... It has 
no community element and the question as to whether such internal regula-
tions violate other principles is a different matter ... The Law does not create 
such a right of residence as it expressly states in articles 4 and 15 that it con-
cerns the right to free movement and residence in the Republic ... It requires 
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movement of such citizen to Cyprus and it does not concern Cypriots and 
their right to reside in his country. In accordance, that approach is extended to 
the family members of such a citizen, but dependent on the existence of a 
right by the Union citizen ... Since there is no movement by the  
Union citizen, there can be no independent right of residence of the members 
of his/her family.’70 
 Moreover, the minority view cited the decision of the CJEU in Blaise 
Baheten Metock and Others v Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Re-
form,71 with specific, yet mere citation of the relevant paragraphs 73 and 74 
of the judgment of the CJEU. Although the citation is proper and correct, the 
lack of any other comment by the Supreme Court (minority decision) is lack-
ing the necessary emphasis, and thus resulted in the majority view completely 
ignoring the judgment and its relevancy. In specific, the minority view cited 
the following:  
‘On this point, the answer must be, first, that it is not all nationals of non-member countries 
who derive rights of entry into and residence in a Member State from Directive 2004/38, 
but only those who are family members, within the meaning of point 2 of Article 2 of that 
directive, of a Union citizen who has exercised his right of freedom of movement by be-
coming established in a Member State other than the Member State of which he is a na-
tional. Second, Directive 2004/38 does not deprive the Member States of all possibility of 
controlling the entry into their territory of family members of Union citizens. Under Chap-
ter VI of that directive, Member States may, where this is justified, refuse entry and resi-
dence on grounds of public policy, public security or public health. Such a refusal will be 
based on an individual examination of the particular case’.72 
However, the part of the Blaise Baheten Metock decision that would have 
been extremely useful for the Supreme Court was neither cited nor comment-
ed upon and that part was paragraph 78: ‘Any difference in treatment be-
tween those Union citizens and those who have exercised their right of free-
dom of movement, as regards the entry and residence of their family mem-
bers, does not therefore fall within the scope of Community law’.73 
 The saga continued, with the Supreme Court in full panel again revisiting 
the issue of reverse discrimination in another appeal relating to Republic ν. 
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Shalaeva74 and indicated that there was disagreement with the majority deci-
sion discussed supra, yet without further examining the matter. The whole 
situation was finally concluded with the adoption of Law 7 (I)/2007 that in 
terms of the definition of the term ‘Union citizen’, article 2 Law 7 (I)/2007 
states: ‘that any person who is citizen of a Member State of the Union, other 
than the Republic of Cyprus, in accordance with art. 17 of the Treaty, as well 
as any person who is citizen of a State that is party to the EEA’. Also, article 
4 (1) states that ‘the Law applies to any Union citizen, who arrives or resides 
in the Republic as well as to members of his family, irrespective of nationali-
ty, that accompany him during his arrival to the Republic or that arrive at the 
Republic to meet him’.  
 Accordingly, Judge Nicolaides who earlier supported a different view, 
held in Majed v Republic75 that from the now combined meaning of the pro-
visions of Law 7 (I)/2007, the provisions of the Law and of the Directive are 
not applicable in instances where a third country national of a Cypriot moves 
to reside in Cyprus. This is now the position that the Supreme Court applies 
and it has been summarised in the case of Irina Levacheva v Republic.76 
There Judge Erotokritou reiterated the above approach and cited as authority 
Case C-127/08, Blaise Baheten Metock and Others v Minister for Justice, 
Equality, and Law Reform. Nonetheless, the Judge also cited the earlier Case 
C-109/01, Secretary of State for the Home Department v Hacene Akrich as 
setting the exact precedent. At this point, one must distinguish the difference 
in approach between the two judgments of the CJEU as regards at least the 
issue of legal and illegal entry into a Member State of the Union; however 
this useful distinction was omitted. 
 It must be noted that in the preceding decisions there was no examination 
of the possibility to submit a preliminary reference on the matter, despite the 
fact that the key to interpreting the national legislation was to be found in the 
provisions of the Directive. Moreover, no justification was given as to the 
clarity of the provisions of the Directive in accordance with the doctrine of 
acte claire77 in the instances where the Supreme Court was examining ap-
peals from first instance decisions, thus acting as court of last resort. Finally, 
there was also no examination as to the criteria for direct effect of the Di-
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rective,78 nor was there any reference to the doctrine of indirect effect that re-
quires the harmonious interpretation of the national implementing measure 
with the Directive.79 In effect, the decisions whether in favour of including or 
excluding Cypriots from the scope of the Directive were based on national 
perceptions and interpretation techniques. This, in the opinion of the author 
represents the most serious problem in applying effectively the provisions of 
the Directive, irrespective of the correctness of the approach of the Supreme 
Court in the sense of finding the provisions of the Law as coming within the 
margin of discretion that the Directive grants. Finally, the reference to the 
guiding authority which is the relevant case law of the CJEU was either ab-
sent or merely sporadic and laconic. 
Finally, reference must be made to the very interesting decision in Teresa 
Amayuwon v Republic.80 It must be stated that the decision by Judge Nico-
latos in effect applied the protective effect of article 12 the Directive, as im-
plemented by article 25 of Law 7(I)/2007, despite the fact that the interested 
party (a citizen of the Philippines) was the spouse of a deceased Cypriot citi-
zen. In effect, the shift in the approach of the Supreme Court, discussed su-
pra, that applies the principle of exclusion of Cypriots from the scope of the 
Directive, was not applied in this instance. Therefore, issues about consisten-
cy of the case law arise. 
 In this case, the applicant legally entered into Cyprus in 2007 and in 2010 
married a Cypriot citizen who passed away in 2013. The applicant had ap-
plied for a temporary residence permit in 2010, yet a final decision was made 
in 2013 whereby the application was rejected on the basis that her spouse was 
now diseased. Shortly after the applicant was arrested and detained pending 
expulsion. It must be noted that the applicant also had inheritance rights that 
were contented by other relatives of the diseased on the basis, among other 
reasons, that the applicant was bigamous. The Court relied expressly on art-
icle 25 (2) of Law 7(I)/2007 on the retention of the right of residence by fam-
ily members in the event of death or departure of the Union citizen. More im-
portantly, in the second from last paragraph of the judgment it was stated that 
‘the applicant in the specific case, derives rights from Law 7(I)/2007 that im-
plemented [the Directive] and which has superior effect over national law, 
including the Constitution.’ Consequently, it is striking that this otherwise 
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positive conclusion was reached despite the earlier decisions on the matter of 
reverse discrimination81 and which followed the amendment of article 2 of 
Law 7(I)/2007. It is also interesting that Judge Nicolatos emphasised the ap-
plication of the principle of supremacy of EU law, thus seeming to imply that 
the Directive does not permit reverse discrimination, and as such its provi-
sions have overriding effect in relation to conflicting national provisions such 
as article 2 of the Law 7(I)/2007. Unfortunately, this line of reasoning was 
not stated, and we are unable to draw specific conclusions as to whether this 
case marks the departure from the interpretation favouring reverse discrimi-
nation or is a mere misapplication of the preceding provision. The lack of ref-
erence to the concepts of direct effect and indirect effect, as well as to any 
case law of the CJEU is also not helpful in guiding the analysis of this other-
wise significant case. 
On the equally problematic approach to the matter of homosexual couples, 
the Supreme Court also examined the situation by adopting a narrow reading 
to the provisions of the Directive and in isolation from the broader principles 
of EU law. Indicative is the decision in Correia and Or v Republic82 
 This case was a follow-up to Complaint No. 159/2008 examined by the 
Ombudsman and mentioned in paragraph 13.3.2.1. The petitioners, the Cyp-
riot Savvas Savva and his Canadian spouse Thadd Correia, claimed that the 
CMRD letter/reply of 25th July 2008 (stating that Mr Correia was not consid-
ered a family member of a Cypriot citizen because his marriage with Mr Sav-
va in Canada was not recognized by Cypriot legislation) was null and void, 
illegal, and without legal effect, for being contrary to the EU Law, the ECHR, 
as well as art. 15 (right to private life), 22 (right to marry), and 28 (right to 
equal treatment) of the Cyprus Constitution. The petition was rejected on 
procedural grounds,83 mainly because under Cypriot administrative case-law 
the impugned act – the CMRD letter of 25th July 2008 – was held to be of an 
informative nature and not an enforceable act of administration. Nonetheless, 
the Court went on to discuss the merits of the petitioners’ claim (albeit not as 
fully as it would have done had the petition not been dismissed). 
 The Court rejected the arguments of the petitioners and held as follows: a) 
Directive 2004/38/EC and national implementing legislation did not apply to 
EU nationals who wished to reside in an EU Member State of which they 
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were a national, such as Mr Savva who wished to reside in his native Cyprus; 
b) facilitation of entry and residence could take many forms, but did not 
amount to recognition of marriage celebrated abroad; c) there was no ques-
tion of violating art. 22 and 28 of the Constitution since the law in Cyprus did 
not provide for same-sex marriage, but only for marriage between persons of 
different-sex; d) the Strasbourg case-law has not advanced to the point of rul-
ing that non-recognition of same-sex marriage was in violation of the right to 
private and family life; on the contrary, it has acknowledged that the right to 
marry and regulation of same-sex marriage fell within the discretion of the 
ECHR States parties, which could decide on the meaning of marriage in ac-
cordance with their own legislation and social views; the fact that some States 
decided to extent the right to marry to persons of same-sex reflected their 
own views on the role of marriage in their societies and did not give rise to 
any legal principle or interpretation of the Convention that could affect the 
traditional concept of marriage; e) the Strasbourg case-law on the right of 
transsexuals to marry could point to an extension of that right to persons of 
same-sex in the future; f) the Strasbourg jurisprudence on the right of same-
sex couples to private life did not help the petitioners in the instant case; the 
protection of traditional family was a valid ground for justifying distinctions 
in treatment.84 
 This was a narrow reading of the same legal provisions that were con-
strued more liberally by the Ombudsman. Admittedly, the Ombudsman had 
more leeway to make extensive use of non-binding instruments such as the 
relevant PACE recommendations and resolutions of the European Parliament. 
This was among the factors that led to different legal determinations and con-
clusions than the Supreme Court. 
 The legal issues raised in this case were virtually identical to the ones in 
Tadeucci and McCall v Italy,85 which was brought before the Strasbourg 
Court and was pending at the moment of writing. The outcome of this case as 
well as the cases against Greece86 is hopefully expected to influence related 
developments in Cyprus. 
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Interim Conclusion 
The approach of the legislation that intended to implement the Directive has 
been overall satisfactory, but with certain specific problems that are yet to be 
resolved on the basis of a broader reading of the general purposes of the Di-
rective and of the overarching principles of equality and non-discrimination. 
The narrow approach that insists on exploding to the full the margin of dis-
cretion that the Directive allows to Member States in terms of reverse dis-
crimination and also in terms of recognising registered partnerships, remains 
in full force that undermining the full effectiveness of the free movement 
principle. Nonetheless, the relevant case law of the CJEU seems to some de-
gree to allow such a narrow reading, yet the Supreme Court’s approach has 
found it difficult to reach a conclusion as to the matters involved and also 
failed to fully utilise the reasoning of the CJEU. This has been the case due to 
the adopted ‘national interpretative approach’ that sidelined the CJEU’s juris-
prudence as a mere binding authority without elaborating on the full meaning 
of those decisions. Notable in the above respect is the difference in approach 
by the Ombudsman when examining identical issues.  
Question 2 
The implementation of article 7 (1) (a) of the Directive concerning sufficient 
resources is transposed verbatim by article 9 (1) Law 7 (I)/2007.  
 Accordingly, article 9 (1) Law 7 (I)/2007 states that EU citizens who wish 
to stay in Cyprus for more than three months must either be in paid or unpaid 
employment, art. 9 (1); or have sufficient financial means so as not to become 
a burden on the social security system of the country, Art. 9 (1) (a); have a 
comprehensive medical insurance cover in the Republic of Cyprus, 9 (1) (b); 
or be enrolled in a private or educational institution approved by or registered 
with the Government to undertake studies or specialist training courses and 
have full medical insurance and sufficient financial means so that they and 
their family members will not become a burden on the social security system 
of the country, Art. 9 (1) (c); or, finally, be family members accompanying/ 
joining an EU citizen who satisfies the above-mentioned criteria. 
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 Moreover, as Trimiklioniotis summarises the national provisions relating 
to the deprivation of status87: 
‘Article 9(4) of Law 7/2007 provides that a national of a Member State cannot be deprived 
of his/her status as a worker in paid or unpaid employment simply because he/she is no 
longer employed because: he/she is temporarily unable to work as a result of illness or ac-
cident (para. a); or has been registered as involuntarily unemployed after being employed 
for more than 12 months and is classified as a person in search of employment with the 
Department of Labour (para. b). If a worker has been registered as involuntarily unem-
ployed on the basis of a contract for less than one year, or became unemployed within the 
first 12 months (on the basis of testimony to that effect by the Department of Labour), 
he/she retains the status of a worker for not more than six months. The status of a worker 
in paid or unpaid employment is retained if a worker has become involuntarily unem-
ployed and is pursuing a professional education course of study that is relevant to his/her 
previous employment, Art. 9(4)(d). The law provides that it is the Department of Labour 
that will decide whether a worker has been made ‘involuntarily unemployed’ and is ‘in 
search of employment,’ Art. 9(5). However, it should be noted here that it is by no means 
clear how the phrase ‘involuntarily unemployed’ is to be interpreted.’88  
Finally, the competent authority (Social Welfare Services of the Ministry of 
Labour and Social Insurance) will take into consideration the personal situa-
tion of each individual and that type of assessment will not be carried out sys-
tematically (per article 10 (5) of the Law). 
 With reference to the case law applying the preceding provisions, it must 
be noted that there is limited or even no evidence of expulsion decisions be-
ing taken on the ground of non-fulfilment of the conditions imposed by the 
Directive and transposed into national law. Instead, there is a plethora of de-
cisions by the Supreme Court examining the legality of expulsion that result-
ed from the deprival of the status due to public safety reasons89 and/or evi-
dence of marriages of convenience90 and /or public health grounds.91 In this 
respect, the case law is reflective of the traditional issues that have preoccu-
pied the immigration authorities and the majority of the cases come within 
the scope of the Aliens and Immigration Law, Chapter 105 (as amended 
                                                        
87. Trimiklioniotis, op. cit., n. 22, at p. 12. 
88. Ibid. 
89. Borislav Borisov v Republic, Case Number 213/2013, 29.06.2013; Anghel Viorel v 
Republic, Case Number 1064/2012, 02.08.2012; re Marta Ayredin Mohammed, Case 
Number 79/2012, 28.05.2012. 
90. Asif Muhammad and Picioroaga Elena Alexandrina v Republic, Case Number 
6296/2013, 2.12.2013; Abdulkader Majed v Republic, Case Number 1099/2009, 
07.02.2011. 
91. OFU v Republic, Case Number 857/2010, 24.04.2013. 
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by Law 8(I)/2007). Once the case is disconnected from the scope of the Di-
rective due to the lack of legally valid marriage, then the examination of ex-
pulsion comes within normal immigration rules. Article 18 of the Aliens and 
Immigration Law, Chapter 105 (as amended by Law 8(I)/2007) provides 
for a sufficient resources criterion that is by analogy similar to article 9 (1) 
Law 7 (I)/2007 on sufficient resources for persons coming within the scope 
of Directive. It is therefore in this context that analysis of the case law can be 
made, in the absence of decisions on 9 (1) Law 7 (I)/2007 directly. 
 The two important cases where reference was made either directly or indi-
rectly to the criteria for having sufficient financial means are Lien Thi Ha v 
Republic92 and Richard Dugan v Republic.93  
 The applicant was a Vietnamese citizen who arrived in Cyprus in 2008 
with an entry permit in order to be employed as household assistant (au pair) 
and remained legally in the country until marrying a Cypriot citizen in 2010. 
Then, the authorities granted her a temporary residence permit that was re-
newed until 2014. In 2012 the applicant gave birth to and subsequently ap-
plied for family reunification permit in relation to her other three underage 
children residing in Vietnam. The application was rejected in 2011 on the ba-
sis that the financial resources of her spouse were insufficient for providing 
for such an extended family, since the only source of income was the monthly 
salary of €1.340. The applicant proceeded to an action for annulment against 
the administrative decision on the basis that she was currently also employed 
and that the couple had an improved financial status that enabled it, after the 
issuing of the administrative decision, to purchase an apartment in 2012. The 
Court held that the material time is when the administrative decision was tak-
en and also took into account the fact that the applicant calculated in the fami-
ly income the social assistance/benefit that would have been available (Law 
95(Ι)/2006) subject to the arrival of the three children.  
 Two points must be made as to this ruling. Firstly, the decision is unfortu-
nately not examining the scope of application of the Directive since the 
spouse of the applicant is Cypriot and as such excluded, thus raising the re-
verse discrimination problem analysed previously. Secondly, the case is illus-
trative of the approach of the Supreme Court towards the sufficient resources 
criterion by analogy. That means that judicial approach to the provision of 
Article 18 of the Aliens and Immigration Law, Chapter 105 (as amended 
by Law 8(I)/2007) that provides for a sufficient resources criterion is useful 
                                                        
92. Lien Thi Ha v Republic, Case 1023/2011, 20.07.2017.  
93. Richard Dugan v Republic, Case Number 1498/2008, 03.09.2009. 
CYPRUS 
 415 
for establishing an understanding as to the approach of the Court in general 
towards such type of quantitative criteria. This is the case because there are 
no cases on the Directive’s sufficient resources test, partly due to the restric-
tive and exclusionary scope of Law 7 (I)/2007. Since Article 18 of the Aliens 
and Immigration Law, Chapter 105 (as amended by Law 8(I)/2007) is by 
analogy similar to article 9 (1) Law 7 (I)/2007 on sufficient resources for per-
sons coming within the scope of Directive, the judgment above is indirectly 
useful. Hence, it is reasonable to conclude that the Court adopts a narrow 
reading on the meaning of the requirements for sufficient resources with spe-
cific caution towards the availability of the social benefits and the burdening 
of the public purse.  
 In Richard Dugan v Republic,94 the applicant who was a citizen of the 
U.S.A, arrived in Cyprus in June 2000 with his Cypriot wife, whom he mar-
ried in 1989, and their three children. The applicant resided continually in 
Cyprus on the basis of residence permits, the last of which was issued on 
5/8/04 and remained valid until 5/8/09. In the meantime, the applicant and his 
wife filed for divorce which was dully issued in October 2005. Under the 
terms of the divorce, the applicant had certain specific visit rights and speci-
fied contact with the three children. Therefore, the applicant filed to the im-
migration authorities for recognition of residence rights, seeking to rely on 
article 13 of the Directive (duly implemented via article 26 of Law 7 
(I)/2007) that provides for retention of the right of residence in the event that 
there is a court order on the matter of access to a minor child. The application 
was rejected on the basis that Law 7 (I)/2007 is not applicable since the 
spouse of the applicant is Cypriot, thus applying the reverse discrimination 
approach provided for in article 2 of Law 7 (I)/2007. Instead, the application 
should be examined under the Aliens and Immigration Law, Chapter 105 
(as amended). The claimant challenged the legality of the administrative de-
cision and the Supreme Court held that his case falls within the scope of the 
Directive since the preamble of the Directive and the general aims that it pur-
sues could not be taken as to exclude Cypriot citizens. This judgment was de-
livered prior to the amendment in the Law and to the subsequent shift in the 
approach of the Supreme Court. It is nonetheless useful, since the Supreme 
Court (Judge Fotiou) went on to examine whether the applicant had sufficient 
financial resources as required under article 13 of the Directive. The Court 
held that the applicant satisfied the criterion since at the time was paying ali-
mony and half of the tuition fees for the education of the children in a private 
                                                        
94. Richard Dugan v Republic, Case Number 1498/2008, 03.09.2009. 
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school, while at the same time had a documented and steady employment. 
Moreover, the Court considered as important factor the length of duration of 
the marriage.   
 The case is indicative of the willingness to examine the criterion for suffi-
cient resources in an ad hoc manner by taking into account the specific details 
of each case. Important in such consideration seems to be the length of dura-
tion of the marriage. Nonetheless, the case is not strictly speaking dealing 
with expulsion, but since there is lack off specific case law on the matter, the 
methodology applied in the specific case is of indirect interest. Needless to 
say, the same case if examined today would have excluded the applicant from 
the protective scope of the Directive and would have applied the Aliens and 
Immigration Law, Chapter 105. 
 On the administrative level, the interpretation of sufficient means is gov-
erned by the overall objective of preventing the creation of an ‘unreasonable 
burden’ on the social welfare system. Therefore, the issue becomes the ad-
ministrative interpretation of the meaning of ‘sufficient resources’ and the de-
limitation of the starting points where a ‘burden’ arises. Article 4.1(5) of Law 
7(I)/2007 designates the Social Welfare Services as the competent authority 
to determine what constitutes ‘burden on the social assistance system of Cy-
prus’. 
 The European Commission letters of 22.09.2009 and 20.05.2011, which 
had been responded to by the Cypriot government on 27.01.2011 and 
25.07.2011 respectively,95 raised issues regarding the deportation and no-
entry ban under articles 30 and 31 of the free movement Directive. The letters 
that the European Commission addressed to the Cypriot Government claimed 
that although Law 7(I)/2007 correctly transposed the provision of article 7 
and 8 (3) of the Directive, administrative practice deviates from that by re-
quiring that the workers demonstrate certain incomes for themselves and their 
families to recognise their right to residence under art. 7(1). 
 As Trimikliniotis states,96 the prerequisites are set out in the circular is-
sued by the immigration authorities97 which ‘requires a number of formalities 
to ensure that Union citizen applicants are in possession of ‘the appropriate 
                                                        
95. Trimikliniotis., op. cit., n. 22, at p. 1. 
96. Trimiklioniotis, N., ‘Report on the Free Movement of Workers in Cyprus in 2011-
2012’, 2012, available at http://www.google.co.uk/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&frm 
=1&source=web&cd=1&cad=rja&ved=0CCoQFjAA&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.r
u.nl%2Fpublish%2Fpages%2F608499%2Fcyprus_2011-12_def.pdf&ei=CUrvUtS1O 
MmFyAPanIGoCg&usg=AFQjCNH2jIl04IUObjXrHoGlILa_AIfZWQ, at pp. 11-12. 
97. File No. 30/2004/IV, 29.9.2008. 
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means’.’ The circular provides guidelines for the determination of ‘sufficient 
means’ for EU nationals who are not employees, but who state that they have 
sufficient means. The circular lists the following as minimum amounts: €600 
for himself; €400 for his wife; €300 for each child over 12 years old; €200 for 
each child under 12 years old. Pensioners and aged persons must have a bank 
account and statements proving that their pension is paid to them from abroad 
and is banked to their bank account in Cyprus (or statements that they with-
draw money from their bank account abroad through their cards). They must 
also submit a certificate of health insurance and a rental agreement, or a sales 
contract evidencing that they have purchased a place to stay in Cyprus. The 
circular requires that the minimum pension from abroad is at least €600. Union 
citizens who are students and also employed on a part-time basis will not be 
considered workers; their application will be processed on the basis of criteria 
applicable for students.  
 Moreover, in response to the Commission’s concerns, Cypriot authorities 
produced a circular98 which ‘reiterates the content of the law transposing the 
Directive as follows:  
(2) In the case of a worker who is a Union citizen and his/her family, irrespective of their 
nationality, the immigration authorities do not check in any way the sufficiency of their 
means. Registration is granted with the submission of the relevant documents as required 
by the application guidelines MEU1A and MEU2A. 
(3) Notwithstanding the fact that section 10(4)(a) of law 7(I)/2007 does not comply with 
art. 8(3) of Directive 2004/38/EC, in the case of any other than worker Union citizens and 
his/her family, self-employment can be demonstrated by the registration with the Social 
insurance Services or other proof that they are such, e.g. European documents E101/A1’.99  
Accordingly, it has been argued ‘that the guidelines contained in the circular 
regarding the minimum income necessary in order to obtain a Certificate of 
registration was never a condition precedent, but a mere guide. The new cir-
cular, no. 15/2006/III, issued on 18.07.2011, clarifies matters and sets the 
procedure in line with the Directive’.100 Therefore, the European Commission 
in its letter dated 22.3.2012, considered the matter as resolved.  
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Question 3 
The provisions of the Directive (articles 12-15) on the retention of the right of 
residence by family members in the event of death or departure of the Union 
citizen, on the retention of the right of residence by family members in the 
event of divorce, on the annulment of marriage or termination of registered 
partnership, on the retention of the right of residence, and on the procedural 
safeguards, have been transposed effectively in the Cypriot law. In specific, 
Law 7(I)/2007 in articles 25-28 makes provision in verbatim of the respec-
tive provisions of the Directive with two exceptions. Firstly, in relation to art-
icle 13 of the Directive that makes reference also to the termination of a regis-
tered partnership, article 26 of Law 7(I)/2007 excludes such reference. Sec-
ondly, in article 27 (3) Law 7(I)/2007 that transposes article 14 (3) of the Di-
rective, there is an additional reference to reads as follows: ‘An expulsion 
measure shall not be the automatic consequence of a Union citizen’s or his or 
her family member's recourse to the social assistance system of the host 
Member State. The responsible authority shall in such a case examine if this 
is an instance of temporary hardship and take into account the length of time 
of the interested party in the Republic, his personal situation, and the amount 
of assistance that has been granted in order to assess whether the person con-
stitutes an unduly burden for the system of social welfare and then proceed to 
take action for his expulsion’. Two comments must be made. In relation to 
the registered partnerships, the matter has been discussed in the first part of 
this report and it suffices to say that despite the granted discretion to Member 
States on the matter, there remain issues of discrimination. In relation to the 
issue of the provided additional guidelines in connection with the prohibition 
of automatic expulsion due to access to the social welfare system, those act 
positively in ensuring the direction of the discretion granted to the relevant 
authorities of the republic and are therefore welcomed.  
 In terms of relevant case law, most of the cases involve Cypriot citizens 
and such were excluded from the scope of application of the Directive in the 
way analysed previously, while the same applied for cases where marriages 
of convenience were documented101 as well as also in cases involving regis-
tered partnerships.  
 However, specific reference must be made to the very interesting decision 
in Teresa Amayuwon v Republic.102 It must be stated that the decision by 
                                                        
101. Abdulkader Majed v Republic, Case Number 1099/2009, 07.02.2011; Kale Ekema 
Ngomba v Republic, Case Number 5630/2013, 26.07.2013. 
102. Teresa Amayuwon v Republic, Case Number 802/2013. 17.10.2013. 
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Judge Nicolatos in effect applied the protective effect of article 12 the Di-
rective, as implemented by article 25 of Law 7(I)/2007, despite the fact that 
the interested party (a citizen of the Philippines) was the spouse of a deceased 
Cypriot citizen. In effect, the shift in the approach of the Supreme Court, dis-
cussed supra, that applies the principle of exclusion of Cypriots from the 
scope of the Directive, was not applied in this instance. Hence issues about 
consistency of the case law arise. 
 The Court relied expressly on article 25 (2) of Law 7(I)/2007 on the reten-
tion of the right of residence by family members in the event of death or de-
parture of the Union citizen. More importantly, in the second from last para-
graph of the judgment it was stated that ‘the applicant in the specific case, de-
rives rights from Law 7(I)/2007 that implemented [the Directive] and which 
has superior effect over national law, including the Constitution.’ Conse-
quently, it is striking that this otherwise positive conclusion was reached de-
spite the earlier decisions on the matter of reverse discrimination103 and 
which followed the amendment of article 2 of Law 7(I)/2007. It is also inter-
esting that Judge Nicolatos emphasised the application of the principle of su-
premacy of EU law, thus seeming to imply that the Directive does not permit 
reverse discrimination and as such its provisions have overriding effect in re-
lation to conflicting national provisions such as article 2 of the Law 
7(I)/2007. Unfortunately, this line of reasoning was not stated, and we are 
unable to draw specific conclusions as to whether this case marks the depar-
ture from the interpretation favouring reverse discrimination or is a mere mis-
application of the preceding provision. The lack of reference to the concepts 
of direct effect and indirect effect, as well as to any case law of the CJEU is 
also not helpful in guiding the analysis of this otherwise significant case.  
Question 4 
The provisions of the Directive (articles 16-21) relating to the eligibility for 
the right of permanent residence include: the general rule for Union citizens 
and their family members; exemptions for persons no longer working in the 
host Member State and their family members; acquisition of the right of per-
manent residence by certain family members who are not nationals of a 
Member State; documentation certifying permanent residence for Union citi-
zens; permanent residence card for family members who are not nationals of 
                                                        
103. Majed v Republic, Case Number 1099/09, 7.2.2011; Case 170/2011, Irina Levacheva v 
Republic, 15 April 2013.  
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a Member State; continuity of residence. These provisions have been trans-
posed effectively in the Cypriot law. In specific, Law 7(I)/2007 in articles 
14-19 makes provision in verbatim of the respective provisions of the Di-
rective with certain minor exceptions. In article 17 (1) (c) of the Directive 
reference is being made to ‘workers or self-employed persons who, after 
three years of continuous employment and residence in the host Member 
State, work in an employed or self-employed capacity in another Member 
State, while retaining their place of residence in the host Member State, to 
which they return, as a rule, each day or at least once a week’. The last refer-
ence to ‘each day or at least once a week’ has been implemented by article 15 
(1) (c) Law 7(I)/2007 by excluding the ‘each day’ part. In article 17 (2) Di-
rective reference is being made to ‘the conditions as to length of residence 
and employment laid down in point (a) of paragraph 1 and the condition as to 
length of residence laid down in point (b) of paragraph 1 shall not apply if the 
worker's or the self-employed person's spouse or partner as referred to in 
point 2(b) of Article 2 is a national of the host Member State or has lost the 
nationality of that Member State by marriage to that worker or self-employed 
person’. The key point of difference is the omission in article 15 (3) Law 
7(I)/2007 of the term ‘partner’, while the terminology used is also gender 
problematic. In specific, the provision reads ‘the conditions as to length of 
residence and employment ... and the condition as to length of residence ... 
shall not apply if the worker's or the self-employed person's wife is a national 
of the Republic or has lost the nationality by her marriage to that worker or 
self-employed person’ (emphasis added). Therefore, the provision seems to 
imply that it applies only in relation to the female gender, whereas the Greek 
version of the Directive expressly includes both genders. Moreover, articles 
17 and 18 Law 7(I)/2007 adopt a specific procedure for applicants whereby 
they shall apply for the permanent residence document and for the permanent 
residence card in conjunction with a payment of 20 euro in each case. In addi-
tion, in article 18 (2) Law 7(I)/2007 imposes a penalty of up to 1500 Cypriot 
pounds (to be estimated now in euros) for failing to comply with the require-
ment to apply for a permanent residence card. 
 In analysing the above provisions, reference can be made first to the Euro-
pean Commission’s warning letter to the Republic of Cyprus where it was 
stated that although the Directive articles 16 and 19 were properly transposed 
through Law 7(I)/2007, the applied administrative practice seemed to be fol-
lowing a different approach. It was stated that applicants for status of perma-
nent resident were required by form ‘MEU3’ to present bank statements and 
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utility bills for the period of five years prior to the application. This has been 
argued104 amounts to breach of article 21 of the Directive where it is stated 
that ‘continuity of residence may be attested by any means of proof in use in 
the host Member State’, since ‘any means’ can not be construed as requiring 
such specific documentation. Therefore, the Cypriot government issued a cir-
cular (18.06.2011) where it is clarified that the list of documents included in 
the MEU3 form is merely indicative and does not exclude any other docu-
ments not mentioned therein.  
 In addition, concerned was expressed by the European Commission about 
the administrative fee of 34,17 € required that was found to be in breach of 
article 25 (2) Directive and also discriminatory since the analogous fee for Cyp-
riots applying for identity cards was merely 5 Cypriot pounds (around 3.4 €). 
The Cypriot government rejected this argument by stating that the charge is 
not exceeding the charge for Cypriot applying for the issuing of similar doc-
uments that is beyond identity cards.105  
 Finally, an interesting complaint had been cited by the European Commis-
sion.106 That concerned a British national who had been asked to submit 
proof of a deposit in a Cypriot bank of the sum of €12,000 which, in the Euro-
pean Commission’s opinion, was in breach of Directive article 16; the said 
complainant was not issued with the document certifying permanent resi-
dence foreseen in Directive article 19. In its response dated 27.02.2011 the 
Cypriot government stated that a bank deposit of any amount is not obliga-
tory, but did not dispute the complainant’s allegations. The Cypriot govern-
ment responded that the said complainant never applied for permanent resi-
dence and was never required to present evidence of a deposit in relation to 
that; the deposit of €12,000 was required as evidence of having sufficient 
means to support himself for the purposes of his application for a residence 
permit dated 14.06.2006.6 In any case, his application for a residence permit 
was never examined and the complainant was issued a registration certificate 
on the same day he applied (16.03.2011).107 
 In terms of relevant data, the latest published statistics108 available are for 
2010 and there it is stated that 21,727 applications for registration have been 
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filed, 1967 applications for document of permanent residence for Union citi-
zen, and 37 applications for permanent residence cards. 
 In terms of case law, no noteworthy reference can be made to any case on 
the preceding matters. 
Question 5 
The provision of article 24 (2) of the Directive stating that ‘the host Member 
State shall not be obliged to confer entitlement to social assistance during the 
first three months of residence or, where appropriate, the longer period pro-
vided for in article 14(4)(b), nor shall it be obliged, prior to acquisition of the 
right of permanent residence, to grant maintenance aid for studies, including 
vocational training, consisting in student grants or student loans to persons 
other than workers, self-employed persons, persons who retain such status, 
and members of their families’, has been transposed in article 22 (2) Law 
7(I)/2007 in verbatim. Moreover, an addition subparagraph has been added 
(article 22 (3) Law 7(I)/2007) stating that the provisions on equal treatment 
and the relevant derogation are applied only in relation to European Union 
citizens and to their family members that are residing in the areas under the 
effective control of the Republic. The rationale for this approach has already 
been explained in the introductory part of the report and the response to ques-
tion 1.  
 As to the matter of relating the non-discrimination derogation with the 
category of jobseekers seeking allowance, the background must be examined. 
In general, jobseekers are obliged to register at the district job-seeking bureau 
and then register at the district social security office. This applies equally to 
Cypriots and other EU citizens. There has been no noteworthy case law on 
the status of Union citizens who are jobseekers in Cyprus, as well as those re-
quiring public assistance. Trimikliniotis109 correctly argues that in practice 
there seems to be a proper application of the Antonissen criteria.110 It is posi-
tive that according to statistical analysis and research by Trimikliniotis,111 
there has been ‘no information, or any report or complaint about the deporta-
tion of EU citizen who is a job-seeker in Cyprus: such rather drastic measures 
of requiring from an EU citizen to leave the territory of that Cyprus (subject 
to appeal) for failing to find employment there after six months has not been 
                                                        
109. Trimikliniotis, op.cit., n. 96, at p. 6.  
110. Case C-292/89, The Queen v Immigration Appeal Tribunal, ex parte Gustaff Desider-
ius Antonissen. 
111. Trimikliniotis, op.cit., n. 96, at p. 6. 
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used in Cyprus. The policy paper/ memorandum regarding job-seekers who 
are EU citizens in Cyprus (issued in late 2009) is in operation since the be-
ginning of 2010’.  
 With reference now to the ‘real link’ approach in the context of jobseek-
ers, the relevant approach as adopted in Case C-258/04 Office national de 
l’emploi v Ioannis Ioannidis/ Case C-138/02 Brian Francis Collins v Sec-
retary of State for Work and Pensions and in Joined Cases C-22/08 and 
C-23/08 Athanasios Vatsouras and Josif Koupatantze V Arbeitsgemein-
schaft, it is analysed below.  
 The issues related to the cases of Ioannides and Collins was put before the 
Cypriot Social Security officers in personal interviews by Trimikliniotis.112 Ac-
cording to the interviewer, they were invited to comment on the necessary 
distinction between such cases concerning the provision of ‘job seekers al-
lowance’, which is of a non-contributory provision type, and the equality 
derogation.113 It must first be clarified that in Cyprus unemployment benefit 
is based on contributions, therefore the argument by the officers was that the 
two cannot be compared.114 This is unsatisfactory and overly formalistic 
since the established general principle must influence the approach to the 
provision of non-contributory benefits. 
 More importantly, the Cypriot Equality Body examined the matter in rela-
tion to the receipt of public assistance for health reasons, which is by analogy 
indicative of the applicable situation to European Union citizens requiring 
public assistance that includes jobseekers’ allowance.115 The findings are elo-
quently summarised by Trimkliniotis and are as such cited and relied upon 
below.116 
 A complaint was registered by an 18-year-old Greek citizen suffering 
from severe leukaemia against the Social Welfare Service, which had decided 
to discontinue the claimant’s social assistance benefit for treatment received 
until May 2007. The Union citizen had been resident in Cyprus with his par-
ents since 2002 and had been granted a ‘visitor’ indefinite leave to remain 
and was in receipt of public assistance since 2005 for humanitarian reasons, 
despite initial rejection due to his ‘visitor’ status. In October 2006, the com-
plainant and his mother’s residence status was changed to that a family mem-
                                                        
112. Trimikliniotis, op.cit., n. 96, at p. 37. 
113. Ibid. 
114. Ibid. 
115. Mezeridis Compalint, AKP 70/2007, issued on 24 March 2008.  
116. Trimikliniotis, op.cit., n. 96, at p. 37. Note that the relevant subsection section relies 
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ber of a Union citizen based on the law on free movement of workers. The 
Social Welfare Service decided to discontinue the public assistance on the 
grounds that he was not allowed assistance as his residence status was that of 
a dependent of his mother, who is a Union citizen with a residence permit for 
reasons of employment activity. According to the Report of the Cyprus 
Equality Body,117 this specific circular has wider application in similar pur-
poses and distinguishes between Union and Cypriot citizens based on Law 
7(I)/2007 and the Law on Public Assistance 95(I)/2006: ‘the provision of 
law on Public Assistance 95(I)/2006, makes a distinction between the rights 
of Union citizens and citizens of the Republic of Cyprus, and article 12(1)(a) 
of the law for exemption from the responsibility for the maintenance of a dis-
abled child in not applied in the cases of Union citizens.’118  
 The reasoning is based on the logic that the granting of residence is prem-
ised on the proof that the complainant’s mother is in possession of ‘sufficient 
means for the maintenance of her family.’119 The Director of the Social Wel-
fare Service erroneously suggested that a precondition for granting the free 
movement rights under article 9(1)(b) of Law 7(I)/2007 is that they are not con-
sidered to be ‘unreasonable burden on the social assistance system of Cyprus’ 
(AKP 70/2007, p. 4).120 Moreover, the Director went on, again erroneously, 
to comment that the right of residence is dependent on being in possession of 
sufficient means.’121 The Cypriot Equality Body, after analysing the relevant 
legal framework, determined that ‘the Director of the Social Welfare Service 
had wrongly interpreted and applied the law on the following grounds: the 
Directive and the respective Cypriot law transposing the Directive do not 
make the exercise of the primary right of free movement, residence and work 
dependent upon sufficient means to avoid burdening the national social wel-
fare system; the Directive explicitly sets out the principle of non-discrimina-
tion on the grounds of nationality; the right to free movement is a right adja-
cent to the exercise of a professional/economic activity in the EU that has 
been settled at treaty level. This is done in a manner that is broad in scope, 
lucid and direct and the exercise of this right is a condition precedent to the 
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exercise of any professional activity in the host country (AKP 70/2007, p. 
12)’.122  
 Central to the finding of the Cypriot Equality Body is the principle of 
equal treatment under section 22 of Law 7(I)/2007, considering the discrimi-
nation by the Social Welfare Service as unreasonable. The Equality Body re-
ferred to the broad principles of paragraphs 16, 20, and 21 of the Directive 
preamble as well as to a number of cases before the Court of the European 
Communities, such as Martinez Sala C-85/96, Rudy Grzelczyl C-184/99 as 
well as D’ Hoop C-224/98. Moreover, the Equality Body went on to further 
to clarify two legal issues that also have a bearing on the residence rights of 
jobseekers: ‘(1) All administrative formalities for the exercise of free move-
ment and residence of Union citizens and their families for a period more 
than three months are set out exhaustively in the law and the Directive. It is 
clear that their primary residence stay is not dependent on the existence of 
sufficient means, as is the case with students or pensioners, for instance; (2) it 
must be clarified that the competent authority for such issues is the Civil Reg-
istry and Migration Department, and not the Social Welfare Service; however 
in the case of Union citizens, such as the one above, the granting of the per-
mit provided has but an identification and evidential value’.123  
 As for the right of Union citizens to public assistance, ‘the non-discrimina-
tion principle as set out in article 22 of the law is of paramount importance 
and recommends that the authorities restore the public assistance benefit to 
the complainant and withdraw the relevant circular issued. The Social Wel-
fare Service has complied with the recommendation’.124 It is therefore rea-
sonable to infer that by analogy the same principles must apply to jobseekers, 
yet the practice of the administrative authorities is not conclusive on the mat-
ter.  
 It is not clear how long jobseekers may stay without complying with for-
malities; presumably indefinitely so long as they do not seek recourse to pub-
lic funds. There has been no case law to test whether the Ioannidis/ Collins 
type of social assistance benefits would be allowed.125  
 The question of how Cypriot authorities enable access to public assistance 
by job-seekers cannot be answered in clear terms. As Trimikliniotis argues, 
‘the Vatsouras/Koupatantze cases may be illuminating in clarifying possible 
confusion in the practices by Cypriot authorities: work which had lasted bare-
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ly more than one month was considered to be professional activity, following 
an overall assessment of the employment relationship, which may be consid-
ered by the national authorities as real and genuine, thereby allowing its hold-
er to be granted the status of ‘worker’ within the meaning of article 39 EC. 
The issue of access to work and benefits after 3 months for work seekers has 
not been tested in Cypriot courts. It is not clear how long jobseekers may stay 
without complying with formalities; presumably indefinitely so long as they 
do not seek recourse to public funds. Social security officers claim that the 
principles do not really have bearing on contributory unemployment benefit, 
as these refer to general public benefits provisions to jobseekers’.126  
 The Cyprus equality is examining this type of complaints, whereas in the 
case law of the Supreme Court no reference has been made to the guiding 
cases of the CJEU while there was also no decision to date that focused in the 
matter of the equality derogation. 
Question 6 
The provisions of the Directive (articles 27-33) on the restrictions on the right 
of entry and the right of residence on grounds of public policy, public security, 
or public health have been transposed effectively in the Cypriot law. In spe-
cific, Law 7(I)/2007 in articles 29-35 makes provision effectively in verbatim 
of the respective provisions of the Directive. 
 In applying the relevant provisions in the case law, the Supreme Court has 
yet to make reference to the 2009 Commission’s guidelines on the implemen-
tation of the Directive.127 Moreover, the case law on the matter is scarce and 
often not addressing the issue directly. In general, the Supreme Court applied 
vigorously the principle of proportionality when reviewing administrative de-
cisions, yet in relation to the expulsion decisions the application of the test 
seems to be deferential to the discretion of the decision-making body and lim-
ited to an effective review of power to make such a decisions on the basis of 
the factual evidence that is used for classifying the subject of such orders as 
dangerous within the meaning of protection of the public interest in general. 
In such a context, the emphasis is also placed on whether the expulsion re-
spects the fundamental rights. Interestingly, the latter is almost exclusively 
done in relation to article 8 ECHR, and not (yet) with the EU Charter of Fun-
damental Rights, at least in a manner that has a practical effect for the out-
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come of the review. Finally, the relevant general background is formed by the 
three umbrella considerations that impact upon the application of the Di-
rective, namely the reverse discrimination principle, the marriages of conven-
ience and the exclusion of registered partnerships. The combined effect is that 
not many cases remain to be examined under the provisions of articles 27-33 
of the Directive and most cases are therefore within the scope of the Aliens 
and Immigration Law, Chapter 105 (as amended). 
 The decision in Anghel Vorel v Republic128 is characteristic of the judi-
cial approach. The applicant, a Romanian citizen, remained in Cyprus since 
1991 and married a Romanian citizen in 1993. They have a child, born in 
2001 that attends school in Cyprus. Since May 2007 the applicant obtained a 
residence permit and remained lawfully in Cyprus. On the 1st July 2012 the 
applicant was arrested and ten days later was deported on grounds of public 
safety. The applicant had no criminal record; had no prior conviction, and no 
criminal proceedings were pending against him.  
 It is important to firstly examine the argumentation used by the applicant’s 
lawyer in the ex parte proceedings. There, reference was made to article 45 of 
the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights: ‘Every citizen of the Union has the 
right to move and reside freely within the territory of the Member States’. 
The Court acknowledged that the right is of fundamental importance and is 
subject to article 52 EU Charter, thus any limitation to the right must be pro-
vided by law and must be proportionate. 
 The lawyer of the applicant also argued that the provision in article 29 of 
Law 7(I)/2007 that expressly provides that the limitations on the exercise of 
the right of free movement must be construed with reference to the principle 
of proportionality. Specifically, any limitation must be proportionate, must be 
founded exclusively on the personal conduct of the affected party, and must 
constitute a real, present and sufficiently serious threat against the essential 
interest of the society. It was argued that the lack of any prior criminal con-
victions on itself was adequate reason for finding the administrative provision 
disproportionate since in article 29 (3) (b) Law 7(I)/2007 reference is made 
to the fact that even prior convictions should not be seen as adequate reason 
for expulsion. Moreover, the applicant was deported on the basis of an order 
by the Attorney General, while the other arrested parties involved in the same 
case, who were all Cypriot citizens, were released. Finally, the procedural 
guarantees provided for in article 33 of Law 7(I)/2007 were also not com-
plied with. 
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 The Supreme Court held that the procedural and substantive guarantees 
were not complied with and ordered the suspension of the order that prevent-
ed the applicant from re-entering into Cyprus. However, the Court failed to 
examine in detail the arguments relating to the application of proportionality, 
since in just one paragraph there was confirmation of the non compliance 
with proportionality. In addition, the Court failed to assess the issue of the 
scope of article 52 of the EU Charter. Nonetheless, the Court illustrated that 
in cases of clear and undisputed violation of the essence of proportionality it 
is willing to enforce in a strict manner the principle and with a strong will-
ingness to apply an intense level of judicial scrutiny.  
 The same sensitivity and subsequent carefully protective approach was 
applied by the Court in the case of OFU v Republic,129 this time in relation 
to an administrative decision based on the ground of protecting the public 
health. The case concerned a Nigerian national that first entered into Cyprus 
illegally and subsequently applied for political asylum, while at the same time 
notifying the authorities that he was diagnosed with Hepatitis B. Some time 
afterwards, the applicant married a Latvian citizen already living in Cyprus 
and applied for a permanent residence card, with the immigration authorities 
rejecting his application on the sole ground of being a threat to public health. 
The Supreme Court examined the action for annulment of the applicant on 
the basis of the principle of equality and not proportionality, yet the finding of 
the Court was that a less drastic approach was applied in relation to Cypriot 
citizens, hence the adoption of a negatively differential treatment against the 
applicant would be violating the principle of non discrimination on the 
grounds of nationality. The legal basis that the Supreme Court referred to was 
article 22 of Law 7(I)/2007 and article 18 of the TFEU. Moreover, the Court 
relied on the precedent of Leonie Marlyse Yombia Ngassam v Republic130 
where it was held that in relation to a citizen of a third country who applied 
for political asylum and was HIV/Aids positive, the reference by the adminis-
trative authorities to that medical fact as a ground for deporting the applicant 
amounted to unlawful discrimination. Therefore, in that case the basis was 
article 6 (1) (c) of the Aliens and Immigration Law, Chapter 105 (as 
amended), since there was no element of EU law involved. In the case of 
OFU v Republic,131 the Court held that the expulsion of an individual on the 
sole ground that he is diagnosed with Hepatitis B amounts to ‘breach of the 
principle of equality, either within the framework of article 6 (1) (c) of the 
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Aliens and Immigration Law, Chapter 105 (as amended) or the frame-
work of article 29 (1) of Law 7(I)/2007’. 
 In conclusion, the Supreme Court has shown that in cases of clear and un-
disputed violation of the essence of proportionality and/or equality, it is will-
ing to enforce in a strict manner the principles and with a strong willingness 
to apply an intense level of judicial scrutiny. In so doing, the Court seems to 
be taking into account, at least in an indirect manner, considerations such as 
how long the individual concerned has resided on its territory, the state of 
health, the stability of the family, and the employment status as well as the 
consequent economic situation of the affected party. The approach of the 
Court is certain cases theoretically and methodologically unstable since the 
principle of proportionality has not been applied in a structurally rigid manner 
as regards its components, while the use of the principle of equality seems to 
be substituting the provided criteria to be found in the Directive and which 
refer to proportionality as the yardstick. Needless to say, these concerns are of 
secondary value as long as the approach of the Court remains focused on 
safeguarding the intensity of review of the administrative actions in this field.  
 However, there are also examples where the Supreme Court failed to ap-
ply the same vigorous standard of review in the same context, thus illustrating 
an inconsistency in approach that does not make the analysis of the jurispru-
dence any easier, especially when there are no significant differences between 
cases being approached differently. 
 In Krisztian Bekefi v Republic132 the Supreme Court examined in ex 
parte proceedings the application by a Hungarian citizen that was deported as 
a threat to public order in accordance with article 29 of Law 7(I)/2007 while 
it was also prohibited to the applicant to return to Cyprus in the next 10 years. 
The evidence on which the decision was based were provided by the police 
authorities and were in effect an amalgam of suspicions and information pro-
vided to the police that created a basis for understanding that the applicant 
was involved in organised crime. There was neither a documented complaint 
filed against the applicant, nor were there any pending criminal proceedings. 
The argument put forward by the applicant was founded on article 29 of Law 
7(I)/2007 and on the disproportionate nature of the measures adopted against 
him as well as on the failure of the authorities to take into account the factors 
provided for in article 30 Law 7(I)/2007 that refer to considerations such as 
how long the individual concerned has resided on its territory, his/her age, 
state of health, family and economic situation, social and cultural integration 
                                                        
132. Krisztian Bekefi v Republic, Case Number 293/2012, 07.03.2012. 
CONSTANTINOS KOMBOS 
  430 
into the host Member State, and the extent of his/her links with the country of 
origin. The Court relied on the earlier case of Eddine v Δημοκρατίας133 
where it was held that ‘the deportation order, especially, in cases where pub-
lic ordered is affected, does not have a punitive character but is rather an ex-
pression of state sovereignty. The presence of the affected party is not neces-
sary during relevant proceedings, since the procedure can be limited to the 
written testimony that has been filed to the authorities. There is no breach of 
the principle of good administration’. On this basis, the Court concluded that 
no irreparable harm would be suffered until the examination of the merits of 
the case, thus making no comment or assessment of the principle of propor-
tionality. When the substance of the case was examined in Krisztian Bekefi 
v Republic134 the Court found in favour of the applicants on procedural 
grounds relating to the revocation of the expulsion order due to procedural 
fault and without reference to proportionality. Relevant in that respect is the 
earlier judgment in Slevoslav Stoyanov v Republic,135 where in identical 
facts concerning a Bulgarian citizen the Court held that the central issue was 
whether the revocation of the deportation order, due to erroneous reliance of 
it on the Aliens and Immigration Law, Chapter 105 (as amended) instead 
of Law 7(I)/2007, caused irreparable harm to the applicant of a kind that 
would enable him to continue with his legal challenge against the administra-
tive decision that has now been revoked and substituted with a new deporta-
tion order that was based on the correct legal basis of Law 7(I)/2007. The is-
sue or proportionality was not discussed in the judgment while the Court also 
rejected the claim of the applicant that he was unlawfully deprived of his lib-
erty since the procedurally faulty deportation order was later replaced with a 
procedurally complete deportation order. Alas, no examination if the propor-
tionality of either of the deportation orders was made, with the Court taking 
for granted that the assessment by the authorities of the applicant as a threat 
to public order was in effect supported by evidence that were a collection of 
suspisions by the police authorities.  
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EU citizenship beyond Directive 2004/38/EC – exploring national 
application of primary EU law 
Question 7 
It must be stated from the outset the jurisprudence on the issues covered by 
the question is minimal, yet the relevant issues are effectively the supporting 
rationale in relation to the reverse discrimination approach that is applied to-
wards Cypriot citizens by excluding them from the scope of the Directive. 
Therefore the preceding analysis to be found in the first and second sections 
of this report is directly relevant. Nonetheless, reference can be made to the 
decision in Sari Tekin ν. Republic,136 where Judge Konstantinides held that 
‘The matter of the right of residence of a third country national that is the 
spouse of a Cypriot citizen is a matter that comes within the scope of the reg-
ulation of the internal state of affairs of a Member State of the Union ... It has 
no community element and the question as to whether such internal regula-
tions violate other principles is a different matter ... The Law does not create 
such a right of residence as it expressly states in articles 4 and 15 that it con-
cerns the right to free movement and residence in the Republic ... It requires 
movement of such citizen to Cyprus and it does not concern Cypriots and 
their right to reside in his country. In accordance, that approach is extended to 
the family members of such a citizen, but dependent on the existence of a 
right by the Union citizen ... Since there is no movement by the Union citi-
zen, there can be no independent right of residence of the members of his/her 
family’ (emphasis added).137  
 The case law as regards the reverse discrimination approach seems to be 
partly founded on the reasoning that sees the non-movement of the Cypriot 
citizen as transforming the situation into a purely domestic one. Nonetheless, 
the inconsistency in the relevant case law combined with the lack of any fur-
ther and elaborated use of the rationale of Sari Tekin ν. Republic,138 lead to 
the conclusion that the issue has not been fully examined in the Cypriot con-
text. Further evidence to that can be found in the lack of any reference and 
discussion of the CJEU’s case law (e.g. Chen, Ruiz Zambrano, and sub-
sequent decisions) and in the rarity of invocation of Articles 20 and/or 21 
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TFEU in cases involving free movement as defined by Directive 2004/38. A 
possible and rare example where reference to EU primary law has been relied 
upon by the Supreme Court can be found in in the case of OFU v Repub-
lic.139 The Supreme Court examined the action for annulment of the applicant 
on the basis of the principle of equality and not proportionality, yet the find-
ing of the Court was that a less drastic approach was applied in relation to 
Cypriot citizens, hence the adoption of a negatively differential treatment 
against the applicant would be violating the principle of non discrimination 
on the grounds of nationality. The legal basis that the Supreme Court referred 
to was article 22 of Law 7(I)/2007 and article 18 of the TFEU.  
Question 8 
In the Cypriot legal order, the issue of acquisition and/or loss of the Cypriot 
citizenship are governed primarily by article 113 of Law 141(Ι)/02 that 
states:  
‘(1)  Citizen of the Republic who is citizen following registration or naturalized person 
shall cease to be a citizen of the Republic if deprived of citizenship by decree of the Coun-
cil of Ministers issued pursuant to this article. 
(2) Subject to the provisions of this article, the Council of Ministers may by decree deprive 
any such citizen of the acquired Cypriot citizenship if it is satisfied that that the acquisition 
of citizenship was based on deception, false representation or concealment of any material 
fact. 
(3)        ....... 
(4)        ...... 
(5) The Council of Minister does not deprive any person of his capacity as a citizen under 
this article unless satisfied that condition is not conducive to the public interest as that per-
son continues to be a citizen of the Republic’ (translation by the author).’ 
Therefore, the issue of automatic loss of the EU citizenship is not covered by 
the preceding legislation, while in the case law no such connection has been 
made despite the fact that in two cases the Supreme Court dealt with the loss 
of Cypriot citizenship in the immediate aftermath of the Rottmann judgment.  
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 In specific, the first case was Hussein Alí Assaf v Republic140 (6.5.2010) 
that concerned a Lebanese citizen that acquired the Cypriot citizenship after 
creating a company that never had any activities and after marrying a Cypriot 
citizen whom she later divorced due to a parallel affair with another woman. 
The authorities proceeded to recommend to the Council of Ministers to re-
voke the granted Cypriot citizenship due to the fact that that the acquisition of 
citizenship was based on deception, false representation, or concealment of 
any material fact. The Council of Ministers issued such a decree in July 2006 
and the applicant sought annulment of the relevant decision primarily for lack 
of adequate justification. The Supreme Court found in favor of the applicant 
and rejected the claim of the Government that the decree was a non reviewa-
ble act of government (prerogative power) and not an administrative decision 
that could be reviewed. Nonetheless, in the proceedings no reference was 
made to the impact that the loss of the Cypriot citizenship had on the status of 
the applicant as EU citizen, nor was any reference made to the CJEU decision 
in Rottmann.  
 In the subsequent case of Matry v Republic141 (20.09.2011) in a relative-
ly similar factual situation that concerned an Egyptian citizen, the Supreme 
Court followed Hussein Alí Assaf v Republic, but found that adequate justi-
fication was given in specific case. Moreover, once again no reference was 
made to the impact that the loss of the Cypriot citizenship had on the status of 
the applicant as EU citizen, nor was any reference made to the CJEU decision 
in Rottmann.  
 It is necessary to clarify that the Supreme Court relies on the arguments 
presented before it by the parties and if the parties failed to raise the Rott-
mann paradigm, then the Supreme Court’s obligation to consider it in its 
judgment is minimized. It is submitted that this reasoning is unsatisfactory 
given the immensity of the significance of Rottmann and the rarity of such 
cases arising; a miss opportunity has in effect passed.  
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Political rights of EU citizens 
Question 9 
Directive 93/109/EC on European Parliament elections has been transposed 
by the Law Concerning the Election of the Members of the European Parlia-
ment of 2004 (Law 10(I)/2004) as amended by 202(I)/2004, 207(I)/2004, 
13(I)/2009, 144(I)/2013.  
 The law came into force upon the accession of the Republic to the EU. 
 In terms of the right to vote, article 4 states: ‘Right to vote in the elections 
to the European Parliament have all the citizens of the Republic, and all the 
nationals of another Member State who reside in the Republic, who on the 
reference day are eighteen-years old and had been resident in the Republic for 
a period of six months immediately before the day of acquisition of electoral 
qualifications, as defined in paragraph (7) of article 101 of the Civil Registry 
Law. It is understood that for the purposes of this Law, the requirement for 
six-month residence in the Republic before the time of acquisition of electoral 
qualifications is met if a citizen of the Republic or a national of another 
Member State was habitually resident for an equivalent time in any other 
Member State, provided that on the date of entry in the special electoral regis-
ters for voters and Community voters, as the case may be, is residing in Cy-
prus’. 
 Moreover, article 5 (1) states that ‘The Community voters exercise their 
right to vote either in the Republic or in the Member State of origin’, while 
article 6 states ‘The voters and the Community voters who have not been de-
prived of the right to vote under the article 7 of this Law, are registered in ac-
cordance with the provisions of Part III of the present Law, in the respective 
special electoral registers provided for in the said Part’. In addition, article 8 (1) 
states ‘The voters and the Community voters are registered in special elec-
toral registers for voters and Community voters, respectively, that are pre-
pared and completed for the purposes of this Law by the Civil Registry and 
Migration Department in accordance with the procedure laid down in the 
Civil Registry Law, mutatis mutandis, and in accordance with the provisions 
of article 9 of this Law, in order to include all the voters and Community vot-




 With reference to Cypriot voters, article 9 (1) states: 
‘The Civil Registry and Migration Department enters in the special electoral register for 
voters: 
(a) Each voter who on the date of publication of this Law in the Official Gazette of the Re-
public, is registered in the permanent electoral register under the Civil Registry Law, 
and 
(b) every other citizen of the Republic who has the right to vote under Article 4 of this 
Law, and who presents himself to the Electoral Register Services at the offices of the 
District Administrations, and submits in a form specified by the Minister a formal 
statement in order to be entered into the special electoral register for voters concerting 
the fact that he/ she meets the terms and conditions for registration as set out in Article 
4 of this Law.’ 
With reference to Community voters article 9 (1)-(3) provide that ‘The Civil 
Registry and Migration Department registers in the special electoral register 
for Community voters each Community voter having the right to vote under 
Article 4 of this Law, who wishes to exercise the said right in the Republic 
and presents to the Electoral Register Services at the offices of the District 
Administrations an ID card issued by the authorities of the Republic, or a val-
id passport or a valid ID card issued by the authorities of the Member State of 
which the Community voter is a citizen, and/ or Registration Certificate of a 
Union citizen concerning himself, and submits a statement in which he/ she 
declares the following: 
(i) citizenship; 
(ii) that he/ she has not been deprived of the right to vote in the Member State of origin; 
(iii) if applicable, the last electoral register, in which he/ she has been entered in the 
Member State of origin; 
(iv) address of permanent residence in the Republic; 
(v) the date from which he/ she resides in the Republic or in another Member State; 
(vi) that he/ she will exercise the right to vote only in the Republic. 
 
(3) Voters and Community voters who acquire the right to vote submit within thirty days 
from the date of acquisition of their voting rights an application to the respective Dis-
trict officer in order to be entered into the special electoral registers for voters or for 
Community voters, as the case may be, subject to the provisions of paragraphs (1) 
and (2) of the present article. 
It is understood that voters and Community voters who acquire their right to 
vote in the elections to the European Parliament due to completion of the 
eighteenth year of age on the reference date may submit the application for 
registration in the electoral registers before that day, but not later than the day 
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immediately preceding the date of the preparing of the respective special 
electoral register’. 
 As regards the right to stand and the documentation required, article 13 
imposes the same conditions for Cypriots and Community voters.  
 Overall; the effect of the implementation process has been satisfactory. 
There is question mark as to whether additional burdening conditions are im-
posed on EU citizens compared to national citizens in terms of special regis-
tration or residence requirements. This is the case since in practice Cypriot 
voters are in some cases automatically registered if they are already registered 
as voters in other elections despite the provision in the legislation for a spe-
cial procedure. It has not been possible to confirm that the same applies 
equally to EU citizens given the practical obstacles arising from the possibil-
ity of them exercising their electoral rights in their country of origin. 
 No relevant case law in domestic courts can be found, while Law 
144(I)/2013 amended Law 10(I)/2004 in order to implement Directive 
2013/1/EE. Finally, it must be noted that at the tie of writing there is pending 
draft law that will permit the automatic registration of Turkish-Cypriots 
(95;000) to the electoral catalogue for the forthcoming elections, thus facili-
tating the opportunity to participate in the elections without requiring special 
registration procedures.  
Question 10 
Law 98(I)/2004 has been adopted in order to implement the provisions of 
Directive 94/80/EC and entered into force upon the accession of the Repub-
lic to the EU. 
 Article 3 of the Law extends the right to vote in local elections to all the 
nationals of another Member State who reside in the Republic, who on the 
reference day are eighteen-years old; and had been resident in the Republic 
for a period of six months immediately before the day of acquisition of elec-
toral qualifications, as defined in paragraph (7) of article 101 of the Civil 
Registry Law. It is understood that for the purposes of this Law, the require-
ment for six-month residence in the Republic before the time of acquisition of 
electoral qualifications is met if a citizen of the Republic or a national of an-
other Member State was habitually resident for an equivalent time in any oth-
er Member State, provided that on the date of entry in the special electoral 
registers for voters and Community voters, as the case may be, is residing in 
Cyprus. The provisions of Law 98(I)/2004 are directly analogous to those of 
Law 10(I)/2004 regarding elections to the European Parliament and in addi-
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tion permit the election to office without restrictions others than those that 
apply to Cypriots. No relevant case law in domestic courts can be found. 
Question 11 
In Cyprus, elections are organized with regard to the following bodies: presi-
dential, House of Representatives, Municipal; and European. Elective rights 
for the municipal and European elections are on the basis of residence, re-
gardless of the nationality of the person involved. On the other hand, partici-
pation in the national presidential and House of Representatives elections is 
subject to the possession of Cypriot nationality.  
Question 12 
According to the Cypriot Constitution, the limitations for standing for presi-
dent are provided for in article 40 and include that he/she ‘has not been, on or 
after the date of the coming into operation of this] Constitution, convicted of 
an offence involving dishonesty or moral turpitude or is not under any dis-
qualification imposed by a competent court for any electoral offence; is not 
suffering from a mental disease incapacitating such person from acting as 
President’. Similarly, for standing for the House of Representatives article 64 
provides ‘has not been, on or after the date of the coming into operation of 
this Constitution, convicted of an offence involving dishonesty or moral tur-
pitude or is not under any disqualification imposed by a competent court for 
any electoral offence; is not suffering from a mental disease incapacitating 
such person from acting as a Representative’.  
 In terms of exercising electoral rights, the limitations are provided for in 
the electoral law as stated in article 63 of the Constitution ‘no person shall be 
qualified to be registered as an elector who is disqualified for such registra-
tion by virtue of the Electoral Law’. Therefore, article 6 of the Law 72/1979 
provides that a citizen of the Republic is derived of the right to vote if ‘during 
the relevant period is deprived of his liberty due to lawful detainment or im-
prisonment or has been declared under the law as person with mental im-
pairment; under the specific law has been deprived of his electoral rights’. 
The latter is specified in article 37 of the Law that states that anyone who has 
been convicted for specific election related offences (listed in article 37 (2)) 
can be deprived of his electoral rights by a court order for a period not ex-
ceeding 7 years from the moment of his conviction for such offenses. 
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Culture(s) of citizenship 
Question 13 
It is submitted that the culture that prevailed is a mixed one and one that sees 
a rights-based EU ‘free movement’ and ‘constitutional’ culture as an adjunct 
to national immigration systems based on ‘permissions’ to non-nationals to 
be present in the territory. This is due to the unsystematic nature of the case 
law and the lack of effective application of fundamental principles governing 
EU law. Moreover, the legislation has insisted on the restrictive reading of 
the Directive as permitting a reverse discrimination approach and has also 
created gaps in terms of effectiveness for registered partnerships.  
Question 14 
In the view of the reporter, and as documented in the preceding sections, the 
full effect of the EU Charter has yet to find its application before Cypriot 
courts. The emphasis remains on the constitutional protection for human 
rights and on the role of priority given to the ECHR that has been instrumen-
tal in the development of Cypriot case law. There is an unfortunate detach-
ment from the EU dimension of human rights that is manifested also in rela-
tion to free movement and citizenship.  
Question 15 
In Cyprus, media discussions of issues connected to EU citizenship generally 
follow events related to national politics, while issues related to EU citizen-
ship have not been prominent or present at all. Focus is very often on the na-
tional immigration policies, especially in relation to granting social benefits. 
Landmark cases on residence rights (Chen, Jia, Metock) and access to student 
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Czech Republic 
Citizenship within Directive 2004/38/EC – stability of residence for 
Union citizens and their family members 
Question 1 
The articles 2, 3, and 5 of the Directive have been transposed mainly in Sec. 
15a, Sec. 20 para. 4 and Sec. 87a-87aa of Law no. 326/1999 Coll., on the stay 
of foreigners in Czech Republic´s territory (Aliens Law). In Sec. 15a paras 1 
and 2 of the Aliens Law the definition of family relationships falling under 
the scope of Art. 2, para. 2 of the Directive is dealt with. The definition of the 
law is fully compatible with that of the Directive. Situations according to Art. 
3 para. 2 of the Directive are dealt with by Sec. 15a para. 3 of the Aliens Law. 
Sec. 15a para. 4 extends the entitlements of Union citizen family members 
also to family members of Czech citizens, making them benefit from the 
equal level of protection provided by law to EU citizens. Because of this ex-
tended scope of the definition in the Czech law, the internal legislation gov-
erning foreigner´s stay made EU legislation applicable to purely internal situ-
ations.  
 Because of that, the judicial interpretation of the Directive treats both in-
ternal situations of Czech citizens’ family members and EU citizens’ family 
members equally.  
 The Supreme administrative court ruled that as family relationship should 
be regarded as the relationship between parents and their children or between 
grandparents and children. The relationship similar to family relationship ac-
cording to Sec. 15a para. 4 of the Law must be defined similarly strictly, and 
must be analogous to those family relationships expressly mentioned in the 
Aliens Law in line with the Directive 2004/38/ES. Therefore, according to 
the Supreme administrative court case law, the relationships between the sib-
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lings or even cousins cannot be regarded as family relationship in the sense of 
the definition of Directive and Sec. 15a of the Aliens Law.2 
 Both the judicial interpretation and the administrative practice put the non-
institutionalized partnership on the same level with the marriage for the pur-
poses of family relationship in the sense of the Directive. The official reason-
ing report attached to the draft law in this respect stated, that the stable rela-
tionship of partners is in the Czech Republic equal to that of uninstitutional-
ized partnership.3 However, the Supreme administrative court ruled, that it is 
not possible to limit not expressly defined family relationships falling under 
transposition legislation to uninstitutionalized partnerships only.4 
 There is also a considerable body of case-law related to fictitious marriag-
es.5 According to Supreme administrative court, the marriage should be re-
garded as functional, when it is proved in any stage of the administrative pro-
cedure that the marriage in question is fulfilling its functions, even when it 
was not always so.6 
 The procedural safeguards are provided by judicial revision of decisions 
issued by the administrative body – Czech Police, Directorate of the service 
of foreign police. In our opinion there are to no signs that the procedural safe-
guards were ineffective.  
Question 2 
To our knowledge there is no evidence of expulsions of EU citizens (and/or 
their family members) on purely economic grounds in the decisions of judi-
cial bodies. However, in the administrative practice Article 8 para. 3 of the 
Directive is frequently violated, as the administrative bodies require the EU 
citizens to submit proof of accommodation when submitting the application 
for legalization of stay (’confirmation of the stay’). This requirement is vest-
ed in the Sec. 87a para. 2 e) of the Aliens law. On the other hand, there is no 
legal obligation for EU citizens to legalize their stay. It may be useful for 
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practical reasons to obtain the ‘confirmation of the stay’, but there is no pen-
alty for not doing this. 
Question 3 
The implementation of the provisions of the Directive with respect to divorce 
or death of the EU citizen affecting his/her family member status are imple-
mented mainly in Sec. 87f of the Aliens Law. The law guarantees continua-
tion of residence where the family member stayed in the Czech Republic at 
least a year before the death of his/her family member who was EU citizen. 
In case of divorce, the law stipulates that the residence continues when custo-
dy or regular visiting rights to the child were granted, or when the marriage 
continued for at least three years and the family member residence in the 
Czech territory lasted minimally 1 year at the date of the divorce. To the con-
tinuation of the residence permit is also entitled the family member who tends 
the child during his/her primary, secondary, and university education in the 
Czech Republic. 
 The provisions guaranteeing continuation of residence in case of divorce 
do not apply to splitting not registered couples, where the partner of a EU 
citizen has got residence permit on the ground of unification of family, and 
then the couple separates and the EU member moves outside the territory. 
There is no protection of continuation of stay specially for such a case, and 
such family members could only invoke one of the other provisions for con-
tinuation of stay when they qualify for it (for example childcare, etc.) 
 Beyond the scope of the Directive goes the provision of Sec. 87h para. 1 c) 
of the Aliens Law, providing that the permanent residence permit will also be 
issued to a EU citizen family member, who is bereaved of deceased Czech 
citizen permanently resident in the Czech Republic. It is not fully clear, 
whether ‘bereaved persons’ could be only those who fall within the definition 
contained in Art. 2 of the Directive, or whether the interpretation could be 
wider.  
 To our knowledge there are no serious disputes on the application and in-
terpretation of Sec. 87f of the Aliens law. The court disputes, also where the 
Sec. 87f is being interpreted to deal primarily with the issue of fictitious mar-
riage.  
Question 4 
The implementation is provided by Sec. 87g-87l of the Aliens Law. Sec. 87g 
of the Aliens Law provides for the right to apply for permanent residence 
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permit for persons whose employment or economic activity was terminated 
because of retirement or invalidity, for other special grounds, and provides 
for procedural issues. The periods of residence required as qualification 
ground for permanent residence according to the Aliens Law correspond to 
the requirements of the Directive.  
 According to Sec. 87h of the Aliens Law, all family members of the EU 
citizens have the right to be issued with the permanent residence permit after 
5 years of uninterrupted continuous stay. The family members of both Czech 
citizens and of permanently residing EU citizens are entitled to apply for 
permanent residence after 2 years of continuous stay. The same applies to 
family members of deceased Czech and EU citizens, who stayed at the Czech 
territory in cause of employment or different economic activity.  
 The volumes of applications sorted according to the type of residence per-
mits are published yearly by Ministry of Interior at http://www.mvcr.cz/ in the 
yearly ‘Report on migration and integration in the Czech Republic’ [Zpráva o 
migraci a integraci v České republice]. To this date, the most actual report for 
2011 is available at: http://www.mvcr.cz/azyl-migrace-a-integrace.aspx. 
 The data on the volumes of foreigners with permanent residence status 
granted is also provided at the web page of the Ministry of Interior, sorted by 
individual countries including EU countries. The statistics appear monthly on 
the official web pages of the Ministry of Interior: http://www.mvcr.cz/clanek/ 
cizinci-s-povolenym-pobytem.aspx, and the last chart available at the date of 
submitting this report is from August 2013. 
Question 5 
The entitlements to different sorts of social benefits and advantages are gov-
erned by a number of special laws in the area of social security, not in the  
Aliens Law. For example the most important legislation in this area could be 
found in Law no. 117/1995 Coll., on state social support, in Law no. 
111/2006 Coll., on social need help, or in Law no. 435/2006 Coll. on employ-
ment, etc. These laws usually follow the condition of registration of the for-
eigner according to the Aliens Law, including registration of EU citizens’ 
family members according to the transposing legislation, in order to meet re-
quirement equality highlighted in Art. 24 (2) of the Directive.  
 In the area of social benefits, there is EU legislation which is directly bind-
ing, namely Council regulation no. 1612/68, on free movement.  
 Regulation no. 1612/68 has precedence before national legislation on so-
cial security. Appropriate references are therefore made to the regulation by 
the national legislation. For example, Law no. 111/2006 Coll., on social need 
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help in Sec. 5, para. 1 e) declares that the EU citizen’s family member regis-
tered and factually resident at the Czech territory for more than 3 months are 
eligible to benefits according to the conditions of the law, in case that he/she 
is not entitled to social advantages according to the directly applicable EU 
legislation.  
 The laws in the area of social benefits do not distinguish between EU fam-
ily members and job seekers. It is not clear what sense such differentiation 
could have – in our opinion it would be rather contra-productive. The EU 
family member could also be job-seeker at the same time, as these categories 
are not exclusive.  
Question 6 
Sec. 119 para. 2 of the Aliens Law was changed by amendment no. 161/2006 
Coll., in order to provide transposition of Art. 27 and 28 of the Directive.  
 The case law of administrative courts on Sec. 119 para. 2 as legislation 
transposing EU law, is produced, as a judicial review of administrative deci-
sions on expulsion of foreigners issued by administrative organs – the Czech 
Republic Police, Service of Foreigners Police Directorate, takes place at the 
Regional courts as court of 1. instance and by Supreme administrative court 
as a court of cassation. The Supreme administrative court is also responsible 
for giving judicial opinions binding for administrative adjudication with re-
spect to all sorts of legal issues reflected by administrative courts. In the case 
law of administrative courts, the terms ‘public order’ and ‘public security’ are 
often interpreted together. However, in fact most of the case law concerns  
rather expulsions which are factually based on ‘public order’ ground.  
 In its Resolution no. 3 As 4/2010-151 the Supreme administrative court 
gave binding judicial opinion interpreting the concept of ‘disturbance of pub-
lic order’. In the first place, the court held that acts of the foreigner are dis-
turbing public order, only when these acts represent real, actual, and ade-
quately serious danger to one of basic interests of the society. Yet, this is only 
general characterization of the criterion, according to the court: still, it has to 
be respected that expulsion is the most serious intervention with the rights of 
the foreigner. Therefore, the provision of Sec 119 para. 2 of the law should be 
applied only in accordance with principle of proportionality, with respect to 
real situation of the foreigner, level of his integration, his family and personal 
affairs, length of his stay in the territory of the member state, state of health, 
or relevant linkages to the country of origin. 
 The Supreme administrative court held, that for example the illegal stay or 
entry to the Czech Republic itself cannot be regarded as ‘real, actual, and ad-
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equatelly serious danger’ in the sense of the transposing legislation – espe-
cially when it concerns the family member of the EU citizen or family mem-
ber of the Czech citizen. At the same time, the court held that the ‘disturbance 
of public order’ cannot be limited only to acts ‘exceeding the intensity of the 
defined substance of criminal act’, as was held previously by one of its sen-
ates.7  
 With respect to acts consisting in conclusion of fictitious marriage, the 
Supreme administrative court referred to the distinctions which the Directive 
itself makes with respect to interests of protection of public order, public se-
curity, or public health laid down in Chapter VI of the Directive, and abusing 
rights or deception, for example fictitious marriage, laid down in Art. 35 of 
the Directive. The Supreme administrative court held that similarly, the  
Aliens Law differentiates grounds consisting in public order and grounds 
consisting in circumventions of the law, for example fictitious marriage or 
fictitious affidavit of paternity. Thus the Supreme administrative court re-
fused the idea that fictitious marriage could be subsumed under the concept 
of ‘public order’, because in most cases fictitious marriage does not constitute 
‘real, actual, and adequately serious danger to basic interests of the society’, 
and expulsion on this ground cannot be held as proportionate intervention to 
the rights of the foreigner. The same conclusion was held by the Supreme 
administrative court in case of fictitious affidavit of paternity.8 
EU citizenship beyond Directive 2004/38/EC – exploring national 
application of primary EU Law 
Question 7 
The tendency to reject arguments based on EU citizenship rights on the 
grounds that the dispute involves a ‘purely internal situation’ probably does 
not have a place in the Czech Republic. Sec. 15a para. 4 of the Aliens Law 
extends the entitlements of Union citizen family members to family members 
of Czech citizens, making them benefit from the equal level of protection 
provided by law to EU citizens. Because of this extended scope of the defini-
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tion of EU family member in the Czech law, the internal legislation govern-
ing foreigner´s stay made EU legislation applicable to purely internal situa-
tions.  
 The Supreme administrative court, corroborating on this concept, held that 
by formulation contained in Sec. 15 a of the Law, the internal legislator ex-
tended the protection over the limits given by the EU legislation only to mi-
grating EU citizens and their families to foreign family members of the Czech 
citizens. Therefore, according to the Supreme administrative court, internal 
legal provision can in that way ‘activate’ EU law, which would otherwise be 
inapplicable to the concrete situation, not containing any element decisive for 
the application of the EU law. The member state can extend the EU law to 
situations which cannot be subsumed under EU law. The Supreme adminis-
trative court thus concluded that the sections of the Aliens Law, which are 
transposing the Directive, have to be applied in both situations – those includ-
ing family members of EU citizens migrating from one member state to the 
other, as well as to purely internal situations of Czech citizens and their fami-
ly members.9 
Question 8 
Regarding any questions concerning the Czech citizenship we have to bear in 
mind that the existing citizenship law no. 40/1993 Coll. (hereinafter referred 
to as ‘StObč’) is replaced from 1. 1. 2014 by the new citizenship law 
no. 186/2013 Coll. (hereinafter referred to as ‘NZStObč’). The new law in-
troduces essential change regarding double citizenship – it will allow double 
citizenship (both on entry and on exit) so the loss of the previous citizenship 
will no longer be a requirement for the naturalization in the Czech Republic. 
Neither will the acquisition of another citizenship result in loss of the Czech 
citizenship. In this respect the new law is more inclusive since many foreign-
ers living in the Czech Republic have so far refused to apply for Czech citi-
zenship because of the inability to hold their previous citizenship.  
 Regarding the length of the required stay there is one notable change – EU 
citizens will be eligible for Czech citizenship after only 3 years of permanent 
residence (instead of 5 years which concerns the ‘other’ applicants) – Sec. 14 
para. 1 NZStObč.  
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 However, in almost all other aspects the new law is stricter and it is cer-
tainly a step back to the exclusive model of citizenship.  
 The requirements for naturalization will be distinctly stricter. One of the 
new requirements is the proof of the income of the applicant (Sec. 14 para. 4 
NZStObč) and the requirement that the applicant has not been a burden to the 
social system in the last three years (Sec. 14 para. 8 NZStObč).  
 Moreover, the so called ‘integration test’ has been introduced. The aim is 
to prove the knowledge of the ‘constitutional system of the Czech Republic, 
and the cultural, geographical, and historical facts’. Some of the questions in 
this test were published in November 2013. This has raised criticism since 
some of the questions are hardly to be answered by the majority of the current 
Czech citizens – e.g. what is the area of the Czech Republic, what are the tax 
duties for using a car for business purposes etc. 
 The Czech Ministry of Interior is given the power to relieve almost all of 
the requirements. Moreover, Sec. 12 NZStObč states expressively that there 
is no legal claim to naturalization. This might be a reaction to the case law of 
the Supreme Administrative Court which in many cases has overruled the 
naturalization refusal decision of the Ministry of Interior in the last ten years. 
 There is other disputable issue in the new citizenship law – the application 
can be dismissed on security grounds (Sec. 22 para. 3 NZStObč). In such a 
case the judicial review is explicitly excluded (Sec. 26 NZStObč). This might 
be unconstitutional since the Constitutional Court of the Czech Republic has 
already stated in other cases that the achieved level of the human rights pro-
tection shall not be diminished. This might be in conflict with Art. 12 of the 
European Convention on Nationality, which states that each State Party shall 
ensure that decisions relating to the acquisition, retention, loss, recovery, or 
certification of its nationality should be open to an administrative or judicial 
review in conformity with its internal law. 
 New citizenship law expressively predicts in Sec. 39 NZStObč that surrep-
titiously acquired citizenship shall be revoked according to the general regu-
lation of administrative law. In theory, nothing changed in this respect since 
the application of the general regulations of administrative law has always 
been possible although not expressively stated in the existing citizenship law. 
Yet, in practice naturalization has so far never been revoked. According to 
the new citizenship law we can expect that cases of denaturalization will oc-
cur. This will be possible even if the person concerned remains stateless. 
Since the denaturalization decision according to the general administrative 
law can be subject to the judicial review, the administrative courts will have a 
chance to decide what role the Rottmann case will play in such cases.  
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Political rights of EU citizens 
Question 9 
The Directive 93/109/EC on European Parliament elections has never been 
fully implemented in the Czech Republic since the problems which have been 
mentioned in the FRACIT report from June 2013 still remain – i.e. stricter 
requirement on EU citizens regarding registration and the fact that EU citizen 
can stand as a candidate only on the ballot of a Czech political party.  
 EU citizens need permanent residence or sojourn for at least 45 days be-
fore the second day of the elections – Sec. 5 para. 1 European Parliament 
Election Act (hereinafter referred to as ‘ZEP’).Their registration for the EP 
elections is more complicated than that of Czech citizens. While Czech citi-
zens do not have to register at all, EU citizens have to be registered at least 40 
days prior to the elections (Sec. 29 para. 1 ZEP). 
 Concerning the passive voting rights, any Czech citizen and every EU cit-
izen who has permanent residence or who is sojourning on Czech territory 
can become a member of the EP. If an EU citizen stands as a candidate, it is 
required that he has had permanent residence or has sojourned in the Czech 
Republic for at least 45 days before the second day of the elections (Sec. 6 
ZEP). 
 A more serious obstacle to the carrying out of the EU citizens’ passive 
rights to vote for the EP is the fact that one can only stand as a candidate on 
the ballot of a political party (Sec. 21 para. 1 ZEP). Here, we are facing the 
problem that only a ‘citizen’ can be a member of a political party, which is, in 
current practice, understood as ‘citizen of the Czech Republic’. The EU-
conform interpretation of the term ‘citizen’ as it was discused in the FRACIT 
report from June 2013 has so far never been held by the Czech courts. 
Question 10 
Directive 94/80/EC on local elections has never been fully implemented. Also 
in local elections remain the problems which have been mentioned in the 
FRACIT report from June 2013. 
 The active right of EU citizens to vote for local assemblies sometimes col-
lides with its principal condition: the voter has to have his/her permanent resi-
PAVLA BOUČKOVÁ & PAVEL KANDALEC 
  448 
dence registered in the municipality in question. As Marek Antoš10 has point-
ed out, this condition is regulated in the same way for all voters (citizen resi-
dents and EU citizens). In reality, however, it is strongly discriminatory and 
represents a considerable obstacle for EU citizens. 
 The concept of ‘permanent residence’ in fact does not have the same con-
tent in all of the legal code. In the case of citizens of the Czech Republic, 
permanent residence is regulated by Law no. 133/2000 Coll. on the record of 
residents and is inherently defined for record keeping purposes. A Czech citi-
zen can change his/her permanent residence very easily – by mere declaration 
at the local authority – the only condition he/she has to fulfill is to prove 
he/she has the right to reside in the municipality (as e.g. tenant or owner of 
the house, flat etc.). 
 On the other hand, in the case of foreigners (EU citizens included), the 
concept of permanent residence is regulated by Law no. 326/1999 Coll. on 
the residence of foreigners on Czech territory and represents a significantly 
different institute. In principle, an EU citizen is eligible to obtain ‘permission 
for permanent residence’ (from the foreign police authority) after five years 
of uninterrupted sojourn on the territory of the Czech Republic, if he/she ful-
fils additional conditions (Sec. 87(g) of the law on the residence of foreign-
ers). A foreigner (EU citizen) who is intending to live in the Czech Republic, 
obtains at first ‘confirmation’ of the stay and in most cases can apply for a 
higher level stay – ‘Permanent Residence’ – not earlier than after five years 
of sojourn. 
 It is thus clear that, in local elections, EU citizens’ chances of carrying out 
their voting rights cannot be compared to the citizen residents’ chances of 
carrying out their voting rights. Recent research shows that only two fifths of 
EU citizens have ‘permanent residence’. The others only have what is called 
sojourn and cannot participate in local elections. The actual resulting partici-
pation of EU citizens in local elections is then a mere 1 % of all EU citizens 
living in the Czech Republic.11 
 Marek Antoš12 further calls attention to another discriminatory circum-
stance: citizen residents do not have to register before the elections, because 
their names appear on the list of voters based on the fact that they have their 
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permanent residence in the municipality concerned. If a citizen resident pre-
sents himself/herself at the polling place on the day of the elections and by 
chance does not appear on the list (e.g. because he moved to the municipality 
a few days preceding the elections), the election committee is liable, accord-
ing to Sec. 33 para. 3 Local Election Act (hereinafter reffered to as ‘ZZO’) to 
add him to the list. 
 An EU citizen who is intending to participate in local elections must have 
obtained permission for permanent residence (see above) and must also have 
registered, before 4 p.m at least two days prior to the elections (Sec. 28 ZZO). 
Question 11 
There are no other elections in which EU citizens residing in the country can 
participate, except the local elections and the elections to the European Par-
liament, i.e. no voting right is granted to EU citizens in the regional elections.  
 A special situation concerns the voting rights of EU citizens residing in 
Prague. Although Prague is a city (commune) and elections there conform to 
the law on elections into local assemblies (ZZO), Prague is simultaneously 
considered to be on the same level as the other 13 Czech regions. A paradox-
ical situation arises, as an EU citizen with permanent residence in Prague has 
in fact the possibility to vote at this higher – regional level. 
Question 12 
There are two problems – both of them have been mentioned in the FRACIT 
2013 report. One is the de facto disfranchise of the convicted persons and the 
other one is disfranchise of the persons with mental impairments: 
 Officially in the elections for the Chamber of Deputies (the lower chamber 
of the Parliament), the Senate (the upper chamber of the Parliament), the Euro-
pean Parliament, or the presidential elections, prisoners are not limited in 
their active voting rights in any way. On the other hand, convicted prisoners 
are disenfranchised in regional and local elections (Sec. 4 para. 2 (a) ZZO; 
Sec. 4 para. 2 (a) Regional Election Act (hereinafter referred to as ‘ZZK’). In 
local and regional referendums, both convicted prisoners and prisoners in 
pre-trial detention are disenfranchised according to the law. 
 The prisoners can vote for the president, the European Parliament, and the 
Chamber of Deputies without limitations. However, in reality they cannot ful-
ly vote for the Senate. The Senate elections take place every two years, but 
only individuals in one-third of 81 Senate districts are allowed to vote at any 
given time (the senators’ mandate then continues for six years). Thus, on a 
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rotating basis, every two years around 33 percent of all eligible voters in 27 
Senate districts can vote. 
 Legal regulations nevertheless specify that in order for the prisoner to be 
allowed to vote in Senate elections, these elections have to be announced in 
both the Senate district where he/she has permanent residence and the Senate 
district in which he/she is imprisoned. Taking into account that Senate dis-
tricts are relatively small and that there are more of them than there are pris-
ons (there are 36 prisons), it is clear that in this ‘lottery’ only some prisoners 
have actual voting rights. As can be seen from the statistics of the Prison Ser-
vice of the Czech Republic, every two years only 2 percent of all prisoners 
(not the expected 33 per cent) can vote.13 
 Local and regional elections give rise to an even more extreme situation. 
Although prisoners in pre-trial detention are not disenfranchised in local and 
regional elections, it is in fact necessary for them to have served their pre-trial 
detention in the prison that is located in the same district as their permanent 
residence. The word district now refers to the voting district – ‘okrsek’ in the 
sense of Sec. 26 ZZO. These districts are stipulated by the local mayors so 
that they contain around 1,000 voters. This is just an administrative arrange-
ment (the results of local elections do not depend on the districts). Such a vot-
ing district usually only contains a few streets; in practice, elections for sev-
eral districts take place together in the nearest public building (e.g. a school). 
The probability that the prisoner will reside in a prison in the same voting dis-
trict in which he/she has his permanent residence is thus close to zero and in 
these local and regional elections, prisoners in pre-trial detention become de 
facto disenfranchised. 
 Legal regulations are not the sole problem for elections in prisons. It fol-
lows from recent research,14 that around a quarter of all prisoners do not have 
an identity card. Although they could arrange for an ID card to be issued in 
the prison with the help of the prison service, since they need their ID even 
less in prison than when they were free they often neglect this. However, 
prisoners cannot participate in elections without an ID card. This issue is the 
same with elections for the Chamber of Deputies, the Senate, the EP, and 
presidential elections. All electoral laws, in fact, agree that the voter is 
obliged to prove his/her identity with his/her ID card or his/her passport. This 
normally legitimate requirement loses meaning in prison. The identity of a 
                                                        
13. ANTOŠ, Marek., DRÁPAL, Jakub. Volební právo vězňů: zelená je teorie, šedý je 
strom života. Trestněprávní revue. 10/2012, p. 224-230. 
14. ANTOŠ, Marek., DRÁPAL, Jakub. Volební právo vězňů: zelená je teorie, šedý je 
strom života. Trestněprávní revue. 10/2012, p. 224-230. 
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prisoner cannot be doubted at all (if it was, the right of the state to imprison 
them would have to be doubted, too). 
 All electoral laws agree that incapacitation obstructs the carrying out of 
both active and passive voting rights. This has become a serious problem, 
mainly in relation to the practice of civil courts in the decision-making pro-
cess about incapacitation. In fact, in Czech law there are two ways through 
which the civil courts can limit the legal eligibility of mentally disabled peo-
ple: the ‘limitation of legal eligibility’ (Sec. 10 para. 2 of the Civil Code) and 
‘incapacitation’ (Sec. 10 para. 1 of the Civil Code). It is the latter measure 
that limits legal eligibility most strongly and it is only this measure which ob-
structs both passive and active voting rights in all types of elections and ref-
erendums. The Constitutional Court of the Czech Republic in its finding of 
12/07/2012 ref. no. IV. ÚS 3102/08 found this practice unconstitutional. The 
legal measure of incapacitation is a legal measure of civil law that allows 
courts to deprive a person of legal eligibility if this person becomes unable to 
make legal acts due to a mental disorder that is not completely transient. Or-
dinary courts, such as the Constitutional Court learned from official records, 
possibly because of the primarily civilian nature of incapacitation, do not take 
the public law consequences (i.e. the ex lege loss of voting rights) of their de-
cisions into consideration. Concerning this matter, the Constitutional Court 
pointed out the alarming statistics which showed that by 30 July 2007 3,893 
people had been ‘limited in their legal eligibility’ and 23,283 people had been 
classed as ‘incapacitated’. Based on these numbers, the Constitutional Court 
concluded that ordinary courts too often decide on the constitutionally prob-
lematic incapacitation ruling.  
 When deciding about the limitation of legal eligibility or incapacitation of 
a natural person, ordinary courts are, according to the Constitutional Court, 
obliged to judge separately whether the concrete person is able to understand 
the meaning, the purpose, and the consequences of the elections. 
 The Constitutional Court, nevertheless, did not derogate any of the elec-
toral laws. The sole fact that incapacitated people have neither active nor pas-
sive voting rights was not evaluated as unconstitutional. It criticised only the 
existing practice of civil courts.15 
 The practical impact of the findings mentioned above have so far been 
negligible, as the vast majority of people who have been incapacitated do not 
                                                        
15. For more about the topic see: VYHÁNEK, Ladislav, Mental Disability and the Right 
to Vote in Europe: A Few Notes on the Recent Development. In WIIIth World Con-
gress of the International Association of Constitutional Law, 2010. 
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struggle for the redefinition of their legal limitations that the Constitutional 
Court has evaluated. 
Culture(s) of citizenship 
Question 13 
On the basis of our findings we are convinced that EU citizenship has so far 
been understood only as adjunct to the Czech immigration system. However, 
as mentioned above, there is no duty to registry for permanent residence for 
EU citizens. The ‘confirmation’ according to the Sec. 87a of the Aliens Law 
is being arranged for practical reasons, but there is no penalty for not doing 
this.  
Question 14 
We have not noticed any such case. 
Question 15 
We have not noticed any dominant theme within national media. If there have 
been any well known cases of expulsion – so these were the cases regarding 
to non EU citizens – especially expulsion (criminal extradition) of Russian 









Citizenship within Directive 2004/38/EC – stability of residence for 
Union citizens and their family members 
The material provisions of the Residence Directive (hereafter the Directive) 
on residence and its termination are regulated by executive order, the EU 
Residence Order, which mainly duplicates its provisions.2 The right of entry 
and the competence to expel Union citizens is on the contrary regulated by 
the Aliens Act. While the Aliens Acts concerns all foreigners, its limitations 
are only applicable to EU/EEA citizens and their family members provided 
that they are in conformity with EU law.3 The EU Residence Order uses, in 
line with the Directive, a right-based terminology, whereas the complex 
structure of the Aliens Act and its terminology makes it more administration-
friendly. 
Question 1 
In the EU Residence Order, Denmark has endorsed the same definitions of 
family members as those in its Art. 2, and assimilates registered partnership 
to marriage. In addition, a durable relationship under the same roof is also as-
similated to marriage.4 Art. 3 of the Directive on other ‘beneficiaries’ of the 
                                                        
1. Associate Professor, Dr., Research Centre in Legal Studies in Welfare and the Mar-
ket, Faculty of Law, University of Copenhagen. Many thanks to my research assis-
tant, Sandra Urschat, for her precious help and support. 
2. Executive Order No. 358 on Residence in Denmark for Aliens Falling within the 
Rules of EU law of 21/4/2006 (EU-Opholdsbekendtgørelsen) with further amend-
ments. The EU Residence Order actually in force is of 2001 (No 474). Competence to 
the Ministry of Justice to adopt the executive order follows from the Aliens Act. 
3. See Sect. 2(3) of the Consolidated Aliens Act actually in force (LBK No. 863 of 
25/6/2013). 
4. This is in conformity with the Court’s ruling in case 58/85, Reed. According to Sect. 
16 of the EU Residence Order of 2011, a durable relationship requires that the Union 
citizen provides for the needs of the partner in the same way as in marriage. 
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right of family reunification, has been implemented as granting an automatic 
right of residence to any family member of the Union citizen having the pri-
mary right of residence (1) who in the country of origin is dependent on the 
Union citizen or is a member of his/her household, or (2) who has serious 
health problems that require the personal care of the Union citizen. The right 
of residence of ascendants and other family members as just defined above 
under (1) is conditional upon demonstration of economic dependency both in 
the host State and in the home State. This is in line with the Court’s ruling in 
Jia (case C-1/05).5 
 The right of residence is granted to family members who accompany or 
join the Union citizen who has established a genuine and effective residence 
in Denmark. The EU Residence Order is hereby referring to the terminology 
used by the ECJ in the Metock ruling (case C-127/08.). Following this ruling, 
Danish law was amended in 2008 removing the requirement of prior lawful 
residence in the EU for the family member. This requirement had been in-
serted in 2006 as a result of the Akrich ruling (case C-109/01). It was a dra-
matic summer 2008 in Denmark with its negative flow of reactions following 
Metock and criticism by the Danish Ombudsman of the Danish authorities’ 
misinformation of their own citizens on their EU-right to family reunification 
in Denmark.6 The EU Residence Order is now explicitly stipulating in this 
respect that family members of Danish nationals have an EU-right of resi-
dence where they are covered by the Treaty. 
 A few cases concerning the definition of a family member have reached 
Danish courts. An Iraqi national could not be considered as a spouse to a Union 
citizen since his marriage under Muslim law (religious marriage) was not 
recognized under Danish law.7 Nor could he be considered as a father to a 
Union citizen as he was not ‘dependent’ upon his child pursuant to Art. 
2(2)(d) of the Directive.8 Finally, the Iraqi national could not demonstrate that 
                                                        
5. For further details, see the Briefing Note of the Ministry of Integration of 17/3/2009 
on the condition of dependency in the Directive (Notat om forsørgelseskravet i EU-
opholdsdirektivet). 
6. Final report of the Ombudsman of 21/11/2008 on the authorities’ information on the 
right to family reunification pursuant to EU law, (Ombudsmandens undersøgelse af 
udlændingemyndighederne – vejlening om familiesammeførelse efter EU-retten 
mm.). 
7. Judgment of the Supreme Court of 24/8/12 in case 58/2012, reported in U.2012. 
3399H. 
8. The Danish courts did not refer to case C-200/02, Zhu and Chen where the ECJ ruled 




he had a durable relationship to a national of another Member State pursuant 
to the EU Residence Order. This condition was not fulfilled even though it 
was not disputed that the couple had known each other for at least 6 years, 
and had in fact lived together for at least one year.9 The fact that they had a 
child together and another to come did not alter this finding. In any event, the 
Supreme Court found that the offenses committed made him a genuine, pre-
sent, and sufficiently serious threat affecting one of the fundamental interests 
of society. He was expelled and prohibited from reentering the country in 6 
years. In a similar case of expulsion concerning a Ganesh national married (in 
absentia) in Ghana to a Polish national, the Supreme Court did not examine 
whether the marriage was valid and whether the Ganesh national was thereby 
a spouse to a Union citizen.10 The Supreme Court found that irrelevant since 
the offenses committed (use of false ID-documents and illegal residence and 
work) were sufficient for him to be considered as a serious threat to public 
order and security, and be expelled with a prohibition from reentering the 
country in 6 years. 
 Concerning the right of entry of family members who are from third-
countries (Art. 5 of the Directive), the authorities are obliged to treat visa ap-
plications on the basis of an accelerated procedure not exceeding 15 days un-
less the situation is exceptional and duly justified.11 The visa should be free 
of charge and no conditions of dependency or travel insurance can be im-
posed. Only a valid passport and documentation of the family relationship 
can be required in this respect. Union citizens and their family members can 
be refused access pursuant to the Aliens Act if they do not have the required 
documentation. Yet, the safeguards of Art. 5(4) were literally transposed in 
an executive order implementing the Aliens Act.12  
                                                        
her baby as dependency was the other way round, but could rely directly on Art. 21 
TFEU for a right of residence in the UK with the baby Union citizen. 
9. The couple was not formally registered at the same address, and this might have been 
the decisive factor for the Western Appeal Court, judgment of 25/10/2011, S-1689-
11. 
10. Judgment of the Supreme Court of the 7/4/2011 in case 364/2010, reported in 
U.2011.2014H. 
11. See the Briefing Note of the Ministry of Justice of 11/1/2013 on practice regarding 
visas in force from the 15/1/2013. 
12. See the Briefing Note of the Ministry of Integration of 30/6/2011 on deportation on 
grounds of lack of sufficient resources or on the ground of protection of the public 
order under 1.5 (Notat om adgangen til ud- og afvisning af EU-/EØS-statsborgere 
på baggrund af subsistensløshed eller af hensynet til den offentlige orden). 
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Question 2 
Decisions refusing or terminating the right of residence on the specific 
ground of lack of sufficient resources can only be taken within the first 3 
months of arrival and by administrative decision. This possibility is regulated 
in the Aliens Act.13 According to Udenfor, a Danish NGO dedicated to the 
protection of homeless people, 278 EU-nationals were expelled on grounds of 
lack of sufficient economic resources between the 1st of January 2009 and the 
30th of June 2011.14 Still, according to the NGO, a person who was in posses-
sion of less than 350 kr./35 Euros (corresponding to the price of a night at a 
hostel) was regarded as lacking sufficient resources and was expellable. A 
Briefing Note of 2011 from the Ministry of Integration referring to Art. 14 of 
the Directive and the Grzelczyk ruling (case C-184/89) seems to have put an 
end to this practice.15 It follows that expulsion on grounds of lack of re-
sources within the first 3 months can only be the consequence of the person 
requesting economic support from the State and that this in itself is not suffi-
cient. The authorities have to assess on the basis of the personal circum-
stances of each applicant whether the person is an unreasonable burden. This 
can never be the case upon the person’s first application for social benefits.  
 In respect of Union citizens and their family members who have resided for 
more than 3 months in Denmark, their right of residence might be terminated 
where they no longer fulfill the conditions for residence pursuant to EU law. 
The Aliens Act stipulates that illegal residence is a ground for expulsion.16 It 
might thus be that certain persons are expelled on the ground that they cannot 
be considered as economically active and do not fulfill the condition of self-
sufficiency. There is no reported case-law on this point concerning Union citi-
zens. On the other hand, some expulsions on grounds of protection of the pub-
lic order are inherently linked to economic considerations. For example, fines 
for minor offenses, such as ‘squatting’ have justified expulsion on grounds of 
protection of the public order, but were annulled by the Supreme Court, cf. 
                                                        
13. Sect. 28 of the Aliens Act of 2013. In respect of jobseekers, the limit is 6 months or 
more provided that they can document that they are actively looking for a job and 
have serious chances of obtaining one. 
14. The numbers are based on the statistics of the Danish Immigration Service, see Bene-
dicte Ohrt Fehler, Udenfor, ‘Formanskabet bør sætte fokus på hjemløse EU-borgere’ 
(‘The EU presidency should focus on homeless EU-citizens’), of 6/12/2012 on 
http://udenfor.dk/dk/menu/om-projekt-udenfor/det-mener-projektudenfor/formand 
skabetborsattefokus-pa-hjemlose-eu-borgere. 
15. Briefing Note of the Ministry of Integration of 30/6/2011 mentioned in footnote 12.  
16. See Sect. 25(b) of the Aliens Act of 2013. 
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question 6.17 Yet, there is evidence that expulsion on economic considerations 
has found place in respect of EEA citizens on the basis of the Nordic Conven-
tion.18 This convention secures an extended right of free movement to the citi-
zens of the 5 Nordic countries members long before the Residence Directive. 
Since EEA citizens are also protected by the Directive, their expulsion should 
have been assessed in this light and might conflict with it.  
 Finally, a recent practice of the Danish police, especially targeted at Roma 
people, is to issue them with fines for illegal residence if they do not have a 
registration card after the first 3 months of their stay, and retaining them until 
they have paid their fine. The ground for retention is to facilitate deportation, 
but the persons are in practice released upon payment of the fine.19  
Question 3 
The EU Residence Order entitles family members to Union citizens who die 
or leave the country to retain their right of residence.20 The same is true in case 
of divorce, annulment of the marriage, and termination of partnership.21 Both 
provisions provide that in respect of family members who are third-country 
nationals, retention of the right of residence is conditional upon the person be-
ing economically active or self-sufficient. There is no reported case-law. 
 In respect of the right to remain for children of departed Union citizens 
who pursue an education in the host State (Art. 12(3) of the Directive), the 
                                                        
17. Judgment of the Supreme Court of 31/3/13 in case 264/2010, reported in U.2011. 
1794H. 
18. See Kirsten Ketscher, ‘Hjemsendelse af Nordiske borgere – en kritisabel dansk prak-
sis’, in Undring og Erkjennelse, Karl Harald Søvig, Sigrid Eskeland Schütz og Ørnulf 
Rasmussen (red.), Fagbokforlaget 2013, pp. 279-291. The author reports two cases, 
one concerning a pregnant Icelandic woman who had resided over 1 year in Denmark 
where she was living with her husband and had partly worked and partly received so-
cial help. She was refused a minimum means of subsistence, and was asked to leave 
the country. The other case concerned a Swedish national who suffered from psycho-
logical diseases linked to her previous situation as a Palestinian refugee. Pursuant to a 
court order, she had to leave the country as she was not self-sufficient and did not ful-
fill the condition of 3 years residence in Denmark pursuant to the Nordic Convention. 
19. Information gathered from the Danish Charity organization, DanChurchSocial 
(Kirkens Korshær). 
20. Sect. 14 of the EU Residence Order of 2011. 
21. Sect. 15 of the EU Residence Order of 2011. 
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Danish rules and practice are now complying with the Court’s ruling in Ibra-
him and Texeira (cases C-310/08 and C-480/08).22 
 Art. 14 of the Directive on retention of the right of residence is duplicated 
in various provisions of the EU Residence Order, but it is doubtful whether it 
is fully respected in practice, cf. answer to questions 2 and 5. 
 Finally, the procedural safeguards of Art. 30 of the Directive are applica-
ble by analogy where the person is expelled on other grounds than the protec-
tion of the public order, security, and health.23 
Question 4 
The right of permanent residence in Art. 16-21 of the Directive is implement-
ed through the EU Residence Order.24 EU nationals who have legally resided 
in Denmark for 5 continuous years have an unconditional right of permanent 
residence. The authorities are not entitled to enquire whether the conditions 
of work or self-sufficiency in Art. 7 are fulfilled at the time of application. 
Yet, in a Briefing Note of 2009, the Ministry of Integration specifies that a 
registration certificate might not be enough to establish previous lawful resi-
dence and the applicant for permanent residence might have to prove by other 
means that this condition is fulfilled.25 On the continuity of residence, the Or-
der closely follows the Directive and practice assimilates imprisonment to 
lawful residence.26  
 The right of residence of family members under Art. 16(2) was first re-
strictively interpreted and enforced by the Danish authorities. Until mid-2012, 
Danish authorities required that the Union citizen with the right of permanent 
residence should document being a worker or having sufficient resources to 
provide for his/her family. As a result of the Clauder ruling by the EFTA-
Court, the authorities changed their practice and family members now have 
                                                        
22. See the Briefing Note of the Ministry of Justice of 3/5/2010 on reviewing negatives 
decisions infringing Art. 12 of Regulation 1612/68 and Art. 12(3) of the Residence 
Directive following the Court’s rulings in Ibrahim and Teixeira. 
23. See further, the Briefing Note of the Ministry of Integration of 30/6/2011 under 2, 
mentioned in footnote 12. 
24. See Sect. 19 of the EU Residence Order of 2011. 
25. Briefing Note of the Ministry of Integration of 18/5/2009 on the right of permanent 
residence (Notat om tidsubegrænset ophold efter opholdsdirektivet). 




an unconditional right to reside with the permanently settled Union citizen.27 
Yet, it is worth noting that this is only applicable to family members (regard-
less of nationality) to the Union citizen, who has a right of permanent resi-
dence in Denmark. In contrast, the ‘old’ practice is still applicable to third-
country nationals who are family members to another third country national 
who has a permanent right of residence because of his/her relationship to an 
EU citizen.28 This ‘discrimination’ is grounded in the fact that the Clauder 
ruling only concerned the situation of family members to a Union citizen and 
is evidence of a restrictive interpretation of EU law.  
 Art. 17 and 18 of the Directive on the right of residence for specific cate-
gories are fully implemented by the EU Residence Order and seem unprob-
lematic. The same is true as regards the procedural provisions of Art. 19, 20, 
and 21. However, the EU Residence Order goes further than Art. 21, stipulat-
ing that permanent residence also ends when it has been obtained fraudulent-
ly (through for example marriage of convenience or false declaration). 
 The Immigration Office (Udlændingestyrelsen) provides statistics on their 
homepage on the yearly number of EU citizens who obtain a right of resi-
dence in Denmark. The statistics operate with 4 categories: (1) workers, (2) 
students (3) family members, and (4) the remaining EU-citizens (self-
employed, retired, and self-sufficient) which are further divided by country of 
origin. There are no official statistics on the volume of applications for the 
status of permanent residence. Following a question put by a the Parliamen-
tary Committee for Immigration and Integration in 2012, the Ministry of Jus-
tice disclosed the numbers of successful applications for the status of perma-
nent residence of Union citizens.29 In 2010, 2148 were registered as perma-
nent residents pursuant to EU-law, in 2011 the number was 2121, and 848 for 
the first half of 2012. It is interesting to note that the numbers cover both citi-
                                                        
27. Case E-4/11, Clauder of 26/7/2012. Persons who had wrongly been refused a right of 
residence as a family member to a Union citizen with a permanent right of residence 
could have their case decided anew. Yet, the Ministry of Justice found that there was 
no obligation upon the authorities to take old cases up on their own initiative since 
they were too difficult to identify. 
28. Legal Interpretative Note of the Ministry of Justice of 14/8/2012 on the EFTA-
Court’s judgment in the Clauder case (Juridisk fortolkningsnotat om Clauder-dom-
men).  
29. Question no. 368 of the Parliamentary Committee for Immigration and Integration to 
the Minister of Justice of 24/5/2012 (Spørgsmål nr. 368 fra Folketingets Udvalg for 
Udlændinge- og Integrationspolitik) that was kindly brought to my attention by the 
Immigration Office. 
CATHERINE JACQUESON 
  460 
zens of another Member State and their family members as well as family 
members of Danish citizens who have used their right of free movement. 
Question 5 
Strikingly, Art. 24 of the Directive was not transposed into the EU Residence 
Order and the exceptions to the principle of equal treatment provided for in 
its Art. 24(2) are explicitly or implicitly implemented in existing Acts.  
 The exception in respect of students was implemented through an amend-
ment of the Act on Students’ Grants and Loans Scheme which excludes na-
tionals from other Member States who are not workers or family members 
from the entitlement to student grants and loans within the first 5 years of resi-
dence.30 Until recently Union citizens who worked in Denmark along their 
studies were not entitled to the grant. On several occasions, the Danish au-
thorities refused to recognize them as workers, especially if they had first ar-
rived to enroll for a study. They were considered as students and thus not en-
titled to maintenance help pursuant to Art. 24(2) of the Directive. In a way, 
the authorities relied on the intention of the Union citizen: arrival with the 
purpose of studying in Denmark disqualified them as workers. The Danish 
Ombudsman reacted to this uncertain practice of the authorities and of the 
Appeal Tribunal for the Students’ Grants and Loans Scheme (highest admin-
istrative body) recalling their EU law obligations. The Appeal Tribunal then 
asked the ECJ whether full-time students who are working along their studies 
should be regarded as workers and should thus be entitled to the student grant 
on an equal treatment basis. The Danish government argued that with the 
adoption of the Directive, the EU legislator intended full-time students to be 
covered by the exception to the principle of equal treatment in the Directive.31 
The Court disagreed in the LN case and practice was changed in this re-
spect.32 The LN ruling came as a shock for politicians and reactivated in the 
                                                        
30. See inter alia Sect. 2a in the Act on the Students’ Grants and Loans Scheme No. 661 
of 29/6/2009 (LBK om statens uddannelsesstøtte (SU-loven)) amending Act No. 448 
of 1995 with further amendments (Lov om Statens uddannelsestøtte med senere æn-
dringer). 
31. See further C. Jacqueson, ‘For better or for worse? Transnational solidarity in the 
light of Social Europe’ in Resocialising Europe in times of crisis, CUP, October 
2013. 
32. Case C-46/12, LN. Negative decisions within the last 3 years can be reassessed in the 
light of the ECJ’s ruling.  
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media fears of social tourism with its waves of students especially from East-
ern EU-countries invading Danish universities. 
 In respect of social benefits, it is clear that Union citizens and their family 
members have no such entitlement within the first 3 months of their stay and 
for longer when the Union citizen is a first-time jobseeker. As the Act on Ac-
tive Social Policy provides for public support to all persons in need that are 
lawfully residing in Denmark, an amendment to the Act was inserted in 2004 
as a result of the EU’s enlargement to the 10 new Member States. It excludes 
short-term residents and jobseekers from entitlement to public support except 
from financial help to get back home.33 The rationale is that pursuant to EU 
law such persons are supposed to be self-sufficient and are therefore not en-
titled to any financial support from the State. The Act explicitly excludes 
them from the entitlement to a non-contributory benefit ensuring a minimum 
means of subsistence (kontanthjælp). This exclusion of first-time jobseekers 
seems to conflict with the Court’s rulings in Collins (case C-138/02) and 
Vatsouras (case C-22/08). Indeed, this benefit can be assimilated to a job-
seeker allowance since it is conditional upon the person being available to 
work and actively looking for employment. Thus, it fulfills the condition in 
the Court’s case-law of being a benefit facilitating return to the labour market 
and should be available to all those who can demonstrate a sufficient link to 
the Danish labour market.34 Yet, this is not the position adopted by the legis-
lator and the Ministry of Employment which administrates the Act.35  
 Entitlement to social benefits for all other Union citizens residing more 
than 3 months who are not workers or self-employed shall be assessed case 
by case. As mentioned above, according to the Act on Active Social Policy, 
all persons lawfully residing in Denmark are entitled to public support if the 
conditions for obtaining the benefit are fulfilled.36 Hence, the question would 
be whether the Union citizen is lawfully residing in Denmark.37 This issue 
has especially been salient in Denmark in respect of homeless persons who 
                                                        
33. Act No. 282 of 26/4/2004 inserting Sect. 12a in the Act No. 455 on Active Social Pol-
icy of 1997 (Lov om aktiv socialpolitik). 
34. Kirsten Ketscher, Socialret – principper, rettigheder, værdier, 3rd ed., DJØF 2008 at 
p. 251 and Catherine Jacqueson, ‘Unionsborgerens ret til sociale ydelser – Hvilken 
vej blæser vinden?’ EU-ret og Menneskeret, June 2010 at p. 162. 
35. Guidelines No. 19 from the Work Department of the Ministry of Employment on 
EU/EEA citizens’ access to minimum means of subsistence of 4/4/2008 (Vejledning 
om EU/EØS-borgeres adgang til kontanthjælp og starthjælp). 
36. Sect. 3 of the Aliens Act of 2013. 
37. See decisions of the Appeal Tribunal for Social and Employment Affairs (Ankestyrel-
sen) A-191-11 of 8/9/11, A-27-07 of 21/11/07. 
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are nationals of other Member States concerning their access to shelter 
homes. According to Danish law, shelter homes which are to some extent 
State-funded shall only accept persons who are legally residing in the coun-
try. In practice, lawful residence has in this respect been interpreted restric-
tively as excluding undocumented citizens (i.e. those who do not have a regi-
stration certificate, a residence card, or a Danish health card).38 Such interpre-
tation conflicts with the Directive as (1) all EU-nationals have an uncondi-
tional right of residence within the first 3 months and beyond when the per-
son is actively looking for employment (without registration document) and 
(2) the registration certificate is not constitutive of the right of residence 
which might be documented by other means. The authorities’ underlying ra-
tionale is that such persons are in any event not lawfully residing in Denmark 
since they are requesting public support by using shelter homes. They do not 
fulfill the condition of self-sufficiency and are a burden on the social system. 
This rationale conflicts with the Directive, especially with its Art. 14.39 
 Since there is very limited case-law and practice available on the issue of 
social benefits to non-economically active citizens, it is difficult to say 
whether the authorities rely at all on the real link doctrine in the ECJ’s case-
law in situations not covered by Art. 24(2). 
 Finally, as mentioned in respect of question 2, receipt of social benefits 
might after some time lead to termination of the right of residence of the Union 
citizen.  
Question 6 
Expulsion of nationals of the Member States is regulated in the Aliens Act 
which is applicable to all foreigners. A foreigner can either be (1) denied ac-
cess to Denmark (within the first 3 months of arrival), or (2) be deported with 
a prohibition of reentering the country. In respect of Union citizens, access 
and residence in Denmark for the first 3 months can be refused by adminis-
                                                        
38. Information gathered from the Danish Charity organization, DanChurchSocial 
(Kirskens Korshær). In January 2013, the organization opened up a shelter home for 
homeless foreigners. 2/3 of the users are from EU-countries and ¼ comes from Ro-
mania. Most of the users ask for help in understanding and accessing the Danish la-
bour market. For more information, see (in Danish): http://www.kirkenskorshaer.dk/ 
nyheder/flere-fattigdomsmigranter-s%C3%B8ger-r%C3%A5dgivning. 
39. It also conflicts with the Ministry of Justice own Briefing Note of 2011, mentioned in 
footnote 12, on the possibility of expelling Union citizens who are requesting public 
support, under 1.3 and 1.6. 
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trative decision if the citizens constitute a threat against public order, security 
or health, they have a prohibition from reentering the country, or if they can-
not provide for their own needs.40 Concerning deportation, which is normally, 
(but not exclusively) a consequence of a criminal conviction and normally, 
(but not exclusively) decided by a court, the Act does not quote or otherwise 
refer to Art. 27 and 28 of the Directive, but the EU Residence Order does so 
extensively. In addition, the Act specifies that expulsion of Union citizens 
and their families is only possible if it is compatible with EU law.41 Expul-
sion rules are quite complex, but are based on a simple rationale which is 
similar to that adopted in the Directive: the longer the stay, the more serious 
the offense should be.42 In contrast, the shorter the stay, the easier it is to ex-
pel the foreigner. Yet, contrary to the Directive, the Danish Act is very for-
malistic and specifies the type of offenses that can justify deportation. Just to 
mention a few examples, expulsion of a foreigner who has lived more than 9 
years in Denmark requires an offense which is punished by more than three 
years in prison. Where the person has lived between 5 and 9 years, offenses 
punished by one year prison are sufficient and for all other foreigners, offens-
es which are punished by a prison sentence are sufficient, or where the person 
otherwise constitutes a threat to the public order, security, or health. Illegal 
residence is also a ground of expulsion.43 
 Upon an analysis of the case-law of Danish courts, two remarks can be 
made. First, courts’ reasoning in expulsion cases appears to be quite formalis-
tic. Courts usually start by referring to the categories of the Aliens Act and 
assess whether deportation has a legal basis therein. Only afterwards do 
courts examine whether the result would be compatible with the Directive. 
Second, if the personal conduct is seen as a threat to the public order and se-
curity, there should be very strong links to Denmark and to family members 
residing there to lead to another decision.44 The following cases are deporta-
                                                        
40. See Sect. 28 of the Aliens Act of 2013. 
41. See Sect. 2(3) of the Aliens Act of 2013. 
42. See Chapter 4 of the Aliens Act of 2013, especially Sect. 22-25. 
43. Sect. 25b of the Aliens Act of 2013. 
44. Courts do not distinguish between public order and public security. Public health has 
to my knowledge not been relied upon to deny access to Union citizens or to expel 
such persons. 
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tion cases with a prohibition of reentering the country and most of them, (but 
not all) are the natural consequence of a criminal conviction.45  
Illegal residence and work 
It appears from two cases on illegal residence of family member to Union citi-
zens, already mentioned in question 1, that illegal residence will most likely 
render the person a serious threat to the public order and security and that 
personal circumstances, such as children in Denmark, cannot lead to another 
assessment. Therefore, it seems very difficult to prove that deportation in a 
given case is disproportionate, the argument being that the link to Denmark 
has been established illegally and is not worth protection. In the two above 
mentioned cases, the Danish Supreme Court considered that the two foreign-
ers fulfilled the conditions for deportation in the Aliens Act. The Court then 
added that the use of a false identity card in order to manufacture a right of 
residence and work, as well as illegal residence and work make the person a 
genuine, present, and sufficiently serious threat to one of the fundamental in-
terests of society pursuant to the Directive which can justify expulsion for 6 
years.46 In respect of the Ganesh national condemned to 50 days prison, the 
Court emphasized that expulsion was not breaching the principle of propor-
tionality since his link to the Danish territory was established illegally as he 
had relied on a false ID-card.47 In addition, the Ganesh national was not liv-
ing together with his Polish spouse at the time of his arrest, and his spouse 
should have been aware that he was residing illegally in Denmark. Deporta-
tion was also held to be proportionate in respect of the Iraqi national who had 
committed the same kind of offenses and was sentenced to 60 days prison. 
The Supreme Court found that expulsion was not disproportionate even if the 
Iraqi national had lived in Denmark (illegally) for 10 years and was the father 
to a Romanian child living in Denmark and of another child to come.  
 Where the Union citizen is not resident in Denmark or has been residing 
there for less than 5 years, courts assess the seriousness of the threat depend-
ing on whether the offense was circumstantial or the result of a pattern, 
whether it led to substantial damage, and whether the person has previously 
                                                        
45. No court case was reported on refusing access to Denmark on the ground that the Union 
citizen or the family members constitute a threat to the public order or security. 
46. Judgment of the Supreme Court of 24/8/12 in case 58/2012, reported in U.2012. 
3399H. 




been convicted.48 This is demonstrated below where courts balance the right 
of free movement, on the one hand with the public order and security, on the 
other hand. Personal circumstances are unlikely to make the balance tip in 
another direction. 
Public order and no residence in Denmark, cf. Art. 27 of the Directive 
An infringement of the law prohibiting import and sale of fireworks in Den-
mark which was sentenced by 4,5 months prison was not sufficiently serious 
to justify expulsion of a German national who had no connection to Den-
mark.49 The Appeal Court came to the same conclusion in a case concerning 
a Lithuanian national who was condemned to 30 days prison for violence 
against an airport police officer.50 Nor was infringement of the Act on Arms 
by being in possession of a knife sufficiently serious to justify expulsion.51 
The same was true of a person who was found guilty of ‘squatting’ a second-
ary home for 3 days.52 In this case, the Supreme Court found that since the 
offense was circumstantial and created little damage, it could not constitute a 
serious threat against the public order.  
 On the contrary, the Appeal Court found that a Polish national found 4 
times guilty of driving under the influence of alcohol could be expelled ac-
cording to the Aliens Act. In addition, his behavior constituted a serious 
threat to road safety and was thereby compatible with Art. 27 of the Di-
rective.53 Deportation was proportionate as there was no evidence that he re-
sided in Denmark and he had no recent contact with his family residing there. 
The Supreme Court found that stealing using an ‘alarmproof’ bag was suffi-
                                                        
48. See also the Briefing Note of the Ministry of Integration of 30th of June 2011 men-
tioned in footnote 12.  
49. Judgment of the Western Appeal Court of 21/2/02, S-0310-02, reported in U.2002. 
1080V. 
50. Judgment of the Eastern Appeal Court of 3/8/09, S-2116-09, reported in U.2009. 
2834Ø. 
51. Judgment of the Eastern Appeal Court of 12/4/10, S-2958-09, reported in U.2010. 
2082Ø, and judgment of the Supreme Court of 21/3/12 in case 230/2011, reported in 
U.2012.2072H. 
52. Judgment of the Supreme Court of 31/3/13 in case 264/2010, reported in 
U.2011.1794H. On the same day the Supreme Court also held in another case, that at-
tempt to steal a bike was not serious enough to justify expulsion, see judgment of the 
Supreme Court in case 319/10 reported in U.2011.1800H. 
53. Judgment of the Eastern Appeal Court of 14/3/12, S-3281-11, reported in U.2012. 
2231Ø. 
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ciently serious to justify expulsion.54 The court relied on the fact that the EU 
national had committed criminality on the very day of his arrival, and that 
criminality was part of a pattern. The Court added that this was confirmed by 
previous convictions of the person in his home State. In a similar case against 
two Polish nationals convicted of stealing in a supermarket and sentenced to 
60 days prison, the Supreme Court confirmed that the offenses committed 
were a serious threat to the public order and security. Since the offenders had 
no link to Denmark, expulsion for 5 years was justified.55 
Public order and residence beyond 5 years, cf. Art. 27 of the Directive  
A Lithuanian national who had entered Denmark in order to study there was 
twice found guilty of violence against persons and was twice sentenced to 3 
months prison.56 The Appeal Court found that the formal requirements for 
expulsion in the Aliens Act were fulfilled and the question was whether this 
was compatible with the Directive. Because the person had no connection to 
Denmark and had repetitively committed offenses during his short stay, he 
constituted a serious threat against the public order that justified expulsion for 
3 years. A Spanish national was condemned to 4 months prison for 13 of-
fenses of fraud using false names and credit cards and for false declarations to 
the police.57 He had worked (on the black market) and lived in Denmark for 
nearly 2 years. The Appeal Court found that expulsion for 5 years was com-
patible with EU law and the free movement of workers. The Court relied di-
rectly on Art. 27(2) and quoted considerations 23 and 24 of the preamble of 
the Directive. Referring to the ECJ’s ruling in case C-100/01, Olazabal, it 
noted that it was up to the national court to assess whether the conditions for 
expulsion were fulfilled. It found that the person’s systematic criminal behav-
ior made him a genuine, present, and sufficiently serious threat against the 
public order.  
                                                        
54. Judgment of the Supreme Court of 29/12/08 in case 170/2008, reported in 
U.2009.813H. For a similar case of expulsion as a result of stealing, see judgment of 
the Supreme Court of 31/3/11 in case 143/2009, reported in U.2011.1788H. 
55. Judgment of the Supreme Court of 19/10/09 in case 425/2008, reported in U.2010. 
250H. 
56. Judgment of the Eastern Appeal Court of 29/1/09, S-3604-08, reported in U.2009. 
1137Ø. 




 On the other hand, the Supreme Court found that it would be dispropor-
tionate to expel a British national who was condemned to 60 days prison for 
violence against a bus driver.58 The Court relied on the fact that his offense 
was a result of an impulsive reaction, that he had not previously committed 
criminality, and that he had family residing in Denmark. The Supreme Court 
thereby quashed on this point the ruling of the district court which had been 
confirmed on Appeal.  
Public order and imperative grounds, cf. Art. 28(3) of the Directive 
A Slovakian national who had resided in Denmark for more than 10 years 
was sentenced to 4 years and 6 months prison for various offenses, such as 
stealing and violence against persons.59 The Appeal Court considered that he 
should be expelled for life relying essentially on the serious nature of the 
committed offenses and the fact that he had previously been sentenced to 5 
years prison for similar offenses. It was not disputed that the Slovakian na-
tional had strong links to Denmark, had three sisters living there, and spoke 
the language. In contrast, he had no link to Slovakia and could barely speak 
the language. Nevertheless, the Appeal Court found that because of the seri-
ousness of the offenses, expulsion was not disproportionate. The question 
was raised whether the Slovakian national could be protected under Art. 
28(3)(a) and whether the expulsion was based on imperative grounds of pro-
tection of public security. The Appeal Court found that prison years should 
be taken into account in calculating the period of residence relying on the fact 
that they constitute legal residence. Yet, the seriousness of the offenses com-
mitted made expulsion necessary on imperative grounds of public security. 
 Art. 28(3)(a) was also applicable in an expulsion case against a Portuguese 
national who had lived in Denmark for more than 19 years.60 He was sen-
tenced to 1 year and 3 months prison for abusive behavior, repeatedly beating 
and threatening his three sons over a period of more than 10 years. The Su-
preme Court found that expulsion was not required on imperative grounds of 
public security and would therefore be contrary to the Directive. It is interest-
                                                        
58. Judgment of the Supreme Court of 29/12/08 in case 169/2008, reported in U.2009. 
808H. 
59. Judgment of the Western Appeal Court of 13/11/08, S-1421-08, reported in U.2009. 
581V. 
60. Judgment of the Supreme Court of 12/1/12 in case 128/2011, reported in U.2012. 
1119H. 
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ing to note that the Court in this case exclusively relied on the Directive and 
did not refer to the Aliens Act.  
 In the summer 2013, the Appeal Court found that expulsion against a Cro-
atian national who grew up in Denmark was based on imperative require-
ments of public security.61 The Croatian national was condemned to 5 years 
prison for robbery and was previously convicted and imprisoned for similar 
offenses. In addition, he had twice been sentenced to expulsion, but the sanc-
tions were suspended. The convicted person’s personal situation and his link 
to Denmark could not outweigh the seriousness of the criminality committed. 
This was despite the fact that it was not disputed that he grew up in Denmark 
where his family was living, that he had no link to Croatia, and could only 
speak Roma besides Danish. 
EU citizenship beyond Directive 2004/38/EC – exploring national 
application of primary EU Law 
Question 7 
In Denmark, EU law is only applicable where the situation is not purely in-
ternal. Danish nationals have to demonstrate that there is a cross-border ele-
ment in their case in order for the EU free movement provisions to apply. 
There is thus is no constitutional principle of equal treatment putting Danish 
nationals at the same level as other EU nationals protected by EU law. Yet, in 
exceptional situations, EU law might apply in purely internal situations pur-
suant to Art. 20 TFEU and the Zambrano-ruling. 
Art. 21 TFEU and purely internal situations 
EU law is very relevant in cases of family reunification, since the Danish 
Immigration rules are quite restrictive, especially where compared to the lib-
eral EU rules.62 The right of Danish nationals to family reunification in Den-
mark pursuant to EU law is provided for in the EU Residence Order and is 
                                                        
61. Judgment of the Eastern Appeal Court of 26/8/13, S-4062-12, not yet reported. 
62. Issues of the application of EU law to Danish nationals also arise in respect of the 
right to social benefits upon the person’s return to Denmark. Indeed some benefits 
are/were conditional upon previous residence in Denmark in a certain amount of 
years (D’Hoop type of cases). 
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further implemented through practice of the Immigration Office which fol-
lows the guidelines issued by the relevant Ministry implementing the case-
law of the ECJ. According to Danish practice, Danish nationals shall demon-
strate that they have genuinely and effectively resided in another Member 
State. This requirement surprisingly follows from Metock (case C-127/08) 
even though this case has nothing to do with family reunification in one’s 
own State. The Immigration Office then assesses on a case by case analysis 
whether this requirement is fulfilled. It is up to the applicants to choose how 
to prove their previous use of the right of free movement and it is difficult to 
know upon which criteria the assessment is made. A registration certificate 
attesting residence in another Member State is not sufficient in itself and sup-
plementary documentation is needed. This leaves a great discretion to the 
public authorities, which is difficult to reconcile with the fundamental right of 
free movement and residence.  
 To my knowledge only one case of family reunification to a Dane pursu-
ant to EU law has reached Danish courts. The couple returned to Denmark 
after approx. 6 months in Germany where they were residing in a rented 
flat.63 The Western Appeal Court found that EU law was not applicable since 
the Danish national had not demonstrated that she had genuinely and effec-
tively resided in Germany. The national court relied on the fact that the Danish 
national kept her apartment in Denmark while the couple resided in Germa-
ny, that she was frequently in Denmark where she worked at weekends and 
that the plans of setting up a pizzeria in Germany were very loose. Implicitly 
the ruling seems grounded in an abuse of EU law in order to circumvent the 
strict Danish immigration rules. It seems extremely difficult for a Danish na-
tional to demonstrate genuine and effective residence where the person has 
not exercised economic activity in another Member State. In other words, 
such residence is implicitly assimilated to an abuse of EU law regardless of 
whether it is genuine and effective. The Danish Appeal Court did not find it 
necessary to ask a preliminary question to the ECJ on the lawfulness of the 
Danish requirement and its application in the given case. On this background, 
the ECJ’s rulings on the nature and extent of the cross-border element in the 
pending cases of O and S are nervously awaited in Denmark.64 
 Where the Danish national has a right to family reunification pursuant to 
the free movement rules in the Treaty, the provisions of the Directive apply 
by analogy in defining the protected family members, the length and the con-
                                                        
63. Judgment of Western Appeal Court of 27/3/2012, B-1173-11, reported in U2012. 
2187V. 
64. C-456/12, O and C-457/12. 
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ditions for residence.65 This is not the case where the right of family reunifi-
cation is based on Art. 20 TFEU which is analysed below. 
Art. 20 TFEU and internal situations 
The Ministry of Integration has in a Briefing Note on the legal implications of 
the Zambrano ruling specified that the ECJ’s ruling in this and subsequent 
cases is very narrow.66 It is only applicable in cases where the decision of the 
Danish authorities would lead to his/her departure. In cases of family reunifi-
cation, the following criteria have to be taken into account: (1) the case must 
concern the right of residence of a parent to a Danish child, (2) the parent 
shall be a third-country national, (3) the parent shall live with the Union citi-
zen and provide for his/her needs, (4) refusing a right of resident to the parent 
would lead the child to leave the Union, which is most likely where there is 
no other parent with whom the child can live, (5) the parent does not need to 
be the biological parent, but can be another adult upon whom the child is de-
pendent.67 According to the Ministry of Justice, Zambrano-situations are un-
likely to arise in Denmark as children born in Denmark normally only get 
Danish nationality where one of the parents is a Danish national (and in such 
a case the Zambrano-rationale is not applicable). Should the extraordinary 
situation nevertheless arise where a Danish child is compelled to leave the 
Union, then the third-country national shall be granted a right of residence 
pursuant to Art. 20 TFEU.68 Yet, since the Directive is not applicable to this 
situation, Danish authorities shall not apply its provisions by analogy, and the 
                                                        
65. Where Danish nationals have not worked in another Member State, but only resided 
there lawfully, they have to demonstrate on their return that they can provide for their 
needs and for that of their family. Such interpretation of EU law is difficult to recon-
cile with the ECJ’s ruling in case C-291/05, Eind. 
66. Briefing Note of the Ministry of Integration of 11/5/2011 on the legal implications of 
the Zambrano-ruling. The note was subsequently updated by the Ministry of Justice 
(now in charge of immigration) in the light of the cases C-434/09, Mc Carthy, C-
256/11, Dereci and C-356-357/11, O & S.  
67. In accordance with the Court’s rulings in joined cases C-356-357/11, O & S. 
68. Such extraordinary situation could arise where Denmark is compelled by the U.N. 
Convention on the protection of the rights of children to grant Danish nationality to a 
stateless child born in Denmark. It could also arise in mixed couples where the Danish 
parent dies, departs, or is in some other way is not providing for the needs of the Danish 
child, or the couple divorces. 
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authorities are not bound by its provisions on who is a family member and on 
the right of permanent residence.69  
 The restrictive interpretation of Zambrano by the Danish government is 
questionable in the light of EU law. Indeed, it might argue that since the deci-
sive criterion is the link of dependency with the Union citizen/Danish nation-
al, a right of residence pursuant to Art. 20 might also arise in cases where the 
Union citizen is not a child, but an adult who is dependent on another person 
for his financial and emotional needs. Likewise, Danish authorities’ refusal to 
give a right of residence under EU law to the other parent who is also a third-
country national (Mrs Zambrano) is also difficult to reconcile with EU law. 
Yet, it is typical of the Danish authorities’ restrictive application of the 
Court’s case-law on family reunification. No court case has been reported on 
Art. 20 TFEU, but the Ministry of Integration has in four decisions referred to 
the Zambrano-ruling.70 In two of these cases, a right of residence was given 
on the basis of Art. 20 TFEU to a third-country national who was a widow to 
a Danish national with whom she had a Danish child. 
Question 8 
The Rottmann ruling of 2010 had no direct implications on the Danish rules 
of loss of nationality. Yet, Danish law and practice might be difficult to rec-
oncile with the requirements of Union citizenship. 
 Danish nationality is automatically lost where the individual (1) has ob-
tained another nationality or (2) was born in another country and has by 
his/her 22 years not lived in Denmark and has no attachment to the country. 
A person might be deprived from his/her nationality by court order (1) if the 
person has obtained it by fraud, or (2) has been convicted of a crime against 
the State.71 Until now a couple of court orders have deprived citizens of their 
Danish nationality because of fraud, while the only case so far on grounds of 
crime against the State has been rejected.72 It is only in respect of the latter 
ground that courts may refuse deprivation if the person becomes stateless. In 
                                                        
69. See the Briefing Note of the Ministry of Justice of 15/7/2013 on the legal implications 
of the Zambrano and subsequent rulings. 
70. See P. Starup, Grundlæggende Udlændingeret I, DJØF 2012 at p. 354. 
71. Nationality Act No. 252 of 1950 with further amendments. See Consolidated Act No. 
422 of 7/6/2004 actually in force. 
72. Eva Ersbøll, ‘Country report – Denmark’ for the EUDO Citizenship Observatory, up-
dated in June 2013 available on: http://eudo-citizenship.eu/admin/?p=file&appl 
=countryProfiles&f=2013-25-Denmark.pdf. 
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contrast, this is not the case where the deprivation is grounded on fraud.73 In-
deed, a person who was naturalized Danish was deprived of this nationality 
because of false declaration (not mentioning that he had been sentenced to 
prison and permanently deported from Denmark) although this deprivation 
rendered him stateless (he had previously renounced his Turkish nationali-
ty).74 This ruling of the Appeal Court which was given in 2003 before Rott-
mann, is difficult to reconcile with this case and the principles of Union citi-
zenship. 
 Concerning acquisition of Danish nationality, Danish rules are quite re-
strictive and nationality is essentially based on jus sanguinis while naturaliza-
tion is possible after several years of residence.75 Controversies very rarely 
reached Danish courts. It follows from the Constitution that nationality is in-
deed granted by name to each applicant by an Act of Parliament and can 
therefore not be subject to judicial review. This practice was very recently 
overruled by the Supreme Court which accepted for the first time to review 
the preparatory ‘decisions’ leading up to the Nationality Act.76 Such ‘overrul-
ing’ was grounded in Denmark’s international obligations which have to be 
respected or would otherwise lead to State liability for damages.  
 Finally, it might argue that the provisions of the Nationality Act which 
make a distinction between children depending on whether they are born in 
Denmark or in another country might conflict with the Union citizenship and 
the fundamental right of free movement.77 Issues on nationality, naturaliza-
tion, and double/multiple nationality are at the moment a hot topic in Den-
mark and are issues where courts might now play a role. 
                                                        
73. Eva Ersbøll mentioned above. 
74. UfR.2003.1600V. 
75. On the restrictive rules of acquisition of Danish nationality, see the report of Eva Ers-
bøll mentioned above. 
76. Judgment of the Supreme court of the 13/9/2013 in case 306/2012. 
77. See Sect. 8.1 of the Nationality Act where Danish citizens born in another country 
lose their nationality when they are 22 years old if they have not lived or have no 
connection to Denmark and Sect. 1.1 where the a child born abroad to a Danish father 
cannot become Danish. 
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Political rights of EU citizens 
Question 9 
The Directive on EP elections of 1993 was implemented by an amendment to 
the Act on Election of Danish Members of the European Parliament on the 1st 
of February 1994.78 The Directive is fully implemented and contains no de-
rogations. Similarly, it does not impose any additional conditions on EU na-
tionals compared to Danish nationals.  
 Voting rights to the EP are granted to any citizen of another Member State 
who is 18 or above on the day of election and who is residing in Denmark.79 
Union citizens have the right to stand to the EP provided that they have the 
right to vote. Like Danish citizens, they may be deprived of their eligibility 
right if they have been punished for an act which makes them unworthy to be 
a member of the EP, this assessment being made by the Parliament (Folke-
ting). In addition and in accordance with the Directive, citizens of other 
Member States do not have such right to stand if they have been deprived of 
their eligibility right by a decision in civil or criminal law in their own 
State.80  
 Danish citizens who reside in another Member State have the right to vote 
and stand to EP elections on the same conditions as mentioned above with the 
exception of the residence requirement.81 These rights are also granted to 
Danish nationals living in a third country who plan on returning to Denmark 
within 2 years (are considered to be residents in Denmark). Yet, this does not 
apply when moving to the Faroe Islands or Greenland. As pointed out by Eva 
Ersbøll in her report on Denmark for the EUDO Citizenship Observatory, this 
practice does not seem compatible with the ECJ’s ruling in case C-300/04, 
Eman and Sevinger. It does indeed make a difference of treatment between 
                                                        
78. See Act No. 1086 of 22/12/1993.  
79. According to the Act on the Civil Registration System, Sect. 6, ‘residence’ means the 
place (dwelling) where a person regularly sleeps when not temporarily absent owing 
to holiday, business travel, illness or the like, and where the person has his or her 
property and belongings, cf. Eva Ersbøll mentioned above. 
80. Eva Ersbøll, ‘Access to electoral rights – Denmark’, June 2013, EUDO Citizenship 
Observatory, available on: http://eudo-citizenship.eu/admin/?p=file&appl=country 
Profiles&f=137-DK-FRACIT.pdf. 
81. See Section 3(1)(2) of the Act. 
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Danes residing in a third country and Danes residing in other parts of the 
Danish realm which seems difficult to justify. 
Question 10 
The Directive on local elections of 1994 was fully implemented by the Act on 
Local and Regional Elections of the 1st of July 1995.82 The directive is im-
plemented without derogations and there is no additional conditions imposed 
on EU citizens when compared to Danes. As noted by Eva Ersbøll in her re-
port on access to electoral rights mentioned above, ‘the issue of EU citizens’ 
electoral rights at local elections has been more or less uncontroversial, and 
there is no relevant case law on this matter in domestic courts or the ECJ’. 
Denmark had indeed already granted electoral rights at local elections, first to 
Nordic citizens since 1977, and later, in 1981, to all foreigners. 
Question 11 
EU nationals who have the right to vote to local elections also have such right 
in respect of elections to the 5 regional councils. Regional and local elections 
are indeed regulated through the same Act and follow the same principles.  
Question 12 
There does not seem to be any tension between EU law and Danish law limit-
ing the scope of the franchise of residents in Denmark. Only persons with 
mental disabilities may be disenfranchised. According to the Danish Consti-
tution’s Sect. 29, a person who has been declared legally incompetent be-
comes disenfranchised. This will be the case where a person is deprived of 
his or her legal capacity under a guardianship order.83 This is also specified in 
the various elections Acts. Prisoners cannot be disfranchised, but a conviction 
may render a person unable to run to public offices. They are different rules 
depending on the elections (national, regional/local, and the EP).84 No differ-
ence is made between Danish citizens and other EU nationals. 
 There might be a tension between EU law and the constitutional require-
ment of residence for the franchise of Danish nationals. According to Sect. 
29 of the Constitution, only Danes who reside in Denmark have a right to 
                                                        
82. See Act No. 208 of 29/3/1995 amending the Act on local elections. 
83. See the report of Eva Ersbøll mentioned above in footnote 80. 
84. See further the report of Eva Ersbøll mentioned above. 
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vote, thereby excluding Danes residing in other Member States. Since emi-
grants very rarely will enjoy a right to vote for the national parliament of their 
place of residence, this could amount to an obstacle to the free movement of 
Union citizens which can only be upheld if justified and proportionate. Exter-
nal voting rights are supported by most political parties and, ‘consequently, 
the residence requirement has been broadened as much as possible within the 
limits of the Constitution’.85 
Culture(s) of citizenship 
Question 13 
Danish authorities and courts have in their application of EU law, a tendency 
to be quite formalistic and their starting point is generally the national legal 
framework and culture. Union citizen is thus at times understood as an ad-
junct to Danish immigration law. This is especially true in respect of expul-
sion cases where the reference is the Aliens Act and the formal categories that 
it operates with. Only afterwards, do the administration and courts check 
whether the given outcome is also in line with EU law. It is also interesting to 
note that the Aliens Act is by its complexity and its terminolgy more aimed at 
the administration than at the citizen. One might argue that it is more framed 
in permission terms than in right-based terms and this might be reflected in 
the way issues of foreigners, including Union citizens, are addressed and ad-
ministrated. Yet, recent court cases are evidence of a change in this respect 
with direct reference to EU law and the protection of individual rights. 
 Similarly, as the report has also shown there is at times a restrictive inter-
pretation of EU rights, especially in two areas. The first area is that of social 
benefits, be it for workers (and first-time jobseekers) or for inactive Union 
citizens. It is difficult to assess whether the latter enjoy any right or protection 
at all. ‘Pure’ Union citizenship rights thus seem predomantly construed as 
permission- rather than right-based, and depend on whether Union citizen is 
seen as lawfully residing in Denmark. The second area, where the authorities 
have a restrictive interpretation of EU-rights is family reunification (and so-
cial benefits) for their own citizens who have made used, of their free move-
ment rights or who might be covered by the Zambrano-doctrine.  
                                                        
85. Eva Ersbøll mentioned above. 
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 On a final note, with the exception of expulsions, I have found very little 
litigation. There might be issues of Union citizenship that never reach courts 
and Appeal boards, or that are not reported. In addition, courts and boards 
nearly never refer cases for a preliminary ruling to the ECJ in respect of free 
movement of persons and Union citizenship. In some of the expulsion cases, 
courts addressed this issue, but always concluded that a reference was not 
needed in the given case. There is only one exception which is the reference 
by the Appeal Tribunal for Students’ Grants and Loans Scheme in the LN 
case mentioned in question 5. This is, to my knowledge, the first time an Ap-
peal Tribunal in the social area asks the ECJ how EU law and the Residence 
Directive shall be interpreted.  
Question 14 
To my knowledge, no court case relating to Union citizenship and/or free 
movement rights refers to the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European 
Union. For example, there is no reference to the Charter in any of the depor-
tation cases reported under question 6. 
Question 15 
Issues connected to EU nationals feature quite frequently in the Danish main-
stream and specialized media. Issues on EU nationals are generally reported 
under the heading of immigration where they are mostly pictured in negative 
terms. Media rarely refer to EU/Union citizenship as such. A search on Info-
media (which is a database covering all press articles published in Denmark) 
reveals that the concept is not used in the Danish newspapers and the rights 
attached thereto are generally not mentioned. As a general rule, the Danish 
media do not clearly distinguish between EU citizens and immigrants from 
third countries. In contrast, they are mostly all together treated as ‘foreigners’. 
Yet, there is at times a tendency of criticising specific groups of foreigners, 
such as those from the Eastern European countries, the Polish, Turks, Soma-
lians, and so on.  
 Dominant themes are access to state benefits and expulsion of immigrants. 
In addition, there is specific focus on issues of social tourism and social 
dumping, which are mainly a consequence of the application of EU law. 
Therefore EU citizens are the target of such criticism and especially those 
from the poorer Eastern European EU countries.  
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The media, politicians and social tourism 
2013 was the year where politicians and the press were shocked by the ECJ’s 
ruling in the LN case, mentioned above, entitling students who work part-
time in Denmark to student grants on an equal footing with Danish nationals. 
Nearly all political parties reacted negatively, and claimed that this was not 
an issue that the EU and the ECJ shall decide upon. The general picture that 
emerged from the Danish media was that the ECJ’s ruling threatened the ex-
istence of the Danish welfare State in the long run, as well as the future of 
Danish students. Yet, two parties, the Radicals and the Social Democrats 
claimed afterwards that this supposed threat was largely overstated as num-
bers did not predict a high increase in entitled students from other Member 
States. 
 Looking further back in time, since the enlargement of the EU to the 10 
new Member States in 2004, the issue of social tourism has been on the 
agenda of both politicians and the media.86 The discourse revolves around the 
distinction between ‘us’ and ‘them’, where EU-nationals – especially those 
from the Eastern European countries – are portrayed as people who mainly 
come to Denmark to benefit from its generous social system, such as family 
and employment benefits.87 A few politicians refuted this assumption and in 
autumn 2013, the media timidly qualified the picture by quoting experts’ 
views that there is no evidence that people move to get access to State bene-
fits.88 Also the Commission’s report counteracting the widespread notion of 
welfare tourism within some Member States received some media cover-
age.89  
                                                        
86. In view of the enlargement of 2004, the government issued a report on Danish social 
benefits (‘Danske sociale ydelser i lyset af udvidelsen af EU’) in April 2003 which 
was abundantly discussed in the media. 
87. For example, see the article of 23/9/2013 in Jyllands-Posten on the number of EU-
citizens who are in receipt of the jobseeker allowance, ‘Flere end 7.000 EU-borgere 
får dansk kontanthjælp’, and Jyllands-Posten,18/10/2013 on family benefits, ‘Rege-
ringen mangler flertal for at fjerne hegnet om børnepengene’. On benefit tourism 
more generally, see for example Ugebrevet A4, ‘Velfærdsturisme starter dansk vel-
færdsslagsmål’, 24/9/2013, and Jyllands-Posten, ‘Spillet om den danske velfærd’, 
25/8/2013. 
88. Mandag Morgen, ‘‘Velfærdsturisme’ er en god forretning’, 16/10/2013. 
89. European Commission, DG Employment, Social Affairs, and Inclusion, Final report 
submitted by ICF GHK in association with Milieu Ltd. ‘A fact finding analysis on the 
impact on the Member States' social security systems of the entitlements of non-
active intra-EU migrants to special non-contributory cash benefits and healthcare 
granted on the basis of residence’ of 14/10/2013. 
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 Yet, media focus is still on EU-nationals from poor countries contributing 
little to the Danish welfare State or for little time and filling their pockets 
with State money on their way. In the Autumn 2013, the Ministry for Euro-
peean Affairs stated that he would look at each specific social benefits and 
assess which safeguards could be put into place. In this respect Denmark 
joined the club of countries comprising the UK, Germany, and The Nether-
lands which are actually putting pressure on the EU to protect themselves 
against what they call ‘poverty migration’.90 
 The negative image of immigrants/EU nationals and their association with 
social tourism is to a certain extent due to the huge impact of the Danish Right 
Wing Party, The Danish People’s party (Dansk Folkeparti) on the Liberal-
Conservative government between 2002 and 2011 where it was supporting it. 
For several years, the People’s Party made the adoption of restrictive immi-
gration rules and/or cuts in immigrants’ rights to social benefits a condition 
for their support of the government’s State budget. In addition, the Party was 
the initiator of at least one comprehensive study examining how to restrict the 
social rights of foreigners.91 Likewise, the People’s Party entered into an 
agreement with the Liberal-Conservative government in 2008 with a view to 
combat the negative consequences of the Metock ruling. Both the report and 
the agreement received massive media coverage. The party is still successful 
in drawing the attention of politicians, the media, and the Danish people on 
the threat that EU citizens pose to the welfare state. This was most recently 
demonstrated in relation to the issue of student grants. The party perceived 
the LN ruling as the ECJ’s unlawful intrusion into Danish sovereignty, and 
obtained that the numbers of applications would be closely monitored and the 
issue would be taken up again in the coming years.  
The media, Roma people, and expulsion cases 
The Roma people are a minority group on which the media focuses massive-
ly. Issues relating to the Roma people pop up regularly in the Danish media 
depending on police reporting. This is true not only in respect of problems 
                                                        
90. Berlingske Tidende, ‘Danmark går i EU-opgør om sociale ydelser’ of 30/11/2013. 
91. The Danish People’s party was, for example, the successful initiator of a report on 
foreigners’ access to social benefits in March 2011 where the Ministry of Employ-
ment issued a report on ‘residence requirements’ (‘Rapport om optjeningsprincippet i 
forhold til danske velfærdsydelser’). Still in 2011, the economic consequences of for-




arising in Denmark, but also more generally where the media refer to situa-
tions involving this minority in other Member States. The media uses cases 
from all Europe to fuel public indignation and thereby confirm all the stereo-
types around the Roma people.  
 The influence of the Danish People’s Party is also clearly visible on the 
issue of criminality committed by foreigners in Denmark, and their coverage 
by the media. The party is a frontrunner in discussing issues of expulsion of 
foreigners and prevention against criminality through border control. It is one 
of the few parties that support the abolition of the Schengen area and it was 
close to succeeding in this respect just before the Liberal-Conservative gov-
ernment stepped down in the autumn of 2011.  
 In conclusion, media mainly mirror a negative picture of immigrants, in-
cluding EU nationals, which are associated to the fear of social tourism and 
dumping. Whereas EU individual rights, especially of workers, are at times 
explained by the media in small ‘fact-boxes’, the discourse is generally not 
one protective of these rights, but one which challenge their legitimacy. In 
other words, media attention is selective and more directed at the potential 
abuse of the generous Danish system. It is interesting to note in this respect 
that criticism is essentially targeted at those who are economically active, 
such as workers who contribute little to the Danish economy or for little time 
and who, nevertheless, have access to social benefits, for example jobseeker 
allowances and family benefits. Public discourse is not really concerned with 
access to social benefits by inactive EU citizens, but by those who in EU le-
gal jargon qualify as workers. There is not a lot of focus on the social rights 
of the inactive and the reason might well be that the authorities in practice do 
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Estonia 
As a preliminary remark, it should be noted that there have been very few 
cases in Estonia relating to Directives 2004/38/EC, 93/109/EC, and/or 
94/80/EC and/or the citizenship rights conferred directly by the Treaties or 
the Charter of Fundamental Rights. It is therefore difficult to outline any clear 
evolution in the understanding and interpretation of citizenship rights based 
on administrative and court practice.  
Citizenship within Directive 2004/38/EC – stability of residence for 
Union citizens and their family members 
Question 1 
Directive 2004/38/EC (hereinafter also Directive) is primarily transposed into 
the Estonian legal system by the Citizen of the European Union Act2 (herein-
after also CEUA), which originally entered into force on 1 May 2004 when 
Estonia joined the European Union. The Act was considerably amended in 
2006 in order to transpose Directive 2004/38/EC, with the amendments enter-
ing into force on 1 August 2006.  
 As regards the application of the CEUA to Union citizens and their family 
members, the authors would like to point out three issues. 
 First, whereas Directive 2004/38/EC distinguishes between Union citi-
zens’ family members as defined in Art. 2(2) who enjoy the right of entry in-
to and residence in the host Member State, and other family members envis-
aged in Art. 3(2) whose entry and residence must only be facilitated,3 no such 
                                                        
1. Merike Saarmann, LL.M, Advisor to the Chancellor of Justice of the Republic of Es-
tonia; Siiri Aulik, LL.M, Aequalitas Consulting. The report reflects the personal 
views of the authors. 
2. Euroopa Liidu kodaniku seadus. The English translations of Estonian Acts are avail-
able at www.riigiteataja.ee/en. Please note that not all translations are up to date.  
3. Cf. C-83/11 Secretary of State for the Home Department v Muhammad Sazzadur 
Rahman and Others [2012] not yet reported, paras 18-20.  
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distinction is made in the CEUA. According to the CEUA, the term ‘family 
member’ includes the spouse of the Union citizen, direct descendants under 
the age of 21, and dependent direct relatives in the ascending and descending 
line of both the Union citizen and his or her spouse. It also includes other 
people who, in the country from which they arrive, are dependents or mem-
bers of the household of the Union citizen or persons who require personal 
care by the Union citizen for reasons of health or disability.4 However, the 
wording of the CEUA implies that a dependent person must already have re-
sided together with the Union citizen prior to arriving in Estonia. This re-
quirement may prove to be problematic in light of the recent case law of the 
CJEU, as dependent persons hoping to benefit from these provisions of the 
CEUA might not necessarily have previously shared a common household 
with the Union citizen in the country from which they arrive.5 
 Secondly, since registered partnerships, be they between same-sex or op-
posite-sex partners, are not legally recognized in Estonia, the concept of 
‘family member’ in the CEUA would not seem to include registered partners. 
The CEUA also does not make any specific reference to partners with whom 
the Union citizen has a duly attested durable relationship, as set out in Art. 
3(2)(b) of the Directive. However, a recent analysis on non-marital partner-
ships published by the Ministry of Justice suggests that a (registered) partner 
of a Union citizen could fall under the definition of ‘member of the house-
hold’ of the Union citizen, and thus fall within the scope of application of the 
CEAU.6 According to the information provided by the Ministry of the Interi-
or, this interpretation has been followed in practice and the right of residence 
of (registered) partners has been recognized. 
                                                        
4. Subsection 3(1) CEUA. 
5. Supra nota 3, paras 27-35. The CJEU noted: ‘[---] the wording of Directive 2004/38 
does not support the conclusion that family members of a Union citizen who do not 
fall under the definition in Article 2(2) of that directive and who have duly demon-
strated their situation of dependence on that citizen can be excluded from the scope of 
Article 3(2) of the directive solely because they have not resided in the same State as 
that citizen’. 
6. Andra Olm. Mitteabieluline kooselu ja selle õiguslik regulatsioon (Non-marital Co-
habitation and its Legal Regulation), Ministry of Justice, 2009, p. 77. Available at: 
http://www.just.ee/orb.aw/class=file/action=preview/id=44568/Partnerlussuhted_anal
%FC%FCs_09.07.2009.pdf (4 November 2013). A similar interpretation has been 
given by the Minister of the Interior in his letter dated 17.11.2012 to the Chancellor 




 Thirdly, while the CEUA applies to Union citizens and their family mem-
bers, it expressly states that it does not apply to Estonian citizens.7 Yet the 
CJEU has confirmed that barriers to family reunification are liable to under-
mine the right to free movement not only when a Union citizen moves 
abroad, but also where that person wishes to return to his own state after hav-
ing lived and (genuinely) worked in another Member State for a certain 
amount of time.8 This raises the question of which rules should be applicable 
where an Estonian citizen who has lived and worked in another Member 
State wishes to return home together with his or her non-EU national spouse 
or (registered) partner. According to the information provided by the Ministry 
of the Interior, the provisions of the Aliens Act9 (i.e. not specific to Union na-
tionals and their family members) would be applicable in such situations. 
This, however, is a cause of tension, as the provisions of the Aliens Act re-
garding family reunification are less favourable than the comparable provi-
sions of the CEUA (cf. answer to Question 7 below). At the time of writing 
this report, the authors are not aware of any such cases in Estonia, and thus it 
is not certain whether and how the practice of the CJEU would be taken into 
account when applying the relevant provisions of the Aliens Act. 
 As regards the implementation of Art. 5 of the Directive, no visa is re-
quired from third-country national family members who join or accompany a 
Union citizen and have a valid residence card.10 Also, where a visa is re-
quired, it is issued free of charge.11 The CEUA sets out that a visa may be is-
sued to a family member provided that he or she has a valid travel document, 
there is proof that he or she will be travelling with or joining a Union citizen, 
and that his or her status as a Union citizen’s family member is proved.12 The 
family member also need not have a valid health insurance contract.13 Ac-
cording to the Ministry of the Interior, where a family member does not have 
                                                        
7. Subsection 1(2) CEUA. Also, Art. 3(1) of Directive 2004/38/EC states that the Di-
rective applies to all Union citizens who move to reside in a Member State other than 
that of which they are a national, and to their family members. 
8. Cf. C-291/05 Eind [2007] ECR I-10719, esp. paras 35-37. Cf. also Communication 
from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council on guidance for 
better transposition and application of Directive 2004/38/EC on the right of citizens 
of the Union and their family members to move and reside freely within the territory 
of the Member States, Brussels, 02.07.2009 COM(2009) 313 final, p. 3. 
9. Välismaalaste seadus. 
10. Section 10 CEUA . 
11. Clauses 38(3)5) and 6) State Fees Act (riigilõivuseadus). 
12. Subsection 10(21) CEUA. 
13. Subsection 10(22) CEUA. 
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the required visa to enter Estonia, but it is proved that the person meets the 
abovementioned criteria, the visa is issued at the border, which in itself con-
stitutes an accelerated procedure.14  
Question 2 
With regard to the sufficient resources requirement set out in Art. 7(1) of the 
Directive, the CEUA does not lay down any conditions for the right of resi-
dence of a Union citizen for more than 3 months in Estonia except the re-
quirement to register one’s residence in the population register.15 This means 
that the Union citizen does not have to prove employment, sufficient re-
sources or valid health insurance coverage.  
 However, the requirement of sufficient financial resources does come into 
play when a Union citizen who has come to reside in Estonia wishes to be 
joined by his family members who themselves are not EU nationals.16 The 
CEUA foresees that the right of residence is granted to a family member pro-
vided that the Union citizen whom the family member wishes to accompany 
or join is either a worker or self-employed or has sufficient resources for him-
self and the family member, as well as valid health insurance, or if the Union 
citizen is a student who meets the same requirements of sufficient resources 
and health insurance. 
 The CEUA does not offer guidance on what are to be considered sufficient 
financial resources, but the explanatory memorandum to the draft CEUA 
mentions that this should be viewed on a case-by-case basis, taking account 
the particular circumstances of the person concerned.17  
 To date there is no administrative or court practice in Estonia on the ex-
pulsion of EU citizens and their family members on purely economic 
grounds. Considering that the threshold for a person to become eligible for a 
                                                        
14. The authors are not aware of any cases where the effectiveness of these procedural 
safeguards has been questioned. 
15. The obligation to register one’s place of residence also applies to Estonian citizens 
under the Population Register Act (rahvastikuregistri seadus). 
16. The requirement of sufficient resources is also relevant with regard to retention of the 
right of residence by family members in the event of the death or departure of the Union 
citizen or in the event of divorce (sections 36-38 CEUA). 
17. The explanatory memorandum to the draft CEUA (864 SE) is available on the web-
site of the Riigikogu, the Parliament of Estonia at: www.riigikogu.ee.  
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subsistence benefit in Estonia is very low,18 it would not be very difficult for 
a Union citizen to meet this requirement. 
 While no other (economic) conditions are posed on EU citizens to reside 
in Estonia, the requirement of a registered place of residence, however, seems 
to be the constitutive element of a Union citizen’s right of residence in Esto-
nia. According to the CEUA, a Union citizen only acquires the right of resi-
dence for more than three months in Estonia upon registration of his place of 
residence in the population register19 and, subsequently, that right of resi-
dence automatically ceases to exist if the place of residence is no longer reg-
istered.20 As having the right of residence is a pre-requisite for the lawful stay 
of more than three months of a Union citizen in Estonia (section 2 CEUA), a 
grammatical interpretation of the CEUA also leads to the result that, without 
a registered place of residence in Estonia, a Union citizen’s stay becomes al-
together illegal.21 Moreover, if a Union citizen does not have a registered 
place of residence, his non-EU-national family members cannot join him in 
Estonia. It should be mentioned, however, that the CEUA does not foresee 
the issue of an expulsion order against someone who has not registered, nor is 
there any sanction for failing to register a (correct) place of residence.  
 While registration in the population register serves an important public in-
terest function,22 it is questionable whether linking a right of residence and its 
consequences exclusively and strictly to the administrative procedure of reg-
                                                        
18. In 2013, persons whose monthly net income, after the deduction of the fixed expenses 
connected with their dwelling, was below 76.80 euros were eligible for a subsistence 
benefit. 
19. Subsection 7(2) CEUA provides that a citizen of the European Union must register 
his or her residence pursuant to the procedure provided for in the Population Register 
Act no later than three months after his or her date of entry into Estonia. At the same 
time, a Union citizen may apply for registration before this deadline and thus obtain a 
right of residence earlier.  
20. According to the interpretation provided by the Ministry of the Interior, a Union citi-
zen can reside in Estonia without registration for three months after his place of resi-
dence ceases to be registered in the population register. He must have his new place 
of residence registered by the end of this period in order to have a continuing right of 
residence in Estonia. 
21. This conclusion seems to apply regardless of whether the person has a job or suffi-
cient resources to support himself and his family. 
22. E.g. in relation to allocating a proportion of a person’s income tax to the local gov-
ernment’s budget, participating in local elections, calculating the period of the Union 
citizen’s continuous residence in Estonia in order to grant the right of permanent resi-
dence, etc.  
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istration is proportional in terms of Art. 8(4)23 and in light of recital 1124 of 
the Directive. 
Question 3 
The articles concerning retention of the right of residence by family members 
in the event of the death or departure of a Union citizen or in the event of the 
divorce or annulment of a marriage have been transposed into Estonian law in 
accordance with the relevant provisions of the Directive.  
 As regards the requirements of having sufficient resources and not becom-
ing an unreasonable burden on the Estonian social assistance system, see the 
answer to Question 2 above. According to the CEUA, a Union citizen must 
have sufficient resources for himself as well as his family if he wants to be 
joined by his non-EU national family member(s). If this condition is not met 
(or is no longer met during the period of residence), the CEUA foresees that 
expulsion measures may be taken against the family members. However, 
there are no provisions in Estonian law that prohibit the expulsion of family 
members of a Union citizen for economic reasons where the Union citizen is 
a worker, self-employed person or person seeking employment, as required 
by Art. 14(4) of the Directive.25  
Question 4 
The provisions of the CEUA regarding the right of permanent residence gen-
erally mirror the relevant provisions of the Directive. However, since the 
CEUA associates the acquirement of the right of residence for more than 
three months with registration in the population register, this criterion is also 
relevant when it comes to the right of permanent residence. In other words, 
the concept of legal residence implied by the words ‘have resided legally’ in 
Art. 16(1) of the Directive can, in the context of the CEUA, be construed to 
                                                        
23. Art 8(4), third sentence of the Directive states: ‘Failure to comply with the registra-
tion requirement may render the person concerned liable to proportionate and non-
discriminatory sanctions.’ 
24. Recital 11 of the Directive states: ‘The fundamental and personal right of residence in 
another Member State is conferred directly on citizens by the Treaty and is not de-
pendent upon their having fulfilled administrative procedures.’  
25. The authors are not aware of any court cases in Estonia dealing with retention of a 
right of residence or having sufficient resources and not becoming a burden on the 
national social assistance system. 
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mean having a registered place of residence in Estonia according to the Popu-
lation Registry Act.26 In order for residence to be considered continuous in 
the meaning of Art. 16(1) of the Directive, a Union citizen (and his family 
members) must live in Estonia for at least six months a year, with exceptions 
for longer periods of absence due to reasons referred to in Art. 16(3) of the 
Directive.27 The CEUA also prescribes an obligation to notify the Police and 
Border Guard Board of absences longer than six months. 
 According to the information provided by the Police and Border Guard 
Board, 5154 Union and European Economic Area citizens and citizens of the 
Swiss Confederation have been granted the right of permanent residence in 
Estonia. Also, 59 non-EU national family members have acquired the right of 
permanent residence in Estonia.28 
Question 5 
There is no specific provision in the CEUA that directly transposes Art. 24 of 
the Directive. Therefore, in order to obtain an overview of how the require-
ment of equal treatment and the derogations from this requirement (as set out 
in Art. 24(2)) are being applied, we must look into various sector-specific 
legislative acts. A number of different legislative acts regulate the provision 
of and access to different social benefits.29 Pursuant to these laws, benefits 
are available to both Estonian citizens as well as Union citizens and their 
family members who have the right of residence30 in Estonia. As noted earli-
er, according to the CEUA, the right of residence is linked to registration of a 
person’s place of residence in Estonia. Although there is no requirement to 
register a place of residence during the first three months of a person’s stay in 
Estonia, there is nothing to prevent a Union citizen from doing so. Conse-
quently, there do not seem to be any exceptions that would specifically limit 
access to social assistance during the first three months of residence (or longer 
periods with regard to job-seekers) mentioned in Art. 24(2) of the Directive. 
                                                        
26. Cf. also answer to Question 2. 
27. Subsection 2(2) CEUA.. 
28. Information as at 1 October 2013. To the best knowledge of the authors, there have 
been no court cases in Estonia regarding the right of permanent residence  
29. E.g. the Social Welfare Act, Social Benefits for Disabled People Act, State Family 
Benefits Act, Victim Support Act, Labour Market Services and Benefits Act, Parental 
Benefit Act, etc. This list is exemplary and does not aim to provide a comprehensive 
overview of all the social benefits granted in Estonia at state and local level. 
30. Cf. also the answer to Question 2 regarding the right of residence. 
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 Regrettably, it would seem that Estonia has not properly transposed the 
derogation expressly set out in Art. 24(2) of the Directive concerning mainte-
nance aid for studies. Whereas the Directive provides that Member States are 
not obliged to grant student loans prior to acquisition of the right of perma-
nent residence, such derogation can only be applied with regard to economi-
cally non-active Union citizens31. Consequently, if a Union citizen is a work-
er, self-employed person or retains such status, he should be treated equally 
with nationals of the Member State for the purposes of granting student 
grants and loans, i.e. without setting the requirement of permanent residence. 
As the CJEU has recently confirmed, the fact that a Union citizen has a right 
of residence in the Member State as a student ‘for the principal purpose of 
following a course of study’ does not automatically exclude the possibility 
that he can also have the status of worker within the meaning of Art. 45 
TFEU.32 Under the Estonian Study Allowances and Study Loans Act,33 study 
allowances are granted to both Estonian citizens and persons with the right of 
residence in Estonia under EU law. The possibility to apply for study loans, 
however, is limited to Union citizens and their family members who have ac-
quired the right of permanent residence, regardless of whether the Union citi-
zens simultaneously fall under the category of worker, self-employed person 
or someone who has retained such status. 
Question 6 
The CEUA provides for the possibility of restricting the right of entry and the 
right of residence of Union citizens and their family members, including the 
possibility of ordering their expulsion, if this is justified on the grounds of 
public policy, public security or public health. The specific regulation regard-
ing expulsion and exclusion orders, including the considerations that must be 
taken into account before issuing an expulsion order, is laid down in the Ob-
ligation to Leave and Prohibition on Entry Act.34 Although the Act sets out 
some specifications and limitations regarding Union citizens and their family 
members based on Arts 27-29 of the Directive, it does not clearly distinguish 
between the concepts of ‘public policy, public security or public health’, ‘se-
                                                        
31. Cf. C-46/12 L. N. v Styrelsen for Videregående Uddannelser og Uddannelsesstøtte 
[2013] not yet reported, para. 35. 
32. Ibid., paras 35-36. 
33. Õppetoetuste ja õppelaenu seadus. 
34. Väljasõidukohustuse ja sissesõidukeelu seadus. The Act applies to all foreigners, not 
only to Union citizens and their family members. 
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rious grounds of public policy or public security’ and ‘imperative grounds of 
public security’35. To the best of our knowledge, to date there have been no 
cases in Estonia where the differentiation between these concepts has been 
challenged or considered. 
 However, there has been one case in Estonia regarding prohibition of the 
right of entry of a Union citizen on grounds of public order and public securi-
ty. This case concerned two orders by the Minister of the Interior that set a 
short-term prohibition on entry on a Finnish citizen who was considered to 
incite political hatred and provoke conflict, and was suspected of cooperating 
with extremist groups that organise anti-government campaigns. The prohibi-
tion orders covered the time periods when the authorities expected that cam-
paigns aimed at provoking anti-Estonian sentiment would take place, which it 
was feared might result in violent clashes. According to the Minister, the de-
cisions considered the free movement rights of Union citizens and the re-
quirements set out in Directive 2004/38. While the court of first instance up-
held the orders, they were overturned by the court of appeal, which noted that 
while the appellant had expressed critical opinions about Estonian history, 
politics and relations between ethnic groups with which many people would 
disagree, these statements could not in themselves be considered to induce 
political hatred. Moreover, since it was not substantiated that the presence of 
the appellant at the planned public events would cause violent clashes, the 
measures taken against him were based on considerations of general preven-
tion and therefore unlawful.36 
                                                        
35. Cf. subsections 291(2) and (3) of the Obligation to Leave and Prohibition on Entry 
Act. These provisions refer to instances where a Member State cannot rely on 
grounds of public health or public order, but do not set out when expulsion decisions 
can be taken against Union citizens and their family members who have the right of 
permanent residence or who have resided in Estonia for ten years or more. 
36. Cf. decision of the Tallinn Circuit Court No. 3-09-1279 of 12.12.2010. Available at: 
https://www.riigiteataja.ee/kohtuteave/maa_ringkonna_kohtulahendid/menetlus.html?
kohtuasjaNumber=3-09-1279/72 (13 November 2013). 
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EU citizenship beyond Directive 2004/38/EC – exploring national 
application of primary EU Law 
Question 7 
To date there have been no cases in Estonia where the courts have dealt with 
possible rights deriving directly from EU citizenship status in situations that 
are argued to be ‘purely internal.’ However, the issue of reverse discrimina-
tion arising in purely internal situations has played a role in two of the cases 
addressed by the Chancellor of Justice (hereinafter also Chancellor).37 
 It is the settled case law of the CJEU that any difference in treatment be-
tween Union citizens who have exercised their right of freedom of movement 
and those whose situation is considered purely internal, does not fall within 
the scope of Union law.38 Nevertheless, the CJEU has suggested that such 
difference in treatment may still be relevant under national law where the law 
of the Member State requires that nationals of that state should be allowed to 
enjoy the same rights as those which nationals of another Member State 
would derive from Union law in a comparable situation.39 Against this back-
ground, it can be argued that the different treatment of persons who can and 
cannot invoke rights deriving from EU law comes within the scope of appli-
cation of § 12 of the Estonian Constitution, which sets out the principle of 
equality.40 This hypothesis has yet to be tested in the courts.  
 In the first of two cases, the Chancellor of Justice examined the linking of 
reduced public transport fares in Tallinn, the capital of Estonia, to a residence 
requirement, i.e. only registered residents of Tallinn could benefit from the 
reduced fares. In the opinion of the Chancellor, such a residence requirement 
                                                        
37. The Chancellor of Justice (õiguskantsler) is an independent official who reviews the 
legislation of general application of the legislative and executive powers and of local 
governments for conformity with the Constitution of the Republic of Estonia. He also 
serves as an Ombudsman. 
38. C-127/08 Metock [2008] ECR I-06241, para. 78. Cf. also different approach suggest-
ed by Advocate General Sharpston in the Ruiz Zambrano case. Opinion of Advocate 
General Sharpston in case C-34/09 Ruiz Zambrano [2011] ECR I-01177, paras 123-
150.  
39. Cf. C-212/06 Government of the French Community and Walloon Government 
[2008] ECR I-01683, para. 40. 
40. § 12 states: ‘Everyone is equal before the law. No one may be discriminated against 
on the basis of nationality, race, colour, sex, language, origin, religion, political or 
other views, property or social status, or on other grounds.’ 
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might constitute indirect discrimination on grounds of nationality under EU 
law and therefore EU citizens would be able to contest this measure relying 
on EU law.41 As regards Estonian citizens who reside in Estonia but outside 
of Tallinn and who cannot rely on EU law, the Chancellor noted that where 
the nationals of other Member States are treated more favourably in a compa-
rable situation solely due to the fact that they can invoke EU law, such situa-
tions could fall within the scope of § 12 of the Constitution. In other words, it 
might be possible to rely on the constitutional requirement of equal treatment 
in cases of reverse discrimination.42 
 In 2013, the Chancellor analysed the compliance of the Aliens Act with 
the constitutional requirements of respect for family life and equal treatment. 
Pursuant to the Aliens Act in conjunction with the Family Law Act,43 the 
third-country national spouse of an Estonian citizen can apply for a residence 
permit in Estonia while the same is not possible for a same-sex (registered) 
partner in a comparable situation.44 The applicants questioned whether this 
also constitutes reverse discrimination, as a Union citizen who resides in Es-
tonia can rely on the CEUA and Directive 2004/38 when seeking family reu-
nification with his or her non-EU national same-sex partner,45 whereas the 
Aliens Act applicable to static Estonian citizens does not foresee such possi-
bility. However, the Chancellor chose not to address the issue of reverse dis-
crimination in his conclusions,46 but rather found the regulation to be uncon-
stitutional based on the right of family life in conjunction with equal treat-
ment between same-sex and opposite-sex couples.47  
                                                        
41. A similar case was recently before the CJEU. Cf. C-75/11 Commission v Austria 
[2012] not yet reported. 
42. Cf. letter from the Chancellor of Justice to the Tallinn City Government, dated 
29.12.2010, reference number 6-4/100271/1007546, points 67-76. Available at the 
public document registry of the Chancellor of Justice at: http://adr.rik.ee/okk/. 
43. Perekonnaseadus. 
44. According to the Aliens Act, a temporary residence permit may be issued to a for-
eigner for the purpose of settling with a spouse. At the same time, the Family Law 
Act does not recognise registered partnerships and prescribes that marriage is con-
tracted between a man and a woman.  
45. Cf. answer to Question 1 above. 
46. Cf. letter of the Chancellor of Justice to the Minister of the Interior, 05.11.2013, refer-
ence number: 6-1/120905/1304680. Available on the website of Chancellor of Justice: 
http://oiguskantsler.ee/sites/default/files/field_document2/6iguskantsleri_margukiri_e
lamisloa_taotlemine_samasoolisele_elukaaslasele.pdf (5 November 2013). 
47. Whereas opposite-sex partners can marry in Estonia and thus have the potential to apply 
for a residence permit for a spouse, same-sex couples do not have the same option. 
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Question 8 
Although Estonia was one of the states that intervened and submitted obser-
vations in the Rottmann case, the subsequent (academic) discussion about the 
potential effects of the judgment in general as well as in the specific context 
of Estonian citizenship legislation has been relatively moderate.48 It is inter-
esting to point out, however, that the updated commentary on the Constitu-
tion of the Republic of Estonia now refers to the judgment and specifically 
notes that since Rottmann, the conditions for the acquisition and loss of citi-
zenship, while still within the competence of the Member States, must have 
due regard for EU law, and are at least partially subject to review by the 
CJEU.49 It remains to be seen whether and how such considerations emanat-
ing from Union law will be taken into account in adjudicating future cases 
regarding the acquisition and loss of Estonian citizenship.  
 There is, however, an ongoing discussion regarding the conditions of ac-
quisition of Estonian citizenship through naturalisation and, consequently, of 
Union citizenship. According to the Estonian Citizenship Act,50 Estonian citi-
zenship is acquired either by birth or naturalisation. Among other require-
ments for citizenship by naturalisation, the applicant must have lived in Esto-
nia on the basis of a residence permit or a right of residence for at least eight 
years prior to submitting an application for Estonian citizenship and must 
have lived permanently in Estonia for at least the five preceding years. Per-
manent residence in the context of the Citizenship Act means a lawful stay in 
Estonia for at least 183 days per year, provided that absence from Estonia 
does not exceed 90 consecutive days per year.  
                                                        
48. Cf. PhD dissertation: Berit Aaviksoo. Riigi otsustusruumi ahenemine: kodakondsus 
nüüdisaegses Euroopas. (Narrowing of State Discretion: Citizenship in Contemporary 
Europe) Dissertationes Iuridicae Universitas Tartuensis, Tartu, 2013. Available at: 
http://dspace.utlib.ee/dspace/bitstream/handle/10062/29120/aaviksoo_berit.pdf?seque
nce=1 (13 November 2013). Cf. also Berit Aaviksoo, Petturlik hr Rottmann, föderal-
iseeruv Euroopa ja põhiseaduse aluspõhimõtted – poleemiline pastišš (The Fraudu-
lent Mr. Rottmann, Federalising Europe and the Fundamental Principles of the Con-
stitution – Polemical Pastiche), Juridica 4/2013, pp. 223-233. 
49. Berit Aaviksoo. Comments to § 8 of the Constitution, Eesti Vabariigi põhiseadus. 
Kommenteeritud väljaanne, Juura, 2012. The commentary on the Constitution of the 
Republic of Estonia is available online: http://pohiseadus.ee/.  
50. Kodakondsuse seadus. 
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 A case brought before the Administrative Law Chamber of the Supreme 
Court51 (hereinafter SC) concerned a Turkish citizen who applied for Estoni-
an citizenship. Although he had moved to Estonia nearly ten years previously 
and had a family in Estonia, his application was rejected on the grounds that 
he did not meet the condition of permanent residence, since he had spent 
more than 183 days per year away from Estonia due to his work as a ship 
captain. The applicant claimed that he was discriminated against based on his 
occupation, which, due to its nature, did not allow for him to spend the neces-
sary minimum of at least 183 days per year in Estonia. 
 In its decision the SC noted that while persons who have resided in Esto-
nia for the required period of time and persons who have not are treated dif-
ferently, there are legitimate reasons, which justify the permanent residence 
requirement. These include the need to ensure that there is a stable connection 
between the person and the state, which consequently allows for the presump-
tion that he or she is sufficiently integrated in Estonian society. The perma-
nent residence requirement also enables the state to ensure that a person re-
spects and observes the constitutional order and laws of Estonia.52 
 In this case, which preceded Rottmann, the SC noted that by obtaining Es-
tonian citizenship, a person also becomes a Union citizen.53 The court did 
not, however, examine whether EU law and Union citizenship might have 
any impact on assessing the legality of Estonian citizenship requirements.  
 This judgment was criticized notably by one of the judges. In his dissent-
ing opinion, Justice Anton held that the requirement that a person is consid-
ered to have lived permanently in Estonia only if he has not left Estonia for 
more than 183 days per year for the past five years and which excludes any 
possibility of weighing the particular circumstances of the applicant might be 
too strict and consequently unconstitutional. He also noted that the notion of 
permanent residence should be construed to take into account changing social 
circumstances and the fact that it is becoming more common to work abroad. 
This includes situations where a person works in another Member State but 
returns regularly home to his family in the host Member State.54  
                                                        
51. The Supreme Court (riigikohus) is both a court of cassation and a constitutional re-
view court.  
52. Judgment of the Administrative Law Chamber of the Supreme Court No. 3-3-1-42-08 
of 20 October 2008, paras 26-30. Available at www.riigikohus.ee.  
53. Ibid., para. 29. 
54. Dissenting Opinion of Justice Tõnu Anton to the Judgment of the Administrative 
Law Chamber of the Supreme Court No. 3-3-1-42-08 of 20 October 2008, para. 3. 
Available at www.riigikohus.ee. 
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 In a subsequently published article, Uno Lõhmus questioned whether, in 
the light of the free movement of persons in the EU, such a strict and formal-
istic approach to the permanent residence requirement complied with EU law. 
He accurately noted that this question would clearly arise if the applicant 
were a citizen of another Member State applying for Estonian citizenship.55 
 More recently in 2012, the Chancellor of Justice addressed a proposal to 
parliament in which he held that the five-year permanent residence require-
ment in the Citizenship Act was unconstitutional and should be amended, as 
it does not allow for any consideration of the specific circumstances of the 
applicant.56 While the proposal found support in parliament, as of the time of 
submission of this report, the Citizenship Act has not been amended.  
 As for the conditions for loss of citizenship, the Citizenship Act foresees 
that a person must renounce his current citizenship in order to qualify for Es-
tonian citizenship by naturalisation. Further, Estonian citizenship that has 
been acquired through naturalisation can be revoked if the person has submit-
ted false information or concealed facts, which would have precluded the 
granting of citizenship57 and, consequently, a ‘Rottmann scenario’ could po-
tentially occur. It remains to be seen whether and how the proportionality and 
consequences of revocation of citizenship in light of EU citizenship rights 
would be taken into account, should such a case be brought before an Estoni-
an court. 
                                                        
55. Uno Lõhmus. Mõtteid kodakondsusest ühe kohtuotsuse valguses (Thoughts on Citi-
zenship in the Light of One Judgment), Juridica 2/2009, pp. 76-85 at p. 79. The article 
reflects the personal opinions of the author who was Judge at the European Court of 
Justice from 2004-2013. 
56. Proposal of the Chancellor of Justice to the Riigikogu, 04.07.2012. Available at: 
http://oiguskantsler.ee/sites/default/files/field_document2/6iguskantsleri_ettepanek_n
r_17_riigikogule_eestis_pusivalt_viibimise_absoluutne_noue_kodakondsuse_taotlem
isel_kods_ss_6_ja_11.pdf (13 November 2013). 
57. The Citizenship Act also provides that a person who has dual citizenship by birth 
must renounce either Estonian citizenship or citizenship of the other state within three 
years after attaining the age of 18. However, as § 8 of the Constitution prescribes that 
no one may be deprived of Estonian citizenship acquired by birth, in practice there is 
no lawful means of depriving a person of Estonian citizenship if no choice is made. 
Cf. B. Aaviksoo, Comments, supra nota 49.  
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Political rights of EU citizens 
Question 9 
The first European Parliament Electoral Act58 (hereinafter EPEA) in Estonia 
entered into force in January 2003 in anticipation of the accession of Estonia 
to the EU on 1 May 2004. The primary additional condition imposed on Union 
citizens is residence. Estonian law does not require that Estonian citizens be 
residents of Estonia or of an EU Member State in order to stand as a candi-
date or vote in European Parliament (hereinafter also EP) elections in Esto-
nia. If, however, a non-national EU citizen wishes to register as a voter or 
candidate, his or her permanent residence must be in Estonia, which the 
EPEA specifies to mean that the address details of the person have been en-
tered in the population register.59 As for other additional conditions, to regis-
ter as a voter, in addition to the information required pursuant to Art. 9(2) of 
Directive 93/109/EC, a non-national EU citizen must declare that he has not 
been deprived of the right to vote in his home Member State and must submit 
a copy of his identity document.60 To register as a candidate, EU citizens 
must submit the additional information set out in Art. 10(1) and (2) of the 
same Directive. We have found no evidence that fulfilment of these condi-
tions or registration as a voter or candidate has been problematic in practice.  
 While the EPEA appeared to transpose the full requirements of Directive 
93/109/EC, the fact that the right to be a member of a political party was re-
served exclusively for Estonian citizens created an important legal obstacle 
that interfered with the full enjoyment of the right to stand as a candidate of 
non-national EU citizens or, more precisely, with their right to stand a chance 
at actually being elected. In EP elections, candidates can stand either as indi-
vidual candidates or on a list prepared by a political party. While there is no 
formal requirement for a person on a party list to be a member of that party, 
the limit of twelve persons per list means that it is unlikely that anyone other 
than the party faithful will be included.61 Candidates on a list where votes are 
                                                        
58. Euroopa Parlamendi valimise seadus.  
59. Clause 4(2)2) and subsection 5(2) EPEA.  
60. Subsection 21(1) and (2) EPEA, in accordance with Art. 9(3) of Directive 93/109/EC.  
61. EP elections are rather simple in their structure in Estonia. Both before and after the 
entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon, Estonia has been allotted six seats in the EP 
and the entire country constitutes one electoral district. 
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accumulated have a clear advantage over individual candidates.62 The legality 
of the exclusion of EU citizens from political parties was questioned in two 
separate documents in 2005 by the EU Network of Independent Experts on 
Fundamental Rights.63 While this obstacle has not been challenged in the 
courts within the context of EP elections, it became the subject of a legal 
challenge in the context of municipal elections, which is detailed in the an-
swer to Question 10 below. The Political Parties Act has since been amended 
to allow for EU citizens to join and form political parties in Estonia.64  
 The EPEA must be amended to comply with the December 2012 amend-
ments to Directive 93/190/EC. Currently, non-national EU citizens must 
submit an attestation from the competent administrative authorities of their 
home Member State certifying that they have not been deprived of the right 
to stand as a candidate in the home Member State or that no such disqualifi-
cation is known to the authorities.65 Now, if a citizen of the Union wishes to 
exercise the right to stand as a candidate, he must declare that he has not lost 
the right to stand as a candidate in EP elections in his home Member State, 
but it will be up to the Member State of residence to verify this information.66 
To comply with the amendment to Art. 10 of the Directive, a Union citizen 
will in the future also be obliged to submit information on his date and place 
of birth and his last address in the Member of State of residence.67 The cur-
rent EPEA amendment bill designates the National Electoral Committee as 
the contact point to receive and transmit information.68 It is interesting to note 
that the bill does not foresee a different deadline for the submission of appli-
                                                        
62. MEP Indrek Tarand is a notable exception. In the 2009 EP elections he obtained 
25.8 % of the vote as an individual candidate, second only to one of six party lists, 
partially due to a general protest vote against party politics.  
63. Report on the Situation of Fundamental Rights in the European Union and its Mem-
ber States in 2005: Conclusions and Recommendations, p. 119, available at 
http://www.statewatch.org/news/2006/jun/EU-funrights-report05.pdf, (10 November 
2013); Opinion of the E.U. Network of Independent Experts on Fundamental Rights 
Regarding the Participation of E.U. Citizens in the Political Parties of the Member 
State of Residence. March 2005, p. 14, available at http://ec.europa.eu/justice/funda 
mental-rights/files/cfr_cdfopinion1_2005_en.pdf, (10 November 2013). Cited in U. 
Lõhmus, Mõtteid, supra nota 55, p. 83.  
64. This amendment entered into force on 10 December 2006.  
65. Subsection 27(6) EPEA.  
66. Council Directive 2013/1/EU OJ L 26/27, 26.1.2013, Art. 6(2) and (3).  
67. Proposed amendment to subsection 27(4) EPEA.  
68. As at 15 November 2013. Available in the draft legislation database of the Ministry 
of Justice, http://eelnoud.valitsus.ee/main/mount/docList/70101512-7641-4c9e-b1f8-
ad96de672abf#dCBKykZR, (15 November 2013).  
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cations to stand as a candidate by non-national Union citizens than that set for 
national citizens, as proposed in recital 8 of the amending directive. Current-
ly, applications are accepted between the 60th and 45th day before the elec-
tions and all candidates must be registered by the 40th day before election 
day.69 This short deadline might not be sufficient for information from the 
home Member States of all candidates to be considered in due time before 
registration closes, particularly since Member States are obliged to respond to 
requests for information in five working days,70 not calendar days. 
Question 10 
In preparation for membership in the EU, a new Local Government Council 
Electoral Act71 (hereinafter LCCEA) was passed in March 2002, which in-
cluded provisions regarding Union citizens that entered into force upon Esto-
nia’s accession to the EU on 1 May 2004. Both Estonian citizens and non-
national EU citizens must have their permanent residence, according to the 
information in the population register, in the municipality in which they wish 
to vote or run as a candidate.72 In general, all of the same requirements are 
imposed on Estonian and other EU citizens,73 except that EU citizens who 
wish to stand as a candidate must provide information on their nationality.74 
According to the National Electoral Committee, no disputes have arisen with 
regards to registration of non-national EU citizens as voters or candidates. 
Nevertheless, the issue of the extent to which political rights are guaranteed 
in practice has been raised.  
 The new LCCEA appeared to fully transpose Directive 94/80/EC. How-
ever, an important legal obstacle interfered with the full enjoyment of the 
right to stand as a candidate of non-national EU citizens or, more precisely, 
with their right to stand a fair and equal chance of actually being elected. The 
                                                        
69. Subsections 29(1) and (2) and 31(1) EPEA.  
70. Art 6(3) of Directive 93/190/EC.  
71. Kohaliku omavalitsuste volikogu valimiste seadus.  
72. Subsections 5(1) and (5) LGCEA. Under subsection 5(2) LGCEA, Estonia also al-
lows third country nationals who are residing in Estonia on the basis of a long-term 
residence permit or the right of permanent residence to vote in local government 
council elections.  
73. Under subsections 55(2) and 482(1) of the Local Government Organisation Act (ko-
haliku omavalitsuse valimise seadus), rural municipality and city mayors, members of 
local governments and rural municipality and city secretaries must be Estonian citi-
zens.  
74. Subsection 33(31) LGCEA, in accordance with Art. 9(1) of Directive 94/89/EC. 
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problems stemmed from § 48 of the Estonian Constitution, which sets out 
that only Estonian citizens may be members of a political party. This provi-
sion was also echoed in the Political Parties Act (hereinafter PPA), which re-
served the right of membership in a political party to Estonian citizens who 
have attained 18 years of age and have active legal capacity.75 
 The exclusion of Union citizens from the right to membership in political 
parties was challenged by the Chancellor of Justice in a petition for constitu-
tional review before the Supreme Court of Estonia (hereinafter also SC).76 
The Chancellor challenged the conformity of the provision of the PPA that 
did not allow EU citizens to be members of political parties with Art. 19 of 
the EC Treaty77 and the Constitution. He argued that since the Constitution, 
pursuant to the Republic of Estonia Constitution Amendment Act (hereinafter 
CAA),78 is to be applied with consideration for the rights and duties arising 
from the Accession Treaty, then the fundamental right to belong to a political 
party that is reserved for Estonian citizens under § 48 of the Constitution may 
be interpreted such that EU citizens also have the right to belong to a political 
party.  
 In a widely discussed decision,79 the SC held that despite reference to the 
Constitution and the CAA, the Chancellor was in fact challenging the con-
formity of the provisions of the PPA with EU law. The SC declared the ap-
plication with respect to the conformity of Estonian legislation with EU law 
to be inadmissible, as the law did not provide the Chancellor of Justice with 
the competence to petition for the Supreme Court to declare a parliamentary 
Act to be invalid because it is in conflict with EU law. Furthermore, the 
CJEU has held that the supremacy of EU law means the supremacy of its ap-
plication and there is no requirement that an abstract judicial review proce-
dure to ensure the compliance of national law with EU law be available in the 
Member States.80  
 Justice Laffranque dissented with the opinion of the majority on the issue 
                                                        
75. Erakonnaseadus, subsection 5(1). 
76. Judgment of the Supreme Court en banc No. 3-4-1-1-05 of 19 April 2005. English 
translation available at http://www.riigikohus.ee/?id=823.  
77. Now Art. 22 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union.  
78. Eesti Vabariigi põhiseaduse muutmise seadus. Cf. infra nota 79 for an explanation of 
its effect. 
79. Cf. e.g. PhD Dissertation by Carri Ginter: Application of general principles of Euro-
pean law in the supreme court of Estonia, pp. 17-19, available at:  
 http://dspace.utlib.ee/dspace/bitstream/handle/10062/6494/gintercarri.pdf?sequence=3, 
(10 November 2013).  
80. Supra nota 76, para. 49.  
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of admissibility. She held that while the Chancellor was not competent to re-
quest that the SC review the conformity of national norms with EU law, he 
did have the right to petition for legislative acts that are in conflict with the 
Constitution to be declared invalid. She further held that the CAA obliges the 
SC to take the general principles of EU law into consideration, if these do not 
conflict with the fundamental principles of the Estonian Constitution.81 Thus, 
the SC should have reviewed the Chancellor’s application regarding the 
compliance of the relevant provisions of the Political Parties Act with the 
Constitution, which must be interpreted in conformity with EU law.82  
 Justice Laffranque added that while Art. 19 TEC and Directive 94/80/EC 
do not expressly oblige Member States to provide all EU citizens with the 
right to be members of a political party, the purpose of the electoral rights of 
EU citizens has been interpreted in EU law to be the political and social inte-
gration of EU citizens and ensuring equal opportunities in executing local 
government power. The right to belong to and form political parties on all 
levels is also supported by Art. 12(1) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of 
the European Union (CFR). Equal opportunities and the equal treatment of 
candidates are not sufficiently guaranteed if non-national EU citizens are only 
able to stand as individual candidates, or even if they are on a party list with-
out party membership or on a non-party electoral coalition list. Consequently, 
in accordance with the requirement of equal treatment under § 12 of the Con-
stitution and in conjunction with the CAA and the interpretation of EU law, 
all EU citizens must be allowed membership in a political party for the pur-
                                                        
81. Dissenting Opinion of Supreme Court Justice Julia Laffranque to the Judgment of the 
Supreme Court en banc No. 3-4-1-1-05, para. 4. The Constitution of the Republic of 
Estonia Amendment Act, which allowed for Estonia’s accession to the EU, provides a 
‘bridge’ between Estonian and EU law. The CAA comprises only 4 provisions, two 
of which govern its adoption and amendment. Of the substantive provisions, § 1 
states laconically, that ‘Estonia may belong to the European Union, provided the fun-
damental principles of the Constitution of the Republic of Estonia are respected’ 
while § 2 sets out: ‘When Estonia has acceded to the European Union, the Constitu-
tion of the Republic of Estonia will be applied without prejudice to the rights and ob-
ligations arising from the Accession Treaty’. The true significance of these provisions 
are the subject of great scholarly debate in Estonia, particularly with regards to what 
is meant by ‘the fundamental principles of the Constitution’, and what might be the 
consequences if some rule or principle of EU law fails to respect them. Cf. e.g. Julia 
Laffranque, Pilk Eesti õigusmaastikule põhiseaduse täiendamise seaduse valguses (A 
Glance at the Estonian Legal Landscape in the Light of the Constitution of the Re-
public of Estonia Amendment Act), pp. 523-536 at p. 525. English translation availa-
ble at http://www.juridicainternational.eu/?id=12684, (15 November 2013).  
82. Dissenting Opinion, supra nota 81, para. 4.  
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pose of standing as a candidate in municipal elections. § 48 of the amended 
Constitution must be interpreted to mean that Union citizens may also belong 
to political parties, and the PPA should be tested against this interpretation.83  
 By the time of delivery of the judgment, both the Government and parlia-
ment had understood the need to amend the PPA. As of December 2006, the 
PPA allows all EU citizens of at least 18 years of age who have active legal 
capacity and whose permanent residence is in Estonia to be members of a po-
litical party. 
Question 11 
There are no regional elections in Estonia and no other elections in which res-
ident EU citizens have explicit electoral rights. Yet a non-national EU citizen 
could theoretically play a role, albeit an indirect and small one, in the election 
of the President of the Republic. As a general rule, the President is elected by 
the members of parliament (Riigikogu), who must be Estonian citizens. How-
ever, if no candidate receives the required mandate, the President is elected 
                                                        
83. Ibid., supra nota 81, paras 9-10. Justice Laffranque added that if the SC had been un-
sure of the relevant norm of EU law and of how to interpret the Constitution, the 
Court could have suspended the proceedings and requested a preliminary ruling from 
the CJEU on the interpretation of Art. 19 of the EC Treaty as further defined by Di-
rective 94/80/EC. Dissenting Opinion, para. 11. The SC issued an advisory Opinion 
on the interpretation of the Constitution in anticipation of Estonia’s adoption of the 
Euro in January 2011 (Opinion of the Constitutional Review Chamber of the Su-
preme Court No. 3-4-1-3-06 of 11 May 2006). In what has been called an ‘unprece-
dented European-friendly’ Opinion (cf. J. Laffranque, Pilk, supra nota 81, at pp. 530-
531), the SC held that where a constitutional provision is in conflict with EU law, the 
effect of that provision is suspended, and only that part of the Constitution which is in 
conformity with the EU law or which is not regulated by EU law can be applied. 
However, the Court failed to address the issue of what would happen in EU law were 
to conflict with the ‘fundamental principles of the Constitution’ and what these prin-
ciples might be (cf. on this issue the Dissenting Opinion of Supreme Court Justices 
Erik Kergandberg and Villu Kõve), Therefore, it remains unclear whether or not a 
constitutional provision that has been held to be contrary to EU law is actually 
‘asleep’ (cf. J. Laffranque, Pilk, supra nota 81, at p. 531). There has also been aca-
demic criticism of the fact that the CAA has lead to the interpretation of Constitution-
al provisions which either add or subtract from the letter of the Constitution, which 
has lead to an increasing gap between the letter and meaning of the text. Cf. on this 
issue U. Lõhmus, Põhiseaduse muutmine ja muutused põhiseaduses, (Amending the 
Constitution and Amendments to the Constitution), Juridica I/2011, pp. 12-26, esp. 
pp. 22-26.  
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by an electoral body comprised of members of the Riigikogu and representa-
tives of the local governments.  
 A local government representative to the electoral body must also be an 
Estonian citizen and a member of the local government council in question, 
but the councils were free to determine the method for electing a representa-
tive to the electoral body. An amendment to the President of the Republic 
Electoral Act84 in 2010 set out that delegates are to be elected by the council 
in one round of voting, but made no mention of the citizenship of the council 
members. Thus, a non-national EU citizen who is a member of a local gov-
ernment council could vote in the election of the representative of that coun-
cil to the electoral body that will vote to elect the President. It does not appear 
that this indirect enfranchisement of EU citizens was ever an issue in the 
adoption of this amendment.85  
Question 12 
Under Estonian law, persons in active service in the Defence Forces cannot 
stand as a candidate in elections, but have active voting rights.86 Persons with 
mental impairments are not automatically disenfranchised. Where necessary, 
legal capacity is limited with specific mention of the acts and transactions 
which the person may continue to perform himself. If a court of law appoints 
a guardian for a person for managing all of the person’s affairs, the person is 
deemed to be without active legal capacity with regards to voting rights.87 
Where a person is deemed to be without active legal capacity with regards to 
voting rights, this is clearly set out as a separate point in the relevant court 
decision.88  
 The restriction of the voting rights of prisoners is, however, the cause of 
significant tension. Under Estonian law, persons who, according to the data in 
the penal register, have been convicted of a criminal offence and who, as at 
                                                        
84. Vabariigi Presidendi valimise seadus.  
85. According to the explanatory memoranda to the original and amended bills, this 
amendment was adopted to provide proportionate representation for opposition coun-
cil members in larger municipalities in which several representatives to the electoral 
body are elected, Draft Bill 776 SE, available at www.riigikogu.ee.  
86. Subsection 4(6), Riigikogu valimise seadus (Riigikogu Electoral Act, REA), subsec-
tion 5(6) LGCEA, clause 4(6)3) EPEA.  
87. Tsiviilkohtumenetluse seadustik (Code of Civil Procedure), subsection 526(5). 
88. We have been unable to identify any cases in which the restriction of the voting rights 
of a person in active service or a person with a mental disability has been contested in 
court .  
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30 days before election day, are serving a sentence in a penal institution, can-
not be registered as voters for elections to the Riigikogu89 (parliament), local 
government councils90 or the European Parliament.91 A person who has been 
disenfranchised cannot be a candidate in any of these elections. This issue has 
been addressed with regard to voting rights in national elections, the right to 
stand as a candidate in municipal elections and the right to vote in municipal 
elections, including in a number of ongoing challenges92 in the context of the 
local government council elections held in October 2013.  
 There have been two separate applications regarding the national parlia-
mentary electoral system and the validity of its results arising from the fact 
that convicted prisoners are precluded from voting.93 While both of the appli-
cations were declared inadmissible for procedural reasons, the SC neverthe-
less deemed it appropriate to note that the provisions prohibiting convicted 
criminal offenders who are serving a prison sentence from taking part in par-
liamentary elections may be contrary to § 57 and § 11 of the Estonian Consti-
tution94 ‘as they must be interpreted pursuant to Art. 3 of Protocol No. 1 to 
the European Convention on Human Rights as interpreted by the European 
Court of Human Rights in Hirst (2) v the United Kingdom, Frodl v Austria, 
Green and M.T. v the United Kingdom and, in particular, in the judgment of 
the Grand Chamber in Scoppola v Italy (No. 3).’95 The SC held that its rules of 
procedure precluded it from assessing this potential conflict in the cases in hand 
and noted that it was up to parliament to react to any possible contradiction.96 
 Recently, in the context of the October 2013 municipal elections, several 
challenges related to exclusion of prisoners from the right to stand as a candi-
date have been launched.97 In one case, an appeal was submitted to the Con-
                                                        
89. Subsection 22(3), REA.  
90. Subsection 27(3) LGCEA.  
91. Clause 20 (3) 1) EPEA.  
92. The information on these cases reflects the situation as at 15 November 2013.  
93. Judgment of the Constitutional Review Chamber of the Supreme Court No. 3-4-1-7-
11 of 23 March 2011 and Ruling of the Constitutional Review Chamber of the Su-
preme Court No. 3-4-1-26-12 of 22 January 2013.  
94. § 57 of the Constitution regulates voting rights and § 11 of the Constitution sets out 
the principle of proportionality.  
95. Ruling No. 3-4-1-26-12, supra nota 93, para. 38. Judgment No. 3-4-1-7-11, supra 
nota 93, para. 11.  
96. Ruling No. 3-4-1-26-12, supra nota 93, para. 38.  
97. Cf. also Judgment of the Constitutional Review Chamber of the Supreme Court No. 
3-4-1-50-13 of 9 October 2013, Judgment of the Constitutional Review Chamber of 
the Supreme Court No. 3-4-1-46-13 of 3 October 2013.  
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stitutional Chamber of the Supreme Court against a resolution of the City of 
Tartu Electoral Committee not to register the applicant as an individual can-
didate because he had been convicted of a criminal offence for which he was 
serving a prison sentence.98 He claimed that this constituted a violation of the 
Constitution, international law and EU law. The SC held that the Constitution 
only regulates the active right to vote in local government elections but is si-
lent on the issue of passive voting rights.99 In the opinion of the SC, the legis-
lature has regulated this matter in accordance with the Constitution. While 
not all of a prisoner’s fundamental rights are restricted, imprisonment brings 
about the automatic restriction of those fundamental rights that presuppose 
that the person has the right to move freely in society. The work of a council 
member requires at a minimum that the member attend council meetings. In-
carceration as a punishment is in essence the restriction of a person’s freedom 
of movement, and it is therefore ‘not unjustified’ that prisoners be denied the 
right to stand as a candidate.100  
 This decision raises as many questions as it answers. If the SC considered 
a person’s passive voting right to be a fundamental right, it should have as-
sessed whether this practical consideration or inevitable consequence could 
be equated with a legitimate aim or whether some other legitimate aim for the 
restriction of passive voting rights existed. The permissibility of this measure 
would then have to be tested through the proportionality test required by § 11 
of the Constitution. If, however, deprivation of this right is merely an addi-
tional consequence of the punishment of imprisonment, this raises the ques-
tion of the permissibility of such additional punishment, as the deprivation of 
voting rights, active or passive, is not among the principal or supplementary 
punishments which may be imposed on a natural person pursuant to the Penal 
Code.101  
 As for the applicant’s claims relating to international law, the SC held that 
Art. 3 of Protocol 1 to the European Convention for the Protection of Human 
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR) does not regulate municipal elec-
tions and was therefore not applicable. The cited case law of the European 
                                                        
98. Judgment of the Constitutional Review Chamber of the Supreme Court No. 3-4-1-44-
13 of 2 October 2013. The Supreme Court is competent to hear complaints against 
the decisions or acts of electoral committees pursuant to Chapter 6 of the Constitu-
tional Review Court Procedure Act. Such complaints must be adjudicated within sev-
en working days.  
99. Ibid., para. 12.  
100. Ibid., para. 13.  
101. Karistusseadustik, Chapter 3.  
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Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) is also not relevant, as the cases Hirst v the 
United Kingdom, Green and M.T. v the UK and Scoppola v Italy only address 
the right of prisoners to vote, not to stand as a candidate.102 As for EU law it-
self, the SC held that Arts 39 and 40 CFR apply only to the rights of non-
national EU citizens to participate in municipal and EP elections under the 
same conditions as nationals of that Member State, and do not regulate the 
voting rights of prisoners with the citizenship of the Member State in ques-
tion. The CFR was therefore deemed to be irrelevant, and no other provisions 
or principles of EU law were considered.103  
 While this view might hold up to scrutiny with regards to Art. 40 CFR and 
municipal elections, this statement would seem to ignore that Art. 39(2) lays 
down the fundamental principle that ‘[m]embers of the European Parliament 
shall be elected by direct universal suffrage in a free and secret ballot.’ This 
paragraph sets requirements for the conduct of EP elections with respect to all 
Union citizens, both nationals and non-nationals, who partake in EP elections 
in their Member State of residence.104  
 Less than a week later the SC made a similar judgment in an appeal 
launched by a convicted killer against refusal to register him as a candidate in 
the rural municipality in which he is serving his sentence. The applicant em-
phasized that the right to vote, which is guaranteed under the Constitution, 
and the right to stand as a candidate are closely related in Estonian law, as the 
right to stand as a candidate is restricted to persons who are entered on the list 
of voters. The applicant claimed that the absolute deprivation of voting rights 
was a disproportionate restriction of his fundamental rights and stressed that 
under the rule of law, restriction of voting rights cannot be punitive in na-
ture.105 While the SC conceded that the right to stand as a candidate is deter-
mined by the right to vote, this was not relevant in this case since the prisoner 
had not been refused registration as a candidate because he did not have the 
right to vote, but because he was in prison. Further, the Constitutional Cham-
ber considered the prisoner’s lack of a right to stand as a candidate to be con-
                                                        
102. Supra nota 98, paras 16-17, emphasis added.  
103. Ibid., para. 15, emphasis added.  
104. According to the Explanations relating to the Charter of Fundamental Rights (2007/C 
303/02), ‘Article 39(2) takes over the basic principles of the electoral system in a 
democratic State’. 
105. Judgment of the Constitutional Review Chamber of the Supreme Court No. 3-4-1-49-
13 of 8 October 2013, para. 9.  
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stitutional regardless of whether he has the right to vote.106 The SC reiterated 
that Arts 39 and 40 CFR do not regulate the voting rights of prisoners.107  
 Restriction of the active voting rights of prisoners in municipal elections 
has also been challenged in at least two different applications launched with 
an administrative court of first instance108 by a total of nine prisoners. Unfor-
tunately, as of the time of submission of this report, these cases were still 
within the appeal process, and the judgments have therefore yet to enter into 
force or be made public.  
 In a rather extraordinary application submitted to the National Electoral 
Committee by 145 prisoners,109 the applicants claimed that the right to vote 
of 2380 persons who were serving a sentence in a penal institution had been 
violated in the October 2013 municipal elections and that consequently the 
elections should be declared unlawful and void throughout Estonia.110 The 
SC rejected the application for procedural reasons but responded to the appli-
cants’ claim that Art. 3 of Protocol 1 of the ECHR had been violated. The SC 
pointed out that the European Court of Human Rights in McLean and Cole v 
the UK found that local governments bodies in the UK are not part of the leg-
islature and therefore do not come under the scope of Art. 3 Protocol 1.111 In 
Molka v Poland, the ECtHR held that the municipal councils, based on the 
Polish Constitution, do not form part of the legislature of the Republic of Po-
land. The SC noted that Estonia, like Poland, is a unitary state in which, pur-
suant to the Constitution, legislative power is vested in the Riigikogu, and 
thus perhaps signalled how it might find should it be faced with a similar but 
admissible case. Further, the SC noted that as a general rule, the results of lo-
cal elections may be declared void only in a particular voting district, elec-
toral district, county or city. However, the National Electoral may declare the 
results of voting to be void throughout the entire country if the elections have 
been held pursuant to a legal norm that has been declared to be unconstitu-
tional.112 In this case the SC decided that it could not review the constitution-
                                                        
106. Ibid., para. 17  
107. Ibid., para. 19.  
108. Refusal to register a person on the list of voters must be challenged in an administra-
tive court according to regular procedure.  
109. The authorisation of all of the prisoners was not however recognised.  
110. Judgment of the Constitutional Review Chamber of the Supreme Court No. 3-4-1-58-
13 of 14 November 2013. 
111. Ibid., paras 27-30.  
112. Ibid., paras 25-27.  
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ality of the LGCEA, but provided procedural guidelines on how such proce-
dure might be initiated.113  
 With EP elections scheduled for May 2014 and national parliamentary 
elections due in March 2015, it is highly likely that the outright ban on voting 
and standing as a candidate of convicted prisoners will be challenged. It will 
be interesting to follow where this series of cases will lead, and what Consti-
tutional, EU and ECHR law will be applied. To date, the SC has addressed 
the issue of voting rights in appeals against decisions of the National Elec-
toral Committee which must be decided within seven days114 and which have 
centred around passive voting rights, to which cited ECtHR case law does not 
apply. Furthermore, the applications have related to the rights of prisoners in 
municipal elections, which may justifiably fall outside the scope of the ECHR 
and CFR. It will be interesting to see whether the courts will respond to ques-
tions regarding the legitimate aim of these bans and to the proportionality of 
blanket measures,115 and whether they will re-assess the significance of Art. 
39(2) CFR or look towards the democratic principles set out in Arts 6, 10 and 
14 TEU should the issue of prisoners’ voting rights be raised within the con-
text of EP elections. As for Art. 3 Protocol 1 ECHR, the ECtHR has already 
found a violation where there was a blanket ban on prisoners’ voting in elec-
tions to the European Parliament.116 In the national courts, the SC has stated 
that § 56 of the Constitution must be interpreted to mean that the people exer-
cise their supreme power also through EP elections and that article this pro-
vides for the fundamental right of Estonian citizens to vote and be elected in 
EP elections.117  
                                                        
113. Ibid., paras 34-35.  
114. Põhiseaduslikkuse järelevalve kohtumenetluse seadus (Code of Constitutional Re-
view Procedure), section 44.  
115. The Chancellor of Justice has analysed the possible legitimate aim of these re-
strictions in an Opinion submitted to the Chair of the Parliamentary Constitutional 
Committee Nr. 6-8/051820/0601632 in March 2006. According to the preparatory 
materials for the Constitutional Assembly that drafted the first post-occupation Con-
stitution that was adopted in 1992, the ban on prisoner voting was intended to be 
temporary. The Assembly considered that the state was not yet ‘technically prepared’ 
to provide prisoner voting and there was also insufficient experience with democracy 
at that time. Decision of this issue was therefore delegated to parliament. While the 
Government of the Republic has proposed amending the ban, parliament has yet to 
act. 
116. Greens and M.T. v the United Kingdom, nos. 60041/08 and 60054/08, § 77-78, 
ECHR 2010 (extracts). 
117. Judgment of the Supreme Court en banc No. 3-4-1-33-09 of 1 July 2010, para. 40. 
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 Within and beyond the Constitution, the issue of equal treatment of per-
sons is also unresolved. For example, Estonian law prohibits convicted pris-
oners who are serving a sentence in a penal institution from voting and run-
ning in elections, but not persons who are subject to electronic surveillance as 
a substitute punishment or who may have been convicted of a more serious 
crime but who have been given a conditional sentence. The ban is also lim-
ited to the actual time that a person spends in a penal institution, which means 
that one prisoner might be banned from voting in more or fewer elections 
than another prisoner serving an identical sentence for an equivalent crime. 
Whether or not a person convicted of treason,118 an act against the state, is in 
a comparable situation with a person convicted of theft is also pertinent, as 
unequals should not be treated equally if we are to respect the principle of 
equality119.  
 What is clear is that under current Estonian law, the ban on convicted 
prisoners’ voting rights in national parliamentary and EP elections is auto-
matic and indiscriminate and fails to take into account the nature or gravity of 
the offence, the length of the prison sentence or the prisoner’s individual con-
duct or circumstances. Since Hirst (No. 2) the ECtHR has found such blanket 
measures to be outside any margin of appreciation that the member state 
might have and thus incompatible with Art. 3, Protocol No. 1, ECHR. 
Culture(s) of citizenship 
Question 13 
In Estonia, it is appropriate to speak of cultures of citizenship in the plural, as 
the cultures of Estonian citizenship by naturalization and within the context 
of Union citizenship are somewhat different. Within the context of naturaliza-
tion in the post-occupation era, there are clear indications that Estonian citi-
zenship is still considered to be a matter of ‘permission’, if not more. In a 
much discussed case detailed in the answer to Question 8, the Supreme Court 
                                                        
118. Hermann Simm, a former chief of the Estonian Defence Ministry's security depart-
ment and convicted Russian spy who is serving a sentence for treason also applied 
for, and was refused, registration on the list of voters.  
119. These concerns were raised by the Chancellor of Justice in an Opinion submitted to 
the Chair of the Parliamentary Constitutional Committee, supra nota 115, cf. in par-
ticular paras 49-51. 
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in 2008 emphasized that citizenship through naturalization is not a fundamen-
tal right, but indeed a privilege.120 This sentiment was echoed by the Minister 
of the Interior on Estonian Citizenship Day in 2011.121  
 The appropriateness of the notion of privilege in today’s world has been 
questioned in the academic literature by Uno Lõhmus,122 who pointed out the 
notable effect of European integration, the weakening of national identity and 
the rise of cosmopolitanism on the institution of citizenship, as well as the in-
fluence of the principle of real and effective nationality, as developed by the 
ICJ in the 1955 Nottenbohm case.123 In his view, it is difficult to justify the 
setting of formal obstacles to citizenship for foreigners who have strong ties 
to the Estonian state and society. This, he noted, would clearly raise the issue 
of compatibility with EU law, if an applicant were an EU citizen who had ex-
ercised his free movement rights.124  
 With regards to Union citizenship rights, we have found that administra-
tive practice for EU citizens and their family members is generally favourable 
in its interpretation, and that the courts, the Chancellor of Justice, the Gov-
ernment and parliament have all recognized that the political rights of Union 
citizens must not only be enacted, but also guaranteed in practice. 
 These two cultures were intertwined recently in a speech by President Ilves 
in which he emphasized that Estonian citizenship is based on the Western 
ideals of the right of peoples to self-determination, independence as well as 
the equality of all people. While this was disrupted by the fanaticism of both 
Communism and Fascism, the value and guarantee provided by Estonian citi-
zenship now extends beyond Estonia to the entire European Union. This al-
lows for Estonian citizens to not only elect members of the Estonian parlia-
ment, but also, under certain circumstances, to elect the mayor of London or a 
city councillor of Berlin. He emphasized that we cannot say that ‘the right to 
be an Estonian citizen means the obligation to be or become an Estonian’ but 
that ‘we can surely say that the right to be a European Union citizen that ac-
                                                        
120. Judgment No. 3-3-1-42-08, supra nota 52, paras 28 and 31.  
121. Ken-Marti Vaher: Eesti kodakondasus on privileeg (Estonian Citizenship is a Privi-
lege), available at: http://www.parnupostimees.ee/650439/ken-marti-vaher-eesti-koda 
kondsus-on-privileeg (10 November 2013).  
122. U. Lõhmus, Mõtteid, supra nota 55, at p. 85.  
123. Ibid., pp. 77 and 81.  
124. Ibid., p. 79.  
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companies Estonian citizenship means the obligation to be a European. This 
means to share the values upon which today’s Europe is built’.125 
Question 14 
As there have been very few cases in Estonia where the courts have interpret-
ed any of the rights of EU citizens addressed in this report, it would be mis-
leading to speak of any trends. Whereas it has been noted that the Estonian 
Supreme Court was rather forward thinking in that it repeatedly made refer-
ence to the CFR already before its entry into force as a binding instrument,126 
with regard to the EU citizenship rights under review in this report, the poten-
tial effect of the CFR has yet to be investigated. 
 On the contrary, in the two challenges in relation to the October 2013 mu-
nicipal elections detailed in the answer to Question 12, the Supreme Court 
held that Arts 39 and 40 CFR apply only to the rights of non-national EU citi-
zens to participate in municipal and EP elections under the same conditions 
as nationals of that Member State, and do not regulate the voting rights of 
prisoners with the citizenship of the Member State in question. This view has 
been critiqued in the answer to Question 12 above.  
Question 15 
In our opinion, it cannot be said that issues connected to EU citizenship have 
been a very salient issue in the national media, since the national public dis-
course on citizenship is dominated by debate on the foundations of Estonian 
citizenship law and the integration of the non-ethnic-Estonian population 
since the restoration of independence in 1991. However, within and beyond 
this context, a number of issues relate to EU citizenship rights.  
 First, the local context should be explained briefly. As the Republic of Es-
tonia that was established in 1918 never ceased to exist de jure during half a 
                                                        
125. Ilves rõhutas Eesti kodakondsuse suurt väärtust, (Ilves Emphasized the Great Value 
of Estonian Citizenship), available at http://www.postimees.ee/863284/ilves-rohutas-
eesti-kodakondsuse-suurt-vaartust, (10 November 2013).  
126. Cf. Julia Laffranque, Eesti põhiseadus ja Euroopa õiguse kooselu, (The Cohabitation 
of the Estonian Constitution and European Law), Juridica VIII/2003, pp. 180-190, at 
p. 187. Also, in her dissenting opinion to a 2005 case addressing the right to belong to 
political parties (cf. answer to Question 10) Justice Laffranque pointed to Art. 12(1) 
CFR as a source supporting the right to belong to and form political parties on all lev-
els.  
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century of occupation, upon the restoration of de facto independence, the Es-
tonian citizenry consisted of persons who were citizens of the Republic of Es-
tonia on June 16, 1940127 and their descendants. This meant that the hundreds 
of thousands of non-citizens who had settled in Estonia in the interim, and 
their descendants, did not automatically acquire Estonian citizenship.  
 Estonian citizenship is based on the principle of ius sanguinis. According 
to the Constitution, every child with at least one parent who is an Estonian 
citizen has the right to Estonian citizenship by birth,128 with no territorial re-
strictions. There are no automatic rights for persons who are born on Estonian 
territory under the law (ius soli). Over the past years, there has been signifi-
cant debate on whether Estonian citizenship law needs to expand its bases. 
This would include providing Estonian citizenship automatically to children 
born in Estonia to parents with undetermined citizenship to prevent their 
stateless status.129 There have also been calls to initiate debate on whether Es-
tonia’s ‘extremely conservative citizenship policy is sustainable ... for the de-
velopment of a small state’130 or whether a paradigm shift towards a form of 
‘constitutional patriotism’131 needs to be made. The discourse is more fo-
cused on how to create a common identity and citizenship within the country 
                                                        
127. The invasion and occupation of Estonia by the Soviet Union began on 16 June 1940.  
128. § 8, first sentence.  
129. The Chancellor of Justice called for a public debate on the issue in 2009. Council of 
Europe Commissioner for Human Rights Nils Muižnieks has also called on the Esto-
nian authorities to consider this option, cf. Report by Nils Muižnieks Commissioner 
for Human Rights of the Council of Europe Following his visit to Estonia from 25 to 
27 March 2013, CommDH(2013)12, p. 3, available online at ww.coe.int.  
130. Cf. Valitsuse esimene tegevusaasta – vahekokkuvõtted (The Government’s First Year 
of Office – Interim Summary), Praxis Centre for Political Studies, May 2012, availa-
ble at: http://www.praxis.ee/fileadmin/tarmo/PraxisYldine/praxis_05_29a.pdf, p. 19. 
Estonia also does not generally allow for dual citizenship, except where a person is a 
citizen by birth in both countries of citizenship. Cf. supra nota 57.  
131. Report by the Chancellor of Justice to the Riigikogu, minutes of the XI Riigikogu, VI 
session, 1 October 2009, available at http://www.riigikogu.ee/?op=steno&stcom 
mand=stenogramm&date=1254380700&pkpkaupa=1&paevakord=4902#pk4902, 
(10 November 2013); The Chancellor borrowed this idea from a presentation made 
by Lauri Mälksoo on 15 May 2008 ‘Põhiseadusel põhivev patriotism – kas see 
Saksamaal välja kujunenud mõiste puudutab ka Eestit?’ (Patriotism based on the 
Constitution – Does this Concept that Has Developed in Germany Also Concern Es-
tonia?), Vikerkaar 2009, No. 10-11, Available online at 
 http://www.vikerkaar.ee/?page=Arhiiv&a_act=article&a_number=5001 (10 Novem-
ber 2013).  
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than on promoting (or questioning) a greater European citizen-based identity 
made possible by EU citizenship.  
 Yet EU citizenship is not without a role in these processes. Since 1991, 
non-citizens have had the right to apply for Estonian citizenship through natu-
ralisation, and for citizenship of the Russian Federation as the successor to 
the USSR or other states (such as Ukraine) under the laws of those countries. 
Over time, where no choice has been made, a third group of persons with un-
determined citizenship has emerged in Estonia who hold a so-called ‘grey 
passport’ or alien’s passport.132 Currently, holders of an alien’s passport can 
travel visa-free within the Schengen area and are also allowed visa-free entry 
into the Russian Federation. As Estonian citizens and other EU citizens can-
not travel to the Russian Federation without obtaining a visa, this places 
holders of a grey passport, who often have strong family and cultural ties to 
Russia, at a practical advantage. This has been portrayed in the media as a 
disincentive for holders of grey passports to acquire Estonian and thereby EU 
citizenship.133  
 Since 2004, EU citizenship has also contributed to a surge of migration. 
According to data from the 2011 census, there were 6751 non-national EU 
citizens living permanently in Estonia. Net emigration just in 2012, however, 
amounted to 7000 persons, with the primary destinations being Finland and 
the UK. The entire population had decreased by 75 000 since 2000.134  
 With an ageing population and only 889 770 residents identifying them-
selves as ethnic Estonians in the census, it is understandable that the viability 
of the economy as well as survival of the Estonian people and their unique 
language and culture are at the centre of the public discourse and concern135. 
Within this discourse, the EU is perceived as a guarantee for economic and 
geopolitical security, but also as a destination and facilitator for those who 
seek an economically more prosperous and simple life.  
                                                        
132. According to the 2011 Census, of the total population of slightly less than 1.3 million, 
over 98 000 were foreigners with the citizenship of countries outside the EU, while 
more than 84 000 persons had yet to determine the citizenship of their choice. 
133. This generalisation has been recognized, but also refuted. Cf. e.g. Sergei Stadnikov, 
Miks halli passi omanikud enam Eesti kodakondsust ei taha? (Why Don’t Holders of 
Grey Passports Want Estonian Citizenship Anymore?), available at http:  
 www.ekspress.ee/archive/article.php?id=45125699 (10 November 2013).  
134. Information on the 2011 census in available in English at http://www.stat.ee/phc2011.  
135. Cf. e.g. Argo Ideon, Väljarändest paanikata, (On Emigration, Without Panic) in Euro-
kratt, 16 September 2013, available at: http://www.eurokratt.ee/valjarandest-paanikata, 
(10 November 2013). Cf. also U. Lõhmus, supra nota 55, p. 80.  
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 Most recently, media attention has been focused on EU citizens who par-
ticipated in the municipal elections in October 2013, in particular as this is 
still a rather new and exotic phenomenon in Estonia.136 Significant attention 
was given to the candidacy and successful election of Abdul Turay, a UK citi-
zen of African descent who was already quite well known as a commentator 
in the national media. He had been invited by two major parties to run on 
their candidate lists, and his candidacy, with the candidacies of other EU citi-
zens, was generally portrayed not only as a natural consequence of Estonia’s 
inclusion in the EU, but also as a positive step towards expanding Estonian 
society, providing recent immigrants with a voice in politics and making the 
Estonian capital of Tallinn a more cosmopolitan city.137  
 
                                                        
136. According to the National Electoral Committee, 24 non-national EU citizens ran as a 
candidate in the 2013 municipal elections (0.16 % of all candidates).  
137. Cf. e.g. Interview: Abdul Turay, the Expat Running for Tallinn City Council, pub-
lished 17.08.2013 on the Estonian Public Broadcasting English language website at 
http://news.err.ee/features/4d45d87d-5e06-4b2f-984d-3000a20569e2, (10 November 
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Finland 
Citizenship within Directive 2004/38/EC – stability of residence for 
Union citizens and their family members 
Question 1 
Article 2 (‘Definitions’) of the Directive was implemented by an amendment 
of the Aliens Act (later AA)4 entering into force in 2007.5 Articles 2(2)a, c, 
and d are implemented by Sections 154(1)1, 2, and 3 AA. The definition of 
‘Union citizen’ (Article 2(1)) is given in Section 3(2) of the AA as: ‘EU citi-
zen or a comparable person means a citizen of a Member State of the [EU] or 
a citizen of Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway, or Switzerland.’ Section 154 AA 
(Ch. 10 ‘Residence of citizens of the European Union or comparable per-
sons’) on EU citizens’ family members implements Article 2(2)b as ‘persons 
living continuously in a marriage-like relationship in the same household re-
gardless of their sex are comparable to a married couple if they have lived in 
the same household for at least two years. [...] However, the [two-year] re-
quirement [...] does not apply if the persons living in the same household 
have a child in their joint custody or if there are other weighty reasons for it’.6 
According to the Finnish National Police Board, weighty reasons may in-
clude, i.a., a joint mortgage or home loan. Additionally, according to Section 
154(2) AA, the guardian of a minor EU citizen living in Finland is considered 
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a family member for the purpose of the Directive – already from the entry in-
to force of the current AA, in 2004.7 
 Transposing Article 3 (‘Beneficiaries’) of the Directive was revisited by a 
2007 amendment to the AA. The AA provides that its Ch. 10 applies to ‘EU 
citizens who move to Finland or reside in Finland, and their family members 
who accompany them or join them later’;8 whereas the next paragraph pro-
vides for Finnish citizens’ family members: ‘The Chapter applies to family 
members of a Finnish citizen if the Finnish citizen has exercised his or her 
right of free movement under the Directive by settling in another Member 
State, and the family member accompanies him or her to Finland or joins him 
or her later.’9 After Metock,10 the requirement of prior lawful residence by a 
third country national family member (Art. 2(2)), in another Member State 
has been removed from Section 153 AA in 2010.11 
 Rights of other family members (Art. 3(2)),12 are provided for in the AA 
(amended in 2007) as: ‘Other relatives are treated in the same manner as fam-
ily members of EU citizens, regardless of their citizenship, if: the relative is, 
in the country of departure, dependent on an EU citizen who has the primary 
right of residence, or the relative lived in the same household with the EU citi-
zen in question; or serious health grounds [strictly]13 require the EU citizen in 
question to give the relative personal care.’14 The provision shall be applied 
on a casuistic basis according to the exact wording thereof. Cases are decided 
based on an overall consideration (kokonaisharkinta) of the merits (for which 
the burden of proof vests with the applicant). The Government Proposal on 
amending the AA expressly considered it impossible to predict how this 
change will affect granting the status of ‘other relative’.15 National courts 
                                                        
7. Section 154(2) AA. 
8. Section 153(3) AA. 
9. Section 153(4) AA. 
10. Case C-127/08, Metock, [2008] ECR I-624 is mentioned as the cause for amendment, 
see Government Proposal (HE) 77/2009 vp, pp. 6-7. 
11. See Government Proposals (HE) 77/2009 vp. and (HE) 432/2010 vp. 
12. The term applied in the AA ‘other relatives’ (FI: muut omaiset) aims to correspond 
with ‘other family members’. 
13. Unofficial translations of Finnish legislation do not always take into account English 
versions of the directives being implemented: In this case, ‘strictly’ in the directive 
EN text appears as ‘ehdottomasti’ [unconditionally] in the FI text, translated as ‘abso-
lutely’. No change in meaning appears to have been intended. This assumption is fol-
lowed throughout this report. 
14. Section 154(4) AA.  
15. Government Proposal (HE) 205/2006 vp., p. 30. 
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have not yet dealt with the provisions related to the definition of family 
member or beneficiary. However, the National Police Board maintains that 
the degree of relation between such a relative and the primary rights holder 
does not matter. All ‘other relatives’ are required to present documentary evi-
dence issued by the country of origin which recognises the existence of prior 
co-habitation and/or proof of serious health grounds that strictly require that 
the EU citizen in question give the relative personal care (in compliance with 
Arts 8(5)e and 10(2)e).  
 Sections 155 and 155a AA specify entry requirements (following Art. 5 
‘Right of entry’) for EU citizens and their family members. The transposition 
of Article 5(4) closely corresponds to the wording of the Directive.16 The 
higher level of procedural protection accorded to EU citizens and their third-
country-national (TCN) family members in Article 5(2)2 (visa) and (4) (trav-
el documents/visa) – including an accelerated procedure, free of charge, for 
processing visa applications of TCN family members – is provided for by 
Sections 155(2) and 155a(3) AA.17 Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland 
internal guidelines reflect this requirement. According to the website of one 
embassy,18 processing times for the free visas of EU/EEA citizens’ TCN fam-
ily members varies between 3 to 10 days as compared to the normal 15 
days.19 Greater procedural protection is also conferred to family members of 
EU citizens in this respect, as an oral hearing may be arranged20 for the visa 
applicant or his or her family members with regard to the consideration of the 
issuance of the visa, unlike with other regular TCNs. 
 Sections 155a(3-4) and 191(1)1 AA on the procedural safeguards on noti-
fication and appeals of negative visa decisions (refusals, annulments, and 
non-voluntary revocations) for Union citizens’ TCN family members follow 
Articles 30-31 of the Directive together with Articles 32(3) and 34(7) of the 
Visa Code (Reg. 810/2009). Whereas regular TCNs denied a visa are given a 
standard form identifying a standard reason for the refusal and appeals follow 
                                                        
16. Section 155(2) AA.  
17. Section 155a(3) AA.  
18. Embassy of Finland in Bangkok, Thailand <http://www.finland.or.th/public/ 
default.aspx?contentid=105843&nodeid=35097&contentlan=2&culture=en-US> 
(accessed May 11th 2013). 
19. Cf. Art. 23 Visa Code (Reg. 810/2009). 
20. If interviewee is abroad, hearing is conducted by a Finnish consulate, if in Finland, by 
the police, see Section 155a(3) AA. 
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a more formal procedure,21 EU citizens’ TCN family members are given 
more comprehensive accounts of the reasons for denying a visa and benefit 
from enhanced legal safeguards in the form of appeals which follow a more 
thorough and substantial procedure governed by the Finnish Administrative 
Procedure Act (Sections 7(2) and 12(1)), appeals at the Administrative Court 
of Helsinki).22 Hence, the theme of effective protection is evident in the im-
plementation of Article 5 as a whole: significant procedural protection in var-
ious forms is granted to family members of EU citizens concerning their en-
try, visa applications, supporting documents, travel documents, appeals, and 
fees. 
Question 2 
As to deportation,23 EU citizens who have registered their residence and/or 
their family members (and other relatives) who have been issued a residence 
card, including situations where grounds could be considered economic,24 is 
governed by Sections 167-168 AA. Existing case-law does not shed light on 
the threshold for expulsion or refusal of entry purely on economic grounds as: 
after the entry into force of the transposed Directive cases regarding deporta-
tion and refusal of entry have exclusively regarded criminal activities. Ac-
cording to information received from the Finnish Immigration Service, depor-
tations on purely economic grounds are extremely rare, although the FIS did 
not rule out this possibility if the relevant conditions are met. 
 Because of the way residence-based (comprehensive) health insurance is 
organised in Finland, it is unlikely that lack of health insurance would give 
rise to disputes. Sections 167(2) and 168(1) AA allows economically inactive 
EU citizens, their family members, or other relatives, to be refused entry or 
deported on economic grounds. According to Section 167(2) AA Union citi-
zens and their family members can become an unreasonable burden on Fin-
                                                        
21. Following Article 32(2) of the Visa Code, Finnish authorities employ its Annex VI 
Standard form for notifying and motivating refusal, annulment or revocation of a vi-
sa.). 
22. Finnish Administrative Procedure Act (Hallintolainkäyttölaki) 1.12.1996/586. No 
such case is known to have been lodged before 31.5.2013. 
23. When residence permitless aliens enter Finland, their deportation is called ‘refusing 
entry’ (käännyttäminen) until their residence has been registered (Sections 159-159a 
AA) or they hold a residence card (Sections 161-161a-c AA). For the definition of re-
fusing entry, see Section 142 AA. 
24. Section 158a AA covers economic requirements for residence over three months for 
the economically non-active and their family members (mainly reproducing Art. 7). 
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land’s social security system by ‘resorting repeatedly to social assistance pro-
vided in the Act on Social Assistance or other comparable benefits or in other 
similar manner’. Nevertheless, the (legislative) approach to the notion of an 
unreasonable burden does not seem overly strict. 
Question 3 
Articles 12-15 on retaining the right of residence are transposed into Finnish 
law in Ch. 10 AA. Section 161d AA implementing Article 12 resembles it 
considerably, quite like Section 161e AA has been transposed in almost iden-
tical words to Article 13 – except for the title of the Section (‘in the event of 
divorce’). Although the Section title, especially the wording used in the offi-
cial Finnish and Swedish texts refers only to marriage, as does the wording in 
Section 161e(2)3 AA (implementing Article 13(2)c) on a TCN family mem-
ber in the event of having been a victim of domestic violence), a general rule 
of interpretation elsewhere in national legislation provides that registered 
partnerships are presumed to be treated equally to marriage, unless expressly 
excluded.25 The wording of Section 161f AA on retaining right of residence 
follows closely that of Article 14. At the point of implementing Directive 
2004/38, the AA was already considered to satisfy the procedural safeguards 
in Article 30 and referred to in Article 15.26 
 According to the National Police Board, there is currently neither ongoing 
litigation nor administrative appeal procedures regarding the issue of rights 
retention. The National Police Board views the retention of the right of resi-
dence by family members in a positive light insofar as there is no suspicion of 
abuse of the rights pertaining to the Directive. 
Question 4 
Article 16 of the Directive (‘General rule for Union citizens and their family 
members’) on the right of permanent residence is transposed into national 
legislation in Section 161g AA. The Finnish legislation, enacted during the 
                                                        
25. See e.g. Section 8 Act on Registered Partnerships (Laki rekisteröidystä parisuhteesta) 
9.11.2001/950: ‘Unless otherwise provided for in legislation, the registration of a 
partnership has the same legal effects as a marriage; A legal rule concerning marriage 
is applied also to registered partnership; A legal rule concerning a spouse also con-
cerns a registered partner, and rules on engagements also apply to those who intend to 
register their partnership.’ 
26. See Government Proposal (HE) 205/2006 vp., p. 18. 
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discussions leading to the adoption of Dir. 2004/38, had set the required peri-
od of continuous residence in Finland at four years (instead of five as in the 
final version of the Dir.) for the right of permanent residence.27 From 2007, 
Section 161g(1-2) AA has required five years of lawful and continuous resi-
dence in order for Union citizens and their family members to have the right 
of permanent residence (implementing Articles 16(1-2) and 18). On the con-
tinuity of residence, Section 161g(3) AA closely follows the exceptions listed 
in Article 16(3). Article 16(4) concerning absence and acquiring the right to 
permanent residence is implemented by Section 165(2) AA for Union citi-
zens and their family members. As stated in the answer to question 1 above, 
the AA treats those who qualify as ‘other family members’ (muut omaiset, 
Art. 3(2)a) as ‘family members’ (perheenjäsenet, Art. 2(2)), hence Article 18 
is implemented by Section 161g(1-2) AA. Implementing Articles 16(4) and 
20(3), Section 165(2) AA states that the right of permanent residence and 
permanent residence card are revoked upon continuous over two-year ab-
sence from Finland. Article 17 (‘Exemptions for persons no longer working 
in the host Member State and their family members’) has been transposed in-
to Section 163 AA in virtually identical wording, including family members’ 
rights (163(5) AA). 
 A case from the Supreme Administrative Court of Finland (KHO 2011:64, 
judgement of 5 July 2011) dealt with the right of permanent residence. An 
Italian citizen had lawfully resided in Finland from 1997, the latest residence 
permit being valid from 2002 to 2007. In 2008, the national authority had ad-
vised him to register his residence. The Supreme Administrative Court found 
that having resided in Finland lawfully for a period exceeding the five-year 
period stipulated in Section 161g AA, registering residence was no longer 
necessary (the unfounded 40€ registration fee must be refunded) and instead 
an ipso jure right of permanent residence existed, and a document certifying 
this can be issued upon application. 
 Section 161h AA transposing Article 19 (‘Document certifying permanent 
residence for Union citizens’) follows closely the wording of the Directive 
(‘upon application’, ‘without delay’), as well as Section 162 AA implement-
ing Article 20 (‘Permanent residence card for TCN family members’). Sec-
tion 162(3) AA, as to TCN family members, implements Article 20(3) quite 
literally: ‘Interruptions to residence not exceeding a maximum of two con-
secutive years do not affect the validity of the permanent residence card.’ The 
                                                        
27. See Government Proposal (HE) 205/2006 vp., p. 14. The duration of residence in Fin-
land is normally verified from the Population Information System, maintained by the 
local register offices as well as the address register of Posti, the national postal office. 
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AA poses no special sanctions (Art. 20(2)) for neglecting to apply for a per-
manent residence card, as Section 185 AA generally states that if an alien 
‘through negligence fails to comply with the obligation to register his or her 
residence or apply for a residence card or permanent residence card’, the alien 
‘shall be sentenced to a fine for a violation [of the AA]’.28 Article 21 (‘Conti-
nuity of residence’) did not cause any change in the AA.29 
 The Police have access to the Register of Aliens (Ulkomaalaisrekisteri) 
which contains detailed data on permanent residence permits. Information on 
the number of both applications for documents certifying the right of perma-
nent residence of EU citizens and permanent residence permit applications is 
regularly published. Police statistics for 2012 show that 335 certificates of 
permanent residence right were issued to Union citizens (none were rejected). 
Of 35 applications by TNC family members for a permanent residence card, 
one was rejected.30 In 2011 and 2012, these groups of applications counted 
for 0.5 % of all alien licenses and permits.31 In 2012, the average time of pro-
cessing EU citizens’ documents on permanent residence was 14 days and for 
TCN family members 43 days.32 
Question 5 
Article 24(2) is not expressly transposed into national law as the government 
proposal mentions no changes to the pre-existing legislation based on this 
provision. Pre-existing legislation does not fully utilise the possible excep-
tions to equal treatment. For example, an exception to the rule provides that 
anyone in need of urgent support can be granted social assistance. Assistance 
is granted by a body of the municipality where the person (or family) – what-
ever the reason for their stay in Finland and including stays not exceeding 
three months – is staying when the application is submitted.33  
 National law does not distinguish between Union citizens who are short-
term residents and Union citizen jobseekers from other MSs (falling under 
the scope of Co-ordination Regulation 883/2004). Residents are treated 
                                                        
28. Section 185 AA. 
29. See Government Proposal (HE) 205/2006 vp., pp. 15 and 11. 
30. Publicly available on the Police website (https://www.poliisi.fi/), see ‘Poliisin lupa-
hallinnon toimintaa kuvaavia tilastoja, tammi-huhtikuu 2013’, pp. 11-12. 
31. Id. p. 12. 
32. Id. p. 15. 
33. Section 14(3) Social Assistance Act (SAA) (Laki toimeentulotuesta) 30.12.1997/1412. 
See also Government Proposal (HE) 205/2006 vp., p. 17. 
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equally with nationals or other immigrants in terms of access to related un-
employment benefits (unemployment allowance / labour market subsidy / in-
tegration assistance) as soon and as far as they fulfil the Finnish requirements 
of qualifying as jobseekers – as is their TCN family upon obtaining a (non-
temporary) residence permit and qualifying as jobseekers.34 
 As for students, maintenance aid35 is granted to mobile workers (and fami-
ly members) and EU citizens (and family members) who base their right of 
residence on other than Article 7(1)c student status and who have registered 
their residence, on equal basis with host MS nationals.36 Union citizens rely-
ing on student status are eligible for student maintenance aid upon obtaining 
the permanent right of residence. 
 Article 24(2) did not cause any amendments to the AA or other national 
legislation regarding social assistance (including unemployment benefits) and 
study grants.37 
Question 6 
The concepts of public policy, public security, and public health (Article 27, 
Sections 156 and 156a AA) relate to expulsion, which in Finland takes the 
form of two distinct procedures: refusing entry and deportation. In practice, 
the former applies to EU citizens whose residence has not been registered and 
their family members or other relatives who have not been issued with a resi-
dence card.38 The threshold for the former is far lower than for the latter. In 
practice, EU citizens, their family members or other relatives have been re-
fused entry into Finland on the basis of fairly minor offences. According to 
information obtained from the Finnish Immigration Service, even the suspi-
cion of having committed an offence has led to refusing entry into Finland. 
Repetitive petty theft and shoplifting, drug offences (other than for minor 
self-use), and multiple cases of driving while seriously intoxicated have also 
led to the refusal of entry. Such criminal behaviour and the refusal of entry 
related thereto are justified under ‘public order and security’ (Section 156 
                                                        
34. See Section 2 (Ch. 2) Unemployment Security Act (Työttömyysturvalaki) 
30.12.2002/1290.  
35. Student maintenance aid consists of student grant (opintoraha), housing allowance 
(asumislisä), and a student loan guarantee by the State (opintolainan valtiontakaus) 
36. Section 1 Student Maintenance Aid Act (Opintotukilaki) 21.1.1994/65. 
37. See Government Proposal (HE) 205/2006 vp., p. 15 and 11. 
38. Sections 167 and 168 AA. 
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AA).39 There are no known cases related to public health for the purposes of 
the Directive. 
 A Supreme Administrative Court (KHO 2004:8940) case illustrates refus-
ing entry into Finland on the basis of public order and security. An Estonian 
citizen had been sentenced to six years for an aggravated narcotics offence 
(sentence scale: 1-10 years imprisonment).41 Assessment of the circumstanc-
es and individual factors leading to the imprisonment lead the court to con-
clude that the perpetrator’s previous behaviour (sentence for a forgery of-
fence, prior entry refusals based on suspected criminal activity) and personal 
conduct poses a present threat to public order and security and, as the appli-
cant had no family ties to Finland, the appeal against deportation was reject-
ed. The court’s reasoning emphasises proportionality,42 the review of which 
follows ECJ case-law (e.g. Joined cases C-482/01 and C-493/01, Orfanopou-
los) and takes into account: the nature and seriousness of the offence; unlaw-
ful residence; duration of time spent in the host MS; time elapsed from com-
mitting the offence; the (lack of) family or other ties to Finland; and that the 
applicant (and family members) are unlikely to face problems upon returning 
to the MS of origin.  
 Imperative grounds (Art. 28) are defined in Section 168(5) AA: being 
found guilty of an act which is punishable by no less than one year of impris-
onment, and the Union citizen is, on grounds of the seriousness of the crime 
or of continued criminal activity, considered a danger to public security, or 
where there are grounds for suspecting the person is seriously endangering 
the nation security of Finland or another State. In case KHO 2006:82,43 also 
decided prior to the implementation deadline of the Directive, the Supreme 
Administrative Court found that an EU citizen guilty of aggravated negligent 
manslaughter and aggravated assault (sentenced to three years and ten months 
imprisonment and fined for a separate assault), could not be deported on seri-
ous grounds of public order or security. In finding for the Estonian applicant 
that the deportation order was unlawful, the court considered the applicant’s 
age, state of health, family, and financial matters, how well the applicant had 
integrated into the society and culture of the host MS as well as the lack of 
remaining ties to the MS of origin. Having resided in Finland for ten years 
                                                        
39. Section 156 AA. 
40. http://www.kho.fi/paatokset/27793.htm. 
41. Section 2 (Ch. 50) The Criminal Code of Finland (Rikoslaki) 19.12.1889/39. 
42. See also Section 168b AA on overall consideration as to deportation on grounds of 
public order or security. 
43. http://www.kho.fi/en/paatokset/37638.htm. 
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with all family ties in Finland, too, and no family ties existing in the MS of 
origin, entrepreneurship in Finland, the applicant’s circumstances and behav-
iour after the crime, his deportation could not be justified on serious grounds 
of public order or security as the personal conduct of the applicant did not 
pose a continuing threat to the life of other people. 
 Yet, in another case decided prior to the implementation deadline of the 
Directive, KHO 2006:83,44 the Supreme Administrative Court found that a 
Union citizen could be deported on imperative grounds of public security. 
The Estonian applicant had been found guilty on four charges of aggravated 
narcotics offence in 1999 and for unlawful dealing in imported goods in 2003 
and sentenced, altogether, for five years and six months imprisonment. The 
applicant had resided in Finland for 11 years and had both family ties (exer-
cised parental visiting rights after divorce) and part-time employment in Fin-
land. The court found that the prison sentence alone could not be ground for 
deportation, however, taking into account the nature of repeated criminal 
conduct that indicates disregard towards the prohibitions of the law and how 
aggravated narcotics trafficking and unlawful dealing in imported prescrip-
tion drugs poses a danger to the safety of the society at large and individuals 
therein, the deportation was lawful. 
 The case-law examples above demonstrate how ‘overall consideration’, 
regulated by Section 146 AA is in practice carried out. This applies to deci-
sions on refusal of entry, deportation, and when determining the duration of 
an entry restriction. Emphasis is placed on the best interests of the child as 
well as the protection of family life. Other factors include duration of the al-
ien’s stay, purpose of stay, and the social and family ties to both the host state 
and state of origin. The principle of proportionality is in this regard is con-
templated especially in Section 146 AA, as amended in 2007.  
 In the recent case (KHO 2013:88), the Supreme Administrative Court an-
nulled a decision to refuse the residence registration of a Union citizen who 
was also a worker. The police, responsible for registration, had refused this 
on the basis that the Union citizen had been found guilty of unlawfully im-
porting a registered substance and of petty theft offences and therefore pre-
sented a threat to public order and security. However, as the SAC observed, 
this was not an express ground for refusal in the national legislation, which 
must be interpreted in the light of Union law. This supported the outcome that 
such grounds for refusal could only be relied on where a person was refused 
entry or deported, in which case both the Directive and the relevant national 




legislation enabled this. The judgment cites Treaty provisions, the directive, 
the Charter of Fundamental Rights, as well as the C-215/03, Oulane and 
C-376/89, Giagounidis judgments of the Court of Justice. 
EU citizenship beyond Directive 2004/38/EC – exploring national 
application of primary EU Law 
Question 7 
The recent judgment of the Finnish Supreme Administrative Court (FSAC) in 
its case KHO 2013:97 illustrates current practice on many of the issues raised 
by the question. L, a TCN, had received a residence permit on the basis of a 
previous marriage. L had custody of A, a child who was a Finnish citizen, 
and thus an EU citizen. M, another TCN, subsequently married L and was 
then deported. L and M later had a child, B, who was only a TCN due to in-
herited citizenship. The judgment concerned whether it was lawful for the 
Immigration Service to deny a residence permit to M for lacking sufficient 
means. Before issuing its judgment, the FSAC received an answer to its relat-
ed preliminary reference in Joined cases C-356/11 and C-357/11 (KHO 
2011:62 and 63). The FSAC ultimately denied the family reunification appli-
cation of L and M, noting in its reasoning that the decision of the Immigration 
Service to deny M’s residence permit application did not apply directly to L 
or L’s children. The decision to deny M’s right of residence did not, accord-
ing to the FSAC, have the consequence of denying the Union citizen child 
their genuine enjoyment of Union citizenship rights. In this case, M did not 
have custodial rights over A. The judgment notes the distinction between 
rights acquired under the Directive and under the Treaty Articles themselves. 
 In KHO 2012:47, the FSAC confirmed the deportation of a TCN family 
member who was the spouse of a Finnish union citizen and the father of their 
Finnish child. Grounds of public security could be invoked on the basis of a 
prior drugs conviction and outweighed other claims for effective enjoyment 
of citizenship rights. The FSAC issued its judgment after considering Ruiz 
Zambrano and Dereci, but without a preliminary reference. The case is typi-
cal of the ‘overall consideration’ exercised under Finnish nationality law. 
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Question 8 
Ordinary multiple citizenship has been accepted since 2003: acquiring Finn-
ish citizenship does not require loss of other citizenship and those with multi-
ple citizenship, yet sufficiently connected to Finland, can retain their Finnish 
citizenship beyond the age of 22. Prior to this, multiple citizenship was highly 
exceptional, according to the domestic rules on the acquisition and loss of na-
tionality. Citizenship can still be lost within five years from acquiring it if the 
applicant withheld or provided false or misleading information decisive for 
the naturalisation decision (see Section 33 NA). Since the latest 2011 
amendment of Section 29 of the Nationality Act (NA), former Finnish citi-
zens can (always) reacquire Finnish citizenship by their own declaration. The 
Government Proposal for this amendment does not mention Rottmann, sug-
gesting instead that the amendment regularises earlier more limited Sections 
on reacquiring Finnish citizenship.45 Article 5 of the Finnish Constitution and 
Sections 4 and 56 NA forbid loss of Finnish citizenship which would lead to 
statelessness. These predate Rottmann, and prevent the situation in Rottmann 
from arising due to the withdrawal of Finnish citizenship. See also KHO 
2011:77, concerning the finality of a decision awarding Finnish citizenship 
regardless of later evidence supporting a contrary outcome. 
Political rights of EU citizens 
Question 9 
Directive 93/109/EC was transposed by 22 December 1995 (final part of sev-
eral pieces of legislation entered into force 1 January 1996). Finland acceded 
to the EU on 1 January 1995 and the first EP elections took place in Finland 
on 20 October 1996. 
 There are no derogations. 
 The Election Act (EA) poses an additional residence and registration re-
quirement for EU citizens as compared to Finnish nationals. According to the 
EA, all EU citizens 18 years of age or over (on the day of elections), who 
have registered their residence in accordance with Municipality of Residence 
Act are considered to reside in Finland and hence eligible to vote in EP elec-
                                                        
45. See Government Proposal (HE) 80/2010, p. 38. 
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tions (in accordance with Articles 4-6).46 In order to use the voting right, in 
addition to residing in Finland, they must register at the Local Register Of-
fice, at the latest, 80 days (by 4 p.m.) before the day of (the first) elections – 
according to Section 18(5) EA. Each is prompted to do so by a personal letter 
sent by the Population Register Centre.47 Under Section 2 EA, a person who 
has lost their franchise in EP elections in their state of citizenship will not 
gain the vote in Finland. 
 Amendments to Directive 93/109/EC required changes to Sections 172(1), 
174(1), and 177 EA concerning candidates. These have entered into force 1 
                                                        
46. See Section 2 Election Act (Vaalilaki) 2.10.1998/714 and Section 4(3) Municipality 
of Residence Act (Kotikuntalaki) 11.3.1994/201. 
47. As prompted by Section 22 EA, the letter informing of 2009 elections stated: 
  ‘The European Parliament elections will be held in Finland on 7 June 2009. Thir-
teen members will be elected from Finland to the European Parliament. No one may 
vote in more than one Member State of the European Union in the same election. As 
a citizen of a Member State of the European Union you will be entered in the register 
on those with the right to vote in Finland as eligible to vote provided that 1) you still 
have a municipality of residence in Finland on 17 April 2009, 2) you have not forfeit-
ed your right to vote in your home state, 3) you have, by no later than 4 p.m. on 19 
March 2009, notified the Local Register Office (maistraatti) in writing that you want 
to use your right to vote only in Finland. You can make the notification by filling in 
the attached form. 
  If you register in Finland as a person entitled to vote, the Population Register Centre 
will inform the relevant authority in your home state of your registration. In this case, 
your personal data will be removed from the electoral register of your home state. 
  The Local Register Office (maistraatti) will, by no later than 14 May 2009, notify 
all those entered in the register on those with the right to vote in the European Parlia-
ment elections in Finland of their eligibility to vote (notification card). 
  If you want to vote in the European Parliament elections in your home state, you 
are not required to submit a notification to the Finnish authorities. 
  You will also be eligible as a candidate in these elections provided that 1) based on 
your notification you have the right to vote in these elections in Finland, 2) you have 
not been nominated as a candidate in these European Parliament elections in another 
Member State, 3) you have not forfeited your eligibility in the European Parliament 
elections in your home state. 
  If you want to be a candidate in these European Parliament elections, you must 
contact the political parties operating in Finland or, if you do not want to be a candi-
date of a political party, collect support for your candidacy from 2000 people with the 
right to vote. Additional information on being a candidate can be obtained from the 
Electoral District Committee of Helsinki (address: Helsingin vaalipiirilautakunta, PL 
25, c/o Oikeusministeriö, 00023 VALTIONEUVOSTO). 
  For more information on the European Parliament elections, please visit 
www.vaalit.fi.’ 
S. SANKARI & S. MIETTINEN ASSISTED BY M. HAKKARAINEN 
 526 
July 2013 and include: candidates’ declaration (of not been deprived of the 
right to stand as candidate in EP elections in their home state) replacing a cer-
tificate by the home State; identifying the candidate also by identity number; 
and the Population Register Centre (i.e. contact point) relaying information 
on such declarations to the home State without delay.48 
Question 10 
Directive 94/80/EC was fully implemented in mainland Finland by 22 De-
cember 1995 (into force 1 January 1996), and in the autonomous Province of 
Åland Islands by 1 March 2007.49 As to Åland, the right is limited to munici-
pal elections for those having resided there for a year before the elections. 
 No additional conditions are imposed on EU citizens in the elections on 
local (municipal) councils. EU citizens at least 18 years of age (on the day of 
elections) and resident in Finnish municipalities are eligible voters (automati-
cally registered as such), and can stand as candidates in the municipality 
where they reside 51 days prior to the day of local municipality elections.50 
Question 11 
No official regional elections beyond municipal elections exist in (mainland) 
Finland. Beyond what EU law requires, in addition to municipal and EP elec-
tions, EU citizens can take part in Municipal Consultative Referenda on the 
same terms as Finnish nationals (age and residence terms are the same as in 
question 10 above). Since the beginning of 1995, 49 such referenda have tak-
en place within the currently 320 municipalities.51 
 That the franchise remains the same in municipality elections and munici-
pal consultative referenda seems only logical. That EU nationals and Nordic 
non-EU nationals are treated similarly as to franchise and privileged as com-
pared to regular TCNs (required longer period of residence) may reflect the 
closer bonds between EU MSs and, traditionally, Nordic states (e.g. Nordic 
Council cooperation). 
                                                        
48. See Act amending the Election Act (Laki vaalilain muuttamisesta) 1.7.2013/496. 
49. See Provincial laws of Åland (Landskapslag) ÅFS 10/2007 and ÅFS 11/2007. 
50. Section 26 Municipality of Residence Act. 
51. See Section 30 Municipality Act, see also Act on the Procedure for Municipal Con-
sultative Referenda (Laki neuvoa-antavissa kunnallisissa kansanäänestyksissä nou-




There are no specific areas of tension on voting rights. In Finland, limitations 
to franchise mentioned in the question do not exist (for the only requirements, 
see questions 9 and 10). 
Culture(s) of citizenship 
Question 13 
It would seem that national implementation in this field is understood more as 
an adjunct to national immigration systems, and is based on permissions and 
registrations. Nevertheless, the legislation does not directly contradict free 
movement as a rights-based or constitutional culture founded in EU law. Re-
cent case law of the Supreme Courts tends to balance a number of sources 
and perspectives, and refer to overlapping legal sources including national 
law, EU treaties, secondary law, and case law. As a result of the underlying 
positivist and dualist national legal culture, courts prefer to interpret and ap-
ply national law as far as possible, although they appear aware of and respect-
ful of EU law and ECJ case-law. The courts’ openness to considering a 
rights-based approach may not be emphasized in reasoning which is often 
comparatively minimalist or laconic, although instruments such as the Char-
ter of Fundamental Rights or directly applicable free movement provisions 
may be cited in judgments. 
Question 14 
At the time of writing, there are 25 published judgments of the Finnish Su-
preme Administrative Court which refer to the Charter of Fundamental 
Rights, many of these citizenship cases which are discussed above. The dates 
of the judgments demonstrate that the CFR has received judicial attention in 
Finland well before the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty. In the first 
FSAC case to refer to the CFR, the Charter right to good administration was 
invoked on the grounds presented by the Court of Justice in paragraph 38 of 
C-540/03, according to which the Charter, even if it is not binding in itself, 
reaffirms rights found in other legally binding sources (KHO 2006:86 at 16). 
Thus, the CFR was legally relevant before 1.12.2009. However, most of the 
case law is dated after the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, from KHO 
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2010:82. In the context of EU citizenship, some of the FSAC case law on citi-
zenship or residence in fact often involves explanations for why particular 
rights in the CFR are not an obstacle to the application of national law, espe-
cially where citizenship and residence rights are concerned. (KHO 2013:97, 
discussed above, KHO 2011:98 concerning CFR 47, which did not prevent 
expulsion (contra KHO 2010:84 and KHO 2011:25, and 2012:1 , 2012:18, all 
referring to CFR 2, 18 and 19 and preventing deportation; KHO 2013:88 on 
registration, referring to CFR 45). The FSAC regularly refers cases to the 
Court of Justice, including questions related to EU citizenship and the Charter 
(Joined cases C-356 O and S and C-357/11 L, involving both). A very recent 
reference from a lower court (C-318/13, Sähköalojen ammattiliitto), asks i.a. 
about the direct effect of Article 47 CFR. Thus, it is clear that some lower 
courts also have a clear appreciation of the significance of the Charter, and 
are prepared to refer questions that concern its outer limits. 
 In a recent general evaluation, Tuomas Ojanen considers that the Lisbon 
Treaty appears to have generally made way for the application of the Charter 
before Finnish Courts (Ojanen in Lavapuro and Heinonen (eds) Oikeus-
kulttuurin eurooppalaistuminen 241-263, esp. 259-262). Ojanen notes that the 
FSAC has a tendency to refer to national and EU fundamental rights in tan-
dem, without always clarifying the relative importance of the European di-
mension in relevant cases. Both of these general observations can be support-
ed with evidence from the EU citizenship case law noted in this report. 
Question 15 
We find that a small empirical sample might provide an answer. By submit-
ting search words ‘EU-citizen’, ‘Union citizen’, ‘Union citizenship’, ‘Union 
citizens’ to the data archive (1994 to mid-2013) of the highest circulating 
Finnish daily newspaper (Helsingin Sanomat), some 200 results are returned. 
That is, on average the concept has been employed less than fortnightly. 
Some 30 ‘hits’ were published on the opinions pages, focusing mainly on 
personal accounts or concerns on work, mobility, and family life. From the 
remaining ‘hits’, three more related general themes seem to emerge: articles 
on the Lisbon Treaty, mobile Romanians, and two cases concerning deporta-
tion decisions of two TCNs’ elderly grandmothers. Generally the facts, if 
such are provided for, seem relatively accurate. As for media influence, the 
general disinterest of the media (observation consistent with the sample 
above) and audience towards the EU might show in the recent success of po-
litical anti-EU movement that has also benefitted from the coinciding eco-








La citoyenneté dans le cadre de la directibe 2004/38/CE – La 
stabilité de résidences des citoyens de l’Union et des membres de 
leurs familles 
Question 1 
La directive 2004/38/CE (ci-après : la directive) a été transposée en droit 
français par la loi du 24 juillet 2006,2 venant modifier le code de l'entrée et du 
séjour des étrangers et du droit d'asile (le « CESEDA ») en intégrant aux ar-
ticles L. 121-1 à L. 122-3 et R. 121-1 à R. 122-5 du CESEDA ces droits 
d'origine supranationale. Cette loi a été complétée par deux décrets.3 Enfin, 
une circulaire ministérielle, en date du 10 septembre 2010, est venue préciser 
l'interprétation à donner de ces textes par l'Administration.4 
 Les définitions contenues dans l'article 2 de la directive sont intégrées 
dans l'article L. 121-1 du CESEDA en ce qui concerne les séjours de plus de 
trois mois. Le droit de séjour de moins de trois mois relevait de l'article R. 
121-3 du CESEDA, avant d'être hissé au rang législatif par l'article L. 121-4-
1.5 Selon l'article 3 de la directive, le droit de se rendre ou de séjourner dans 
un Etat membre autre que le sien, varie selon : que le bénéficiaire est un ci-
toyen de l'Union européenne (L. 121-1.1° à 3° du CESEDA) ; un membre de 
la famille d'un citoyen de l'Union européenne (L. 121-1 4° et 5° du CESEDA) ; 
un membre de famille ressortissant d'un Etat tiers (L. 121-3 du CESEDA) ou 
un membre de famille autre que ceux visés à l'article 2.2 de la directive (R. 
121-2-1 ; R. 121-4-1 du CESEDA).  
                                                        
1. Juriste spécialisée en droit européen, Master 2 droit européen des affaires, Université 
Nice Sophia-Antipolis. 
2. Loi n° 2006-911, du 24 juillet 2006. 
3. Décret n° 2007-371 du 21 mars 2007 et décret n° 2011-1049 du 6 septembre 2011. 
4. Circulaire du Ministre de l'immigration, de l'intégration, de l'identité nationale et du 
développement solidaire, Circulaire n° NOR IMIM1000116C. 
5. Décret n° 2011-1049 du 6 sept. 2011, art. 4. 
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 Un ressortissant peut devenir membre de la famille d'un citoyen de l'Union 
européenne de diverses façons : 
– Il peut le devenir par les liens du mariage. Il a été jugé, par les tribunaux 
français, qu'il n'était pas exigé que l'étranger soit en situation régulière à la 
date de son mariage avec un ressortissant d'un Etat membre pour se préva-
loir de sa qualité de conjoint d'un ressortissant de l'Union Européenne.6 
Aussi, le mariage religieux n'est pas considéré par les juridictions fran-
çaises comme équivalant au mariage civil ou à un partenariat enregistré. 
Une telle union religieuse peut néanmoins être un élément venant appuyer 
la communauté de vie.7  
– Il peut le devenir en concluant un partenariat enregistré, au sens de l'article 
2.2.b de la directive. Si le pacte civil de solidarité8 n'était pas regardé, 
comme le prévoit la directive, comme équivalent au mariage – ni par la loi 
de transposition du 24 juillet 2006 ni par la circulaire ministérielle relative 
aux conditions d'exercice du droit de séjour9 – les juridictions françaises 
ont usé à plusieurs reprises de l'effet direct de la directive en reconnaissant 
cette équivalence. À cette fin, les juges réfutaient l'application de l'article 
L. 313-11 7° du CESEDA (ie: 3.2b de la directive), au profit de l'applica-
tion des articles L. 121-1 et L. 121-3 du CESEDA (ie: 2.2.b de la direc-
tive).10 Enfin, il appartient au préfet, afin de caractériser de frauduleux la 
communauté de vie postérieure à un tel partenariat enregistré, d'apporter 
les éléments probants à l'appui de ses allégations de fraude; tel que l'ab-
sence de résidence commune.11  
                                                        
6. Cour administrative d'appel de Paris, 18 févr. 2010, Karmani Seffar: req. n° 
09PA04280. 
7. Cour administrative d'appel de Paris – Paris – 7ème chambre – 11PA04118 – 21 sep-
tembre 2012.  
8. Equivalent de l'article 2 .2. b) « le partenaire avec lequel le citoyen de l'Union a con-
tracté un partenariat enregistré ». 
9. Point 3.5.2 et 3.5.5 Circulaire du Ministre de l'immigration, de l'intégration, de l'iden-
tité nationale et du développement solidaire, Circulaire n° NOR IMIM1000116C. 
10. Tribunal administratif de Nice, 16 oct. 2009, Alves do Couto: req. no 0902958 ; Cour 
administrative d'appel de Marseille – Marseille – 5ème chambre – formation à 3 – 
09MA04065 – 12 mai 2011 ; Cour administrative d'appel de Marseille – Marseille – 
5ème chambre – formation à 3 – 10MA04024 – 28 juin 2012; Cour administrative 
d'appel de Bordeaux – Bordeaux – 1ère chambre – formation à 3 – 12BX00350 – 05 
juillet 2012. 
11. Cour administrative d'appel de Bordeaux – Bordeaux – 1ère chambre – formation à 3 
– 12BX00350 – 05 juillet 2012.  
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– Par une communauté de vie lorsque la relation est durable et dûment attes-
tée. L'interprétation par les juridictions françaises d'une « relation durable, 
dûment attestée » entre ressortissants, doit être individualisée. À cet égard, 
une communauté de vie de trois mois avant la date du dépôt de la de-
mande est considérée comme trop brève pour permettre d'être regardé 
comme membre de la famille d'un citoyen de l'Union européenne.12 Dans 
une autre espèce, le juge administratif français considère que ne présente 
pas un caractère suffisamment stable une communauté de vie de quatre 
mois, même si elle était prouvée par un certificat de concubinage.13  
L'article 5.1 de la directive porte sur le droit d'entrée et les documents y atte-
nants. Si l'article, de droit commun, L. 221-1 du CESEDA pose le principe de 
l'obligation de présentation de certains documents et visas, les articles R. 121-
1 et R. 212-1 du CESEDA dérogent au principe susmentionné pour les res-
sortissants d'un Etat de l'Union européenne, en ce que la simple présentation 
d'une carte d'identité ou passeport en cours de validité est suffisant pour l'ad-
mission sur le territoire français. Les articles R. 121-1 alinéa 2 et R. 121-2-1 
du CESEDA visent les membres de la famille ressortissants d'un Etat tiers. 
Ces derniers sont admis sur le territoire français sous les mêmes conditions 
que celles imposées par la directive.14 Le décret du 6 septembre 2011 met la 
France en conformité avec les garanties procédurales de l'article 5.2° et 5.4° 
de la directive et les lignes directrices de la Commission15 qui estiment qu'un 
délai raisonnable doit être de l'ordre de quatre semaines. En effet, le décret 
susmentionné rajoute aux articles R. 121-1 et R. 121-2 du CESEDA une pro-
cédure accélérée, procédure qui a été reconnue par la juridiction suprême de 
l'ordre administratif français.16 
                                                        
12. Cour administrative d'appel de Bordeaux – Bordeaux – 3ème chambre (formation à 
3) – 10BX03057 – 08 novembre 2011. 
13. Cour administrative d'appel de Marseille – Marseille – 7ème chambre – formation à 3 
– 10MA01524 – 13 mars 2012.  
14. Point 2.1, Circulaire du Ministre de l'immigration, de l'intégration, de l'identité natio-
nale et du développement solidaire, Circulaire n° NOR IMIM1000116C. 
15. Communication de la Commission au Parlement européen et au Conseil concernant 
les lignes directrices destinées à améliorer la transposition et l'application de la direc-
tive 2004/38/CE relative au droit des citoyens de l'Union et des membres de leurs fa-
milles de circuler et de séjourner librement sur le territoire des Etats membres, 
COM/2009/0313. 




Le bénéfice du droit de séjour de plus de trois mois est conditionné à la 
preuve de ressources suffisantes, ainsi que d'une assurance maladie ; afin de 
ne pas devenir une charge pour le système d'assistance sociale selon l'article 
L. 121-1 2° à 5° du CESEDA. Nous qualifierons par la suite ces pré-requis de 
« motifs purement économiques » pouvant mener à une expulsion. Les moda-
lités et le caractère suffisant de ces motifs purement économiques sont régis 
par les dispositions de l'article R. 121-4 du CESEDA et sont interprétés dans 
la circulaire de la Direction de la sécurité sociale.17 
 Les bénéficiaires de l'article L. 121-1 du CESEDA doivent produire une 
attestation d'assurance maladie couvrant les prestations prévues aux articles 
L. 321-1 et L. 331-2 du code de la sécurité sociale (le « CSS »). La preuve est 
libre, la régularité de la demande sera appréciée en fonction de la réalité18 et 
de la durée de cette couverture maladie. 
 Lorsque le caractère suffisant des ressources est exigé par l'article L.121-1 
du CESEDA, il doit être apprécié individuellement, à l'aune du revenu de so-
lidarité active de l'article L. 262-2 2° du code de l'action sociale et des fa-
milles (le « CASF ») et s'il s'agit de l'allocation de solidarité aux personnes 
âgées des familles, de l'article L. 815-1 du CSS. Ces montants sont adaptés en 
fonction du nombre de personnes composant la famille du ressortissant de 
l'Union. La preuve peut s'administrer par tout moyen.19 Si les moyens d'exis-
tences sont personnels ou issus d'une tierce personne, le demandeur devra en 
justifier l'effectivité et la durée. 
 L'article 7.3 de la directive, qui prévoit les hypothèses dans lesquelles un 
citoyen de l'Union européenne perd sa qualité « de travailleur », est transposé 
à l'article R.121-6 du CESEDA. La charge induite sur le système d'aide so-
                                                        
17. Circulaire DSS/DACI n° 2011-225, du 9 juin 2011, relative à la condition d'assurance 
maladie complète dont doivent justifier les ressortissants européens inactifs, les étu-
diants et les personnes à la recherche d'un emploi, au delà de trois mois de résidence 
en France ; B.O. santé, Protection sociale Solidarité n° 2011/7 du 15 août 2011, p. 
365. 
18. Ie : Si le ressortissant est couvert par une assurance autre que française, le « panier de 
soin » doit être comparable aux prestations en natures offertes par l'assurance maladie 
française. 
19. Cour administrative d'appel de Nancy – Nancy – 1ère chambre – formation à 3 – 
10NC01754 – 15 décembre 2011 ; Point 3.3.1, Circulaire du Ministre de l'immigra-
tion, de l'intégration, de l'identité nationale et du développement solidaire, Circulaire 
n° NOR IMIM1000116C.  
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ciale au regard des prestations ou aides qu'il solliciterait s'apprécie au cas par 
cas, selon la lettre de l'article R.121-4 alinéa 3 et 4 du CESEDA. 
 Au-delà des griefs portés par l'association Human Rights Watch,20 selon 
lesquels les préfectures françaises ne motiveraient pas à suffisance de droit la 
durée du séjour de plus de trois mois permettant ainsi d'appliquer les critères 
de ressources suffisantes, il convient de souligner les tendances jurispruden-
tielles majeures. À titre préliminaire, il convient de rappeler qu'en 2008, le 
Conseil d'Etat a jugé que l'insuffisance des ressources peut être opposée par le 
préfet pour prendre une décision d'éloignement à l'encontre d'un ressortissant 
communautaire qui séjourne en France depuis plus de trois mois ; alors même 
que l'intéressé n'est pas encore effectivement pris en charge par le système 
d'aide sociale et ne dispose d'aucune resource.21 Aussi, l'insuffisance de res-
sources qui peut conduire à une expulsion d'un ressortissant communautaire, 
sans domicile fixe dans l'espèce visée, doit préalablement faire l'objet d'une 
appréciation individuelle de la situation ressortissant.22 Enfin, ces critères 
s'appliquent aussi à l'ascendant ressortissant d'un Etat tiers qui a, à sa charge, 
son enfant ressortissant d'un Etat membre.23 
 Les juridictions françaises ont estimé, sur le fondement des article L. 121-
1 4° et L. 121-3 du CESEDA, que le droit au séjour ne pouvait être refusé à 
un ressortissant d'un Etat tiers au motif que son épouse, ressortissante d'un 
Etat membre et bénéficiant d'un droit de séjour permanent, disposait de res-
sources insuffisantes suite à un accident de la circulation, alors même que 
cette dernière était titulaire de diverses allocations et que le montant de ces 
dernières dépassait le seuil minimum de l'article R. 121-4 du CESEDA. En 
conséquence, l'arrêté du préfet procédant à son éloignement a été annulé.  
                                                        
20. « Le respect par la France de la Directive européenne relative à la liberté de circula-
tion et l'éloignement de ressortissants européens appartenant à la communauté Rom 
Document d'information », Human Rights Watch soumis à la Commission euro-
péenne en juillet 2011, disponible au : http://www.hrw.org/fr/news/2011/09/28/le-
respect-par-la-france-de-la-directive-europ-enne-relative-la-libert-de-circulatio 
21. CE, avis, 26 novembre 2008, Silidor, req. N° 315441 : lebon 442, AJDA 2009 270, 
conl. Guyomar, RFDA 2009. 183 ; repris par Cour administrative d'appel de Ver-
sailles – Versailles – 4ème chambre – 09VE02162 – 08 juin 2010 ; Cour administra-
tive d'appel de Versailles – Versailles – 4ème chambre – 10VE01303 – 24 mai 2011.  
22. Cour administrative d'appel de Lyon, 8 octobre 2009, Iancovici : req n° 09LY01119. 
Et Cour administrative d'appel de Douai – Douai – Juge des reconduites à la frontière 
– 10DA01148 – 16 décembre 2010. 
23. Cour administrative d'appel de Bordeaux – Bordeaux – 5ème chambre (formation à 
3) – 10BX01839 – 08 juillet 2011.  
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 Pour caractériser l'insuffisance des ressources, un préfet peut s'appuyer sur 
l'absence d'un emploi stable, de ressources propres, de domicile ou encore 
d'assurance maladie.24 Il pourra aussi justifier sa décision d'expulsion par le 
fait que le ressortissant se livre à la mendicité ou vit dans des conditions ma-
térielles précaires. Aussi, l'intéressé ne peut utilement invoquer une attesta-
tion d'aide établie par sa fille à une date postérieure à la décision litigieuse à 
l'appui de sa prétendue qualité d'ascendante à charge.25 La notion de res-
sources inclut nécessairement, selon les juridictions nationales, une certaine 
stabilité. Ne peuvent être considérés comme étant suffisants, au regard des 
articles L. 121-1 et R. 121-4 du CESEDA, les revenus tirés de missions 
d'intérim ne dépassant pas 800 euros par mois pendant deux mois consécu-
tifs.26 En ce qui concerne la charge induite sur le système d'aide sociale, au 
regard des prestations ou aides qu'un ressortissant solliciterait, il a été jugé 
que l'absence totale de moyens de subsistance permet de considérer qu'un res-
sortissant se trouve dans une situation irrégulière en France au sens de l'ar-
ticle L. 512-2 du CSS, le privant par là même du bénéfice de plein droit des 
prestations familiales.27 Partant, est constitutif d'un abus de droit au sens des 
dispositions du 2° de l'article L.511-3-1 du CESEDA, le ressortissant qui ne 
remplit pas les conditions de ressources suffisantes prévues aux articles 
L.121-1 et R121-4 CESEDA et qui effectuait de multiples allers retours entre 
la France et son pays d'origine, dans le seul but de se maintenir sur le terri-
toire français pour une durée inférieure à trois mois, sans justifier des condi-
tions requises.28 Est aussi considéré comme un abus de droit, le fait d'être une 
charge déraisonnable pour le système d'assistance sociale en ayant recours à 
l'assistance dans des conditions telles que le séjour en France est effectué 
dans le but essentiel de bénéficier du système d'assistance sociale français.29 
                                                        
24. Cour administrative d'appel de Lyon – Lyon – 2ème chambre – formation à 3 – 
11LY00993 – 05 janvier 2012.  
25. Cour administrative d'appel de Lyon – Lyon – 2ème chambre – formation à 3 – 
11LY02480 – 26 juin 2012.  
26. Cour administrative d'appel de Marseille – Marseille – 7ème chambre – formation à 3 
– 09MA00375 – 24 janvier 2011.  
27. Cour d'appel de Rennes – Rennes – CH. 09 CH. SECURITE SOCIALE – 10/01381 – 
29 novembre 2011.  
28. Cour administrative d'appel de Lyon – 6ème chambre – N° 12LY00483 – Préfet du 
Rhône c/ M. D. – 29 novembre 2012.  
29. Cour administrative d'appel de Lyon – Lyon – 1ère chambre – formation à 3 – 




L'article 12 de la directive 2004/3830 (ci-après « la directive ») concerne le 
maintien du droit de séjour des membres de la famille en cas de décès ou du 
départ du citoyen de l'Union. Les alinéas 1er et 2ème de cet article ont été 
transposés en droit français par un décret de 2011,31 respectivement à l'article 
R.121-7 du Code de l'entrée et du séjour des étrangers et du droit d'asile (ci-
après « CESEDA ») qui concerne les ressortissant d'un Etat membre de 
l'Union ; l'article R.121-8 CESEDA, qui concerne les ressortissants d'un Etat 
tiers à l'UE ; enfin un décret de 200732 a créé l'article R.121-9 CESEDA qui 
transpose l'alinéa 3 de la directive et qui traite des conditions de conservation 
du droit de séjour des enfants du citoyen de l'Union ou du parent qui en a la 
garde. Alors que la directive partage les dispositions des articles 12 et 13 se-
lon le cas du décès ou départ du citoyen de l'Union pour l'article 12 et le cas 
du divorce pour l'article 13 ; la transposition française distingue entre les 
membres de la famille issus d'un Etat membre pour l'article R.121-7, et ceux 
issus d'un Etat tiers pour l'article R.121-8.  
 Le deuxième paragraphe de l'alinéa 2 de l'article 12 de la directive énonce 
les conditions du maintien du droit de séjour des membres de la famille du 
citoyen de l'Union pour les périodes de plus de trois mois, et avant l'acquisi-
tion d'un droit de séjour permanent. Ces conditions sont celles de démontrer 
que les intéressés disposent de ressources suffisantes pour ne pas devenir une 
charge pour le système d'assistance sociale de l'Etat membre d'accueil, et la 
couverture par une assurance maladie dans l'Etat membre d'accueil. L'article 
R.121-4 CESEDA modifié par un décret de 201133 transpose ces dispositions.  
 L'alinéa 3 de l'article 12 de la directive sur la conservation du droit de sé-
jour des membres de la famille du citoyen de l'Union après son départ ou son 
décès ayant la garde des enfants est conditionné à deux éléments, et ce 
quelque soit leur nationalité : la résidence dans l'Etat membre d'accueil et 
l'inscription des enfants dans un établissement scolaire jusqu'à la fin de leurs 
études. La transposition française a été effectuée à l'article R.121-9 CESEDA, 
                                                        
30. Directive 2004/38/CE du Parlement européen et du Conseil du 29 avril 2004 relative 
au droit des citoyens de l'Union et des membres de leurs familles de circuler et de sé-
journer librement sur le territoire des Etats membres, modifiant le règlement (CEE) n° 
1612/68 et abrogeant les directives 64/221/CEE, 68/360/CEE, 72/194/CEE, 
73/148/CEE, 75/34/CEE, 75/35/CEE, 90/364/CEE, 90/365/CEE et 93/96/CEE. 
31. Décret n°2011-1049 du 6 septembre 2011 – article 9. 
32. Décret n°2007-371 du 21 mars 2007 – art 1 JORF 22 mars 2007. 
33. Op.cit. (Note 1). 
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mais restreint la conservation de ce droit de séjour pour ce qui est du deu-
xième élément, à l'achèvement de la scolarité des enfants dans un établisse-
ment français d'enseignement secondaire, qui correspond à la fin du lycée.  
 L'article 13 de la directive concerne le maintien du droit de séjour des 
membres de la famille en cas de divorce, d'annulation du mariage ou de rup-
ture d'un partenariat enregistré. L'alinéa 1er traite des membres de la famille 
ayant la nationalité d'un Etat membre et a été transposé en droit français par 
l'article R.121-7 CESEDA. Le deuxième alinéa traite des membres de la fa-
mille de la nationalité d'un Etat tiers et est transposé à l'article R.121-8 CE-
SEDA. Il est intéressant de noter que le droit français, à l'inverse de la direc-
tive, ne mentionne pas le cas de la rupture d'un partenariat enregistré, mais 
seulement celui de la rupture ou l'annulation du mariage.  
 L'article 14 de la directive sur les conditions du maintien du droit de séjour 
est transposé à l'article L.121-1 et L.121-4-1 CESEDA.34 Des doutes quant à 
l'interprétation de l'article 14 alinéa 2 de la directive ont pu être exprimés 
dans la jurisprudence,35 mais n'ont jamais été portés à la Cour de Justice de 
l'Union européenne par les cours et tribunaux français.  
Question 4 
Les articles 16 à 21 de la directive 2004/3836 (ci-après « la directive ») traitent 
du droit de séjour permanent. L'article 16 de la directive énonce la règle géné-
rale pour les citoyens de l'Union et les membres de leur famille. L'alinéa 1er 
accorde un droit de séjour permanent aux citoyens de l'Union ayant séjourné 
légalement pendant une période interrompue de cinq ans sur le territoire de 
l'Etat membre d'accueil et est transposé en droit français à l'article L.122-1 du 
code de l'entrée et du séjour des étrangers et du droit d'asile (ci-après « CE-
SEDA »). L'alinéa 2, transposé au même article du CESEDA octroie l'appli-
cation de l'alinéa 1 aux membres de la famille n'ayant pas la nationalité d'un 
Etat membre. L'alinéa 3 de l'article 16 de la directive indique les conditions 
                                                        
34. Article L.121-4-1 CESEDA créé par la loi n° 2006-911 du 24 juillet 2006 – art. 23 
JORF 25 juillet rectificatif JORF 16 septembre 2006. 
35. Voir par exemple arrêt n° 10VE01177 du 14 décembre 2010, 4ème chambre de la 
cour administrative d'appel de Versailles. 
36. Directive 2004/38/CE du Parlement européen et du Conseil du 29 avril 2004 relative 
au droit des citoyens de l'Union et des membres de leurs familles de circuler et de sé-
journer librement sur le territoire des Etats membres, modifiant le règlement (CEE) n° 
1612/68 et abrogeant les directives 64/221/CEE, 68/360/CEE, 72/194/CEE, 
73/148/CEE, 75/34/CEE, 75/35/CEE, 90/364/CEE, 90/365/CEE et 93/96/CEE. 
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dans lesquelles la continuité du séjour n'est pas entachée malgré une absence 
de six mois par an au total, des absences plus longues,37 ou douze mois 
maximum.38 Ces conditions sont retranscrites à l'article R.122-3 CESEDA. 
Selon l'alinéa 4 de l'article 16 de la directive transposé à l'article L.122-2 CE-
SEDA, une fois acquis, le droit de séjour permanent ne se perd que par des 
absences d'une durée supérieure à deux ans consécutifs de l'Etat membre 
d'accueil.  
 L'article 17 de la directive concerne des dérogations pour les travailleurs 
ayant cessé leur activité dans l'Etat membre d'accueil et les membres de leur 
famille. Cet article se divise en 4 alinéas, transposés aux articles R.122-4 et 
R.122-5 CESEDA.  
 L'article 18 de la directive sur l'acquisition du droit de séjour permanent 
des membres de la famille n'ayant pas la nationalité d'un Etat membre est 
transposé à l'article R.122-2 CESEDA.  
 Les articles 19, 20 et 21 régissent les formalités administratives. L'article 
19 sur le document attestant de la permanence du séjour pour les citoyens de 
l'Union est transposé à l'article R.121-15 CESEDA. L'article 20 concerne la 
carte de séjour permanent pour les membres de la famille qui n'ont pas la na-
tionalité d'un Etat membre. L'alinéa 1er de cet article prévoit le délai dans le-
quel la carte de séjour permanent doit être donnée aux membres de la famille 
n'ayant pas la nationalité d'un Etat membre, et énonce que la carte de séjour 
permanent est renouvelable de plein droit tous les dix ans. La transposition de 
l'alinéa 1er de l'article 20 de la directive se trouve à l'article L.122-1 CESE-
DA. Le deuxième alinéa de ce même article traite du délai à respecter pour la 
demande de la carte de séjour permanent et est transposé à l'article R122-2 
CESEDA. Enfin, le troisième alinéa de l'article 20 de la directive transposé à 
l'article L.122-2 CESEDA énonce les cas dans lesquels la validité de la carte 
de séjour permanent est menacée. Les modalités concernant la continuité de 
séjour sont exposées à l'article 21 de la directive et à l'article R.122-3 CESE-
DA.  
Question 5 
Les exceptions à l'égalité de traitement prévues par l'article 24, paragraphe 2, 
de la directive 2004/38/CE (la « directive ») ont été abondamment reprises 
par la France en matière législative. Le cadre règlementaire est en revanche 
                                                        
37. Dans le cas d'accomplissement d'obligations militaires. 




favorable aux droits du ressortissant d'un autre Etat membre de l'Union euro-
péenne (le « ressortissant d'un autre Etat membre »). 
 Au niveau législatif, le droit du ressortissant d'un autre Etat membre à ob-
tenir une prestation d'assistance sociale est assez réduit. Si le législateur fran-
çais a souvent pris le soin de rappeler les droits qu'avaient le travailleur et ses 
enfants39 conformément à l'article 45 TFUE et au règlement n° 492/201140 (le 
« travailleur »), il a presque systématiquement recouru à la « solution la plus 
restrictive41 » pour les autres ressortissants, en combinant deux exceptions. 
 D'une part, le législateur français a introduit une condition de résidence de 
trois mois minimum dans plusieurs articles du code de l'action sociale (le « 
CASF ») et du code de la sécurité sociale (le « CSS »). Tel est, par exemple, 
le cas des dispositions relatives au revenu de solidarité active (le « RSA »),42 
ainsi que du revenu minimum d'insertion (le « RMI »)43 et de l'allocation de 
parent isolé (l'« API »),44 qu'il a remplacés. La condition de résidence de trois 
mois minimum est également un préalable nécessaire à l'obtention de l'alloca-
tion de solidarité aux personnes âgées (l'« APSA »), de l'allocation supplé-
mentaire d'invalidité (l'« ASI »)45 et de l'allocation aux adultes handicapés (l'« 
AAH »).46 
 D'autre part, le demandeur d'emploi a fait l'objet de dispositions spécifiques. 
En effet, « le ressortissant d'un autre Etat membre de l'Union européenne (...), 
entré en France pour y chercher un emploi et qui s'y maintient à ce titre n'a pas 
droit [au RSA,47 et auparavant au RMI48 et à l'API,49 ainsi qu'à la couverture 
maladie universelle (la « CMU »),50 l'APSA, l'ASI51 et l'AAH ».52  
                                                        
39. V. notamment l'article L. 262-6 du code de l'action sociale et des familles (le 
« CASF ») et l'article L. 821-1 du code de la sécurité sociale (le « CSS »). 
40. Règlement n° 492/2011 du 5 avril 2011 relatif à la libre circulation des travailleurs à 
l'intérieur de l'Union, JO L 141/1, 27 mai 2011. 
41. B. KHIARI, Débats parlementaires, Sénat 1ère lecture, XII° législature, Séance du 
1er février 2007. 
42. Article L. 262-6, alinéa 1, du CASF. 
43. Article L. 262-9-1, alinéa 1, du CASF. 
44. Article L. 524-1, alinéa 4, du CSS. 
45. Article L. 816-1, du CSS. 
46. Article L. 821-1, alinéa 3, du CSS. 
47. Article L. 262-6, alinéa 5, du CASF. 
48. Article L. 262-9-1, alinéa 5, du CASF. 
49. Article L. 524-1, alinéa 8, du CSS. 
50. Article L. 380-1, du CSS. Cet article vise l'accès au régime général d'assurance mala-
die. « En pratique, ce n'est pas l'accès à l'assurance maladie mais à une prise en 




 « Le refus systématique d'accorder [certaines des prestations précédem-
ment listées] au [demandeur d'emploi], quel que soit le lien qu'il a pu tisser 
avec le marché de l'emploi [est] contraire au droit [de l'Union européenne] 
».53 En effet, les Etats membres doivent, en vertu de l'article 18 TFUE, de 
l'article 45, paragraphe 2, TFUE et des arrêts Collins54 et Vatsuras,55 accorder 
une prestation « de nature financière destinée à faciliter l'accès à l'emploi sur 
le marché du travail d'un Etat membre »56 s'il existe un « lien réel » entre le 
demandeur d'emploi et le marché du travail de l'Etat membre d'accueil.57 
 Il serait donc nécessaire de cibler toutes prestations « de nature financière 
[destinées] à faciliter l'accès à l'emploi sur le marché du travail d'un Etat 
membre » et d'ajouter une nouvelle exception qui préciserait les critères per-
mettant de caractériser un « lien réel ». Pourraient être intégrés, la formule 
des arrêts Collins et Vatsouras, selon laquelle « la personne en cause a, pen-
dant une période d'une durée raisonnable, effectivement et réellement cherché 
un emploi »,58 et, conformément à l'arrêt Prete,59 « les éléments ressortant [de 
son] contexte familial », tels la durée de son séjour et « le mariage avec un 
ressortissant de [l'Etat membre d'accueil] ».60 
 L'arrêt de la cour administrative d'appel de Paris du 20 octobre 201161 est 
topique du manque de prise en compte de la jurisprudence de la Cour de jus-
tice de l'Union européenne (la « CJUE ») sur le « lien réel » par les cours et 
les tribunaux nationaux. En l'espèce un ressortissant polonais s'était vu refu-
ser l'accès au RSA. Confirmant le jugement du tribunal administratif de Paris, 
la cour administrative d'appel de Paris a estimé que le demandeur n'était pas 
fondé à toucher le RSA car celui-ci était « entré en France pour y chercher un 
emploi » et qu'il s'y maintenait à ce titre. Le juge semble avoir procédé à un 
                                                        
truction, des personnes en recherche d'emploi ne sont pas redevables de cotisations » 
(Rapp. d'information n° 3671 C. BOUTIN, Ass. Nat., XII° législature, 5 mars 2007). 
51. Article L. 816-1 du CSS. 
52. Article L. 821-1, alinéa 7, du CSS. 
53. J. CAVALLINI, Recherche d'emploi et accès aux aides sociales, JCP S, n° 29, 14 
juillet 2009, 1325 ; En ce sens, v. A. MATH, Roms et autres : la protection sociale 
des ressortissants communautaires, Droit social 2010, p. 1037. 
54. CJCE, 23 mars 2004, aff. C-138/02, Collins. 
55. CJCE, 4 juin 2009, aff. jointes C-22 et C-23/08, Vatsouras. 
56. Ibid, pt. 37 ; Collins, Op. cit., pt. 63. 
57. Vatsouras, Op. cit., pt. 38 ; Collins, Op cit., pt. 67. 
58. Vatsouras, Op. cit., pt. 39 ; Collins, Op cit. pt. 70. 
59. CJUE, 25 octobre 2012, aff. C-367/11, Déborah Prete c/ Office national de l'emploi. 
60. Ibid, pt. 50. 
61. CAA Paris, 20 octobre 2011, n° 10PA05222. 
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double contrôle : celui de la conformité du refus d'accorder le RSA avec la 
directive et de sa conformité avec le statut de « travailleur ». Il n'a en re-
vanche pas recherché s'il existait un « lien réel » entre le demandeur et le 
marché de l'emploi de l'Etat membre d'accueil. 
 Au niveau règlementaire, le texte de nombreuses circulaires rappelle les 
droits des « travailleurs » ainsi que ceux des étudiants pouvant faire état d'un 
« lien réel » tel que défini par la jurisprudence Bidar.62 Pour rappel, une cir-
culaire est un texte qui permet aux autorités administratives d'informer leurs 
services. En matière d'attribution de bourses, celles-ci sont la règle puisque 
les articles L. 821-1 à L. 821-4 du code de l'éducation relatifs aux aides aux 
étudiants ont confié au pouvoir exécutif la charge de déterminer les condi-
tions d'attribution des bourses.  
 A titre d'exemple, la circulaire du 22 août 201263 est venue expliciter la 
condition de la « nationalité » prévue à l'article 1er du décret n° 2008-974 du 
18 septembre 2008 relatif aux bourses et aides financières accordées aux étu-
diants relevant du ministère de l'enseignement supérieur,64 modifié par le dé-
cret n° 2012-455 du 4 avril 2012.65 Cette circulaire prévoit que le ressortis-
sant d'un autre Etat membre doit remplir deux conditions alternatives. Soit 
celui-ci établit qu'il relève de la protection du régime du « travailleur », soit il 
se prévaut de sa qualité de citoyen de l'Union européenne, auquel cas il doit 
attester « d'un certain degré d'intégration ».66 Ce degré d'intégration peut être 
« apprécié notamment au vu de la durée du séjour (un an minimum), de la 
scolarité suivie en France ou encore des liens familiaux en France ».67  
                                                        
62. CJCE, 15 mars 2005, aff. C-209/03, Bidar, pt. 63. 
63. Circulaire du 22 août 2012 relative aux modalités d'attribution des bourses d'ensei-
gnement supérieur sur critères sociaux et des aides au mérite aux étudiants des éta-
blissements d'enseignement supérieur habilités à délivrer un diplôme relevant du mi-
nistère de la culture et de la communication et des écoles ou centres de formation 
agréés ou habilités, pour l'année 2012-2013 ; v. aussi circulaire du 22 juin 2012 rela-
tive aux modalités d'attribution des bourses d'enseignement supérieur sur critères so-
ciaux et des aides au mérite et à la mobilité internationale pour l'année 2012-2013 ; 
circulaire du 9 octobre 2012 relative aux bourses nationales d'enseignement supérieur 
agricole court et long. 
64. Décret n° 2008-974 du 18 septembre 2008 relatif aux bourses et aides financières ac-
cordées aux étudiants relevant du ministère de l'enseignement supérieur : JO, 19 sep-
tembre 2008, n° 219, p. 14553. 
65. Décret n° 2012-455 du 4 avril 2012 modifiant le décret 2008-974 du 18 septembre 
2008 relatif aux bourses et aides financières accordées aux étudiants relevant du mi-
nistère de l'enseignement supérieur : JO, 6 avril 2007, n° 81, p. 6286. 
66. Circulaire du 22 août 2012, Op. cit., p. 7. 
67. Circulaire du 22 août 2012, Op. cit., p. 7. 
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 Cette durée minimum est bien plus favorable au ressortissant d'un autre 
Etat membre que ce qu'offrent aux Etats membres l'article 24, paragraphe 2, 
de la directive et l'arrêt Föster.68 La directive prévoit, en effet, la possibilité 
de n'accorder aucune bourse avant l'obtention du droit de séjour permanent, à 
savoir 5 ans.69 La CJUE avait, quant à elle, estimé qu'une condition de rési-
dence de 5 ans était conforme au droit de l'Union européenne.70 Les condi-
tions avantageuses, qu'offre le droit français au regard du droit de l'Union eu-
ropéenne, expliquent peut-être l'absence de contentieux récent relatif à l'ar-
ticle 24, paragraphe 2, de la directive ou au « lien réel » devant les cours 
d'appel et le Conseil d'Etat en matière de bourses.71  
 Il s'avère donc que les démarches administratives permettant d'accéder aux 
minimas sociaux et les conditions à remplir sont assez contraignantes, de 
sorte qu'il est possible de se demander si le ressortissant de l'Union n'est pas 
considéré comme un étranger aux yeux des autorités françaises.  
Question 6 
Le juge français a intégré très tôt dans sa jurisprudence,72 la solution de l'arrêt 
Bouchereau73 reprise par la directive 2004/38/CE (la « directive ») et codifiée 
                                                        
68. CJCE, 18 novembre 2008, aff. C-158/07, Förster ; Il ne semble pas que la solution de 
l'arrêt Förster soit plus restrictive que celle de l'arrêt Bidar. Certes la durée de séjour 
qui a été censurée par la CJUE dans l'arrêt Bidar était de 3 ans, alors que dans l'arrêt 
Förster, une durée de séjour de 5 ans a été déclarée conforme au droit de l'Union eu-
ropéenne (Förster, Op. cit., pts. 51 et s.). Cependant, la première affaire « concernait 
une règlementation nationale qui, outre le respect d'une condition de résidence, impo-
sait aux étudiants provenant d'autres Etats membres prétendant à une aide visant à 
couvrir leurs frais d'entretien qu'ils soient établis dans l'Etat membre d'accueil » 
(Förster, Op. cit., pt. 47). Or, « la règlementation en cause (...) excluait toute possibili-
té pour un ressortissant d'un autre Etat membre (...) de remplir ladite condition » 
(Förster, Op. cit., pt. 47). Une telle condition n'existait pas dans l'affaire Förster. 
69. Article 16, paragraphe 1, de la directive codifié à l'article L. 122-1, alinéa 1, du code 
de l'entrée et du séjour des étrangers et du droit d'asile (le « CESEDA »). 
70. Förster, Op. cit., pts. 51 et s. 
71. Pour un aperçu de la situation telle qu'elle était antérieurement aux circulaires des 
dernières années, v. CE, 2 février 2005, requête n° 257984 ; CE, 15 juillet 2004, re-
quête n° 245357 ; J.-P. LHERNOULD, L'accès des étrangers aux bourses d'ensei-
gnement supérieur sur critères sociaux, Droit social 2005, p. 1018. 
72. A. ILIOPOULOU, Le temps des gitans: à propos de la libre circulation des Roms 
dans l'Union, Europe n° 1, Janvier 2011, étude 1, note de bas de page 28 ; CAA 
Nantes, 21 décembre 2007, n° 07NT02122 ; CAA Versailles, 29 décembre 2009, n° 
09VE02276 ; CAA Lyon, 22 septembre 2009, n° 09LY00111. 
73. CJCE, 27 octobre 1977, aff. 30/77, Bouchereau, pts. 28 et 36. 
MARGOT BLOCH 
 542 
par le législateur français en 2011,74 selon laquelle il est nécessaire que le 
comportement de l'intéressé représente « une menace réelle, actuelle et suffi-
samment grave pour un intérêt fondamental de la société » pour constituer 
une « menace à l'ordre public ». Cette formule, qui assure une appréciation au 
cas par cas, signifie que l'assimilation entre condamnation pénale et « menace 
pour l'ordre public » n'a pas sa place en droit français. Elle vaut également 
pour la « menace grave à l'ordre public » et la « nécessité impérieuse pour la 
sûreté de l'Etat et la sécurité publique » (la « nécessité impérieuse »), équiva-
lent des « raisons impérieuses de sécurité publique » de l'article 28, para-
graphe 3, de la version consolidée de la directive.75 Une analyse approfondie 
de la pratique du juge français révèle toutefois que chacune de ces notions est 
associée de façon récurrente aux mêmes infractions pénales.76 
 La « nécessité impérieuse » n'avait été conçue au départ que pour per-
mettre l'éloignement des terroristes, des espions et des trafiquants de drogue77 
mais son champ d'application a été étendu. Il a ainsi été admis que « la com-
mission d'actes portant atteinte à la sécurité des personnes (...) pouvait justi-
fier [une mesure éloignement] ».78 Le juge a, notamment, permis aux autori-
tés administratives d'étendre cette notion au viol.79 Ces dernières se sont éga-
lement vues reconnaître le pouvoir de prendre une décision pour « nécessité 
impérieuse » en cas de trafic de stupéfiants.80 
 La « menace grave pour l'ordre publique » peut être fondée sur des actes 
portant atteinte à l'intégrité physique des personnes, révélant ainsi la dangero-
sité de l'individu. Il peut, par exemple, s'agir d'assassinat,81 de violences sui-
vies d'incapacité82 ou de viol sur une personne vulnerable.83 Des infractions 
                                                        
74. Loi n° 2011-672 du 16 juin 2011 relative à l'immigration, à l'intégration et à la na-
tionalité, JORF n°0139 du 17 juin 2011, p. 10290 ; articles L. 121-4, L. 511-3-1, L. 
521-1, L. 521-1 et L. 521-5 du code de l'entrée et du séjour des étrangers et du droit 
d'asile (le « CESEDA »). 
75. Rectificatif au rectificatif à la directive 2004/38/CE du 29 avril 2004 relative au droit 
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77. Déclaration de N. QUESTIAUX : JOAN CR, 30 septembre 1981, p. 1420. 
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pénales d'une moindre gravité ne révèlent, en revanche, aucune « menace 
grave contre l'ordre public ». Telle peut être le cas d'une escroquerie en bande 
organisée.84 
 Enfin, la « menace à l'ordre public » a, notamment, été retenue par le juge 
pour les infractions de vol85 et de menace de mort avec arme.86 Par contre, le 
juge français a considéré que l'occupation illégale d'un terrain « [n'était] pas, à 
elle seule, de nature à caractériser une menace pour l'ordre public87 ». Il en est 
de même pour des faits de prostitution et de racolage actif.88 Si l'on peut gros-
sièrement associer à chaque notion certains types d'infractions pénales, l'arti-
culation de ces différentes notions demeure assez floue. En effet, une mesure 
d'éloignement doit être adoptée en considération de l'ensemble du comporte-
ment de l'étranger et non pas seulement d'une infraction pénale dont il aurait 
fait l'objet.89 La répétition d'infractions,90 la gravité croissante des infrac-
tions91 et la volonté de réinsertion de l'intéressé92 sont autant de circonstances 
susceptibles de jouer sur l'adoption d'une mesure d'éloignement.  
 La délimitation imprécise de chaque notion dénote également un contrôle 
au cas par cas du juge sur l'appréciation de l'autorité administrative. Il peut 
ainsi s'avérer particulièrement difficile de « distinguer [la notion de « nécessi-
té impérieuse »] de la simple « menace grave pour l'ordre public93 ». En effet, 
des infractions identiques ont pu justifier un éloignement pour « menace 
                                                        
83. CE, 7 novembre 2012, requête n° 354224 ; CE, 4 février 2003, requête n° 253742. 
84. CE, 25 janvier 2007, requête n° 298431. 
85. CAA Bordeaux, 5 juin 2012, n° 11BX02697 ; CAA, Bordeaux, 1 mars 2012, n° 
11BX02753 ; CAA Bordeaux, 12 mai 2011, n° 10BX02859. 
86. CAA, Lyon, 3 février 2010, n° 09LY00407. 
87. CAA Versailles, 29 décembre 2009, n° 09VE02276 ; Le législateur a intégré l'occu-
pation illégale d'un terrain dans la liste de l'article L. 533-1 du CESEDA relatif aux 
ressortissants d'Etat tiers, « cette dernière précision [paraissant] nécessaire au regard 
de l'interprétation de la notion d'ordre public par certaines juridictions judiciaires qui 
considèrent que l'occupation illégale d'un terrain pour y installer un campement n'est 
pas susceptible de porter atteinte au bon ordre, à la sécurité, à la salubrité et la tran-
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sept. 2010). 
88. CAA Paris, 1 février 2013, n° 12PA01733. 
89. CE, 6 décembre 2002, requête n° 238068. 
90. CE, 29 juillet 1994, requête n° 145997. 
91. CAA Douai, 31 janvier 2002, requête n° 246942. 
92. CE, 27 mai 1994, requête n° 147307. 
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grave » et pour « nécessité impérieuse ».94 Cette appréciation du comporte-
ment de l'intéressé au cas par cas est complétée par un examen de la propor-
tionnalité de la mesure par rapport à la situation personnelle de l'intéressé. 
Les cours et tribunaux français n'ont pas attendu la codification tardive de 
201195 par le législateur français des critères énumérés par la directive, à sa-
voir la durée de séjour, l'âge, l'état de santé, la situation familiale et écono-
mique, l'intégration sociale et culturelle et l'intensité des liens avec le pays 
d'origine, pour apprécier la proportionnalité d'une mesure d'éloignement au 
regard de la situation personnelle de l'intéressé. Ils ont, en effet, tenu compte 
de ces critères depuis des dizaines d'années en s'efforçant de protéger le droit 
au respect de la vie privée et familiale tel qu'énoncé à l'article 7 de la charte 
des droits fondamentaux de l'Union européenne et à l'article 8 de la conven-
tion européenne des droits de l'homme et des libertés fondamentales (la « 
CESDH »). Le contrôle de proportionnalité a été réalisé en cas de « menace à 
l'ordre public »,96 mais aussi en cas de « menace grave à l'ordre public »97 et 
de « nécessité impérieuse ».98 
 « Aucune grille de lecture ne permet d'établir des circonstances qui s'op-
poseraient formellement au départ forcé de certains étrangers ».99 D'une part, 
« l'absence de lien dans le pays d'origine, la présence d'enfants de nationalité 
française et une vie maritale ne [garantissent] nullement l'annulation de la 
mesure de départ forcé ».100 D'autre part, « l'éloignement d'un célibataire ne 
peut pas être tenue pour acquise [même si] elle constitue un élément à dé-
charge ».101 Il faut toutefois relever que certaines « infractions d'une particu-
lière gravité (trafic de drogue, homicide) (...) semblent automatiquement ex-
clure une éventuelle annulation [d'une mesure d'éloignement] ».102 Le viol 
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fait également l'objet d'une « certaine automaticité dans l'appréciation du juge 
».103 Cette automaticité ne signifie pas que le juge ne procède pas à un con-
trôle de proportionnalité. Elle traduit seulement le fait que presque aucune 
circonstance personnelle ne permet de faire pencher la balance de la propor-
tionnalité vers une annulation de la mesure d'éloignement lorsque l'intéressé 
commet des infractions particulièrement graves. 
La citoyenneté européenne au-delà des dispositions de la directive 
2004/38/CE – Etudier l'application, au niveau national, du droit 
primaire européen 
Question 7 
Dans l'affaire Zambrano104 la CJUE a franchi un cap dans l'encadrement des 
droits du citoyen européen découlant de l'article 20 TFUE, en conditionnant 
son application à l'existence d'une privation de la jouissance effective de l'es-
sential de ce droit. Dans cette affaire, la CJUE n'a pas appliqué le droit à la 
libre circulation de la Directive 2004/38 dans laquelle un élément transfronta-
lier est nécessaire pour son effectivité. Plus précisément, la Cour a eu à con-
naitre de l'étendue du droit de séjour de ressortissants de pays tiers qui sont 
les parents d'un mineur citoyen de l'Union qui n'a pas, jusqu'à à présent, 
quitté l'Etat membre où il est né. Cette interprétation entraîne une certaine 
confusion au regard du champ d'application des droits du citoyen européen105 
et sa limite avec le droit national. Jusqu'à Zambrano, le droit européen ne 
s'appliquait pas aux situations purement internes.106 Par ailleurs, l'existence 
d'une discrimination à rebours contre les citoyens européens qui n'ont jamais 
franchi la frontière de leur pays au regard des citoyens d'un Etat tiers reste 
aussi très polémique. Il ressort l'existence d'un droit de séjour autonome du 
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droit de circuler et sans qu'il soit nécessaire de prouver un déplacement. 
Néanmoins, cette hypothèse a été relativisée un peut plus tard par l'arrêt 
McCarthy.107 Une telle différence de traitements entre la famille Zambrano et 
la famille McCarthy reste difficilement justiciable au regard de la Directive 
2004/38 qui inclut à la fois le conjoint et les enfants dans le cadre des 
membres de famille.  
 En France, l'article 20 du TFUE l'article 20 est intégré dans l'article L.121-
1 du CESEDA. Plusieurs décisions ont été adoptées à la lumière du raison-
nement de la CJUE et fondées sur la citoyenneté européenne tirée de l'art 20 
TFUE. Il semble que les Tribunaux français reconnaissent l'autonomie des 
droits tirés de l'art 20, cependant jusqu'à aujourd'hui, les Tribunaux n'ont pas 
eu à trancher une situation telle que celle de Zambrano, c'est-à-dire, une situa-
tion purement interne. Le champ d'application ne reste toujours pas clair au 
sein de la jurisprudence française et la législation française n'a pas été modi-
fiée. Dans une récente décision de la CAA de Lyon,108 le refus de délivrance 
de titre de séjour a été discuté à la lumière de l'art 20 du TFUE et tel qu'inter-
prété par la jurisprudence Zambrano. Notamment si la décision en lui obli-
geant à quitter le territoire français méconnaissait les dispositions de l'art 8 de 
la CEDH. En l'espèce, Mme C ressortissante tunisienne est entrée en France 
durant l'été 2011 accompagnée par son époux et trois enfants de nationalité 
belge. Selon la cour, il ne pouvait pas êter regardé comme ayant droit de sé-
jour faute d'y exercer une activité professionnelle et des documents justifiant 
des ressources suffisantes. De plus, les enfants venaient d'être inscrits dans un 
centre scolaire français. La cour interprétant l'art 20 TFUE et l'arrêt Zam-
brano considère d'une part que Mme C n'a pas sollicité un titre de séjour en 
qualité de parent d'enfant mineur sinon en qualité de conjointe d'un ressortis-
sant de l'Union européenne. D'autre part, la Cour considère aussi que le droit 
des enfants de séjourner ne revêt pas un caractère absolu et s'exerce dans la 
limite de l'art 121-1 du Code de l'entrée et du séjour des étrangers et du droit 
d'asile, transposition de la directive 2004/38.  
 De la même façon, la CA de Bordeaux fait une interprétation limitée du 
droit au respect de la vie familiale et privée de l'art 311-7 du même Code109 et 
lui refuse la carte de séjour considérant que les pièces ne permettent d'établir 
ni la réalité de la vie commune avant son mariage, ni le caractère habituelle 
de sa présence en France. D'une part, la Cour déclare le non rattachement du 
demandant et sa famille au territoire française et toujours à la lumière de l'art 
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20, la Cour décide que le refus de séjour assorti d'une obligation de quitter le 
territoire, malgré la séparation temporaire, n'empêche pas la demande posté-
rieure d'un visa longue durée. En outre, la CA de Paris110 a également rejeté 
le droit de séjour et oblige M. Oscar Ernesto de nationalité péruvienne et ses 
enfants de nationalité espagnole à quitter le territoire à cause de l'absence de 
justification de leur entrée et séjour sur le territoire français.  
 On peut déduire encore une certaine confusion au regard du champ d'ap-
plication des droits des citoyens européens découlant de l'art 20. D'un côté, 
les tribunaux interprètent l'art 20 malgré l'existence d'un élément transfronta-
lier et reconnaissent une différence de traitement entre les enfants et les con-
joints. D'autre part, le rattachement au territoire français fait l'objet d'une in-
terprétation très stricte et les tribunaux se montrent d'accord pour établir 
comme condition sine qua non pour l'octroi d'un titre de séjour, l'entrée et le 
séjour régulier.  
Question 8 
L'institution d'une citoyenneté européenne a pour base la notion de nationalité 
comme l'a déjà souligné l'art. 20-1 du TFUE dont dispose qu'est citoyen de 
l'Union européenne toute personne ayant la nationalité d'un Etat membre. 
Cette disposition montre clairement que la compétence pour régler les condi-
tions d'acquisition de la nationalité appartient aux Etats membres. La juris-
prudence de la Cour de justice des Communautés européennes est claire et 
constante111 sur la définition des conditions d'acquisition et de perte de la na-
tionalité, elle dit que la compétence relève, conformément au droit internatio-
nal, de chaque Etat membre, mais ces compétences doivent être exercées 
dans le respect du droit communautaire. Toutefois la Cour de justice des 
Communautés européennes a défini l'influence que peut avoir le droit de 
l'Union sur l'exercice de la compétence relative à la nationalité. Précisément 
dans l'arrêt Rottmann la Cour dit que le respect a le droit de l'Union ne porte 
pas atteinte au principe de droit international selon lequel les Etats membres 
sont compétents pour définir les conditions d'acquisition et de perte de la na-
tionalité, mais consacre le principe selon lequel, lorsqu'il s'agit de citoyens de 
l'union, l'exercice de cette compétence, dans la mesure où il affecte les droits 
conférés et protégés par l'ordre juridique de l'Union, est susceptible d'un con-
trôle juridictionnel opéré au regard du droit de l'Union. 
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 Dans l'arrêt Rottmann, la décision de retrait de la naturalisation en raison 
de la fraude commise par l'intéressé dans le cadre de la procédure de son ac-
quisition est a priori est valable, parce qu'il est légitime pour un Etat membre 
de vouloir protéger le rapport particulier de solidarité et de loyauté entre lui-
même et ses ressortissants ainsi que la réciprocité de droits et des devoirs, qui 
sont le fondement du lien de nationalité. Ces considérations restent valables 
lorsqu'un tel retrait a pour conséquence que la personne concernée perde, 
outre la nationalité de l'Etat membre de naturalisation, la citoyenneté de 
l'Union. Mais vu l'importance qu'attache le droit primaire au statut de citoyen 
de l'Union, il convient, lors de l'examen d'une décision de retrait de la natura-
lisation, de tenir compte des conséquences éventuelles que cette décision em-
porte pour l'intéressé et, le cas échéant, pour les membres de sa famille, en ce 
qui concerne la perte des droits dont jouit tout citoyen de l'Union. Il importe à 
cet égard vérifier si la décision de retrait respecte le principe de proportionna-
lité en ce qui concerne les conséquences qu'elle comporte sur la situation de 
la personne concernée au regard du droit de l'Union, outre, le cas échéant, 
l'examen de la proportionnalité au regard national. L'examen de proportion-
nalité doit vérifier si cette perte est justifiée par rapport à la gravité de l'infrac-
tion commise par celui-ci, au temps écoulé entre la décision de naturalisation 
et la décision de retrait, ainsi qu'a la possibilité pour l'intéressé de recouvrer 
sa nationalité d'origine. L'utilisation du principe de proportionnalité sert pour 
diminuer les cas des apatrides au niveau de l'Union, et de renforcer davantage 
le processus vers l'autonomie du statut de citoyen européen.112 
 Dans le cas de la France l'art. 27-2 du Code civil113 permet à l'Etat le re-
trait de la naturalisation si telle décision a été obtenue par mensonge ou 
fraude. Pour la France le retrait de naturalisation est une solution pour les cas 
les plus graves.114 De la même façon qu'il existe ce type de dispositions dans 
la plupart des législations des Etats membres.115 Mais depuis l'arrêt Rott-
mann, dans un tel cas, il doit y avoir un contrôle de proportionnalité avec un 
examen de la situation personnelle du citoyen européen.  
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Les droits politiques des citoyens européens 
Question 9 
La directive 93/109/CE du Conseil du 6 décembre 1993 fixant les modalités 
du droit de vote et d'éligibilité au Parlement européen pour les citoyens de 
l'Union européenne qui résident dans un pays membre de l'Union européenne 
dont ils n'ont pas la nationalité prévoit les modalités de l'exercice de ce droit. 
Elle est entrée en vigueur le 30 décembre 1993, avec un délai de transposition 
fixé au 1er février 1994. La loi n°94-104 du 5 février 1994 a transposé la di-
rective dans notre ordre juridique interne. 
 Dans un rapport datant du 27 octobre 2010,116 la Commission européenne 
a pu constater que les pays de l'Union ont, de manière générale, correctement 
transposé et mis en œuvre la directive 93/109. L'article 19 ex- TCE prévoit 
cependant une dérogation que la Commission européenne peut accorder à un 
Etat membre, « lorsque des problèmes spécifiques à un Etat membre le justi-
fient ». Seul le Luxembourg l'a demandée et en a bénéficié : l'Etat a ainsi pu 
conserver son système de réserve du droit de vote aux électeurs qui justifient 
d'une durée minimale de résidence dans cet Etat membre. Ce n'est pas le cas 
en France  
 S'agissant des conditions juridiques permettant aux citoyens de l'Union 
d'exercer leur droit de vote et d'éligibilité dans l'Etat membre de résidence, la 
France impose des conditions aux ressortissants supplémentaires au citoyen 
de l'Union européenne pour l'exercice de son droit de vote. Le ressortissant, 
doit, tout comme le citoyen français, jouir de sa capacité civile et politique 
dans son état d'origine. Par ailleurs, il doit jouir de leur capacité civile et poli-
tique dans leur Etat d'origine ; ils doivent par ailleurs être domiciliés dans la 
commune où ils souhaitent voter, ou résider en France depuis au moins 6 
mois, ou être inscrits au rôle d'une contribution directe communale depuis 5 
années au moins.  
 Enfin, ils doivent s'être préalablement inscrits sur une liste électorale com-
plémentaire de leur lieu de résidence avant le 31 décembre 2008. Les ressor-
tissants doivent compléter ce formulaire accompagné de pièces justificatives : 
photocopie d'une pièce d'identité et de nationalité en cours de validité (carte 
d'identité, passeport ou carte de séjour) et d'un justificatif de domicile (quit-
tance de loyer, facture d'électricité ...). Pour finir, ce formulaire s'accompagne 
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d'une déclaration sur l'honneur par laquelle le ressortissant s'engage à ne pas 
prendre part au vote dans un autre Etat membre autre que la France pour ce 
scrutin.  
 De même, la Bulgarie, la République Tchèque, la République Chypre, 
l'Estonie, la Hongrie ainsi que la Lettonie exigeaient des citoyens de l'Union 
européenne qu'ils produisent une attestation d'enregistrement pour prouver 
leur lieu de résidence, ou bien un renouvellement de leur inscription pour 
chaque nouvelle élection européenne. Quant à la République de Malte, elle 
exigeait des citoyens de l'Union européenne ressortissants d'un autre Etat 
membre qu'ils présentent une carte d'identité maltaise pour tout inscription 
sur une liste électorale – cette exigence de carte de séjour a été supprimée par 
la directive 2004/38/CE à laquelle s'est substituée l'exigence d'une attestation 
d'enregistrement. Enfin, le rapport constate que seuls quelques Etats 
membres, dont la République Tchèque, la République Chypre, la Lituanie et 
l'Estonie, avaient transposé correctement l'obligation d'informer les citoyens 
sur les conditions et modalités d'exercice du droit de vote et d'éligibilité aux 
élections européennes. Tout ressortissant de l'Union européenne votant en 
France à cette élection perd son droit de vote dans un autre Etat de l'Union. Il 
pourra exercer à nouveau son droit de vote dans un autre Etat de l'Union seu-
lement lorsqu'il se sera fait radier des listes complémentaires en France : un 
vote multiple est puni d'une peine prévue à l'article L.92 du code électoral, à 
savoir deux ans de prison et 15 000 euros d'amende. Ces exigences supplé-
mentaires contraires à la directive ont pu donner lieu à une procédure 
d'infraction. Dans une affaire du 12 septembre 2006 opposant Gibraltar au 
Royaume-Uni de Grande-Bretagne, la Cour de justice avait établi que « la dé-
termination des titulaires du droit de vote et d'éligibilité aux élections au Par-
lement européen est dans la compétence de chaque Etat membre, en respect 
du droit communautaire ». 
 La directive 2013/1/UE du Conseil du 20 décembre 2012 en ce qui con-
cerne certaines modalités de l'exercice du droit d'éligibilité aux élections du 
Parlement européen pour les citoyens de l'Union résidant dans un Etat 
membre dont ils ne sont pas ressortissant a été adoptée le 20 décembre 2012, 
et vient modifier la directive 93/109/CE. Suite au constat, par la Commission 
européenne, en 2010,117 de la baisse de participation aux élections euro-
péennes et la nécessité de faciliter la participation des citoyens de l'Union eu-
ropéenne aux élections, il était nécessaire de promouvoir et faciliter la parti-
                                                        




cipation aux élections européennes, car celles-ci sont « l'un des moyens les 
plus importants pour les citoyens de faire entendre leur voix dans l'Union eu-
ropéenne ».118 
 Le premier changement notable tend à faciliter la possibilité, pour les ci-
toyens de l'Union européenne, de présenter leur candidature aux élections eu-
ropéennes. Ainsi, l'obligation faite aux citoyens de l'Union européenne de 
présenter, lors du dépôt de leur candidature dans un Etat membre autre que 
leur Etat membre d'origine, une attestation des autorités administratives com-
pétentes de l'Etat membre d'origine certifiant que les personnes concernées ne 
sont pas déchues ou qu'une telle déchéance n'est pas connue desdites autori-
tés, est supprimée. Le citoyen de l'Union européenne candidat ne devra plus 
que présenter une déclaration confirmant qu'il n'a pas été déchu de son droit 
d'éligibilité au Parlement européen. C'est à l'Etat membre de résidence du ci-
toyen qu'incombe la tâche de s'enquérir d'une éventuelle déchéance du droit 
d'éligibilité auprès de l'Etat membre d'origine. Si celui-ci ne répond pas dans 
les délais impartis, cela n'entraînera pas l'inéligibilité pour le citoyen de 
l'Union. Les Etats membres devront par ailleurs, dans leur droit interne, pré-
voir des délais différents pour le dépôt de candidatures aux élections euro-
péennes selon qu'il s'agit d'un ressortissant de l'Etat membre ou d'un citoyen 
de l'Union européenne, pour qui les démarches sont nécessairement plus 
longues et plus complexes. Tous ces changements supposent donc la désigna-
tion, par les Etats membres, d'un point de contact unique chargé de fournir les 
informations requises pour les candidats. Cependant, les nouvelles règles 
fixées par la directive 2013/1/UE ne seront effectives que lorsque celle-ci sera 
entrée en vigueur : c'est-à-dire le lendemain de sa publication au Journal Of-
ficiel de l'Union européenne. 
Question 10 
La volonté de donner voix au chapitre aux citoyens européens lors des élec-
tions municipales a été affirmée à l'occasion du premier Conseil européen en 
1974.119 La participation aux élections municipales, en tant qu'électeur ou 
comme candidat, constitue aujourd'hui un droit fondamental consacré par l'ar-
ticle 40 de la charte des droits fondamentaux de l'Union européenne120 et ses 
modalités sont fixées par la directive 94/80/CE. Aux termes de l'article 14 de 
                                                        
118. Discours de Viviane Reding, Vice-présidente de la Commission européenne. 
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la directive, les Etats membres devaient adopter les mesures nationales de 
transposition avant le 1er janvier 1996. A cette date, 
– quatre Etats membres (Danemark, Irlande, Luxembourg et Royaume-Uni) 
avaient adopté l'intégralité des mesures de transposition 
– trois Etats membres (Allemagne pour les Länder, sauf Brême, Finlande 
continentale et Autriche pour Carinthie et Tyrol) avaient partiellement 
transposé la directive  
– onze Etats membres n'avaient pas mis en œuvre la directive (Belgique, Al-
lemagne pour Brême, Grèce, Espagne, France, Italie, Pays-Bas, Autriche 
pour sept Länder, Portugal, Finlande pour les îles Åland et Suède). Des 
procédures d'infraction pour défaut de notification des mesures nationales 
de transposition (Article 226 du traité CE) à l'encontre de ces Etats ont été 
engagées par la Commission en 1996. Ces procédures ont été clôturées 
avant la saisine de la Cour de justice des Communautés européennes, sauf 
dans le cas de la Belgique, qui a été condamnée en 1998, avant notifica-
tion de ses mesures de transposition à la Commission en 1999.121  
Des dérogations sont prévues à l'article 12 de la directive. En son paragraphe 
1er, il est énoncé que les Etats, dans lesquels la proportion de citoyens de 
l'Union en âge de voter y résidant sans en avoir la nationalité dépasse 20 % 
de l'ensemble des citoyens de l'Union en âge de voter y résidant, peuvent exi-
ger une période minimale de résidence, tant des électeurs que des candidats, 
ou prendre des mesures relatives à la composition des listes de candidats. 
Comme cela a pu être souligné par la réponse précédente, le seul Etat 
membre ayant appliqué cette dérogation est le Luxembourg qui a limité le 
droit de vote aux citoyens de l'Union non nationaux qui y sont légalement 
domiciliés et y résident depuis une période minimale de moins cinq ans avant 
leur inscription sur la liste électorale.122 En ce qui concerne le droit d'éligibili-
té, ces derniers doivent également y avoir résidé pendant au moins cinq an-
nées avant le dépôt de leur déclaration de candidature.123 Dans ses rapports, 
adoptés les 22 novembre 1999,124 22 août 2005125 et 9 mars 2012,126 la 
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Commission a examiné si cette dérogation était toujours applicable au 
Luxembourg. Sur la base d'une vérification des données statistiques corres-
pondantes, elle a conclu que les raisons qui justifiaient l'octroi de cette déro-
gation au pays persistent et que, en conséquence, il n'y a pas lieu de proposer 
des adaptations. L'article 12, paragraphe 2, autorise la Belgique à appliquer 
des restrictions prévues par la directive à un nombre limité de communes 
dont elle communique la liste un an au moins avant le scrutin communal pour 
lequel il est envisagé de faire usage de cette dérogation. Toutefois, la Bel-
gique n'a jamais requis l'application de cette derogation.127 
 L'article 12, paragraphe 3, autorise tout Etat membre à ne pas appliquer les 
articles 6 à 11 aux citoyens de l'Union qui ne sont pas ressortissants de l'Etat 
en question, si ces derniers ont le droit de vote au parlement national de cet 
Etat et sont donc inscrits sur les listes électorales dans exactement les mêmes 
conditions que les électeurs nationaux. Aucun Etat membre n'a jamais invo-
qué la dérogation prévue à l'article 12, paragraphe 3.128 
 Plusieurs conditions supplémentaires imposées aux citoyens européens par 
rapport aux nationaux ont été constatées par la Commission et ont été par la 
suite annulées. A titre d'exemples : 
1 En Grèce, la législation comportait une disposition aux termes de laquelle 
seules les personnes connaissant la langue grecque disposaient du droit de 
vote. Comme une telle exigence est discriminatoire et contraire à l'article 3 
de la directive, la Commission a adressé un avis motivé à la Grèce. Une 
autre disposition non conforme à l'article 4 de la directive prévoyait que 
seules les personnes résidant en Grèce depuis au moins deux ans étaient 
autorisées à voter. Ces conditions supplémentaires ont été abrogées suite à 
une modification de la législation nationale. 
2 En Allemagne, les Länder de Saxe et de Bavière exigeaient que l'électeur 
non national fasse une déclaration sous serment attestant qu'il réside de-
puis au moins trois mois, sans interruption, dans la municipalité où il sou-
haite voter et que c'est là que se trouve son principal centre d'intérêt. En 
outre, ces deux Länder allemands exigeaient que les citoyens de l'Union 
résidant en Allemagne présentent une demande d'inscription sur la liste 
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électorale avant chaque élection municipale, ce qui constitue une violation 
de l'article 8, paragraphe 3, de la directive. Après l'ouverture des procé-
dures d'infraction, la législation nationale a été modifiée, de telle sorte que 
les citoyens de l'Union non nationaux sont à présent inscrits automatique-
ment sur la liste électorale pour chaque élection municipale.  
Question 11 
Il existe plusieurs types d'élections, à savoir, 
1 les élections locales regroupant les élections municipales, les élections 
cantonales et les élections régionales 
2 les élections nationales regroupant l'élection présidentielle, les élections 
législatives et les élections sénatoriales 
3 les élections européennes qui consistent à élire les députés du Parlement 
européen. 
Les traités et la Charte des Droits fondamentaux garantissent le droit de vote 
et d'être élu dans l'Etat membre de résidence dans les mêmes conditions que 
les nationaux uniquement pour les élections européennes et municipales. 
Cette limitation tient à la notion de souveraineté. Ainsi, statuant sur le droit 
de vote accordé aux ressortissants de l'Union européenne aux élections lo-
cales, le Conseil constitutionnel avait considéré qu'il n'était contraire à la 
Constitution que dans la mesure où il risquait de les faire participer à la dési-
gnation des sénateurs, et donc à l'élection d'une Assemblée qui, elle, est con-
nectée sur une notion de souveraineté nationale.129 Toutefois, une initiative 
citoyenne européenne intitulée « Let Me Vote ! » est actuellement en cours et 
vise à accorder à tout citoyen européen résidant dans un Etat membre de 
l'Union Européenne dont il n'a pas la nationalité, le droit de voter non seule-
ment aux élections municipales et européennes, mais aussi aux élections ré-
gionales et nationales de son pays de residence.130 
 Un droit de vote spécifique, allant au-delà des droits électoraux aux élec-
tions locales et à celles du Parlement européen tels que prescrit dans le droit 
européen, est attaché à la citoyenneté européenne. En effet, la directive 
94/80/CE n'affecte pas les dispositions de chaque Etat membre régissant les 
                                                        






droits de ses propres nationaux ou des ressortissants de pays tiers résidant sur 
leur propre territoire. Les modalités d'exercice du droit de vote aux élections 
locales ainsi qu'à celles du Parlement européen sont donc conditionnées par 
les droits internes. Ainsi les Etats membres peuvent-ils réserver à leurs res-
sortissants les fonctions de maire et d'adjoint au maire, en raison de leur par-
ticipation à l'autorité publique ou à l'élection d'une assemblée parlementaire 
(article 5, paragraphes 3 et 4 de la directive). Une dérogation permet aussi 
aux Etats membres dans lesquels des problèmes spécifiques peuvent se poser, 
dans la mesure où plus de 20 % des personnes y résidant sont citoyens de 
l'Union sans être nationaux, de réserver le droit de vote et d'éligibilité aux 
électeurs qui satisfont à certaines exigences de durée de résidence – déroga-
tion dont bénéficie le Luxembourg. Par ailleurs, le double vote et la double 
candidature sont des droits attachés à la particularité de la citoyenneté euro-
péenne, la directive 94/80/CE ne s'y oppose pas. Ils permettent ainsi au ci-
toyen de l'Union non ressortissant d'un Etat membre de voter à la fois dans 
une commune de l'Etat membre dans lequel il a sa résidence principale, mais 
également dans une commune de l'Etat membre d'origine.  
 Le Traité de Maastricht en 1992 a consacré un nouveau droit en faveur des 
citoyens de l'Union européenne, le droit de vote et d'éligibilité aux élections 
municipales dans un Etat dont ils n'ont pas la nationalité.131 Cette avancée 
correspond à la volonté des rédacteurs d'amorcer le processus d'intégration 
politique de l'Union européenne, par le truchement d'une citoyenneté euro-
péenne de résidence, ouverte à toutes les personnes qui travaillent, vivent, ré-
sident sur le territoire de l'un des Etats membres. La notion de citoyenneté est 
de nature à encourager la pleine participation des citoyens à la vie démocra-
tique de l'Union. Jean MONNET l'affirmait : « nous ne coalisons pas des 
Etats, nous unissons des hommes », et ce nouveau droit correspondait à un 
souhait de faciliter une intégration locale et efficiente des citoyens. L'Europe 
est une construction, une volonté politique – en plus d'une communauté éco-
nomique. Dès lors, le citoyen européen devait avoir le droit de participer à 
tous les scrutins, afin « d'apporter sa pierre à l'édifice européen ».132 L'identité 
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européenne s'est forgée à partir d'une volonté politique de partager un destin 
commun et des valeurs communes. Cela doit avoir pour conséquence l'attri-
bution de droits, au nom d'une ambition et d'un destin communs. Le Traité de 
Maastricht constituait une « nouvelle étape dans le processus créant une 
union sans cesse plus étroite entre les peuples de l'Europe ; [considérant] que 
l'Union a, notamment, pour mission d'organiser de façon cohérente et soli-
daire les relations entre les peuples des Etats membres ; qu'elle compte, au 
nombre de ses objectifs fondamentaux, celui de renforcer la protection des 
droits et des intérêts des ressortissants de ses Etats membres par l'instauration 
d'une citoyenneté de l'Union ».133 Il convenait d'assurer que le citoyen puisse 
participer à la vie démocratique et influencer le processus décisionnel au ni-
veau local, où les décisions prises concernent directement le citoyen. Ce droit 
s'affirme comme une possibilité de combler le déficit démocratique dont 
souffre l'Union, en permettant au citoyen européen de s'intégrer et de partici-
per à la vie démocratique de son pays d'accueil.134 En outre, le plan d'action 
de Stockholm du 20 avril 2010 soulignait que « pour rapprocher les citoyens 
du projet européen, il est essentiel de faciliter et d'encourager leur participa-
tion à la vie démocratique de l'Union. L'augmentation du taux de participa-
tion aux élections du Parlement européen est une ambition commune. Le 
droit de vote et d'éligibilité aux élections locales et européennes dont jouis-
sent les citoyens européens résidant dans un autre Etat membre que leur Etat 
membre d'origine doit être encore valorisé et renforcé ».135  
Question 12 
Avec les élections pour le Parlement européen qui se profilent l'an pro-
chain136 et l'année 2013 déclarée comme l'Année européenne pour les ci-
toyens par la Commission européenne, la thématique des droits dévolus au 
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citoyen européen reprend de sa vigueur, notamment appréciée dans son ac-
ception politique. 
 La communication sur et l'effectivité des droits fondamentaux au sein de 
l'Union ont connu de nombreuses réussites au cours de ces dernières années ; 
pour autant, les dirigeants européens demeurent confrontés à des défis d'en-
vergure, comme il est nécessaire de rappeler « les droits dont [les citoyens] 
bénéficient grâce à l'Union européenne et ce que cette dernière peut faire pour 
chacun d'entre nous ».137 Ainsi, le droit de vote -droit politique et civique par 
excellence- demeure sujet à des restrictions, des limitations contraires au droit 
de l'Union européenne, et il convient de faire évoluer les droits nationaux 
pour assurer leur conformité aux normes européennes pertinentes.  
 Le droit de vote des détenus reste une question épineuse, en particulier au 
Royaume-Uni condamné par un arrêt retentissant,138 qui n'a consenti à au-
cune modification de son cadre légal en dépit d'obligations juridiques.139 L'af-
faire Peter Chester v Secretary of State for Justice actuellement pendante de-
vant la Supreme Court met une nouvelle fois en exergue l'incompatibilité des 
dispositions britanniques avec le droit de l'Union européenne, et notamment 
l'article 39 de la Charte des droits fondamentaux.140 L'appelant est un prison-
nier condamné à une peine d'emprisonnement à perpétuité pour le meurtre de 
sa nièce intervenu en 1977. En raison de son incarcération il a été déchu de 
son droit de vote aux élections nationales et européennes, en vertu du Repre-
sentation of the People Act 1983 et du European Parliamentary Elections 
2002.141 En 2008, le condamné a introduit un recours en invoquant une viola-
tion de ses droits garantis par le droit de l'Union européenne, soulignant la 
disproportion d'une suppression totale du droit de vote des prisonniers au 
Royaume-Uni pour les prochaines élections du Parlement européen. Le Pre-
mier Ministre David CAMERON a pu partager sa réticence ferme quant au 
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recouvrement par les prisonniers de leur droit de vote : « It makes me physi-
cally ill even to contemplate having to give the vote to anyone who is in pri-
son. Frankly, when people commit a crime and go to prison, they should lose 
their rights, including the right to vote. But we are in a situation that I am 
afraid we have to deal with. This is potentially costing us £160 million, so we 
have to come forward with proposals, because I do not want us to spend that 
money; it is not right. So, painful as it is, we have to sort out yet another pro-
blem that was just left to us by the last Government ».142 
 Contrairement à son homologue britannique, la législation française qui 
prévoie aussi des restrictions répond aux impératifs européens. Elle est affi-
liée à « une catégorie intermédiaire dans laquelle la privation du droit de vote 
est appliquée en fonction du type d'infraction et/ou à partir d'un certain seuil 
de gravité de la peine privative de liberté (lié à sa durée) »143 par la Cour de 
Strasbourg. La suspension du droit de vote ne peut pas en principe être liée 
automatiquement à une condamnation, mais doit être expressément pronon-
cée par un juge. Ce système satisfait aux exigences européennes, la CEDH 
accordant sa préférence à « un tribunal indépendant appliquant une procédure 
contradictoire » pour le prononcé de cette sanction.144 En d'autres termes, 
l'interdiction des droits civiques, civils et de famille est devenue une peine 
complémentaire, ne revêtant plus de caractère automatique depuis 1994 et la 
réforme du code pénal. La privation n'est automatique que dans les cas de 
corruption et de menace à l'encontre d'un agent public.145  
 Une limitation du droit de vote en cas de handicap est encore observée 
dans certains Etats membres. 
 Le Comité des Nations Unies sur les droits des personnes handicapées, 
adoptant une interprétation large de la signification de la participation à la vie 
politique et publique, a appelé à revoir « toutes les dispositions pertinentes 
[...] afin de garantir que toutes les personnes handicapées puissent voter, quel 
que soit leur handicap, statut juridique ou lieu de résidence, et qu'elles puis-
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sent participer à la vie politique et publique au même titre que les autres ci-
toyens ».146 
 L'accessibilité des bureaux de vote demeure un problème récurrent pour 
les Etats membres de l'Union européenne, alors que 24 d'entre eux ont sous-
crit au principe que les élections devraient être totalement accessibles.147 En 
guise d'illustration, des évolutions ont été constatées en Autriche et en Fin-
lande, où plusieurs plans d'action nationaux ont été adoptés en 2012 visant à 
augmenter la participation des personnes handicapées à la vie publique et po-
litique. 
 La France, au nom d'une plus grande accessibilité, a mis en place un vote 
électronique par internet à l'occasion des élections parlementaires françaises 
de juin 2012 et au bénéfice des citoyens résidant à l'extérieur du territoire.148 
Les électeurs ont communiqué leur adresse électronique et leur numéro de 
portable aux consulats, qui leur ont ensuite envoyé un identifiant ainsi que 
des instructions sur la procédure de vote.149 Pour autant, l'Etat doit procéder à 
de nouveaux efforts afin d'assurer une meilleure accessibilité de tous ses bu-
reaux de vote aux électeurs souffrant d'un handicap.150 S'agissant des per-
sonnes malvoyantes et de leur accès à l'isoloir, un rapport de l'OSCE souligne 
« qu'aucune mesure particulière n'[a] été adoptée afin d'aider les personnes 
malvoyantes, qui n'ont de la sorte pas pu voter dans le secret ».151 
 Le droit de vote des personnes souffrant d'un handicap mental ou de 
troubles de la santé mentale est un domaine du droit qui varie énormément 
d'un Etat membre de l'Union européenne à l'autre. La majorité d'entre eux as-
socient encore la perte de la capacité juridique à la privation du droit de vote. 
Les Etats membres de l'Union suivent trois approches principales : l'exclusion 
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totale, l'examen au cas par cas, et la participation pleine et entire.152 En 
France, la participation des personnes handicapées mentales et des personnes 
souffrant de troubles mentaux à la vie politique est considérée comme « satis-
faisante » puisque ne prônant pas « l'exclusion ».153 Le Code électoral dispose 
en son article L5 qu'il appartient au juge de statuer sur le maintien ou la sup-
pression du droit de vote de la personne protégée. Auparavant, les droits ci-
viques étaient supprimés automatiquement dès que les personnes étaient pla-
cées sous une protection juridique. L'inversion du principe est intervenue 
avec l'entrée en vigueur en 2009 de la loi sur le handicap de 2005. Il s'agit en 
conclusion d'une participation limitée, au cas par cas, souvent sur décision du 
juge. 
Culture(s) de la citoyenneté 
Question 13 
En général en France, on peut considérer que la mise en œuvre des normes en 
matière de citoyenneté européenne fait partie d'une culture européenne basée 
sur les droits de la « libre circulation » et des droits « constitutionnels ». En 
effet, on trouve des nombreux exemples dans la pratique décisionnelle des 
tribunaux français, ainsi que dans les différentes lois de transposition du droit 
de l'UE, dans les domaines traités dans les questions ci-dessus. Le droit de sé-
jour fait partie des droits compris dans les droits « constitutionnels » français. 
En matière des droits de séjour accordés aux membres de la famille d'un ci-
toyen de l'UE, le pacte civil de solidarité154 prévu par la directive comme 
équivalent au mariage n'était pas regardé en France. Néanmoins, les juridic-
tions françaises ont usé à plusieurs reprises de l'effet direct de la directive en 
reconnaissant cette équivalence. À cette fin, les juges réfutaient l'application 
de l'article L. 313-11-7° du CESEDA (ie: 3.2b de la directive), au profit de 
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154. Equivalent de l'article 2 .2. b) « le partenaire avec lequel le citoyen de l'Union a con-
tracté un partenariat enregistré ». 
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l'application des l'article L. 121-1 et L. 121-3 du CESEDA (ie: 2.2.b de la di-
rective).155  
 En ce qui concerne le droit d'accès, et même si l'article, de droit commun, 
L. 221-1 du CESEDA pose le principe de l'obligation de présentation de cer-
tains documents et visas, les articles R. 121-1 et R. 212-1 du CESEDA déro-
gent au principe susmentionné pour les ressortissants d'un Etat de l'Union eu-
ropéenne, en ce que la simple présentation d'une carte d'identité ou passeport 
en cours de validité est suffisant pour l'admission sur le territoire français.  
 Les juridictions françaises ont estimé, sur le fondement des article L. 121-
1 4° et L. 121-3 du CESEDA, que le droit au séjour ne pouvait être refusé à 
un ressortissant d'un Etat tiers, sur le fondement de l'article L.121-1 4° et 
L.121-3 CESEDA, au motif que son épouse, ressortissante d'un Etat membre 
et bénéficiant d'un droit de séjour permanent, disposait de ressources insuffi-
santes suite à un accident de la circulation, alors même que cette dernière était 
titulaire de diverses allocations et que le montant de ces dernières dépassait le 
seuil minimum de l'article R. 121-4 du CESEDA. En conséquence, l'arrêté du 
préfet disposant de l'obligation de quitter le territoire procédant à son éloi-
gnement a été annulé. 
 Les cours et tribunaux français n'ont pas attendu la codification tardive de 
2011156 par le législateur français des critères énumérés par la directive, à sa-
voir la durée de séjour, l'âge, l'état de santé, la situation familiale et écono-
mique, l'intégration sociale et culturelle et l'intensité des liens avec le pays 
d'origine, pour apprécier la proportionnalité d'une mesure d'éloignement au 
regard de la situation personnelle de l'intéressé. Ils ont, en effet, tenu compte 
de ces critères depuis des dizaines d'années en s'efforçant de protéger le droit 
au respect de la vie privée et familiale tel qu'énoncé à l'article 7 de la charte 
des droits fondamentaux de l'Union européenne et à l'article 8 de la conven-
tion européenne des droits de l'homme et des libertés fondamentales (la « 
CESDH »). Le contrôle de proportionnalité a été réalisé en cas de « menace à 
                                                        
155. Tribunal administratif de Nice, 16 oct. 2009, Alves do Couto: req. no 0902958 ; Cour 
administrative d'appel de Marseille – Marseille – 5ème chambre – formation à 3 – 
09MA04065 – 12 mai 2011 ; Cour administrative d'appel de Marseille – Marseille – 
5ème chambre – formation à 3 – 10MA04024 – 28 juin 2012; Cour administrative 
d'appel de Bordeaux – Bordeaux – 1ère chambre – formation à 3 – 12BX00350 – 05 
juillet 2012. 
156. Loi n° 2011-672 du 16 juin 2011, Op. cit. ; articles L. 121-4, L. 511-3-1, L. 521-1, L. 
521-1 et L. 521-5 du CESEDA. 
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l'ordre public157 », mais aussi en cas de « menace grave à l'ordre public158 » et 
de « nécessité impérieuse159 ». 
 On peut néanmoins trouver des exemples d'une mise en œuvre des normes 
en matière de citoyenneté européenne en tant « qu'ajout » aux systèmes 
d'immigration. En ce qui concerne le droit aux prestations sociales des de-
mandeurs d'emploi, l'arrêt de la cour administrative d'appel de Paris du 20 oc-
tobre 2011160 est typique du manque de prise en compte de la jurisprudence 
de la Cour de justice de l'Union européenne (la « CJUE ») sur le « lien réel » 
par les cours et les tribunaux nationaux. En l'espèce un ressortissant polonais 
s'était vu refuser l'accès au RSA. Confirmant le jugement du tribunal admi-
nistratif de Paris, la cour administrative d'appel de Paris a estimé que le de-
mandeur n'était pas fondé à toucher le RSA car celui-ci était « entré en France 
pour y chercher un emploi » et qu'il s'y maintenait à ce titre. Le juge semble 
avoir procédé à un double contrôle : celui de la conformité du refus d'accor-
der le RSA avec la directive et de sa conformité avec le statut de « travailleur 
». Il n'a en revanche pas recherché s'il existait un « lien réel » entre le deman-
deur et le marché de l'emploi de l'Etat membre d'accueil. 
Question 14 
Il faut rappeler que le juge national reste l'organe juridictionnel privilégié 
pour assurer la protection des citoyens ; de même, le juge ordinaire du droit 
de l'Union est le juge national. La CJUE ne peut connaître d'un recours que si 
elle est saisie par une institution de l'Union européenne ou à travers le renvoi 
préjudiciel en interprétation et en appréciation de validité. Mais la primauté 
du droit de l'Union sur l'ensemble du droit national pourrait se heurter à la 
conservation de l'autorité des Cours constitutionnelles des Etats membres,161 
dont la France.  
 La Charte des droits fondamentaux de l'Union européenne162 est l'exemple 
habituel, les droits fondamentaux faisant partie intégrante des principes géné-
                                                        
157. CAA Versailles, 8 novembre 2012, n° 11VE01627. 
158. CE, 21 septembre 2005, requête n° 260269. 
159. CE, 2 juillet 2001, requête n° 223181. 
160. CAA Paris, 20 octobre 2011, n° 10PA05222. 
161. Cour constitutionnelle allemande, 30 juin 2009, décision relative à la ratification du 
Traité de Lisbonne. 
162. Charte des droits fondamentaux de l'Union européenne du 18 décembre 2000, JOCE 
18 décembre, no C 364. 
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raux163 du droit dont le juge de l'UE doit assurer le respect,164 y compris les 
dispositions de ladite Charte des droits fondamentaux de l'Union européenne. 
Même avec sa visibilité réduite (du fait de sa non-inscription dans le corps du 
Traité de Lisbonne) il lui est reconnu la même valeur que les Traités165 et sa 
justiciabilité est limitée à la mise en œuvre du droit de l'Union au sein des 
Etats membres, comme rappelé par la Cour.166 De même, il a été précisé que 
les droits reconnus par la Charte doivent être interprétés en cohérence avec 
les traditions des Etats membres.167  
 La régulation ces dernières années a été complexe. La Cour de justice a 
étendu la responsabilité d'un Etat membre pour violation du droit de l'UE, en 
la reconnaissant quel que soit l'organe national imputable.168 En France, elle a 
également établi une sorte de contre-limite aux capacités du contrôle de con-
formité à la Constitution nationale dans une affaire relative à la question prio-
ritaire de constitutionnalité.169 Selon elle, « l'article 267 TFUE s'oppose à une 
législation d'un Etat membre qui instaure une procédure incidente de contrôle 
de constitutionnalité des lois nationales, pour autant que le caractère priori-
taire de cette procédure a pour conséquence d'empêcher, tant avant la trans-
mission d'une question de constitutionnalité à la juridiction nationale chargée 
d'exercer le contrôle de constitutionnalité des lois que, le cas échéant, après la 
décision de cette juridiction sur ladite question, toutes les autres juridictions 
nationales d'exercer leur faculté ou de satisfaire à leur obligation de saisir la 
Cour de questions préjudicielles ».  
 Encore en ce qui concerne la protection des droits fondamentaux, dans le 
cadre d'une procédure faisant application du droit français de la concurrence, 
la Cour de cassation a censuré sur le fondement du droit à un procès équi-
table170 un arrêt de condamnation dès lors que l'entente était prouvée par un 
enregistrement d'une conversation téléphonique obtenue à l'insu de l'auteur 
                                                        
163. Idot L., Le respect des droits de la défense in Réalités et perspectives du droit com-
munautaire des droits fondamentaux, sous la direction de F. Sudre et H. Labayle, 
Bruylant Bruxelles, 2000, p. 213. 
164. Traité UE, art. 6, § 2. 
165. Article 6 TUE. 
166. CJCE, 13 juill. 1989, aff. 5/88, Waschauf c/ Bundesamt für Ernährung und 
Forstwirtschaft, Rec. CJCE, p. 2609 ; CJCE, 13 avr. 2000, aff. C-292/97, Karlsson, 
Rec. CJCE, I, p. 2737. 
167. I. article 52, § 4, de la Charte. 
168. CJCE, 30 sept. 2003, aff. C-224/01, Köbler, Rec. CJCE, I, p. 10239. 
169. CJUE, 22 juin 2010, aff. jointes C-188/10 et C-189/10, Melki et Abdeli. 
170. CEDH, art. 4, § 1. 
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des propos.171 Si la Cour d'appel de Paris a résisté sur renvoi après cassation 
et conclu que les enregistrements peuvent être écartés si leur production porte 
atteinte au droit à un procès équitable, au principe du contradictoire et aux 
droits de la défense de ceux auxquels ils sont opposés, mais qu'en l'espèce, les 
sociétés mises en cause n'apportaient pas la preuve d'une atteinte concrète à 
ces droits et principe,172 la Cour de cassation a cassé l'arrêt au visa de l' article 
9 du Code de procédure civile et de l'article 6, paragraphe 1 de la Convention 
européenne des droits de l'Homme.173 De manière générale, la sous-
protection du ressortissant dans le cadre du droit de l'Union européenne rap-
pelle la sous-protection du ressortissant d'un Etat tiers dans la Convention Eu-
ropéenne des Droits de l'Homme.  
 Le droit français et le droit de l'Union coexistent d'une façon nécessaire. Il 
en est de même pour leurs juges, qui dialoguent (ou qui s'ignorent) et même 
parfois, arrivent à affirmer leur suprématie sur l'autre. Néanmoins, émettre 
des jugements en ce qui concerne le rôle joué par la Charte dans la manière 
dont les droits des citoyens européens sont interprétés par le juge français 
nous semble précipité à ce stade, d'autant qu'elle n'est que peu utilisée par les 
parties de manière générale.  
Question 15 
Comme l'affirmait Bronislaw Geremek174 : « Après avoir fait l'Europe, nous 
devons faire maintenant des Européens ». Cet objectif était celui de l'Europe 
il y a déjà vingt ans au moment de la création de la citoyenneté européenne. 
En effet, il s'agissait de favoriser l'identification des citoyens à l'Union euro-
péenne et de développer une identité européenne qui viendrait se fondre dans 
la citoyenneté nationale. Les médias constituent une extraordinaire plate-
forme pour modeler le ton du débat public. Or, un grand nombre d'enquêtes 
montrent que les médias français continuent d'informer très peu les citoyens 
sur ce qui se passe dans le reste de l'Union. Quant à ce qui se passe à 
Bruxelles, le traitement qui en est fait est généralement technique et rébarba-
tif. La construction de la citoyenneté passe nécessairement par l'information, 
                                                        
171. Cass. com., 3 juin 2008, no 07-17.147, Bull. civ. IV, no 112. 
172. CA Paris, 29 avr. 2009, 1re ch., sect. H, no RG : 2008/11907, Philips France, Avan-
tage, Sony France. 
173. Cass. ass. plén., 7 janv. 2011, nos 09-14.316 et 09-14.667, Bull. ass. plén., no 1, 
RLDA 2011/57, no 3284, obs. Anadon C. 
174. Visions d'Europe, 2007. 
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cela suppose donc que les médias concentrent d'avantage leur attention sur 
l'Union européenne.  
 En France, on constate que les questions liées à la notion de citoyenneté 
européenne dans sa globalité sont peu relayées par les médias nationaux. 
L'Europe, et plus particulièrement le thème de la citoyenneté, est le parent 
pauvre des médias français.175 On ne peut parler d'un véritable paysage mé-
diatique européen qui permettrait de susciter des débats et d'intéresser le pu-
blic. A ce propos, le rapport de M. Lamassoure176 avait mis en évidence que 
les actualités concernant la politique américaine étaient considérées, dans de 
nombreux Etats membres dont la France, comme plus importantes que l'ac-
tualité européenne. L'anniversaire des vingt ans de la création de la citoyen-
neté européenne en est un exemple flagrant. En effet, en dépit de l'importante 
communication de la part des institutions européennes, peu de sujets lui ont 
été consacrés dans les médias français. Ainsi, s'agissant d'une part de l'audio-
visuel, les chaînes de télévision ont pour la plupart consacré à ce thème un 
reportage de quelques minutes dans les journaux télévisés, consistant en gé-
néral en des « micro-trottoir » où des citoyens étaient questionnés sur leur 
sentiment d'être citoyen européen. S'agissant d'autre part de la presse écrite, 
les articles ont simplement fait état des initiatives des collectivités territoriales 
en faveur de la citoyenneté européenne. L'absence de débats, même à cette 
occasion, est à déplorer. Nous pouvons donc malheureusement affirmer qu'il 
y a en France une absence quasi-totale de communication sur l'Europe.  
 Il semble s'imposer dans les médias français la thématique de la difficulté 
de la construction de la citoyenneté européenne, au travers des sondages et 
autres enquêtes portant sur le sentiment de conscience de sa citoyenneté et 
des droits qu'elle confère. Ainsi, on a pu voir émerger un grand nombre de 
sondages posant les questions suivantes : « vous sentez-vous européen ? Etes-
vous familier avec le terme citoyen européen ? A quel moment vous sentez-
vous le plus citoyen européen ? Comment renforcer le sentiment de citoyen-
neté européenne ? »,177 etc. On constate que certains aspects de la citoyenneté 
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européenne ont dominé dans les médias nationaux tels que la libre circulation 
des personnes et des travailleurs et le droit de résidence. En effet, un des 
thèmes ayant fait l'objet d'un traitement médiatique important est l'intégration 
de la minorité rom dans la société française. La question de leur expulsion est 
souvent au cœur des rédactions de la presse écrite. A ce sujet, on note de 
nombreux articles dans les journaux tels que Le Point,178 L'Express,179 L'Hu-
manité,180 mais aussi dans la presse sur internet où des vifs débats ont lieu à 
ce sujet (site de Médiapart181 ou de Rue 89), ainsi que dans les journaux télé-
visés avec un reportage consacré à l'expulsion de terrains occupés par des 
Roms plusieurs fois par mois. Il ressort de ces articles le thème de la discri-
mination à l'égard de cette population en dépit de leur citoyenneté euro-
péenne. Le ton est donné par les médias français qui, en ne parlant que très 
peu de la citoyenneté européenne et en évoquant principalement l'aspect de la 
libre circulation des personnes à travers les expulsions de Roms, soulignent 
uniquement des aspects de la citoyenneté qui font polémiques au regard des 
implications qu'elles ont au niveau de la politique nationale. Ainsi, à travers 
l'angle choisi par les médias, cela influence le ton des débats alors lancés en 
opposant les intérêts nationaux aux droits attachés à la citoyenneté euro-
péenne. Le titre de cet article du journal en ligne Médiapart182 : « l'Europe 
menace, Paris expulse » en témoigne. Outres ces thèmes récurrents, l'infor-
mation relative à la citoyenneté européenne étant assez pauvre, et donc in-
complète, on peut difficilement apprécier son exactitude. De ce manque 
d'information et du fait de l'angle choisi par les médias pour traiter des ques-
tions de citoyenneté européenne, il ressort une connaissance de cette notion 
                                                        
 – Place publique.fr, « Deux Français sur trois se sentent ‘citoyens de l'Union euro-
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178. Le Point, « ROMS – Le Parlement européen demande à Paris de suspendre les expul-
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quand-une-politique-exemplaire-pour-l-integration-des-roms>.  




qui ne peut être qu'erronée ou tout du moins partiale. Le résultat d'une en-
quête effectuée dernièrement montrant que 47 % des Français estiment que 
les Roms ne sont pas des citoyens européens comme les autres183 est un 
exemple que les médias ont aujourd'hui une réelle influence sur le discours 
public. Le ton du débat public donné dans les médias et dans la société civile 
imprégnée de ces thématiques, nous dévoile une image et une compréhension 
du statut et des droits liés à la notion de citoyenneté qui reste encore assez 
vague et incertaine pour la population française. Mis à part l'accent mis sur 
des aspects polémiques, les Français sont peu sensibilisés par les médias à la 
citoyenneté européenne. Ces médias pourtant détenteurs d'une grande respon-
sabilité, en raison de leur pouvoir d'influence sur le débat public, n'ont pas usé 
de manière responsable de ce pouvoir, notamment en ne fournissant pas 
d'informations assez précises sur les droits en vigueur, et en choisissant de ne 
traiter que certains aspect de cette citoyenneté. 
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Germany 
Unionsbürgerschaft im Rahmen der Richtlinie 2004/38/EG – 
Beständigkeit des Aufenthalts von Unionsbürgern und ihren 
Familienangehörigen 
Frage 1 
Der personale Anwendungsbereich des Freizügigkeitsgesetzes beschränkt 
sich auf Familienangehörige im Sinn des Art. 2 Nr. 2 RL 2004/38/EG. Eine 
besondere Bestimmung für sonstige Familienangehörige wurde bis zum heu-
tigen Zeitpunkt nicht in dem Freizügigkeitsgesetz aufgenommen. Allerdings 
gilt insoweit die allgemeine Bestimmung des § 36 AufenthG, der auch alle 
sonstigen Familienangehörigen im Sinn des Art. 3 Abs. 2 RL 2004/38/EG 
umfasst. Ob dessen Voraussetzungen den Anforderungen des Rahmann-
Urteils genügen,2 ist umstritten. Es scheint uns, dass eventuelle Unsicherhei-
ten im Wege der europarechtskonformen Auslegung beseitigt werden kön-
nen, so dass im Ergebnis kein Konflikt besteht. 
 Freilich könnte eine Änderung des Staatsangehörigkeitsgesetzes neue 
Streitfragen verursachen. Gemäß § 4 Abs. 3 StAG erlangen die Kinder von 
nicht-deutschen Eltern, die sich seit mindestens acht Jahren in Deutschland 
aufhalten, regelmäßig die deutsche Staatsangehörigkeit kraft Geburt. Bei 
Unionsbürgern darf hierbei die eventuell bestehende weitere Staatsangehö-
rigkeit des Herkunftslandes der Eltern ohne Bedingungen beibehalten wer-
den.3 Wenn ein Kind hiernach, zum Beispiel, die deutsche und die französi-
sche Staatsangehörigkeit besitzt, stellt sich die Frage, ob das Kind sich auf 
das EU-Freizügigkeitsrecht berufen kann (etwa wenn es einen Ehepartner aus 
einem Drittstaat heiratet). Einzelne Verwaltungsgerichte sind der Auffassung, 
dass in einem solchen Fall die Unionsbürgerrechte nicht gelten sollen, weil 
                                                        
1. Beide Berichterstatter sind Inhaber eines Lehrstuhls an der Universität Konstanz und 
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2. Vgl. EuGH, Rs. C-83/11, Rahman u.a., Slg. 2012 I-0000. 
3. Vgl. zur Mehrstaatigkeit bei Unionsbürgern § 12 Abs. 2 StAG. 
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die betroffene Person sich aus Sicht der deutschen Rechtsordnung im Land 
der eigenen Staatsangehörigkeit aufhält und mithin nicht von ihrem Freizü-
gigkeitsrecht Gebrauch machte.4 Ob sich diese Auffassung durchsetzt, bleibt 
abzuwarten. Für türkische Arbeitnehmer entschied der EuGH, dass sie ihrer 
Rechte aus dem Assoziierungsabkommen nicht verlustig werden, wenn sie 
neben der türkischen auch die deutsche Staatsangehörigkeit erwerben.5 
 Uns ist nicht bekannt, dass die Verfahrensvorschriften gemäß Art. 5 der 
Richtlinie nachhaltige Schwierigkeiten verursachen. 
Frage 2 
Im Jahr 2013 wurde das deutsche Freizügigkeitsgesetz zur Umsetzung der 
RL 2004/38/EG geändert und die behördliche Bescheinigung des Freizügig-
keitsrechts für Unionsbürger abgeschafft.6 Dies hat zur Folge, dass Unions-
bürger keine (deklaratorische) Bestätigung ihres Aufenthaltsstatus erlangen. 
Sie müssen – wie jeder Bürger – ihren Wohnsitz bei den Meldebehörden an-
zeigen, ein spezielles aufenthaltsrechtliches Verfahren gibt es jedoch nicht 
mehr. An die Stelle der behördlichen Ex-ante-Überprüfung des Aufenthalts-
status tritt die Möglichkeit der nachgelagerten Ex-post-Kontrolle durch die 
zuständigen Behörden, die in einer deklaratorischen Verlustfeststellung mün-
den kann, soweit der betroffene Unionsbürger die Voraussetzungen des Art. 7 
RL 2004/38/EG nicht (mehr) erfüllt.7 Zu unterscheiden ist die Verlustfeststel-
lung hinsichtlich der Nichtexistenz eines Aufenthaltsrechts von der Entzie-
hung aus Gründen der öffentlichen Ordnung oder Sicherheit.8 
 In der Praxis besitzt die Verlustfeststellung eine geringe Bedeutung. Aus-
weislich der staatlichen Statistiken, die sowohl die Verlustfeststellung als 
auch den Entzug aus Gründen der öffentlichen Ordnung umfassen, sind nega-
tive Behördenentscheidungen selten, freilich mit steigender Tendenz: Im Jahr 
2012 ging es um 1557 Fälle, im Vergleich zu 926 im Jahr 2006 sowie 1144 
im Jahr 2009.9 Andere Daten zeigen, dass gegenüber 1726 Unionsbürgern ei-
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9. Siehe die Antwort der Bundesregierung auf eine Kleine Anfrage der Fraktion DIE 




ne Ausreiseverpflichtung ausgesprochen wurde, wobei 1338 das Land frei-
willig oder aufgrund einer Abschiebung verließen.10 Die meisten betroffenen 
Personen kamen aus Rumänien (439), Polen (362), Bulgarien (251) und Li-
tauen (94). All diese Zahlen sind gering, wenn man bedenkt, dass beinahe 3 
Millionen Unionsbürger in Deutschland wohnen (eine Ausreisepflicht wurde 
einzig gegenüber ca. 0,05 % ausgesprochen). Diese vergleichsweise geringen 
Fallzahlen sind teils auf die kategorische Trennung zwischen AufenthG und 
FreizügG/EU zurückzuführen (siehe Frage 13). Im Bereich der Unionsbür-
gerschaft scheint der Streit über den Zugang zu Sozialleistungen an die Stelle 
von aufenthaltsrechtlichen Verfahren getreten zu sein (siehe Frage 5). 
 Die aufgeführten Statistiken unterscheiden nicht zwischen einer Verlust-
feststellung aus Gründen der öffentlichen Ordnung sowie mit Blick auf Art. 7 
RL 2004/38/EG. Zudem gibt es keine verlässlichen Informationen, ob die 
letztgenannte Kategorie in erster Linie Arbeitnehmer betraf (genauer: den 
fehlenden Arbeitnehmerstatus) oder ausreichende Existenzmittel. In beiden 
Fällen stellen der Gesetzestext, die Verwaltungsvorschrift sowie die Recht-
sprechung freilich sicher, dass die innerdeutsche Praxis sich prinzipiell an den 
EU-Vorgaben orientiert. Dies gilt auch für Art. 7 Abs. 1 Buchst. b und das 
Brey-Urteil, hinsichtlich dessen juristische Datenbanken bisher wenig Strei-
tigkeiten aufweisen. Dies kann sich freilich schnell ändern. 
Frage 3 
Art. 12-15 wurde vollständig in nationales Gesetz umgesetzt.11 Rechtsstrei-
tigkeiten speziell zu diesen Normen gibt es nur wenige, wichtiger sind die 
Diskussionen um die wirtschaftliche Selbstständigkeit sowie die Einschrän-
kung aus Gründen der öffentlichen Ordnung (siehe Fragen 2 und 3). 
Frage 4 
§ 4 a FreizügG/EU orientiert sich am Wortlaut von Art. 16-21 RL 2004/38 
EG und garantiert allen Unionsbürgern ein Recht auf Daueraufenthalt. Es gibt 
                                                        
nen und Bürgern aus Rumänien und Bulgarien, BT-Drs. 17/13322 vom 26. 04. 2013, 
S. 19 f. (die Daten betreffen alle EU-Bürger, nicht nur Rumänen und Bulgaren). 
10. Vgl. Antwort der Bundesregierung auf die Kleine Anfrage der Fraktion DIE LINKE: 
Abschiebungen im Jahr 2012, BT-Drs. 17/12442 vom 22. 02. 2013, S. 33 f.; die un-
terschiedlichen Zahlen sind wohl durch unterschiedliche Definitionen des Rückfüh-
rungsbegriffs zu erklären, der in den Dokumenten nur allgemein bezeichnet ist. 
11. Siehe § 3 Abs. 4 f. FreizügG/EU. 
CHRISTOPH SCHÖNBERGER & DANIEL THYM 
  572 
vereinzelte Gerichtsentscheidungen zur Auslegung der Norm, unter Ein-
schluss des EuGH-Urteils Ziolkowski & Szeja, das einer Vorlage des 
BVerwG entspringt.12 Es steht zu erwarten, dass das Recht auf Daueraufent-
halt zukünftig eine größere rechtspraktische Bedeutung erlangt, nachdem die 
Freizügigkeitsbescheinigung im Frühjahr 2013 abgeschafft wurde (siehe Fra-
ge 2). Dies hat zur Folge, dass Unionsbürger mit ungewissem Aufenthaltssta-
tus vermehrt eine behördliche Automatisierung ihres Aufenthalts nach fünf-
jähriger Anwesenheit beantragen könnten. Da jedoch das Daueraufenthalts-
recht nicht infolge Zeitablaufs automatisch entsteht,13 dürfte es bei der Ent-
scheidung zu vermehrten Streitigkeiten kommen, ob in den zurückliegenden 
fünf Jahren die Voraussetzungen des Art. 7 RL 2004/38/EG erfüllt waren.14 
Frage 5 
Politischer Kontext: Sozialleistungen für Unionsbürger sind zu einem um-
strittenen rechtspolitischen Thema geworden. Zu Beginn des Jahres 2014 be-
richteten zahlreiche deutsche Tageszeitungen auf den Titelseiten über War-
nungen speziell der CSU vor der »Armutszuwanderung« innerhalb Europas, 
insb. aus Bulgarien und Rumänien. Das Thema beherrschte einige Wochen 
lang die Schlagzeilen und die neue Bundesregierung richtete einen Staatssek-
retärsausschuss ein, der praktischen und/oder rechtlichen Handlungsbedarf 
ausloten soll.15 Bereits im Koalitionsvertrag der Großen Koalition aus dem 
November 2013 heißt es: »Wir wollen im nationalen Recht und im Rahmen 
der europarechtlichen Vorgaben durch Änderungen erreichen, dass Anreize 
für Migration in die sozialen Sicherungssysteme verringert werden.«16 
Rechtlicher Kontext: Seit Jahren dreht sich die juristische Debatte um die 
Deutung des Vatsouras-Urteils, in dem der EuGH eine Vorlage des BSG zur 
Vereinbarkeit des deutschen Rechts mit Art. 24 Abs. 2 RL 2004/38/EG nicht 
eindeutig beantwortet hatte.17 Binnen fünf Jahren fand die deutsche Sozialge-
                                                        
12. Siehe EuGH, verb. Rs. C-424/10 & C-425/10, Ziolkowski & Szeja, Slg. 2011 I-0000. 
13. Vgl. EuGH, Rs. C-325/09, Dias, Slg. 2011 I-6387, Rn. 53-55. 
14. Ein ähnliches Phänomen ist derzeit im Vereinigten Königreich zu beobachten, das 
schon länger keine Freizügigkeitsbescheinigung mehr hat. 
15. Ergebnisse werden für Mai/Juni 2014 erwartet. 
16. Koalitionsvertrag zwischen CDU, CSU und SPD: Deutschlands Zukunft gestalten 
(18. Legislaturperiode), 28. 11. 2013, S. 108. 
17. EuGH, Rs. C-22/08 & C-23/08, Vatsouras & Koupatantze, Slg. 2009 I-4585, Rn. 41-
43 verpflichtet die nationalen Gerichte zur eigenständigen Beurteilung, ob das deut-




richtsbarkeit zu keiner eindeutigen Position. Überaus wichtig ist freilich die 
Feststellung, dass der Streit einzig Arbeitsuchende im Sinn des Unionsrechts 
betrifft und mithin diejenigen Personen meint, die »mit begründeter Aussicht 
auf Erfolg« einen Job suchen.18 Für Personen, die nicht hierunter fallen, gel-
ten andere Regeln, die nachfolgend dargestellt werden. 
 Wenn man das Zusammenwirken von nationalem und supranationalem 
Recht verstehen will, hilft das Bewusstsein für die Unterscheidung zwischen 
drei Kategorien an Sozialleistungen in Deutschland: 
(a) Arbeitslosengeld II gemäß § 7 SGB II (»Hartz IV«) wird an Personen 
gezahlt, die prinzipiell erwerbsfähig sind – und zwar unabhängig davon, 
ob sie wegen begründeter Einstellungschance zugleich als Arbeitsuchen-
de im Sinne des Unionsrechts gelten. 
(b) Sozialhilfe im engeren Sinne gemäß § 23 SGB XII wird an all diejenigen 
gezahlt, die nicht dem Arbeitsmarkt zur Verfügung stehen, insbesondere 
Rentner, Erwerbsunfähige, etc. 
(c) Sonstige Sozialleistungen, wie etwa Kindergeld, Wohngeld, Studienbei-
hilfen, Betreuungsgeld, etc., verfügen teils über eigene, spezialgesetzli-
che Regelungen bezüglich der Leistungsberechtigung.19  
Soweit keine spezialgesetzliche Regelung besteht, gilt für Unionsbürger die 
Generalklausel des § 30 SGB I, wonach alle Personen über Leistungsansprü-
che nach deutschem Sozialrecht verfügen, die ihren Wohnsitz oder gewöhnli-
chen Aufenthalt in Deutschland haben.20  
1. Drei-Monats-Periode nach der Einreise 
In Übereinstimmung mit Art. 24 Abs. 2 RL 2004/38/EG verweigert § 7 Abs. 
1 S. 2 Nr. 1 SGB II allen Unionsbürgern während der ersten drei Monate des 
Aufenthalts einen Anspruch auf Grundsicherung bei Arbeitsuche (»Hartz 
                                                        
Auslegung einzustufen sei, ohne dass die europarechtlichen Vorgaben eindeutig wä-
ren. 
18. EuGH, Rs. C-292/89, Antonissen, Slg. 1991 I-745, Rn. 22; die innerstaatliche deut-
sche Definition rekurriert auf die EuGH-Begrifflichkeit; vgl. § 2 Abs. 2 FreizügG/EU 
sowie Nr. 2.2.1.3 Allgemeine Verwaltungsvorschrift zum Freizügigkeitsgesetz/EU 
vom 26. 10. 2009 (BMBl. 2009, 1270). 
19. Gemäß EuGH, Rs. C-140/12, Brey, Slg. 2013 I-0000, Rn. 52 unterfallen all diese 
Leistungen dem Sozialhilfebegriff der RL 2004/38/EG. 
20. Die Vorschrift wird ähnlich (aber nicht identisch) ausgelegt wie der Begriff des ge-
wöhnlichen Aufenthalts gem. VO (EG) Nr. 883/2004. 
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IV«). Für die Sozialhilfe im engeren Sinne bestimmt § 23 Abs. 3 SGB XII 
dem Wortlaut nach ambivalenter, dass Personen nicht umfasst seien, »die 
eingereist sind, um Sozialhilfe zu erlangen, oder deren Aufenthaltsrecht sich 
allein aus dem Zweck der Arbeitsuche ergibt.« Juristische Datenbanken ent-
halten keine Hinweise, dass die letztgenannte Norm zahlreiche Rechtsstrei-
tigkeiten zur Folge hätte, was von einer geringen Praxisrelevanz zeugt (ganz 
anders als der Streit um Hartz IV, der im Folgenden dargelegt wird). Dies 
überrascht nicht, weil die meisten Unionsbürger prinzipiell erwerbsfähig sind 
und damit innerstaatlich den Regelungen des SGB II unterfallen. 
2. Arbeitnehmer/Selbstständige 
Da Arbeitnehmer und Selbstständige dem Arbeitsmarkt als wirtschaftlich ak-
tive Bürger zur Verfügung stehen, unterfallen sie den Regelungen im SGB II, 
die ihrerseits eine volle Gleichbehandlung von Arbeitnehmern, Selbstständi-
gen sowie Familienangehörigen gewährleisten – unter Einschluss der ersten 
drei Monate nach der Einreise. Praktische Bedeutung besitzt dies für diejeni-
gen Arbeitnehmer, die als »Aufstocker« ergänzende Sozialleistungen bezie-
hen. Berichte der Bundesagentur für Arbeit deuten darauf hin, dass diese Per-
sonengruppe die Mehrzahl an Unionsbürgern ausmacht, die derzeit (partiell) 
Hartz IV-Leistungen beziehen.21 Dies gilt auch für Selbstständige, hinsicht-
lich derer einzelne Beobachter ein erhöhtes Missbrauchspotenzial bei der 
Anmeldung (vermeintlicher) Gewerbe i.V.m. ergänzenden Sozialleistungen 
ausmachen.22 Jenseits des Zugangs zur Grundsicherung wirft die Gruppe der 
Arbeitnehmer und Selbstständigen freilich wenig Probleme auf, zumal § 30 
SGB I einen prinzipiellen Gleichbehandlungsgrundsatz während des Aufent-
halts in Deutschland zusichert. Problematischer ist die Situation von Grenz-
gängern, die freilich nicht vom Anwendungsbereich der RL 2004/38/EG um-
fasst sind und daher an dieser Stelle nicht näher behandelt werden. 
                                                        
21. Siehe die Pressemitteilung vom 14.01.2014 http://www.presseportal.de/pm/6776/ 
2642295; sowie die beständig aktualisierten statistischen Daten unter http://statistik. 
arbeitsagentur.de/Navigation/Statistik/Statistische-Analysen/Statistische-Sonderbe 
richte/Statistische-Sonderberichte-Nav.html.   





In Übereinstimmung mit Art. 24 Abs. 2 RL 2004/38/EG besitzen nicht alle 
Unionsbürger einen Anspruch auf BAföG-Leistungen. Während Wanderar-
beitnehmer und deren Kinder über gleiche Rechte wie deutsche Staatsangehö-
rige verfügen, gilt dies für sonstige Unionsbürger gemäß § 8 Abs. 1 BAföG 
erst nach Erwerb des Rechts auf Daueraufenthalt. Einschränkungen für deut-
sche Staatsangehörige, die im EU-Ausland studieren, sorgten für wiederkeh-
rende Streitigkeiten nebst EuGH-Vorlagen.23 Da das Verhältnis eigener 
Staatsangehörigen zum Heimatstaat nach der Ausreise gleichfalls nicht von 
RL 2004/38/EG umfasst ist, wird auch diese Gruppe nicht betrachtet.  
4. Arbeitsuchende (im Sinn des Unionsrechts) 
Bekanntlich wird der Zugang von Arbeitsuchenden zur Grundsicherung 
(»Hartz IV«) seit dem Vatsouras-Urteil des EuGH in Rechtskreisen intensiv 
diskutiert. Hintergrund ist die Entscheidung des deutschen Gesetzgebers, in 
§ 7 Abs. 1 S. 2 Nr. 2 SGB II eine Ausnahme vom Leistungsanspruch für Per-
sonen niederzulegen, »deren Aufenthaltsrecht sich allein aus dem Zweck der 
Arbeitsuche ergibt«. Nachdem der EuGH sich zur Europarechtskonformität 
dieser Norm nicht eindeutig positioniert hatte, begann ein langwieriger Streit 
in der deutschen Sozialgerichtsbarkeit. Erst jüngst näherte sich eine endgülti-
ge Entscheidung, als das Bundessozialgericht in Dezember 2013 entschied, 
erneut ein Vorabentscheidungsersuchen nach Luxemburg zu senden, um dort 
eine Klarstellung der früheren Rechtsprechung sowie Aussagen zu den Aus-
wirkungen der VO (EG) Nr. 883/2004 zu erhalten.24 Eine vergleichbare Vor-
lage hatte das SG Leipzig bereits einige Monate zuvor an den EuGH gerich-
tet.25 Hierdurch scheint eine jahrelange innerstaatliche Debatte mit immer 
neuen Wendungen einer Lösung zugeführt zu werden.  
 Für das Verständnis der jüngeren innerdeutschen Entwicklung vor der 
EuGH-Vorlage ist ein Urteil des BSG aus dem Jahr 2010 bedeutsam,26 das 
einen Widerspruch zwischen § 7 Abs. 1 S. 2 Nr. 2 SGB II mit dem Europäi-
schen Fürsorgeabkommen angenommen hatte (ein völkerrechtlicher Vertrag, 
                                                        
23. Im Lauf des Jahres 2013: EuGH, verb. Rs. C-523/11 & C-585/11, Prinz & Seeberger, 
Slg. 2013 I-0000; EuGH, Rs. C-220/12, Thiele Meneses, Slg. 2013 I-0000; und 
EuGH, Rs. C-275/12, Erlick, Slg. 2013 I-0000. 
24. BSG, Beschluss vom 12.12.2013, B 4 AS 9/13 R.  
25. SG Leipzig, Beschluss vom 3.06.2013, S 17 AS 2198/12 = Rs. C-333/13, Dano. 
26. BSG, Urteil vom 19.10.2010, B 14 AS 23/10. 
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der im Jahr 1953 im Rahmen des Europarats ausgearbeitet wurde). Dies hatte 
zur Folge, dass Bürger aus EFA-Vertragsstaaten, die vorrangig im Westen 
und Süden Europas liegen,27 einen Anspruch auf Hartz IV erlangten.  
 Auch dies war nur eine Zwischenlösung, weil die Bundesregierung im 
Dezember 2011 entschied, durch eine Erklärung gemäß Art. 16 Buchst. d des 
Übereinkommens die Grundsicherung zur Arbeitsuche von dessen Anwen-
dungsbereich auszunehmen. Das letzte Wort war freilich auch dies nicht, weil 
die deutschen Sozialgerichte alsbald die Vereinbarkeit der Erklärung mit dem 
Völkerrecht bezweifelten.28 Zudem wurde argumentiert, dass österreichische 
Staatsbürger aufgrund eines bilateralen Abkommens aus dem Jahr 1966 einen 
Anspruch auf Hartz IV besäßen.29 Beide Fragen sind bis heute nicht ab-
schließend geklärt, d.h. deutsche Sozialgerichte beurteilen die völkerrechtli-
che Zulässigkeit der Erklärung unterschiedlich. Freilich gilt das nur für An-
tragsteller aus den Vertragsstaaten des Übereinkommens, zu denen die meis-
ten mittel- und osteuropäischen Staaten nicht gehören. Speziell für diese letz-
te Gruppe bleibt mithin die Vereinbarkeit des Leistungsausschlusses in § 7 
SGB II mit dem Unionsrecht das zentrale Thema, zu dem zwischenzeitlich 
mehr als 100 Entscheidungen deutscher Sozialgerichte mit divergierendem 
Ausgang vorliegen. Aus diesem Grund ist eine klare Antwort des EuGH auf 
die anhängigen Vorlagen für die deutsche Rechtspraxis so wichtig. 
 Die meisten Gerichtsentscheidungen zur Thematik in Deutschland kon-
zentrieren sich auf die abstrakte Frage, ob die Grundsicherung zur Arbeitsu-
che infolge des Vatsouras-Urteils als Sozialleistungen im Sinn der Richtlinie 
einzustufen ist, beschäftigen sich jedoch nicht (oder allenfalls am Rande) mit 
der ergänzenden Frage, ob jeder einzelne Antragsteller eine tatsächliche Ver-
bindung mit dem deutschen Arbeitsmarkt aufweist, die der EuGH als zusätz-
liche Voraussetzung für eine Gleichbehandlung fordert. 
5. Wirtschaftlich inaktive Unionsbürger 
Es sollte erneut betont werden, dass das Vatsouras-Urteil sich nur auf Arbeit-
suchende im Sinn des EU-Rechts bezieht und mithin nur diejenigen betrifft, 
                                                        
27. Aktuell sind EFA – Vertragsstaaten Belgien, Dänemark, Deutschland, Estland, 
Frankreich, Griechenland, Irland, Island, Italien, Luxemburg, Malta, Niederlande, 
Norwegen, Portugal, Schweden, Spanien, die Türkei und das Vereinigte Königreich. 
28. Siehe z.B. die divergenten Auffassungen verschiedener Spruchkörper innerhalb des 
LSG Berlin-Brandenburg, Beschluss vom 09. 05. 2012, L 19 AS 794-12 B ER sowie 
ebd., Beschluss vom 02. 08. 2012, L 5 AS 1297/12 B ER. 
29. LSG Mecklenburg-Vorpommern, Beschluss vom 07.03.2012, L 8 B 489-10, Rn. 27-9. 
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die eine begründete Aussicht auf Einstellung besitzen. Wenn ein Antragstel-
ler das letztgenannte Kriterium nicht erfüllt, unterfällt er aus Sicht des EU-
Rechts dem allgemeinen Freizügigkeitsrecht nach Art. 21 AEUV sowie Art. 
7 Abs. 1 Buchst. b RL 2004/38/EG. Hierbei geht es um Personen, die von 
vornherein keine Arbeit suchen (etwa: Rentner; Erwerbsunfähige; Eltern, die 
sich auf die Kindererziehung konzentrieren) oder keine begründete Aussicht 
auf Einstellung besitzen (etwa: mangels Qualifikation; nachhaltig erfolglose 
Arbeitsuche; Arbeitsunwilligkeit). Diese Personen sind keine Arbeitsuchen-
den im Sinn des EU-Rechts und unterfallen aufgrund der prinzipiellen Er-
werbsfähigkeit dennoch den Regeln im SGB II (Hartz IV).30 Diese Unter-
scheidung klingt akademisch, hat jedoch bedeutende Auswirkungen.  
 Erstens greift in diesem Fall nicht die Ausnahme in Art. 24 Abs. 2 RL 
2004/38/EG für den Sozialleistungsausschluss für Arbeitsuchende im Sinn 
des EU-Rechts. Stattdessen tritt das Kriterium der ausreichenden Existenz-
mittel als Voraussetzung für das Aufenthaltsrecht (siehe Frage 2) und einher-
gehende Gleichbehandlungsrechte gemäß Art. 24 Abs. 1 RL 2004/38/EG 
und/oder Art. 18 AEUV in das Zentrum. Wenn es zutrifft, dass diese Be-
stimmungen die EuGH-Rechtsprechung zu modifizieren bestimmt sind (und 
keine unbedingte Rechtsgleichheit einfordern),31 richtet sich die Abgrenzung 
zwischen Personen mit/ohne Leistungsanspruch nach der EuGH-Formel, dass 
einzig Unionsbürger eine Gleichbehandlung beim Sozialleistungszugang er-
langen, die sich »bis zu einem gewissen Grad in die Gesellschaft ... [integriert 
haben].«32 Dies wird von den nationalen deutschen Gerichten jedoch selten 
diskutiert. Während einzelne die Unterscheidung zwischen Arbeitsuchenden 
und wirtschaftlich Inaktiven im Sinn des EU-Rechts nicht verstanden haben 
dürften, lösen andere Gerichte derartige Fragen einzig auf Grundlage des na-
tionalen Rechts. 
 Zweitens gilt es zu beachten, dass der deutsche Leistungsausschluss ge-
mäß § 7 Abs. 1 S. 2 Nr. 2 SGB II nach dem Wortlaut nur diejenigen Personen 
betrifft, »deren Aufenthaltsrecht sich allein aus dem Zweck der Arbeitsuche 
ergibt«. Dies wurde von verschiedenen Sozialgerichten restriktiv interpretiert, 
unter Einschluss des BSG, das bislang freilich keine abschließende Position 
bezog, ob alle Personen, die keine Arbeitsuchenden im Sinn des EU-Rechts 
                                                        
30. Hierzu die einleitenden Bemerkungen; bei fehlender Erwerbsfähigkeit gelten die Re-
geln des SGB XII (Sozialhilfe), die gleichfalls oben beschrieben wurden. 
31. See D. Thym, Sozialleistungen für und Aufenthalt von nichterwerbstätigen Unions-
bürgern, NZS 2014, 81 (88 f.). 
32. EuGH, Rs. C-209/03, Bidar, Slg. 2005 I-2119, Rn. 57. 
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sind, kraft nationalen Rechts einen Anspruch auf Hartz IV besitzen.33 Diesen 
Weg beschreitet freilich das LSG Nordrhein-Westfalen, das im Oktober 2013 
zu dem Schluss kam, dass alle Unionsbürger, die keine Arbeitsuchenden im 
Sinn des EU-Rechts (mehr) sind, unabhängig vom Europarecht einen Leis-
tungsanspruch kraft § 7 SGB II besitzen, weil von der zitierten Ausnahme-
klausel nur die Arbeitsuche im Sinn des Unionsrechts umfasst sei.34 Es bleibt 
abzuwarten, ob das BVerfG diese Rechtsansicht in der Revision aufrecht er-
hält. Selbst wenn dies der Fall sein sollte, könnte der Bundesgesetzgeber im-
mer noch § 7 Abs. 1 S. 2 Nr. 2 SGB II ändern. In diesem Fall würde die Ver-
einbarkeit mit Unionsrecht wieder in das Zentrum rücken. 
 Drittens betrifft die aufgeführte Debatte einzig die Sicherung des Lebens-
unterhalts aufgrund von »Hartz IV«-Leistungen im engeren Sinn, während 
andere innerstaatliche Sozialleistungen nach Maßgabe des § 30 Abs. 1 SGB I 
grundsätzlich allen Unionsbürgern zustehen. Hiervon gibt es freilich eine 
Ausnahme. Das neu eingeführte Betreuungsgeld gilt, ebenso wie das Eltern-
geld, einzig für Unionsbürger, die über ein Freizügigkeitsrecht nach EU-
Recht verfügen und schließt mithin diejenigen Personen aus, die nicht die 
Schwelle des Art. 7 RL 2004/38/EG überwinden, etwa weil sie nicht über 
ausreichende Existenzmittel verfügen.35 Da speziell das Betreuungsgeld erst 
seit kurzem existiert, überrascht es nicht, dass juristische Datenbanken inso-
weit bislang von keinen umfassenderen Streitigkeiten berichten.  
Frage 6 
Bis zum Jahr 2004 war die Ausweisung von Unionsbürgern aus Gründen der 
öffentlichen Ordnung ein überaus kontroverses Thema in Deutschland. In der 
Zwischenzeit besitzt die Frage eine geringere rechtspraktische und theoreti-
sche Relevanz, nachdem der EuGH die Europarechtswidrigkeit der deutschen 
Regeln festgestellt hatte,36 das Bundesverwaltungsgericht die Abkehr vom 
alten Regime verkündete37 und der Gesetzgeber die Regeln für Unionsbürger 
                                                        
33. BSG, Urteil vom 25.01.2012, B 14 AS 138/11 R für einen polnischen Unionsbürger, 
der als Kind nach Deutschland eingereist war; sowie ebd., Urteil vom 30.01.2013, 
B 4 AS 54/12 R in Bezug auf eine schwangere Frau. 
34. LSG Nordrhein-Westfalen, Urteil vom 10.10.2013, L 19 AS 129/13. 
35. § 4 a i.V.m. § 1 Abs. 7 Gesetz zum Elterngeld und zur Elternzeit (BEEG).  
36. Siehe EuGH, verb. Rs. C-482/01 & C-493/01, Orfanopoulos & Olivieri, Slg. 2004 
I-5257. 
37. BVerwG, Urteil vom 03.08.2004, 1 C 30.02. 
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aus dem Ausländerrecht ausgliederte.38 Seither orientiert sich das Freizügig-
keitsgesetz am Wortlaut der Art. 27 f. RL 2004/38/EG und wird von den Ver-
waltungsgerichten in Übereinstimmung mit den EU-Vorgaben ausgelegt. 
Falls neue Fragen auftreten, scheuen die Gerichte nicht davor zurück, diese 
dem EuGH zur Entscheidung vorzulegen. Prominente jüngere Urteile zum 
Ausweisungsrecht gründen in innerdeutschen Streitigkeiten, unter Einschluss 
der Rechtssachen Tsakouridis und P.I.39  
 Zum Grundsatz der Verhältnismäßigkeit gab es eine innerdeutsche Aus-
einandersetzung, wie die hinreichende Gefahr der Rückfälligkeit bei Wieder-
holungstätern gemessen werden soll, die als ein Aspekt von mehreren in die 
Verhältnismäßigkeitsprüfung einfließt. Der Verwaltungsgerichtshof Baden-
Württemberg bezweifelte die Europarechtskonformität des Je-desto-Ansatzes 
des Bundesverwaltungsgerichts, wonach die Wiederholungsgefahr von der 
Schwere der Straftat abhängt (je schwerer die Straftat, desto größer die Ge-
fahr).40 Diese Ansicht wies das BVerwG in einem obiter dictum unter Hin-
weis auf die EuGH-Rechtsprechung zurück.41 
 Ergänzende Faktoren wie Sprachkenntnisse, der Gesundheitszustand oder 
der gesellschaftliche Integrationsgrad scheinen bei der Entscheidung von 
Einzelfällen keine entscheidende Rolle zu spielen. Es entspricht der kontinen-
taleuropäischen Tradition der Auslegung von Gesetzesrecht (anstelle des Fo-
kus des Common Law auf den Sachverhalt und dem Kontext), dass juristi-
sche Datenbanken sich auf die abstrakte Rechtsauslegung durch Obergerichte 
konzentrieren. Auf dieser Ebene gibt es jedoch keine Hinweise, dass sonstige 
gesellschaftliche Faktoren eine entscheidende Rolle spielten. Es gibt keine 
Hinweise, dass Unionsbürger aus Gründen der öffentlichen Ordnung ausge-
wiesen würden, weil sie über keine hinreichende Integration verfügen. Viel-
mehr hat es den Anschein, dass die überwiegende Mehrzahl an Ausweisun-
gen gegenüber Straftätern ausgesprochen wird (auch wenn die Ausweisung 
nie die automatische Konsequenz einer Verurteilung ist). In diesen Fällen 
werden persönliche Lebensumstände, wie die Gesundheit oder gesellschaftli-
che Bindungen, zu Gunsten der Betroffenen gewichtet.  
                                                        
38. § 6 FreizügG/EU. 
39. Vgl. EuGH, Rs. C-145/09, Tsakouridis, Slg. 2010 I-HYPERLINK „http://curia.europa. 
eu/jurisp/cgi-bin/form.pl?lang=de&Submit=Rechercher&numaff =C-145/09“11979; 
und EuGH, Rs. C-348/09, P.I., Slg. 2012 I-0000. 
40. VGH Baden-Württemberg, Urteile vom 04.05.2011, 11 S 207/11; und vom 
10.02.2011, 11 S 136/11. 
41. BVerwG, Urteil vom 10.07.2012, 1 C 19.11. 
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Unionsbürgerschaft außerhalb der Richtlinie 2004/38/EG – Unter-
suchung der nationalen Anwendung von primärem EU-Recht 
Frage 7 
Frühphase: Deutsche Gerichte (und Wissenschaftler) reagierten schnell auf 
das Ruiz Zambrano-Urteil und eruierten mögliche Folgen. In einer ersten 
Phase gab es Forderungen nach einer juristischen Kehrtwende, insbesondere 
mit Blick auf den Aufenthaltsstatus von drittstaatsangehörigen Familienmit-
gliedern deutscher Staatsangehöriger.42 Ein prominentes Folgeurteil des 
EuGH, die Rechtssache Iida, nimmt seinen Ausgang in einer deutschen 
Rechtsstreitigkeit, welche die Grenzen der Kernbereichsdoktrin auszutesten 
bestimmt war.43 Nachdem der EuGH erklärt hatte, dass der neue Ansatz rest-
riktiv zu handhaben sei, wurde dies von deutschen Gerichten umgehend zur 
Kenntnis genommen. Verschiedene Berufungsgerichte wiesen das Kernbe-
reichsargument unter Verweis auf die neue EuGH-Rechtsprechung zurück.44 
Denselben Weg ging das Bundesverwaltungsgericht wenige Wochen nach 
McCarthy in einem Urteil vom Juni 2011; die Richter betonten, dass der neue 
Ansatz nicht die Position des EuGH zur so genannten Inländerdiskriminie-
rung ändere.45 Hieraus folgte ganz konkret, dass die rechtspraktisch bedeut-
same Fallkonstellation des Familiennachzugs zu deutschen Staatsangehörigen 
nicht von der Kernbereichsdoktrin umfasst ist. 
Umweg (»Dänemark-Fälle«): Immer wieder sorgt die Inländerdiskriminie-
rung in Bezug auf immobile deutsche Staatsangehörige für Diskussionen. In 
zeitlicher Parallelität zum Ruiz Zambrano-Urteil des EuGH wurden inner-
staatlich die deutschen Regeln zum Familiennachzug zu Deutschen in den 
»Dänemark-Fällen« unter Berufung auf Art. 21 bzw. 56 AEUV herausgefor-
dert. Deutsche Staatsangehörige heirateten ihre Partner aus Drittstaaten in 
Dänemark, wo sie zumeist nur ein verlängertes Wochenende verbrachten (das 
dänische Eherecht verlangt keinen Inlandswohnsitz), um sodann unter Beru-
                                                        
42. Exemplarisch B. Huber, Die ausländerrechtlichen Folgen des EuGH-Urteils Zambra-
no, NVwZ 2011, 856-858; und, kritischer, K. Hailbronner/D. Thym, Ruiz Zambrano 
– Die Entdeckung des Kernbereichs der Unionsbürgerschaft, NJW 2011, 2008-2013. 
43. Vgl. EuGH, Rs. C-40/11, Iida, Slg. 2012 I-0000. 
44. Siehe, z.B., VGH Kassel, Beschluss vom 20.10.2011, 3 A 554/11 Z; VGH Mann-
heim, Urteil vom 04.05.2011, 11 S 207/11. 
45. Siehe BVerwG, Urteil vom 22.06.2011, 1 C 11.10. 
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fung auf die innereuropäische Freizügigkeit ein Aufenthaltsrecht für die Ehe-
gatten nach den privilegierten Regeln für Unionsbürger einzufordern. Dieser 
Gedanke wurde vom Bundesverwaltungsgericht im Jahr 2011 zurückgewie-
sen, als dieses entschied, dass durch die Eheschließung in Dänemark von den 
unionalen Freizügigkeitsrechten nicht »nachhaltig Gebrauch gemacht« wur-
de.46 Dieser Position folgten diverse Oberverwaltungsgerichte,47 während 
deutsche Staatsangehörige, die längere Zeit im Ausland wohnten, sich selbst-
verständlich auf das Freizügigkeitsrecht berufen können. 
Status quo: Die enge Auslegung der Kernbereichsdoktrin durch den EuGH in 
Dereci und die neue Flexibilität im Urteil O & S wurden vom Bundesverwal-
tungsgericht aufgegriffen. In einer Reihe von Urteilen im Jahr 2013 hatte die-
ses über das Aufenthaltsrecht von drittstaatsangehörigen Eltern junger Deut-
scher zu entscheiden. Hierbei stufte das BVerwG die Kernbereichsdoktrin als 
subsidiäre Auffangkategorie ein, die erst nach den speziellen Regelungen des 
deutschen und des europäischen Rechts geprüft wird.48 Dies hat den Vorteil, 
dass nationale Richter im ersten Zugriff die teils detaillierten Vorgaben in den 
Spezialgesetzen unter Einschluss der EGMR-Standards anwenden, bevor sie 
auf die vielfach vagen EuGH-Kriterien in der Fortfolge des Urteils Ruiz 
Zambrano eingehen. Letztere bleiben ein subsidiärer Kontrollstandard im 
Hintergrund, während der Rechtsalltag von nationalen und europäischen Spe-
zialregelungen geprägt wird (die deutsche Richter etwas großzügiger ausle-
gen und auf diesem Weg eventuelle Härtefälle lösen, die aufgrund der Kern-
bereichsdoktrin hätten geprüft werden können).49 
Frage 8 
Das Urteil Rottmann entsprang einer Vorlage aus Deutschland und das 
BVerwG folgte in seinem Urteil den EuGH-Vorgaben, deren Anwendung im 
Einzelfall dem zuständigen OVG überlassen wurde,50 dessen Entscheidung in 
                                                        
46. BVerwG, Urteil vom 11.01.2011, 1 C 23/09 sowie die kritische Bewertung von T. 
Oberhäuser, Dänemark-Ehen, Unionsrecht und Inländerdiskriminierung, NVwZ 
2012, 25-28. 
47. Siehe, z.B., VGH München, Beschluss vom 30.11.2012, 10 CS 12.1563. 
48. Siehe BVerwG, Urteile vom: 13.06.2013, 10 C 16.12; 30.07.2013, 1 C 15.12; 30.06. 
2013, 1 C 9.12. 
49. Weiterführend M. Wendel, Aufenthalt als Mittel zum Zweck, DÖV 2014, 133 ff. so-
wie D. Thym, Grenzen der Unionsbürgerschaft, EuR 2014, Beiheft 1, i.E. 
50. BVerwG, Urteil vom 11.11.2010, 5 C 12/10. 
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juristischen Datenbanken nicht erhältlich ist (dem Vernehmen nach verlor 
Herr Rottmann die deutsche Staatsangehörigkeit). Mit Ausnahme einer Fall-
konstellation, die unten diskutiert wird, scheint das Rottmann-Urteil keinen 
nachhaltigen Einfluss in Deutschland entfaltet zu haben. Die Gründe hierfür 
sind einfach. Traditionell unterliegt der Verlust der deutschen Staatsangehö-
rigkeit aufgrund verfassungsrechtlicher Vorgaben einer strikten Verhältnis-
mäßigkeit. Hiernach war die einzige Neuerung des EuGH-Urteils die not-
wendige Berücksichtigung des Verlustes auch der Unionsbürgerschaft. Diese 
vergleichsweise dezente Neuausrichtung der Verhältnismäßigkeitsprüfung 
scheint in der Praxis wenige Auswirkungen zu haben.  
 Eine Bedeutung könnte der Rottmann-Test bei der so genannten Options-
pflicht entfalten, die Kinder von drittstaatsangehörigen Eltern betrifft, die 
aufgrund des Geburtsortsprinzips (ius soli) deutsche Staatsangehörige wer-
den. Wenn diese Kinder neben der deutschen auch eine weitere Staatsangehö-
rigkeit besitzen, verlangt das deutsche Staatsangehörigkeitsrecht bis zur Voll-
endung des 23. Lebensjahrs eine Entscheidung zwischen den beiden Staats-
bürgerschaften (es sei denn eine Ausnahmeklausel greift). Da diese Reform 
aus dem Jahr 1999 nur bestimmte Jahrgänge betrifft, gibt es bislang erst we-
nige Streitfälle. Wissenschaftliche Beobachter sind sich jedoch einig, dass das 
Rottmann-Urteil ein wichtiger Faktor in künftigen Gerichtsurteilen sein 
wird.51 Dieser Streit könnte evtl. jedoch hinfällig sein, nachdem die neue 
Bundesregierung entschied, die Optionspflicht einer erneuten Reform zu un-
terziehen, deren Einzelheiten innenpolitisch überaus umstritten sind. 
Politische Rechte von Unionsbürgern 
Frage 9 
Seit dem Jahr 1994 ist die Richtlinie in Deutschland vollständig umgesetzt. 
Freilich war die erste Umsetzung fehlerhaft, weil es seinerzeit kein perma-
nentes Wahlregister gab, so dass Unionsbürger sich für jede Europawahl ge-
sondert registrieren mussten – und zwar auch dann, wenn sie an einer frühe-
ren Europawahl teilgenommen hatten (eine Verpflichtung, der deutsche 
Staatsangehörige nicht unterliegen, weil sie nach der Anmeldung automatisch 
                                                        
51. Siehe U. Berlit, »Rottmann« und die Option, in: Jochum u.a. (Hrsg.): Grenzüber-
schreitendes Recht. Festschrift für Kay Hailbronner (C.F. Müller, 2013), S. 283-299; 
und F. Lämmermann, Ein Jahrzehnt ius soli, ZAR 2011, 1-8. 
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zugleich als Wahlberechtigte registriert wurden52). Dies widersprach Art. 9 
Abs. 4 der Richtlinie und die innerstaatlichen Regelungen mussten angepasst 
werden. Dies geschah zwischenzeitlich. Gemäß § 17 b Europawahlordnung 
besitzen Unionsbürger heute ein Wahlrecht, solange sie bei den Meldebehör-
den registriert sind und sich an einer früheren Europawahl beteiligten.  
 Nach Maßgabe des deutschen Europawahlgesetzes unterliegen Unions-
bürger und deutsche Staatsangehörige denselben Bedingungen. Insbesondere 
müssen beide Personengruppen seit mindestens drei Monaten in Deutschland 
oder einem anderen Mitgliedstaat der EU gewohnt haben (§ 6). Gleiche Vor-
aussetzungen gelten auch für den Ausschluss vom Wahlrecht, zum Beispiel 
als Folge von Gerichtsentscheidungen (§ 6 a). Die Änderungen der Richtlinie 
im Dezember 2012 wurden durch das Fünfte Änderungsgesetz zum Europa-
wahlgesetz vom 7. Oktober 2013 vollständig umgesetzt.53 
Frage 10 
Für die Ausweitung des Wahlrechts musste in Deutschland die Verfassung 
geändert werden, mit Blick auf die Rechtsprechung des Bundesverfassungs-
gerichts (siehe Frage 11). Aus diesem Grund wurde im Dezember 1992 ein 
neuer Art. 28 Abs. 1 S. 3 in das Grundgesetz eingefügt, der den Weg für die 
Ratifikation des Vertrags von Maastricht bereitete. Hiernach besitzen Uni-
onsbürger bei Kommunalwahlen ein Wahlrecht nach Maßgabe des EU-
Rechts.54 In der Folge änderten auch die Bundesländer ihre regionalen Rege-
lungen zur Öffnung des Kommunalwahlrechts. An Bedingungen war diese 
Entwicklung nicht gebunden. In der Regel besteht ein Wahlrecht nach einem 
dreimonatigen Aufenthalt in einer Gemeinde. Uns ist keine Rechtsprechung 
bekannt, die von weit reichenden Problemen zeugte. 
Frage 11 
Einzig bei Kommunal- und Europawahlen besitzen Unionsbürger in Deutsch-
land ein Wahlrecht. Insoweit gibt es keine Rechte, die über die EU-Vorgaben 
hinausgehen. Insbesondere an Bundestagswahlen sowie an Wahlen zu den 
Landtagen können Unionsbürger nicht teilnehmen. Die Einführung entspre-
chender Wahlrechte würde eine Verfassungsänderung erfordern, weil nach 
                                                        
52. Siehe den Bericht der Kommission an das Europäische Parlament und den Rat zur 
Anwendung der Richtlinie 93/109/EG, KOM(97) 731, Abschn. 4.2. 
53. Siehe insb. den neuen § 11. 
54. Siehe C. Schönberger, Unionsbürger (Mohr Siebeck, 2005), 446-454. 
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der Rechtsprechung des Bundesverfassungsgerichts das Demokratieprinzip 
im Grundgesetz einer einfachgesetzlichen Ausweitung des Wahlrechts entge-
gensteht.55 Die Verfassungsänderung des Jahres 1992 reagiert auf diese 
Rechtsprechung (siehe Frage 10). 
Frage 12 
In Deutschland stellt sich die Frage nicht in vergleichbarer Weise wie im 
Vereinigten Königreich und uns sind keine vergleichbaren Streitlagen be-
kannt. Insbesondere scheinen die deutschen Einschränkungen weniger streng 
zu sein als die britischen, die gegenwärtig von den Gerichten überprüft wer-
den. 
Kultur(en) der Staatsbürgerschaft 
Frage 13 
Seit dem Jahr 2004 ist die Umsetzung der Unionsbürger-Richtlinie das Para-
debeispiel für einen Rechte-basierten Ansatz, der das Individuum ins Zent-
rum rückt. Seinerzeit wurde entschieden, die Regeln für Unionsbürger aus 
dem allgemeinen Ausländerrecht auszugliedern und in das neu geschaffene 
Freizügigkeitsgesetz/EU zu überführen. Diese Trennung hat zur Folge, dass 
in der Rechtspraxis immer klar ist, dass die Regeln für Unionsbürger nicht 
dem konventionellen Ausländerrecht folgen. Seither gibt es weniger Streit 
und die nationalen Behörden und Gerichte orientieren sich vollumfänglich 
am EuGH. Dies gilt freilich nur für die verwaltungsrechtliche Ebene. Im Ver-
fassungsrecht besteht die Spannung zwischen eigenen Bürgern und (fremden) 
Unionsbürgern partiell fort, sodass auf der Ebene des Verfassungsrechts kei-
ne vollständige Inklusion der Unionsbürger gewährleistet ist. 
Frage 14 
Im Allgemeinen konzentriert sich die deutsche Rechtspraxis auf den Grund-
rechtskatalog im Grundgesetz, der ein zentraler Inhalt der juristischen Aus-
bildung ist. Dies hat zur Folge, dass die Europäische Menschenrechtskonven-
                                                        
55. Federal Constitutional Court Decision Reports (BVerfGE) 83, 37 (1990). 
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tion sowie die Charta der Grundrechte eine vergleichsweise geringe Rolle be-
sitzen. Dies wandelt sich nur Schritt für Schritt und es hat den Anschein, dass 
das Migrationsrecht (gegenüber Drittstaatsangehörigen) ein Sachbereich ist, 
der sich in besonderer Weise an den internationalen Menschenrechten orien-
tiert.56 So ist die geringe Bedeutung des Ruiz Zambrano-Urteils in der jünge-
ren deutschen Rechtsprechung zumindest auch das Ergebnis einer Auslegung 
des nationalen Rechts im Lichte der EMRK (siehe Frage 8). Früher oder spä-
ter werden die Folgen der Grundrechtscharta ausgetestet werden – wie dies 
der VGH Baden-Württemberg in der Vorlage unternahm, die zum Iida-Urteil 
führte, in dem der EuGH freilich die Anwendung der Grundrechtscharta zu-
rückwies.57 Ein weiterer Anlass könnte die Vorlage des SG Leipzig zum So-
zialleistungsanspruch von Arbeitsuchenden sein (siehe Frage 5), die unter an-
derem die Wechselwirkung zwischen den sozialen Grundrechten in der Char-
ta und dem Vatsouras-Urteil zu ergründen sucht. 
Frage 15 
Im allgemeinen wird die Unionsbürgerschaft in überregionalen Tageszeitun-
gen nicht intensiv diskutiert. Eine Ausnahme ist die jüngere Debatte um die 
Arbeitnehmerfreizügigkeit zum Jahreswechsel 2013/14, als die Übergangs-
frist für die Freizügigkeit von Rumänen und Bulgaren auslief. Seinerzeit do-
minierte die Warnung vor der so genannten »Armutszuwanderung« mehrere 
Wochen lang die Schlagzeilen – und wurde in TV-Talkshows wiederholt dis-
kutiert. Hierbei gibt es, nicht nur beim Thema der Freizügigkeit, immer wie-
der Probleme in der korrekten Darstellung des Europarechts (was jedoch 
auch an dessen Komplexität liegen dürfte). Zugleich hat die Euro-Krise zur 
Folge, dass in der Öffentlichkeit ein größeres Bewusstsein für EU-Fragen be-
steht. Führende Intellektuelle wie Jürgen Habermas und Ulrich Beck sind die 
prominentesten Akteure in dieser öffentlichen Debatte. Dieses neu erwachte 
Interesse an Europa scheint zunehmend andere Sachthemen als die Euro-
Krise sowie, jüngst, die Arbeitnehmerfreizügigkeit zu betreffen. 
                                                        
56. Siehe D. Thym, Migrationsverwaltungsrecht (Mohr Siebeck, 2010), Kap. 4. 














Citizenship within Directive 2004/38/EC – stability of residence for 
Union citizens and their family members 
Directive 2004/38/EC (hereinafter, the Directive) has been transposed into 
national law by Presidential Decree 106/2007 on the ‘free movement – resi-
dence in Greece of EU citizens and their family members’ (hereinafter, the 
Presidential Decree).2 This act was recently amended by article 42 of Law 
4071/2012.3 Although some of the amendments were just stylistic or tech-
nical in nature, some others aimed at fixing a number of transposition prob-
lems linked to specific provisions.4 Useful implementation guidelines are 
contained in several ministerial decisions and administrative circulars. It 
should be noted at the outset that cases concerning the application of the Pres-
idential Decree (and the Directive) are still rare before the Greek courts – a 
few interesting judgments of the Council of Sate (Συμβούλιο της 
Επικρατείας), the country’s supreme administrative court, will be considered 
bellow – and that EU citizenship is the subject of only a small number of ac-
ademic writings. 
                                                        
1. Lecturer in EU Law, Aristotle University of Thessaloniki. 
2. Government Gazette Issue A 135 of 21.6.2007. Greece was one of the nineteen 
Member States against which the European Commission had initiated infringement 
proceedings under article 226 TEC (now 258 TFEU) for failure to communicate na-
tional transposition measures (Member States had to adopt national transposition 
measures before 30 April 2006). After the adoption of the aforementioned Presiden-
tial Decree, however, the case was closed. 
3. Government Gazette Issue A 85 of 11.4.2012. 
4. These problems had been spotted by the European Commission. See EUROPEAN 
COMMISSION, Report from the Commission to the European Parliament and the 




Following the distinction made in article 3 of the Directive, the Presidential 
Decree distinguishes between family members (of an EU citizen) who enjoy 
an automatic right of entry and residence in Greece, and family members (of 
an EU citizen) who do not enjoy such a right, but should be facilitated to en-
joy it. 
 Family members who enjoy an automatic right of entry and residence in 
Greece include a) the spouse, b) the direct descendants (and those of the 
spouse) who are under the age of 21 or who, irrespective of their age, are de-
pendants, and c) the dependent direct relatives in the ascending line (and 
those of the spouse).5 Since the Greek legislation does not treat registered 
partnership as equivalent to marriage, the partner with whom the EU citizen 
has contracted such a partnership does not fall into this category. 
 Family members (in a broader sense) who do not enjoy an automatic right 
of entry and residence in Greece, but should be facilitated to enjoy it include 
a) all other family members who, in the country from which they have come, 
were dependants or members of the household of the EU citizen having the 
primary right of entry and residence or who require his/her personal care due 
to serious health problems and b) the partner with whom the EU citizen main-
tains a durable relationship dully attested.6  
 The term ‘durable relationship’ is not defined. However, such a relation-
ship is irrefutably presumed to exist when the EU citizen and his/her partner 
have contracted a registered partnership in Greece or elsewhere or they have 
(or have adopted) children together.7 The undertaking of shared long-term le-
gal, social, or financial commitments (for example, mortgage to buy a house) 
can serve as proof of the durability of the relationship, especially if the EU 
citizen and his/her partner live under the same roof.8  
 As a general rule, applications submitted by family members not enjoying 
an automatic right of entry and residence in Greece are examined in priority 
and on the basis of an accelerated procedure. Other minor facilities for family 
                                                        
5. See article 2 (2) of Presidential Decree 106/2007 as amended by article 42 (1) of Law 
4071/2012. In case b) there is now no restriction as to the degree of relatedness. Be-
fore it was amended, this case concerned only the children of the EU citizen and 
those of the spouse. 
6. See article 3 (2) of Presidential Decree 106/2007. 





members of this category are provided for in administrative circulars. Finally, 
the ‘reasonable period of time’, foreseen in article 5 (4) of the Directive, 
within which a family member of any category who does not have the neces-
sary travel documents or, when required, the necessary visa must obtain them 
or have them brought to him/her, has been set at one month.9  
 The lack of case-law on these matters is probably a sign that the relevant 
national provisions are clear and that the procedural safeguards contained in 
article 5 of the Directive do provide effective protection. 
Question 2 
In order to verify if EU citizens have sufficient resources for themselves and 
their family members, the competent authorities must take into account a) the 
personal situation of each individual concerned and b) the minimum social 
security pension paid by Greece.10 There is no evidence that the authorities 
undertake checks on the existence and the availability of the resources after 
the EU citizens (and their family members) have been granted the right of 
residence for more than three months. On the other hand, the recent discovery 
of frauds has led to regular checks on the financial situation of EU citizens 
(and their family members) who have made recourse to the national social as-
sistance system.11 There is no evidence that EU citizens (and/or their family 
members) have been expelled on purely economic grounds (i. e. failure to sat-
isfy the conditions set out in article 7 of the Directive). 
Question 3 
Articles 12-15 of the Directive have been adequately transposed into national 
law by articles 11-12, 21 (3) and 22 (5) of the Presidential Decree. It is worth 
mentioning that Greece is one of the few Member States that have explicitly 
transposed the provision of article 14 (2) of the Directive, prohibiting system-
atic verifications of the conditions attached to the right of residence.  
                                                        
9. See article 5 (4) of Presidential Decree 106/2007. In September 2013, the minimal 
social security pension in Greece amounted to 360 euros per month. 
10. See article 8 (3) of Presidential Decree 1062007, as amended by article 42 (7) of Law 
4071/2012. 





Articles 16-21 of the Directive have been adequately transposed into national 
law by articles 13-18 of the Presidential Decree; they have also been properly 
implemented by the authorities that – and this is something worth noting – 
always take into account periods of residence acquired by EU citizens before 
their home countries acceded to the EU. 
 Perhaps the only problem in relation to these provisions could be found in 
the disproportional character of the sanctions imposed for failure to comply 
with the requirement to timely apply for a permanent residence card. Before it 
was amended in 2012, article 17 (4) of the Presidential Decree provided that, 
if the application (for a permanent residence card) was submitted up to one 
year after the expiry of the residence card, the individual concerned would 
have to pay a fine of 150 euros, but if it was submitted more than one year af-
ter the expiry of the residence card, it would be rejected. Today, rejection of 
the application is not possible in any case; its late submission simply results 
to the imposition of a fine of 50 euros.  
 Strangely enough, there are no published data on the volume of applica-
tions for the status of permanent residence submitted by EU citizens, but 
there are on the volume of applications for the status of permanent residence 
submitted by EU citizens’ family members who are third country nationals.12 
This unpleasant situation in relation to the flow of information is due to the 
fragmentation of powers and competencies to two different authorities: the 
Greek Police (supervised by the Ministry of Public Order and Citizen Protec-
tion) for EU citizens and the Immigration Offices of the country’s thirteen 
Regions (supervised by the Ministry of Interior) for EU citizens’ family 
members who are third country nationals. 
 No disputes on the interpretation or application of the provisions on the 
right of permanent residence have been addressed within national courts so 
far. 
                                                        
12. Total number of applications for the (granting or renewal of the) status of permanent 
residence submitted by third country national family members of EU citizens: 151. 
Third country nationals spouses of EU citizens: 143; Third country nationals children 
of EU citizens: 3; Third country nationals parents of EU citizens: 1; Third country na-
tionals family members (other than spouses, children, or parents) of EU citizens: 




Article 24 (2) of the Directive has been adequately transposed into national 
law by article 20 (3) of the Presidential Decree. According to this provision, 
‘(...) Greece is not obliged to confer entitlement to social assistance during 
the first three months of residence or, where appropriate, the longer period 
within which EU citizens can provide evidence that they are seeking em-
ployment in Greece and that they have a genuine chance to be engaged, nor 
shall be obliged, prior to the acquisition of the right of permanent residence to 
grant maintenance aid for studies, including vocational training, consisting in 
student grants or student loans to persons other than workers, self-employed 
persons, persons who retain such status, and members of their families’. 
 Nonetheless, there are two problems closely related to each other that 
could jeopardize proper implementation of this provision. The first is that na-
tional law does not distinguish between the categories specified in article 20 
(3) of the Presidential Decree and job seekers who, pursuant to the Collins 
and Vatsouras and Koupatantze case-law of the Court of Justice,13 are enti-
tled to benefits of a financial nature intended to facilitate access to the labor 
market. The second is that national law does not answer the question when a 
social benefit is intended to facilitate access to the labor market and when it is 
only social assistance. Unfortunately, national courts have not until today 
been called to resolve any disputes related to these issues. 
Question 6 
Greek courts distinguish between the concepts of ‘public policy or public se-
curity’ (article 27 of the Directive), ‘serious grounds of public policy or pub-
lic security’ and ‘imperative grounds of public security’ (article 28 of the Di-
rective)14 by making explicit references to the relevant case-law of the Euro-
pean Court of Justice.15 In judicial practice, the distinction is applied in a 
quite consistent way. Thus, for example, theft is characterized as a threat to 
public policy or public security, whereas selling drugs as a serious threat to 
public policy or public security. Under certain aggravating circumstances, 
                                                        
13. See Case C-138/02, Collins, Judgment of the Court (Full Court) of 23 March 2004, 
ECR 2004, I-2703, and Cases C-22/08 and C-23/08, Vatsouras and Koupatantze, 
Judgment of the Court (Third Chamber) of 4 June 2009, ECR 2009, I-4585. 
14. See, respectively, articles 21 and 22 of Presidential Decree 106/2007. 
15. And especially to Case C-145/09, Tsakouridis, Judgment of of the Court (Grand 
Chamber) of 23 November 2010, ECR 2010, I-11979. 
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crimes in connection with dealing in narcotics are characterized as imperative 
threats to public security. 
 The way Greek courts take into account previous criminal convictions in 
order to decide if the personal conduct of the individual concerned represents 
a genuine, present, and serious threat to the society is, on the other hand, less 
consistent. The following examples are telling:  
– In 2009, a Polish citizen was denied a registration certificate on the sole 
ground that she had been recently convicted to a minor sentence for insult-
ing a police officer. The Council of State pointed out that prior criminal 
convictions can not, in themselves, constitute a ground for taking public 
policy or public security measures and that, in any event, the behavior at 
issue did not pose a threat to public policy or public security.16 Here, the 
previous criminal convictions criterion was applied exactly as it should. 
– In 2008, a Romanian citizen was denied a registration certificate on the 
sole ground that he had been convicted for committing a series of burgla-
ries over a long period of time and for illegally entering Greece. In this 
case, the Council of State found that these convictions, dating back from 
1998 and 2002, were indicative of the personal conduct of the individual 
concerned and could justify public policy or public security measures 
against him.17 This is clearly not a very satisfactory judgment. 
Finally, it is safe to say that in most (if not in all) cases Greek courts and tri-
bunals understand and apply the principle of proportionality in the right 
sense. After all, Greek judges are familiar with it. This is demonstrated by the 
following examples: 
– In 2008, a Bulgarian citizen living and working in Greece since 2003 was 
convicted for selling cocaine and ‘ecstasy’ pills. Soon after his conviction, 
an expulsion decision was also taken against him. In its judgment, the 
Council of State found that this decision did not violate the principle of 
proportionality: the individual concerned was an adult not facing any seri-
ous health problem, had no family in Greece and had kept strong ties with 
the Member State of origin.18 
– In late 2006, an expulsion decision was taken against a Bulgarian citizen 
who was living and working in the island of Rhodes illegally for more 
                                                        
16. See Council of State 695/2012. 
17. See Council of State 1304/2012. 
18. See Council of State 4023/2011. 
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than four years. Enforcement of the decision was still pending when, a few 
months later, Bulgaria became a Member State of the EU. The Adminis-
trative Tribunal of Rhodes ruled that the contested decision had disregard-
ed the impact the expulsion would have had on the professional and social 
situation of the individual concerned and was, for this reason, dispropor-
tional.19  
As far as public health is concerned, suffice to say that there is no evidence 
that the authorities, within three months of the date of arrival, require EU citi-
zens (and their family members) to undergo medical examinations as a matter 
of routine.20  
EU citizenship beyond Directive 2004/38/EC – exploring national 
application of primary EU Law 
Question 7 
Greek citizens seeking family reunification with third country nationals do 
not fall within the scope of Presidential Decree 106/2007 on the ‘free move-
ment – residence in Greece of EU citizens and their family members’ (the act 
implementing the Directive), but within the scope of Law 3386/2005 on the 
‘entry, residence, and social integration of third-country nationals on Greek 
territory’.21 The relevant provisions of the latter are nevertheless almost iden-
tical to those of the Presidential Decree 106/2007 (and the Directive) and, in 
any case, the Greek Ministry of Interior has called all the competent adminis-
trative authorities to interpret them under the light of the said Presidential De-
cree (and the Directive).22 For the above reasons, the potential for reverse 
discrimination is not likely to exist.  
                                                        
19. See Administrative Tribunal of Rhodes 138/2007. 
20. Article 29 (3) of Directive 2004/38/EC has been transposed into national law by art-
icle 21 (9) of Presidential Decree 106/2007. 
21. Government Gazette Issue A 212 of 23.8.2005. 
22. See Ministry of Interior, Circular no. 10 of 28.2.2008. Third country national family 
members of Greek citizens are granted with the same type of residence card issued to 
third country nationals family members of EU citizens, with the indication though 
that they are family members of a Greek citizen. 
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 Given that the legal framework regulating the right of family reunification 
for Greek citizens is not, more restrictive than the one regulating the right of 
family reunification for EU citizens, it should not come as a surprise that, in 
judicial practice, the related disputes (at the heart of which lie usually the 
rights of spouses of Greek citizens)23 are treated as involving a purely internal 
situation. Indeed, the arguments put forward before national courts in support 
or against family reunification and the judgments these courts deliver focus 
solely on the interpretation of articles 61-64 of Law 3386/2005.24  
 Cases in which there could be facts very similar to those that formed the 
basis for the Court of Justice case-law in Zhu and Chen and Ruiz-Zambrano25 
are, for example, those of children born in Greece by stateless parents. These 
children automatically acquire Greek citizenship.26 If the position of the 
Council of State, according to which the administration is obliged to grant or 
to renew the residence permit of an alien parent of a Greek citizen, even if 
he/she is divorced and does not have custody of the child,27 is taken into ac-
count, it can be assumed that in cases like these Greek courts will decide in 
the same way the Court of Justice did, though probably without making any 
reference to its case-law on EU citizenship. 
 Cases concerning EU citizens seeking family reunification from their 
home Member States have not yet reached the Greek courts. As a conse-
quence, it remains to be seen if national courts will be able to distinguish be-
tween rights acquired under the Directive and rights acquired under articles 
20 and 21 TFEU in this particular context. The relationship betweeαn the rel-
evant TFEU provision and the provisions of the Directive is, however, quite 
clear in judgments rendered in cases concerning other EU citizenship rights. 
It is of course true that in the first months after the application of the Di-
                                                        
23. This is so because the provisions on family reunification in Greece are often circum-
vented by means of marriages of convenience. For a detailed analysis see CENTRE 
FOR EUROPEAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, Misuse of the right to family reunifi-
cation: marriages of convenience and false declarations of parenthood, National con-
tribution (Greece to the EMN Focused Study 2012, http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-
affairs/what-we-do/networks/european_migration_network. 
24. See, for example, Council of State 22/2009, and Council of State 1559/2011. 
25. Case C-200/02, Zhu and Chen, Judgment of the Court (Full Court) of 19 October 
2004, ECR 2004, p. I-9925, and Case 34/09, Ruiz Zambrano, Judgment of the Court 
(Grand Chamber) of 8 March 2011, ECR 2011, p. I-1177. 
26. See article 1 (2) of the Greek Nationality Code. For more details see Ζ. 
ΠΑΠΑΣΙΩΠΗ-ΠΑΣΙΑ, Το ‘δικαίωμα’ στην ιθαγένεια κατά το Σύνταγμα της 
Ελλάδος, Αρμενόπουλος 2009. pp. 813-832. 
27. See, for example, Council of State 2921/2005. 
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rective in Greece a few judgments given by lower courts created some confu-
sion as to exactly which provisions had been applied, but subsequent judg-
ments given by higher courts clarified the situation.  
Question 8 
At present, requirements of EU citizenship have no major implications on na-
tional rules on the acquisition and/or loss of Greek nationality. 
 In Rottmann, the Court of Justice held that it is not contrary to EU law, in 
particular to article 17 TEC (now 20 TFEU), for a Member State to withdraw 
from an EU citizen the nationality of that State acquired by naturalisation 
when that nationality was obtained by deception, on condition that the deci-
sion to withdraw observes the principle of proportionality.28 It has been estab-
lished that the tightening of the rules in this area is one of the main current 
trends with respect to the loss of nationality in Europe.29 However, unlike 
most EU Member States, Greece does not (and, actually, could not) have reg-
ulations concerning the loss of nationality on the grounds of false information 
or other forms of fraud.30  
 The issue of the so-called ‘home comers’ is slightly different. After the 
end of the Cold War, hundreds of thousands of ethnic Greeks fled the territo-
ries of the former USSR where they (and their ancestors) were living since 
the fall of the Ottoman empire at the beginning of the 20th century; most of 
them tried their luck in Greece. The Greek State showed extreme generosity 
towards them in the matter of nationality.31 After careful examination of each 
case, the competent administrative authorities would issue a decision declar-
ing that the individual concerned was indeed a Greek national. Later, it was 
found that some of these declaratory decisions were based on fake documents 
or false information and the administration proceeded to their revocation. 
Technically speaking, this is not a case of withdrawal of nationality (since it 
                                                        
28. Case C-135/08, Rottmann, Judgment of of the Court (Grand Chamber) of 2 March 
2010, ECR 2010, I-1449. 
29. See the conclusions of H. VALDRAUCH, Loss of nationality, in R. Bauböck et al. 
(Eds), Acquisition and loss of nationality, vol. I, Comparative analysis: policies and 
trends in 15 European countries, Amsterdam University Press, Amsterdam, 2006. 
30. Article 4 (3) of the Greek Constitution provides that ‘[w]ithdrawal of the Greek citi-
zenship shall be permitted only in cases of voluntary acquisition of another citizen-
ship or of undertaking service contrary to national interests in a foreign country, un-
der the conditions and procedures specifically provided by law’. 
31. See D. CHRISTOPOULOS, Report on citizenship law – Greece (revised and updated 
January 2013), EUDO Citizenship Observatory, http://eudo-citizenship.eu. 
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is proved that the Greek nationality was never acquired) and the Council of 
State points out that the principle of proportionality (as enshrined in the na-
tional legal order) must be observed.32  
 Permanent residence abroad as a reason for loss of nationality is to be 
found in many EU Member States, but not in Greece. At least not any more: 
article 19 of the Greek Nationality Code, stating that Greek nationality could 
be withdrawn from any person of alien origin who had obtained a foreign na-
tionality and had left the country without the intention of coming back, was 
abolished in 1998.33 If still in force, this provision, which in the past was 
mainly used by the authorities to withdraw the Greek nationality from politi-
cally active members of ethnic minorities living abroad,34 could, at least in 
theory, stand in the way of every Greek citizen of non-Greek origin wishing 
to take advantage of his/her free movement right as EU citizen.  
Political rights of EU citizens 
Question 9 
Directive 93/109/EC on European Parliament elections was transposed into 
the Greek legal order by Law 2196/1994.35 Greece has not (and could not 
have) invoked any derogation under article 14 (1) of Directive 93/109/EC. 
The European Commission has found the transposition to be satisfactory.36 
There has been no relevant case-law in domestic courts.  
 EU citizens wishing to exercise their voting rights are registered upon re-
quest on special electoral rolls. For this purpose, they need to present them-
selves to their municipality of residence with a valid identity document (pass-
                                                        
32. Consequently, the declaratory decision can be revoked only within a reasonable peri-
od of time after it was issued. See, for example, Council of State 3935/2011 (where it 
was held that four years is a reasonable period of time). 
33. By article 9 of Law 2623/1998, Government Gazette Issue A 139 of 25.6.1998. 
34. See more about this article in N. SITAROPOULOS, Discriminatory denationalisa-
tions based on ethnic origin: the dark legacy of ex Art. 19 of the Greek Nationality 
Code, in P. Shah – W. Menski (Eds), Migrations, diasporas and legal systems in 
Europe, Routledge, London, 2006, pp. 107-125. 
35. Government Gazette Issue A 41 of 22.3.1994. This act has never been amended. 
36. Like in most Member States. See EUROPEAN COMMISSION, Report to the Euro-
pean Parliament and the Council on the application of Directive 93/109/EC, COM 
(1997) 731 final. 
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port or ID card) and fill out a relevant formal declaration form. The procedure 
is quite simple and the registration is valid for all subsequent European Par-
liament (as well as municipal) elections. EU citizens vote at the same polling 
stations as Greek citizens. The Ministry of Interior provides EU citizens spe-
cific information on the detailed arrangements for the exercise of their right to 
stand as candidates. 
 Yet, there is a possible obstacle to EU citizens' enjoyment of their right to 
participate in European Parliament elections linked to the conditions for 
founding a political party. According to article 29 (1) of the Greek Constitu-
tion, only Greek citizens have the right to found a political party; non-
nationals can only become members of existing political parties. It is believed 
that, this way, EU citizens are to a certain extent denied the chance of repre-
senting platforms not represented by existing political parties.37  
 The December 2012 amendments to Directive 93/109/EC should induce 
the following changes to the current legal framework: a) the requirement for 
EU citizens when submitting their applications to stand as candidates to pro-
duce an attestation from the competent administrative authorities of their 
home Member States certifying that they have not been deprived of their 
electoral rights38 should be replaced by a simple statement with the same con-
tent to be included in the formal declaration they need to produce as part of 
their application, b) the above mentioned formal declaration should also in-
clude the EU citizen's date and place of birth and his/her last address of resi-
dence in the home Member State39 and c) the competent administrative au-
thorities should from now on be under an obligation to consider the possibil-
ity of an EU citizen having been deprived of his/her electoral rights through 
an individual administrative decision.40 
Question 10 
In Greece, municipalities form the first – that is to say the lowest – level of 
local government. In 2010, their number was significantly reduced from ap-
                                                        
37. See EUROPEAN COMMISSION, Report on the election of Members of the Europe-
an Parliament and on the participation of European Union citizens in elections for the 
European Parliament in the Member State of residence, COM (2010) 603 final. 
38. See article 5 (2) (b) of Law 2196/1994. 
39. In addition to his/her nationality and address in Greece; see article 5 (2) (a) of Law 
2196/1994. 
40. As it will be further analyzed below (see answer to question 12), deprivation of elec-
toral rights in Greece is only possible through an individual judicial decision. 
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proximately 1000 down to 325. According to the country's Constitution, mu-
nicipalities enjoy full administrative independence and their authorities are 
elected by universal and secret ballot.41 
 Directive 94/80/EC on municipal elections was transposed into the Greek 
legal order by Presidential Decree 133/1997.42 The European Commission 
found the transposition to be incorrect on several grounds and therefore sent 
Greece a reasoned opinion under article 226 TEC (now 258 TFEU).43 More 
specifically, the exercise by EU citizens of their electoral rights was original-
ly subject to their a) having spent a minimum period of two consecutive years 
in the country, b) having an elementary knowledge of the Greek language and 
c) producing a written declaration that they have not been deprived of the 
right to vote in their home Member State.44 These were additional conditions 
imposed on EU citizens compared to national citizens. Apart from that, EU 
citizens taking part in municipal elections in Greece were prohibited from 
taking part in municipal elections in their country of origin. In other words, 
EU citizens were forced to choose between exercising their electoral rights in 
their country of origin or their country of residence. Most of the above provi-
sions were abolished in late 1999 and the remaining in 2002;45 as a result, the 
European Commission decided not to refer the case to the Court of Justice. 
– In a couple of cases, the results of the 2006 municipal elections were con-
tested on the ground that a number of EU citizens were allowed to vote 
                                                        
41. See article 102 (2) of the Greek Constitution. 
42. Government Gazette Issue A 121 of 12.6.1997. For a detailed analysis of this act see 
Α. ΞΗΡΟΣ, Τα εκλογικά δικαιώματα των πολιτών της Ευρωπαϊκής Ένωσης στις 
δημοτικές-κοινοτικές εκλογές, Το Σύνταγμα 1998, 853-877. Greece was one of the 
eleven Member States against which the European Commission had initiated in-
fringement proceedings for failure to communicate national transposition measures 
(Member States had to adopt national transposition measures before 1 January 1996). 
However, after the adoption of the aforementioned Presidential Decree, the case was 
closed before referral to the Court of Justice. 
43. See EUROPEAN COMMISSION, Report to the European Parliament and the Coun-
cil on the application of Directive 94/80/EC on the right to vote and to stand as a can-
didate in municipal elections, COM (2002) 260 final. 
44. The language condition was held lawful by the Council of State’s opinion 245/1997 
(the elaboration of all presidential decrees of regulatory nature falls under the juris-
diction of the Council of State which has the competence to give an opinion concern-
ing the legality thereof). 
45. See Presidential Decree 320/1999 of 31 December 1999, Government Gazette Issue 
A 305 of 31.12.1999, and Presidential Decree 130/2002 of 15 May 2002, Govern-
ment Gazette Issue A 107 of 15.5.2002. 
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even if they were not residents of the municipality concerned or were resi-
dents of the municipality concerned for less than two years. The Council 
of State emphasized that EU citizens wishing to exercise their right to vote 
in municipal elections must definitely be residents of the municipality 
concerned, but they do not need to live there for a minimum period of 
time, since this last condition had been abolished.46  
EU citizens wishing to exercise their voting rights are registered upon request 
on special electoral rolls. For this purpose, they need to present themselves to 
their municipality of residence with a valid identity document (passport or ID 
card) and fill out a relevant formal declaration form. The procedure is quite 
simple and the registration is valid for all subsequent municipal (as well as 
European Parliament) elections. EU citizens vote at the same polling stations 
as Greek citizens.47  
 EU citizens have the right to run for the office of municipal or depart-
mental councilor, but not for the office of mayor or deputy mayor; further-
more, if elected, they cannot hold the office of president, vice-president, or 
secretary of the municipal council, nor can they be appointed president or 
vice-president of the municipality's executive committee.48 This makes 
Greece one of the few Member States that have applied every restriction un-
der article 5 (3) of Directive 94/80/EC. 
Question 11 
In Greece, regions form the second level of local administration. Until now, 
EU citizens living in the country have not been granted electoral rights in 
these elections.49  
Question 12 
There are no specific areas where tensions exist between EU law and national 
provisions limiting the scope of the franchise. 
                                                        
46. See Council of State 122/2008 and Council of State 1454/2008. See also Α. ΞΗΡΟΣ, 
Κοινοτικοί πολίτες και εκλογές στην τοπική αυτοδιοίκηση, Θεωρία & Πράξη 
Διοικητικού Δικαίου 2008, pp. 280-287. 
47. See article 4 (1) of Presidential Decree 133/1997. 
48. See article 3 (11) of Presidential Decree 133/1997. 
49. See D. CHRISTOPOULOS, Report on electoral rights – Greece (June 2013), EUDO 
Citizenship Observatory, http://eudo-citizenship.eu. 
DIMOSTHENIS LENTZIS 
 600 
 In Greece, permanent or temporary deprivation of political rights as part or 
as a result of a criminal conviction is rather rare. Until recently, however, all 
detainees were de facto deprived of their right to vote, since no polling sta-
tions were set up in penitentiary institutions. The situation changed when the 
Greek legislator provided for special polling stations within prisons for na-
tional and regional elections (1996) and for European parliamentary elections 
and referenda (1998).50 Detainees not deprived of their political rights are 
registered on special electoral rolls. 
 Deprivation of political rights as a result of mental impairments is also 
rather rare. It only occurs in cases of severe mental illnesses making the indi-
vidual completely incompetent to care for himself/herself and it entails a 
(civil) court decision placing the individual concerned under full guard-
ianship.51 On the contrary, persons suffering from mental illnesses limited in 
their functional effects and placed under limited or temporary guardianship 
cannot be deprived of their political rights.  
Culture(s) of citizenship 
Question 13 
The implementation of EU citizenship in Greece is generally understood as 
an adjunct to the national immigration system based on ‘permissions’ to non-
nationals to be present in the territory. Even in the country's Law Schools the 
relevant matters are usually dealt within the context of the courses on immi-
gration law. It is not so difficult to understand why. The vast majority of EU 
citizens making use of the rights conferred upon them by EU citizenship are 
Bulgarian and Romanian nationals living in Greece long before their home 
countries joined the EU in 2007.52 For the administrative authorities (as well 
as for the public), these people simply moved, thanks to their new status, 
                                                        
50. See article 3 (9) of Law 2409/1996, Government Gazette Issue A 120 of 17.6.1996, 
and article 5 (46) of Law 2623/1998, Government Gazette Issue A 139 of 25.6.1998, 
respectively. See also Σ ΜΗΝΑΪΔΗΣ, Τα εκλογικά δικαιώματα των κρατουμένων, 
Αντ. Ν. Σάκκουλας, Αθήνα, 2009. 
51. See article 128 of the Greek Civil Code and article 5 (a) of Presidential Decree 
96/2007 on parliamentary elections, Government Gazette Issue A 116 of 5.6.2007. 
52. According to a 2011 census, almost 70 % of the 199,101 EU citizens living in Greece 
are Bulgarian or Romanian nationals. 
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from a less favorable immigration regime to a much more favorable one. As 
we have already seen, the Greek government showed great concern about the 
effective transposition of EU citizenship directives into the national legal or-
der, but it did not manage to communicate the new rights-based EU ‘free 
movement’ and ‘constitutional’ approach these directives were aspiring to 
impose. 
Question 14 
Soon after the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty in 2009, Greek courts 
started making recourse to the provisions of the EU Charter of Fundamental 
Rights, although not in a way that could be described as being systematic or 
coherent. The provisions that are mostly used are those contained in Title VI 
(Justice) of the Charter and, more particularly, those guaranteeing the right to 
a fair trial and the right not to be tried and punished twice for the same of-
fense (the ne bis in idem principle).53 For the moment, Greeks courts seem to 
ignore Title V of the Charter (Citizens' Rights) and rare are the judgments 
that include a simple reference to the settled case-law of the Court of Justice 
according to which EU citizenship ‘is destined to be the fundamental status of 
nationals of the Member States’.54 The only instance in which the Charter 
plays a role in how the rights of EU citizens are implemented is when judges 
are asked to determine if expulsion of an EU citizen would consist a dispro-
portionate intervention to his/her private and family life; in answering this 
question judges sometimes consider article 7 of the Charter (among other 
provisions of national and international law.55 
Question 15 
EU citizenship and the rights deriving from it have never been a salient issue 
in Greek media – in fact, they have never been an issue at all. This striking 
lack of interest was traditionally attributed to the relatively small number of 
EU citizens living in Greece. However, after the 2007 accession of Bulgaria 
and Romania to the EU, this explanation was no longer convincing. Actually, 
                                                        
53. See Σ. ΚΟΥΚΟΥΛΗ-ΣΠΗΛΙΩΤΟΠΟΥΛΟΥ, Ο Χάρτης θεμελιωδών δικαιωμάτων 
της ΕΕ: πεδίο εφαρμογής και ελληνική νομολογία, Θεωρία & Πράξη Διοικητικού 
Δικαίου 2013, pp. 176-185. 
54. See, for example, Case C-413/99, Baumbast and R, Judgment of the Court (Full 
Court) of 17 September 2002, ECR 2002, I-7091. 
55. See, for example, Council of State 4023/2011. 
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it is doubtful if it ever was. The truth is that most of the journalists who are 
responsible for setting the Greek media’s agenda were and still are unaware 
of what EU citizenship is all about and how it is connected to many issues 
they consider to be of high importance. 
 Issues concerning foreigners living in Greece has been at the top of na-
tional media's agenda for the past twenty years. There are (or, to be more pre-
cise, used to be) two main debates: one focusing on the role foreigners have 
played to the rise of criminality (with mass expulsions often mentioned as a 
solution to the problem) and one other on their poor living conditions (which 
are supposed to improve if they are given access to social and other state ben-
efits).56 More recently, in 2010, there was also a debate on their right to vote 
and to stand as a candidate to local (municipal and regional) elections. But 
the actual or potential impact of EU citizenship on these issues is never ex-
plored.  
 
                                                        
56. For obvious reasons, the second debate became less important after the beak of the 
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Hungary 
Citizenship within Directive 2004/38/EC – stability of residence for 
Union citizens and their family members 
Question 1 
Articles 2, 3 and 5 of the Directive have been implemented by Act No I of 
2007 on the Entry and Stay of Persons Enjoying the Right of Free Movement 
and Residence (hereinafter referred to as Freedom of Movement Act)3 and by 
Government Decree No 113/2007 (V.24.) implementing the Freedom of 
Movement Act (hereinafter referred to as the Implementing Government De-
cree),4 both national implementing legislations entered into force on 1 July 
2007.5 Therefore, the Freedom of Movement Act and the Implementing Gov-
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ernment Decree also contain the relevant domestic rules with respect to 
Union citizen’s family members. As a preliminary issue, it is to be noted that 
in order to avoid reverse discrimination with regard to third-county national 
family members of Hungarian nationals not having exercised their right of 
free movement yet, Hungarian law has upgraded their legal status to that of 
family members of EEA nationals. In other words, Hungarian nationals’ 
third-country national family members living in Hungary are on equal footing 
with Union citizens’ family members in terms of the rights and entitlements 
related to free movement and residence under EU law. 
 The domestic provisions related to family members, implementing Art-
icles 2(2) and 3 of the Directive are the following:  
‘family member’ for the purposes of the Freedom of Movement Act means:  
a) the spouse of an European Economic Area (EEA) national; 
b) the spouse of a Hungarian national; 
c) the direct descendants of an EEA national and those of the spouse of an EEA national 
who are under the age of 21 or are dependents; 
d) the direct descendants of a Hungarian national and those of the spouse of a Hungarian 
national who are under the age of 21 or are dependents; 
e) unless otherwise prescribed in this Act, the dependent direct relatives in the ascending 
line of an EEA national and those of the spouse of an EEA national;  
f) the direct relatives in the ascending line of a Hungarian national and those of the 
spouse of a Hungarian national;  
g) the person having parental custody over a minor child who is a Hungarian national;  
h) any person whose entry and stay has been authorized by the competent authority on 
grounds of family reunification;  
i) an EEA national’s partner from a third country provided that a registered partnership 
was established before an authority in Hungary or another Member State of the Euro-
pean Union; 
j) a Hungarian national’s partner from a third country provided that a registered partner-
ship was established before an authority in Hungary or another Member State of the 
European Union.6 
Furthermore, in implementing Article 3(2) of the Directive, the Freedom of 
Movement Act also stipulates that 
(1) The competent authority may grant the right of residence to persons on the grounds of 
family reunification, who: 
                                                        
Laws: Migration Law (ed.: Dirk Vanheule), Alphen aan den Rijn: Kluwer Law Inter-
national, 2012, pages 107-122. 
6. Article 2 lit. b) of the Freedom of Movement Act. 
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a) are dependents or members of the household of a Hungarian national for a period of 
at least one year, or who require the personal care of a Hungarian national due to 
serious health grounds; or 
b) had been dependents or members of the household of an EEA national satisfying 
the requirements set out in Article 6(1) in the country from which they are arriving, 
for a period of at least one year, or who require the personal care of an EEA nation-
al due to serious health grounds. 
(2) The right of residence of the persons referred to in paragraph (1) shall come to an end 
when their relationship is terminated. 
(3) The persons referred to in paragraph (1) shall have the same legal status as the family 
member of an EEA national during their period of lawful residence, with the exception 
that such right of residence may not be retained on these grounds: 
a) in the event of the Hungarian national’s death or if his/her nationality is terminated; 
b) in the event of the EEA national’s death or if his/her right of residence is with-
drawn, or if the EEA national no longer exercises the right of residence.7 
As for Article 5 of the Directive, the Hungarian implementing provisions are 
as follows in respect of the right of entry for Union citizens’ family members: 
(1) EEA nationals may enter the territory of Hungary with a valid travel document or a 
personal identification document.  
(2) Third-country nationals accompanying an EEA national or a Hungarian national or 
joining an EEA national or a Hungarian national residing in the territory of Hungary, 
who are family members, may enter the territory of Hungary with a valid travel docu-
ment and – unless otherwise prescribed by any directly applicable EU legislation or an 
international treaty – with a valid visa. 
(3) Third-country nationals may also enter the territory of Hungary with a valid travel doc-
ument and – unless otherwise prescribed by any directly applicable EU legislation or an 
international treaty – a valid visa on the grounds of family reunification, who: 
a) are dependents or members of the household of a Hungarian national for a period of 
at least one year, or who require the personal care of a Hungarian national due to 
serious health grounds; or 
b) had been dependents or members of the household of an EEA national in the coun-
try from which they are arriving, for a period of at least one year, or who require the 
personal care of an EEA national due to serious health grounds. 
(4) The persons referred to in paragraphs (2) and (3) may enter the territory of the Hungary 
without a visa, provided that they hold a document evidencing the right of residence as 
set out in this Act, or a residence card issued by States being parties to the Agreement 
on the European Economic Area to family members of EEA nationals who are third-
country nationals. 
(5) The provisions set out in Regulation (EC) No 562/2006 of the European Parliament 
and of the Council of 15 March 2006 establishing a Community Code on the rules gov-
                                                        
7. Article 8 of the Freedom of Movement Act. 
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erning the movement of persons across borders (hereinafter referred to as ‘Schengen 
Borders Code’) shall also apply to the entry specified above.8  
The Hungarian legislation provides every facility to obtain the necessary visa, 
which is evidenced, in particular, by Articles 7, 9 and 11 of the Implementing 
Government Decree. 
 Article 9(1) of the Implementing Government Decree sets out that the visa 
authority shall presume the availability of financial means necessary for the 
entire duration of stay or for the return or continued travel. Similarly, Article 
11 of the Implementing Government Decree introduces an accelerated proce-
dure for persons enjoying the right of free movement meaning that ‘the com-
petent consulate officer shall adopt a decision concerning visa applications 
within fifteen days.’ Whereas, the timeframe for visa procedure applicable to 
third country nationals not enjoying the right of free movement is 15/30/60 
days under the EU Visa Code,9 accordingly accelerated procedure for visa re-
quests by Union citizens’ third-country family members is ensured. Further-
more, Article 7 of the Implementing Government Decree lays down special 
rules facilitating the receipt of the required visa at the border under which 
procedure special provisions are set out in order to provide an accelerated 
procedure: 
(1) Short-term visas under Chapter VI of the Visa Code may be applied for 
at road, air, and water border crossing points of Hungary (hereinafter re-
ferred to as ‘border crossing points’), with applications submitted to the 
Police. 
(2) The Police shall forward visa applications submitted at border crossing 
points by way of electronic means without delay to the competent Re-
gional Directorate of Office of Immigration and Nationality. 
(3) The Regional Directorate shall promptly adopt a decision concerning the 
aforementioned applications, not to exceed three hours, and shall notify, 
via the Police, the applicant of its decision electronically. 
(4) If the application is approved, the short-term visa shall be issued to the 
applicant by the Police. 
                                                        
8. Article 3 of the Freedom of Movement Act. 
9. Regulation (EC) No 810/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 




Finally, Point 1 of Annex 2 of Decree No 28/2007 (V.31.) of the Minister of 
Justice and Law Enforcement on the Costs related to the Entry and Stay of 
Third-Country Nationals and Persons enjoying the Right of Free Movement10 
specifies the fees for the visa procedure. Given that the Ministerial Decree 
exempts third-country national family members of EU citizens (and of Hun-
garian nationals) from visa fee11 and the Annex does not set out that any fee 
should be paid by third-county national family members, it follows that visa 
procedure under the Freedom of Movement Act is free of charge.  
 The table below summarizes the correspondence between the relevant 
rules of the Directive and the Freedom of Movement Act as well as other na-
tional implementing measures: 
Directive 2004/38/EC Freedom of Movement Act and/or other 
national implementing measures 
Article 2(2) Article 2 lit. b) 
Article 3 Article 2 lit. b) 
Article 8 
Article 5 Article 3 
Implementing Government Decree, Articles 7, 9, 11 
Decree No 28/2007 (V.31.) of the Minister of Jus-
tice and Law Enforcement, Article 5(3) lit. a); An-
nex 2, Point 1 
 
Regarding the above, it can be stated that the procedural safeguards contained 
in Article 5 of the Directive have been incorporated into the Hungarian legal 
system and they are consistently applied by immigration authorities; there-
fore, they provide effective protection for Union citizens’ family members. 
 As far as the practice of the Hungarian courts and tribunals are con-
cerned, we have limited case-law on the interpretation and/or application of 
the different types of family relationships outlined in Articles 2 and 3 of the 
Directive. Hungary is a relatively new Member State of the EU (since 1 May 
                                                        
10. 28/2007. (V.31.) IRM rendelet a szabad mozgás és tartózkodás jogával rendelkező 
személyek, valamint a harmadik országbeli állampolgárok beutazásával és tartóz-
kodásával kapcsolatos eljárások díjáról (promulgated in Magyar Közlöny No 
67/2007 of 31 May 2007, pages 4723-4729; the text in force can be downloaded from 
www.njt.hu). 
11. Article 5(3) lit. a) of the Decree No 28/2007 (V.31.) of the Minister of Justice and 
Law Enforcement. 
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2004) and the judiciary has been slowly adapting its practice to apply EU law 
regularly. Moreover, the domestic implementing legislation of Directive 
2004/38/EC entered into force on 1 July 2007, so not many years have passed 
since then. Consequently, the few recent judicial decisions characterise the 
legal reasoning of the Hungarian courts and tribunals concerning the applica-
tion of Articles 2 and 3 of Directive 2004/38/EC. 
 As for Article 8(1) of the Freedom of Movement Act (relating to benefi-
ciaries – quoted above) the Supreme Court (Kúria) has expressed in several 
judgments12 that in line with Article 3(2) of the Directive, the competent au-
thorities need to thoroughly investigate the existence of the elements con-
tained in the definition of ‘beneficiaries’. According to our national law it is 
needed to verify in details if the EEA national and the family members (in-
cluding third-country national family members) have been living together in 
one household for a year, as the same registered address is not a proof in it-
self. Furthermore, the Supreme Court has stated many times13 that not only 
should the simple declaration of the support by the EEA national be checked, 
but it should also be verified whether there are such strong economic and 
physical ties between the third-country national and its sponsor EEA national, 
which provides reasonable ground for placing the third-country national ben-
eficiary under the personal scope of the Freedom of Movement Act. Further-
more, in 2012 the Supreme Court held that basing residence rights on a fami-
ly relationship with a Hungarian national gained as a result of declaration of 
paternity by the Hungarian national, which relationship, however, has no real 
substantive elements, is incompatible with the primary purposes of EU law 
and national law.14  
Question 2 
Article 27 of the Directive lists clearly and exhaustively the grounds on 
which the freedom of movement and residence of EU citizens (and their fam-
ily members) may be restricted, including expulsion. These ground encom-
pass public policy, public security, and public health considerations, nothing 
more thus it stems from this provision that economic grounds cannot justify 
these restrictions (expulsion) as well as it is explicitly stated that ‘these 
                                                        
12. Kfv. III.37.256/2010/4, Kfv.III.37.834/2009/4., Kfv. III.37856/2009/5. 




grounds shall not be invoked to serve economic ends’ either.15 The Hungari-
an implementing legislation strictly follows these rules and principles, so 
there is no domestic provision permitting expulsion on economic grounds.16  
 Regarding the administrative practice, based on the experiences of the 
immigration authorities (mainly the Hungarian Office of Immigration and 
Nationality and its seven Regional Directorates) it can be stated that no ad-
ministrative decision on expulsion has been made so far based purely on eco-
nomic reasons. As a consequence, there is no relevant case law of the Hun-
garian courts and tribunals either; since there was not any administrative de-
cision (expulsion order) to be appealed before the court (the procedural rules 
of the judicial review of such expulsion orders can be found in Article 46 of 
the FMA and in Chapter XX of the Act No III of 1952 on Civil Procedure17). 
Question 3 
Articles 12-13 of the Directive (retention of the right of residence) have been 
transposed into Hungarian law by the Freedom of Movement Act as follows: 
Article 10 
(1) The right of residence referred to in Article 6 (1) shall be retained, subject to the condi-
tions defined therein, by the family member of an EEA national: 
a) in the event of the EEA national’s death; 
b) in the event of the EEA national’s departure. 
(2) The right of residence of an EEA national who is a family member of a Hungarian na-
tional shall be retained according to paragraph (1), in the case specified in lit. a) of par-
agraph (1). 
(3) The right of residence of the spouse of an EEA national shall be retained according to 
paragraph (1), if the marriage was dissolved or annulled by the court. 
(4) The right of residence of an EEA national shall be retained on the grounds of family 
reunification if he/she is a family member of a Hungarian national or a family member 
of an EEA national satisfying the conditions set out in Article 6(1). 
                                                        
15. Regarding the restrictions on the right to free movement (generally, under EU law 
and specifically, under Hungarian law) in the Hungarian legal literature, see Tóth Ju-
dit, ‘Az uniós munkavállalók mozgása és annak néhány akadálya’, in Föld-rész: 
Nemzetközi és Európai Jogi Szemle, 4 (2012), pages 47-70. Ágnes Töttős, A köz-
rendre, közbiztonságra veszélyesség uniós szabályozása a legális migráció területén 
(http://www.pecshor.hu/periodika/XIII/tottos.pdf – accessed on: 09.01.2013); Zámbó 
Katalin, Ordre public azaz vészfék? Vagy zárt kapuk? (http://www.pecshor.hu/ periodi-
ka/XIII/zambo.pdf – accessed on: 01.09.2013). 
16. See Articles 40-47/B of the Freedom of Movement Act. 
17. A polgári perrendtartásról szóló 1952. évi III. törvény (downloadable from 
www.njt.hu).  
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Article 11 
(1) The right of residence of third-country national family members of EEA nationals and 
Hungarian nationals shall be retained as family members in the event of the death of 
the EEA national or Hungarian national if: 
a) they are engaged in gainful employment; 
b) they have sufficient resources for themselves and their family members not to be-
come a burden on the social assistance system of Hungary during their period of 
residence, and have comprehensive sickness insurance cover for health-care ser-
vices as prescribed in specific other legislation, or if they assure that they have suf-
ficient resources for themselves and their family members for such services as re-
quired by statutory provisions; or 
c) they exercise the right of residence as family members of a person who satisfies the 
requirements set out in lit. a) or b). 
(2) The right of residence of a spouse being a third-country national shall be retained as 
family member in the event of divorce or annulment of marriage if: 
a) prior to the divorce or annulment of marriage the marriage has lasted at least two 
years, and the former spouse has resided at least one year in the territory of Hunga-
ry during the marriage as a family member of the EEA national or Hungarian na-
tional; 
b) by court decision the former spouse has custody of the child of an EEA national 
who resides in the territory of Hungary, or by agreement between the spouses has 
the right of access to the minor child; 
c) this is warranted by particularly difficult circumstances, such as having been a vic-
tim of any willful crime committed by the spouse who is an EEA national or a 
Hungarian national while the marriage was subsisting, or if having had the right of 
permanent residence prior to contracting marriage; or 
d) by agreement between the spouses or by court decision, the former spouse has the 
right of access to the minor child, provided that such access shall take place in the 
territory of Hungary according to the agreement or court decision. 
(3) In the case defined in paragraph (2) the right of residence of a third-country family 
member shall be subject to his/her compliance with the requirements set out in lit. a), b) 
or c) of paragraph (1). 
(4) By way of derogation from paragraphs (1) and (3), the right of residence of a third-
country national spouse of a Hungarian national shall be retained unconditionally if the 
spouse has custody of the child who was born during their marriage. 
Article 12 
If the EEA national dies, his/her right of residence terminates or if he/she departs from 
Hungary, the right of residence of his/her child shall be retained – irrespective of age – un-
til the completion of the studies, if already and continuously engaged in such studies. The 
right of residence of the other parent who has custody of the child shall be retained for the 
period of studies of the minor child.’ 
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Furthermore, Article 14(1)-(2) of the Directive have been implemented by the 
following provisions of the Freedom of Movement Act: 
Article 5 
EEA nationals holding a valid travel document or a personal identification document, and 
third-country national family members holding a valid travel document shall have the right 
of residence not exceeding three months from the date of entry for as long as the benefi-
ciaries of the right of residence do not become an unreasonable burden on the social assis-
tance system of Hungary. 
[...] 
Article 6 
(1) All EEA nationals shall have the right of residence for a period of longer than three 
months if they: 
a) intend to engage in some form of gainful employment; 
b) have sufficient resources for themselves and their family members not to become a 
burden on the social assistance system of Hungary during their period of residence, 
and have comprehensive sickness insurance cover for health-care services as pre-
scribed in specific other legislation, or if they assure that they have sufficient re-
sources for themselves and their family for such services as required by statutory 
provisions; or 
c) are enrolled at an educational institution governed by the act on public education or 
the Act on higher education, for the principal purpose of following a course of 
study, including vocational training and adult education if offering an accredited 
curriculum, and they have sufficient resources for themselves and their family 
members not to become a burden on the social assistance system of Hungary during 
their period of residence, and have comprehensive sickness insurance cover for 
health-care services as prescribed in specific other legislation, or if they assure that 
they have sufficient resources for themselves and their family members for such 
services as required by statutory provisions. 
(2) The family members of an EEA national shall have the right of residence, if the EEA 
national satisfies the requirements set out in paragraph (1) lit. a) or b). 
(3) The spouse and dependent children of any EEA national who satisfies the requirements 
set out in paragraph (1) lit. c) shall have the right of residence. 
Article 7 
(1) The family members of any Hungarian national being engaged in gainful employment 
shall have the right of residence for a period of longer than three months. 
(2) The right of residence for a period of longer than three months shall also extend to the 
family members of a Hungarian national if: 
a) they have sufficient resources for themselves or the Hungarian national has suffi-
cient resources for such family members not to become a burden on the social assis-
tance system of Hungary during their period of residence; and 
b) they have comprehensive sickness insurance cover for health-care services as pre-
scribed in specific other legislation, or if they assure that they have sufficient re-
sources for themselves and their family members for such services as required by 
statutory provisions. 
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(3) The right of residence for a period of longer than three months may be granted to a per-
son who exercises parental custody of a minor child who is a Hungarian national, even 
in the absence of the requirements set out in paragraph (2). 
[...] 
Article 35 
(1) The competent authority shall have powers to check compliance with the conditions for 
residence and with the requirements of notifications set out in this Act, if there is rea-
son to believe that these conditions are not satisfied or that the person affected failed to 
comply with any requirement of notification. 
In addition to that, the Implementing Government Decree elaborates more on 
the meaning of the term ‘unreasonable burden on the social assistance sys-
tem’ when stipulating as follows: 
Article 35 
(1) An EEA national or his/her family member shall be considered to have become an un-
reasonable burden on the social assistance system of Hungary if(s)he receives: 
a) old age allowance (as set out in Art. 32/B(1) of SocialA); 
b) benefit for persons in active age (as set out in Art. 33 of SocialA); 
c) nursing allowance depending on the income (as set out in Art. 43/B of SocialA) 
 for any period of more than three months. 
(2) If the benefits referred to in parapgraph (1) are not provided on a regular basis, the pe-
riod mentioned in parapgraph (1) shall be calculated with any duration of any subse-
quent payment period and any payment period within one year prior to the first day of 
payment included. 
(3) For the purposes of determining as to whether an EEA national and his/her family 
member has become an unreasonable burden the competent authority shall take into 
account the personal circumstances of the person in question, such as the duration of 
residence in the territory of Hungary, the duration of payment of benefits and whether 
the difficulties are considered permanent or temporary.’ 
As regards Article 14 (3)-(4) of the Directive it is important to clarify that un-
der Hungarian law if the legislation expressly sets out certain conditions, thus 
provides for an exhaustive list of conditions, it means that except of the listed 
conditions it is strictly forbidden to require other conditions. Therefore, in 
case of listed specific conditions there is no need to set out other provisions 
which would prohibit requiring other conditions, because their prohibition 
lies in the very fact that they are not included in the list. The same holds true 
for the national implementation of Article 15(2) of the Directive.  
 Similarly, with regard to the procedural safeguards mentioned in Article 
15(1) of the Directive, it needs to be highlighted that provisions governing the 
decision-making process and the rights of the individuals involved in admin-
istrative procedures are laid down in Act No CXL of 2004 on the General 
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Rules of Administrative Proceedings and Services.18 Article 72(1) of this Act 
contains a long list on the essential elements of an administrative decision. 
According to this provision, authorities are obliged to include in their written 
decision the grounds of it as well as information on the appeal procedures. As 
for the use of language, the same Act sets forth rules in its Articles 9-11, 
among which Article 10(1) stipulates in which case it is compulsory for the 
authorities to provide the decision in the language of the person concerned 
(here: Union citizens or their family members) as well. 
 The table below summarizes the correspondence between the relevant 
rules of the Directive and the Freedom of Movement Act. 
Directive 2004/38/EC Freedom of Movement Act and/or 
Implementing Government Decree 
Article 12(1) Article 10(1) 
Article 10(2) – more favorable provision 
Article 12(2) Article 11(1) 
Article 12(3) Article 12 
Article 13(1) Article 10 (3) 
Article 13(2) Article 11 (2) – more favorable provision [lit. a)] 
Article 11(3) 
Article 14(1) Article 5 
Implementing Government Decree, Article 35 
Article 14(2) Article 6 
Article 7 – more favorable provision 
Article 35(1) 
Article 14(3)-(4) Article 40 
Article 15 Article 40 
 
The above provisions show Hungarian law fully implemented the articles on 
the retention of residence rights of the Directive. Moreover, the Freedom of 
Movement Act applied here as well most favorable conditions and extended 
the benefits of the retention of residence rights to family members of Hungar-
ian nationals. 
                                                        
18. A közigazgatási hatósági eljárás és szolgáltatás általános szabályairól szóló 2004. 
évi CXL. törvény (promulgated in Magyar Közlöny No 203/2004 of 28 December 
2004, pages 16142-16191.; the text in force can be downloaded from www.njt.hu).  
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 Based on the information received from the Office of Immigration and 
Nationality (which authority shall act in judicial review proceedings before 
courts if an administrative decision restricting or denying the retention of the 
right of residence is challenged by the EU citizen or his/her family member), 
there are no such court cases so far. 
Question 4 
The eligibility conditions for enjoying the right of permanent residence (Art-
icles 16-18 of the Directive) have been transposed in the Hungarian corpus 
iuris by the below provisions of the Freedom of Movement Act: 
Article 16 
(1) Permanent residence status shall be granted to: 
a) EEA nationals who have resided legally and continuously within the territory of 
Hungary for five years; 
b) family members who have resided legally and continuously within the territory of 
Hungary for five years; 
c) persons who have retained the right of residence in connection with their relation-
ship to an EEA national or a Hungarian national, and who have resided legally and 
continuously within the territory of Hungary for five years; and 
d) the children of a parent having the right of permanent residence in the territory of 
Hungary. 
(2) Permanent residence status shall be granted to: 
a) the family members of Hungarian nationals – except the spouse – who have resided 
continuously within the territory of Hungary in the household of a Hungarian na-
tional for a period of at least one year; 
b) the spouse of a Hungarian national if their marriage was contracted at least two 
years prior to the date when the application was submitted and they share the same 
household since then. 
(3) Where an EEA national or his/her family member has abandoned to exercise 
his/her right of residence in Hungary, and returned to Hungary for a period exceed-
ing three months, the duration required for the right of permanent residence shall 
start over from this time. 
Article 17 
(1) In the absence of proof to the contrary, the first day of continuous residence in Hungary 
shall be deemed the date of registration of residence according to Article 21 or the date 
of submission of the application for the residence card [for the third-country national 
family members] described in Article 22. 
(2) The following cases shall not be deemed as discontinuity of residence: 
a) temporary absences from the territory of Hungary not exceeding six months a year; 
b) absences for compulsory military service; 
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c) one absence of a maximum of twelve consecutive months for important reasons 
such as pregnancy and childbirth, serious illness, study or vocational training, or a 
posting. 
(3) The departure of an EEA national or his/her family members from Hungary shall be 
treated as discontinuity of residence. 
Article 18 
(1) Permanent residence status shall be granted to an EEA national who is engaged in 
gainful employment in the territory of Hungary before completion of the five-year pe-
riod of residence specified in Article 16(1) lit. a) if: 
a) having resided in the territory of Hungary continuously for more than three years 
from the time of entry and at the time of termination of his gainful employment 
has reached the age laid down by law for entitlement to an old-age pension, or 
ceased his gainful employment in order to take early retirement, provided that 
such person has been working in the territory of Hungary for at least the preced-
ing twelve months before going into retirement with old-age pension or before 
taking early retirement; 
b) having resided in the territory of Hungary for the purpose of gainful employment 
continuously for more than two years from the time of entry and stopped working 
due to incapacity to work as the result of an illness or accident requiring medical 
treatment; 
c) his/her incapacity to work is the result of an accident at work or an occupational 
disease entitling the person concerned to a benefit specified in specific other legis-
lation; or 
d) after three years of continuous employment and residence in the territory of Hun-
gary, taking up gainful employment in another State party to the Agreement on 
the European Economic Area, while retaining his/her place of residence in the ter-
ritory of Hungary. 
(2) For the purposes of paragraph (1), periods of gainful employment shall also include 
the periods: 
a) when the EEA national has registered as a job-seeker as prescribed in specific 
other legislation; or 
b) when the EEA national did not work due to an illness or accident; 
c) when the EEA national does not engage in gainful employment for reasons be-
yond his or her control. 
(2a) For the purposes of paragraph (1) lit. a) and b), the duration of gainful employment 
shall also include the duration of gainful employment in a State party to the Agree-
ment on the European Economic Area.  
(3) If the spouse of an EEA national residing in Hungary for the purpose of gainful em-
ployment is a Hungarian national, the conditions as to length of residence and em-
ployment laid down in paragraph(1) lit. a) and b) shall not apply and the EEA nation-
al shall be granted the right of permanent residence if: 
a) eligible for old-age pension or early retirement; or 
b) he/she is no longer engaged in gainful employment due to incapacity to work as 
the result of an illness or accident requiring medical treatment. 
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(4) Where an EEA national has acquired the right of permanent residence under para-
graph (1), his/her family members holding the right of residence shall also have the 
right of permanent residence. 
(5) If an EEA national who is engaged in gainful employment in the territory of Hungary 
dies before acquiring permanent residence status under paragraph (1), his/her family 
members residing with him shall acquire the right of permanent residence on condi-
tion that: 
a) the EEA national had, at the time of death, resided continuously on the territory of 
Hungary for the previous two years; or 
b) the EEA national’s death resulted from an accident at work or an occupational 
disease. 
Article 19 
(1) The right of permanent residence of an EEA national or his/her third-country national 
family member shall be lost after an absence for a period exceeding two consecutive 
years. 
(1a) The right of permanent residence of a Hungarian national’s third-country family 
member shall be lost 
a) after an absence of two consecutive years; 
b) in the event that an entry ban has been ordered;  
c) in the event that the family relationship has been established to obtain the right of 
residence; or  
d) in the event that he/she misrepresented data or facts in order to obtain the right of 
permanent residence, of which he/she has been convicted by a final criminal court 
decision. 
(2) In the cases referred to in paragraphs (1) and (1a) the competent authority shall de-
termine the loss of the right of permanent residence in a written decision. 
The administrative formalities relating to the exercise of the right of perma-
nent residence as prescribed by Articles 19-21 of the Directive have been in-
corporated into Hungarian law by the following national implementing 
measures: 
Article 24 
(1) The right of permanent residence of EEA nationals and their family members shall be 
evidenced by a document issued by the competent authority (hereinafter referred to as 
‘permanent residence card’). 
(2) Upon receipt of an application for a permanent residence card the competent authority 
shall issue the permanent residence card or shall reject the application by way of a writ-
ten decision. 
(3) In the proceedings for issuing the permanent residence card, the competent authority 





(1) The family member who is a third-country national shall submit the application for a 
permanent residence card before his/her residence card expires. Any applicant who 
submits the application after his/her residence card has expired, if unable to offer a 
plausible excuse therefor, shall be required to prove that his/her right of permanent res-
idence still exists. 
(2) The competent authority shall immediately issue a certificate of application for the 
permanent residence card to testify the right of residence of the family member who is 
a third-country national. 
Article 26 
The permanent residence card shall be invalid in the event that the right of permanent resi-
dence has terminated.19 
Furthermore, the Implementing Government Decree also contains relevant, 
more detailed and technical provisions: 
Article 38 
(1) EEA nationals and their family members shall submit their application for a permanent 
residence card at the regional directorate of the Office of Immigration and Nationality 
of jurisdiction by reference to their future residence. 
(2) At the time of submitting the application the applicants shall produce their travel doc-
ument or personal identification document, and shall enclose the authentic instruments 
or any other documents specified in this Government Decree to verify of having resid-
ed legally and continuously in Hungary. 
(3) The regional directorate of the Office of Immigration and Nationality, before issuing 
the permanent residence card, shall check the legal background, duration and continuity 
of residence. 
(4) The competent regional directorate of the Office of Immigration and Nationality shall 
automatically renew after ten years, without examining the conditions the permanent 
residence card issued to third country national family members. 
(5) The permanent residence card – together with a valid travel document or personal iden-
tity card – issued to an EEA national shall remain valid for an indefinite period.20 
As the national implementing measures show, the document certifying per-
manent residence in Hungary is called ‘permanent residence card’ (‘állandó 
tartózkodási kártya’).21 This title is indicated on the document itself thereby 
                                                        
19. Freedom of Movement Act, Articles 24-25. 
20. Implementing Government Decree, Article 38. 
21. For the data indicated on the ‘permanent residence card’ see Decree No 25/2007 (V. 
31.) of the Ministry of Justice and Law Enforcement, Annex 6, point 3 (promulgated 
in Magyar Közlöny No 67/2007 of 31 May 2007, pages 4598-4713 – the text can be 
downloaded from www.njt.hu). 
ÉVA LUKÁCS & TAMÁS MOLNÁR 
 618 
differentiating it from any other residence card. Given that the nationality of 
its holder is indicated on the card, it clearly shows whether it was issued for 
an EEA national or a non-EU citizen family member. It should also be stated 
that permanent residence card can only be issued according to the conditions 
laid down in the Freedom of Movement Act; therefore, only persons enjoying 
the right of free movement and residence are entitled to be holders of such a 
permanent residence card. As a consequence, for third country nationals with 
long-term residence, who do not enjoy such a right, other types of ‘titre de 
séjour’ are issued, such as national permanent residence permit or EC perma-
nent residence permit. 
 Some additional explanation may be useful regarding the implementation 
of Article 20(2) of the Directive relating to sanctions. Relevant Hungarian 
legislation sets out proportionate and non-discriminatory sanctions in the case 
of those family members who do not apply for a permanent residence card 
before the expiry of their residence card. It should be noted at the outset, that 
the competent authority in any case needs to verify whether the conditions of 
issuing the permanent residence card (i.e. continuous five year residence in 
the territory of Hungary) are met; given that this is a necessary prerequisite 
for issuing such a card. If the family member fails to submit the application in 
a timely manner he/she still has the right to justify this failure. Detailed provi-
sions regarding what constitutes a ‘plausible excuse’ are set out in the Act No 
CXL of 2004 on General Rules of Administrative Proceedings and Ser-
vices.22 According to this Act, any person who was unable to keep a deadline 
or time limit in the administrative proceedings for reasons beyond his control 
may lodge an application for excuse. The deadline for submitting such an ap-
plication is a maximum of six months from the day of expiry of the residence 
card. In this respect it is important to highlight that competent authorities 
cannot require the applicant to justify facts that are officially known by the 
authority (e.g. data that is available in the official registries). Hence, this veri-
fication in practice does not impose any extra burden of proof on the part of 
the applicant and there is no ‘additional’ verification of the entitlement either 
in case the applicant fails to submit the application for a permanent residence 
card in a timely manner. 
 The table below summarizes the correspondence between the relevant 
rules of the Directive and the Freedom of Movement Act as well as the Im-
plementing Government Decree: 
                                                        
22. Article 66(1) and (4). 
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Directive 2004/38/EC Freedom of Movement Act and/or 
Implementing Government Decree 
Article 16(1)-(2) Article 16(1),(3) 
Article 16(2) – more favorable provision 
Article 17(1) 
Article 16(3) Article 17(2) 
Article 16(4) Article 19(1),(2) 
Article 19(1a) – Hungarian nationals’ family  
members 
Article 17 Article 18 
Article 18 Article 16(1) lit. c) 
Article 19 Article 24 
Article 20 Article 24 
Article 25 
Implementing Government Decree, Article 38 
Article 21 Implementing Government Decree,  
Article 38(2)-(3) 
 
The Office of Immigration and Nationality has annually been publishing on 
its website (www.bevandorlas.hu) the data on the volume of applications for 
the status of permanent residence as well as the number of persons enjoying 
this status (cumulative stock). For previous years these figures were the fol-
lowing: 
 2010 2011 2012 1.01.2013- 
6.30.2013 
Applications for permanent resi-
dence card23 5,741 4,479 3,523 1,880 
EEA nationals/its family mem-
bers holding permanent resi-
dence card (cumulative stock) 14,272 16,508 17,014 17,176 
 
                                                        
23. The main nationalities are Romanians, Germans, and Slovaks. See: Judit Tóth, ‘Hun-
gary’, in International Encyclopaedia of Laws: Migration Law (ed.: Dirk Vanheu-
le), Alphen aan den Rijn: Kluwer Law International, 2012, p. 23. 
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According to the information collected from courts and the Office of Immi-
gration and Nationality, there were no court cases relating to the interpreta-
tion and application of the provisions on obtaining permanent residence by 
EU citizens or their family members.  
 However, outside the scope ratione personae of the Directive, some judi-
cial review proceedings have been initiated against decisions of the immigra-
tion authority rejecting the permanent residence card applications of Hungar-
ian nationals’ family members, since the Office of Immigration and National-
ity has considered the applicant posing a threat to public policy, public securi-
ty, or national security. Although the court has ordered the immigration au-
thorities to restart the administrative procedure, such decisions were based 
exclusively on procedural deficiencies,24 and did not interpret substantive 
law. 
Question 5 
Article 24(2) of the Directive enumerates the exceptions to the equal treat-
ment principle.25 After giving a general overview of the situation, special fo-
cus is put on study grants and the situation of job-seekers.  
1. First and foremost, there is the issue how Member States categorise their 
benefits and which benefits are qualified under the heading ‘social assistance’ 
in terms of the Directive. In Hungary the separation is quite clear-cut. Social 
assistance benefits are those which are not contribution-based and not univer-
sal (these two are meant to be social security benefits). Contribution based are 
health insurance benefits, old age and invalidity benefits, unemployment ben-
efits, and a number of family benefits, while universal benefits are the resi-
dence-based old age and family benefits.  
 Social assistance is meant to be mostly means-tested and granted mostly 
by the local government in case of financial or social need. We are concerned 
that Article 24 (2) of Directive 2004/38/EC refers to these types of benefits 
                                                        
24. Fővárosi Bíróság 21.K.35.104/2008/11.; Fővárosi Bíróság 6.K.33.398/2010/10. 
25. ‘2. By way of derogation from paragraph 1, the host Member State shall not be 
obliged to confer entitlement to social assistance during the first three months of resi-
dence or, where appropriate, the longer period provided for in Article 14(4) lit. (b), 
nor shall it be obliged, prior to acquisition of the right of permanent residence, to 
grant maintenance aid for studies, including vocational training, consisting in student 
grants or student loans to persons other than workers, self-employed persons, persons 
who retain such status, and members of their families.’ 
HUNGARY 
 621 
only meaning (i) that the 3 months waiting period (limitation) is strictly con-
fined to these social assistance benefits while (ii) social security benefits must 
mandatorily be granted from the first day of contribution-payment (insur-
ance) or from the first day of establishing social security residence (under 
Hungarian law this equals to residence under the Directive). Based on this 
approach, when replying Question 5, social security benefits are not dealt 
with.  
2. Since 1 January 2008, in accordance with the personal scope of the Free-
dom of Movement Act, several social laws and governmental decrees have 
been amended. The former approach based on the requirement of economic 
activity has been revisited in a number of cases and the concept of union citi-
zenship has been pronounced.26 In this spirit not only Community workers 
and their family members, but every union citizen and their family members 
(including the family members of Hungarian nationals) became entitled to 
claim social assistance benefits if they meet the criteria.  
3. At first, a general observation shall be made, namely that there is a strong 
interrelationship in Hungary between eligibility to social assistance benefits 
in broad terms and lawful residence. Access to benefits is, as a main rule, 
subject to the effective registration of residence and possession of the regis-
tration certificate / residence card for third countries family members. If the 
EEA national or the family member disposes the right of residence in Hunga-
ry and can verify it with a proper residence document (issuing the registration 
certificate or the residence card automatically means for the person concerned 
the establishment of domicile in Hungary), s/he is entitled to apply for all the 
social assistance benefits. Here, the system is very generous, hence no further 
criteria are examined. At present, no declaration is required that the person 
has his/her habitual residence in Hungary or that she/he has decided to leave 
the former country of residence with a final effect. No special investigation 
takes place as regards his/her future expectations. The authorities accept that 
by registering the residence here, she/he wishes to be part of the solidarity 
community and is given all the opportunities to join. This solidarity is exer-
cised in accordance with the concept of ‘unreasonable burden’ (see the forth-
coming point on limitations).  
 The covered fields are as follows: social assistance benefits and benefits 
for the disabled. Both cash benefits and in kind benefits are involved.  
                                                        
26. Most prominently Act CXXI of 2007 on Social Laws. 
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4. Social assistance benefits, benefits for the disabled. 
Pursuant to Article 3(3) lit. b) of the Act III of 1993 on Social Administration 
and Social Benefits (hereinafter referred to as SocialA) Union citizens (in-
cluding Hungarian citizens)27 and their family members residing lawfully in 
Hungary for more than three months and being registered in the permanent 
address register can be entitled to all benefits enshrining in the Act. The text 
of the Act clearly indicates that the Hungarian legislator made use of the 3 
months waiting period in case of access to social assistance benefits. Union 
citizens and their family members are eligible only after having been regis-
tered for at least three months. The Act contains both cash and in kind bene-
fits, the most of which are means tested and awarded by the self-govern-
ments. Such benefits are old age allowance, benefit for persons on active age, 
nursing allowance, home maintenance support, temporary assistance, funeral 
support, public funeral, public health care card, debt management service. A 
typical form of benefits for active persons not having sufficient income and 
for their family members is the benefit for persons in active age. As a type of 
benefit for persons in active age for those being able to be employed within 
the meaning of the SocialA wage subsidizing allowance can be granted. 
Wage subsidizing allowance can be granted to those who have already ex-
hausted their entitlement for unemployment benefit, or have not even been 
entitled for such a benefit due to the lack of required eligibility period. 
5. Study grants  
As a general and horizontal comment it has to be stated that, albeit Article 
24(2) would provide for the possibility, no requirement of long-term resi-
dence status is foreseen in this field, as a main rule. There is one exception in 
the area of grants. Study loan is only granted to economically active union 
citizens and their family members or those who obtained the long-term resi-
dent status (see these under point 5.2) 
5.1. Students attending the vocational school (15-18-21 years of age) are eli-
gible for scholarship regardless of their nationality or legal status if they par-
ticipate as enrolled (practically resident) in a field that is hit by labour short-
age. The list of these occupations is determined by the regional Vocational 
Training Centre with consultation of chambers and employment agencies. 
According to the Government Decree No 328 of 2009, XII. 29 on Scholar-
                                                        
27. The personal scope has been extended to the family members of Hungarian nationals 
as well meaning that reverse discrimination in this regard was terminated.  
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ship for Students in vocational training, the scholarship is financed from the 
Labour Force Public Foundation through the administration of the National 
Vocational and Adult Education Institution on the grounds of contributions of 
employers. The monthly 10-30,000 HUF (37-110 €) support is available for 
each student whose study result in average reaches 2.52. The Government 
Decree provides the grant for the student independently from other financial 
support that s/he is obtained. 
High-level education encompasses universities and colleges founded or rec-
ognised by the state in the territory of Hungary, the list of which can be found 
in Annex 1 of the Act CCIV of 2011 on the National Tertiary Education 
(hereinafter referred to as HighA). Only recognised/registered high-level edu-
cational institutions are entitled to normative financing from the state – 
among others – on the basis of the number of students who are qualified as 
‘students taking part in education financed by the state’. Their yearly quota is 
determined by the Government, but its maximal length takes 12 semesters 
and plus 4 semesters for handicapped students [Art 55 (2)] Studies beyond 
this period shall be financed by the student.  
 Pursuant to the HighA EEA nationals and their family members are enti-
tled to enter into Hungarian high-level education under the same conditions 
as Hungarian nationals [Article 39 (1) lit. a)]. EEA nationals and their family 
members are entitled to social maintenance payments and other study grants, 
contribution to their books and accommodation as students taking part in ed-
ucation financed by the state [Art. 80]. It means that Hungarian law benefits 
in general EEA nationals and their family members irrespective of the dura-
tion of their stay. No prior residence conditions are foreseen. 
 Hungarian law also takes account of the Grzelczyk case,28 according to 
which in certain cases a Member State is obliged to endure that a legally resi-
dent student faces financial difficulties. Moreover, the HighA expressly dele-
gates the power to the Government to regulate the conditions of foreign stu-
dents’ studies in Hungary [Article 119 (3)]. It regulates the issue in Govern-
ment Decree No 51 of 2007 (III. 26) on Benefits and Fees of Students in 
High-level Education (Articles 7, 26-28) that enumerates the benefits which 
are generally available for students determining the system of supports paya-
ble to foreign nationals who study in Hungary. It stipulates that persons fall-
ing within the scope of the Freedom of Movement Act shall be treated on 
                                                        
28. Case C-184/99 Rudy Grzelczyk v Centre Public d’Aide Sociale d’Ottignies Lou-
vain-la Neuve ECR [2001] I-6193. 
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equal footing with Hungarian nationals as regards rights and obligations in 
terms of fees and benefits. The minister for education is entitled to provide 
grants for non-state financed foreign students [Article 27(1)]. 
5.2. Exception 
Only Hungarian nationals are eligible to get support to studies abroad/at for-
eign institutions getting scholarship from the state (ministerial grant that 
would be provided upon application, grant for studies in mother language of 
minority in the kin-state, Article 79 of the Act).  
 Government Decree No 86 of 2006 (IV. 12) on study loans and on the 
Study Loan Centre aims at providing for long-term and subsidized study loan 
construction for students in high-level education. The Study Loan Centre is 
responsible for granting the loan to the student who meets the requirements 
laid down in the Decree. The following categories form the personal scope: 
Hungarian nationals, refugees, TCN persons with permanent residence per-
mits, and in turn, pursuant to Article 3(1) lit. (b) ba) EEA nationals who exer-
cise an economic activity are entitled to apply for the study loan. Further-
more, pursuant to Article 3(1) lit. (b) bb) family members of EEA nationals 
who exercise an economic activity can also apply. Finally, persons who are 
entitled to permanent residence in terms of the Freedom of Movement Act 
can apply (Art. 3(1) lit. (b) bd). Enrolment to the high-education institution 
(student relationship with the institution), residing registered address in 
Hungary are the main preconditions. The student loan is available for maxi-
mum 10 semesters up to his/her age of 40 monthly up to 60,000 HUF (220 €). 
In brief, the Hungarian rule is in compliance with Article 24(2) of Directive 
2004/38/EC. The loan shall be repaid in monthly instalments after termina-
tion of the student relationship with the institution on the basis of his/her 
monthly income (about its 8 %) and in case of unemployment the reim-
bursement amount fits to the minimum wage. The rate of interest is solid due 
to state subvention and prudent operation of the SLC.  
6. Not only social protection benefits and study grants are guaranteed for res-
ident union citizens and their family members, but also other benefits which 
embrace a much wider scope of grants and subsidies. In this sense, we tend to 
reach the borderline with Regulation No 492/2011/EU on free movement of 
workers, and the social advantages concept inherent in it.  
7. Limitations 
However, benefits from the social assistance system are subjected to the limi-
tation that the person cannot be an unreasonable burden to the social assis-
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tance system of the host Member State. The SocialA and the Freedom of 
Movement Act, reading together, interpret in Hungarian national law the con-
cept of ‘unreasonable burden’. This is valid for all groups (including workers, 
economically inactives, students, and job-seekers alike). According to Article 
21(1) of the Implementing Government Decree – in line with Article 8(4) of 
the Directive – a person has sufficient resources, if the income per capita in 
one household reaches the minimum amount of the old age pension.29 Ac-
cording to Article 35(1) of the Implementing Government Decree an EEA 
citizen or a family member becomes an unreasonable burden on the social as-
sistance system of Hungary if he/she receives  
a) old age allowance (as set out in Article 32/B(1) of SocialA); 
b) benefit for persons in active age (as set out in Article 33 of SocialA); 
c) nursing allowance depending on the income (as set out in Article 43/B of 
SocialA) 
for more than three months. 
In accordance with this provision a condition for obtaining the right of resi-
dence for longer than three months – in case they are not workers or self-
employed persons, or are not following a course of study – is not to become a 
burden on the social assistance system of Hungary during their period of resi-
dence. In case a person is entitled to the right of residence for longer than 
three months, s/he is entitled to have recourse to the social assistance system 
as well. In case the beneficiary receives the enumerated social benefit for 
more than three months, the clerk in the municipal has to report this fact to 
the immigration authorities. As a result, the immigration authorities decide on 
a case by case basis whether the person has sufficient resources in order not 
to become an unreasonable burden on the social assistance system of Hunga-
ry. During such verification the criteria set out in Article 21(4) of Implement-
ing Government Decree needs to be taken into account (number of persons 
having income or assets in a household; number of dependants in a house-
hold; whether the applicant is the owner, beneficiary, or user of the real estate 
providing accommodation for the applicant and his/her family members). 
 Further cash benefits and benefits in kind specified in the SocialA can be 
obtained without verifying whether the person concerned would become an 
unreasonable burden on the social assistance system of Hungary. According 
                                                        
29. It is 28,500 HUF (approximately 100 €) per capita. 
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to public information, no case has ever appeared in Hungary where a union 
citizen has sought recourse to the social assistance system and was rejected. 
There are no statistics either on the number of non-Hungarian nationals draw-
ing social assistance benefits in Hungary.  
 In sum: the right of residence of family members shall be terminated if 
they are qualified as an unreasonable burden and consequently, they are no 
longer able to comply with the conditions for the exercise of the free move-
ment right. However, in practice, not a single case has ever been reported in 
which the right was withheld because of lack of financial resources and re-
course to the social protection system.  
Question 6 
As far as the application of Article 27 of Directive is concerned (restrictions 
on the grounds of ‘public policy, public security, public health’), in some cas-
es judicial review proceedings have been initiated against decisions of the 
immigration authority rejecting the permanent residence card applications of 
Hungarian nationals’ family members, since the Office of Immigration and 
Nationality has considered the applicant posing a threat to public policy, pub-
lic security, or national security. Although the court has ordered the immigra-
tion authorities to restart the administrative procedure, such decisions were 
based exclusively on procedural deficiencies,30 and did not interpret substan-
tive law, therefore, they did not elaborate more on the meaning of ‘public pol-
icy, public security, and public health’ in connection with restrictive mea-
sures against persons enjoying the right of free movement and residence. 
However, the court recalled the relevant case law of the CJEU in relation to 
the meaning of those legal terms, and stated that over the decades the Euro-
pean Court of Justice has elaborated a massive jurisprudence in this regard 
that should be taken into account as well as required a substantive, thorough, 
and detailed examination (balancing) of the factors by the immigration au-
thority. 
                                                        
30. Fővárosi Bíróság 21.K.35.104/2008/11.; Fővárosi Bíróság 6.K.33.398/2010/10. 
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EU citizenship beyond Directive 2004/38/EC – exploring national 
application of primary EU Law 
Question 7 
In Hungary the issue of cases with ‘purely internal situation’ does not arise. 
As stated above, in order to avoid reverse discrimination with regard to third-
county national family members of Hungarian nationals not having exercised 
their right of free movement yet, Hungarian law has upgraded their legal sta-
tus to that of family members of EEA nationals. In other words, Hungarian 
nationals’ third-country national family members living in Hungary (i.e. be-
ing in purely internal situations) are on equal footing with Union citizens’ 
family members in terms of the rights and entitlements related to free move-
ment and residence under EU law. This e.g. is reflected in the definition of 
‘family member’ used in the Freedom of Movement Act.31  
 Against this backdrop, it can be held that Hungarian law effectively im-
plements the CJEU’s relevant case law, using the above logic of legislation. 
As regards the Zambrano ruling, according to the Freedom of Movement Act, 
third-country family members of Hungarian nationals are entitled to the right 
of residence for a period of longer than three months according to the follow-
ing conditions: 
(1) The family members of any Hungarian national being engaged in gainful employment 
shall have the right of residence for a period of longer than three months. 
(2) The right of residence for a period of longer than three months shall also extend to the 
family members of a Hungarian national if: 
a) they have sufficient resources for themselves or the Hungarian national has suffi-
cient resources for such family members not to become a burden on the social assis-
tance system of Hungary during their period of residence; and 
b) they have comprehensive sickness insurance cover for health-care services as pre-
scribed in specific other legislation, or if they assure that they have sufficient re-
sources for themselves and their family members for such services as required by 
statutory provisions. 
                                                        
31. Article 2(2) lit. b), d), f), g) and j) of the Freedom of Movement Act. Several other 
substantive provisions in the same Act provides for the assimilation of Hungarian na-
tionals’ third-country family members with Union citizens’ family members as re-
gards their legal status, rights, and entitlements. 
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(3) The right of residence for a period of longer than three months may be granted to a per-
son who exercises parental custody of a minor child who is a Hungarian national, even 
in the absence of the requirements set out in paragraph (2).32 
In the case in question paragraphs (2) or (3) are applicable, which means that 
the parents have the right of residence for a period of longer than three 
months. A third-country national family member who has the right of resi-
dence for a period of longer than three months is entitled to the same rights as 
an EEA-national as regards different benefits. That means that – as a main 
rule – this person may be entitled to all kinds of residence-based benefits as a 
family member. However, if (s)he is receiving particular means-tested social 
assistance benefits (e.g. benefit for people in active age, old-age allowance, or 
means-tested nursing fee), it can be examined if (s)he has sufficient resources 
not to become an unreasonable burden on the social assistance system of 
Hungary. 
 Furthermore, the Zambrano judgment also requires that a work permit 
shall be granted to such a person, otherwise (s)he ‘would risk not having suf-
ficient resources to provide for himself and his family, which would also re-
sult in the children, citizens of the Union, having to leave the territory of the 
Union. In those circumstances, those citizens of the Union would, in fact, be 
unable to exercise the substance of the rights conferred on them by virtue of 
their status as citizens of the Union.’33 This obligation to ensure the right to 
work is implemented in Hungarian law by virtue of Act No IV of 1991 on Job 
Assistance and Unemployment Benefits,34 granting free access to the labour 
market for all persons enjoying the right to free movement and residence, in-
cluding third-country national family members of EEA nationals, irrespective 
of the grounds on which they have obtained this status.35  
 The Zambrano ruling has been actively discussed in Hungarian academic 
literature.36 
                                                        
32. Article 7 of the Freedom of Movement Act. 
33. Case C-34/09, Gerardo Ruiz Zambrano v Office national de l’emploi (ONEm), 
Judgment of the CJEU (Grand Chamber) of 8 March 2011, para. 44. 
34. 1991. évi IV. törvény a foglalkoztatás elősegítéséről és a munkanélküliek ellátásá-
ról (promulgated in Magyar Közlöny No 20/1991 of 23 February 1991; the text in 
force can be downloaded from www.njt.hu). 
35. Article 2(2) of the Act No IV of 1991. 
36. Cf. e.g. Gyeney, Laura, Aki a bölcsőt ringatja, avagy az uniós polgárságú gyermeket 
nevelő, harmadik állambeli személy státusza a közösségi jogfejlődés fényében. In: 
Iustum Aequum Salutare II. 2006/1-2. 113-129. (http://www.jak.ppke. hu/hir/ias/ 




 As another consequence of the equal treatment by operation of law of 
Hungarian nationals’ third-county family members with those of Union citi-
zens, there is no distinction of rights acquired under the Directive 2004/38/EC 
and the respective provisions of TFEU (Articles 20, 21), neither in codified 
legislation, nor in case law. When Hungarian nationals seek family reunifica-
tion rights from their home county (i.e. in Hungary), their substantive rights 
and related procedures are incorporated in the Freedom of Movement Act. 
This is the case since 1 July 2007 (the entry into force of the aforementioned 
Act). 
Question 8 
The Hungarian Act on Nationality (Act No LV of 1993)37 established certain 
facilitations regarding the acquisition of Hungarian nationality for persons en-
joying the right of free movement and residence, i.e. in the Hungarian context 
for the Union citizens, their family members as well as third-county national 
family members of Hungarian nationals. One requirement for naturalization 
is a compulsory ‘waiting period’ (as a general rule, it is eight years) before 
applying for naturalization. This ‘waiting period’ starts being counted from 
the date when the foreigner establishes a place of permanent residence 
(‘lakóhely’) in Hungary. As the main rule, this only comes with obtaining the 
permanent residence permit, i.e. after minimum three years of lawful resi-
dence in Hungary. However, for Union citizens, their family members as well 
as third-country national family members of Hungarian nationals, the perma-
nent residence (‘lakóhely’) is established once they have been registered at 
the competent immigration authority (i.e. on the date of obtaining the regis-
tration certificate).38 In other words, they do not have to wait at least three 
years before the official waiting period for naturalization (eight years) starts 
counting. This provision is in force since 1 July 2007, so from the date of our 
                                                        
polgárság: a piacorientált szemlélettől való elszakadás göröngyös útja. A Rottmann-, 
a Zambrano-, a McCarthy- és a Dereci-ügyek analízise. In: Iustum Aequum Salutare 
VIII. 2012/2. 141-164.; Töttös, Ágnes, Az Európai Bíróság legújabb ítélkezési gya-
korlatának hatása az idegenrendészeti jogalkalmazásra. (http://www.pecshor.hu/ pe-
riodika/XII/tottos.pdf – accessed on: 01.09.2013.). 
37. A magyar állampolgárságról szóló 1993. évi LV. törvény (the text in force can be 
downloaded from www.njt.hu and in English from http://allampolgarsag.gov.hu).  
38. Article 23(1) lit. c) of Act No LV of 1993 (Nationality Act). Other conditions: clean 
criminal record, self-subsistence, knowledge of constitutional issues (nationality test), 
and no threat to Hungarian public security and national security. 
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EU accession (1 May 2004) till the entry into force of this provision, such a 
differentiation did not exist in favour of this privileged group of foreigners. 
 As regards the direct implications of the Rottmann judgment, we did not 
necessarily have to modify our nationality legislation because of this CJEU 
ruling, since withdrawal of nationality is only allowed in extremely restricted 
conditions under Hungarian law.39 The basic rule is Article G) paragraph (3) 
of the Fundamental Law (our new Constitution)40 (entered into force on 1 
January 2012) according to which ‘no one shall be deprived of Hungarian 
nationality established by birth or acquired in a lawful manner’. Hungary has 
no right to arbitrarily deprive someone from his/her legally acquired national-
ity. Deprivation had been used as a strong political tool in earlier centuries; 
therefore, this instrument had to be eliminated from Hungarian law. In our 
opinion, in case of committing crimes against the State, committing other se-
rious crimes or serious violation of civic allegiance the right of the State to 
prosecute by means of criminal law shall prevail over public law instruments 
such as deprivation of nationality, thus deprivation (withdrawal) shall not ap-
pear as sanction in such cases. As a result of these considerations, Hungarian 
nationality legislation reserves the right of withdrawal as an exceptional pos-
sibility only if the nationality has been acquired through unlawful means. Ac-
cordingly, as the Nationality Act stipulates: 
Hungarian nationality may be withdrawn if it was obtained through unlawful means, in 
particular, by the naturalized person’s conduct aimed at misleading the authorities by dis-
closing false or untrue data, or by concealing any consequential data or information. Hun-
garian nationality may not be withdrawn after ten years from the date of acquisition.41 
The existence of the fact resulting in the withdrawal of nationality shall be es-
tablished by the decision of the authority dealing with nationality related mat-
ters (i.e. Office of Immigration and Nationality). The review of the decision 
can be requested from the Metropolitan Administrative and Labour Court 
                                                        
39. On the analysis of the Rottmann judgment in Hungarian legal literature see e.g. 
Ágnes Töttős, Állampolgársági feltételek – tényleg szuverén a tagállam? 
(http://www.pecshor.hu/ periodika/XI/tottos.pdf – accessed on: 01.09.2013.); Móni-
ka Ganczer, Állampolgárság a nemzetközi jogban – államutódlás esetén. Ph.D. dis-
sertation, Győr, 2013 [manuscript with the author], 68, 77, 91. 
40. Magyarország Alaptörvénye (promulgated in Magyar Közlöny No 43/2011 of 25 April 
2011, pages 10656-10682; the text in force can be downloaded from www.njt.hu; in 
English: http://www.kormany.hu/en/news/the-new-fundamental-law-of-hungary).  
41. Article 9(1) of the Nationality Act. This provision was enacted later as a modifica-
tion, entered into force on 1 July 2001. 
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(Fővárosi Közigazgatási és Munkaügyi Bíróság), thus the proper judicial re-
view is ensured. Proportionality as a general principle of law in our adminis-
trative law is duly taken into account in these proceedings. As a natural con-
sequence, the withdrawal of nationality cannot be expanded to the spouse or 
the child of the person concerned. The withdrawal of nationality is an excep-
tional and serious legal consequence; and it is appropriate to refer it to the au-
thority of the President of the Republic. The procedure to revoke nationality 
is launched ex officio by the authorities. The President of the Republic makes 
a decision on the termination of the nationality by withdrawal, based on the 
proposal of the Minister of Interior. The decision on the withdrawal of the 
Hungarian nationality shall be published in the Hungarian Official Gazette 
(Magyar Közlöny) and the Hungarian nationality shall be considered termi-
nated on the day of publication of the decision.42 
 Further to that, a recent change has been made in our Nationality Law, not 
because of the Rottmann ruling, but its aim and impact also helps to resolve 
situations in relation to the original nationality as occurred with Mr. Rott-
mann. According to this provision,  
[t]he person whose renunciation of Hungarian nationality was accepted may file a petition 
to the President of the Republic for reinstatement within three years of the date of ac-
ceptance, if the petitioner did not acquire nationality in another country.43 (emphasis added) 
This serves as a guarantee preventing a former Hungarian national to fall be-
tween two stools, i.e. to become stateless if changing his/her nationality was 
finally unsuccessful. Hungarian law did contain such a rule beforehand, too, 
but the period for reinstatement of the previous (Hungarian) nationality was 
shorter (only 1 year). 
                                                        
42. Article 9(2)-(4) of the Nationality Act. For such a withdrawal decision, being ex-
stremely rare, see Decision of the President of the Republic No 339/2013 (VII.19.) 
KE. 
43. Article 8(4) of the Nationality Act (this new, modified provision entered into force on 
1 March 2013). 
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Political rights of EU citizens 
Question 9 
The Fundamental Law of Hungary contains the basic rules on the voting 
rights of Union citizens in Article XXIII as follows:44 
Article XXIII 
(1) Every adult Hungarian national shall have the right to vote and to be voted for in elec-
tions of Members of Parliament, local government representatives and mayors, as well 
as of Members of the European Parliament.  
(2) Every adult national of another Member State of the European Union with residence in 
Hungary shall have the right to vote and to be voted for in elections of local govern-
ment representatives and mayors, and of Members of the European Parliament.  
(3) Every adult person recognised as a refugee, immigrant or permanent resident in Hunga-
ry shall have the right to vote in elections of local government representatives and 
mayors.  
(4) A cardinal Act may provide that the right to vote and to be voted for, or its complete-
ness shall be subject to residence in Hungary, and the eligibility to be voted for shall be 
subject to additional criteria.  
(5) In elections of local government representatives and mayors voters may vote at their 
place of residence or registered place of stay. Voters may exercise their right to vote at 
their place of residence or registered place of stay.  
(6) Those disenfranchised by a court for a criminal offence or limited mental capacity shall 
not have the right to vote and to be voted for. Nationals of another Member States of 
the European Union with residence in Hungary shall not have the right to be voted for 
if they have been excluded from the exercise of this right in their State pursuant to a le-
gal regulation, a court decision or an authority decision of their State.  
(7) Everyone having the right to vote in elections of Members of Parliament shall have the 
right to participate in national referendums. Everyone having the right to vote in elec-
tions of local government representatives and mayors shall have the right to participate 
in local referendums.  
(8) Every Hungarian national shall have the right to hold public office according to his or 
her aptitude, qualifications and professional competence. Public offices that shall not 
be held by members or officials of political parties shall be specified by an Act. 
The rules on European Parliament elections are laid down in Act CXIII of 
2003 on the Election of the Members of the European Parliament.45 The Act 
                                                        
44. In English, see http://www.kormany.hu/en/news/the-new-fundamental-law-of-hungary 
(downloaded: 26.08.2013). The former Consitution (in force until 31.12.2011.) con-
tained the same rules in its Article 70.  
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entered into force on 27 December 2003. There was no derogations from the 
Directive (neither special registration, nor prior residence requirement was 
required from Union citizens). The Act has been amended once by Act CCI 
of 2011 with effect from 1 January 2012. This amendment introduced the fol-
lowing rule:  
Article 2/A 
(1) Those persons can be voters and can be voted for who have a residence in Hungary. 
(2) Persons who are in prison on the basis of a res iudicata court judgement or those who 
were imposed mandatory medical treatment cannot be voted for. 
Pursuant to the above Act, the election takes place under a proportional vot-
ing system, through voting on the basis of lists, where the territory of Hunga-
ry constitutes a single constituency. 
 The right to vote shall be exercised under the following condition (Article 
4 of the above Act). 
 At the election of the members of the European Parliament, within Hunga-
ry, the right of vote shall be exercised by: 
a) any Hungarian voter unless such a voter has declared in another member state of the 
Union that he/she wishes to exercise the right of vote in that member state, and 
b) any voter of the other Member States of the European Union if such a voter declares 
that he/she wishes to exercise the right of vote in the territory of Hungary and confirms 
that he/she has a place of residence in Hungary. 
Each voter can exercise his/her right to vote in a single Member State of the 
European Union (Article 3 of the same Act.) Annex 5. of Ministerial Decree 
6/2009. (II. 25.) ÖM on the implementation of Act C of 1997 on Electoral 
Procedures regarding the election of the members of the European Parliament 
contains the application form for EU citizens having residence in Hungary to 
enrol themselves in the voters list.46 In this application they have to declare 
that, ‘I declare that at the election of the members of the European Parlia-
ment I intend to exercise my right to vote in the Republic of Hungary, there-
fore I ask for enrol me into the voter register of my domicile in Hungary.’ 
(See the declaration in Annex I.) The usual process is that Hungarian and 
other EU citizens who are already in the residence (address) register are sent 
a letter informing them about their rights to vote. The criteria of the above 
                                                        
45. For more information see: http://www.valasztas.hu/en/ovi/198/198_0.html (down-
loaded: 26.08.2013). 
46. See: http://www.valasztas.hu/en/ep2009/index.html (downloaded: 02.09.2013). 
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declaration (which is not required from Hungarian citizens) is laid down in 
Directive 93/109/EC, no other additional criteria is laid down in Hungarian 
law. 
 At the European Parliamentary elections, voters who have a place of resi-
dence in Hungary, yet reside outside of Hungary on Polling Day have been 
allowed to cast their votes at the embassies of Hungary, the election bodies at 
the elections of the members of the European Parliament also include the em-
bassy election offices and the embassy ballot-counting committees. It is 
equally applicable for EU citizens. 
 There have been EP elections twice so far: in 2004 and in 2009. In 2009 
only Hungarian nationals stood as candidates and were elected as members of 
the European Parliament. As regards EU citizens (other than Hungarian na-
tionals) who were entitled to vote in Hungary the following statistics are 
available: the number of total (enrolled) voters were 8,023,217 out of which 
5.542 were EU citizens.47 
 There has not been relevant case law in domestic courts.  
 The recent amendment of Directive 93/109/EC is subject to the regular or-
der of legal approximation, no implementation has taken place.  
Question 10 
The implementation of Directive 94/80/EC is based on different legal norms 
that have changed in the past.  
 At present, Article XXIII of the Fundamental Law of Hungary lays down 
that,  
(2) Every adult national of another Member State of the European Union with residence in 
Hungary shall have the right to vote and to be voted for in elections of local govern-
ment representatives and mayors as well as of Members of the European Parliament.’  
[...] 
(4) A cardinal Act may provide that the right to vote and to be voted for, or its complete-
ness shall be subject to residence in Hungary, and the eligibility to be voted for shall be 
subject to additional criteria. 
This cardinal Act is Act No L of 2010 on the Election of Self-government 
Representatives and Mayors that does not contain any differing rules from 
the Directive at present.48 
                                                        
47. See: http://www.valasztas.hu/hu/ep2009/14/14_0_index.html (downloaded: 02.09.2013). 
48. Article 25: ‘This Act serves compliance with the Council Directive 94/80/EC of 19 




 Yet, at the time of the last local governmental elections (Autumn 2010), 
the former Constitution that used to contain the following derogation was still 
in force:  
Article 70  
[...] 
(2) Every adult Hungarian national and national of another Member State of the European 
Union with residence in Hungary shall have the right to vote and – if on the Poll Day 
they are staying in Hungary – to be voted for in elections of local government repre-
sentatives and mayors. (...) The mayor and the Lord Mayor (mayor of the capitol) must 
be a Hungarian national. 
Accordingly, Hungary has then opted for the derogation as provided in the 
Directive 94/80/EC to preserve the post of the mayors for Hungarian nation-
als.  
 In principle, however, the answer to the question, namely when the Di-
rective 94/80/EC has been fully implemented, the answer is that the first Act 
that implemented it was Act No LXIV of 1990 on the Election of the Mem-
bers and Mayors of Local Governments being in force during the 2006 local 
governmental elections.49  
 Altogether 68,008 candidates stood for the 2010 local governmental elec-
tions.50 There are no statistics on the nationality of these candidates, nor 
about the nationality of the elected representatives.  
Question 11 
There is an additional franchise in Hungary for minorities which is regulated 
by Act CLXXIX of 2011 on the rights of minorities. It foresees rules on the 
election of minority governments.  
Article 2 (2)  
2. minority government: an organisation established on the basis of this Act by way of 
democratic elections that operates as a legal entity, in the form of a body, fulfils minority 
public service duties as defined by law and is established for the enforcement of the rights 
of minority communities, the protection and representation of the interests of minorities 
                                                        
Union citizens having domicile in a Member State other than their state of nationality, 
in local self-government elections.’ 
49. See: http://www.valasztas.hu/onkval2006/en/02/2_0.html (downloaded: 01.09.2013). 
50. See: http://www.valasztas.hu//hu/onkval2010/467/467_0_index.html. (downloaded: 
01.09.2013). 
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and the independent administration of the minority public affairs falling into its scope of 
responsibilities and competence at a local, regional, or national level.  
Article 50  
The individual minorities may, by way of direct voting, set up  
a) local minority governments in localities, towns and the metropolitan districts and re-
gional minority governments in the capital and in the counties (hereinafter collectively 
referred to as ‘local’), and  
b) national minority governments. 
Articles 50-78 of the above Act lay down the rules on elections, mandates, 
and status, rights and obligations of minority governments.  
 According to Article 53 on franchise there is one additional eligibility cri-
teria, namely the voter has to declare that he/she belongs to a minority, and 
one individual may only be recorded in a single minority register at any time.  
Article 53 
Electors recorded in the minority register shall be entitled to vote. The following shall be 
entered in the minority register on request:  
a) individuals who have the right to vote at the election of local municipality board repre-
sentatives and mayors,  
b) individuals forming part of the minorities specified in this Act,  
c) individuals who declare their affiliation with a minority with the content determined in 
this Act and as part of the procedure identified in the Act on the election proceedings. 
As regards other criteria there are no differing rules from the rules on local 
governmental elections. 
Question 12 
As regards the voting rights of persons convicted of criminal offences or per-
sons with mental impairments, the Fundamental Law lays down the follow-
ing: 
Article XXIII of the Fundamental Law 
(6) Those disenfranchised by a court for a criminal offence or limited mental capacity shall 
not have the right to vote and to be voted for. Nationals of other Member States of the 
European Union with residence in Hungary shall not have the right to be voted for if 
they have been excluded from the exercise of this right in their State pursuant to a legal 
regulation, a court decision, or an authority decision of their State.  
In our view there is no difference between the rules on Hungarian nationals 
and Union citizens. 
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Culture(s) of citizenship 
Question 13 
At the outset, right after our accession to the EU (1 May 2004), our national 
legislation on the right of free movement of EU citizens and their family 
members followed the traditional ‘permission’ based approach and the legal 
status of this privileged group of persons was understood as adjunct to the or-
dinary Hungarian immigration system. A clear sign of it was the incorpora-
tion of the rules pertaining to the entry and stay of Union citizens in the then 
Aliens Act (Act No XXXIX of 2001) as a separate chapter.51 When this field 
of law has been recodified, as of 1 July 2007, in a separate Act (i.e. in the 
Freedom of Movement Act), the underlying, principal aim was to make a 
shift from the former permission-based, document-centric approach (which 
treated the persons enjoying the right of free movement as a sub-group, but as 
part and parcel of the ordinary foreigners) to the rights-based approach, re-
flecting the free movement legal culture as well as clearly distinguish be-
tween the legal status of this privileged group of people and that of third-
country nationals (the latter being covered by Act No II on the Entry and Stay 
of Third Country Nationals52). This paradigm shift is also emphasized by the 
Explanatory Memorandum of the Freedom of Movement Act.53 
Question 14 
Based on the limited number of judgments and the received communication 
from national courts, one cannot see any tangible role of the EU Charter of 
Fundamental Rights so far in how the rights of EU citizens have been inter-
preted. As stated above, Hungarian sporadic case law does not really concern 
Union citizens and their family members, but rather third-county national 
                                                        
51. Articles 25-30 of the Act No XXXIX of 2001 on the Entry and Stay of Foreigners (A 
külföldiek beutazásáról és tartózkodásáról szóló 2001. évi XXXIX. törvény), not in 
force since 1 July 2007. 
52. A harmadik országbeli állampolgárok beutazásáról és tartózkodásáról szóló 2007. 
évi II. törvény (promulgated in Magyar Közlöny No 1/2007 of 5 January 2007, pages 
36-64.; the text in force can be downloaded from www.njt.hu). 
53. Indokolás a szabad mozgás és tartózkodás jogával rendelkező személyek beu-
tazásáról és tartózkodásáról szóló 2007. évi I. törvényhez, Általános indokolás 
(see: www.parlament.hu). 
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family members of Hungarian nationals. After having analyzed these judg-
ments, we could not find any reference to the Charter of Fundamental Rights 
in them.54 
Question 15 
Generally speaking, issues connected to EU citizenship (freedom of move-
ment, political rights, access to social benefits and social assistance, their na-
tional treatment etc.) have not been regularly dealt with in the Hungarian 
media. This may be due to the relatively low number of mobile EU citizens 
residing in Hungary55 as well as because they are considered as ‘unproblem-
atic’ according to the public perception.56 People enjoying the right to free-
dom of movement are concentrated in the capital (Budapest) and in other 
bigger cities (Győr, Pécs, Debrecen, Nyiregyháza, Miskolc, Szeged), so they 
are also invisible for a great share of the Hungarian population. For instance, 
when the UK, NL, DE, and AT ministers of interiors raised the issue of abus-
es and fraud with the right to free movement in their joint letter addressed to 
the EU Council and the Commission is April 2013 (this was leading news in 
Western European media at that time), this topic was discussed by all EU 
ministers at the June 2013 JHA Council, but Hungarian media did not report 
on that issue. Similarly, no parliamentary questions have been asked in rela-
tion to EU citizenship in the last 3 years (since the last parliamentary elec-
tions in 2010). 
 However, to name a few sporadic examples, the right to free movement 
has been touched upon in the Sólyom case (C-364/10 – Hungary v Slovakia57) 
                                                        
54. Fővárosi Bíróság 21.K.35.104/2008/11.; Fővárosi Bíróság 6.K.33.398/2010/10. For 
a general overview on the EU Charter’s in Hungarian judicial practice see: Varga 
Zsófia: Az Alapjogi Charta a Magyar bíróságok előtt, Jogtudományi Közlöny LXVIII 
(2013), pages 553-563. 
55. The number of EU citizens and their third-country national family members residing 
more than 3 months in Hungary was 85,988 in 2008, 100,632 in 2010, 113,289 in 
2011 and 119,112 in 2012 (slowly increasing, but overall around 50 % out of all for-
eigners staying for more than 3 months in Hungary). 
56. They are mainly from Germany, Romania, Slovakia (with regard to the nationals of 
two latter Member States they are principally ethnic Hungarians), and Austria. 
Source: Judit Tóth: op.cit. 23; www.bevandorlas.hu (accessed on 01.09.2013).  
57. Case C-364/10, Hungary v Slovakia, judgement of 16 October 2012, ECJ EUR-Lex 
LEXIS 2465. For commentaries, see: Harvard Law Review 126 (2013), pages 
2425-2434.; Mattia Filippin, A change for future intra-European diplomatic rela-




when our then President of the Republic, Mr. László Sólyom was denied en-
trance into Slovakia in August 2009 to take part in a ceremony, and Slovakia, 
in a note verbale, invoked Directive 2004/38/EC as legal justification for pro-
hibiting his entry into Slovak territory. In this case the issue at stake was 
whether a Head of State of an EU Member State, being also an EU citizen, 
enjoys the same rights attached to the freedom of moment as other EU citi-
zens do; or given the specific characteristics of the high-rank office held, such 
a visit falls out of the scope of EU law ratione materiae, belonging to the 
realm of bilateral diplomatic relations, thus freedom of movement in such 
circumstances can be limited by rules of public international law (e.g. cus-
tomary rules on ad hoc diplomatic missions or on the right of entry of Heads 
of State to other countries). The CJEU held that,  
[s]uch a specific character [being a Head of State] is capable of distinguishing the person 
who enjoys that status from all other Union citizens, with the result that that person’s ac-
cess to the territory of another Member State is not governed by the same conditions as 
those applicable to other citizens. [...] Accordingly, the fact that a Union citizen performs 
the duties of a Head of State is such as to justify a limitation, based on international law, 
on the exercise of the right of free movement conferred on that person by Article 
21 TFEU.’58 (emphasis added). 
This case, the development of the proceedings and the judgement itself has 
been regularly reported by Hungarian media.59 
 Furthermore, another issue related to the free movement of EU citizens 
reported in Hungarian media, from a different point of view and focus, was 
the case of dual Slovak-Hungarian nationals, who, after having obtained 
Hungarian nationality in a simplified and facilitated procedure, have been de-
prived of their Slovak nationality. The legal problem was to define their legal 
status under EU law afterwards in Slovakia (having permanent residence in 
Slovakia where they were born and lived all their lives), i.e. to determine 
                                                        
ported. Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law 20 (2013), pages 
120-126. 
58. Ibid, para. 50-51. 
59. See e.g. a dossier about the case (http://kitekinto.hu/karpat-medence/solyom_ugy/); as 
well as reports, short news about the opinion of the AG and then the judgment 
(http://index.hu/belfold/2012/10/16/solyomugy_szlovakia_nem_sertett_unios_jogot/; 
http://hvg.hu/vilag/20120306_solyom_laszlo_eu_birosag; http://mno.hu/eu/solyom-
ugy-magyarorszag-ragaszkodik-alla spontjahoz-1057676; http://www.hir24.hu/kul 
fold/2012/10/16/solyom-ugy-szlovakia-nem-sertett-unios-jogot/; 
http://videotar.mtv.hu/Videok/2012/10/16/21/Solyom_ugy_Szlovakia_nem_sertett_u
nios_jogot.aspx) (accessed on 01.09.2013). 
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whether they enjoyed the right to permanent residence as Hungarian nation-
als (EU citizens) in Slovakia.60 
 Finally, a third individual case to be mentioned and reported in the media 
was about a German national, Mr G, having worked and lived for seven 
years in Hungary at the time of the facts, in Harkány (where a well-known 
spa is operating). He wanted to use the benefits provided to local inhabitants 
of Harkány when using the spa. However, while Hungarian nationals having 
the permanent residence in the village were entitled to a 50 % reduction on 
the basis of a special card, this card was refused from Mr G and he had to pay 
full price to have access to the spa. He then submitted a claim to the Equal 
Treatment Authority and finally his case ended before the Metropolitan Court 
of Budapest. The case was also examined in a session of the European Par-
liament.61 
 Generally, the interrelationship between free movement rights and rights 
to social benefits is troubled by stereotypes and fears since the accession of 
Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries to the EU. Some issues are 
continuously on the agenda in Hungary as well, namely the posting of work-
ers and the brain-drain in the field of health care workers. Posting of workers 
is still a sensitive issue;62 hence several problems arise in connection with so-
cial security contribution payment and even with employer’s criminal liabili-
ties.63 The emigration (short-term or long-term) of Hungarian health care per-
sonnel is also quite frequently on the agenda since better wages and career-
possibilities often attract Hungarian doctors which creates a considerable 
                                                        




sagi_torvenyre/#.UkID_RX-ldg (accessed on 01.09.2013). 
61. Judit Tóth, op.cit. 120-121. See in the news e.g. http://index.hu/politika/belfold/ 
harkany0612/?print;  (accessed on 01.09.2013). 
62. Éva Lukács Gellérné, Free movement of persons – a synthesis, in Réka Somssich – 
Tamás Szabados (Eds), Central and Eastern European Countries after and before 
the Accession. Volume I, Budapest, ELTE Faculty of Law, Department of Private 
International Law and European Economic Law, 2011 (http://jmce.elte.hu/docs/ 
PersonsFreeMovement/PersonsFreeMovement.pdf – accessed on 01.09.2013). 
63. Tuengerthal, Hansjiirgen Herrn Prof. Dr., ‘Zum Stand der strafrechtlichen Verfahren 
gegen deutsche Unternehmen, die mit Werkvertragsunternehmen aus den neuen 
Mitgliedstaaten der EU tátig geworden sind, sowie deren auslandische Werkvertrag-
spartner’, Referat, Seminar ‘Werkvertrage Ost II’ am 05.10.2007, Sheraton, Frank-




shortage here. Albeit, thanks to the efforts of the government, this process 
seems to stagnate.64 Social dumping issues, namely that CEE nationals draw 
social benefits in Western countries are not highlighted in the media and usu-
ally the concrete cases are concerned with other CEE nationals.  
 Besides those specific cases, national reporting on EU citizenship issues in 
the media is almost non-existing (this year, a few short news appeared on the 
European Year of Citizens65); therefore, it is hard to assess its accuracy, but 
we could not find major mistakes. Moreover, we cannot detect any evidence 
of the influence of the media on national public discourse, since it does not 
seem to generate measurable interest in Hungary. 
                                                        
64. See: http://hvg.hu/itthon/20130715_Kevesebb_orvos_menne_mar_kulfoldre_az_all 
(accessed on 01.09.2013). 
65. See e.g. http://www.hirado.hu/Hirek/2013/08/05/17/Plakatpalyazat_az_europai_polga 
rok_osszetartozasaert_.aspx; http://nol.hu/kulfold/20130122-unios_ polgar_vagyok_ 
na_es_(accessed on 01.09.2013). 




APPLICATION / ANTRAG / DEMANDE 
 
az Európai Unió Magyarországon lakóhellyel rendelkező állampolgárának névjegyzékbe vételéhez 
for enrolling a European Union citizen having domicile in Hungary into the register 
auf Aufnahme in das Wählerverzeichnis der in Ungarn über einen Wohnsitz verfügenden Staatsbürger der Europäischen 
Union 
d’inscription sur les listes electorales pour les citoyens Europeens Residant en Hongrie 
 
 
A kérelmező adatai / Applicant’s particulars / Daten des Antragstellers / Données du demandeur : 
(1) Családi neve: 
Family name / Familienname / Nom de famille :  ......................................................................... 
 utóneve(i): 
First name(s) / Vorname(n) / Prénom(s):  ......................................................................... 
(2) Születési családi neve: 
Family name at birth / Familienname bei der Geburt / Nom de jeune fille/de naissance 
 utóneve(i): 
First name(s) / Vorname(n) / Prénom(s):  ......................................................................... 
(3) Állampolgárság: 
Citizenship / Staatsangehörigkeit / Nationalité:  ......................................................................... 
(4) Születési hely: 
Place of birth / Geburtsort / Lieu de naissance:  ......................................................................... 
(5) Bejelentett magyarországi lakóhely: 
 Registered domicile in Hungary / In Ungarn gemeldeter Wohnsitz / Adresse en Hongrie: 
 postai irányítószám: 
postal code / Postleitzahl/ Code postal: 
 
 település + kerület: 
settlement+district/ Ort + Bezirk/ Commune + arrondissement:  ........................................................................  
 közterület neve, jellege (út/utca/tér stb.), házszám, épület, lépcsőház, 
szint (fsz., emelet stb.), ajtó: 
name and type of public domain (road/street/square etc.), street- 
number, building, stairway, level (ground floor, floor etc.), door: 
Name, Art der öffentlichen Fläche (Straße/Gasse/Platz/usw.), 
Hausnummer, Gebäude, Treppenhaus, Geschoss, (Erdg. Oberg. usw.) Tür:
Nom et type de la voie publique (avenue/rue/place etc.), numéro, 
bâtiment, escalier, étage (rez-de-chaussée, étage etc.), porte N°: … ..................................................................... 
(6) A személyi azonosítót és lakcímet igazoló hatósági igazolvány száma: 
Number of the official certificate that verifies personal identity and address /  
Nr. des Behördenausweises zum Nachweis der Personenidentität und des Wohnsitzes / 
Numéros de la pièce d’identité et de la pièce contenant l’adresse: 
 
(7) Személyi azonosító: 
Personal identification number / Personenidentität / Numéro d’identité: 
 
(8) Annak az állampolgársága szerinti településnek vagy szavazókörnek vagy választókerületnek a megnevezése, 
melynek névjegyzékében legutoljára szerepelt:  
The name of the settlement or electoral district or constituency in accordance with citizenship, where you were recorded 
in the register last. / Bezeichnung des der Staatsangehörigkeit entsprechenden Ortes oder Wahlkreises oder Wahlbe-
zirks, in dessen Wählerverzeichnis der Name zum letzten Mal aufgeführt war. / Nom de la commune ou de la section de 
vote ou de la circonscription électorale du pays de votre nationalité, dont la liste électorale comprenait votre nom la 
dernière fois: 
 település: 
settlement / Ort / commune:  ......................................................................... 
 szavazókör: 
electoral district / Wahlkreis / section de vote:  ......................................................................... 
 választókerület: 




Nyilatkozat / Declaration / Erklärung / Déclaration 
 
Kijelentem, hogy az Európai Parlament tagjainak választásán szavazati jogomat a Magyar Köztársaságban kívánom gyako-
rolni, ezért kérem a magyarországi lakóhelyem szerinti választói névjegyzékbe való felvételemet. 
I declare that at the election of the members of the European Parliament I intend to exercise my right to vote in the Republic 
of Hungary, therefore I ask for enrol me into the voter register of my domicile in Hungary. 
Ich erkläre, dass ich mein Stimmrecht zur Wahl des Europäischen Parlaments in der Republik Ungarn ausüben möchte, 
deshalb bitte ich um die Aufnahme in das Wählerverzeichnis entsprechend meinem ungarischen Wohnsitz.  
Je déclare que c’est en Hongrie que je souhaite exercer mon droit de vote aux élections parlementaires européennes, pour 
cette raison je demande de m’inscrire sur les listes électorales de mon lieu de résidence en Hongrie. 
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Ireland 
Citizenship within Directive 2004/38/EC – stability of residence for 
Union citizens and their family members 
Question 1 
Directive 2004/38/EC was transposed into Irish law by secondary legisla-
tion.5 The language of the Directive is declaratory of the ‘rights’ of citizens of 
the Union. The Irish implementing measure, S.I. No. 656 of 2006 (as amend-
ed) – called Regulations – has transformed such rights based language into 
the language of State licence: ‘permission’, ‘must satisfy the Minister’, ‘may 
retain – subject to’. The responsible Minister is the Minister for Justice and 
Equality (previously entitled the Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Re-
form). 
 The Regulations were amended to reflect the ruling of the Court of Justice 
in Metock and Others in relation, inter alia, to Articles 2(2), 3(1) and 5 of the 
Directive.6 The earlier version had inserted a requirement of prior lawful res-
idence in another Member State, for third country family members of citizens 
                                                        
1. Dr iur; Institute for the Study of Knowledge in Society, University of Limerick. 
2. Senior Counsel, Bar of Ireland. 
3. Senior Counsel, Bar of Ireland. 
4. Barrister, Bar of Ireland. Particular thanks are due to Jeff Walsh (Student Research 
Associate, Institute for International Immigration Studies, Trinity College Dublin) 
and to Andrew Flynn (LLM student, Harvard University). 
5. European Communities (Free Movement of Persons) Regulations 2006, S.I. No. 226 
of 2006 was revoked (and replaced) by European Communities (Free Movement of 
Persons) No. (2) Regulations 2006 (S.I. No. 656 of 2006) consequent upon the en-
largement of the European Union on 1 January 2007. These latter Regulations have 
been amended by European Communities (Free Movement of Persons) (Amendment) 
Regulations 2008, S.I. No. 310 of 2008.  
6. Case C-127/08 Metock and Others v Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Re-
form, ECR [2008] I-6241. 
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of the Union in order for them to come within the provisions of the Regula-
tions.7 This approach had been based on Ireland’s view that there was a divi-
sion of competence between the Member States, and the Community, as re-
gards the admission of third country nationals coming from outside Commu-
nity territory.8  
 The Court of Justice found that the requirement of prior lawful residence 
in another Member State for third country nationals was an incorrect transpo-
sition of the Directive.  
 The language of Regulations 4 and 5 in the Irish measure differs from that 
of Article 5 of the Directive. The Regulations speak of ‘permission ... to en-
ter’, whereas the Directive speaks of ‘right of entry’. Regulation 4(b), speaks 
of ‘if the Minister decides to issue an Irish visa’. This language underlines the 
Irish emphasis on permission, associated with immigration in general, rather 
than the direct rights of the citizen of the Union and his/her family members. 
There is also some ambiguity in the use of ‘his or her personal conduct has 
been such’ which could suggest past conduct, rather than the requirement of 
present conduct (Article 27(2) of the Directive) in relation to public policy or 
public security. The health restrictions included in Schedule 1 of the Regula-
tions do not reflect the Directive’s provisions.  
The different types of family relationships generally 
The different types of family relationships have not been the subject of sub-
stantive case-law. Rather, Irish courts have been concerned with conditions 
precedent such as prior lawful residence of the family member in the Union. 
Wang9 concerned a Hungarian minor child, her Chinese national mother 
(who had separated from her Hungarian husband-the child’s father, who had 
returned to Hungary before the wife acquired Irish permanent residence under 
the Directive)10 and the mother’s Chinese national partner with whom the 
mother and child began living after the mother’s separation from the Hungar-
ian father. The household was resident in Ireland.  
 The High Court expressed the view that it was doubtful, at a preliminary 
hearing, that a three year old Union citizen could have a primary right of resi-
dence, and even if that were the case, that a Chinese national who has never 
                                                        
7. S.I. No. 656 of 2006, Regulation 3(2).  
8. Case C-127/08 Metock and Others, paras 43-45. 
9. Wang v MJLR [2012] IEHC 311. 
10. Wang v MJLR [2012] IEHC 311 at para. 30. 
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been in either the child’s country of nationality (Hungary)11 or his own coun-
try (China)12 a dependent of the child or member of the child’s household 
could qualify as a family member, although he did fall to be considered in 
connection with the family’s Article 8 ECHR rights.13 
 In respect of the mother, the Court found that ‘an adult cannot be the de-
pendant of a three year old child.’14 
 As the Wang proceedings did not proceed to a full hearing the Irish courts 
did not have the opportunity to consider in a final way whether ‘household’ 
under Article 3 could be established on the foundation a minor Union citizen. 
At the preliminary hearing the High Court considered this proposition argua-
ble:15 the Court stated that ‘the notion may cover for example, an elderly 
housekeeper now retired who had lived with and been supported by the fami-
ly over many years and thus was part of the household.’16 
The difference in treatment between Irish and other EU citizens 
Consequences flow from the fact that the Directive is not applied to the fami-
ly members of Irish citizens,17 but only to non-Irish EU citizens exercising 
free movement rights. In particular, Irish citizens are, it may be argued, treat-
ed less favourably than other EU citizens.  
 The Irish High Court has found that the State cannot seek to prevent a 
marriage between a third-country national and a Union citizen from taking 
place, regardless of the status of the third country national’s presence in the 
State and even if the marriage will have the effect of regularising his situa-
tion;18 but, the same High Court judge found that the State can proceed with a 
deportation of a third-country national to an Irish citizen even if such an ac-
tion will frustrate the marriage.19 
                                                        
11. Wang v MJLR [2012] IEHC 311 at para. 21. 
12. Wang v MJLR [2012] IEHC 311 at para. 24. 
13. Wang v MJLR [2012] IEHC 311 at para. 28. 
14. Wang v MJLR [2012] IEHC 311 at para. 32, consistent with the Opinion of Advocate 
General Trstenjak at para. 34 of Case C-40/11 Iida v Stadt Ulm. 
15. See Wang v MJLR [2012] IEHC 311, in particular para. 33. 
16. Wang v MJLR [2012] IEHC 311 at para. 21. 
17. O & I v MJELR [2009] IEHC 531, High Court (Cooke J) at paras 14-18. 
18. Izmailovic v MJELR [2011] 2 IR 522, at para. 69. 
19. McHugh & Asemota v MJE [2012] IEHC 110. At paras 25-26, the High Court (Ho-
gan J) expressly drew attention to the difference in treatment between the rights of 
Irish and non-Irish EU citizens. 
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 Similarly, the High Court regards the right of Union citizens exercising 
their Treaty rights to bring direct financially dependent ascendants to live 
with them as automatic,20 whereas Irish citizens must prove social ‘depend-
ency’.21 
Metock 
Article 2 and 3 case-law has concerned the residence requirements for family 
members. The Irish courts have interpreted the scope of the Directive’s ‘fami-
ly members’ restrictively.22 The Commission has noted that this practice has 
resulted in a high number of complaints.23 In Metock,24 the Court of Justice 
found that Article 3(1) of the Directive precluded the lawful residence rule, 
which was as set out above retroactively removed.25 
                                                        
20. O’Leary v Minister for Justice [2010] IEHC 256, High Court leave stage (Hogan J) 
at para. 46: ‘The question of reverse discrimination under EU law also hovers over 
this case. It is not in dispute but that had Ms. O'Leary been a citizen of another EU 
state, she would have been entitled to have her dependent parents reside with her 
pursuant to the provisions of Directive 2004/38/EC. However, as she is an Irish cit-
izen she is not permitted to invoke the provisions of the Directive within the realm 
of matters which are governed entirely by domestic law: see, e.g., Case C-
43/90 Shirley McCarthy (2011).’ 
21. TM v MJELR [2009] IEHC 500, at para. 84: ‘[D]ependency means some level of 
handicap, incapacitation, some disqualifying factor which makes one a dependent 
not simply financially but also socially, something that precludes one from com-
pletely independent living.’ However, in the substantive stage of O’Leary v Minister 
for Justice [2012] IEHC 80 Cooke J contextualised the wider dependence sought in 
an application for permission to reside under section 4(7) Immigration Act 2004 as 
one which in a proportionality assessment weighs various factors of private and fami-
ly life (ie, rather than a test which requires a specific level of financial dependence, 
or, indeed, preclusion of independent living). 
22. This policy commenced following the judgment in Case C-109/01 Akrich. Similar 
policies were commenced in the UK, Denmark and Finland. See the Commission Re-
port to the Parliament on the application of Directive 2004/38/EC to Member States, 




24. Metock & Ors v MJELR [2008] IEHC 77. See in particular the views of the Court at 
paras 99-100. 
25. By Article 3(a) of S.I. 310/2008 European Communities (Free Movement of Persons) 
(Amendment) Regulations 2008. 
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 The Irish courts have applied Metock more broadly, finding that a spouse 
of a Union citizen worker cannot be deported from a Member State, regard-
less of the circumstances of their entry or residence in the State prior to the 
marriage.26 However, residence of the Union citizen in Ireland as host Mem-
ber State must be established for the Directive to avail family members.27 
Article 5: procedural safeguards 
In respect of Article 5, the High Court – in a case involving the 3-day deten-
tion of a Romanian national seeking to be accompanied by her Moldovan 
husband on foot of a family residence card – criticised the State’s implemen-
tation and executive application of Article 5 of the Directive.28 
 Whether the procedural safeguards contained in Article 5 are to be viewed 
as effective will depend on the actual application in every instance. It can be 
noted that Regulation 4(5) does reflect the provisions of Article 5 of the Di-
rective.  
Question 2 
In its Report on the application of Directive 2004/38/EC, the Commission 
noted that Ireland was one of 17 Member States that failed to transpose Arti-
cle 7(3) of the Directive correctly. This, the Commission argued, has a re-
strictive effect on the citizen in terms of protection against expulsion as they 
                                                        
26. L (O) v MJELR [2009] IEHC 232, High Court (Irvine J) at page 9 of the unreported 
judgment. 
27. O & I v MJELR [2009] IEHC 531, High Court (Cooke J) at para. 18. See generally 
Article 7 to 14, 16-18 and Schedule 2 of SI 656/2006 European Communities (Free 
Movement of Persons) (No 2) Regulations 2006. 
28. [2011] IEHC 224. The High Court (Hedigan J) found that: ‘While I am convinced that 
no personal blame should attach to either Garda McCormack and Sergeant Biggins – 
both of whom, it is plain, are conscientious and highly dedicated immigration officers – 
the same, unfortunately, cannot be said of the State and its policy with regard to the 
admission of the spouses of EU nationals who are third country citizens. It all too obvi-
ous that there have been significant and very serious breaches of EU law which, on the 
evidence, may well be continuing: the failure, for example, to have a visa processing 
service for such applicants, either at Dublin Airport or elsewhere within the State is 
openly at variance with the express language of Article 5(2) of the 2004 Directive. Nor 
have appropriate steps been taken to inform immigration personnel of the nature and 
importance of family residence cards.’ 
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were allowed to maintain their residence status but lost their status as a work-
er.29 
 The Commission also notes that Ireland is one of 13 Member States that 
do not exclude expulsion ‘as an automatic consequence of recourse to the so-
cial assistance system.’30 
 Very few decisions expelling EU citizens and/or their family members on 
any Article 7 grounds reach the Irish courts.31 
Question 3 
Articles 12-14 of the Directive have been transposed into Irish law by S.I. 
No. 656 of 2006, specifically Regulations 9-11.  
 In this instance, Regulation 9(1)(b), as qualified by Regulation 6(1)(b)(iii) 
is less prescriptive than the Directive (Article 12(1) second sub-paragraph) as 
qualified by Article 7(1)(c)). The Irish measure does not require the educa-
tional establishment where the EU citizen is enrolled to be accredited or fi-
nanced by the State. Regulation 9(3) is also broader in scope than the Di-
rective in that retention of the right of residence of children of a deceased or 
departed (from the State) EU citizen extends to include those enrolled in an 
educational establishment for the principal purpose of following ‘... including 
a vocational training course’.  
 There is no reference to ‘registered partnership’ in Regulation 10, al-
though this category of person is listed in the interpretation Regulation 
2(1)(d) as a ‘permitted family member’.32 
 Regulation 11(1) could be seen as ambiguous as it requires the ‘person re-
siding in the State under Regulation 6(2), 9 or 10 to ‘satisfy the Minister that 
he or she satisfies Regulation 6(2), 9 or 10’. 
                                                        
29. Report of the Commission to the Parliament on the application of Directive 
2004/38/EC, at 6 (available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do? 
uri=COM:2008:0840:FIN:en:PDF – last accessed 17 September 2013). 
30. Report of the Commission to the Parliament on the application of Directive 
2004/38/EC, at 7(available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do? 
uri=COM:2008:0840:FIN:en:PDF – last accessed 17 September 2013). 
31. In Singh and Anor v Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform [2010] IEHC 86 
no expulsion order had been made, but rather a residence card was denied: the Court 
did not quash the Minister’s refusal as the Applicant had not established any basis for 
an Article 7 entitlement. 
32. The website of the Department of Social Protection refers to ‘civil partners’ of (vari-
ous nationalities) – available at – http://www.welfare.ie/en/Pages/Jobseekers-




Article 12 has been interpreted as only permitting the continued residence of 
third country nationals after the departure of their Union citizen spouse when 
such third country national is the primary carer of a child enrolled in full-time 
education, applying the principles from Baumbast, Ibrahim and Teixeira.33 In 
all other cases, save irretrievable marital breakdown, the third country nation-
al must follow the Union citizen.34 
Marriage 
Articles 12 and 13 were analysed extensively by the High Court in Lahyani v 
Minister for Justice and Equality,35 which found that the Articles required an 
assessment of the circumstances of the breakdown of the marriage in order 
that discretion can be exercised to award a continued right of residence to 
spouses of Union workers in circumstances where there is genuine irretrieva-
ble marital breakdown and the Union worker has left the State. The High 
Court found that its previous decision in Shyllon v Minister for Justice, 
Equality and Law Reform36 was not binding upon it: there, the court held that 
a non-national had no continuing right of residence in a host Member State 
when the Union citizen whom he was in the process of divorcing had left the 
jurisdiction. 
                                                        
33. Lahyani v MJE [2013] IEHC 176, at para. 50. 
34. Lahyani v MJE [2013] IEHC 176, at paras 52-54. 
35. [2013] IEHC 176. See in particular at para. 60: ‘It is therefore the view of this Court 
that Article 13 must be interpreted expansively to provide for the occasions where 
marriages and civil partnerships do not work out and where the Union worker simply 
deserts and quits the host state before matrimonial proceedings are contemplated. 
Each case must be determined by its own facts and a measure of discretion applied to 
allow for the almost infinite variations in the way that genuine relationships and mar-
riages disintegrate. Having expressed that view, the Court is equally convinced that it 
cannot be the general rule as postulated by the husband that departure of the Union 
citizen worker confers either an indefinite or permanent right of residence while the 
deserted non-EU spouse considers his/her options and whether or not divorce is being 
contemplated. The wide interpretation of Article 13 – with due regard for human dig-
nity and to prevent abuse – must be restricted to genuine marriages and genuine irre-
trievable breakdown of relationships. As the Court has already noted, if the relation-
ship has not broken down irretrievably, the non-EU spouse is expected to leave the 
host state and travel with the Union citizen.’ 
36. [2010] IEHC 153. 
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 In Lahyani, the Court expressly applied the principles of Diatta and 
Metock such that the Directive cannot be interpreted restrictively and must be 
interpreted in the spirit of freedom of movement and human dignity.37 Con-
sequently, a flexible approach was taken in interpreting the various circum-
stances in which a right of residence might subsist on a personal basis: third-
country nationals otherwise qualified under Article 13(2) are permitted to re-
main in the State while married to a departed Union citizen, provided that 
they satisfy Article 7 requirements, that the relationship has irretrievably bro-
ken down and that they seek a dissolution of the marriage within a reasonable 
period (assessed in light of the circumstances).38 This was found to be neces-
sary to ensure that the Directive is applied consistently across jurisdictions 
regardless of restrictive or permissive divorce regimes in the different Mem-
ber States.39 
 Perhaps due to the length of time it takes to obtain a divorce in Ireland,40 
the residence rights of third country nationals separated from but still married 
to Union citizens is a live issue: a recent Article 267 TFEU reference has 
been made calling into question the meaning of the requirement to reside with 
the spouse under Article 16(2) of the Directive (compared with Article 10(3) 
of Regulation (EC) No 1612/68).41 
 In Ismailovic v MJELR, a case concerning the arrest of a third-country na-
tional prior to his marriage of convenience to a Union citizen, the High Court 
found that marriages of convenience were lawful under Irish law42 and were 
not precluded by the Irish implementing measure. The Court noted that the 
CJEU in Metock had found that the Directive did not extend to spouses from 
‘marriages of convenience’ but found that the doctrine against ‘horizontal di-
rect effect’ precluded Ireland from claiming a discretion under EU law that it 
had declined to transpose into domestic law.43 
                                                        
37. Lahyani v MJE [2013] IEHC 176, at paras 71-74. 
38. Lahyani v MJE [2013] IEHC 176, at paras 58 and 60. 
39. Lahyani v MJE [2013] IEHC 176, at para. 59. 
40. A minimum separation period of 4 out of the immediately previous 5 years. 
41. Ogierakhi v Minister for Justice [2013] IEHC 133, in particular at para. 43. 
42. Izmailovic v MJELR [2011] 2 IR 522, at paras 22-36. 
43. Izmailovic v MJELR [2011] 2 IR 522, at para. 60. No amendments to the Regulations 
have been made since the judgment in Izmailovic. 
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Administrative formalities and proofs 
The rights of family members under the Directive are subject to normal pro-
cedural rules44 and proofs.45 The High Court has confirmed that the right of 
residence is not conditional on administrative procedures such as the produc-
tion of a residence card:46 however, the State has been permitted to take rea-
sonable steps to verify the circumstances attested by the documents,47 and to 
revoke any permission issued for reason of fraud48 (although only to review 
on a continuing basis where there is a legitimate cause for doubt).49 
 Where the conditions for residence of the EU citizen and the family mem-
ber are not found to be unfulfilled per se but rather the Minister is unable to 
verify the conditions which require to be fulfilled, the Minister (prior to 
reaching his decision) must state clearly and plainly the reason why50 and 
which documentary proofs are required.51 
 The Minister’s failure to make decisions within the 6 month period re-
quired under the Directive has resulted in the issuance of mandatory orders.52 
Question 4 
Articles 16-21 of the Directive were transposed into Irish law by S.I. No. 656 
of 2006, specifically Regulations 12-17. 
 In B v Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform,53 the High Court 
held that Article 16 of the Directive requires a continuous period of 5 years 
lawful residence under Union law and that periods of residence prior to the 
applicability of Union law (in that case, prior to the accession of the relevant 
Member State) cannot count towards that 5 year period. In Babington v Minis-
                                                        
44. In L (O) v MJELR [2009] IEHC 232, the substantive rights under Metock were found 
not to supersede the 14-day procedural time-bar on the bringing of applications for 
judicial review. 
45. Adedoja v MJELR [2010] IEHC 406. 
46. Decsi & Ors v MJELR [2010] IEHC 342. 
47. Lamazs & Gurbza [2011] IEHC 50 at paragraphs 13 and 21; affirmed in Saleem v 
Minister for Justice [2011] IEHC 49. 
48. Tagni v MJELR [2010] IEHC 85 at para. 7.1 et seq. 
49. Lamazs & Gurbza [2011] IEHC 50 at para. 18. 
50. El Menkari v MJELR [2011] IEHC 29 at paras 10-11. 
51. Lamazs & Gurbza [2011] IEHC 50 at paras 18-21. 
52. Saleem v Minister for Justice [2011] IEHC 49. 
53. [2009] IEHC 447, at paras 18-20. 
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ter for Justice and Equality,54 the High Court held, inter alia, that the entitle-
ment to permanent residence is satisfied by continuous residence and not con-
tinuous conformity with one particular condition of Article 7 of the Directive. 
Question 5 
Article 24(2) of the Directive was transposed into Irish law by S.I. No. 656 of 
2006 specifically Regulation 18(2)(a). Irish law distinguishes between those 
who could be described as ‘working’, which includes those seeking work, 
and those in ‘education’.55 Another distinction is between those entitled to 
‘benefits’ and those entitled to apply for ‘assistance’. For example, Jobseek-
ers Allowance is a means tested payment to people who are unemployed, and 
who do not qualify for Jobseekers’ Benefit.56 There are several criteria to be 
met when applying for the Jobseeker’s Allowance, one of which is to have 
been habitually resident in the country.57 This would be relevant for the time 
line set down in Article 24(2) of the Directive. 
 We are not aware of any national case-law applicable to the question of 
whether Article 24(2) has displaced the Court of Justice’s ‘real link’ case law. 
The Bidar and Collins case-law in this respect has not been the subject of de-
tailed judicial consideration in Ireland.58 
Question 6 
We are not aware of any national case-law addressing the application of the 
public policy, public health and public security concepts contained in Articles 
27 and 28.  
                                                        
54. High Court (Cooke J), 12th March 2013 at para. 16. 
55. http://www.citizensinformation.ie/en/social_welfare/social_welfare_payments/ 
back_to_education/social_welfare_payments_and_the_student_maintenance_grant
_for_the_2010_11_academic_year.html#lfa027 – accessed 23 September 2013. 
56. http://www.welfare.ie/en/Pages/Jobseekers-Allowance.aspx#condseekwork – ac-
cessed 23 September 2013.  
57. http://www.welfare.ie/en/Pages/Habitual-Residence-Condition--Guidelines-for-
Deciding-Offic.aspx#7.1- accessed 23 September 2013. 
58. See Douglas v Minister for Social Protection [2012] IEHC 27 at para. 12. 
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EU citizenship beyond Directive 2004/38/EC – exploring national 
application of primary EU Law 
Question 7 
The Irish courts make extensive use of CJEU case-law in dealing with cases 
of EU citizenship. The Courts distinguish between rights acquired under Di-
rective 2004/38 and Articles 20 and 21 in all cases reviewed. The scope of 
Chen, Texeira and Ibrahim on the one hand, and Zambrano, Dereci, McCar-
thy and O, S & L on the other, are the subject of regular debate before the na-
tional courts: however, only a small number of these cases have reached 
judgment. 
 The Courts appear willing to apply the genuine enjoyment of the sub-
stance of the rights of Union citizens/Zambrano test to purely internal situa-
tions where freedom of movement has not been exercised by the Union citi-
zen59 and the Union citizen will – by virtue of a refusal to grant a right of res-
idence or a work permit causing the absence of a family member required for 
care and social and/or financial60 support – be forced to depart the territory of 
the Union.61 This is a strict criterion which must be evidenced.62 
 Where – as in Wang63 – other Union citizens are claiming derivative rights 
for family members notwithstanding that they have not exercised freedom of 
movement (eg, a non-Irish Union citizen child born in Ireland), the Di-
rective’s application has been expressly considered. 
Related rights of family members 
The Irish High Court has found that the right of family members under the 
Directive to employment does not derive from the Treaty but from Article 23 
of Directive 2004/38/EC.64 
                                                        
59. Troci v Minister for Justice and Equality [2012] IEHC 542 at para. 46. 
60. Troci v Minister for Justice and Equality [2012] IEHC 542 at para. 46. 
61. AO v Minister for Justice [2012] IEHC 79 (Hogan J) at paras 19-20; Gilani v Minis-
ter for Justice and Equality [2012] IEHC 193 (Cooke J) at paras 15-21; EO v Minis-
ter for Justice and Equality [2014] IEHC 30. 
62. Gilani v Minister for Justice and Equality [2012] IEHC 193 (Cooke J) at paras 19-
20. 
63. Wang v MJLR [2012] IEHC 311. 
64. Decsi & Ors v MJELR [2010] IEHC 342 at paragraph 29. 
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 Moreover, Chen (unlike Texeira) is interpreted as requiring the Union citi-
zen to have sufficient resources.65 
 The High Court has further found that the right derived from Regulation 
(EC) No 883/2004 to social security and social assistance is dependent upon 
the establishment of a right to reside, and if Union Citizens seek to obtain ac-
cess to the social welfare system, they have become a financial burden con-
trary to the requirement to have sufficient resources.66 
 Notwithstanding this, applications have been brought by Chen and Texeira 
primary carers claiming that Union primary law grants primary carers a right 
to work and/or to access social assistance, which proceedings await hearing. 
 S.I. 417/2012 Immigration Act 2004 (Visas) Order allows for visa free en-
try into the State for holders of a permit under Article 10 of Directive 
2004/38/EC. Despite the Metock judgment being handed down before the 
promulgation of S.I. 453/2009 Immigration Act 2004 (Visas) (No. 2) Order 
2009, provision was not made therein for family members of Union citizens 
to enter the State without a visa. S.I. 146/2011 Immigration Act 2004 (Visas) 
Order 2011 provided for visa free entry into Ireland for holders of a ‘Resi-
dence card of a family member of a Union citizen’.  
 The Immigrant Council of Ireland (ICI) (an Irish based NGO advocating 
on behalf of immigrants) has been critical of the lack of Irish national legisla-
tion dealing with family reunification, and points out that Ireland is the only 
EU Member State not to have such rules enshrined in legislation. The ICI 
views the wide discretion of the Minister with regard to granting of family 
reunification to Irish nationals and legally resident migrants as leading to in-
consistencies and a lack of transparency of the decision making process.67 
The current Minister has committed himself to ‘developing a comprehensive 
approach to family reunification or settlement’; however, the promised legis-
lation is still in the parliamentary process.68  
 We are not aware of any cases specifically addressing the Immigration Act 
2004 Orders. 
                                                        
65. Wang v MJLR [2012] IEHC 311 at para. 34. 
66. Genov & Gusa v Minister for Social Protection [2013] IEHC 340. 
67. See too, answer to question 15. 
68. For a comprehensive examination of the issues raised in this question (and brief an-
swer, due to space constraints), see the contribution of the Immigrant Council of Ire-
land at the 2013 Burren Law School, available at http://www.immigrantcouncil.ie/ 





The Twenty Seventh Amendment to the Constitution was passed by the Peo-
ple in 2004: it reversed the broad scope of the Nineteenth Amendment to the 
Constitution passed in 1999 and restricted the ius soli entitlement to Irish citi-
zenship. This may have been in response to disquiet over the phenomenon of 
‘anchor babies’, compounded by the Opinion of Advocate General Tizzano in 
the Chen case that Ireland could, by restricting its citizenship laws, avoid a 
conflict between its domestic laws concerning the rights of residence for non-
citizen parents and those in EU law.69 
 Under the Irish Nationality and Citizenship Act 2004, certain EU nationals 
(along with other EEA nationals and nationals of the Swiss Confederation) en-
joy special treatment. They can acquire citizenship through a statutory declara-
tion that their parents have resided in Ireland for a prescribed period of time.70 
 There is a limited amount of Irish case law dealing with the acquisition or 
revocation of citizenship that correlates with EU citizenship. In Mallak v 
Minister for Justice, the Irish High Court distinguished Rottmann and held 
that EU law was not invoked in decisions concerning the acquisition of citi-
zenship.71 The Supreme Court reversed this decision as a matter of Irish law 
and declined to consider whether a decision on the acquisition of citizenship 
invoked EU law.72  
 Following the Constitutional Referendum on Citizenship in 2004, which 
was influenced by the Chen case,73 there are now three main ways by which 
Irish citizenship can be acquired:74 Automatically at birth, by descent or by 
                                                        
69. EUDO Observatory on Citizenship, Ireland – Country Report at http://eudo-citizen 
ship.eu/admin/?p=file&appl=countryProfiles&f=Ireland.pdf (last accessed 15 Sep-
tember 2013), at p. 9; see also a NIRSA Working paper on the issue, available at 
http://www.nuim.ie/nirsa/research/documents/WPS30.pdf (last accessed 17 Septem-
ber 2013). 
70. EUDO Observatory on Citizenship, Ireland – Country Report at http://eudo-
citizenship.eu/admin/?p=file&appl=countryProfiles&f=Ireland.pdf (last accessed 15 
September 2013), at p. 12. 
71. Mallak v Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform [2011] IEHC 306, at paras 
25-31. See also http://eudo-citizenship.eu/news/citizenship-news/755-mallak-case. 
72. Mallak v Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform [2012] IESC 59, at para. 78. 
73. Case C-200/02 Zhu and Chen v Secretary of State for the Home Department 
[2004] ECR I-9925. See Hilkka Becker and Catherine Cosgrave (Becker and Cos-
grave), EUDO Citizenship Observatory, Naturalisation ProceduresforImmigrants 
Ireland, March 2013, p. 3 – available at http://eudo.citizenship.eu – accessed 14 Au-
gust 2013. 
74. Becker and Cosgrave, p. 2. 
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naturalization if certain conditions are met.75 It should be noted that naturali-
zation is not a right enjoyed by non-Irish individuals. Non-Irish persons le-
gally resident in Ireland may apply for Irish citizenship if they meet the statu-
tory eligibility criteria; granting of citizenship remains at the absolute discre-
tion of the Minister.76  
 Citizenship acquired at birth cannot be withdrawn. On the other hand, a 
certificate of naturalization may be revoked by the Minister when he is satis-
fied that one of a number of situations has occurred. This includes, where the 
certificate was acquired through fraud, misrepresentation (regardless whether 
innocent or fraudulent), or concealment of material facts or circumstances.77 
There is a procedure laid down in relation to any revocation by the Minister, 
including giving notice of the Minister’s intention and the right to apply for 
an inquiry.78 
Political rights of EU citizens 
Question 9 
Directive 93/109/EC on European Parliament elections was originally trans-
posed into Irish law by the European Parliament Elections (Voting and Can-
didature) Regulations, 1994 S.I. No. 14 of 1994. Subsequently, the European 
Parliament Elections Act 1997 was enacted.79 
 The most recent Report from the Commission on the transposition and op-
eration of Directive 93/109/EC found difficulties in relation to measures to 
                                                        
75. Handoll, p. 10. See too, answers to question 15. 
76. Becker and Cosgrave. 
77. Handoll, p. 14. See too in relation to apparent lack of revocation of naturalization cer-
tificate, as well as indications of possible changes in the Minister’s thinking on the is-
sues. 
78. Handoll, p. 15. 
79. According to the Minister for the Environment, Community and Local Government, 
Deputy Phil Hogan, the 1997 Act transposed Directive 93/109/EC into Irish law – see 
http://oireachtasdebates.oireachtas.ie/debates%20authoring/debateswebpack.nsf/tak
es/seanad2013071900020?opendocument – accessed 13 September 2013. In addi-
tion to S.I. No.14 of 1994 and the European Parliament Elections Act 1997, there 
have been some general statutes which have included provisions with relevance for 
this topic.  
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prevent double voting.80 It was noted that, inter alia, in Ireland considerable 
numbers of non-Irish EU citizens could not be identified.81 For example, in 
Ireland only 208 nationals were identified out of the 4,795 notified. The Re-
port also noted that Ireland was one of the Member States indicating late re-
ceipt of data required. This assessment was acknowledged in the 2010 Report 
as deficiencies of the Directive, and as needing to be addressed. This was 
done by the adoption of Directive 2013/1/EU. The Electoral, Local Govern-
ment and Planning Act 2013, enacted on 22 July 2013, provides for the 
changes required by Directive 2013/1/EU.82 
 All would be voters have to apply to be registered to vote. Non-Irish EU 
citizens, other than UK citizens, now have to apply to be registered by com-
pleting the application paper in the form dictated by the Minister. They also 
have to provide the Registration Authority with a statutory declaration stating 
his/her nationality; address at which normally resident in the State; locality or 
constituency in his/her home state, where the EU citizen was last on the elec-
toral roll, and the intention to vote in Ireland, only.83 
 We are not aware of any national case law on this question. 
Question 10 
Ireland transposed Directive 94/80/EC by means of the Local Elections 
Regulations, 1995, S.I. No. 297 of 1995. According to the Commission, in 
examining the transposition of, and compliance with, the Directive, Ireland 
was one of those Member States whose domestic measures complied with the 
Directive.84 There was an increase in Ireland in the participation of non-Irish 
                                                        
80. Commission, Report on the election of Members of the European Parliament (1976 
Act as amended by Decision 2002/772/EC, Euratom) and on the participation of 
European Union citizens in elections for the European Parliament in the Member 
State of residence (Directive 93/109/EC,) /* COM/2010/0605 final */ – available at 
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2010:0605:FIN:EN: 
HTML – accessed 20 September 2013. 
81. COM/2010/0605 final, para. 4.2 
82. Available at http://www.irishstatutebook.ie. This statute deals with issues which are 
both related, and unrelated, to the topic, as can be inferred from its full title. See Min-
ister Hogan in the Seanad debate on the Second Stage of the Electoral, Local Gov-
ernment and Planning andDevelopment Bill (now Act) 2013, 19 July 2013 – availa-
ble at http://oireachtasdebates.oireachtas.ie/debates%20authoring/debateswebpack. 
nsf/takes/seanad2013071900020?opendocument – accessed 13 September 2013. 
83. Section 6 of the 1997 Act. 
84. European Commission, Report from the Commission to the European Parliament 
and the Council, on the application of Directive94/80/EC on the right to stand and 
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nationals in local elections in the period 1991-1999, following the implemen-
tation of the Directive, which the Commission attributed to the specific in-
formation campaigns.85 In commenting on the actual participation in local 
elections in Ireland, the Commission refers to the historical reciprocal parlia-
mentary voting rights for British/Irish citizens in their respective home coun-
tries.  
 We are not aware of any relevant national case law on this question. 
Question 11 
As has been pointed out,86 historically, British citizens resident in Ireland and 
Irish citizens resident in the UK enjoy reciprocal rights to vote in parliamen-
tary elections; this relates to Dáil (Lower House) elections (in Ireland).87 This 
reciprocal right predates EU citizenship and the active and passive electoral 
rights arising from this status. However, both the active and passive franchise 
for the Seanad (Upper House) is confined to Irish citizens – including the six 
University seats.88 This means that non-Irish graduates of the two Universi-
ties (National University of Ireland and University of Dublin, Trinity Col-
lege) are at a disadvantage vis-à-vis their Irish fellow graduates. The Gov-
ernment has produced the heads of a Bill proposing to merge these constitu-
encies and extend the franchise to graduates of other educational institutions, 
but not to other nationals. 
                                                        
vote in municipal elections, COM (2002) 260 final, Brussels, 30.05.2002, para. 4.2 – 
available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2002: 
0260:FIN:EN:PDF accessed 18 September 2013. See too follow up European Com-
mission, Report from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council, 
on the application of Directive 94/80/EC on the right to stand and vote in munici-
pal elections by citizens of the Union residing in a Member State of which they are 
not nationals, COM (2012) 99 final, Brussels, 9.3.2012, available at 
 http://ec.europa.eu/justice/citizen/files/com_2012_99_municipal_elections_en.pdf 
– accessed 18 September 2013. 
85. Para 9. 
86. See answer to question 10. 
87. See, inter alia, Report from the Commission to the European Parliament and the 
Council on the application of Directive 94/80/EC on the right to vote and to stand as a 
candidate in municipal elections by citizens of the Union residing in a Member State 
of which they are not nationals, COM (2012) 99 final, footnote 27, available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/justice/citizen/files/com_2012_99_municipal_elections_en.pdf 
– accessed 22 August 2013.  
88. See Constitution of Ireland, Articles 16.1 and 18.2. 
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 Presidential elections and referenda are confined to Irish citizens.89 Non-
EU residents may stand and vote at local elections. All EU citizens may vote 
at European and local elections.90 There are no other regional elections in Ire-
land.  
 Two common requirements must be met by each category of the elec-
torate; the individual must be registered to vote, and be resident and present 
(except for a few exceptions, such as diplomats) in Ireland. 
Question 12 
Persons undergoing a prison sentence of more than six months, undischarged 
bankrupts or persons of ‘unsound mind’ are disqualified from election to both 
Houses of the Oireachtas (Parliament). 
 The tensions between EU law and national provisions limiting the scope 
of the franchise are limited. The Electoral (Amendment) Act, 2006 gave pris-
oners the right to vote in all elections in the State (provided they are other-
wise eligible, such as having been resident in Ireland prior to being impris-
oned)).91 Wards of Court (other than minors) (i.e. persons whose care is en-
trusted to the courts) are automatically excluded from voting: whilst a candi-
date for permanent or temporary wardship will be individually assessed prior 
to wardship,92 this may fall below the bar set for individualised assessment of 
political participation required by the ECtHR in Kiss v Hungary (Application 
No. 38832/06). The authors note the request to consider FRACTIT data in re-
lation to the national laws on electoral rights: however, the national report for 
Ireland has not yet been written. 
 In the 2012 Commission Report on the application of Directive 94/80/EC 
on the right to vote and to stand as a candidate in municipal elections by citi-
zens of the Union residing in a Member State of which they are not nationals, 
Ireland is noted as one of the Member States that does not automatically en-
                                                        
89. http://www.environ.ie/en/LocalGovernment/Voting/PublicationsDocuments/File 
DownLoad,1866,en.pdf – accessed 18 September 2013. 
90. As noted in the Report from the Commission to the European Parliament and the 
Council (COM) 2012 99 final, footnote 27, Ireland (and Spain) permitted EU citizens 
to vote in municipal elections under certain conditions. 
91. The previous legislative bar on prisoner-voting was upheld as a matter of national 
constitutional law in Breathnach v Ireland [2001] IESC 59. 
92. Lunacy Regulation (Ireland) Act 1871; Order 67 Rules of the Superior Courts 1986. 
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roll voters on the Electoral Register. While this is not compulsory, the Com-
mission does look on the practice of automatic registration favourably.93 
 The EUDO Country Report for Ireland, 2012, does not highlight any is-
sues relating to Irish implementation of EU electoral legislation.  
Culture(s) of citizenship 
Question 13 
Ireland has often been characterised as having a homogenous population – 
historically.94 Ireland has also long been a country of emigration. Coinciding 
to a certain degree with the time periods prior to the accessions of the twelve 
new Member States (2004 and 2007), and the ensuing inflow of citizens of 
the new Member States into the State, Ireland experienced an unprecedented 
increase in asylum seekers/refugees, mainly from areas outside Europe. Many 
of those seeking refugee status have experienced protracted periods of delay 
pending decisions on their legal status in the State; this situation has attracted 
media coverage.95 This background has probably contributed to the general-
ised usage of ‘immigration’ or ‘immigrant’ when discussing issues relating to 
non-Irish citizens, rather than distinguishing between immigrants in the inter-
national law sense, and citizens of the Union.96 
 Turning to the national legislators, a report from the Joint Committee on 
European Affairs in April 2006 conveys a sense of the attitudes of some 
                                                        
93. EU Commission Report application of Directive 94/80/EC on the right to vote and to 
stand as a candidate in municipal elections by citizens of the Union residing in a 
Member State of which they are not nationals, available at  
 http://ec.europa.eu/justice/citizen/files/com_2012_99_municipal_elections_en.pdf 
(last accessed, 16 September 2013). 
94. http://www.oireachtas.ie/documents/committees29thdail/europeanaffairsreports/ 
Immigration_Best_Practices.doc – (Report 2007), Foreword – accessed 12 Septem-
ber 2013. 
95. See inter alia, http://www.migrationinformation.org/Feature/display.cfm?ID=740 
accessed 17 September 2013. 
96. For a systematic analysis of attitudes towards third country immigrants outside the 
EU see McGinnity, Frances / Quinn, Emma / Kingston, Gill / O'Connell, Philip 
(UCD), Annual Monitoring Report on Integration 2012, Dublin: ESRI/The Integra-
tion Centre, 2013.  
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members of the Oireachtas.97 The title itself is illustrative of these views: Re-
port on Migration – an Initial Assessment of the Position of EU Migrant 
Workers post 2004. The overwhelming impression conveyed by this report it 
might be argued, is an apparent lack of understanding of citizenship of the 
European Union and confusion with this status and free movement. 
 A follow-up report in 2007 looks at best practice in other Member States. 
In so doing it continues the emphasis on immigration and immigrants, as can 
be seen from its title Report on Migration and Integration Policy in Ireland.98 
Reference is made to the change from a relatively homogenous native popu-
lation to a multi-ethnic community, with approximately 10 per cent of the 
population being foreign born.99 It refers to the 2007 accessions of Bulgaria 
and Romania, and comments on the numbers of ‘immigrants’ from the two 
new Member States, who moved to Ireland shortly after accession. Positive 
comments are made in relation to the contribution of the immigrants from the 
2004 accession Member States to the Irish economy. The body of the Report 
refers to immigrants and foreign nationals and lessons to be learned (from 
other Member States with a longer history of immigration). There is no sense 
of an understanding of the distinction to be made between citizens of the 
Union and their family members, and third country immigrants in general.  
 Irish transposition of Directive 2004/38/EC conveys a sense of the focus 
being on immigrants in general rather than on any significance of citizenship 
of the Union and the ensuing rights and freedoms – not just for citizens of the 
EU, but also for their (third country) family members. A parliamentary (writ-
ten) question regarding the right of citizens of other Member States with seri-
ous criminal records to travel into or remain in Ireland was answered by the 
(then) Minister100 He described it as ‘difficult in EU law, for a Member State 
to impede the free movement of EU citizens’ and expressed the desire that 
this ‘privilege’ (sic) not be abused.’ A recent written parliamentary question, 
coming under the heading of ‘Immigration Policy’ asked about ‘quotas for 
recently joined Member States’. The Minister confirmed that ‘EU nationals 
enjoy Free Movement Rights in Ireland and no quotas apply’.101 It is an inter-
                                                        
97. http://www.oireachtas.ie/documents/committees29thdail/europeanaffairsreports/ 
Migration.pdf – (Report 2004) – accessed 12 September 2013. 
98. (Report 2007) – accessed 12 September 2013. 
99. Foreword to Report (2007). 
100. Dáil Debates Vol. 645 No. 2 Col. 2462/08 31 January 2008, 
101. Dáil Debates, [46554/12], 24 October 2012, question 182 – accessed 17 September 
2013 
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esting question, some six years plus after the entry into force of the Directive, 
and five years plus after the last accession. 
 As has been mentioned previously, the current Minister (in office since 
2011) has been active in improving the process of naturalisation or acquisi-
tion of Irish citizenship.102 For example, he has introduced Citizenship cere-
monies and put them on a statutory basis – in the authors’ opinion a signifi-
cant and laudable political and cultural innovation. This is mainly relevant for 
third country nationals, many of whom may have acquired refugee status. 
The Minister has acknowledged the wider benefits of Irish citizenship. He has 
referred to it being a ‘major step for the State which confers certain rights and 
entitlements not only within the State but also at EU level’.103  
Question 14 
The Irish courts were (albeit infrequently) prepared to consider the 2000 ver-
sion of the EUCFR when appropriate in interpreting EU law prior to its entry 
into force with the Lisbon Treaty.104 
 Since coming into force, the EUCFR has joined the Irish Constitution and 
the ECHR in the complex network of human rights protection in Ireland. 
There is evidence that the courts, while acknowledging that these three 
sources are not identical in their obligations,105 will in practice consider 
claims invoking these various provisions as substantially equivalent.106 
 There are, however, some instances where the EUCFR has been consid-
ered independently of other rights:107 these typically concern Article 47 
                                                        
http://oireachtasdebates.oireachtas.ie/Debates%20Authoring/DebatesWebPack.nsf/t
akes/dail2012102400088#N4 
102. Becker and Cosgrave. 
103. Dáil DebatesVol. 773 No. 2 18 July 2012 (Written answer – Citizenship applications) 
– referred to by Becker and Cosgrave, p. 12. 
104. MN v RN [2009] 1 IR 388, at paras 25-27, 30; N v N [2008] IEHC 382, at para. 25. 
105. EB v Minister for Justice [2013] 4 JIC 3002, at para. 54. 
106. EB v Minister for Justice [2013] 4 JIC 3002, at paras 56-57; JMcB v LE [2010] 4 IR 
433, at paras 141-142; Digital Rights Ireland Ltd v Minister for Communications 
[2010] 3 IR 251, at paras 57-61, 72; Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform 
v Adam [2011] IEHC 68. 
107. Okunade v Minister for Justice and Equality [2012] IEHC 134, at para. 16; Digital 
Rights Ireland Ltd v Minister for Communications [2010] 3 IR 251, at para. 62; JCM v 
ML [2012] 10 JIC 1205, at paras 27-30; VN v Minister for Justice and Law Reform 
[2012] 2 JIC 1603, at para. 21; AA v Minister for Justice [2012] IEHC 222, at para. 13. 
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EUCFR in the context of the Procedures Directive 2005/85/EC (with the no-
table exception of Digital Rights Ireland108 concerning privacy). 
 In Minister for Justice and Equality v RPG, the High Court (Edwards J) 
interpreted the applicable EUCFR provisions by sole reference to ECtHR 
case law, but noted in extended obiter his potential support for a more exten-
sive interpretation of the EUCFR provisions by reference to its own text.109 
 The Irish Courts have been making use of Article 51 in denying relief un-
der the Charter due to the inapplicability of Union law.110 In IS & Ors v Min-
ister for Justice,111 the High Court (Hogan J) held that the EUCFR is not 
freestanding and must be interpreted in light of the EU law being implement-
ed. Prior to the judgment in Zambrano, the High Court found that the Charter 
was not applicable to deportation of a third-country national to a non-EU 
country which was a national matter. 
Question 15 
In general, citizenship of the Union per se does not appear to be a salient is-
sue in the national media in Ireland; this would also appear to be the case in 
relation to the rights arising for citizens of the Union (and their family mem-
bers). ‘Immigration’ or ‘immigrants’ tend to be used without distinction when 
reporting on non-Irish national, whether or not they are ‘citizens of the 
Union’, third country family members of a citizen of the Union, or migrants 
in general, or even refugees or asylum seekers.112 
 Ius soli had been an important issue in the Chen case, as well as in a num-
ber of domestic cases, and these were weighing on the minds of the Irish au-
thorities. There had been fears that there would be consequences for Ireland if 
the provisions on the acquisition of citizenship were not changed. An article 
by the (then) Minister in the Sunday Independent on 14 March 2004 gives 
some indication of the thinking at the time, with references not just to the im-
pact for Ireland but also to the EU rights arising for third country parents.113  
                                                        
108. Digital Rights Ireland Ltd v Minister for Communications [2010] 3 IR 251. 
109. [2013] IEHC 54, at pp. 78-81. See also Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Re-
form v DL [2011] IEHC 248. 
110. Lofinmakin (an infant) & Others v The Minister [2011] IEHC 116, per Cooke J; Troci v 
Minister for Justice and Equality [2012] IEHC 542, per O’Keeffe J at paras 39-39; IS, 
AS & AS v Minister for Justice & Ors [2011] IEHC 31, per Hogan J at para. 31. 
111. [2011] IEHC 31. 
112. See too, answer to question 13 for a brief historical overview of non-Irish citizens in 
Ireland. In this regard, see Handoll. 
113. http://www.inis.gov.ie/en/INIS/article.pdf/Files/article.pdf. 
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 Following the constitutional amendment on 11 June 2004, the constitu-
tional provisions on Irish citizenship were changed. People born in (sic) the 
island of Ireland would not have a constitutional right to be an Irish citizen, 
unless at the time of their birth, one of their parents was an Irish citizen or 
was entitled to be an Irish citizen.114 
 A review of print media coverage of the 2004 Citizenship Referendum is 
helpful in considering the question raised here. According to Breen et al, 
while editorial treatment (and opinion pieces) was balanced, the dissemina-
tion of unanalysed and unchallenged quotations of politicians, mainly in fa-
vour of the referendum, led to a flawed, prejudiced and inadequate debate on 
the issues. ‘Loophole’ became part of the normalised vocabulary, they assert-
ed. ‘Loophole’ and ‘abuse of Irish citizenship’ were used in tandem. ‘Loop-
hole’ referred to Ireland’s ius soli approach to citizenship and nationality and 
the ensuing benefits for third country national parents of Irish citizens, who 
were also EU citizens. While the EU benefits associated with being (third 
country) parents of an EU citizen (family member) were mentioned, the em-
phasis in the coverage was on Irish citizenship.115 
 In the intervening period the influx of asylum seekers (and thereby of ref-
ugees) has abated, and media coverage of these issues has also reduced. 
However, the economic crisis in Ireland has had an impact on the numbers of 
citizens from other Member States in the State and more recent print media 
coverage continues the trend already identified, of generalised usage of ‘im-
migrant’, immigration’ – regardless of the nationality. For example, The Irish 
Times, a broadsheet newspaper. on 29 June 2013 carried an article entitled 
‘The growth of intolerance.’ The article discussed a report on ‘immigrants’. 
References to the persons concerned fluctuated between ‘immigrant’, ‘non-
nationals’, ‘foreign-born population’, ‘foreign nationals’, and then various 
                                                        
114. http://www.refcom.ie/en/past-referendums/irish-citizenship/ – accessed 17th Sep-
tember 2013. See too, answer to question 8. 
115. Michael Breen, Amanda Haynes and Eoin Devereux, Citizens, Loopholes and Ma-




202004%20Citizenship%20Referendum'.(Book%20Chapter).pdf – accessed 9 Sep-
tember 2013. Also of interest, albeit not necessarily falling within the status of ‘na-
tional media’, is http://indiamond6.ulib.iupui.edu:81/chencasemeehan.html. This ar-
ticle refers, inter alia, to nightly television current affairs programmes and draws on 
print media treatment of the benefits flowing from EU citizenship once Irish citizen-
ship is acquired, referring to the Chen case and the Citizenship Referendum. 
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nationalities as well as all-embracing reference to ‘Africans’. Citizenship was 
mentioned only in the context of a time span in which ‘34,500 people from 
outside the EU were given Irish citizenship.’ The conflation of ‘foreign na-
tionals’ and ‘EU rules on immigration’ and references to nationalities within 
and without the EU, does not indicate an understanding of the difference (in 
legal status as regards citizenship of the Union and the rights of the EU citi-
zen compared to a third country national migrant).  
 The Irish Times, on 2 September 2013, carried two substantial reports on 
Irish citizen children, and their third country parents. In many cases the third 
country parents had been refused residency in Ireland; some had left voluntar-
ily, and taken their Irish citizen children with them.; some parents had been 
deported and taken, or been accompanied by, their Irish citizen children. 
While one article deals with ‘case studies’ of individual Irish citizen children, 
the other article addresses the overall policy – both in theory and, as the arti-
cle shows, in practice. There is reference to the Zambrano ruling, and its po-
tential impact for Irish citizen children, and their third country parents. The 
dominant theme is of deportation/departure from Ireland of the third country 
parents, and the impact on the Irish citizen children. 
 A recent report carried out for the European Commission’s Representation 
in Ireland examines experiences of, and attitudes to, citizenship of the 
Union.116 It found that there is a strong correlation between levels of 
knowledge about the EU, and feelings of EU citizenship, among Irish citi-
zens. In relation to media coverage of EU affairs, (not specifically citizenship 
of the Union), the assessment of the (objectivity of the) coverage was seen as 
in line with EU averages.117  
                                                        
116. European Commission’s Representation in Ireland, Public Opinion in the European 
Union Autumn 2012 National Report Ireland Standard Eurobarometer 78 /Autumn 
2012 – TND Opinion and Social – available at  
 http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/eb/eb78/eb78_ie_en_nat.pdf – accessed 
26 August, 2013. 
117. P. 19. 
 In sum, we find generalised usage of language when referring to non-Irish 
citizens, without distinguishing between those who benefit from citizenship 
of the Union and others. It could also be inferred that the media treatment (of 
the issues arising from the Chen case) during the Citizenship Referendum had 
an impact on public discourse, as instanced in the outcome of that Referen-
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Italy 
Citizenship within Directive 2004/38/EC – stability of residence for 
Union citizens and their family members 
Question 1 
Directive 2004/38/EC has been transposed into the Italian legal system 
through Legislative Decree 6-2-2007 no. 30, in force from 11-4-2007, as sub-
sequently amended by Legislative Decree 28-02-2008, no. 32, Law 2-8-2011 
no. 128 and Law 6-8-2013 no. 97. 
 Legislative Decree no. 30 of 2007 reproduces Directive 2004/38/EC in or-
der to define the members of the family: Article 2 gives the same definitions 
as the Directive, Article 3 lists the beneficiaries. Both Article 2 and Article 3 
repeat Articles 2 and 3 of the Directive literally.  
 Under Article 2(1) b of Legislative Decree no. 30 of 2007, a member of 
the family is:  
1) the spouse,  
2) ‘the partner with whom the Union citizen has contracted a registered part-
nership, on the basis of the legislation of a Member State, if the legislation 
of the host Member State treats registered partnerships as equivalent to 
marriage and in accordance with the condition laid down in the relevant 
legislation of the host State’, 
3) the direct descendants who are under the age of 21 or are dependants and 
those of the spouse or partner as defined in point 2); 
4) the dependent direct relatives in the ascending line and those of the spouse 
or partner as defined in point 2).  
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BRUNO NASCIMBENE & ALESSIA DI PASCALE 
 670 
Under Article 3 of the Legislative Decree, family members as defined in Art-
icle 2(1) b enjoy the right to enter and stay, while the host State shall facilitate 
entry and residence for the following persons: 
a) any other family members, irrespective of their nationality, not falling un-
der the definition in Article 2(1) b, who, in the country from which they 
have come, are dependants or members of the household of the Union citi-
zen having the primary right of residence, or where serious health grounds 
strictly require the personal care of the family member by the Union citi-
zen; 
b) ‘the partner with whom the Union citizen has a durable relationship duly 
attested with official documents’.  
As to the partner, the durable relationship shall be officially attested. Please 
note, however, that Italy (the host State under Articles 2 and 3 of the Legisla-
tive Decree) neither regulates registered partnerships nor equates them to 
marriage. The partner with whom the Union citizen has an officially attested 
durable relationship will therefore fall under article 3 (members of the family 
for whom the State shall facilitate entry and residence). 
 As to the different types of family relationships outlined in Articles 2 and 
3, one of the most controversial issues has concerned same sex spouse. Al-
though same-sex spouses are not able to marry in Italy nor is it possible to 
have such a marriage transcribed,3 it is increasingly frequent for the foreigner 
to request a residence permit on the grounds of being one of a couple where 
the other is an Italian national. The court of Reggio Emilia has acted as a 
trail-blazer in quashing the decision to refuse the permit by the police authori-
ty on the basis of the fact that the capacity of spouse acquired in the country 
where the marriage was celebrated should have effect in Italy as well if only 
for the purposes of the issue of the residence card (Order 13-2-2012, the 
judgment is final because not appealed by the State Counsel). The Court of 
Pescara recognized ‘spouse’ in accordance with Legislative Decree no. N. 30 
of 2007 also the citizen of a country outside the European Union who has 
married abroad a EU citizen of the same sex, with consequent entitlement to 
the issuance of a residence permit and / or residence card. In 2012, the Minis-
try of the Interior issued a circular in which, while recalling that Legislative 
Decree no. 30 of 2007 does not permit the issue of a residence card pursuant 
                                                        
3. Going against its previous case-law, the Supreme Court has stated that the marriage 
of two Italians of the same sex celebrated abroad would be without force and effects 
in Italy, but not contrary to public order: judgment 15-3-2012 no. 4184. 
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to Article 10 to a spouse of the same sex, in effect acknowledged the practice 
of those police authorities which had issued a residence document as legiti-
mate (Circular 26-10-2012, no. 400/C/2012/8996/IIdiv). The question of 
recognition of same sex marriages for purposes of family reunification re-
mains, however, open. 
 Art. 5 of Legislative Decree no. 30 of 2007 basically reproduces art. 5 of 
the Directive. Legislative Decree 2008 no. 32 added a new para. 5 bis to Art-
icle 5 of Legislative Decree 2007 no. 30. Before the amendment, Legislative 
Decree did not require the Union citizen to report his/her presence within the 
Italian territory. Following the 2008 amendment, the Union citizen may re-
port his/her presence to a police office. The provision is not drafted as to im-
pose an obligation, but if the Union citizen has not reported to the police of-
fice, s/he shall be regarded as having stayed in Italy for more than three 
months, unless s/he can prove otherwise (see Article 5 para. 5-bis of Legisla-
tive Decree 2007 no. 30).  
 Legal scholars have much criticized that provision in relation to its com-
patibility with EU law. In fact, while the Union citizen has no obligation to 
report, not doing so entails negative consequences for them. If they did not 
report, and are unable to prove that they had been in Italy no longer than three 
months (a proof very difficult to provide), they would be deemed to have in-
fringed the obligation to register their residence with the municipal authority. 
In other words, the provision results in imposing additional documents not 
requested by the Directive, since the Union citizen can legally stay in Italy for 
less than three months if he/she can show, in addition to an identity card or 
passport, the document issued by the police stating that he/she reported 
his/her presence.  
 EU citizens who stay in Italy for more than three months have to register 
their residence with the municipal authorities of the place of domicile. The 
application has proved difficult sometimes, because some Municipalities 
have asked for more documents than allowed (a birth certificate, for exam-
ple). A number of Mayors, acting in their capacity as chiefs of the registry of-
fice, have issued some orders hardly in line with EU law. These decisions 
have then been annulled by Courts. 
Question 2 
There is no evidence of the expulsion of EU citizens (and/or their family 
members) on purely economic grounds in the decisions of national courts 
and/or tribunals.  
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 As far as economic resources are concerned, Law Decree no. 89 of 2011 
amended the original provision contained in Legislative Decree 2007/30. Be-
fore the amendment, the legislative decree asked for a fixed amount of re-
sources as a condition for registration of residence for non active EU citizens. 
After the amendment, it was added that in any case, the personal situation of 
the person concerned shall be taken into account in order to appreciate 
whether his/her economic resources are adequate.4 It is explicitly stated that 
recourse to the social assistance system is not a sufficient reason for adopting 
an expulsion order for lack of resources.5 
Question 3 
Articles 12-15 of the Directive have been transposed in compliance with EU 
law, basically reproducing the text of these provisions. Some differences con-
cern the following points: 
 Art. 13, para. 2, point c). The directive refers to ‘particularly difficult cir-
cumstances, such as having been a victim of domestic violence while the 
marriage or registered partnership was subsisting’. The Italian transposing 
norm is apparently more restricted ‘the concerned person is the offended par-
ty in criminal proceedings, pending or defined by a judgment of conviction 
for crimes against the person committed within the family’, thus requiring a 
criminal lawsuit. 
 The decree, however, is more favorable than the Directive in predicting 
that the family member that does not meet the requirement of a prior one-year 
residence, in case of death, or the conditions laid down in the event of disso-
lution, may retain the right to stay under art. 30, para. 5 of Legislative Decree 
25.7.1998, no. 286 (i.e. The Single Text on immigration). This provision 
specifies that ‘in case of death of the family member who meets the require-
ments for reunion and in case of legal separation or dissolution of marriage 
or, for the child who can not obtain a residence permit, at the age of eighteen 
years, the residence permit can be converted into a residence permit for em-
ployment, self-employment, or study, in compliance with the minimum age 
requirements for the performance of work activities’. 
 These provisions have not raised particular problems before the Courts.  
                                                        
4. New Article 9, para. 3-bis, of Legislative Decree no. 30 of 2007, as amended by Art-
icle 1, lit. c, of Decree-Law no. 89 of 2011.  
5. New Article 21, para. 1, of Legislative Decree no. 30 of 2007, as amended by Article 




Articles 16-21 of the Directive have been transposed into national law in line 
with EU Law. No data on the volume of applications to date for the status of 
permanent residence are available. 
 The provisions on permanent status for EU citizens did not give rise to any 
particular issues within national courts or tribunals. 
Question 5 
Art. 24(2) of the Directive has been transposed in the following terms by art. 
19(3) of legislative Decree no. 30 of 2007:  
‘Notwithstanding paragraph 2 (which establishes the principle of equality of treatment of 
EU citizens), and if not attributed independently by virtue of the exercised activity or other 
provisions of law, the citizen of the Union and their family do not enjoy the right to social 
assistance during the first three months of residence or, in any circumstance, in the cases 
provided under Article 13, para. 3, letter b),6 unless this right is automatically recognized 
by virtue of the exercised activity or by other law provisions.’7  
In light of the above, as a matter of principle, job seekers do not enjoy the 
right to social assistance and are equated to EU citizens during the first three 
months of residence. 
 This provision did not give rise to special issues.  
Question 6 
Art. 20 (1) of Legislative Decree 2007 no. 30, states that except for the case 
that the conditions grounding the stay in Italy do no more subsist, the right of 
entry and residence of Union citizens or their family members, whatever their 
nationality, may be restricted only for: reasons of state security, imperative 
grounds of public security, and other reasons of public policy or public secu-
rity.  
a) State security. The grounds of State security include facts that affect the 
stability of State institutions (for example, a terrorist attack or espionage 
activity). These grounds therefore include the case of the person being part 
                                                        
6. I.e. EU citizens who have entered Italy with the purpose of seeking a job. 
7. Article 19, para. 2, of Legislative Decree no. 30 of 2007. 
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of a terrorist organization or when there are reasonable grounds for believ-
ing that his/her stay in Italy could favor a national or international terrorist 
organization or its activities in any way (Article 20 (2) of Legislative De-
cree 2007 n. 30 as amended). To this purpose, any convictions handed 
down by an Italian court for one or more crimes related to those set in 
Book II, Title I of the Criminal Code, shall be taken into account (i.e. 
crimes against the State) 
b) Public security. Imperative grounds of public security subsist when the 
behavior of the person to expel amount to a genuine, effective, and serious 
threat affecting the fundamental human rights, or public safety, making 
his/her expulsion urgent because his/her stay is irreconcilable with orderly 
society. To this purpose it should be taken into account of previous crimi-
nal convictions decided by Italian or foreign judges, for one or more inten-
tional crimes, committed or attempted against the life or health of people 
and preventive measures or expulsion orders decided by foreign authori-
ties (Article 20 (3) of Legislative Decree 2007 n. 30 as amended.).8 Crimi-
nal convictions for a number of crimes are also taken into account. Among 
these, some are serious crimes (murder, rape) while others are offences 
that are not, as such, evidence of a social danger (e.g. counterfeiting).  
c) Other reasons of public policy or public security. It is also provided for a 
removal for other reasons of public policy or public security: it is adopted 
by the Prefect of the place of stay or residence of the recipient and relates 
to situations of people that do not fit into the circumstances described 
above, but nevertheless constitute a serious and present risk to state insti-
tutions or civil society. The Administration may use this type of measure 
in respect of a person whose presence on Italian territory is considered a 
serious threat to civil society or the institutions of the State, even if its sit-
uation is not one of those that legitimize the adoption of an expulsion de-
cision on grounds of public order or security of the State, or an expulsion 
on imperative grounds of public security. The conditions for this measure 
have been criticized in that they appear too general and therefore, this type 
of measure would not comply with EU requirements. 
Art. 20 (4) of Legislative Decree 30/2007, as amended by the Law of 2011, 
provides that removal orders must be adopted in accordance with the princi-
ple of proportionality and cannot be motivated by economic reasons, or by 
                                                        
8. This provision corresponds to Article 4 (2) of Decree-Law 2007 no. 249 which by its 
part elaborated on Article 20 (7-ter) as amended by Decree-Law 2007 no. 81. 
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reasons unrelated to the individual behavior of the person concerned repre-
senting a real, genuine, and sufficiently serious threat to public order or pub-
lic safety. The existence of criminal convictions shall not in itself justify the 
adoption of such measures.  
 In taking an expulsion measure, it must also be taken into account the 
length of stay in Italy, the age, the family status and economic situation, the 
state of health, the social and cultural integration in the national territory, and 
the importance of the ties with the country of origin of the concerned person. 
 The holders of the right of permanent residence may be expelled from the 
national territory only on grounds of national security, on imperative grounds 
of public security, or for other serious reasons of public policy or public secu-
rity. 
 The beneficiaries of the right of residence who have stayed in the country 
during the previous ten years or who are minors may only be removed for 
reasons of national security or for reasons of public security, unless the ex-
pulsion is necessary in the interests of the child, as required by the Conven-
tion on the Rights of the Child of 20 November 1989, ratified by 27 May 
1991, n. 176. 
 It should therefore be noted that the greater the attachment of the Union 
citizen with the host State (represented by the length of residence), the more 
limited the power of the State. So the Union citizen having the right of per-
manent residence (that is acquired after five years of residence) may only be 
expelled for reasons of State security, for imperative reasons of public securi-
ty, or for other serious reasons of public policy or public safety (par. 6 of art. 
20). The citizens of the Union residing for ten years or minors may only be 
expelled on grounds of national security or for reasons of public security (par. 
7 of art. 20). The Union citizen who does not fall into the categories above 
can then be expelled for all four reasons.  
 Diseases or infirmities that may justify restrictions on freedom of move-
ment within the national territory are only those with epidemic potential as 
identified by the World Health Organisation and other infectious diseases or 
contagious parasitic diseases if they are the subject of protection provisions 
applying to Italian nationals. Diseases that occur after entry into the territory 
cannot justify expulsion. 
 Courts have effectively applied these principles on the expulsion of Union 
citizens or their family members. 
 By decree of the Court of Milan 8.10.2008 an expulsion measure motivat-
ed with a criminal record of the person was canceled, because the documenta-
tion produced by the Police was not capable of proving the existence of such 
precedents. The Judge noted that the documents filed by the Administration 
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was such as to justify the adoption of a removal order for the cessation of 
conditions of stay, but not a removal for reasons of public order or security. 
 By decree of 9.3.2009, the Rome Court annulled the expulsion order, con-
sidering the tenuous nature of the alleged facts of the crime and enhancing the 
integration of the EU citizen in the country. 
 By decree of 4.7.2008, the Florence Court noted that failing registration, 
the absence of work and the lack of economic resources are all irrelevant cir-
cumstances or irrelevant for the purposes of determining the existence of 
grounds of public security. 
 By decree of 16.1.2008, the Court of Bologna ruled that some precedents, 
such as a conviction for theft and some reports for trespassing were not likely 
to represent a real threat, effective and serious threat to human dignity, the 
fundamental rights of the person or public safety. 
Judicial expulsion 
The Italian legal system regulates the expulsion of foreigners found guilty of 
particular offences (crimes against the State: Article 312 of the Criminal 
Code; serious crimes related to drugs: Article 86 of Decree of the President of 
the Republic no. 309 of 1990) or sentenced to a term of imprisonment of a 
certain length (Article 235 of the Criminal Code). In those cases, expulsion is 
a security measure, which is a measure enacted against a person who repre-
sents a danger for the general public, in order to prevent him from commit-
ting further crimes. Therefore, expulsion is not automatic, but depends on a 
specific analysis of the danger that the offender represents, made by both the 
judge who convicts him and the supervising court after the person has served 
his term of imprisonment. In order to ascertain if the person represents a dan-
ger, the judges have to take into account the offence committed, the circum-
stances in which the offence took place, and the personality of the offender. 
In doing that, the judge was not expressly committed to take into account the 
general principles laid down by Articles 27 and 28.1 of Directive 
2004/38/EC. An amendment was brought in 2009 stating that expulsion of 
Union citizens is to be carried out according to Article 20 of Legislative De-
cree 2007 no. 30 (implementing Articles 27 and 28.1 of the Directive). 
Thanks to the amendment, it is now clearer than any expulsion as security 
measure is to be carried out according to Article 20 of Legislative Decree 
2007 no. 30, and the judge has to take into account all the factors that EU law 
requires before deciding on the expulsion of a Union citizen under Articles 
235 and 312 of the Criminal Code.  
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EU citizenship beyond Directive 2004/38/EC – exploring national 
application of primary EU Law 
Question 7 
Purely internal situations did not give rise to particular issues. In this regard, 
please note that Legislative Decree no. 2007/30 also applies to the members 
of the family of Italian citizens.9 Hence, Courts or the administration do not 
need to resort to EU law when dealing with the reunification of family mem-
bers of an Italian citizen. The Chen case does not raise particular issues: al-
though there is no rule on the point, the principles affirmed therein are re-
spected in the practice. The case of Ruiz Zambrano is not relevant to Italy, 
because pursuant to Italian law (art. 19 Single Text on immigration) the ex-
pulsion of the parents of an Italian citizen is prohibited and, is therefore not 
necessary to apply EU law.  
Question 8 
Italian citizenship by naturalization may be granted to a EU citizens residing 
legally in Italy for four years, instead of 10, as it is required for third country 
nationals (Article 9 of Law no. 91/1992). EU citizens benefit of a preferential 
treatment as to the acquisition of nationality. 
 The Italian Law on citizenship does not provide for the revocation of citi-
zenship in case of fraudulent acquisition. Citizenship is automatically re-
voked under the following circumstances: 
– in case of revocation of adoption due to causes attributable to the adoptee; 
– for not having complied with the Government request to abandon a public 
office or military service in another state. 
No evidence of application of Rottmann principles in practical cases. 
                                                        
9. Pursuant to Art. 23, the provisions of Legislative Decree no. 30/2007, if more fa-
vorable, also apply to non-Italian family members of Italian citizens. 
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Political rights of EU citizens 
Question 9 
As far as the election of the members of European Parliament is concerned, 
art. 40 of Law no. 18 of 1979 already entitled nationals of EC member States 
who were in Italy at the time of EP elections to vote for candidates of their 
country of citizenship, in accordance with bilateral agreements that had oc-
curred between those countries and the Italian Government, and on a reci-
procity basis.  
 Council Directive 93/109 of the European Union Council of 6 December 
1993 was implemented in Italy by Law Decree 24 June 1994, no. 408 (Urgent 
provisions for elections to the European Parliament), converted into law, with 
amendments, by the law 3 August 1994, no. 483, amended by Law 24 April 
1998, n. 128.  
 EU citizens residing in Italy may, upon request, exercise their right to 
vote, and to stand for elections, as Italian representatives to the European Par-
liament; in this case, however, since the right to vote in European elections 
may not be exercised more than once in the same election, those who vote for 
the election of the Italian representatives to the European Parliament waive 
the same voting rights in their country of origin. 
 To vote and to stand for elections in Italy, EU citizens must enroll in an 
electoral additional list within the Municipality of residence. This registration 
in additional electoral lists is effected upon request of the concerned person, 
while for Italian citizens it is automatically carried out by the Municipality. 
 In submitting their application, EU citizens must declare expressly: 
a) their willingness to exercise the right to vote in Italy only; 
b) their nationality; 
c) the address in the municipality of residence and in the home member 
State;  
d) the capacity to vote in the home member State; e) the absence of a court 
order, criminal or civil, stating that he/she has been deprived of the right to 
vote in his/her home Member State. 
A national of another Member State of the Union who intends to stand for 
elections as Italian representative in the European Parliament must provide 
the Registry of the competent Court of appeal, at the time of filing the list of 
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candidates, in addition to the documentation required for Italian candidates, a 
formal statement containing the following information: 
A) the nationality and address in Italy; 
B) the municipality or district of the State of origin in whose lists he/she is 
enrolled; 
C) that he/she is not a candidate and does not present its candidature for the 
same election of the European Parliament in any other Member State. 
The declaration must be accompanied by a certificate from the competent au-
thority of the country of origin stating that the concerned person is entitled to 
electoral rights in the same State.  
 The Court of Appeal shall inform the applicant of the decision concerning 
the admissibility of the application. In case of rejection of the application, the 
applicant is entitled to the same forms of judicial protection allowed, in simi-
lar cases, for Italian candidates. 
 The appeal court shall inform the competent authorities in the countries of 
origin of the names of their citizens who have applied to stand for election in 
Italy. 
 There has not been relevant case-law in domestic jurisdiction. 
 As far as the new Directive 2013/1/EU is concerned, the main changes 
concern the introduction of a measure of simplification of the procedures for 
exercising the right of standing for elections, providing for the substitution, 
for the purpose of submitting the application, of the certification proving the 
requirements that he/she has not been deprived of the right to stand as a can-
didate in the home Member State through an individual judicial decision or 
an administrative decision, with a simple statement.  
Question 10 
Legislative Decree no. 197/1996, implementing Directive 94/80/EC, lays 
down detailed rules governing the exercise of the right to vote and stand in 
Municipal and District elections, for EU citizens residing in another Member 
State. 
 To vote and to stand for elections in Italy, EU citizens must be at least 18 
years old by the day fixed for the vote and enjoy political rights. It is also im-
perative that they enroll in an electoral additional list within the Municipality 
of residence. This registration in additional electoral lists is effected upon re-
quest of the concerned person, while for Italian citizens it is automatically 
carried out by the Municipality. 
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 Article 1, paragraph 5, of the Decree of 12 April 1996 no. 197, provides 
that the registration allows EU citizens to exercise their right to vote for the 
election of the mayor, the Council of the municipality and the district in 
whose lists they are recorded. Moreover they are entitled to be elected as 
counselors and member of the council of the municipality, with the exception 
of the office of deputy mayor and mayor. 
 There have not been derogations so far and these rules did not give rise to 
particular litigation. 
Question 11 
EU citizens are granted electoral rights (to vote and to stand as a candidate) in 
relation to municipal elections (Elezioni comunali), by means of Act n. 52 of 
6 February 1996 and Legislative Decree no. 197 of 12 April 1996. 
 There is no franchise for EU citizens that goes beyond the local and EP 
electoral rights required under EU law. 
Question 12 
There are no specific areas where tensions exist between EU law and national 
provisions limiting the scope of the franchise.  
Culture(s) of citizenship 
Question 13 
The theme of the treatment of citizens of the European Union in recent years 
has been mainly dealt within a key policy of repression and control, rather 
than focusing on access to rights profiles. After the first transposition of 2007, 
subsequent changes made to the rules in force were centered mainly on the 
issue of expulsion and how to test the length of stay. 
 After the murder of an Italian woman by an undocumented EU citizen in 
November 2007, EU citizens in an irregular position (most of them were 
Romanian citizens of Roma origin) became the focus of strong Italian con-
cern. A cornerstone of emergency-response strategy has been the argument 
that repressive turn was necessary to prevent spontaneous reactions.  
 Measures and legislative initiatives on the matter of migration were thus 
incorporated in a ‘security package’, a diverse set of measures that have in 
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common the purpose of making the action to prevent and combat macro and 
micro crime more efficient and effective. As a reaction to the above men-
tioned serious criminal acts of which irregular migrants were found guilty, 
amendments to legislation in force were adopted in order to tighten the rules 
on removal. 
Question 14 
There is no evidence that the binding effect of the Charter of Fundamental 
Rights of the European Union, following the entry into force of the Lisbon 
Treaty in 2009, played any role in how the rights of EU citizens are being in-
terpreted by the national courts and/or tribunals. 
Question 15 
Please refer to the remarks in question 13 above. Media have been accused of 
fuelling a culture of fear and blame around in public opinion against undoc-
umented migrants, especially Roma. EU citizens in general are not the target 
of media criticism, but special negative attention has been directed to people 













Citizenship within Directive 2004/38/EC – stability of residence for 
Union citizens and their family members 
Question 1 
Directive 2004/38 was transposed into Maltese Law by Legal Notice 191 of 
2007, as amended by Legal Notices 427 of 2007, 329 of 2011 and 107 of 
2012.  
 Article 2 of the Directive on Definitions has been transposed into Article 2 
of the national legislation concerning definitions, ad litteram, except for the 
following: 
(a) The definition in Article 2(2)(b) of the Directive concerning registered 
partnerships has been excluded from the national legislation because 
Malta does not have any legislation on registered partnerships. 
Article 3(1) of the Directive on Beneficiaries has been included in Article 
1(4) of the national legislation ad litteram and specifies that the Order also 
applies to ‘third country nationals’ who are family members of the Union citi-
zen and who accompany or join him or her.  
 Article 3(2) of the Directive has been transposed into Article 2 of the na-
tional legislation concerning definitions, under the definition of the term ‘other 
family members’. The definition under Article 2 reflects that under Article 
3(2) of the Directive but again excludes a partner who has a duly attested du-
rable relationship with the Union citizen. 
 Article 5(1) of the Directive on Right of Entry has been transposed into 
Article 3(2) of the national legislation and allows a Union citizen and his 
family members who are also Union citizens to ‘enter and leave Malta’ with a 
                                                        
1. Dr Natasha Buontempo is Assistant Lecturer at the University of Malta teaching EU 
Law and is currently studying for a Ph.D in Law at the University of Strathclyde, UK. 
NATASHA BUONTEMPO 
 684 
valid identification card. This also applies to family members of the Union 
citizen who are third country nationals in possession of a valid passport.  
 Article 5(2) and 5(3) of the Directive and its proviso have been transposed 
into the proviso to Article 3(2) of the national legislation. The proviso is in 
accordance with Article 3(2).  
 Article 4 of the Directive on the right to a reasonable opportunity to pro-
duce valid travel documents/visa has been transposed into the proviso of Ar-
ticle 3(2) of the national legislation. 
 Article 5(5) of the Directive on reporting one’s presence when no valid 
travel documents/visa have been produced does not feature in the national 
legislation. This is a facultative concession which the State may grant to the 
person concerned. Malta has opted not to adopt this procedure. 
How have national courts and/or tribunals dealt with the different types of 
family relationships outlined in Articles 2 and 3? 
In the case Ogunyemi Kehinde Olusegum & Sandra Wetterich v Director of 
Public Registry and the Advocate General,2 a third country national from Ni-
geria and a German resident in Malta applied for the publication of their mar-
riage banns. Olusegum had been working in Malta with a valid visa and 
working permit. However, when the visa expired he was refused renewal. 
Subsequently, when they applied for the publication of their marriage banns, 
the Director of Public Registry refused to issue the banns on the basis that 
Olusegum was in fact residing illegally in Malta. The issue was taken before 
the Constitutional Court on the basis that the decision of the Director of Pubic 
Registry violated their fundamental right to marry and start a family. Their 
claim was based both on the European Convention on Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms, Article 8, as well as Directive 2004/38 particularly 
the right of third country nationals who are married to Union citizens to re-
side with their spouse. No claim was based on Article 3(2)(b) which obliges 
Member States to ‘facilitate entry and residence for ... the partner with whom 
the Union citizen has a durable relationship, duly attested’. 
 In this case, the Court’s decision was mainly focused on the definition of 
‘family’ as developed by the European Court on Human Rights (ECrtHR). 
The Court did recognise that the European Court has defined ‘family’ in a 
broad manner to include ‘two persons, male and female, who have the inten-
                                                        




tion of getting married or to cohabit for a considerable period of time’. How-
ever the Court felt that the plaintiffs had not submitted sufficient proof that 
the couple had ‘a long and well established family life in Malta’. 
 What is significant in this judgment is that the Court focused only on the 
international obligations of the State on the basis of the ECHR quoting DJ 
Harris, M O’Boyle u C Warbrick in ‘Law of the European Convention on 
Human Rights’ page 313: 
It should be noticed at the outset that the obligation on the state is to respect family life: it 
does not allow persons to claim a right to establish family life, e.g. by marrying or having 
the opportunity to have children, nor a general right to establish family life in a particular 
jurisdiction. 
The Court did not consider the obligation of the Member States to ‘facilitate 
entry and residence for ... the partner with whom the Union citizen has a du-
rable relationship, duly attested’ (Article 3(2)(b)) as well as the spirit of 
Clause 6 of the Preamble to the Directive.  
 The Court predominantly considered the issue from the ECHR point of 
view and very minimally from the European Union point of view and Di-
rective 2004/38. When it came to considering Directive 2004/38 the Court 
referred to the definition of ‘family member’ envisaged by Article 2 of the 
Directive only, excluding consideration of the other ‘beneficiaries’ envisaged 
by Article 3 including ‘the partner with whom the Union citizen has a durable 
relationship, duly attested’. The Court held that Olesegun did not qualify un-
der the definition of ‘family member’ envisaged by Article 2(2) of the Di-
rective. 
 The line of reasoning which the Constitutional Court undertook was the 
definition of ‘family’ as a point of departure under both the ECHR and the 
Directive. 
 Yes, the procedural safeguards contained in Article 5 provide effective 
protection. 
Question 2  
There is no evidence of expulsions of EU citizens from Malta for failure to 
satisfy conditions related purely to economic grounds. 
Question 3 
Articles 12, 13, 14, and 15 have been transposed into national legislation by 
means of Legal Notice 191 of 2007 (as explained above).  
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 Articles 12 and 13 have been transposed into Articles 5; the first proviso 
to Article 13(2) has been transposed into the second proviso to Article 6.  
 Article 14(1) has been transposed into the proviso to Article 3(3) of the 
national legislation and the proviso to Article 14 into Article 4(2) of the na-
tional legislation. Article 14(3) and (4) have been transposed into proviso 1 
and to Article 13 of the national legislation. 
 Article 15 has been transposed into Article 14 of the national law whereas 
Article 15(2) has been transposed into Article 13(6) of the said law. 
 There is no evidence that disputes on the interpretation or application of 
these provisions have arisen before the Maltese Courts. 
Question 4 
Articles 16, 17, and 18 have been transposed into Article 6 of the national 
legislation.  
 Article 19 has been transposed into Article 7(8) of the national legislation. 
 Article 20 has been transposed into Article 7(6), 7(9), 7(10) of the national 
legislation. 
 There is no evidence that data on the volume of applications for the status 
of permanent residence has been published. 
 There is no evidence that issues relating to Article 16 to 21 have been the 
subject of litigation in the Maltese Courts. The Immigration Appeals Board, 
however, does not publish its decisions and therefore, it is very difficult to 
obtain such information. From the Immigration Appeals Board, there is the 
faculty to appeal to the Court of Appeal in its inferior jurisdiction. To date, 
the Court of Appeal (Inferior) has not delivered any judgments on the above-
mentioned articles and/or their interpretation. 
Question 5 
Article 24(2) has been transposed into the second proviso to Article 3 of the 
national legislation. In addition, Article 3(4) of the national legislation allows 
the three month period to be extended to six months in the case of a person 
who is seeking employment. 
 The national law does not distinguish between social assistance as envis-
aged by Article 24(2) of the Directive and a benefit or advantage which helps 
facilitate access to the labour market as per the CJEU judgment in Collins. 
Job-seeker’s allowance does not form part of Maltese policy. 
 There is no evidence of litigation on the basis of Article 24(2) and the 




There is no evidence that the Courts have entertained the interpretation of the 
terms ‘public policy, public security, or public health’ in the context of Art-
icles 27 and 28 of the Directive or the corresponding national legislation. 
 The Court has not pronounced itself on the principle of proportionality in 
the context of the above-mentioned articles. 
 There is no evidence that the Court has entertained considerations such as 
how long the individual concerned has resided on its territory, his/her age, 
state of health, family and economic situation, social and cultural integration 
into the host Member State, and the extent of his/her links with the country of 
origin on the basis of Directive 2004/38. 
EU citizenship beyond Directive 2004/38/EC – exploring national 
application of primary EU Law 
Question 7 
There is no evidence that the Court has rejected arguments on EU citizenship 
rights on the basis that the matter involves a ‘purely internal situation’. No 
such dispute has arisen before the Maltese courts.  
 In both Chen and Zambrano, a child was born to third country national 
parents in a Member State of the European Union and in both cases, by the 
mere fact of ius soli, the child acquired citizenship of the Member State 
wherein they were born. Under Maltese law,3 a child who is born in Malta to 
parents who are both third country nationals will not automatically acquire 
Maltese citizenship. Following the 1989 amendments to the Maltese Citizen-
ship Act, a child will acquire Maltese citizenship if at least one of the parents 
was a citizen of Malta at the time of birth of the child.4 Therefore, the situa-
tion which arose in Chen and in Zambrano cannot arise in Malta because the 
principles of both ius soli and ius sanguini are applied. A child in such a sit-
uation will be treated as a third country national. 
                                                        
3. Maltese Citizenship Act, Chapter 188 of the Laws of Malta. 
4. Buttigieg E, Country Report: Malta, EUDO Citizenship Observatory (2013) at  
 http://eudo-citizenship.eu, accessed on 2 Sept. 2013. 
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 There is no evidence that disputes regarding rights acquired under Di-
rective 2004/38 and those under Articles 20 and 21 TFEU in terms of EU citi-
zens seeking family reunification rights have arisen before the Maltese courts. 
Question 8 
Article 14 the Maltese Citizenship Act states: 
(1) Subject to the provisions of this article, the Minister may by order deprive of his Mal-
tese citizenship any citizen of Malta who is such by registration or naturalisation if he 
is satisfied that the registration or certificate of naturalisation was obtained by means of 
fraud, false representation or the concealment of any material fact. 
In addition, the Minister has the power to deprive citizenship by registration or 
naturalisation in other specified circumstances envisaged by Article 14(2)-(5).5 
 Article 14(4) states: 
Before making an order under this article, the Minister shall give the person against whom 
the order is proposed to be made notice in writing informing him of the ground on which it 
                                                        
5. (2) Subject to the provisions of this article, the Minister may by order deprive of his 
Maltese citizenship any citizen of Malta who is such by registration or by naturalisa-
tion if he is satisfied that the citizen – 
 (a) has shown himself by act or speech to be disloyal or disaffected towards the Pres-
ident or the Government of Malta; or 
 (b) has, during any war in which Malta was engaged, unlawfully traded or communi-
cated with an enemy or been engaged in or associated with any business that was to 
his knowledge carried on in such a manner as to assist an enemy in that war; or 
 (c ) has, within seven years after becoming naturalised, or being registered as a citizen 
of Malta, been sentenced in any country to a punishment restrictive of personal liberty 
for a term of not less than twelve months; or 
 (d ) has been ordinarily resident in foreign countries for a continuous period of seven 
years and during that period has neither - 
 (i) been at any time in the service of the Republic or of an international organisation 
of which the Government of Malta was a member; or 
 (ii) given notice in writing to the Minister of his intention to retain citizenship of Malta. 
 (3) The Minister shall not deprive a person of citizenship under this article unless he 
is satisfied that it is not conducive to the public good that that person should continue 
to be a citizen of Malta and, in the case referred to in subarticle (2)(c), it appears to 
him that that person would not thereupon become stateless. 
 (5) The Minister may make rules for the practice and procedure to be followed in 
connection with a committee of inquiry appointed under this article, and such rules 
may, in particular, provide for conferring on any such committee any powers, rights 
or privileges of any court, and for enabling any powers so conferred to be exercised 
by one or more members of the committee. 
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is proposed to be made and of his right to an inquiry under this article; and if that person 
applies in the prescribed manner for an inquiry, the Minister shall refer the case to a com-
mittee of inquiry consisting of a chairman, being a person possessing judicial experience, 
appointed by the Minister and of such other members appointed by the Minister as he 
thinks proper. 
Legal Notice 40 of 1991 establishes the composition and function of the 
committee of inquiry the role of which is to make an inquiry into a complaint 
brought forward by an aggrieved person and to take a decision by majority 
vote.6 
Political rights of EU citizens 
Question 9 
Directive 93/109/EC was promulgated into Maltese law by means of Act 
XVI of 2003, as amended by Legal Notices 42 of 2007, 308 and 426 of 2012. 
It was adopted on the 1 January 2004 (the day Malta officially acceded to the 
European Union). 
 Every person whose name appears in the national Electoral Register and 
the EU Electoral Register is entitled to vote.7 The national Electoral Register 
lists all Maltese citizens who are entitled to vote whereas the EU Electoral 
Register lists all EU citizens who are entitled to vote in local council elections 
and European Parliament elections. 
 The criteria for inclusion in the national Electoral Register are envisaged 
by the General Elections Act.8 A person is entitled to be included in the na-
tional Electoral Register and registered as a voter if he satisfies the following: 
1. he must be a citizen of Malta; 
2. he must be 18 years of age; 
3. he must reside in Malta and must have done so for six months or aggre-
gate of six months during the eighteen months immediately preceding his 
registration.9 
                                                        
6. Article 10(1), LN 40 of 1991. 
7. Article 10, European Parliament Elections Act, Ch. 467 of the Laws of Malta. 
8. Ch. 354 of the Laws of Malta. 
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The criteria which EU citizens must satisfy in order that they may qualify to 
be included in the EU Electoral Register and to consequently vote in Euro-
pean Parliament elections are as follows: 
1. the person must be a national of a Member States whose name does not 
appear in the Electoral Register; 
2. he must be in possession of a legally valid identification document; 
3. he must be over the age of 18; 
4. he must be resident in Malta for at least a period of six months or aggre-
gate of six months in the eighteen months preceding his registration.10 
Persons who are included in the Electoral Register and the EU Electoral Reg-
ister have a right to stand for election as a member of the European Parlia-
ment.11 There are no additional conditions imposed on EU citizens. 
 There has not been any court cases on the issue, but for a short period of 
time there seems to have been unequal treatment in the way in which registra-
tion to vote took place as EU citizens resident in Malta were required to enrol 
in the EU Electoral Register within a given period of time whereas such a 
rule was inapplicable in the case of Maltese citizens.12 Today the issue has 
been resolved and there is no time period which limits enrolment of EU citi-
zens on the EU Electoral Register following discussions between the Euro-
pean Commission’s Directorate-General for Justice and the Maltese authori-
ties in 2011. 
What additional changes will be required by the December 2012 amendments 
to Directive 93/109/EC? 
The following are the changes required by the amendments to Directive 
93/109/EC: 
Preamble 9 
To facilitate communication between national authorities, Member States should designate 
one contact point to be responsible for the notification of information concerning such 
candidates.  
                                                        
9. Article 15, General Elections Act, Ch. 354 of the Laws of Malta. 
10. Article 11, European Parliament Elections Act, Ch. 467 of the Laws of Malta. 
11. Ibid Art. 18. 
12. DeBono D, Access to Electoral Rights Malta, EUDO Citizenship Observatory, June 




Article 1(c) of the amending Directive states: 
For the purposes of paragraph 2 of this Article, the Member State of residence shall notify 
the home Member State of the declaration referred to in Article 10(1). To that end, the rel-
evant information that is available from the home Member State shall be provided in any 
appropriate manner within five working days from the reception of the notification or, 
where possible, within a shorter time-limit, if so requested by the Member State of resi-
dence. Such information may include only details which are strictly necessary for the im-
plementation of this Article and may be used only for that purpose.  
 If the information is not received by the Member State of residence within the time-
limit, the candidate shall none the less be admitted.  
Question 10 
Directive 94/80/EC on local elections became part of Maltese Law with the 
accession of Malta to the EU. The Local Councils Act13 was amended to en-
sure transposition of the Directive in Maltese Law.  
 No, there have not been any derogation. 
 EU Citizens resident in Malta are not required to register in order that they 
may vote in local council elections. In Malta, non-national EU citizens are 
automatically entered in the Local Council election rolls, once they are in-
cluded in the EU Electoral Register.14  
 There has not been any relevant case law on the matter. 
Question 11 
In Malta EU Citizens are granted the right to vote in and to run for local 
council elections and European Parliament elections, reflecting Directives 
93/109/EC and 94/80/EC respectively. They are not allowed to participate in 
any manner in general elections. Third country nationals resident in Malta are 
not allowed any voting rights at any level. 
 No, there is no franchise for EU citizens that go beyond the local and EP 
electoral rights required under EU law. 
                                                        








There is no evidence of any case law which deals with tensions between EU 
law and national provisions. 
Culture(s) of citizenship 
Question 13 
The implementation of EU citizenship in Malta seems to rest on the idea of 
‘permission’ rather than the idea of a constitutional right emanating from the 
Treaties and other subsidiary legislation such as the Citizens’ Rights Di-
rective, transposed into Maltese Law by means of Legal Notice 191 of 2007. 
The ‘permission’ mentality is reflected in the way in which EU legislation on 
citizenship has been implemented in Malta, generally by amending our im-
migration laws.15 Legal Notice 191 of 2007, which transposes the Citizens’ 
Right Directive, makes ample reference to the Immigration Act and the Im-
migration Appeals Board. Cases of citizenship are dealt with by a single Di-
rectorate for Citizenship and Expatriate Affairs, irrespective of whether the 
persons concerned are EU citizens or third country nationals. Any complaints 
or objections raised concerning citizenship are dealt with by the Immigration 
Appeals Board.16  
Question 14 
There is no evidence that the Maltese Courts have pronounced themselves on 
the rights of EU citizens on the basis of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of 
the EU. 
                                                        
15. See for example, Article 1(2) of Legal Notice 191 of 2007 (Free Movement of Euro-
pean Union Nationals and Family Member Order).  
16. See Legal Notice 191 of 2007 (Free Movement of European Union Nationals and 




There have been incidents of alleged discrimination against EU citizens relat-
ed to the charging of bus fares17 and utility bills. It has been alleged by a 
number of EU citizens residing in Malta that they are being made to pay 
35 % and 60 % more in bills of electricity and water respectively, than their 
Maltese counterparts.18 A constitutional case has been recently lodged in the 
Maltese Courts.19 Another incident reported in the local newspapers concerns 
an English woman who has been living in Malta for two years, together with 
her husband and children, and who had to go through considerable red tape to 
register her younger child at a government school because her old identity 
card had expired.20  
 Issues relating to EU citizenship are generally reported in the national me-
dia when they involve discrimination or discriminatory rules against non-
nationals, as in the cases mentioned above. Issues of EU citizenship are dealt 
with by the Directorate of Citizenship and Expatriate Affairs and are not 
made public. Objections to decisions taken by the Directorate may be lodged 
before the Immigration Appeals Board, but decisions of such board are not 
usually made public. As a consequence, it is not very easy to determine the 
kind of issues that arise unless those concerned contact the media to make 
their case publicly known. It is also quite difficult to determine whether na-
tional reporting of EU citizenship is accurate or otherwise.  
 
                                                        
17. Times of Malta,‘Expats put Adverts on ‘discriminatory’ Buses’, 19 August 2013. 
 http://www.timesofmalta.com/articles/view/20130819/local/Expats-put-adverts-on-
discriminatory-buses.482392#.UlOyuhbx34w, accessed on 8 October 2013. 
18. The Malta Independent, ‘EU Nationals in Malta ‘Up in Arms’,’ 14 July 2013, found 
at http://www.independent.com.mt/articles/2013-07-14/letters/eu- nationals-in-malta-
up-in-arms-2068054019/, accessed on 8 October 2013.  
19. Times of Malta, ‘Expats take tariff fight to the Court’, 1 October 2013, found at 
http://www.timesofmalta.com/articles/view/20131001/local/Expats-take-tariff-fight-
to-the-court.488469#.UlOyJBbx34w, accessed on 8 October 2013. 
20. Times of Malta ‘Expat anger as schools won’t accept old ID card’, 2 September 2013, 
found at http://www.timesofmalta.com/articles/view/20130902/local/Expat-an ger-as-
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The Netherlands 
Citizenship within Directive 2004/38/EC – stability of residence for 
Union citizens and their family members 
Question 1 
The relevant framework in this regard consists of the Aliens Act 2000 
(Vreemdelingenwet 2000), Aliens Decree 2000 (Vreemdelingenbesluit), and 
the Aliens Circular (Vreemdelingencirculaire). Article 1(e) Aliens Act 2000 
defines the term ‘Community subject’ as either a national of a member state 
who has the right based on primary EU law to enter and remain in the Nether-
lands (paragraph 1), or a third-country national family member of a person 
who has the right based on secondary EU legislation to enter and remain in 
the Netherlands (paragraph 2). Article 9(1) of the same act provides that the 
persons mentioned in paragraph 2 of Article 1(e) shall be issued a residence 
card. 
 The main thrust of the legal framework consists of Articles 8.7-8.25 Aliens 
Decree 2000. These articles are intended to implement Directive 2004/38. Art-
icle 8.7 provides in essence that the Aliens Decree is applicable to EU nation-
als and the family members enumerated in Article 2(2) of the Directive 
2004/38. It is noteworthy that in the Netherlands the term ‘spouse’ is inter-
preted widely, as civil marriage under Dutch law also includes same-sex mar-
riages. Likewise, a foreign and legally registered partnership is acceptable 
under Article 8.7. Article 8.7(3) declares the section to be applicable to the 
family members enumerated in Article 3(2)(a) of the Directive. Article 8.7(4) 
                                                        
1. Dr. J. Langer is a legal advisor in EU law with the Dutch Foreign Office and a pro-
fessor at Groningen University; Dr. A. Schrauwen is a professor at the University of 
Amsterdam. The report was co-authored by C. Bakker, J. Bierbach, M. Botman, G. 
Dictus, H. Van Eijken, J. Frijters, K. Heede, J. Hoogveld, S. Mooij, J. Rijpma, C. 
Schillemans, S. de Vries, and H. de Waele. All opinions expressed in this report are 
personal views and do not represent the views of any company, organisation or minis-
try with which the authors may be affiliated.  
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declares the section to be applicable to the de facto partners provided for by 
Article 3(2)(b) of the Directive. It also goes somewhat farther than the Di-
rective in additionally providing for applicability of the section to the direct 
descendant of such a partner who is 18 or under. Article 8.9 implements Art-
icle 5(2) of the Directive. Article 8.11 implements Article 5(1) of the Di-
rective. It additionally provides in Art. 8.11(1)(b) that proof of an EU citi-
zen’s identity and nationality can be provided by means other than a valid 
passport or valid identity card. 
 Until January 2009, unmarried and unregistered partners of EU citizens 
enjoyed a right of residence by complete analogy to the immigration facilities 
made available by Dutch immigration law to the de facto partners of Dutch 
citizens and third-country nationals. This (national) practice was an imple-
mentation of the Reed decision by the ECJ requiring non-discriminatory ac-
cess for Community workers.2 In January 2009, the Government introduced a 
new policy rule changing the basis of rights of residence for de facto partners 
from the non-discrimination principle to the Directive provision (Art. 3(2)(b)) 
on ‘durable relationship[s], duly attested’.3 The new policy rule stated that 
sufficient proof of a durable relationship was provided, in any case, if the two 
partners had had a child together or if they could prove that they had already 
cohabited for six months. If they had cohabited in the Netherlands, the proof 
could only be provided by a common municipal address registration. On the 
other hand, if they had cohabited in another country a joint rental contract or 
joint utility bills would provide proof. The Council of State has been critical 
in its case law regarding these policy rules. According to the Council, evi-
dence could not be limited to common registration in the municipal address 
register as proof of prior cohabitation in the Netherlands, as this indirectly 
imposes a requirement of prior legal residence on a third-country national.4 
The Council has accepted that alternate satisfactory evidence of a durable re-
lationship can be provided if the two persons involved are interviewed sepa-
rately and provide matching answers to questions about their relationship.5 
As a consequence, on 1 June 2013 a new version of the Aliens Circular came 
into effect. This version contains the same policy as introduced in January 
2009, but with the explicit comment that in all matters of EU law, the rele-
vant authorities will not limit the means of evidence that can be used.  
                                                        
2. Case 59/85 State of the Netherlands v Ann Florence Reed [1986] ECR 1283. 
3. Chapter B10/1.7 Aliens Circular as amended on 31 January 2009. 
4. Raad van State, 6 September 2011, ECLI:NL:RVS:2011:BS1678. 




There is in the case law limited evidence of expulsion decisions taken on the 
ground of non-fulfilment of the conditions imposed by the Directive. The fol-
lowing court decisions are noteworthy in this regard. The District Court of 
Amsterdam ruled on 21 February 2013 in a case concerning the request for 
allowance by a Bulgarian national that municipalities are under an obligation 
to assess themselves whether the EU citizen has a right of residence. They 
cannot rely on the residence status as recorded by the immigration authorities 
(IND).6 According to the Court, this obligation derived from the fact that the 
right of residence of EU citizens flows directly from the Treaty. Therefore, it 
ruled that in the case at hand, the Bulgarian citizen did not have a right of res-
idence based on Article 7 of the Directive. Consequently, he was not entitled 
to an allowance. The Court refrained from ruling on alternative grounds for 
the residence status. On 18 March 2013, however, the Administrative High 
Court (the highest court in social security matters) ruled that municipalities, 
when deciding on allowances, may not refuse these allowances with the ar-
gument that the recourse to social assistance is proof of the absence of the 
right to stay in the Netherlands.7 The Court stressed that the recourse to social 
assistance cannot automatically result in expulsion: the IND decides on the 
residence status and the municipalities decide on allowances. 
 In mid-2013, the Minister of Social Affairs announced the start of a pilot 
project in Rotterdam.8 This pilot will commence as of 1 October 2013 for a 
period of six months. Local authorities and immigration authorities will col-
laborate closely in cases where an EU citizen applies for social assistance. 
The plan is that the IND will on short term verify the residence status of the 
applicant. If the applicant has no right under EU law to stay in the Nether-
lands, the IND will accordingly inform the local authorities. If the applicant 
was either employed or self-employed for over a year, social assistance will 
be granted. The same applies to economically non-active EU citizens who 
have resided in the Netherlands for more than five years.  
                                                        
6. Rechtbank Amsterdam, 21 February 2013, ECLI:NL:RBAMS:2013:BZ5689. 
7. Centrale Raad van Beroep, 18 March 2013, ECLI:NL:CRVB:2013:BZ3853, BZ3854, 
BZ3855, see also Centrale Raad van Beroep, 19 March 2013, ECLI:NL:CRVB: 
2013:BZ3857. 
8. Letter of the Minister of Social Affairs, 10 July 2013, reference: 2013-0000091692, 
available at: http://www.rijksoverheid.nl/documenten-en-publicaties/kamerstukken/ 
2013/07/10/pilot-verblijfsbeeindiging-eu-burgers-rotterdam.html>. 
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Question 3 
Article 12 of Directive 2004/38 has been fully transposed in, respectively, 
Articles 8.14, 8.15(2) sub a and b, 8.15(5) and (6) of the Aliens Decree 2000.  
 Article 13 of the Directive has been transposed in respectively Article 8 
and Article 8.15(4) of the Aliens Decree 2000. The Decree provides that an 
ex-spouse (or ex-civil partner) of a EU citizen is eligible for permanent resi-
dency after five years of legal residence in the Netherlands on the basis of EU 
law if the marriage lasted at least three years, of which one of those years was 
in the Netherlands. With the implementation of the Directive, the Netherlands 
has explicitly chosen to treat the non-registered partners of EU citizens in a 
similar way to spouses or registered partners (Article 8.7(4) Aliens Decree 
2000). 
 The Council of State decided on 4 May 2012 that an unmarried partner of 
a EU national could make a claim for entitlement to permanent EU-residency 
with regard to compelling humanitarian reasons, in case of a (former) durable 
relationship duly attested with an EU citizen.9 The District Court of The 
Hague determined that unmarried third-country national partners of EU citi-
zens have a right to continued residency in case that their relationship ends if 
the third country national ex-partner is able to prove that he or she had a du-
rable relationship for at least three years with an EU citizen, at least one of 
which was spent living legally in the Netherlands.10 
 Article 14 has been transposed in Article 8.16 of the Aliens Decree 2000. 
Verification of conditions is not carried out systematically, only when the EU 
citizen applies for a sticker in his passport to prove legal residency in the 
Netherlands on the basis of Article 7 of Directive 2004/38.11 
Question 4 
Article 16 of the Directive has been transposed in Articles 8.17(1) and (2) and 
8.18 sub a) of the Aliens Decree 2000. Legal residence for a continuous peri-
od of five years is presumed if the relevant authorities have not withdrawn the 
residence permit.12 
                                                        
9. Raad van State, 4 May, 2012, ECLI:NL:RVS:2012:BW5523. 
10. Rechtbank Amsterdam, 27 March 2013, ECLI:NL:RBAMS:2013:4271. 
11. See also question 2. 




 Article 17 of the Directive has been transposed in Article 8.17(3)-(7) of 
the Aliens Decree 2000. In general, Article 18 has been transposed in Article 
8.15(2) and (4) of the Aliens Decree 2000. It should be noted, however, that 
the ‘particularly difficult circumstances, such as having been a victim of do-
mestic violence while the marriage or registered partnership was subsisting’ 
(Article 13(2) sub c of the Directive) has been translated in Article 8.15(4) 
sub d as ‘compelling reasons of a humanitarian nature’. The element ‘and 
for as long as is required’ in Article 13(2) sub d has not been copied into 
Article 8.15(4) sub c. Article 19 has been transposed in Article 8.19 of the Al-
iens Decree 2000. 
 In general, Article 20 has been transposed in Article 8.20(1) of the Aliens 
Decree 2000. In contrast to the provision of the Directive, the implementing 
rules do not mention that the permanent resident card should be issued within 
6 months after the application has been filed. Deciding within 6 months was 
already the general administrative law practice, and the modern approach fur-
ther reduced that timeframe to 3 months. The implementing rules also do not 
stipulate explicitly that the card expires after 10 years, and that it is automati-
cally renewable after that period. The practice is that the residence card is in-
deed automatically renewable, but it is issued for five years. Failure to com-
ply with the requirement to apply for a permanent residence card may lead to 
administrative fines.13 
 Article 21 of the Directive has been partly transposed in Article 8.21 of the 
Aliens Decree 2000: it provides that continuity of residence is broken from 
the moment the alien has left the Netherlands. Article 8.21 does not explicitly 
mention means of proof. In this regard, the liberal rules on evidence generally 
adhered to in Dutch administrative law apply.14 In practice, enrolment in the 
municipal register for an uninterrupted period of five years is proof of conti-
nuity of residence.  
 The IND publishes annual reports providing information on the overall 
number of residence permits issued to EU citizens.15 No specific information 
is provided on the number of applications for the permanent residence status 
on the basis of Directive 2004/38/EC. In February 2013 the Central Bureau 
for Statistics published an overview of EU-nationals and nationals from can-
                                                        
13. Article 108 Aliens Act. 
14. See Aliens Circular 2000, Chapter B10/1.7. See also Rechtbank ’s-Gravenhage, 26 
January 2012, ECLI:NL:RBSGR:2012:BV2627, on various statements and docu-
ments as proper proof of the existence of a durable relationship. 
15. See http://www.rijksoverheid.nl/documenten-en-publicaties/jaarverslagen/2012/03 
/20/ de-ind-belicht-jaarverslag-2011-van-de-ind.html. 
J. LANGER & A. SCHRAUWEN 
 700 
didate member states residing or working in the Netherlands for the period 
2007-2012.16 The report also contains data on the duration of enrolment in 
municipal databases, and number of persons per nationality.  
 Relevant case law has been limited. Reference can be made to a ruling by 
the District Court of The Hague of 17 December 2009.17 The applicant in this 
case requested the IND to take a binding decision determining the exact mo-
ment in time the right to permanent residence comes into being. The appli-
cant argued that the IND has the power to take such a decision on the basis of 
Directive 2004/38. The District Court rejected this claim. The Court stated 
that the IND does not have such competence under Dutch law. The compe-
tence was neither created by Articles 16-20 of Directive 2004/38. This ruling 
was subsequently upheld in appeal.18 In another judgment, the District Court 
of The Hague stressed that a permanent resident status does not have to be 
conferred in cases where a continuous period of five years on the territory of 
the Netherlands has not been completed, and where the prolonged absence of 
the claimant also exceeded the limits of Article 16 paragraph 4.19 
 A decision by the District Court of The Hague of 27 March 2013 is also 
noteworthy.20 This case concerned a Ghanaian applicant who had been in a 
registered partnership with an EU citizen, but did not meet the requirement of 
having stayed in the Netherlands for five consecutive years, as required for 
the acquisition of a right of permanent residence. It was not disputed, how-
ever, that the registered partnership had lasted for more than three years. 
Therefore, the District Court considered that she had nonetheless retained a 
residence right as such on the basis of Article 8.15 of the Aliens Decree 2000, 
since that provision also applies to non-registered partners.  
Question 5 
Article 11(1) of the Dutch Act on Employment and Social benefits provides a 
general right for social benefits for all residents in the Netherlands who lack 
sufficient means to be able to support themselves. Article 11(2) states that 
this right equally applies to all foreigners who legally reside in the Nether-
                                                        
16. See: http://www.cbs.nl/nl-NL/menu/informatie/beleid/publicaties/maatwerk/archief/ 
2013/130212-migrantenmonitor-fase-2-2007-2012-mw.htm, esp. table 1 and table 4A.  
17. Rechtbank ’s-Gravenhage, zittingsplaats Assen, 17 December 2009, ECLI:NL:RBS 
GR:2009:BK7600. 
18. Raad van State, 21 February 2011, ECLI:NL:RVS:2011:BP5947. 
19. Rechtbank ’s-Gravenhage, 17 July 2012, ECLI:NL:RBSGR:2012:BX2779. 
20. Rechtbank Amsterdam, 27 March 2013, ECLI:NL:RBAMS:2013:4271.  
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lands. This also includes EU citizens who stay in the Netherlands on grounds 
of EU law. Article 24(2) of the Directive is transposed in Article 11(2) by 
means of a direct reference: foreigners in ‘situations as described in Article 
24(2) of the Directive’ are not entitled to social benefits. As regards mainte-
nance aid for studies, the exception of Article 24(2) is laid down in Article 
3a(1) of the Student Finance Decree 2000. EU students can only obtain 
maintenance aid for studies after they have stayed in the Netherlands for over 
5 years (long term residence as provided in Article 16 of the Directive). 
 National law does not distinguish between the categories specified in Art-
icle 24(2) and job seekers. Just like the categories specified in Article 24(2) of 
the Directive, job seekers do not have a right to receive social benefits. 
 Article 24(2) has not entirely displaced the Court of Justice’s ‘real link’ 
case law before national courts or tribunals. The ‘real link’ test is still used as 
an additional test, in order to verify whether there are grounds on which a 
right to social benefits or maintenance aid for studies may not be denied to a 
EU citizen under Article 18 TFEU.21 
Question 6 
Article 67 of the Aliens Act 2000 confers upon the Minister of Immigration 
and Asylum the possibility to declare an alien unwanted. Articles 8.18 and 
8.22 of the Aliens Decree 2000 follow almost verbatim the text of the Di-
rective.  
 When applying the public order and public security exceptions, Dutch 
courts frequently refer to the 2009 Commission’s guidelines on the imple-
mentation of the Directive.22 Generally, Dutch courts carry out a proportion-
ality check when reviewing expulsion decisions. They also check whether the 
expulsion is respecting the fundamental rights. Interestingly, the latter is al-
most exclusively done in relation to Article 8 ECHR, and not (yet) with the 
EU Charter of Fundamental Rights.  
 Following a pilot in 2008, the Minister of Social Affairs announced in 
2011 that the accumulation of offences (that individually would not reach the 
threshold of constituting a threat to a fundamental interest of society) could 
                                                        
21. Centrale Raad van Beroep, 18 December 2009, ECLI:NL:CRVB:2009:BK8135 
(maintenance aid for studies); Centrale Raad van Beroep, 29 June 2009, ECLI:NL: 
CRVB:2009:BJ1015 (maintenance aid for studies); Centrale Raad van Beroep, 21 
August, 2008, ECLI:NL:CRVB:2008:BF0366 (job seekers). 
22. COM(2009) 313 final, following the 2008 report on the implementation of the Di-
rective (COM(2008) 840 final). 
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together be considered to meet the threshold.23 The Commission did not raise 
any objections to this new approach, whereas the judiciary has been careful to 
check whether the behaviour of the individual concerned still constitutes a 
genuine and sufficiently serious threat to a fundamental interest of society.24 
With respect to EU citizens, a ruling by the District Court of The Hague in 
2011 considered that multiple minor offences could not be seen as justifying 
expulsion for ‘serious’ reasons of public policy.25 The Court held that it was 
required to suspend the expulsion order indefinitely given that the effective-
ness of EU law was to be respected.  
 It seems as if the distinction between the existence and degree of the threat 
to the public order and the existence of personal conduct constituting a suffi-
ciently serious threat is sometimes blurred. The Dutch courts seem to take in-
to account the nature of the offence committed, the nature of the penalty pre-
scribed by law, the penalty actually imposed, and the time-span within which 
offences have been committed.26 Occasionally, reference has been made to 
the Tsakouridis case, but solely to reaffirm the need for imperative grounds of 
public policy in case of expulsion of an EU citizen with a permanent resi-
dence right and the fact that organized drug trade can be considered as such a 
ground.27 
 As to multiple minor offences, the penalty actually imposed on the indi-
vidual concerned is relevant, as well as whether or not the public prosecutor 
chose to apply its internal guidelines in relation to multiple offenders as an 
aggravating circumstance.28 Recently, the Council of State considered that in 
case an expulsion order is issued in case of multiple minor offences the com-
petent authorities must duly motivate what the concrete threat to society is, 
why expulsion is necessary despite the fact that minor penalties were im-
posed and they must take into account the circumstances under which the of-
fences were committed.29 In case of multiple offences, the competent authori-
ties cannot combine factors pertaining to different occurrences in order to 
prove that all elements of the threat are present.30  
                                                        
23. Letter of 14 April 2011, Parliamentary Documents II 2010/11, 29407, nr. 118. 
24. Case C-349/06, Polat [2007] ECR I-8167, para. 35.  
25. Rechtbank ’s-Gravenhage, 21 March 2011, ECLI:NL:RBSGR:2011:BP8895. 
26. Rechtbank ’s-Gravenhage, 19 July 2012, ECLI:NL:RBSGR:2012:BX2790. 
27. Case C-145/09, Tsakouridis [2010] ECR I-11979. See e.g. Raad van State, 5 October 
2011, ECLI:NL:RVS:2011:BT8385 and Rechtbank ’s-Gravenhage, 21 March, ECLI: 
NL:RBSGR:2011;BP8895. 
28. Rechtbank ’s-Gravenhage, 15 February 2013, ECLI:NL:RBSGR:2013:CA1559. 
29. Raad van State, 18 June 2013, ECLI:NL:RVS:2013:62. 
30. Rechtbank ’s-Gravenhage, 13 January 2011, ECLI:NL:RBSGR:2011:BP2584. 
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 The existence of a present and actual threat can continue to exist also after 
a prison sentence has been served. Good behaviour during detention was 
found to be irrelevant.31 At the same time, the authorities were not allowed to 
shift the burden of proof of the existence of a present threat to the detained 
EU-national.32 With reference to the Orfanopoulos case, the intensity and 
magnitude of the illegal trade in drugs and the dependency of the EU citizen in 
question formed important elements to conclude that a present, threat persist-
ed.33 Once a national court accepts that there is a genuine, present and suffi-
ciently serious threat affecting one of the fundamental interests of Dutch socie-
ty, the next step is to see whether the decision by the competent authority is in 
line with the considerations as laid down in Article 28(1) of the Directive.  
 The principle of proportionality is also a general principle in Dutch admin-
istrative law. It is generally applied by administrative authorities as well as by 
Dutch courts in administrative procedures. Authorities have an obligation to 
weigh the interests directly involved. The adverse consequences of a decision 
may not be disproportionate to the purposes to be served by the decision. Any 
decision (initial decision and decision on appeal) must be based on proper 
reasoning. This means that the authorities must gather the necessary infor-
mation concerning the relevant facts and the interests to be weighed. Before 
an administrative authority decides on an objection, it shall give the interested 
party the opportunity to be heard. The decision of the authority must show 
that the principle of proportionality and in particular the considerations as laid 
down in Article 28(1) were taken into account. If not, it can lead to the an-
nulment of the decision, due to a failure to state reasons.34  
 Although national courts review the decision in light of Article 28(1) of 
their own motion, the individual is expected to demonstrate elements that can 
support an argument that the decision is disproportionate in the light of Art-
icle 28(1) of the directive. If no elements linking the individual to Dutch so-
ciety are brought forward,35 or if the individual explicitly stated that there is 
no reason for staying in the Netherlands,36 national courts generally accept 
                                                        
31. Rechtbank ’s-Gravenhage, 14 September 2012, ECLI:NL:RBSGR:2012:BX9061. 
32. Rechtbank ’s-Gravenhage, 26 January 2013, ECLI:NL:RBSGR:2013:BV3857.  
33. Rechtbank ’s-Gravenhage, 8 July 2008, ECLI:NL:RBSGR:2008:BD7243. 
34. Rechtbank ’s-Gravenhage, 18 March 2010, ECLI:NL:RBSGR:2010:BL9840; Recht-
bank ’s-Gravenhage, 6 March 2007, ECLI:NL:RBSGR:2007:BA0549; Rechtbank 
’s-Gravenhage, 26 August 2008, ECLI:NL:RBSGR:2008:BF0172. 
35. Rechtbank Den Haag, 11 June 2013, ECLI:NL:RBDHA:2013:CA3247. 
36. Rechtbank ’s-Gravenhage, 23 September 2008, ECLI:NL:RBSGR:2008:BF3214. 
J. LANGER & A. SCHRAUWEN 
 704 
that the principle of proportionality was respected.37 When elements are 
brought forward individuals must provide sufficient evidence to support the 
claim.38 In balancing the interest of the individual and the interest of society, 
the reasoning of national courts varies; it is sometimes elaborate,39 and some-
times brief.40 We have not found any cases where the elements brought for-
ward are found to be sufficient to quash the decision.41 Examples of consid-
erations that were not accepted as sufficient: 
– having a relationship with a person living in the Netherlands;  
– the desire to work in the Netherlands; 
– good behaviour in prison; 
– birth of a child/ back on the right path; 
– desire to stay in the Netherlands pending criminal trial; 
– light forms of medical treatment;42 
– economic situation in the country of origin;43 
– no longer welcome with relatives in the country of origin. 
In some cases, individuals invoke Article 8 ECHR. Courts have reviewed 
such claim with reference to the so-called ‘guiding principles’ as stipulated in 
the Boultif and Üner decision of the ECHR.44 It is often in this review that 
national courts give a more elaborate reasoning with regard to the principle of 
proportionality.45  
                                                        
37. Rechtbank ’s-Gravenhage, 8 July 2008, ECLI:NL:RBSGR:2008:BD7243. 
38. Rechtbank Den Haag, 17 July 2013, ECLI:NL:RBDHA:2013:10529. 
39. Rechtbank ’s Gravenhage, 8 November 2011, ECLI:NL:RBSGR:2011:BU5206. 
40. Rechtbank Den Haag, 10 Janury 2013, ECLI:NL:RBDHA:2013:BY8148. 
41. Rechtbank Den Haag, 17 July 2013, ECLI:NL:RBDHA:2013:10529. 
42. Rechtbank ’s-Gravenhage, 12 July 2012, ECLI:NL:RBSGR:2012:BX1255. 
43. Rechtbank ’s-Gravenhage, 18 March 2010, ECLI:NL:RBSGR:2010:BL9840. 
44. Boultif v Switzerland, no. 54273/00, ÜNER v. The Netherlands, no. 46410/99. 
45. Rechtbank ‘s-Gravenhage, 8 November 2011, ECLI:NL:RBSGR:2011:BU5206. 
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EU citizenship beyond Directive 2004/38/EC – exploring national 
application of primary EU Law 
Question 7 
There is growing case law in relation to Article 20 TFEU.46 Generally, Dutch 
courts accept that EU citizens are only deprived of the ‘genuine enjoyment of 
the substance of rights’ if they have no ‘real’ other possibility to stay within 
the territory of the EU. The fact that a family has to split up in order for the 
children to reside in the EU does generally not endanger this according to the 
case law. In one illustrative case, authorities refused a residence permit to a 
mother from Kosovo. Given the absence of a permit, she had to leave the 
Netherlands. But, after she gave birth to a daughter, her deportation was post-
poned for six weeks, though in the end she never left the country. After she 
gave birth to a second child, her partner, a Dutch national, made a declaration 
of paternity in relation to both children holding Dutch nationality. The mother 
claimed a right to stay in the country in the light of the Zambrano judgment. 
The District Court of The Hague ruled that her situation differed from that in 
Zambrano, since her children could still enjoy residency in the EU, with their 
father, who had Dutch nationality.47 
 Another set of cases concern the situation that the Dutch parent is (partly) 
unable to take care of the children. It was ruled that a Moroccan father did not 
have a derived right to stay in the Netherlands, because the Dutch mother 
could not take care of the children and the children were forced to stay in a 
foster home. The Court ruled that in these circumstances, the children were 
not obliged to leave the territory of the EU.48 Another example is a case 
where the Dutch parent was mentally ill and could not take care of the chil-
dren. It was also held that there was no derived residence right to the other 
parent with the third country nationality.49 
 There are also instances where a Zambrano claim has been accepted. An 
example is a case concerning a Turkish father and a Dutch mother with a 
Dutch child. The Dutch mother was in the position to take care of her child. 
Nevertheless, due to the mental illness of the father, the Council of State 
                                                        
46. Up until June 2013, 39 cases have been published online on www.rechtspraak.nl. 
47. Rechtbank ’s-Gravenhage, zittingsplaats Roermond, 28 March 2011, ECLI:NL: 
RBSGR:2011:BQ0062.  
48. Rechtbank ‘s-Gravenhage, 11 July 2011, ECLI:NL:RBSGR:2011:BR1625LJN. 
49. Rechtbank ‘s-Gravenhage, 31 August 2011, ECLI: NL:RBSGR:2011:BR7035. 
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ruled that the Turkish father had a derived right to reside in the Netherlands. 
There were indications that a deportation to Turkey would lead to so much 
psychological suffering that his Dutch spouse and child had no other choice 
than to join the father and thus to reside outside the EU. Another example is 
the situation that the children would be placed under supervision if the third 
country national parent were to be deported.50 In this context, it is interesting 
to note that Dutch courts seem to require clear evidence that the Dutch parent 
is not in the position to take care of the children involved. The mere declara-
tion that the Dutch parent would not provide the necessary care is not suffi-
cient to trigger the scope of Article 20 TFEU.51 The fact that the presence of 
the third country national parent is important for the psychological health of 
the Dutch parent is insufficient if others like family members could provide 
support to the Dutch parent as well.52 The dependency of the EU citizen on 
the third country national to reside in the EU is decisive, the desire to stay 
with the whole family within the European Union is not sufficient to trigger 
the scope of Article 20 TFEU.53 Also noteworthy is the decision by the Dis-
trict Court of Arnhem ruling that the national authorities are obliged to grant 
an allowance in order to facilitate the residency of the dependent Union citi-
zens.54 In this case, the mother is Venezuelan and the father is Dutch. The fa-
ther did not take care of the daughter. The mother was not granted an allow-
ance. The Court ruled that if the daughter were to be granted the effective en-
joyment of her EU citizenship rights, her Venezuelan mother should have 
sufficient financial resources to take care of her family.  
 Generally, Dutch courts have not turned down residence claims based on 
Article 20 TFEU with the argument that the dispute involves an internal sit-
uation.55 When turning down these claims, courts tend to do so because the 
EU citizens involved have not been deprived of their essential rights. A 
judgment by the District Court of The Hague of 12 January 2012 is illustra-
tive in this regard. The case concerned a national of Nicaragua, who request-
ed a residence permit in the Netherlands, and who had a relationship with a 
Dutch national and a child with Dutch nationality. Later, she had a child with 
another Dutch national with whom she subsequently had a second child. This 
(second) child has the Nicaraguan nationality. The Court held that this case 
                                                        
50. Raad van State, 26 April 2013, ECLI:NL:RVS:2013:BZ9025. 
51. Raad van State, 12 June 2013, ECLI:NL:RVS:2013:CA3605. 
52. Raad van State, 6 August 2012, ECLI:NL:RVS:2012:BX5044. 
53. Raad van State, 18 July 2013, ECLI:NL:RVS:2013:425. 
54. Rechtbank Arnhem, 10 July 2012, ECLI:NL:RBARN:2012:BX3418. 
55. Rechtbank ’s-Gravenhage, 12 January 2012, ECLI:NL:RBSGR:2012:BV2012. 
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was not an internal situation, even though the right of free movement was not 
exercised. Referring to the Zambrano judgment, the Court stressed that no in-
ternal situation will arise in the case that national measures have the effect 
that EU citizens are deprived of the effective enjoyment of the substance of 
their EU rights.56 This line of reasoning has also been applied in other (simi-
lar) cases.57 According to the Council of State, it is possible to rely upon Art-
icle 20 TFEU independently from other EU Treaty provisions.58 Consequent-
ly, the Council of State held that the possession of a residence permit based 
on national law may not be imposed as a condition prior to invoke Article 20 
TFEU.59 Furthermore, the Council ruled that a residence card based on Art-
icle 9 Aliens Act (which provides for issuance of a residence card based on 
Directive 2004/38) shall also be issued to family members of EU citizens 
who derive rights from Article 20 TFEU. Whether legislative changes are 
needed to accommodate the Zambrano ruling is (still) under discussion. 
 There is also case law in relation to family members of Dutch citizens be-
ing denied a right of residence after the Dutch citizen involved has made use 
of his mobility rights within the EU and returned to the Netherlands. Various 
reasons have been invoked for denial of analogous application of Directive 
2004/38: the use of Treaty rights of residence was considered to be too short-
term, usually less than 3 months,60 or the Dutch citizen had not furnished 
convincing substantive proof of ‘genuine and effective residence’ in the host 
member state.61 In another case, the Court held that the Dutch national in-
volved was not the provider of services in the sense of the Carpenter ruling. 
Moreover, the Court argued that the (adult) Dutch national had de facto used 
his free movement rights, and that it is not tenable that he is being deprived of 
the genuine enjoyment of the substance of his EU citizenship rights.62 In this 
case, the use of free movement rights seemed one of the factors blocking reli-
ance upon Article 20 TFEU, even if the use did not lead to ‘genuine and ef-
fective residence’ necessary for analogous application of Directive 2004/38. 
                                                        
56. Rechtbank ’s-Gravenhage, 12 January 2012, ECLI:NL:RBSGR:2012:BV2011. 
57. Rechtbank ’s-Gravenhage, 12 January 2012, ECLI:NL:RBSGR:2012:BV2012 and 
Raad van State, 7 March 2012, ECLI:NL:RVS:2012:BV8623. 
58. Raad van State, 17 October 2012, ECLI:NL:RVS:2012:BY0833. 
59. Raad van State, 9 August 2013, ECLI:NL:RVS:2013:725. 
60. Rechtbank ’s-Gravenhage, zittingsplaats Amsterdam, 13 September 2010, ECLI:NL: 
RBSGR:2010:BO7110. 
61. Raad van State, 17 December 2012, ECLI:NL:RVS:2012:BY7401; also Rechtbank 
‘s-Gravenhage, zittingsplaats Zwolle, 9 March 2012, ECLI:NL:RBSGR:2012: BV8504. 
62. Rechtbank ’s-Gravenhage, zittingsplaats Haarlem, 26 April 2011, ECLI:NL:RBS 
GR:2011:BQ5774. 
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Meanwhile, the Council of State has asked preliminary questions to the Court 
of Justice to clarify under what circumstances long-term, but intermittent res-
idence in a host Member State can be considered to constitute the necessary 
use of Treaty rights by a Union citizen, and how long after the EU-national’s 
return the family member can still derive rights from EU law.63 
 As to Directive 2004/38, courts seem to distinguish between citizens using 
their free movement rights and those who do not. One example concerns a 
Dutch national who is married with a third country national and who has not 
used her free movement rights. In that case, she could not rely upon Directive 
2004/38.64 A recent ruling of the Council of State made clear that in the con-
text of Directive 2004/38, a third country national taking care of a minor EU-
national (who is making use of free movement rights) and having sufficient 
resources has the right to reside with the child in the Netherlands regardless 
of the origin of the resources. In such a situation, the fact that the third coun-
try national is the child’s primary carer is decisive. This differs from the sit-
uation under Article 20 TFEU, where the dependency of the minor EU-
national (who is not making use of free movement rights) on the third country 
national is decisive.65 With regard to family members of Dutch nationals re-
turning to the Netherlands, the Council of State identifies the right of resi-
dence so established as based on an analogous application of Directive 
2004/38. Lower courts seem to be less cautious and often refer directly to Di-
rective 2004/38 as the (potential) source of rights in such a case. 
Question 8 
Articles 14 and 15 of the Kingdom Act on Netherlands Nationality regulate 
the loss of Dutch Nationality. According to Article 14(1), the acquisition or 
grant of Dutch nationality may be revoked if it is based on a false declaration 
made by the person concerned or fraud and/or on concealment of any fact 
relevant to the acquisition or grant. The revocation has retroactive effect to 
the time of the acquisition or grant of Dutch nationality. In addition, Dutch 
nationality can be withdrawn if the person concerned is convicted for certain 
criminal offences referred to in the Criminal Law (Article 14(2)). Moreover, a 
person who is of full age shall lose his or her Dutch nationality if the person 
                                                        
63. Raad van State 5 October 2012, ECLI:NL;RVS:2012:BX9567; pending at the ECJ 
with case number C-456/12. 
64. Rechtbank ‘s-Gravenhage, zittingsplaats Zwolle, 9 March 2012, ECLI:NL:RBSGR: 
2012:BV8504. 
65. Raad van State, 3 September 2013, ECLI:NL:RVS:2013:1068. 
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concerned has failed, after his or her naturalisation, to make every effort to 
divest himself of his or her original nationality (Article 15(1)(d) and (f)) or if 
he renders voluntary military service to a hostile state (Article 15(1)(e)). With 
the exception of Article 14(1), Dutch nationality may not be lost if this would 
lead to statelessness.  
 As to the possible implications of the Rottmann ruling, it is generally ac-
cepted that the grounds to revoke Dutch nationality are not contrary (as such) 
to EU law. Nevertheless, it is for the national courts to ascertain in each indi-
vidual case whether the withdrawal decision observes the principle of propor-
tionality in light of EU law. Generally, the principle of proportionality also 
applies in Dutch national law. The ‘Guide to the Netherlands Nationality Act’ 
even explicitly states that no withdrawal decision will be taken if this would 
be disproportionate.66 As for the application of the Rottmann-based propor-
tionality test, it could be argued that it only applies in those cases where the 
person concerned has lost the nationality of another Member State that he/she 
originally possessed. On the other hand, it could be argued that national 
courts should apply the Rottmann-based proportionality test in all individual 
cases where Union citizenship is in danger of being lost. However, the Dutch 
courts have so far refused such a broad application of the Rottmann judg-
ment.67  
 For example, in a case involving a Somali national who acquired Dutch 
nationality on the basis of false (identity) information, it was ruled that the 
naturalisation decision based on false information had no legal effect and the 
Somali national had never acquired Dutch nationality. Therefore, the rights 
attached to Union citizenship were not lost, since the rights were never ac-
quired. Consequently, the Rottmann ruling did not apply.68 
 Certain aspects of the Dutch rules governing the loss of Dutch nationality 
arguably require closer scrutiny in light of the principle of proportionality as 
set out in Rottmann. For example, the proportionality test as formulated by 
the Court in Rottmann (in particular paras 56-58) implicates that this requires 
the person concerned to be afforded a reasonable period of time in order to 
try to recover the nationality of his Member State of origin. The courts should 
assess whether EU citizens deprived of their Dutch nationality are afforded 
                                                        
66. See the Handleiding Rijkswet op het Nederlanderschap 2003, paras 2.2, 2.3 and 4.2.  
67. Rechtbank ’s-Gravenhage, 7 April 2011, ECLI:NL:2011:BQ0863; Rechtbank ‘s-Gra-
venhage, 4 October 2012, ECLI:NL:RBSGR:2012:BY0139; Rechtbank ‘s-Graven-
hage, 26 January 2012, ECLI:NL:RBSGR:2012:BV3372 and Rechtbank ‘s-Graven-
hage, 13 December 2012, ECLI:NL:RBSGR:2012:BZ0382.  
68. Rechtbank ’s-Gravenhage, 7 April 2011, ECLI:NL:2011:BQ0863. 
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such a reasonable period when their Union citizenship is in danger of being 
lost entirely.69  
Political rights of EU citizens 
Question 9 
The transposition of Directive 93/109 was effectuated by 1 April 1993.70 Un-
der Dutch law, the requirement of Article Y 37 Elections Act (now repealed) 
that a candidate had to produce credentials from his national authorities prov-
ing that he has not been deprived of the right to stand as a candidate was im-
plemented by requiring that candidates should produce their credentials after 
the elections. The Commission contested this way of transposition of the Di-
rective. According to the Commission, the credentials should be produced 
when applying as a candidate. As a result, the Dutch Elections Act was 
changed in 1999 to the effect that candidates not having provided for the right 
documentation are taken off the list of candidates.71 Nationals of other Mem-
ber States must have their actual place of residence in the Netherlands to be 
eligible to be a member of the European Parliament. EU citizens must, unlike 
Dutch nationals, have their actual place of residence in the European part of 
the Kingdom of the Netherlands on nomination day. In the original transposi-
tion of the Directive, all Dutch nationals living abroad had both active and 
passive electoral rights for the European Parliament, except those residing on 
Aruba and the Antilles, who had only passive voting rights. Following the 
Eman and Sevinger ruling, Dutch nationals living in Aruba and the Antilles 
were enfranchised for European elections in 2008.72 Non-Dutch EU-nationals 
living in non-European parts of the Kingdom of the Netherlands are not al-
lowed to participate in the Dutch election of the European Parliament.73  
                                                        
69. In one case the Court has found that there were no reasons to afford more than a 7 
months period to take steps to recover the former (third-country) nationality, regard-
less of the applicability of the judgment in Rottman. See Rechtbank Breda, 7 January 
2011, ECLI:NL:RBBRE:2011:58. 
70. Stb. 1993, 75. 
71. Article Y 35a Elections Act. 
72. Case C-300/04, Eman and Sevinger, ECR [2006] p. I-8061. 
73. Residence in the non-European part of the Netherlands is not presumed to be resi-
dence ‘in a Member State of which he is not a national’ under article 22 TFEU, TK 
2008-2009, 31956, nr. 3, par. 7.5. 
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 The implementing law of Directive 2013/1 is pending and expected to en-
ter into force before 2014. The law proposal uses the discretionary possibility 
laid down in Art. 6(3) to shorten the deadline for provision of information on 
disqualification from standing for election to less than 5 days as currently ap-
plied to candidatures from Dutch nationals.74 
Question 10 
Directive 94/80 was transposed by amendments to the Elections Act and the 
Municipal Act on 3 July 1996.75 Parliament decided that only one amend-
ment was necessary: the condition that non-nationals had to reside in the 
Netherlands for five years prior to the elections, was abolished with regard to 
EU citizens. 
 EU citizens who reside in the Netherlands have the right to vote and to 
stand for election in municipal elections under the same conditions as Dutch 
citizens. These conditions are quite straightforward. The right to vote is re-
served to persons who:76  
– are residents of a municipality (i.e. persons who have their actual place of 
residence in one of the 400 municipalities); and 
– have attained the age of eighteen years on polling day; and 
– are not disqualified from franchise or standing for election by a final deci-
sion of a court (B5 Elections Act and 10 Municipalities Act). 
Voting is not compulsory in the Netherlands. EU citizens deprived of their 
right to stand as a candidate under the law of their home state can nonetheless 
take part in municipal elections in the Netherlands. 
Question 11 
In the Netherlands, elections are organized with regard to the following gen-
eral representative assemblies: municipal, provincial, national, and European 
as well as the election of the General Management of the District Water 
Boards. Elective rights for the District Water Boards and municipal council 
are on the basis of residence, regardless of the nationality of the person in-
                                                        
74. TK 2012-2013, 33586, Arts. Y 35b and Y 38 Elections Act. 
75. Stb. 1996, 392. 
76. Article B3 Elections Act (vote) and 10 Municipal Law (stand). 
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volved.77 On the other hand, participation in the national and provincial elec-
tions is subject to the possession of Dutch nationality.78 The nationality con-
dition in provincial elections can be explained by the indirect elections of the 
Upper House via the provincial councils. 
Question 12 
According to the Dutch Constitution, electoral rights of anyone (including 
EU-nationals) can be restricted by Court order.79 In practice, this has not hap-
pened after the Constitutional changes in 1983.80 People who are lawfully 
deprived of their liberty on polling day are not excluded from the right to vote 
or to stand as a candidate. They can exercise the franchise by voting by 
proxy.81 In other words: they can exercise the right in law and in fact. 
 The Dutch Constitution contained the provision that anyone who has been 
deemed legally incompetent by irrevocable judgment of a court because of 
mental disorder was not entitled to vote. This provision was withdrawn in 
June 2008 following a ruling of the Council of State.82 The Council of State 
ruled that categorical exclusion as such is not an unreasonable restriction of 
the right to vote in the meaning of Article 25 International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights, but that it could be in individual cases. The legislator re-
acted by withdrawing the constitutional exclusionary provision for this cate-
gory of voters.83 
Culture(s) of citizenship 
Question 13 
The relevant articles of the Aliens Decree 2000 implementing Directive 
2004/38 start from the presumption that movement within the EU is free: EU 
                                                        
77. Articles 15-17 Act on District Water Boards of 6 June 1991, Stb 1991, 379, Article 
10 Municipalities Act. 
78. Article 56 Dutch Constitution, Article 10 Provincial Law. 
79. Articles 54.2, 129, 130 Constitution. 
80. TK 33586 nr. 3 para. 3. 
81. Article B6 Elections Act. 
82. Raad van State, 29 October 2003, ECLI:NL:RVS:2003:AM5435.  
83. TK 30 471, nr. 3. 
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citizens and their family members ‘have lawful residence’.84 We note in this 
regard the terminology used for lawful residence of foreigners not falling un-
der the scope of the Directive: these aliens are ‘permitted to reside’ in the 
Netherlands (Article 3.3 Aliens Decree 2000). 
 Dutch courts generally follow the presumption of lawful residence. The 
case law repeatedly referred to the ruling earlier discussed that municipalities 
must assume lawful residence until the IND has decided differently. The case 
law referred to under Question 6 illustrates that national courts duly take ac-
count of the more protected status of EU citizens with a permanent resident 
right. National case law on residence rights for third-country national family 
members referred to under Question 7 shows a strict application of the ‘genu-
ine enjoyment of the substance of rights’ criterion. Although one could argue 
that the approach in the case law is more one of strict immigration control 
than a rights-based approach, the basic presumption of the courts remains that 
EU citizens may not be forced to leave the territory of the EU. 
 National administrative actors follow the free movement culture, but there 
is more focus on enforcement of the conditions for lawful residence. In that 
regard, it is to be noted that fulfilment of the conditions for lawful residence 
of economically inactive EU citizens is assumed as long as no social welfare 
or student aid is requested. In addition, certain norms (14.4 hours work per 
week and an income of 50 % of the relevant subsistence norm) must be ful-
filled in order to qualify as a worker or self-employed under EU law (Article 
B10 under 2.4 Aliens Circular). 
 Not all EU citizens apply for registration when they stay for a period long-
er than three months, and the government is aiming at improving registration 
facilities.85 In February 2013, the Dutch government published a policy doc-
ument outlining its view on migration.86 The document contains plans for 
language and integration courses for EU citizens, as well as the intention to 
investigate the possibility of a ‘participation agreement’. The plans and inten-
tions are still under discussion. 
 The plans start from the presumption of lawful residence of EU citizens, 
but focus on stricter enforcement of conditions for migration (e.g. better in-
formation for EU migrants, better registration, adequate housing, and incen-
                                                        
84. E.g. Articles 8.11, 8.12, 8.13 and 8.17 Aliens Decree.  
85. Letter from the Minister of Social Affairs and Employment on Migrantenmonitor 
2007-2012 ref. 2013-0000024987. 
86. Agenda Integratie, bijlage bij kamerstuk 32824, nr. 7, and Ministry of Social affairs 
and Employment, Beleidsnota Agenda Integratie, bijlage bij kamerbrief agenda inte-
gratie, 2013-0000015514, 19 February 2013. 
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tives for language training). In this respect, the open letter of the Minister of 
Social Affairs, claiming ‘code orange’ for labour migration within the EU, 
and in which he argues for a European solution to combat abuses of EU-
workers is instructive.87  
Question 14 
The binding effect of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights has played a role 
in how rights of EU-nationals are being interpreted, although it has rarely led 
to a more favourable result for the claimant. Articles 7 and 24 of the EU 
Charter have been invoked in situations where a right to stay in the Nether-
lands is claimed on the basis of the Zambrano case law. Dutch courts general-
ly argued that when there is no deprivation of the genuine substance of rights, 
EU law does not apply, and consequently the EU Charter is not applicable. It 
is noteworthy to mention that the District Court of The Hague in several of 
these cases remarked that Articles 7 and 24 of the EU Charter do not belong 
to the ‘substance of rights’ of EU citizens, and consequently concluded that 
the EU Charter did not apply in the situation at hand, as it fell outside the 
scope of EU law.88 However, in January 2013, the Council of State accepted 
the claimant’s grounds of appeal that the District Court should have consid-
ered Article 8 ECHR and Article 3 ITRC ex officio where the applicant had 
invoked Articles 7 and 24 of the EU Charter. Yet, it could not lead to another 
outcome in the case at hand, as the document that the applicant applied for 
had only declaratory status.89 Article 7 of the EU Charter has also been in-
voked in situations where third-country nationals claimed residence rights as 
family members on the basis of Directive 2004/38. The Council of State has 
confirmed that non-existence of a durable relationship or marriages of con-
venience do not imply family life, and hence, Article 7 of the Charter is not 
violated.90 We found two cases regarding expulsion orders based on Article 
27, where Articles 47 and 45 of the EU Charter have been invoked. In both 
                                                        
87. Lodewijk Asscher and David Goodhart, ‘Code Oranje voor vrij werknemersverkeer 
binnen EU’ De Volkskrant, 17 August 2013 and ‘So much migration puts Europe’s 
dykes in danger of bursting’, The Independent, 18 August 2013. 
88. Rechtbank ’s-Gravenhage, 8 July 2011, ECLI:NL:RBSGR:2011:BR0795; Rechtbank 
’s-Gravenhage, 31 August 2011, ECLI:NL:RBSGR:2011:BR7035; Rechtbank 
’s-Gravenhage, 14 July 2011, ECLI:NL:RBSGR:2011:BR1625. 
89. Raad van State, 3 January 2013, ECLI:NL:RVS:2013:BY8254. 
90. Raad van State, 18 December 2012, ECLI:NL:RVS: 2012:BY7389; Raad van State, 
28 June 2012, ECLI:NL:RVS:2012:BX0165. 
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instances, the Courts found that there was a sufficiently serious threat to a 
fundamental interest of society, and that the expulsion orders were compati-
ble with respectively Article 47 and Article 45 of the EU Charter.91  
Question 15 
In the Netherlands, media discussion of issues connected to EU citizenship 
generally follows events related to national politics.92 Issues related to EU 
citizenship have not been very salient, they hardly ever make it to the front 
page of journals93 and very few editorials are dedicated to EU-citizenship is-
sues.94 The national newspapers NRC Handelsblad, Volkskrant, and Trouw 
cover EU citizenship issues at least twice as much as popular and more euro-
sceptic national newspaper De Telegraaf or local newspapers. Focus is very 
often on the national implementing policies, responsible national politicians, 
and enforcement failures. Landmark cases on residence rights (Chen, Jia, 
Metock) and access to student support (Bidar, Förster) are covered as well. 
Newspaper coverage does not always use the term ‘EU citizens’.95  
 Several themes are recurring, in general whenever certain issues or policy 
plans recur on the national political scene. For instance, media reported on 
possibilities of language requirements and integration courses for EU mi-
grants whenever Dutch government members suggested their introduction.96 
Also, the rulings of the Administrative High Court of March 2013 (see an-
swer to Question 2) on EU citizens’ claims to social assistance led to a num-
ber of newspaper articles. Coverage in newspaper articles using the concept 
of ‘welfare tourism’ appeared following the announcement of the Dutch dep-
                                                        
91. Raad van State, 19 April 2012, ECLI:NL:RVS:2012:BW4915; Rechtbank Den Haag, 
11 June 2013, ECLI:NL:RBDHA:2013:CA3247.  
92. The answer to this question is largely based on a Dutch news database search in Lex-
isNexis Academic NL. The search word EU-burgers (EU citizens) resulted in 934 
hits, from November 1994 till July 2013. The choice for newspapers as source is 
based on the fact that print media remain a crucial line of communication See R. 
Koopmans and P. Statham, ‘Theoretical Framework, Research Design and Methods’ 
in R. Koopmans and P. Statham (eds), The Making of a European Public Sphere. 
Media Discourse and Political Contention, Cambridge University Press, 2010, pp. 
34-59, at p. 50.  
93. Only 9 out of 934 articles. 
94. A search in the digital archives of NRC Handelsblad resulted in 5 editiorials contain-
ing the term ‘EU citizens’. 
95. Search term ‘Meldpunt Polen’ resulted in 997 hits, but only 15 of these also included 
the term ‘EU citizens’. 
96. Asscher in 2013, Leers in 2011, Verdonk in 2004. 
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uty minister of justice to address, together with Germany, Austria, and the 
United Kingdom, their concerns about the abuse of welfare benefits. Cover-
age was not front-page, and included the remark that the number of abuses 
was unknown. Welfare tourism as such has been covered before, notably 
when previous Dutch ministers announced to implement stricter controls ‘to 
prevent welfare tourism’.97 The launch of a website to collect complaints on 
migrants from Middle and Eastern Europe by the right-wing PVV, an opposi-
tion party which at the time was tolerating the minority government, led to 
front page coverage, but here the focus was especially on the position of the 
Dutch prime minister, who refused to formally distance himself from the 
website. The position of labour migrants from Middle and Eastern Europe 
figures regularly in Dutch newspapers, and is usually connected to news cov-
erage of local discussions on housing of labour migrants and perceived nui-
sance caused by migrants. In some newspapers, coverage of perceived nega-
tive issues related to EU citizenship (welfare benefit tourism, criminality) is 
not dealt with as linked to ‘EU citizenship’, but to migration from Middle and 
Eastern Europe. Family migration became an issue in newspapers when fami-
ly reunification under Dutch law became more stringent, in 2004, and when 
the Court ruled in the Metock case in 2008. At that time, the deputy minister 
of Justice announced stricter measures against the so-called ‘Belgium route’ 
and newspapers reported on this route and the so-called ‘Europe route’, and 
on how Dutch attempts to strengthen family migration conditions in Euro-
pean directives were doomed to fail. Expulsion of EU citizens was covered in 
newspaper articles following the ECJ’s ruling in Commission/Netherlands 
(C-50/06) on article 67 of the Aliens Act and the connection between crimi-
nal conviction and measure of expulsion, and several months later when 
newspapers covered expulsion of Roma by Italy.  
 In the 1990s, a dominant theme related to EU citizenship in Dutch news-
papers was voting rights, especially voting rights for EU citizens in Belgium. 
Unsurprisingly, in 2000 and 2001 more was written on fundamental rights for 
EU citizens and on EU citizens’ support for the euro. As of 2002, enlarge-
ment and labour migration become more salient issues, and in 2003, the first 
newspaper articles appeared on limiting labour migration from the new 
Member States. Since 2005, EU (labour) migration from Middle and Eastern 
European States has been the most dominant theme. Issues covered are (lack 
of) good housing, abusive practices, perceived nuisance, and expulsion. The 
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newspaper articles on this subject do not always use the term ‘EU citizenship’ 
or ‘EU citizens’, but often use nationality indications. 
 As to media influence on national public discourse, this was paramount 
for instance when in April 2013 a television newscast reported on a welfare 
benefit-draining scheme, in which Bulgarian nationals were transported to the 
Netherlands in order to falsely obtain a residence number. Subsequently, they 
were transported back to Bulgaria, while the schemers used their residence 
number to claim welfare benefits antedate. This fraud led to the near-
downfall of the deputy minister of finance and to a project to revise the Dutch 
welfare benefit system. It seems that the focus of the national public dis-
course did quickly turn away from EU citizenship rules as source of the fraud 
towards political responsibility of Dutch politicians and badly designed and 
complicated Dutch legislation on welfare benefits. Apart from ‘obvious’ cases 
of influence on the national debate, national media might have influence 
through editorials (newspapers) or news frames (television), as politicians or 
activists pay close attention to these. It is argued that framing strategies may 
have an impact on how salience of an issue is enhanced.  
 One of these strategies is to use the economic consequences frame,98 
which might explain the dominance of public discourse on the cost-benefit of 
EU-citizenship for Dutch society. Another example could be the use of spe-
cific nationalities (Polish, Romanian, Bulgarian) when ‘problems’ of migrant 
EU citizens are reported, or when newspaper headlines use words like ‘large 
flux’ or ‘flood’ of immigrants form Eastern Europe. It could be influential on 
the perception of pros and cons of EU citizenship in The Netherlands, but the 
writers of this report do not have the expertise to analyse the existence of 
such influence.  
 
                                                        
98. De Vreese, C., Framing Europe. Television News and European Integration, Aksant, 












Citizenship within Directive 2004/38/EC – stability of residence for 
Union citizens and their family members 
Question 1 
1. Directive 2004/38/EC is implemented by the ‘Act on entry, stay, and de-
parture from the territory of Republic of Poland of EU citizens’ and their 
family members (‘Act on EU citizens’ and their family members’, enacted in 
2006). The Act on EU citizens’ and their family members defines ‘family 
member’ as: 
– spouse being the EU citizen,  
– direct descendant of the EU citizen or of his spouse, under the age of 21 or 
dependent of the EU citizen or his spouse and  
– direct relatives in the ascending line, dependent of the EU citizen or his 
spouse [implementation of art. 2 point 2) of Directive 2004/38/EC].  
Partnerships or any other form of cohabitation different from marriage are not 
recognized in the Polish legal system, thus a ‘partner’ is not recognized by 
the law on EU citizens transposed into national law.  
2. The family members (as defined above) are beneficiaries of the right of en-
trance and residence under the Act on EU citizens’ and their family members 
when they accompany the EU citizens or join them [implementation of art. 
3(1) of Directive 2004/38/EC]. This condition applies without distinction to 
all EU citizens’ family members who are EU citizens and third country na-
tionals.  
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3. In the present state of law, Article 3(2) of Directive 2004/38/EC, which 
obliges the Member States to facilitate entry and residence of family mem-
bers other than explicitly mentioned in article 2 point 2), has not been imple-
mented into Polish legal system. However, the Polish Parliament proceeds a 
considerable amendment of the Act on EU citizens’ and their family mem-
bers, which contains proposal of a provision implementing Directive 
2004/38/EC in this aspect. The proposed provision will enable the national 
administration to grant a right of residence in the territory of Poland to family 
members (other than these explicitly mentioned above) who accompany the 
EU citizens or join them, for the reasons of: 1) existing constant and stable 
relations between them, 2) financial dependence, or 3) serious health 
grounds, which necessitate a personal care over the EU citizen, residing in the 
territory of Poland.  
 It will be possible to grant a right of residence to family members of EU 
citizens (amendment of Act on EU citizens’ and their family members) and 
family members of non-EU citizens (new Act on foreigners).  
 It is also worth mentioning that the legal structure of proposed provisions 
is such that the national administration will not be authorized to deny a right 
of residence to a person, when the above-mentioned conditions are met. This 
means that the margin of discretion of national administration will be limited 
only to verification whether one of the above-mentioned conditions is met. A 
potential denial of right to residence in the territory of Poland must take a 
form of administrative decision and is subject to a judicial control by the ad-
ministrative courts.  
 Although definition of a ‘partner’ does not appear explicitly in the draft 
provisions, the introduction of a condition of ‘existing constant and stable re-
lations between them’ aims at enabling the Polish administration to facilitate 
stay of ‘partners’ from other Member States, even if the Polish legal system 
does not recognize partnerships as such.  
4. EU citizen may enter the territory of Poland with a valid travel document 
or any other valid document stating his identity and nationality, there are no 
visas or equivalent formality requested [implementation of article 5(1) of Di-
rective 2004/38/EC]. 
 Family members who are not EU citizens may enter the territory of Poland 
with a valid travel document and visa (when necessary). From the visa re-
quirements are exempted:  
– third country nationals, who benefit from a partial or total resignation of 
visa requirement according the Regulation 539/2001  
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– family members who are third country nationals, holding a valid document 
which is equivalent to the documents of residence or permanent residence, 
according to the Act on foreigners (which is the national law implement-
ing i.a. the EU directives concerning the third country nationals).  
These provisions implement article 5(2) of Directive 2004/38/EC. However, 
the Polish administration is entitled to check, whether the marriage is not fic-
tional.  
5. There are no specific provisions aimed at implementing the procedural 
safeguards, stemming from Article 5(4) and (5) of Directive 2004/38/EC. 
Yet, the structure of relevant provisions of the Act on EU citizens’ and their 
family members is such as to enable the national administration to demand 
additional information or relevant documents from an interested person. The 
Act on EU citizens’ and their family members requires such person to have a 
valid travel document or any other document, confirming his/her identity and 
citizenship (EU citizen) or valid travel document (a family member). When 
an application for a residence card is submitted to the national administration 
– an interested person is obliged to present a valid travel document, but an 
EU citizen may present any other document certifying his/her identity and 
citizenship. This means that the national administration is obliged to accept 
any document, which will prove the identity and nationality of an interested 
person. In any case, a denial to grant the right of residence takes form of an 
administrative decision, which is subject to judicial control by the administra-
tive court.  
6. There is no evidence of particular problems with application of these pro-
visions in the national courts. There is interesting judgment of the Supreme 
Administrative Court2 in a case concerning the expulsion decision of a third 
country national (as a result of criminal conviction for possession of drugs, 
which was a serious threat to public order), who was a spouse to a Polish citi-
zen.3 The Polish legal system reflects the dichotomy existing in the EU law, 
consisting in different regulation of third country nationals being the family 
members of EU citizens. A third country national, who is a family member of 
                                                        
2. The judicial control of administrative decisions in Poland is based on two instances: I 
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EU citizen moving from home Member State to host Member State, falls un-
der the provisions of Directive 2004/38/EC (when he accompanies or joins an 
EU citizen). These provisions are implemented by the Act on EU citizens’ 
and their family members. However, a third country national, who is a family 
member of EU citizen who has never exercised his/her right of free move-
ment (in this case a Polish citizen who resides in Poland), falls under national 
provisions concerning third country nationals. These EU provisions are im-
plemented by the Act on foreigners. The most important difference of treat-
ment which stems from this dichotomy is that the deportation of a third coun-
try national, who acquired the right of permanent stay in Poland, is allowed – 
according to the provisions of Act on EU citizens’ and their family members – 
only on the grounds of ‘serious threat’ to public order or security, whereas on 
the basis of the Act on foreigners – ‘reasons of public order or security’ are 
sufficient. In addition the Act on foreigners does not require the national ad-
ministration to consider the particular personal and family situation as well as 
the existing link with the host Member State and a degree of integration of a 
third country national, before a deportation from the territory of Poland is or-
dered. The administrative decision in this particular case was based on rele-
vant provision of the Act on foreigners, but the claimant argued that this pro-
vision breached i.a. the principle of equality as guaranteed by the Polish Con-
stitution.  
 The Supreme Administrative Court rightly pointed out that the Act on EU 
citizens’ and their family members, which implements Directive 2004/38/EC, 
applies only to the family members (EU citizens and non-EU citizens) of EU 
citizens, who accompany or join them. For this reason the Act on EU citizens’ 
and their family members applies only to third country nationals who are 
family members of EU citizens who moved in and reside in Poland, but may 
not apply to family members of Polish citizens residing in Poland (case C-
127/08 Metock was invoked in this respect).  
 Interestingly, then the Supreme Administrative Court analyzed the case in 
the light of the constitutional principle of equality. It stated that the situation 
of the third country national, who is a spouse of EU citizen residing in Poland 
is actually better that the situation of a third country national who is a spouse 
of a Polish citizen. This is a consequence of different relevant provisions: on 
the basis of the Act on EU citizens’ and their family members in case of a 
third country national being a family member of EU citizen the national ad-
ministration must consider additional circumstances (this reflects art. 28(1) of 
Directive 2004/38/EC); whereas on the basis of the Act on foreigners there is 
no such requirement. The Supreme Administrative Court ruled in this case 
that a condition of a ‘serious threat to public order’ which is a condition of 
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deportation in case of a third country national being a family member of an 
EU citizen, could be an example of ‘reverse discrimination’ of a third country 
national being a family member of a Polish citizen who is subject to a depor-
tation decision only when this third country national would fulfill all condi-
tions required for the permanent stay on the territory of Poland’. As the 
claimant could not prove that he had been a resident in Poland for the preced-
ing 5 years before the deportation decision was issued he could not effective-
ly argue that he was subject to reverse discrimination.  
 However, this case is an interesting example of the reasoning, because it in 
a way undermines the dichotomy which is a result of different EU law legis-
lation.  
Question 2 
The Act on EU citizens’ and their family members implements art. 27(1) of 
directive 2004/38/EC properly, as it excludes the denial of residence on pure-
ly economic grounds. There is no evidence that there ever been expulsion of 
EU citizens on purely economic grounds.  
Question 3 
1. A family member being EU citizen retains his right of residence in case of 
divorce, annulment of marriage [implementation of Article 13(1) of Directive 
2004/38/EC], death, or departure from the territory of Poland [implementa-
tion of Article 12(1) of Directive 2004/38/EC].  
 As Poland does not recognize the partnerships or any other forms of co-
habitation, the termination of registered partnership mentioned in Directive 
2004/38/EC was not implemented into Polish law.  
2. A family member being a third country national retains the right of resi-
dence in the following cases: 
a) death of EU citizen, if he has been residing in the territory of Poland for 
the period of at least on year before the death of EU citizen [implementa-
tion of Article 12(2) of Directive 2004/38/EC] 
b) divorce or annulment of marriage with EU citizen, when  
i) the marriage lasted at least three years before the initiation of the pro-
cedure of divorce or annulment, including 1 year of residence of EU 
citizen in the territory of Poland  
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ii) as an ex-spouse of EU citizen has custody of the EU citizen’s chil-
dren, by agreement between spouses 
iii) there are particularly important circumstances, including the domestic 
violence during the marriage was subsisting 
iv) as an ex-spouse of the EU citizen he has a right of access to a minor 
child, by agreement between spouses or by court’s order; provided 
that from the agreement or an order in stems that the visit must take 
place in the territory of Poland  
[implementation of Article 13(2) of Directive 2004/38/EC].  
3. In case of death or departure of EU citizen from the territory of Poland, a 
child of EU citizen, residing in the territory of Poland and enrolled at school 
or university, and his parent having custody of that child, retain the right of 
residence until the completion of education or studies [implementation of 
Article 12(3) of Directive 2004/38/EC]. It needs to be underlined that the rel-
evant provision of the Act on EU citizens’ and their family members takes in-
to account widely understood education, both obligatory education at school 
as well as studies, which seems to be connected with higher education at the 
university.  
4. Article 14 (1) of Directive 2004/38/EC, which grants the right of residence 
up to 3 months under condition that persons do not become an unreasonable 
burden on the social assistance system of the host Member State, is not ex-
plicitly implemented into the Act on EU citizens’ and their family members. 
According to the national law EU citizens and their family members may re-
side in the territory of Poland up to 3 months without necessity to fulfill the 
conditions laid in the Act on EU citizens’ and their family members itself. At 
the same time it must be stated that from other provisions of national law (re-
ferred extensively in the answer to Question 5) the right to social aid benefits 
is granted to EU citizens or their family members when they reside in the ter-
ritory of Poland. So the non-discriminating treatment is granted only to these 
EU citizens, who obtained document of residence ( residing at least 3 months 
and thus are obliged to obtain a residence card), which does not go beyond 
the margin of discretion left to the Member States under Article 14(1) of Di-
rective 2004/38/EC.  
5. Under the Act on EU citizens’ and their family members, at the submission 
of an application for a residence card, EU citizen is obliged to present docu-
ments certifying the fulfillment of relevant conditions (which are implemen-
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tation of conditions from Article 7 of Directive 2004/38/EC) and declare that 
he possesses sufficient financial sources for himself and his family members 
not to become a burden on the social assistance system. Proof of having suf-
ficient financial sources may include in particular a credit card or a certifica-
tion of having funds at a bank or other financial institution confirmed by a 
seal and a signature of an authorized officer of the bank or institution, issued 
one month before submitting an application for registration of a stay at the 
latest.  
 The national administration is entitled to verify, whether the condition of 
sufficient resources is fulfilled, before a residence card is issued. However, 
once the card of residence is granted, it may not be retired on economic 
grounds. The residence card may be annulled only in exceptional cases, 
namely when it was obtained as a result of submitting false documents or 
fraudulent information.  
 The expulsion for economic reasons is not possible under the Act on EU 
citizens’ and their family members, including the potential reason consisting 
of ‘recourse to the social assistance system’. The analysis of the relevant na-
tional provisions leads to the conclusion that in general EU citizens, who are 
lawfully resident in the territory of Poland, are entitled to social aid as if they 
were Polish citizens. The expulsion from the territory of Poland is allowed, 
under the Act on EU citizens’ and their family members, only on the grounds 
of public order, public security, and public health (see answer to Question 6 
below) [implementation of Article 14(2) of Directive 2004/38/EC]. 
6. In the present state of law there is no specific provision implementing Art-
icle 14(4) of Directive 2004/38/EC, which obliges Member States to take into 
consideration a particular situation of a job-seeker. Yet, the proposed 
amendment to the Act on EU citizens’ and their family members, which is 
proceeded in the Polish Parliament, aims at introducing a provision, which 
will enable the residence in the territory of Poland for a period longer that 3 
months to an EU citizen ‘who entered the territory of Poland for the purposes 
of seeking for a job – for a period of up to 6 months, unless after that period 
of time he can provide evidence that they are continuing to seek employment 
and that they have a genuine chance of being engaged’.  
7. The procedural safeguards, mentioned in article 15 of Directive 
2004/38/EC, are fully implemented into the Act on EU citizens’ and their 
family members. Denial of residence card or annulment of residence card 
takes form of an administrative decision and may be subject to judicial con-




1. The provisions of Directive 2004/38/EC concerning the right of permanent 
residence are properly implemented. EU citizen acquires the right of perma-
nent residence after 5 years of continuous stay in the territory of Poland, 
without any other conditions to be fulfilled.  
 A family member who is a third country national acquires a right of perma-
nent residence after 5 years of continuous stay in the territory of Poland with 
the EU citizen [implementation of Article 16(2) of Directive 2004/38/EC].  
 The residence in the territory of Poland is considered to be ‘continuous’ 
when the interruptions do not exceed in total 6 months in a year. The ‘contin-
uous’ residence is not considered as interrupted, if the territory of Poland is 
left for a period longer than 6 months in a year because of: carrying out a 
compulsory military service or important personal situation, in particular 
pregnancy, childbirth, sickness, studies, vocational training, or delegation re-
quiring stay outside Poland, provided that such period is no longer that 12 
consecutive months [implementation of Article 16(3) of Directive 
2004/38/EC].  
 In addition the Act on EU citizens’ and their family members states that 
the execution of a decision on expulsion of EU citizen shall be considered as 
discontinuation of the residence in the territory of Poland [implementation of 
Article 21 of Directive 2004/38/EC]. 
2. The Act on EU citizens’ and their family members also implements Article 
17 of Directive 2004/38/EC concerning the possibility of acquiring the right 
of permanent residence before 5 years-period in the territory of Poland.  
3. Article 18 of Directive 2004/38/EC considering the particular situation of 
family members being the third country nationals is also properly implement-
ed into the Act on EU citizens’ and their family members. A family member 
who is a third country national, who has resided continuously in the territory 
of Poland for a period of 5 years and who retained his right of residence (un-
der the provision implementing article 12(2) and 13(2) of Directive 
2004/38/EC) – acquires the right of permanent residence.  
4. As to administrative formalities, which may be required under national law 
in accordance with Articles 19-21 of Directive 2004/38/EC, it should be not-
ed that they are mostly implemented.  
 The permanent residence card shall be issued upon application by the in-
terested EU citizen or a family member of EU citizen. The permanent resi-
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dence card for the EU citizen shall be issued as soon as possible, and for the 
family member – within maximum 6 months of the submission of the appli-
cation.  
 A permanent residence card is valid for 10 years. The new document shall 
be issued upon the application of EU citizen or family member [implementa-
tion of article 19 and 20 of Directive 2004/38/EC]. 
 The permanent residence card for a family member may be annulled when 
the family member not being EU citizen left the territory of Poland for a peri-
od exceeding two consecutive years [implementation of Article 20(1) of Di-
rective 2004/38/EC].  
 There is no evidence on any disputes on the interpretation or application of 
these provisions before national courts.  
Question 5 
1. There is no general provision in the Act on EU citizens’ and their family 
members implementing Article 24(2) of Directive 2004/38/EC and the an-
swer to this question necessitated the analysis of the Polish laws concerning 
different forms of social assistance, namely: forms of social aid (point 2), un-
employment allowance (point 3), and financial aid for students (point 4). The 
retirement pensions and family allowances were not considered, because they 
fall in the scope of application of the EU system of coordination of social se-
curity systems.  
2. The social benefits may be granted under: 
1) Act on social aid – which is addressed to persons, who are in difficult fi-
nancial situation;  
2) Act on social pension – which is addressed to persons, who became inca-
pable of working before they could even enter the labour market.  
In both cases the benefits are granted to EU citizen having place of residence 
and being actually present in the territory of Poland, and having right of resi-
dence or right of permanent residence (in the meaning of Directive 
2004/38/EC), under condition that the objective requirements are met (diffi-
cult material situation of an applicant). The structure of both Acts is similar – 
they introduce: formal/administrative conditions (the right of residence or 
permanent residence, granted on the basis of the Act on EU citizens’ and their 
family members, implementing Directive 2004/38/EC) and factual condition 
of ‘having place of residence’ and ‘actual presence in the territory of Poland’.  
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 The Constitutional Tribunal interprets these clauses in the following way: 
‘having place of residence in the territory of Poland’ means the presence with 
the intent of permanent residence; whereas ‘actual presence in the territory’ – 
is only factual situation without the intent of the interested person to make 
this place her center in life and interest.4  
 It seems that in the context of non-discrimination these national provisions 
do not exceed the margin of discretion left to the Member States in Article 
24(2) of Directive 2004/38/EC. The social benefits are granted to EU citizens 
who reside in the territory of Poland and it is not required to prove at least 5 
years residence (permanent residence). This means that Poland did not decid-
ed to limit in more restrictive way the categories of beneficiaries. Probably 
for this reason there is no evidence of any disputes concerning the ‘real link’ 
before national courts, (but see ‘real link’ argument in the context of Polish 
citizens moving within EU, answer to the Question 7).  
3. As to job-seekers, the Act on promotion of employment simply states that 
EU citizens who intend to find employment are entitled to benefits granted 
under this Act, after fulfilling the objective criteria. There is no particular de-
mand of minimum period of stay in Poland. Still, it must be remembered that 
the most important unemployment allowance may be granted after an inter-
ested person has worked for the minimum 365 days in the preceding 18 
months in the territory of Poland. This means that any EU citizen may be reg-
istered in the administration responsible for the employment immediately af-
ter he/she has arrived in the territory of Poland, but the right to allowance 
may be granted only after an interested person has worked for some time be-
fore. The right to allowance which was obtained in other Member States is 
realized under the EU system of coordination of social security systems.  
4. It seems that the national provisions make a distinction in the meaning of 
Article 24(2) of Directive 2004/38/EC only in respect to students and the 
Polish law may be considered in the framework of this provision. According 
to the Act on Higher Education EU citizens and their family members having 
the right of permanent residence should be treated in the same way as Polish 
citizens, including the access to all forms of financial aid granted students (it 
includes in particular social pension for persons in difficult financial situa-
tion, pension for handicapped persons as well as allowance in all other unex-
                                                        
4. See to this effect judgment of the Constitutional Court of 25.06.2013, P 11/12, which 
is also referred to in the answer to question 7.  
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pected circumstances, resulting in the difficult financial situation of a benefi-
ciary). All other EU citizens and their family members (thus those who hold a 
residence card) may undertake studies in Poland, when they have sufficient 
financial sources, with no right to any form of financial aid as mentioned 
above. It seems that this is in accordance with the exemption granted to 
Member States under article 24(2) of the Directive 2004/38/EC.  
Question 6 
1. Articles 27 and 28 of Directive 2004/38/EC were implemented into Act on 
EU citizens’ and their family members. An expulsion decision of an EU citi-
zen (or a family member who is not EU citizen) may be lawfully issued only 
when the residence of a person concerned in the territory of Poland consti-
tutes a threat to public order or public security or public health [implementa-
tion of Article 27(1) of Directive 2004/38/EC]. 
 When a person concerned benefits from the right of permanent residence a 
decision of expulsion may be issued only when his/her residence in the terri-
tory of Poland constitutes a serious threat to public order or public security 
[implementation of Article 28(2) of Directive 2004/38/EC]. 
 When an EU citizen concerned with a possible expulsion, has resided in 
the territory of Poland for a period exceeding 10 years, the expulsion decision 
may be issued only when his/her residence in the territory of Poland consti-
tutes a threat for the security of the state or public security as a consequence 
of a threat to peace, humanity, sovereignty of Poland or as a result of terrorist 
activities [Implementation of Article 28(3) of Directive 2004/38/EC]. 
 An expulsion decision shall be issued with respect to principle of propor-
tionality and be based exclusively on the individual conduct of the person 
concerned, which constitutes genuine, present, and sufficiently serious threat 
to the social interest. Previous criminal conviction shall not constitute a suffi-
cient basis for a decision of expulsion. Threats mentioned in the Law may not 
be invoked for economic reasons [Implementation of Article 27(2) of Di-
rective 2004/38/EC]. 
2. The judicial practice of administrative courts seems to properly reflect the 
understanding of these phrases in the light of EU law (even if particular rul-
ings of the ECJ are not cited in this context). There is a series of cases where 
the administrative courts reviewed administrative expulsion decisions of EU 
citizens on the ground that an interested person was subject to criminal con-
viction and imprisonment (in particular for sexual abuse of minors).  
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 The administrative courts considered in particular that expulsion from the 
territory of Poland of EU citizen who has not a permanent residence therein 
may be lawfully based only when strict requirements are met (these constitut-
ing the national implementation of Article 27 of Directive 2004/38/EC). A 
decision taken by the national administration must be exercised with a certain 
margin of appreciation left to the national immigration administration. How-
ever, administration courts consequently underline that national administra-
tion is obliged to respect specific requirements stemming from provisions 
implementing Article 27(2) of the Directive 2004/38/EC, in particular the 
principle of proportionality and individual conduct of a person concerned.  
 For these reasons the administrative courts in several cases annulled ad-
ministrative decisions of expulsion for the reason of breaching the above 
mentioned provisions of national (and EU) law. For example, in judgment of 
26.04.2010 the Regional Administrative Court in Warsaw ruled that decision 
of expulsion was illegal, because it was based on the information gathered in 
the criminal proceeding against interested person, which took place 5 years 
before the administrative proceedings leading to expulsion. The court was of 
the view that the national administration could not rely on the experts’ opin-
ions expressed in the criminal process, which resulted in 5 years of impris-
onment, but should – after the custodial penalty was terminated – exercise its 
own analysis of the situation and check, whether this EU citizen still consti-
tutes a real threat for the social interest and that this threat is serious enough 
to justify an expulsion decision.5 In another case the Regional Administrative 
Court in Warsaw ruled that the national administration illegally issued a deci-
sion of expulsion, while an interested EU citizen was still in prison as a con-
sequence of the criminal conviction and that in this case the decision of ex-
pulsion was in breach of national (and EU) law, because it was issued as a 
means of individual prevention,6 which is generally prohibited.  
 There have been no disputes before administration courts so far, concern-
ing the difference in treatment between EU citizens – residents in the territory 
of Poland and those who hold the right to permanent residence.  
                                                        
5. Judgment of the Regional Administrative Court in Warsaw of 26.04.2010 r., V 
SA/Wa2047/09; judgment of the Regional Administrative Court in Warsaw.  




EU citizenship beyond Directive 2004/38/EC – exploring national 
application of primary EU Law 
Question 7 
1. The rights of individuals, guaranteed by Treaties, were early recognized by 
the Constitutional Tribunal. The Constitutional Tribunal recognized the prin-
ciple of non-discrimination, enshrined in Article 18 TFEU (Article 12 TEC), 
in its ruling on the Accession Treaty.7 In the particular procedural context of 
this case (review of constitutionality of the international treaty) the Constitu-
tional Tribunal ruled on the relation between EU standard on equality (Art-
icles 18 and 19 TFEU (Articles 12 and 13 TEC respectively) and constitu-
tional standard enshrined in Articles 32 and 33 of the Polish Constitution, es-
tablishing the general principles on equal treatment. The Constitutional Tri-
bunal confirmed that there is no conflict between constitutional and European 
standards on the equality (as claimed the appellants).  
2. Article 21 TFEU is taken into consideration by national courts in various 
context of the cases. Analysis of the jurisprudence of the regional administra-
tive courts and the Supreme Administrative Court leads to conclusion that 
Article 21 as well as TFEU provisions on internal market freedoms are effec-
tively taken into account by national judges, in particular in cases concerning 
the disputes with the tax authorities.  
 2.1. The case Rüffler concerned a dispute of a German national, residing in 
Poland and receiving a German retirement pension. The dispute with the 
Polish tax administration was raised on the basis of the national tax provision, 
which made it impossible to grant to Mr Rüffler a reduction of income tax by 
the amount of health insurance contributions paid in another Member State 
(Germany), although such a reduction is granted to a taxpayer whose health 
insurance contributions are paid in Poland. The decision of tax administra-
tion, refusing him a reduction, was reviewed by the Regional Administration 
Court in Wroclaw, who raised doubts as to the conformity of the provision in 
question with EU law and referred a question to the ECJ. The Court of Justice 
confirmed the doubts of the national court, ruling that: 
‘Article 18(1) EC [Article 21(1) TFEU] precludes legislation of a Member State which 
makes the granting of a right to a reduction of income tax by the amount of health insur-
                                                        
7. Judgment of 11.05.2004, K 18/04.  
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ance contributions paid conditional on payment of those contributions in that Member 
State on the basis of national law and results in the refusal to grant such a tax advantage 
where the contributions liable to be deducted from the amount of income tax due in that 
Member State have been paid under the compulsory health insurance scheme of another 
Member State.’8  
The national tax provision was amended after this judgment and also as a 
consequence of the judgment of ECJ in case Filipiak and judgment of the 
Constitutional Tribunal referred to in point 2.2.  
 2.2. The case Filipiak concerned a dispute of a Polish national who was 
subject to unlimited tax liability in Poland with the national tax administra-
tion, which was raised on the basis of the national tax legislation on income 
tax. The national provisions made it impossible to grant entitlement to tax ad-
vantages in respect of the payment of social security and health insurance 
contributions in the tax year, in the case where the contributions were paid in 
a Member State other than the State of taxation, even though such tax ad-
vantages are granted to taxpayers whose contributions are paid in the Mem-
ber State of taxation. As Mr Filipiak paid the respective social security and 
health insurance contributions in the Netherlands and could not include these 
expenses in his year tax declaration he brought a case to the Regional Admin-
istrative Court in Poznan, who referred a question to the ECJ. The reasoning 
of the Regional Administrative Court, who raised doubts as to the conformity 
of the national tax provision with the EU law, in particular Article 49 TFEU 
(Article 43 TEC), was confirmed by the ECJ who ruled that:  
‘Articles 43 EC and 49 EC preclude national legislation under which the possibility for a 
resident taxpayer to obtain, first, a deduction from the basis of assessment in the amount of 
social security contributions paid in the tax year and, second, a reduction of the income 
tax which he is liable to pay by the amount of health insurance contributions paid in that 
period, exists solely when those contributions are paid in the Member State of taxation, 
while such advantages are refused in the case where those contributions are paid in an-
other Member State, even though those contributions were not deducted in that other 
Member State.’9 
It is interesting to see that when this case was pending before the ECJ, the na-
tional tax provision in question was also reviewed by the Constitutional Tri-
bunal. In its ruling of 7.11.2007 (so long before the judgment of the ECJ) the 
Constitutional Tribunal ruled that this provision was in breach of the principle 
                                                        
8. Judgment of 23.04.2009, C-544/07 Rüffler. 
9. Judgment of 19.11.2009, C-314/07.  
POLAND 
 733 
of equality, guaranteed by Article 32 of the Constitution and thus declared it 
invalid10 and the national legislation had to be amended.  
 2.3. The Supreme Administration Court also reviewed an administrative 
decision, which was issued on the basis of the national legislation, enabling to 
reduce the contributions liable of the expenses for the education of a child of 
a tax-payer only when they were paid to the Polish education establishment, 
with exclusion of the education expenses paid abroad. The dispute between a 
tax-payer and the tax administration was decided first by the Regional Ad-
ministrative Court, which properly considered Article 21 TFUE as a standard 
of control for the national legislation. During the review procedure the Su-
preme Administration Court considered that Article 21 TFEU was of applica-
tion in this case and that in the light of the jurisprudence of the ECJ the na-
tional tax provision in question may indirectly discourage Polish citizens to 
exercise their right to free movement. It provoked a situation that the risk that 
a tax-payer will be deprived of the right to tax benefit may considerably in-
fluence a choice of the place, where a child of the tax payer should be educat-
ed. In this context, the Court remarked, the choice of school for a child out-
side the territory of Poland may be particularly important from the point of 
view of an EU citizen, who resides in Poland and for this reason he is subject 
to income tax in Poland.11 However it must be underlined that the dispute in 
this case was raised on the basis of provisions in force in 2007. During the 
proceedings the provisions in question were amended with the effect from 1 
January 2009 in order to bring the national legislation into conformity with 
the EU law requirements.  
 2.4. Article 21 TFEU was also taken into consideration by the Supreme 
Administration Court in the review of the administrative decision on the leg-
acy and donations tax.12 The appellant claimed in this case that i.a. the na-
tional taxation law, stating that acquisition of property situated abroad by an 
acquirer holding Polish citizenship or having a permanent residence in the 
territory of Poland, breaches Article 21 and 63 TFEU. The Supreme Admin-
istrative Court was thus called to consider whether the national tax provision 
constitutes a breach of EU law, when it does not differentiate the situation of 
a Polish citizen (whether he is a resident or not) and at the same puts a tax ob-
ligation on a resident not being Polish citizen. The Supreme Administrative 
Court referred to the jurisprudence of the ECJ on Article 21 TFEU, but also 
to the ECJ ruling in case Turpeinen on taxation. On the basis of these consid-
                                                        
10. Judgment of 7.11.2007, K 18/06. 
11. Judgment of 26.09.2011, II FSK 546/10. 
12. Judgment of 29.08.2012, II FSK 1236/11. 
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erations the Supreme Administration Court took the view that national provi-
sion under review does not breach the EU law, in particular Article 21 TFEU.  
3. There is also interesting jurisprudence of the Supreme Court13 and the 
Constitutional Tribunal in cases concerning the situation of Polish citizens, 
who exercised the right of free movement and moved into another Member 
State. Article 21 TFEU is mostly considered in cases where the Polish legis-
lation grants particular social benefit, but limits the categories of beneficiaries 
on the ground of solidarity clause.  
 3.1. The most known case is Nerkowska, a case initiated before the Dis-
trict Court in Koszalin by a Polish citizen, residing in Germany. The case 
concerned the interpretation of Article 5 of the Act on provision for war and 
military invalids and their families, which stipulated that the benefits provid-
ed for by that Act are to be paid to the person entitled to them whilst he-she is 
resident in the territory of Poland. In the preliminary ruling, being a conse-
quence of a reference made by the court in Koszalin, the ECJ ruled that ‘art-
icle 21(1) TFUE is to be interpreted as precluding legislation of a Member 
State under which it refuses, generally and in all circumstances, to pay to its 
nationals a benefit granted to a civilian victims of war or repression solely 
because they are not resident in the territory of that State throughout the pe-
riod of payment of the benefit, but in the territory of another Member State’. 
As a consequence of this ruling, the questioned national provision was re-
pealed with effect from 1.01.2010.  
 Even before this provision was eliminated from the national legal system, 
the conclusion of the ECJ in case Nerkowska was properly applied by the Su-
preme Court reviewing a similar case. On 8.12.2009 the Supreme Court ruled 
that the denial of granting the disability pension for a person being a civilian 
victim of war was unlawful.14  
 3.2. The ECJ ruling in case Nerkowska was also invoked by the Constitu-
tional Tribunal in proceedings on constitutionality review of a provision con-
tained in Act on social pension (referred to in answer to question 5), which 
stipulates that a social pension may be granted if a potential beneficiary has a 
place of residence and is actually present in the territory of Poland. This pro-
vision was subject to constitutionality review by the Constitutional Tribunal 
in the light of the constitutional principle of equality (Article 32(1)) and the 
right of access to social security scheme (Article 67(1)).  
                                                        
13. The Supreme Court is a last instance court in the system of common courts (compe-
tent for civil, criminal, and labour cases).  
14. Judgment of 8.12.2009, I BU 6/09. 
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 In its reasoning the Constitutional Tribunal stated that the system of social 
pension is based on the principle of social solidarity to larger extent than the 
national system of retirements and pensions, as the social pension is granted 
to persons who have never worked, because their incapability existed before 
they could ever enter the labour market. It noticed that Polish law intends to 
limit the number of persons entitled to this benefit only to those who fulfill 
the objective criteria and who are bound by the ‘sufficiently close link with 
the Polish society and state’. In consequence, according to the Constitutional 
Tribunal the requirement of ‘having the place of residence and actual pres-
ence in the territory of Poland’ constitutes the reflection of the degree of inte-
gration of these persons with the Polish society – in this connection the Con-
stitutional Tribunal invoked mutatis mutandis the ECJ judgment in Nerkow-
ska.   
 At the same time the Constitutional Tribunal was of the opinion that the 
principle of social solidarity does not require that the potential beneficiary 
was integrated to this degree with the Polish society, because the link of citi-
zenship ex definitione constitutes the link between the person and the Polish 
State. The Tribunal did not analysed the requirement of having place of resi-
dence but only the requirement of actual presence and only in this second as-
pect, this judgment should be referred to. The Constitutional Tribunal did in 
fact take into consideration the reality of free movement of persons in the EU 
and accepted that Polish citizens may move freely in the EU. According to 
the judges the requirement of having the residence in the territory of Poland 
reflects the sufficient degree of integration with the Polish state and society, 
because this place of residence is intended to be for an interested person the 
center of life interests. Putting on these persons additional burden of actual 
presence in the territory of Poland is not proportionate to the principle of so-
cial solidarity, because the requirement of having a place of residence is suf-
ficient in order to meet requirements of this solidarity.  
 In addition the Tribunal remarked that the requirement of actual presence 
is not in conformity with the aim of the right to social pension, because it ac-
tually demands the permanent presence in the territory of Poland – resulting 
with the loss of entitlement to this pension even in case of temporary pres-
ence on the territory of any other state, for example for studies. What is more, 
in the opinion of the Tribunal this requirement makes it impossible for the 
beneficiaries to exercise the right of free movement, which is guaranteed by 




1. According to Article 34(1) of the Constitution of Republic of Poland 
(1997) Polish citizenship may be acquired by birth to parents who are Polish 
citizens (which is the reflection of ius sanguinis principle). Other forms of 
acquisition of Polish citizenship are defined in the Act on Polish Citizenship 
(2009, entered into force in 2012). Article 34(2) of the Constitution guaran-
tees that no one can be deprived arbitrarily of Polish citizenship. This is only 
possible when an interested person decides to renounce Polish citizenship.  
 The Constitution also states (Article 137) that it is the prerogative of the 
President of the Republic of Poland to confer Polish citizenship and to give 
consent to renounce Polish citizenship.  
2. Act on Polish Citizenship (2009)15 states the principle of continuity of 
Polish citizenship (‘on the day of the entry into force of this Act, Polish citi-
zens are considered to have acquired Polish citizenship as under relevant pro-
visions in force’, Article 2). Polish citizenship may be acquired: 1) by force 
of the law (ex lege, which means by birth); 2) through conferment; 3) through 
acknowledgement of citizenship; 4) through restitution of citizenship (Article 
4 of the Act on Polish Citizenship).  
 Under Act on Polish Citizenship dual citizenship is not prohibited, but at 
the same time this Act reflects the principle of exclusivity of Polish citizen-
ship. Namely according to Article 3 of the Act on Polish Citizenship a Polish 
citizen who is also the citizen of another country enjoys the same rights and is 
liable to the same duties in respect of Poland as any other person holding 
Polish citizenship only.  
3. Loss of Polish citizenship is possible only when an interested Polish citizen 
expresses his/her will to renounce it (submits an application), and only upon 
consent of the President of the Republic of Poland (Article 46 of the Act on 
Polish Citizenship).  
4. As to the judicial control of the actions undertaken by the Polish admin-
istration it must be stated that it depends on the mode of acquisition of Polish 
citizenship.  
                                                        
15. The 2009 Act on Polish Citizenship replace a statute adopted in 1962 – for a compre-
hensive historical background see A. Górny, D. Pudzianowska EUDO CITIZENSHIP 
OBSERVATORY. Country Report: Poland, revised and updated June 2013;  
 http://eudo-citizenship.eu/country-profiles/?country=Poland (consultation 31.08.2013).  
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 Firstly, conferment of Polish citizenship by the President of the Republic 
of Poland is entirely discretionary, because no objective conditions apply. 
This is the prerogative of the President to confer or refuse to confer Polish 
citizenship. As this is discretionary power of the President, which is exercised 
in the form of order, there is no judicial control whatsoever. The same by the 
way applies to the prerogative of the President to give or refuse consent to re-
nouncement of Polish citizenship (also in the form of order, which is not sub-
ject to any judicial control).  
 Secondly, acknowledgement of Polish citizenship is exercised by the Voi-
vod (who is a regional representative of the government-executive power), 
after objective criteria are met, in the form of an administrative decision. The 
objective criteria are precisely defined, for different categories of persons, in-
cluding third country nationals possessing the status of long-term resident (in 
the meaning of directive 2003/109) and EU citizens possessing the right of 
permanent stay. The administrative decision issued by the Voivod may be 
subject to judicial control before administrative courts, but there is no evi-
dence that there have been so far any disputes on this ground with EU law el-
ements. However, it is worth noting that Article 30 of the Act on Polish Citi-
zenship, which enumerates the conditions of acknowledgment of Polish citi-
zenship, was subject to constitutionality’s control by the Constitutional Tri-
bunal. The Tribunal applied as a standard of control only Article 137 of the 
Constitution, but it recognized the ‘EU integration circumstances’. Namely it 
considered that acquisition of the Polish citizenship may seem more attractive 
for third countries nationals nowadays, when Poland is a Member State of the 
EU and acquisition of the Polish citizenship automatically leads to acquisition 
of the EU citizenship. Article 30 of the Act on Polish Citizenship was de-
clared in conformity with the Constitution.  
 Thirdly, restitution of Polish citizenship is exercised by the Minister of the 
Interior. The restitution may be exercised upon application if Polish citizen-
ship had been lost before 1.01.1999 under provisions which were in force 
since 1920 (this is Act from 1920, then Act from 1951 and Act from 1962), 
when Polish citizens could also be deprived of Polish citizenship for political 
reasons. In the present state of law restitution of Polish citizenship is exer-
cised in the form of an administrative decision, which may be subject to judi-
cial control.  
5. Referring now to the case Rottmann it is necessary to consider two differ-
ent situations: 1) a deprival of citizenship as a consequence of acquisition of 
citizenship of another country (Austrian point of view); 2) possible annul-
ment of a decision, which was issued illegally (German point of view). The 
MONIKA SZWARC 
 738 
first situation could not occur in the Polish state of law, because dual citizen-
ship is admissible and there is no ‘sanction’ for acquiring citizenship of any 
other country. Yet, it must be remembered that principle of exclusivity of 
Polish citizenship applies. As to the second situation it must be concluded 
that Polish administrative court could be faced with a similar dispute as in 
case Rottmann before German court. Administrative decisions issued on the 
basis of provisions of Act on Polish Citizenship may be subject to judicial de-
cisions and in general (without entering into details) administrative court is 
authorized to annul an administrative decision which was issued on the basis 
of fraud or crime or fraudulent information. However, it seems that there is 
no need to introduce any amendments to the Act on Polish Citizenship as a 
consequence of the ECJ’s ruling in case Rottmann because this was rather a 
case of application of national law in a concrete individual case and not a 
case of a general non-conformity of national law with EU rules on EU citi-
zenship. What is more, in Rottmann the ECJ explicitly held that a Member 
State is entitled to withdraw from a citizen of the Union the nationality of that 
State acquired by naturalization when that nationality was obtained by decep-
tion, on condition that the decision to withdraw observes the principle of pro-
portionality. In the Polish context application of the principle of proportional-
ity would also be rather the role of the administrative court in the course of 
judicial control than the role of the national legislator to amend Act on Polish 
Citizenship.  
Political rights of EU citizens 
Question 9 
Directive 93/109 was implemented on 1 March 2004, even before the acces-
sion to the EU, by the Electoral law to the European Parliament (2004). 
There were no derogations envisaged. This Electoral law to the European 
Parliament granted rights for EU citizens not holding Polish nationality to 
vote and to stand as a candidate in EU elections held in Poland.  
 The Constitutional Tribunal considered the EU parliament elections twice. 
First, in more general way the Tribunal expressed his view in case K 18/04 
concerning the Accession Treaty, saying that the Polish constitutional legisla-
tor may, in a sovereign manner, regulate the process of elections to State au-
thority organs and elected organs of local self-government within the territory 
of Poland, but such regulations must take account of the Treaty principle, 
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arising in consequence of the existence of citizenship of the European Union, 
that the right to vote and to stand as a candidate at European Parliament elec-
tions is enjoyed by all European citizens within the territories of all Member 
States and not only by citizens of the State on whose territory the voting takes 
place.16  
 Secondly, the Constitutional Tribunal was asked to review the constitu-
tionality of the Electoral law to the European Parliament implementing Di-
rective 93/109/EC. These provisions were challenged before the Constitu-
tional Tribunal as breaching Article 4(1) of the Constitution of the Republic 
of Poland which proclaims the principle of sovereignty of the Polish people.17 
This was an important case in which the Constitutional Tribunal presented its 
understanding of the role of citizenship, rights of EU citizens and the consti-
tutional context of the EP elections held in Poland, even if it ruled that the 
Electoral law to the European Parliament was not in breach of national Con-
stitution. First, the Constitutional Tribunal assumed that the Polish Constitu-
tion uses the notion of the Nation in a political, rather than an ethnic sense. 
The concept of the Nation denotes a community comprised of the citizens of 
the Republic. The Constitutional Tribunal remarked that the right of EU citi-
zens to participate in EP elections, regardless of the Member State in which 
they reside, is one of fundamental rights stemming from the Treaties and re-
called the EU acts concerning the EP elections, namely the Act of 1976 and 
Directive 93/109/EC. It also recalled that the challenged Electoral law to the 
European Parliament implements this EC Directive. Then it stated that the 
phrase ‘members of the European Parliament are representatives of the Na-
tions of the States of the European Union’ contained in Article 4 of the Elec-
toral law to the European Parliament should be understood in the sense that 
‘the constituency of the European Parliament is not a homogenous society, 
but rather a collective body comprising the various Nations of the Union’s 
Member States. This, however, does not imply that the electoral rights in EP 
elections may only be exercised exclusively within the national community 
with which the person is bound by national citizenship’.  
 Electoral Law to the European Parliament (2004) was replaced by the 
Electoral Code (from 1 August 20011), but no substantial changes to elec-
toral rights of EU citizens were introduced. In the Polish legal system EU 
citizen is authorized to vote in EP elections in the territory of Poland when he 
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is 18 years old and has a place of residence in the territory of Poland. Other 
conditions are equally applied to Polish and EU citizens, because no right to 
vote for a person who was deprived of public rights, voting rights, or was in-
capacitated by force of a judicial decision.  
 The right to be elected in EP elections is granted to each person who has a 
right to vote, who is 21 years old and has resided for at least 5 years in the 
territory of Poland or in the territory of any other Member State of EU.  
 Article 6 of Directive 93/109/EC (before amendment by Directive 
2013/1/EU) was implemented in such a way that a candidate to stand in EP 
elections, who is not a Polish citizen, shall submit a declaration that he does 
not stand in EP elections in any other Member State and a certificate issued 
by administration of the Member State nationality of which he holds, that he 
was not deprived the right to stand in EP elections in this country. Directive 
2013/1 will necessitate amendments to the Electoral Code. Firstly, it puts 
much more emphasis on the cooperation between the Member States as re-
gards the exercise of the right to stand in EP elections, in particular necessi-
tates establishing a contact point in each Member State. Secondly, it intro-
duces a new structure, when an interested person may be excluded from 
standing in EP elections. For that reasons the Polish law will be amended, the 
draft law is under preparation. The proposed amendments concern only pro-
cedural solutions, in particular establishing a contact point, required by the 
Directive 2013/1.  
Question 10 
Directive 94/80 was implemented on 1 May 2004, by the amendment to the 
Local Electoral Law. There were no derogations envisaged. This Local Elec-
toral Law introduced right to vote and right to stand in local elections for EU 
citizens who are 18 years old and have residence in the territory of the con-
cerned municipality, which is in conformity with the Directive 2004/90/EC. 
However additional condition was also introduced, that a person who intend-
ed to vote had to be entered in a permanent register of voters not later than 12 
months before the date of elections. This amendment to Local Electoral Law 
was subject to constitutionality review twice.  
 First, the Constitutional Tribunal reviewed the issue of granting the right 
to vote and to be elected in municipal elections to EU citizens in the case 
concerning the constitutionality of the Accession Treaty. This was a case de-
cided in the specific context of constitutionality control of the international 
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agreement, so the Constitutional Tribunal was authorized to review the Trea-
ties in the light of the Polish Constitution.18 In the context of the local elec-
tions the argument raised by the claimants based on the reasoning that art. 19 
(1) TEC (art. 22(1) TFEU) breaches art. 62 (1) of the Polish Constitution, 
which states that a Polish citizen is entitled to vote in referendum, to elect the 
Presidents, deputies and representatives in local bodies when he turns 18 
years old. This, in the opinion of appellants breached the Polish Constitution, 
because the citizens’ rights granted to a Polish citizens are unlawfully extend-
ed to other persons, which limits the political rights guaranteed by the Consti-
tution to Polish citizen.  
 Yet, the Constitutional Tribunal did not find the collision between the two 
provisions. It ruled that the right to vote and to be elected in the local elec-
tions, which is guaranteed in art. 22(1) TFEU do not breach art 62(1) of the 
Constitution. According to the Tribunal the Polish Constitution does not 
make the participation in a local community conditional upon the Polish citi-
zenship. The participation in the local community depends only on a place of 
residence (center of life activities), which is the basic link with the communi-
ty. The Tribunal invoke Directive 94/80/EC, which does not define the ques-
tion of ‘place of residence’, and in consequence each Member State regulates 
in a sovereign way the issues of ‘resident’ and ‘place of residence’. It also 
underlined that right to vote and to be elected in the local elections, which is 
granted under art. 22(1) TFEU is also the consequence of EU citizenship, the 
practical reflection of application the principles of non-discrimination as well 
as a consequence of the EU right to free movement and residence in the terri-
tory of any EU Members State. In addition, the Member States consent to es-
tablish free movement would be deprived full practical effect without the 
right to participate in local elections in the place of residence (and this with 
application of voting rights as established by the host Member State). The 
Constitutional Tribunal ruled that ‘the right to vote and to stand as a candi-
date at local elections vested in EU citizens who, although not holding Polish 
citizenship, are resident in Poland (Article 19(1) of the EC Treaty) does not 
constitute a threat to the Republic of Poland as a common good of all Polish 
citizens (Article 1 of the Constitution) nor to its national independence. The 
local self-governing community participates in exercising public authority of 
a local nature, and decisions or initiatives regarding the State as a whole may 
not be adopted within local self-government (cf. Article 16 of the Constitu-
                                                        




tion). Furthermore, granting foreign EU citizens the right to vote and to stand 
as a candidate at local elections does not contradict Article 62(1) of the Con-
stitution, which guarantees Polish citizens the right to elect, inter alia, their 
representatives to organs of local self-government. The aforementioned con-
stitutional right is not of an exclusive character, in the sense that, should the 
Constitution grant it directly to Polish citizens, it might not also be vested in 
the citizens of other States. ‘  
 Secondly, the Constitutional Tribunal reviewed the provision of the Local 
Electoral Law, which made the right to vote and to stand in local elections 
conditional upon being entered, not later than 12 months prior to the date of 
vote, in the permanent register of voters kept in the respective commune.19 A 
person who failed to obtain the respective registration by that deadline was 
not permitted to vote, nor stand as a candidate, in local elections within the 
territory of the respective commune. The Constitutional Tribunal decided this 
proviso was in breach of the Polish Constitution. In the context of EU citi-
zens’ political rights the Tribunal expressed the view that electoral rights of 
EU citizens not holding Polish nationality and residing permanently within 
the territory of any specific commune in Poland are not expressly envisaged 
in the Polish Constitution. However such rights constitute a consequence of 
Poland’s obligations stemming from its EU membership, in particular the ob-
ligations specified in Article 19(1) TEC.  
 In the present state of law, the Local Elections Law was replaced by the 
Electoral Code (from 1 August 2011). See further answer to the next ques-
tion.  
Question 11 
There are three levels of self-government in Poland and three directly elected 
organs respectively: 1) commune (gmina) – commune council; 2) district 
(powiat) – district council; 3) region (województwo) – regional assembly.  
 EU citizens are authorized to vote in elections for commune councils, dis-
trict councils, and regional assemblies when they are 18 years old on the day 
of elections and reside on the territory of the respective community. But addi-
tionally, EU citizens are also authorized to vote in elections for executive or-
gans of the communities on each level, who are elected by direct universal 
                                                        




suffrage: 1) head of commune (wójt); 2) mayor (burmistrz); 3) president of 
the city. This regulation goes beyond Directive 94/80/EC.  
 EU citizens are also authorized to stand as a candidate in elections to 
elected organs of self-government: commune councils, district councils, and 
regional assemblies – which is implementation of Directive 94/80. Yet, they 
were not granted the right to stand as a candidate for the head of commune, 
mayor nor president of the city – this right is reserved only to the Polish citi-
zens.  
Question 12 
There are no specific tensions in this area. There is a general ban to stand as 
candidate in elections for persons with criminal convictions.  
Culture(s) of citizenship 
Question 13 
EU citizenship is being part of the constitutional culture – the rights stem-
ming from the EU citizenship were recognized by the Constitutional Tribunal 
starting early on with the ruling on Accession Treaty. It is interesting to see 
that the Constitutional Tribunal reviews the national laws in the light of the 
constitutional standard, but at the same time the constitutional judges take in-
to account particular circumstances issuing from the fact that Poland is a 
Member State of the EU and Polish citizens – exercise their freedom to move 
guaranteed by the EU law.  
 Polish citizens are more and more aware of their rights stemming from the 
fundamental status of EU citizens and they claim their rights before national 
courts. This pro-active approach is reflected by cases Nerkowska and Fili-
piak, where the national courts were then in a way called upon to apply 
TFEU. The rights of EU citizens residing in Poland are also effectively en-
forced as in case Ruffler.  
 The general impression is that in general national laws and regulations 
passed after the accession of Poland to the EU recognize the fundamental sta-
tus of EU citizens, who choose Poland as a place of residence. The national 
law, which was enacted before the accession, and often even before the asso-
ciation with the Communities in early nineties of the XX century, happens to 
ignore the requirements stemming from the EU citizenship. Such examples 
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are still evidenced, for example the national law on political parties, which 
makes it impossible to found a political party by a person not having the 
Polish citizenship (at the moment the government prepares an amendment to 
this law). Due to proactive approach of individuals and the jurisprudence of 
the Constitutional Tribunal, administrative courts and common courts, includ-
ing the Supreme Court, the particular national provisions, which do not take 
into consideration the requirements of the EU citizenship, are gradually 
amended.  
 It is also evident that the EU citizenship is subject to dynamic interpreta-
tion by the Court of Justice of EU and the national jurisdictions are called to 
respond to this interpretation in their judicial practice.  
Question 14 
There is no evidence that the national courts interpret the provisions of the 
Charter of Fundamental Rights. It seems that Polish courts are still quite re-
luctant to use the Charter as a ground for the interpretation of EU law. As was 
reported earlier the provisions of the TFEU are sufficient grounds for national 
courts to rule on conformity of national law with the EU law.  
Question 15 
National media are mostly not interested in the EU citizenship topics. After 
the accession of Poland to the EU a considerable number of Poles emigrated 
to EU Member States, mostly Great Britain and Ireland – countries which 
opened the labor markets just after the accession in 2004. The economic is-
sues were the dominant topic in the reports in national media. It seems that 
media are more concerned with the European politics when the European 
Parliament elections are approaching, but also – mostly in the national con-
text of who from the national parliament members will choose to stand in the 
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Portugal 
La citoyenneté dans le cadre de la Directive 2004/38/CE – La 
stabilité de résidences des citoyens de l’Union et des membres de 
leurs familles  
Question 1 
La directive 2004/38/CE a été transposée en droit interne portugais par la Loi 
37/2006, du 9 août. La définition de « membre de la famille » figure à l'article 
2 de cette loi. Selon ladite Loi, est partenaire celui qui vit en union de fait 
constituée aux termes de la loi de l'Etat d'origine du citoyen de l'Union et la 
personne avec laquelle le citoyen maintient une relation permanente dûment 
certifiée. En ce qui concerne le partenariat enregistré, la Loi 37/2006 en re-
connaît l’existence à condition qu'il s’agisse d'une « relation permanente dû-
ment certifiée par l'entité compétente de l'Etat membre de résidence ». 
 Du rapport de la Commission européenne au Parlement et au Conseil sur 
l'application de la Directive, il résulte que le Portugal a procédé à une trans-
position correcte de ces notions. Il en découle également que le Portugal est 
parmi les Etats membres qui reconnaissent aux couples du même sexe les 
pleins droits de libre circulation et séjour. Une étude élaborée par le « Serviço 
de Estrangeiros e Fronteiras – SEF », intitulée « Estudo REM 2012 » sou-
ligne l'existence en droit portugais d'un principe général d'égalité concernant 
le mariage et l'union de fait. 
 Le contenu de l'article 3 de la Directive a été transposé par l'article 3 de la 
Loi. Celle-ci s'applique à tout citoyen de l'Union qui se rend ou séjourne au 
Portugal et aussi à toutes les personnes correspondant à la notion « membre 
de la famille » qui l'accompagnent ou le rejoignent. Elle s'applique, d'autre 
part, aux personnes qui remplissent la notion de « tout autre membre de la 
famille », pour autant que, en termes généraux, elles soient à charge du ci-
toyen de l'Union bénéficiaire du droit de séjour à titre principal, fassent partie 
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du ménage de celui-ci ou soient à sa charge pour des raisons de santé graves. 
L'article 3, paragraphe 4, de la Loi 37/2006 s’applique aux nationaux des 
Etats de l'EEE et à la Suisse.  
 Enfin, le paragraphe 5 de l'article 3 de la Loi prévoit l'application de celle-
ci aux membres de la famille des citoyens portugais indépendamment de leur 
nationalité. 
 L'article 4 de la Directive a été transposé par l'article 5 de la Loi 37/2206 
de façon presque littérale. Les dispositions relatives aux documents d'identifi-
cation et voyage figurent dans la Loi 33/99, du 18 mai, telle que modifiée par 
la Loi 7/2007, du 5 février, et par la Loi 83/2000, du 11 mai. 
 L'article 5 de la Directive a été transposé par les articles 4 et 5 de la Loi 
37/2006. En application du paragraphe 5 de l'article 5 de la Directive, cette 
Loi exige que le membre de la famille originaire d'un Etat tiers signale sa pré-
sence sur le territoire portugais, le non-respect de cette disposition étant pu-
nissable selon la Loi des étrangers. 
 On n'a pas trouvé de jurisprudence relative aux différents types de rela-
tions familiales. De même, la question de savoir si les garanties procédurales 
prévues dans l'article 5 assurent une protection efficace n'a pas fait objet de 
décisions de justice. Ceci donne à penser que les autorités compétentes se li-
vrent généralement à de bonnes pratiques. 
Question 2 
Selon les informations collectées auprès des autorités compétentes, jamais un 
citoyen européen n'a été expulsé du territoire portugais pour des motifs pure-
ment économiques. 
Question 3 
Il y a lieu de remarquer que, en ce qui concerne le maintien du droit de séjour 
des membres la famille en cas de décès ou de départ du citoyen de l'Union 
(article 12 de la Directive), la Loi portugaise (Loi 36/2007) est plus généreuse 
que la Directive. Tandis que cette dernière ne vise que le parent qui a effecti-
vement la garde des enfants, la Loi portugaise comprend toute personne qui a 
cette garde (« garde effective »). 
 L'article 13 a été transposé par l'article 8 de la Loi 37//2006. En cas de di-
vorce, annulation du mariage ou cessation d'union de fait, la Loi ne fait pas 
référence aux conditions de l'article 13, 2, de la Directive. Encore une fois, la 
Loi portugaise est plus favorable que la Directive. 
 L'article 9 a transposé l'article 14 de la Directive. 
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 Il convient de signaler que la disposition du paragraphe premier de l'article 
14 de la Directive n'a pas de correspondance dans l'article 9 de la Loi 
37/2006. Celui-ci concerne seulement le droit de séjour de plus de trois mois. 
Ce silence peut être interprété comme signifiant que la nature même du droit 
de séjour jusqu’à trois mois implique implicitement la condition prévue à l'ar-
ticle 14, 1, de la Directive. 
 L'article 15 de la Directive a été transposé par l'article 9, paragraphes 5 et 
6 de la Loi 37/2006. 
 Aucune jurisprudence n'a été trouvée sur l'application des dispositions vi-
sées par la question. 
Question 4 
Dans l’essentiel, les normes portugaises tendent à reproduire celles de la Di-
rective. 
 L'article 16 de la Directive a été transposé par l'article 10 de la Loi 
37/2006. L'article 17 de la Directive a été transposé par les articles 11 et 12 
de la Loi 37/2006. La transposition semble adéquate. Ceci est également va-
lable pour les articles 18, 19, 20 et 21 de la Directive qui ont été transposés 
respectivement par les articles 13, 16, 17 et 10, 6 et 7, de la Loi 37/2006.  
 En ce qui concerne l'article 20 de la Directive, le régime de transposition 
est plus favorable que celui de la Directive en ce que qu'il prévoit (article 17, 
2, de la Loi 37/2006) un délai de trois mois pour la délivrance de la carte de 
séjour. La transposition de l'article 21 est également plus favorable dans la 
mesure où l'article 17, 4, établit que les interruptions de séjour n'affectent la 
validité de la carte de séjour permanent qu'à partir de trente mois. 
Question 5 
L'article 24, 2, de la Directive a été transposé par l'article 20, 3 à 6 de la Loi 
37/2006. Aux termes desdites dispositions, la loi portugaise ne fait aucune 
distinction entre les catégories décrites à l'article 24, 2, de la Directive et les 
demandeurs d'emploi. On n'a pas trouvé de jurisprudence en la matière. 
Question 6 
La recherche de jurisprudence relative à l'application des articles 27 et 28 de 
la Directive qui ont été transposés par les articles 27 et 28 de la Loi 37/2006 
ne nous a pas permis de constater l'existence de véritables cas d'espèce. Dans 
certains arrêts, les cours et tribunaux ont invoqué l'existence « d'une menace 
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réelle, actuelle et suffisamment grave qui affecte un intérêt fondamental de la 
société ». Ainsi, dans l'arrêt de la Cour Suprême de Justice, du 29 octobre 
2009 (affaire 508/05.1GBLLE.S1) imposant à deux nationaux roumains la 
peine accessoire d'éloignement pour la pratique des crimes de vol qualifié et 
homicide qualifié, la Cour Suprême a fondé l'application de cette peine aux 
condamnés (les deux en situation irrégulière sur le territoire portugais) sur la 
motivation suivante : crimes pratiqués avec grande violence, la personnalité 
des condamnés étant révélatrice d'un degré élevé de dangerosité sociale et 
une réinsertion sociale au Portugal n’étant pas prévisible, tout ceci constituant 
une menace réelle, actuelle et suffisamment grave affectant un intérêt fonda-
mental de la société. 
 Dans des termes pareils, la Cour d'Appel de Lisbonne a décidé, dans l'arrêt 
du 2 novembre 2011 (affaire 24/10.OGAIDN.C1) condamnant plusieurs per-
sonnes pour le crime de trafic de stupéfiants, d'imposer la peine accessoire 
d'éloignement suite à l'exécution de la peine de prison. 
 Dans l'arrêt du 21 juin 2012 (Affaire 527/11.9JAPRT.P1.S1), la même 
Cour Suprême a considéré que la simple application d'une peine de prison, 
bien que pour le crime de trafic de stupéfiants, ne pouvait pas justifier l'ex-
pulsion. Motivant sa décision, la Cour a expliqué que la liberté de circulation 
dont bénéficient les citoyens de l'Union, impose que les restrictions à cette 
liberté soient absolument exceptionnelles et dûment alléguées, identifiées et 
prouvées : raisons d'ordre public, sécurité publique ou santé publique. 
 Finalement, l'arrêt de la Cour Suprême de Justice du 19 avril 2007 (Affaire 
06P4701) peut être résumé de la manière suivante : « les mesures prises pour 
des raisons d'ordre public ou de sécurité publique doivent être en conformité 
avec le principe de proportionnalité et doivent se baser exclusivement sur le 
comportement de la personne concernée, celui-ci devant constituer une me-
nace réelle, actuelle et suffisamment grave qui affecte un intérêt fondamental 
de la société, les justifications sans rapport avec le cas individuel ou basées 
sur des principes de prévention générale ne pouvant être acceptées ». 
 Il faut remarquer qu'il existe une jurisprudence significative concernant la 
peine accessoire d'expulsion dans le cadre de la « loi des étrangers », tant à 
l’abri du Décret-Loi 244/98, du 8 aout modifié ultérieurement, qu’à l’abri de 
la Loi 23/2007, du 4 juillet, qui a abrogé la législation antérieure. Cette juris-
prudence est importante pour cerner les critères selon lesquels les cours et tri-
bunaux ont interprété les concepts d'ordre public et sécurité publique et ont 
invoqué et appliqué le principe de proportionnalité. 
 La Cour Suprême de Justice a énoncé la règle de proportionnalité en tant 
qu'expression d'une pondération qui concilie « l'intérêt de l'Etat dans le non 
maintien à l’intérieur de ses frontières de celui qui viole les valeurs commu-
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nautaires avec l'intérêt qui rend inconsistant, pour la gravité des faits, inexcu-
sable pour nuisible et potentiellement dangereux, l'accueil et la présence dans 
le pays étranger » (arrêt du 7 novembre de 2012 – Affaire 2/10 .9SHLSB-A 
.S1). Dans cet arrêt, prononcé au regard de la Loi 23/2007, concernant une 
personne sans un titre de résidence de longue durée ayant aucun lien avec le 
Portugal, la Cour Suprême a considéré que, tenant compte du principe de 
proportionnalité en matière d'expulsion, seulement dans des cas exceptionnels 
qui, pour la gravité des faits rendent intolérable la présence du citoyen étran-
ger justifie l’éloignement de celui-ci de l’espace territorial souverain. L'arrêt 
invoque l'article 134, 1, alinéa f) (qui permet l'expulsion de l'étranger à 
l’égard duquel existent des raisons sérieuses de croire qu'il a commis de 
graves actes criminels ou qu'il a l'intention de commettre de tels actes no-
tamment sur le territoire de l'Union) et aussi l'alinéa e) de la même disposi-
tion (expulsion d'étranger qui a pratiqué des actes qui, si fussent connus de 
l'Etat portugais, auraient empêché l’entrée sur le territoire portugais), l'article 
135 (limites au pouvoir de l'Etat concernant d'expulsion), l'article 151, 2 (ap-
plicabilité de la peine accessoire d'expulsion à l'étranger résidant dans le pays, 
prenant en compte les critères légaux tels que la gravité des faits, la personna-
lité de l'étranger, une éventuelle récidive, le degré d'insertion sociale, la pré-
vention spéciale et la durée de résidence au Portugal) et l'article 151, 3, (ap-
plicabilité de la peine à un étranger avec résidence permanente lorsque son 
comportement constitue une menace suffisamment grave pour l'ordre pu-
blique ou la sécurité publique). Tous ces dispositions figurent dans la Loi 
23/2007, modifiée par la Loi 29/20122, du 9 août. 
 Plus spécifiquement en ce qui concerne les conditions prévues à l'article 
151, 3 – expulsion d'étranger avec résidence permanente, en cas de grave 
menace pour l'ordre public ou la sécurité nationale – la Cour Suprême a con-
sidéré les faits comme graves (trafic de stupéfiants commis dans un 'établis-
sement pénitentiaire) et la récidive prouvée. Nonobstant, la personne concer-
née étant fortement insérée dans la société portugaise, la Cour a décidé qu'il 
n'y avait pas d'éléments suffisants pour conclure que le comportement, globa-
lement considéré, constituait une menace suffisamment grave pour l'ordre 
public et la sécurité publique justifiant l'application de la peine accessoire 
d'expulsion (arrêt du 16 janvier de 2008 (Affaire 07P4638). Pour ce qui con-
cerne les limites à l'expulsion (article 135, alinéa b) interdisant l'expulsion de 
citoyens étrangers qui ont effectivement à leur charge des enfants mineurs de 
nationalité portugaise résident au Portugal), la Cour Suprême a déclaré qu'un 
impératif constitutionnel exige que les raisons d'ordre public qui fondent la 
peine accessoire cèdent devant l'intérêt de préserver l'unité familiale, dès que 
sont remplies les conditions établies par cette disposition. Dans ce contexte, 
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la Cour a jugé que les conditions énoncées à l'article 135, notamment dans 
son alinéa b), n'étaient pas remplies, dans un cas où la relation entre père et 
fis était très faible, le père ne contribuant pas, économique et affectivement, à 
l'éducation de son fils (arrêt du 14 avril 2011 (Affaire 40/08.1PJCSC). L'arrêt 
du 17 février 2011 (Affaire 66/06.OPJAMD-A.S1) va dans le même sens sti-
pulant qu’il faut prouver que « la relation entre le père et le fils entraîne un 
préjudice matériel ou psychologique significatif ».  
 Appréciant l'expulsion du citoyen étranger non résident, aux termes de la 
Loi 23/2007 et notamment de son article 151, 1, et ladite expulsion étant ap-
pliquée en tant que peine accessoire, la Cour d'Appel de Lisbonne a considéré 
qu'une décision d'expulsion, constituant une ingérence dans la vie de la per-
sonne concernée, présuppose toujours une évaluation du juste équilibre, du 
caractère raisonnable, de proportionnalité et de fair balance entre l'intérêt pu-
blic, la nécessité de l'ingérence et la réalisation des finalité indiquées à l'ar-
ticle 8, 2 de la CEDH, et les droits de l'individu contre l'ingérence des autori-
tés publiques dans sa vie et dans ses relations familiales qui peuvent être sé-
rieusement affectées par l'expulsion, surtout lorsque le degré d’intégration 
dans le pays de résidence coupe ou affaiblit les liens avec le pays d'origine 
(arrêt du 14 avril 2011 (Affaire 44/10.4PJSNT.L1-9). 
 L'arrêt de la Cour Suprême de Justice du 10 décembre 2008 (Affaire 
08P2147) a rappelé une jurisprudence obligatoire selon laquelle la peine ac-
cessoire d’expulsion en cas de trafic de stupéfiants ne peut pas constituer une 
conséquence automatique la condamnation et a cité, à titre d'exemple, des ar-
rêts prononcés jusqu'en juin 2008 dont il résulte que « nonobstant les chan-
gements de législation, la Cour Suprême de Justice a mis en relief la pondéra-
tion, le caractère raisonnable, la nécessité, l'adéquation et la proportionnalité 
immanentes à son application ». 
 Le principe de proportionnalité est également présent dans la jurispru-
dence administrative prononcée en appel de décisions administratives d'éloi-
gnement du territoire national à l’abri de l'article 150 de la Loi 23/2007. À cet 
égard, on peut mentionner les arrêts de la Cour Centrale Administrative du 
Nord du 5 avril 2013 (affaire 0001/13.9BEBEBRG) et de la Cour Centrale 
Administrative du Sud du premier juin de 2011 (Affaire 07608/11) qui ont 
accepté les référés sur le fondement notamment de considérations de propor-
tionnalité, aux termes de l'article 120 du Code de Procédure des Tribunaux 
Administratifs. 
 Depuis la transposition de la Directive, la jurisprudence a suivi l'approche 
selon laquelle les mariages blancs violent l'article 15 de la Loi 37/2006 et, 
partant, la Directive. 
PORTUGAL 
 751 
 Les cours et tribunaux ont estimé que le ratio legis de cette disposition est 
la protection de l'intérêt de l'unité familiale, cette protection étant impérative 
dès lors que le noyau familial existe de fait, l'existence d'une simple appa-
rence d’union n'étant pas suffisante. 
 En principe, l'abus de droit ou la fraude justifient l'application d'une sanc-
tion ainsi que le refus et le retrait des droits de résidence et des allocations so-
ciales. Il convient d'ajouter que la personne concernée doit être notifiée de fa-
çon à ce qu’elle comprenne la décision et puisse la contester. 
La citoyenneté au-delà des dispositions de la directive 2004/38/CE 
– Etudier l’application, au niveau national, du droit primaire 
européen 
Question 7 
On n'a pas trouvé de jurisprudence en matière de regroupement familial qui 
soulève ces questions. Certaines données ont pourtant été recueillies et figu-
rent dans un document élaboré par le « Serviço de Estrangeiros e Fronteiras » 
de 2012. Ainsi, en ce qui concerne l'impact de la jurisprudence de la Cour de 
Justice en matière de regroupement familial, ce document informe que les dé-
cisions récentes de la Cour de Justice n'ont pas eu un impact significatif au 
Portugal. Cependant, selon le même document, il importe de souligner que 
l'exercice du droit de libre circulation obéit aux principes découlant de la ju-
risprudence de la Cour européenne des droits de l'homme relative à l'article 8 
de la Convention et des Directives 2003/86/CE et 2004/38/CE. Il est encore 
utile de remarquer que la jurisprudence et les pratiques administratives sont 
très attentives à la jurisprudence des Cours européennes. 
Question 8  
La loi portugaise sur la perte de nationalité s’éloigne de celle qui est en vi-
gueur dans l'Etat membre où les faits appréciés dans l'affaire Rottmann ont eu 
lieu. Au Portugal, la perte de nationalité n’opère qu’au cas où la personne 
concernée déclare qu'elle ne veut pas garder la nationalité portugaise. Le ré-
gime juridique en vigueur au Portugal est compatible avec les exigences par-
ticulières de la citoyenneté européenne. 
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Les droits politiques des citoyens européens 
Question 9 
Les citoyens européens résidents et inscrits sur la liste électorale au Portugal 
jouissent de capacité électorale active et passive dans les élections locales et 
au Parlement européen, conformément aux Directives 93/109/CE et 
94/80/CE. 
 En ce qui concerne les élections au Parlement européen, ce droit est enca-
dré par l'article 15, 5, de la Constitution de la République Portugaise qui pres-
crit : « La loi peut encore accorder, dans des conditions de réciprocité, aux 
citoyens des Etats membres de l'Union européenne résidents au Portugal le 
droit d'élire et d'être élu députés au Parlement européen ». La Loi électorale 
relative au Parlement européen (Loi 14/87, du 29 avril), rectifiée par la Dé-
claration du 7 mai 1987 et modifiée par la Loi 4/94 du 9 mars et par les Lois 
Organiques du 1/99, du 22 juin, 1/2005, du 5 janvier et 1/2011 du 30 no-
vembre) confère capacité électorale active et passive aux citoyens de l'UE, 
non nationaux de l'Etat portugais, recensés au Portugal. La même capacité est 
reconnue aux citoyens portugais résidents dans un Etat membre qui optent de 
ne pas y exercer leur droit de vote. 
 L'inscription sur la liste électorale de citoyens étrangers est volontaire et 
exige que ce citoyen réside au Portugal. L'identification de la personne con-
cernée est effectuée par le biais d'un titre d'identification en cours de validité. 
Au 31 décembre 2012, 11.504 citoyens de l'Union non portugais étaient ins-
crits sur la liste électorale (en 2003, ce nombre était de 7.028). 
 Les restrictions applicables dans les élections au Parlement européen sont 
identiques à celles imposées par le droit interne visant les nationaux. Lors de 
l'inscription sur la liste électorale, le citoyen étranger doit présenter une décla-
ration formelle indiquant notamment qu'il n'est pas privé du droit de vote 
dans l'Etat d’origine et qu'il opte pour exercer le droit de vote au Portugal. 
Les fausses déclarations sont sanctionnées avec une peine de prison et une 
amende. La loi prévoit un processus d'échange d'information entre les autori-
tés portugaises et celles des autres Etats membres en vue d'assurer l'unicité de 
l'inscription et des candidatures au Parlement européen. 





La Directive 93/109/CE a été transposée par la Loi 4/94 du 9 mars qui a mo-
difié la Loi électorale antérieure et est entrée en vigueur le 10 mars 1994. La 
transposition a été faite sans dérogations ou impositions supplémentaires. 
 Les rapports produits par la Commission européenne sur l'application de 
cette Directive concernant les élections au Parlement européen de 1999 et 
2009 ont détecté des difficultés au niveau de l'application du système institué 
en vue de la prévention du double vote. En 2009, par exemple, le Portugal 
n'aurait identifié que 38.619 nationaux des 83.556 notifiés. 
 On n'a pas trouvé de jurisprudence sur cette question. 
Question 11 
Le droit de vote dans les élections locales et au Parlement européen est re-
connu, comme indiqué ci-dessus, selon les dispositions des Directives. 
 Les citoyens des Etats de l'Union qui s'inscrivent seulement en tant 
qu'électeurs aux élections locales sont dispensés de déclarer qu'ils ne se trou-
vent pas privés de droit de vote dans leurs pays d'origine.  
 Dans les mêmes conditions, le Portugal ne subordonne pas l'exercice du 
droit de vote ou l'éligibilité de citoyens de l'Union à des conditions telles que 
la résidence pendant une certaine période sur le territoire national ou sur le 
territoire de l'entité locale concernée. La loi ne réserve pas non plus aux ci-
toyens portugais l'éligibilité à des fonctions de président ou de membre d'or-
gane collégial exécutif. 
 En outre dans les élections locales, le Portugal reconnaît la capacité électo-
rale active et passive aux citoyens d'autres pays hors des Etats membres, sur 
condition de réciprocité. Ainsi, sont électeurs et éligibles dans les élections 
locales les nationaux du Brésil et de Cap Vert. Peuvent également voter les 
citoyens d'Argentine, Chili, Islande, Norvège, Pérou, Uruguay et Venezuela, 
dès que résidents de plus de trois ans. La loi portugaise admet finalement la 
possibilité de reconnaissance de capacité électorale passive aux citoyens 
d'autres pays non membres de l'UE ou de pays de langue officielle portugaise, 
résidents au Portugal plus de cinq ans, sur condition de réciprocité. Cette pos-
sibilité ne trouve pas à s'appliquer à présent. 
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Question 12 
Tant aux élections au Parlement européen qu'aux élections locales, la capacité 
électorale active et passive n'est limitée (indépendamment de la nationalité de 
la personne concernée) que dans les cas suivants : 
1. Interdiction par décision juridictionnelle passée en chose jugée. Il convient 
d'observer que, aux termes de l'article 65 du Code Pénal, aucune peine 
n'implique comme effet nécessaire la perte de droits civils, professionnels 
ou politiques. Toutefois, aux personnes condamnées pour la pratique de 
crimes électoraux peut être imposée la peine accessoire d'incapacité pour 
l'élection du Président de la République, de membre du Parlement, pour 
les élections locales et pour membre du jury, pour une période de 2 à 10 
ans; 
2. Ceux reconnus notoirement comme malades mentaux, bien que non inter-
dits par décision juridictionnelle, dès lors qu'internés en des établissements 
psychiatriques ou déclarés comme tels par une formation de deux 
membres (trois en cas d'élections locales); 
3. Ceux qui sont privés de droits politiques, par décision juridictionnelle pas-
sée en chose jugée. 
L'existence de ces incapacités est communiquée à un organisme central par 
les autorités compétentes. 
 Les limitations s’appliquent aussi bien aux citoyens portugais qu’à ceux 
d'autres Etats membres. En outre, lors de leur inscription sur les listes électo-
rales, ces derniers doivent déclarer formellement qu'ils ne sont pas privés de 
droit de vote dans leur Etat d'origine, déclaration dispensée s'il s'agit d'élec-
tions locales. Aucune tension n'existe, dans ce domaine, entre le droit portu-
gais et la législation de l'Union. 
 Les tendances d’opinion exprimées récemment au sein de la société civile 
sur des matières connexes à la citoyenneté européenne ont été influencées par 
la question de l'application du mémorandum signé avec la Troika et le rôle 
des institutions et des partenaires européens dans la crise économique et fi-
nancière qui affecte le pays. Selon une étude publiée en Automne 2012 (Eu-
robarómetro Standard 78), la majorité des enquêtés a exprimé un sentiment 
de citoyenneté européenne (59 %, pourcentage inférieur aux 63 % correspon-
dant au taux moyen de l'Union), quoique ce sentiment soit plus accentué chez 
les cadres supérieurs (83 %), les jeunes (73 %) et les individus avec un niveau 
plus élevé de scolarité (71 %). Les personnes âgées, les habitants des zones 
rurales et les domestiques semblent être ceux qui se sentent moins européens. 
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Etant donné que, chez tous les groupes analysés, le sentiment de citoyenneté 
est partagé par 50 % ou plus des enquêtés, on peut conclure que le Portugal 
est une société où le sentiment de citoyenneté européenne est relativement 
transversal. 
 Cependant, encore selon ladite étude « ce sentiment de citoyenneté n'est 
pas accompagné par la connaissance des droits associés à la citoyenneté eu-
ropéenne ni par la volonté d'en savoir d'avantage ». Seulement 35 % des en-
quêtés affirment connaître leurs droits en tant que citoyens européens face à 
45 % dans l'ensemble de l'Union. Il n'y a que la Romanie, la France et l'Italie 
qui présentent des chiffres inférieurs. Toutefois, en contraste avec ces der-
niers Etats membres, beaucoup de Portugais ne trouvent pas qu'il vaille la 
peine d’en savoir d'avantage. Le Portugal a le taux le plus bas de nationaux 
qui aimeraient connaître mieux leurs droits de citoyens européens (35 %), ce 
qui correspond au taux le plus faible de toute Union. 
 À l'instar de la majorité des européens lorsqu’enquêtés sur quels droits ils 
aimeraient obtenir plus d'information, les Portugais ont fréquemment indiqué 
la possibilité de travailler (20 %) (21 % dans l'Union), de vivre dans un autre 
Etat membre (16 % au Portugal contre 15 % pour la moyenne européenne) ou 
la possibilité de recevoir des soins médicaux (14 % au Portugal, 18 % dans 
l'Union) 
 La cause est – me semble-t-il – le sentiment répandu que : 
a) La crise est en grand partie le résultat de la politique monétaire commune; 
b) L'Europe n'a pas encore achevé une véritable intégration; 
c) Il y a un manque de solidarité européenne. 
Il y a aussi une opinion dominante qui soutient que les politiques d'investis-
sement public que le pays a développées dans les années 2000 et suivantes 
ont été suggérées par l'Union européenne elle-même et sont à l'origine de l'ac-
tuel endettement auquel le pays ne peut pas faire face.  
 Enfin, un sentiment général de frustration européenne a envahi la majorité 
des populations, surtout la classe moyenne et moyenne basse. Ainsi 21 % des 
enquêtés n'ont pas répondu à la question ou n'aimeraient pas savoir d'avan-
tage sur les droits découlant de la citoyenneté européenne. Ce chiffre est 
presque le double de celui concernant l'ensemble de l'Union européenne. 
 Quant à la perception des bénéfices découlant de la citoyenneté euro-
péenne, l'étude montre que, chez les Portugais, la libre circulation des per-
sonnes et des marchandises est le résultat le plus positif de l'Union (22 %), 
suivi de la paix entre les Etats membres (12 %) et du niveau de bien-être so-
cial (10 %). Plus de 14 % considèrent que la citoyenneté européenne n'ap-
J.N. CUNHA RODRIGUES 
  756 
porte aucun bénéfice (le double de la moyenne européenne qui est de 6 %) et 
11 % ne sont pas en mesure d‘identifier les bénéfices (face à 5 % dans l'en-
semble de l'Union). 
 Ces indications peuvent être expliquées, en partie, par le fait que les Por-
tugais sont considérablement moins exposés à la réalité des autres Etats 
membres que leurs congénères européens, si l'on prend en compte le pourcen-
tage de personnes qui affirment n'avoir pas visité les autres pays ou lu les 
journaux publiés dans d’autres pays ou avoir socialisé avec les ressortissants 
de ces pays dans les douze derniers mois. 
 En ce qui concerne le rôle des médias, l'étude conclut que les Portugais 
utilisent surtout la télévision pour s'informer (65 % face à 58 % dans l'en-
semble de l'Union). Seulement 4 % utilisent la presse écrite et l'internet, face 
à 11 % et 12 % de la moyenne européenne. Un pourcentage élevé des Portu-
gais (24 %, comparé avec 10 % de l'ensemble de l'Union) ne cherche pas à 
s'informer d'avantage. Les personnes âgées (31 %), les habitants des lieux ru-
raux (33 %) et les moins scolarisés, les domestiques et les retraités (27 %) 
sont ceux qui affirment avec plus de conviction ne pas demander plus 
d'information. 
Culture(s) de la citoyenneté 
Question 13 
Je dirais que la compréhension dominante partage des deux éléments. D'une 
part, la citoyenneté est observée en tant lien culturel qui reconnaît à chaque 
individu, outre le statut de national, le statut d'européen. Une enquête d'été a 
été réalisée à ce sujet par un journal de référence. Les réponses sont diverses 
mais presque toutes reflètent un noyau matriciel qui est lié à l'histoire et à la 
culture commune. Il y a même des réponses qui confèrent une priorité identi-
taire à la citoyenneté européenne, au détriment de la nationalité. Je serais ten-
té à dire que l´élément migration n'est pas si visible. La raison est que les flux 
migratoires sont connus, depuis longtemps, par les Portugais et ne sont pas 
normalement associés au statut de citoyenneté. Ce qui est plus visible est 
l'émigration. L'immigration existe mais concerne surtout des nationaux des 
anciennes colonies portugaises et des nationaux des pays de l'Est. Une syn-
thèse de ces deux éléments saurait être définie par un concept d'intégration 
qui fusionne plusieurs conditions et statuts. 
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 J'ajouterais que l'idée de citoyenneté revêt d'une dimension constitution-
nelle qui découle de la hiérarchie du droit de l'Union mais aussi de la percep-
tion des peuples qui ont assimilé les traits des cultures classiques en Europe. 
Je ne peux m'empêcher d'observer que l'évolution du statut de « citoyenneté 
européenne » dans la jurisprudence de la Cour de Justice semble incorporer 
ces éléments. L'affirmation que la citoyenneté a vocation à être le statut fon-
damental des nationaux des Etats membres ne peut que signifier que, outre 
les droits concrètement consacrés, il y a un noyau dur qui doit être affirmé et 
préservé. Ce noyau a une dimension constitutionnelle et s'inspire des valeurs 
qui structurent l'Union dont le respect des droits fondamentaux et de l'Etat de 
droit. 
 Une définition plus claire et objective dépendra du dépassement d'un obs-
tacle qui me semble plutôt méthodologique : la notion de « situation pure-
ment interne ». 
Question 14 
L'acquisition de force juridique a non seulement donné plus de visibilité à la 
Charte mais aussi attiré l'attention des cours et tribunaux. Trois arrêts récents 
de la Cour Suprême Administrative en attestent. Dans ces affaires, des ques-
tions ont été soulevées ayant trait à la légitimité des membres de la famille 
des requérants de demander à la justice administrative une injonction visant à 
la protection de droits, libertés et garanties. Des demandes initiales avaient 
été présentées auprès du Ministère des Affaires Etrangères pour que celui-ci 
ordonne l'émission urgente de visas de résidence, afin que les requérants 
puissent rejoindre leurs familles. Face à l'opposition du Ministère, les de-
mandes ont été rejetées. Les requérants ont fait appel. Quelques mois après, la 
Cour Suprême Administrative a prononcé un arrêt définitif accordant le re-
groupement. 
 La synthèse des décisions est la suivante : 
1. Dans le cadre du regroupement familial, le visa de résidence existe en 
fonction du regroupement; 
2. Dans la relation matérielle en cause qui est d'émission/non émission du vi-
sa, le titulaire du regroupement familial est considéré comme partie, bien 
qu’il ne soit pas lui-même, naturellement, titulaire du visa; 
3. Il est considéré comme partie, en tant que partie principale dans la rela-
tion; 
4. Pour cette raison, il jouit de légitimité pour agir. 
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Quelques mois après, un arrêt en pourvoi a été prononcé. En résumé, ce der-
nier arrêt affirme que, en cas de retard dans l'émission de visa pour les 
membres de la famille, la demande de regroupement familial ayant été diffé-
rée, le fait que le droit au regroupement familial devient caduque si la de-
mande n'est pas présentée dans le délai de trois mois, impose que le conjoint 
qui réside déjà au Portugal et dispose d'un visa de résidence a légitimité pour 
demander l'émission. Les arrêts citent notamment l'article 8 de la Charte et les 
articles 7, 15, et 33 de la Charte des Droits Fondamentaux. 
 Cette jurisprudence montre l'existence de bonnes pratiques chez les autori-
tés administratives.  
Question 15 
Le débat dans les médias peut être analysé selon trois aspects principaux : 
1. Politico-législatif : altération de mesures politiques et législatives relatives 
à l'immigration et la sécurité; 
2. Technique : publication de rapports, des statistiques ou d'autres informa-
tions; 
3. Individuel : décisions juridictionnelles et pratiques administratives. 
En tant qu'exemple, on pourrait indiquer les discussions autour de la transpo-
sition de la Directive « Retour », notamment à propos du changement des ré-
gimes de nationalité et d’immigration. Les deux autres aspects ont été illus-
trés par l'attention faite aux phénomènes de mutilation génitale féminine et le 
manque de soutien aux réfugiés et aux requérants de protection internationale. 
 Il y a à remarquer, en ce qui concerne l'impact, une tendance d'améliora-
tion des pratiques par les agents concernés et une plus claire volonté d'aug-
menter la diffusion d'information. 
 Les années significatives à cet égard sont celles de 2001 et 2003, période 
qui signale un flux massif d'immigrants et la publication d’une certaine régu-
larisation (avec la prévision d’autorisations de séjour pour des immigrants en 
situation irrégulière mais possédant un contrat de travail, dès lors qu'ils fai-
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Slovenia 
Citizenship within Directive 2004/38/EC – stability of residence for 
Union citizens and their family members 
Question 1 
With respect to a Union citizen’s family members, Articles 2, 3, and 5 of the 
Directive 2004/38 on the right of citizens of the Union and their family mem-
bers to move and reside freely within the territory of the Member States3 
(hereinafter: Directive 2004/38) have been transposed into Slovenian legisla-
tion by the number of provisions contained in the Aliens Act,4 which has 
originally been adopted in 1999 (ZTuj-1), but the new Aliens Act (ZTuj-2) is 
in force since October 2011. 
 The definition of the Union citizens is governed by the twelfth indent of 
Article 2 of the Aliens Act, providing that Union citizen is every alien having 
a nationality of another Member State. This definition is repeated in Article 
117(2) of the Aliens Act, specifying in Article 117(3) that provisions con-
cerning EU citizens are applicable also to the citizens of the EEA.  
 The definition of family members of the EU citizens is governed by the 
provisions of Article 127 of the Aliens Act and is in principle transposing the 
provisions of the Directive 2004/38 without substantial modifications. It takes 
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into account the Slovenian regulation of the ‘family’ pursuant to the Marriage 
and Family Relations Act5 and the regulation in The Registration of a Same-
Sex Civil Partnership Act.6 Thus, the definition in the Aliens Act encom-
passes also a partner with whom the EU citizens resides in a long-term part-
nership, as well as descendants and ancestors of such partner under the condi-
tions set out in the Directive 2004/38 (children under the age of 21, those 
whom the EU citizen or the Slovenian citizen or the spouse, registered part-
ner or partner with whom the EU citizen or the Slovenian citizen has resided 
in a long-term partnership is obliged to maintain or actually maintains in ac-
cordance with the legislation of the state of which he is a citizen). 
 The provision on beneficiaries laid down in Article 3 of the Directive 
2004/38 is transposed with the provisions in the Chapter XIII of the Aliens 
Act, with the title ‘Entry and residence of citizens of EU Member States, their 
family members and family members of Slovenian citizens’. Article 117(1) 
of the Aliens Act provides that the provisions of this chapter are applicable to 
EU citizens, their family members and the family members of Slovenian citi-
zens. The other provisions of the Aliens Act shall apply to the stated catego-
ries only if they are more favourable to them or if so stipulated.7  
 The circle of beneficiaries under the Aliens Act is wider than the one un-
der the Directive 2004/38, as the Aliens Act does not prescribe the exercise of 
free movement rights as a prerequisite for the Aliens Act to be applicable to 
EU citizens and their family members. It is thus applicable to persons regard-
less of their exercise of free movement rights, i.e. to ‘dynamic’ and ‘static’ 
citizens and their family members alike. Since nationals of another Member 
States are in principle exercising their free movement right by moving to or 
residing in Slovenia, this provision is specifically important with respect to 
Slovenian citizens who do not exercise free movement rights, as the Aliens 
Act goes beyond the Directive 2004/38, these provisions of the Aliens Act 
being applicable also to Slovenian nationals and their family members, there-
by excluding the potential of the reverse discrimination effect.  
 The provisions of the Chapter XIII of the Aliens Act govern entry of EU 
citizens and the family members from third countries into Slovenia as well. 
The entry of EU citizens is regulated by the Article 118 of the Aliens Act, 
providing that an EU citizen shall not require any entry permit, i.e. a visa or 
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6. Zakon o registraciji istospolne partnerske skupnosti (ZRIPS), Official Gazette of the 
Republic of Slovenia No 65/05 and the following. 
7. Article 117(1) of the Aliens Act.  
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residence permit, for entry into Slovenia. The entry of their family members 
is regulated by the second and third paragraph of Article 127 of the Aliens 
Act, transposing the provisions of the Directive 2004/38. Concerning the en-
try of family members from third countries, the Aliens Act provides that they 
may, for the purposes of family reunification with an EU citizen or a Sloveni-
an citizen, enter Slovenia with a valid passport containing a visa issued by the 
competent authority of the Republic of Slovenia or by another state party to 
the Convention implementing the Schengen Agreement of 14 June 1984, un-
less he is a citizen of a state for which the Republic of Slovenia has cancelled 
visas, or with a valid travel document and residence permit issued by another 
EU Member State, unless stipulated otherwise by an international agree-
ment.8 
 The Aliens Act provides that the border control authority shall decide on a 
refusal of entry in accordance with the provisions in the Aliens Act. An EU 
citizen may lodge an appeal against the refusal of entry within eight days.9 
 The case law of the national courts dealing with the different types of fam-
ily relationships outlined in Articles 2 and 3 of the Directive 2004/38 is not 
vast. An interesting judgement by the Administrative Court concerns the def-
inition of an ancestor who a Slovenian citizen is obliged to maintain.10 The 
factual background of the case concerns a Slovenian national and her mother, 
a Bosnian citizen applying for the temporary residence permit for the purpos-
es of the family reunification. Her mother would be granted temporary resi-
dence permit pursuant to the Aliens Act if Slovenian national would be 
obliged to maintain her pursuant to the law. Pursuant to Article 124(1) of the 
Marriage and Family Relations Act, the child who has reached the majority is 
obliged to maintain his parents, if they do not have sufficient means of sub-
sistence. The application was rejected on the grounds that her mother receives 
a pension in Bosnia and Herzegovina, which suffices for her needs, and thus 
has a sufficient means of subsistence. Consequently, her mother is not a fami-
ly member for the purposes of family reunification pursuant to the Aliens Act 
and in the sense of Article 2 or 3 of the Directive 2004/38.  
                                                        
8. Article 127(3) o the Aliens Act.  
9. Article 118(5) of the Aliens Act. 
10. Administrative Court judgement III U 88/2011, issued on 23.9.2011. The judge-
ment was issued on the basis of the Article 93.k of the old Aliens Act (ZTuj-1), 
regulating the position of EU citizens and Slovenian nationals’ family members. Its 
provision on ancestors is substantially the same as in the new Aliens Act (ZTuj-2). 
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Question 2 
There is no data on the expulsion of Union citizens (and/or their family 
members) on purely economic grounds in publicly accessible11 decisions of 
national courts.  
 With respect to the expulsion of Union citizens or their family members, 
the general impression steaming out of the available case law is that the na-
tional courts are engaged in the disputes concerning family members with a 
thematic concern about stability of residence for EU citizens and their family 
members. When the expulsion of the family member is in question, the na-
tional courts tend to rule against it with the reasoning that the expulsion may 
lead to the dissolution of the family members, limiting the exercise of their 
right to a private and family life, leading to irreparable harm.12 The expulsion 
would often lead to the dissolution of the family members as they attend 
school or work in Slovenia, have friends and family there, and most likely 
would not join the family member subject to the expulsion in the other coun-
try. On the other hand, the family member being subject to the expulsion usu-
ally does not have assets in the other country and the apartment for him and 
his family. The Supreme Court has held that the dissolution of the family it-
self represents the irreparable harm.13 It held that it should not be expected 
from the family member subject to expulsion to prove those negative (inex-
istent) facts for the decision on expulsion to be nullified. It has noted that in 
the case of expulsion there is a likelihood of the dissolution of the family, 
which in itself constitutes an interference with human rights and fundamental 
freedoms, and the possible consequences of such dissolution are difficult to 
argue and to be proven before they actually occur. 
 It may be deducted from the cited case law that the stability of residence 
for Union citizens and their family members is generated by the reliance on 
the right to private and family life. 
                                                        
11. In Slovenia, decisions of the courts of the second and third instance are publicly ac-
cessible online, as well as decisions of the Supreme Court and of the Constitutional 
Court.  
12. See for example the Supreme Court Order I Up 168/2012, issued on 5.4.2012; the 
Administrative Court Order I U 1337/2012, issued on 20.9.2012.  




Articles 12-15 of the Directive 2004/38 have been transposed into national 
law with Article 129 of the Aliens Act with respect to the retention of a tem-
porary residence permit for a family member.  
 A permanent residence permit shall be issued to a family member for an 
unlimited period of time, so no provisions on retention of the permit are 
needed.14 Nevertheless, with respect to a permanent residence permit for a 
family member who is a third-country national, there is a special provision 
governing the situation when the EU citizen dies during his legal residence in 
Slovenia and was employed or self-employed in Slovenia, but had not yet ob-
tained a permanent residence permit. In such event his family members may 
be issued with a permanent residence permit prior to the expiry of the five 
years period if the EU citizen had resided as an employed or self-employed 
person in the Republic of Slovenia continuously for two years before his 
death or the death of the EU citizen was caused by an accident at work or oc-
cupational illness regardless of the duration of his residence in the Republic 
of Slovenia.15  
 There is no publicly available case law of national courts addressing the 
interpretation or application of these provisions. 
Question 4 
Articles 16-21 of the Directive have been transposed with several provisions 
governed by the Aliens Act, with the main provision found in the Article 126. 
It stipulates in the first paragraph that a permanent residence permit may be 
issued to an EU citizen who has resided in Slovenia continuously for five 
years on the basis of his residence registration certificate, a receipt stating that 
an application was submitted for the issuance or renewal of the residence reg-
istration certificate or his valid identity card or a valid passport, if there are no 
reasonable grounds to believe that his residence in Slovenia would present a 
serious and actual threat to public order and safety or the international rela-
tions of Slovenia, or if there are no grounds to believe that his residence in the 
country would be associated with terrorist or other violent acts, illegal intelli-
gence activities, trafficking in drugs, or with the commission of any other 
criminal acts.  
                                                        
14. See Article 130(10) of the Aliens Act.  
15. Article 130(6) of the Aliens Act.  
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 Further, Article 126 sets out the absences that shall not affect the period of 
five years of continuous legal residence. It also sets out the events in which a 
permanent residence permit may be issued prior to the expiry of the period of 
five years. Article 127 of the Aliens Act governs a permanent residence per-
mit for a family member who is a third-country national. 
 Article 137 of the Aliens Act governs the manner of issuing, content, and 
form of a residence registration certificate and residence permit. A residence 
registration certificate for an EU citizen, a temporary and permanent resi-
dence permit for a family member and a permanent residence permit for an 
EU citizen shall be issued in the form of a card. This certificate must contain 
a photograph of the person to whom it is issued and information specified by 
the Aliens Act. In September 2013, the Ministry for Foreign Affairs has pro-
posed a new Residence Registration Act. 
 The Ministry for Internal Affairs has published the statistical data on the 
volume of issued permanent residence permits at the end of the year 2012.16 
On 31 December 2012 there were 1,759 nationals of EEA having a perma-
nent residence, which is only slightly over 3 % of all permanent residence 
permits issued in 2012.17 In the year 2011, there were 243 permanent resi-
dence permits issued to citizens of the EEA and 1,035 permanent residence 
permits to family members of the citizens of EEA or family members of Slo-
venian citizens.18 4 applications of the citizens of EEA for permanent resi-
dence were rejected in 2011, while 5 procedures were stopped.19 
 There is no data on disputes on interpretation or application of these provi-
sions in publicly accessible decisions of national courts.  
Question 5 
Social assistance is governed by the Financial Social Assistance Act20 and the 
Exercise of Rights to Public Funds Act.21 A person is entitled to public funds 
                                                        
16. See Poročilo o delu direktorata za upravne notranje zadeve, migracije in naturalizaci-
jo za leto 2012, available at  
 http://www.mnz.gov.si/nc/si/medijsko_sredisce/novica/article//7868/.  
17. Ibid., p. 5.  
18. See Poročilo direktorata za migracije in integracijo za leto 2011, available at 
http://www.mnz.gov.si/fileadmin/mnz.gov.si/pageuploads/DMI/Statisticno_porocil
o_-_SLO_zadnja_verzija_-_popravljena.pdf, p. 23.  
19. Ibid, p. 25.  
20. Zakon o socialno varstvenih prejemkih (ZSVarPre), Official Gazette of the Republic 
of Slovenia No 61/10 and the following. 
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if his income does not exceed the statutory income limit for individual rights 
to public funds, while at the same time meeting the other criteria provided for 
in the regulations governing individual rights. The Union citizens are entitled 
to financial social assistance if they reside in Slovenia with a permanent resi-
dence permit, they do not have sufficient means for survival nor assets or sav-
ings to ensure survival, and they are actively seeking solutions to their social 
problems.  
 All categories specified in Article 24(2) of the Directive holding a perma-
nent residence permits are entitled to seek financial social assistance as long 
as they fulfil the conditions. National law does not distinguish between the 
categories specified in Article 24(2) and job-seekers in terms of entitlement to 
social benefits.  
 Financial social assistance is normally granted for a limited period, de-
pending on the circumstances that serve as the basis for the allocation and 
level of financial social assistance. 
Question 6 
The concepts found in Articles 27 and 28 of the Directive have been trans-
posed with Article 136 of the Aliens Act, entitled ‘termination of residence’. 
There is a scant case law on those concepts. In judgement III U 150/201122 
the Administrative Court interpreted the concept ‘public policy, public securi-
ty, or public health’. The applicant has brought an action against the decision 
of the competent authority to reject the application for the temporary resi-
dence permit of the applicant’s husband. The application was rejected on the 
grounds of the threat for public order and safety, as her husband was convict-
ed for robbery and also entered into the Schengen Information System (SIS). 
In its reasoning, applying the principle of proportionality, the competent au-
thority took into account the fact that the husband committed the offense pri-
or to the filing of application and the fact that the rejection of an application 
for a temporary residence permit only temporarily limited his right to private 
and family life. Consequently, the priority should be given to the rights of 
others to public safety and national security of the Republic of Slovenia.  
                                                        
21. Zakon o uveljavljanju pravic iz javnih sredstev (ZUPJS), Official Gazette of the Re-
public of Slovenia No 62/10 and the following.  
22. Administrative Court judgement III U 150/2011, issued on 20.04.2012. The judge-
ment was issued on the basis of the old Aliens Act (ZTuj-1), with the relevant provi-
sions being substantially the same as in the new Aliens Act (ZTuj-2).  
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 In another decision the court rejected the action brought upon the rejection 
of application for temporary residence permit of the family member of Slo-
venian national, as he was convicted for several crimes during the period 
2001-2008, ranging from drug trafficking, domestic violence, thefts to inflict-
ing minor bodily harm.23 As far as the application of the principle of propor-
tionality is in question, the court held that the applicant was repeatedly con-
victed of crimes and that evidence gathered confirms suspicions that his resi-
dence could pose a threat to public order and safety, and that the gravity of 
the offense is such that it represents a danger to public order.  
 There is no available case law on the interpretation of the concepts of ‘se-
rious grounds of public policy or public security’ and ‘imperative grounds of 
public security’.  
EU citizenship beyond Directive 2004/38/EC – exploring national 
application of primary EU Law 
Question 7 
EU citizenship rights conferred upon the EU citizens with the Directive 
2004/38 are granted to the citizens exercising their free movement rights, i.e. 
‘dynamic citizens’, moving or residing in a Member State other than that of 
which they are nationals.24 These rights also include the family reunification 
rights. As far as ‘static citizens’ are concerned, they cannot rely on the rights 
conferred by the Directive 2004/38, as the mobility is the prerequisite for its 
application. In cases where such ‘internal situation’ is concerned, the EU citi-
zenship rights can be, under conditions shaped by the case law of the CJEU, 
conferred upon the EU citizens through the direct application of the Treaty 
provisions on EU citizenship (Articles 20 and 21 of the TFEU). So far, the 
case law of Slovenian courts on disputes involving ‘purely internal situation’ 
has not been reported.  
 The regulation in the Aliens Act is the same for EU citizens and Slovenian 
nationals, thus eliminating the potential of reverse discrimination. The Slove-
nian legislator undertook the approach of releasing the rights of citizenship 
                                                        
23. Administrative Court judgement I U 1922/2011, issued on 11.4.2012. Also this 
judgement was issued on the basis of the provisions of the old Aliens Act (ZTuj-1).  
24. See Article 3 of the Directive 2004/38.  
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from the economic considerations attached to freedom of movement in the 
realm of the internal market, granting those rights to ‘static’ nationals. 
 Family reunification is regulated in Slovenia through two separated pieces 
of legislation. In case when the persons are entitled to international protec-
tion, the family reunification is governed by the provisions found in the Inter-
national Protection Act.25 If no international protection is granted to the per-
sons concerned, the family renunciation is governed pursuant to the provision 
contained in the Aliens Act, which is relevant also in case of the EU citizens 
and their family reunifications.  
 The Aliens Act provides that a family member who is an EU citizen may 
enter Slovenia with a valid identity card or a valid passport without an entry 
permit irrespective of the purpose of residence in the Republic of Slovenia.26 
A family member who is not an EU citizen may, for the purposes of family 
reunification with an EU citizen or a Slovenian citizen, enter Slovenia with a 
valid passport containing a visa issued by the competent authority of the Re-
public of Slovenia or by another state party to the Convention implementing 
the Schengen Agreement of 14 June 1984, unless he is a citizen of a state for 
which the Republic of Slovenia has cancelled visas, or with a valid travel 
document and residence permit issued by another EU Member State, unless 
stipulated otherwise by an international agreement.27 
Question 8 
The conditions for the acquisition and loss of nationality come within the 
competence of each Member State. However, in the judgement Rottmann,28 
the CJEU has held that the situation of a citizen of the Union becoming state-
less as a result of withdrawal of his nationality comes within the ambit of EU 
law. In such situation, the person concerned loses the status of citizen of the 
Union conferred by Article 20 of the TFEU, which is intended to be the fun-
damental status of nationals of the Member States. Therefore, a decision to 
withdraw nationality is amenable to judicial review carried out in the light of 
EU law, checking whether the decision in question is justified by a reason re-
lating to the public interest and whether it respects the principle of propor-
tionality. 
                                                        
25. Zakon o mednarodni zaščiti (ZMZ), Official Gazette of the Republic of Slovenia No 
111/07 and the following. 
26. Article 127(2) of the Aliens Act. 
27. Article 127(3) of the Aliens Act.  
28. C-135/08 Janko Rottmann v Freistaat Bayern, judgment of 2 March 2010.  
VERICA TRSTENJAK & PETRA WEINGERL 
  768 
 The main piece of legislation regulating the acquisition of citizenship in 
Slovenia is the Citizenship Act,29 which is supported by three other docu-
ments: Regulation on the Criteria of Assessing the Conditions and Circum-
stances of Acquisition of Citizenship of the Republic of Slovenia in the Pro-
cess of Naturalization, Rules on the Procedure and Manner of the Solemn Act 
of Oath Taking, and the Decision Establishing the Commission to Perform 
the Slovenian Language Test.30 
 Slovenian citizenship is acquired by origin, by birth in the territory of Slo-
venia, by naturalization (admission to citizenship on the basis of an applica-
tion), and in compliance with international agreement.31 Under the ius san-
guinis principle there are two modes of acquiring Slovenian citizenship: ex 
lege and by registration. The registration has a constitutive character and ret-
roactive effect (ex tunc).32  
 There are four ways to cease Slovenian citizenship: by release (by dismis-
sal), by resignation, by suppression and loss of citizenship through interna-
tional agreements.33 Citizenship can also be lost by the nullification of natu-
ralization.34  
 One of the conditions for the person to lose Slovenian citizenship by re-
lease is that the person can prove or has proof that he/she will be granted for-
eign citizenship.35 A release guarantee may be issued to a person who has ap-
plied for release of citizenship of the Republic of Slovenia although he/she 
does not fulfil this condition. If a person to whom the guarantee referred to 
was issued does not provide proof within a period of two years after such 
guarantee was handed over that he/she has actually moved from Slovenia and 
that he/she was guaranteed foreign citizenship or that he/she has already ac-
quired foreign citizenship, it shall be considered that he/she has withdrawn 
his/her application.36 Moreover, the authority that decided on the release of 
citizenship may revoke the decision on release if the person so requires and if 
                                                        
29. Zakon o državljanstvu Republike Slovenije, Official Gazette of the Republic of Slo-
venia No 1/91-I and the following. 
30. See also Kovič Dine, M.: EUDO Citizenship Observatory, Naturalisation Procedure 
for Immigrants: Slovenia, EUI 2013, p. 1. 
31. Article 3 of the Citizenship Act.  
32. For more information on the modes of the acquisition of Slovenian citizenship see 
Medved, F.: EUDO Citizenship Observatory, Country Report: Slovenia, EUI 2013, 
p. 12.  
33. Article 17 of the Citizenship Act. 
34. Article 16 of the Citizenship Act.  
35. See point 7 of Article 18(1) of the Citizenship Act.  
36. Article 19 of the Citizenship Act.  
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he/she within one year subsequent to the receipt of the decision did not ac-
quire foreign citizenship. The application for revocation of the decision on 
the release may be filed within one year after the handing over of the deci-
sion.37 
 Regarding similar situation to the factual background in the judgment 
Rottmann, where the citizenship was lost with the withdrawal of naturaliza-
tion due to fraudulent obtainment, also the Citizenship Act provides that the 
competent body issuing the decree of granting citizenship by naturalization 
may cancel the decree within three years after its issuance. Though, this is 
possible only if it is stated and proved that naturalization was obtained with 
false statement or by intentional concealing or substantial facts or circum-
stances that would have affected the decision.38  
 However, there is a safety net provision preventing the same consequences 
as in the judgement Rottmann, where the citizen concerned was rendered 
stateless with the withdrawal of naturalization. The Article 16(2) of the Citi-
zenship Act provides that decree cannot be cancelled if the person obtaining 
citizenship of Slovenia by naturalization remains without citizenship. Thus, 
the Slovenian regulation on the acquisition and loss of citizenship comes fully 
in line with the CJEU jurisprudence on this topic and to its full extent reflects 
the implications of the particular requirements of EU citizenship.  
Political rights of EU citizens 
Question 9 
The Directive 93/109/EC on European Parliament elections was transposed 
into Slovenian legal order with the Election of Slovenian Members to the 
European Parliament Act39 (hereinafter: the European Parliament Elections 
Act), adopted in 2002. It has been fully implemented with amendments of the 
European Parliament Elections Act in 2009. With those amendments the re-
quirement of permanent residence for the EU citizen to be entitled to vote has 
been abolished.  
                                                        
37. Article 21 of the Citizenship Act.  
38. See Article 16 of the Citizenship Act. 
39. Zakon o volitvah poslancev iz Republike Slovenije v evropski parlament, Official 
Gazette of the Republic of Slovenia No 96/02 and the following.  
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 In principle, the EU citizens have the electoral rights to the European Par-
liament under the same general conditions as Slovenian nationals. The addi-
tional condition imposed on EU citizens compared to national citizens to 
have the right to vote and to stand as a candidate in elections to the European 
Parliament is now solely the certificate of residence registration, provided 
that their electoral rights have not been revoked and that they have been en-
tered into the electoral register.40 The entry into the electoral register is made 
only upon request of the EU citizen. The request can be filed at any time. 
 There has been no relevant case law in domestic courts regarding the EU 
citizens’ right to vote and to stand as a candidate in elections to the European 
Parliament. 
 The December 2012 amendments to Directive 93/109/EC will not require 
substantial additional changes to the electoral legislation in Slovenia. The 
Voting Rights Register Act regulates the substance covered with the amend-
ments.41 The Voting Rights Register Act provides that the competent authori-
ty shall check whether the citizens of the Union who have expressed a desire 
to exercise their right to stand as a candidate there have not been deprived of 
that right in the home Member State.42 The mode of deprivation in the home 
Member State is not specified, therefore it might encompass both the depriva-
tion by an individual judicial decision and by an administrative decision pro-
vided that the latter can be subject to judicial remedies, as it is laid down by 
the December 2012 amendments to Directive 93/109/EC. The draft of the 
amendments to the Voting rights Register Act required by the December 
2012 amendments is already prepared by the Ministry for Foreign Affairs and 
has been published in May 2013.43  
Question 10 
Directive 94/80/EC has been transposed into Slovenian legal order with sev-
eral acts, the main being the Local Elections Act44 with the implementing 
provisions adopted in 2002. It has been fully implemented with the last 
                                                        
40. Article 10 of the European Parliament Elections Act. 
41. Zakon o evidenci volilne pravice, Official Gazette of the Republic of Slovenia No 
52/02 and the following.  
42. Article 13(5) of the Voting Rights Register Act. 
43. It may be accessed at:  
 http://www.mnz.gov.si/si/zakonodaja_in_dokumenti/predlogi_predpisov/.  
44. Zakon o lokalnih volitvah, Official Gazette of the Republic of Slovenia No 72/93 and 
the following.  
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amendments to the Local Elections Act, adopted in 2012, after the European 
Commission noted in its Report to the European Parliament and the Council 
on the application of Directive 94/80/EC of 9 March 201245 (hereinafter: 
Commission’s Report) that Slovenia seemed to have transposed Articles 3 
and 4 of Directive 94/80/EC incorrectly. The Commission noted that in Slo-
venia, along with Lithuania, EU citizens are granted the right to vote or stand 
as a candidate in municipal elections only after a minimum period of resi-
dence, without such requirement being imposed on nationals. The Commis-
sion has included in this report that the Slovenian authorities have recently 
informed the Commission that they agree to amend their domestic legislation 
to ensure full compliance with Directive 94/80/EC.46 As aforementioned, 
those amendments were adopted a few months later in 2012.  
 The Local Elections Act provides in Article 5 that every citizen of the Re-
public of Slovenia turning 18 years old on the voting day has a right to vote 
and to be elected as a member of the municipal council. The same right is al-
so granted to EU citizens who are either permanent residents in Slovenia or 
those who have obtained a certificate of residence registration and who have 
registered a temporary residence in the territory of Slovenia. 
 The EU citizens also have the right to vote for the mayor; however, they 
do not have a right to be elected as a mayor, as this right is conferred solely 
on Slovenian nationals.47  
 There has been no relevant case law in domestic courts regarding the EU 
citizens’ right to vote and to stand as a candidate in local elections. This is not 
surprising, taking into account that according to the survey on participation of 
non-nationals EU citizens in municipal elections in their Member States of 
residence, which has been published in Commission’s Report in 2012, the 
lowest number of these citizens actually exercising their electoral rights in the 
municipal elections is in Slovenia (1,426 compared to 54,159 in the Czech 
Republic, 108,367 in Austria, or 2,238,641 in Germany).48  
                                                        
45. Report from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council on the ap-
plication of Directive 94/80/EC on the right to vote and to stand as a candidate in mu-
nicipal elections by citizens of the Union residing in a Member State of which they 
are not nationals, COM(2012) 99 final.  
46. Ibid, p. 8.  
47. Article 103 of the Local Elections Act. 
48. Commission's Report (see fn 19), p. 6. 
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Question 11 
The Slovenian electoral system does not have regional elections or other elec-
tions in which EU citizens residing in the country would be granted particular 
electoral rights under national law.49  
Question 12 
There is no specific area where tensions exist between EU law and national 
provisions limiting the scope of the franchise. The difference exist in relation 
to the right to stand as a candidate in mayor elections, as this right is granted 
only to Slovenian citizens under the Local Elections Act. However, there is 
no provision limiting the scope of the franchise of the rights granted both to 
Slovenian nationals and EU citizens. 
Culture(s) of citizenship 
Question 13 
We consider that the implementation of EU citizenship at the national level in 
Slovenia is understood to a certain extent as part of the permissions-based 
immigration law, and to some extent as part of the rights-based EU law. This 
approach towards EU citizenship may be seen through the nomotechnical ap-
proach undertaken by the Slovenian legislator, who has regulated different 
aspects of the EU citizenship in different acts.  
 The aspects of entry and residence of EU citizens is governed by the 
Aliens Act, where also the provisions on the entry and residence of third 
country nationals are found, so this can be viewed through the lenses of the 
permissions-based immigration law. Other aspects of the EU citizenship, like 
political rights of EU citizens, are governed by laws regulating elections, and 
are mostly seen through the lenses of the rights-based EU law.  
                                                        
49. See also Accetto, M.: Access to Electoral Rights: Slovenia, EUDO Citizenship Ob-




There is no available case law on interpretation of the rights of EU citizens by 
the national courts indicating that there is a difference in interpretation after 
the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union was given binding 
effect.  
Question 15 
The general tone of the national debate in media is regarded as positive and 
generally informative, providing information on different rights that EU citi-
zenship confers on individuals and also information on elections in the Euro-
pean Parliament. Also, according to the survey conducted by the Eurobarom-
eter, Slovenian nationals to the large extent feel as being EU citizens, as 68 % 
replied in this manner. This is above the EU average, which is at 63 %.  
 Media tend to report in a positive manner on the rights conferred upon EU 
citizens and are reporting regularly on developments in this area.50 This can 
clearly be seen through the newspaper articles dedicated to the European 
Year of Citizens 2013 with newspaper titles such as ‘EU citizenship offers a 
lot. Take the advantage of it.’51  
 Lately, the media has reported mainly on the voting rights of the EU citi-
zens in Slovenia or the voting rights of Slovenian nationals in other Member 
States.52 In the time of completion of this report, articles were published 
                                                        
50. See for example article published on 16 September 2012 in newspaper Delo: EU: 
kako vrniti zaupanje državljanov? (article on European Parliament’s and Commis-
sion’s campaign before the 2014 elections in European Parliament, focusing on con-
vincing EU citizens to vote in those elections), available at:  
 http://www.delo.si/novice/politika/eu-kako-vrniti-zaupanje-drzavljanov.html.  
51. Article published on 6 January 2013 on the web portal MMC of the national televi-
sion RTV SLO: Evropsko državljanstvo ponuja veliko. Izkoristite ga. Available at: 
http://www.rtvslo.si/evropska-unija/evropsko-drzavljanstvo-ponuja-veliko-
izkoristite-ga/299584. 
52. See for example article published on 27 June 2012 in newspaper Dnevnik: Državljani 
EU takoj na lokalne volitve v Sloveniji (article on EU citizens' right to vote in local 
elections without having to fulfil the permanent residence requirement), available at: 
http://www.dnevnik.si/slovenija/v-ospredju/1042538402; article published on 24 
November 2012 on web portal Siol: Državljani EU bodo po novem lažje kandidirali 
na evropskih volitvah (article on new draft EU legislation making it easier for EU cit-
izens to stand as candidates in 2014 EU elections), available at: http://www.siol. 
net/novice/svet/2012/11/drzavljani_eu_bodo_po_novem_lazje_kandidirali_na_evro
pskih_volitvah.aspx. 
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mainly on the novelties that elections in European Parliament in 2014 will 
bring, for example the online application MyVote2014 and other activities 
promoting the elections and raising the awareness among EU citizens.53 The 
information presented in media tends to be accurate, mostly summarizing acts 
of the institutions of the EU or the press releases issued by those institutions.  
 As there are no salient issues related to EU citizenship in the national me-
dia, no evidence of the influence of the media on national public discourse on 





                                                        
53. See for example article published on 18 September 2013 in weekly magazine Mladi-
na: Z spletnim volilnim pripomočkom na evropske volitve 2014 (European elections 
2014 with the online voting application), available at: http://www.mladina.si/ 
148429/z-spletnim-volilnim-pripomockom-na-evropske-volitve-2014/; article pub-
lished on 27 September 2013 in newspaper Delo: Evropske volitve malo drugače 
(European elections a bit differently), available at: http://www.delo.si/novice/svet/ 
evropske-volitve-malo-drugace.html; article published on 23 May 2013 in weekly 
magazine Demokracija: Evropski poslanci za volitve v EU že konec maja 2014 (Eu-
ropean MPs for the elections in EU already in the end of May 2014), available at: 
http://www.demokracija.si/tujina/politika/21204-evropski-poslanci-za-volitve-v-
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Spain 
Citizenship within Directive 2004/38/EC – stability of residence for 
Union citizens and their family members 
Introductory remarks 
Directive 2004/38/EC has been transposed into Spanish domestic legal sys-
tem through Royal Decree No. 240/2007 of 16 February 1007, on the entry, 
free movement and freedom to reside within Spain of citizens of EU member 
states and other states parties to the Agreement on the European Economic 
Area. It constitutes the latest consolidated version of Spanish legislation on 
this matter and incorporates amendments further introduced by different and 
subsequent legal instruments such as Royal Decree 1161/2009, of 10 July 
2009, OJ 23/07/2009; Royal Decree 1710/2011, of 18 November 2011, OJ 
26/11/2011; Royal Legal Decree 16/2012, of 20 April 2012, OJ 24/04/2012; 
and Royal Decree 1192/2012, of 3 August 2012, OJ 04/08/2012. Consequent-
ly, with regard to Articles 2, 3, and 5 of the said Directive, they have been 
transposed into the Spanish legal system through the aforementioned amend-
ed Royal Decree 240/2007.2 
 However, it should be remarked that a major amendment of this domestic 
ruling has taken place after the Spanish Supreme Court judgment of 1 June 
2010.3 This decision has annulled different articles and conditions established 
by the Decree that were considered to be more restrictive than those settled 
down by the EU Directive. This judgment was the result of the application 
made on behalf of a federation of pro immigrants NGOs in Andalusia called 
                                                        
1. Professor of Public International Law, EU Law and International Relations, Universi-
ty of Málaga, Spain. The reseach has been carried out in the framework of the re-
search projekt DER2012-34411, financed by the Ministerio de Economía y Competi-
tividad. 
2. Spanish Oficial Journal (BOE) no. 51, of 28.02.2007. 
3. See Spanish Oficial Journal (BOE) no. 266, of 03.11.2010. 
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‘Andalucía Acoge’ and the association ‘Asociación Pro Derechos de Andalu-
cía’. The Spanish Supreme Court Decision of 1 June 2010 implies the widen-
ing of the original conception of the term ‘family member’ within the Spanish 
legislation; an important amendment in order to eradicate discrimination 
against Spanish nationals not having exercised their freedom of movement, 
but trying to benefit from the right to family reunification; and the elimina-
tion of some undue restrictions on third countries nationals’ right to reside on 
Spanish territory. 
Question 1 
Article 2 of the Directive concerning the definition of the term ‘family mem-
ber’, and Article 3 concerning beneficiaries are transposed through Article 2 
of the Royal Decree as it has been amended after the said Spanish Supreme 
Court’s Decision of 2010. In particular Article 2 of the Spanish Royal Decree 
deals, in the same vein of Article 2 of the Directive, with the Decree’s per-
sonal scope of application; in general terms it is addressed to UE citizens’ 
family members, leaving aside those family members of the EU citizen who 
have the nationality of a third country not belonging to the EU or to the EEA, 
that are dealt with in Article 11 of the Royal Decree. 
 At the time of defining what the term ‘family member’ means, and of es-
tablishing the different existing categories of family members, it has to be 
noted that Article 2 of the Spanish Royal Decree recalls some restrictions 
concerning these beneficiaries, i.e. when the marriage is declared null and 
void or the couple is divorced. Spain regulates and insists on those limits in 
two different Articles of the Decree, as they are specifically dealt with not on-
ly in Article 2, but also in Article 9 of this Royal Decree. This denotes a a 
priori defensive approach to this freedom on the side of Spain. 
 In general terms it has to be underlined that the Supreme Court, at the time 
of reviewing the correct interpretation an implementation of the Royal Decree 
240/2007 by domestic courts, is sensitive to arguments previously developed 
by the ECJ case law. In this regard, the Court invokes in different judgments 
some ECJ leading cases whose progressive reasoning have allowed itself to 
widen its previous and more restrictive case law, e.g. in the field of definition 
of a dependant family member in the sense of Article 2.2.c) of the Directive.4 
                                                        
4. In particular case of Aissatou Diatta v Land of Berlin, 267/83, of 13 February 1985; 
and case Baumbast and Others v Secretary of State for the Home Department, C-
413/99, of 17 September 2002. According to the case-law of the Court, the status of 




 In particular and as far as beneficiaries are concerned, the first impugned 
restriction had to do with the reference that Article 2 of the Royal Decree 
made to the possibility of becoming beneficiaries for those relatives of a EU 
citizen from another member state or from a state party to the European 
Economic Area Agreement. The wording of this provision closed the door for 
those Spanish nationals’ relatives having the nationality of a third state, be-
cause a Spanish national was not another EU member state citizen or a citi-
zen from a state of the EEA; in fact such a wording constituted a discrimina-
tion against Spanish nationals. The Supreme Court in its aforementioned 
judgment of 2010 considered that the way in which the Directive had been 
transposed into Spanish domestic law constituted an undue restriction of its 
personal scope of application and, therefore, it was contrary to EU law. 
 There are a number of cases having being adjudicated by the Spanish Su-
preme Court on this particular problem. All of them deal with the non issue 
of the required visa to a Spanish national’s relative with the nationality of a 
third country, which could be considered as a beneficiary of the right to fami-
ly reunification according to Article 3 of the Directive. Domestic courts re-
jected this right, not because they were relatives of Spanish nationals who had 
not in fact exercised their right to free movement and who stayed within 
Spain’s territory, as it was the case before the judgment of 1 June 2010. 
These were cases of Latin American nationals – mostly from Colombia, Ec-
uador, Santo Domingo, and Cuba – having acquired the Spanish nationality 
according to Spanish domestic law, and wishing to benefit from the right to 
family reunification by bringing their direct ascendants from their home third 
countries. 
 Spanish domestic courts dismissed several visa applications on grounds of 
Article 2.2.c) of the Directive in the understanding that those were not abso-
lutely dependent from an economic point of view of the Spanish national ex-
ercising his or her right to family reunification and, therefore, doing a narrow 
interpretation of the Directive’s wording. 
 The Spanish Supreme Court relied on the literal wording used by the ECJ 
in order to decide on those cases.5 And additionally, it went on with a pro-
gressively wider interpretation, declaring that ‘as far as the freedom of 
movement constitutes an essential part of the EU citizenship and taking into 
                                                        
factual situation characterised by the fact that material support for the family member 
is provided by the holder of the right of residence. 
5. In particular it referred to case Yunying Jia v Migrationsverket, C-1/05, of 9 January 
2007. 
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account that this European citizenship statute is intended to be in of the 
basements of the EU, it has to be construed in an extensive manner’.6 
 However, the Court takes further into account the fact that there are differ-
ent directives and different requisites regulating first, the right to family reu-
nification in the case of a third country national who is the relative (descend-
ent, ascendant) of a third country citizen legally residing in an EU member 
state; and second, an EU citizen’s relative with the nationality of a third coun-
try. The Supreme Court reaches two crucial conclusions: first that it is imper-
ative although not unconditional the recognition of an EU citizen’s right to 
family reunification; and second, that the reunification not only relies on eco-
nomic dependency, but also on other factors and circumstances, because at 
the end of the day the main object of such a protection is the EU citizen’s 
family and its deep social meaning.7 
 The Spanish Supreme Court considers that the ultimate goal of protection 
meant by Article 2.2 of the Directive is but the protection of family life; this 
is so even if the domestic legislation has not included another factor taken in-
to account by the Directive in order to recognize such a right in favor of an 
EU citizen’s relative in the ascending line, such as the case of an ill national 
from Ecuador, father of a Spanish national, who not only periodically re-
ceived remittances from his sons and his daughter in Spain, but whose four 
out of five sons lived in Spain and whose solitude and limited capacity for 
work was taken into account by the Supreme Court in order to grant the re-
quired visa that domestic courts had initially denied, as they didn’t consider 
him as a dependent relative uniquely on the basis of economic reasons.8 
 Even more, in a case of dismissal of a visa with the aim of family reunifi-
cation on the side of a Colombian lady who tried to bring her mother to 
Spain, the domestic court of first instance refused to grant the visa with a very 
succinct justification which aimed at a non economic dependent status. Yet, 
the Supreme Court not only annulled the visa dismissal, but reasoned in a 
‘reverse’ way in order to widen this possibility, and concluded a contrario 
that: 
‘Más bien al contrario, desde el momento que la propia Administración no ha discutido 
realmente que entre el reagrupante y el reagrupado no existiera la relación de dependencia 
                                                        
6. STS 7339/2011, para.43. 
7. See STS 7339/2011, para. octavo and noveno; STS 8359/2011, para. quinto. 
8. See STS 8677/2011, para. tercero. In the same vein see cases STS 1470/09, of 20 Oc-
tober 2011; STS 1046/2010, of 22 November 2011; STS 129/2011, of 23 March 
2012; and STS 8826/2012, of 26 December 2012. 
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que se enmarca dentro del concepto ‘estar a cargo’ que, por lo demás, a la vista de los da-
tos concurrentes, y con la perspectiva casuística que es inherente a esta materia, puede con-
siderarse justificada.’9 
Some other cases concerned the refusal of a visa with the aim of family reuni-
fication of a son over 21, but still dependent from the holder of the right of 
residence. Arguments in that case dealt with before the domestic court of in-
stance had mainly to do with the minimal amount required in order to consid-
er the person in question as economically dependent from the EU citizen. The 
Supreme Court annulled the judgment and declared that in those circum-
stances the economic dependence of the affected person was clear enough. 
The elements taken into account for reaching such a conclusion in that case 
were varied: the frequency of remittances; the absence of incomes on the side 
of the third national; the cost of life in his country; and the fact that his par-
ents and his sister already lived in Spain. The Supreme Court concluded that:  
‘Los vínculos familiares que tutela el instituto de la reagrupación familiar exigen una in-
terpretación de sus requisitos legales en atención a las circunstancias expresadas.’10  
This is undoubtedly a very progressive way of reasoning on the part of the 
highest judicial instance in Spain that clearly demonstrates a very positive at-
titude towards a full, effective, and wide implementation of the EU citizen’s 
rights and, in particular, of the rights enshrined in the Directive 2004/38. 
However, there have also been some doubtful cases where perhaps this rea-
soning should not automatically be applied. It is e.g. the case of a Senegalese 
citizen who later acquired the Spanish nationality and whose very young 
children were denied a visa, applied for as a previous step for benefiting from 
family reunification. In the first instance, domestic court dismissed the appli-
cation for the visa considering that they lived with their mother in Senegal, 
their father was married again in Spain with a second spouse and had a new 
family with two more children, and considering also that the granting of the 
visa would deprive them of a normal family life and would mean to separate 
them from their mother and to bring them into a very different family atmos-
phere. The court added that the main purpose of the right to family reunifica-
tion was precisely to unify, but not to separate families. Nevertheless, the fa-
ther applied before the Supreme Court insisting on the better possibilities that 
their family life in Spain would give them. 
                                                        
9. STS 1883/2012, para. séptimo in fine. 
10. STS 3863/2012, para. tercero in fine. 
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 The Supreme Court automatically used the same reasoning explained su-
pra, reinforced by the fact that the mother had accepted in a written document 
to decline her right on her children in favour of the husband. But the Supreme 
Court did not wonder about other possible particularities of this case, such as 
the young age of the children and the fact that the gentleman had repudiated 
his first spouse who therefore had less economic possibilities and resources 
and who was, in fact, illiterate. In this vein the Court did not take any guaran-
tee in order to assure that the mother had not been forced to sign or that she 
could perfectly understand the document that she had signed with her finger-
print.11 These shortages were underlined by one of the magistrates in her dis-
senting opinion.12 
 One can agree or disagree with it, but it is true that the Supreme Court – 
contrary to several Spanish domestic courts of instance – has invariably ac-
cepted and adjudicated in favour of almost all cases concerning a generous 
conception of those beneficiaries envisaged in article 2 of the Directive with-
out taking into account possible important differences or nuances.  
 Secondly, still in the text of Article 2 of the Royal Decree, the Spanish 
government initially excluded from beneficiaries not only those already men-
tioned within the Directive, but it also made reference to the separated spous-
es, an existing different legal category in Spanish domestic law whose inclu-
sion would mean a widening of those excluded beneficiaries and, in that 
sense, a restrictive transposition of the Directive itself. The Spanish Supreme 
Court, in making reference to the ECJ case Aissatou Diatta c. Land Berlin,13 
made clear the distinction between divorced spouses and separated spouses 
and decided that this latter category should not be included in the Spanish 
transposition decree as it would constitute a restrictive implementation of the 
EU Directive.14 
 A third restriction has been removed after the Supreme Court’s judgment, 
as the original ruling only considered as a beneficiary a partner with whom 
the UE citizen had contracted a registered partnership, whenever the country 
in which the registration had taken place counted only on a single and unique 
public registry, an additional condition not included in Article 2 of the Di-
rective and that the Spanish Supreme Court has annulled. 
                                                        
11. STS 1485/2012. 
12. See ibíd., dissenting opinion of magistrate María Isabel Perelló Domenech. 
13. Case 267/83, of 13 February 1985. 
14. See STS 114/2007 supra, tercero. 
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 Finally, it is also important to recall that the Royal Decree forgets to in-
clude among beneficiaries to those included in Article 3.2(a) in fine of the Di-
rective: 
‘... any other family members, irrespective of their nationality, not falling under the defini-
tion in point 2 of Article 2 who, in the country from which they have come, are dependants 
or members of the household of the Union citizen having the primary right of residence, or 
where serious health grounds strictly require the personal care of the family member by the 
Union citizen’. 
This autonomous category of family member is not reflected in the already 
mentioned Spanish law, something that could have been problematic and also 
could have been considered as an incomplete or insufficient transposition of 
the Directive 2004/38/EC.15 This particular case has been dealt with by the 
jurisprudence of the Supreme Court that, in a case concerning the dismissal 
of a visa application of an over 21 year old daughter who could not demon-
strate economic dependency from their parents, now Spanish nationals, re-
fused to annul the judgment of the first instance court considering that the 
requisite of suffering from particularly grave health problems was not present 
in those circumstances.16 
 As far as transposition of Article 5 of the Directive is concerned, it has 
been incorporated to Spanish domestic law through Article 4 of the afore-
mentioned 240/2007 Royal Decree, which includes the right of entry of the 
EU citizen’s relatives considered as beneficiaries, and to obtain a visa if nec-
essary according to EC Regulation 539/2001. Procedural guarantees included 
in this provision – that mainly concern requirements and assistance in order 
to get a visa – have been taken into account and faithfully reflected in the 
domestic legislation. The guarantee of issuing the visa free of charge is also 
specifically foreseen in Article 47 of the general law applicable to third states 
nationals – Ley Orgánica 4/2000, de 11 de enero, sobre derechos y libertades 
de los extranjeros en España y su integración social17 – that remarks in par-
                                                        
15. It should be recalled here that Spain was already condemned by the ECJ by judgment 
2009/143/ECJ, of 14 May, as Council Directive 2004/81/CE of 29 April wasn’t 
properly applied and Spain didn’t issue a residence card to third country nationals 
who were victims of traffic on human beings or those third country nationals having 
been used by illegal immigration mafias who co-operate with Spanish authorities.  
16. STS 3020/2013. 
17. Spanish Oficial Journal no. 10, of 12.01.2000, consolidated text available at: 
http://www.boe.es/buscar/pdf/2000/BOE-A-2000-544-consolidado.pdf, last visited 
on 17/09/2013. 
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ticular that visa applications made by a EU citizen’s family members owing 
the nationality of a third country and being beneficiaries of the freedom of 
movement and residence in the EU would be exempt from paying any fare. 
 In this regard some cases by the Spanish Supreme Court should be men-
tioned, both relating to the fact of denying a visa to Romanian citizens, ap-
plied for before 2007 and having been dealt with by Spanish authorities under 
the restrictions temporarily established on Romanian and Bulgarian citizens 
as far as free movement of workers was concerned. The Spanish authorities 
denied the visa to the aforementioned Romanian nationals considering that 
they could neither reside nor work in Spain according to those adopted re-
strictive measures under the safeguard clause included in their accession trea-
ties. However the Supreme Court reasoned in the opposite way, its response 
being grounded on the fact that, after the entry of Romania and Bulgaria in 
the EU with full effects from 1st January 2007 onwards, a right of freedom of 
movement and residence should be granted as an essential part of the Euro-
pean citizenship statute (Article 18 TEU) which implied a wider conception 
and protection of this freedom than the mere free movement of workers fore-
seen in Article 39.1 TEU.18  
Question 2 
Originally, and as far as the right to reside in Spain by EU citizens’ relatives 
holding the nationality of a third country is concerned, the transposition of the 
Directive was not correct, as the Spanish Decree included a more restrictive 
approach when it required them in order to be exempted from the requisite to 
                                                        
18. See STS 2525/2004, of 12.02.2008; STS 2110/2004, of 13.02.2008; STS 1767/2004, 
of 15.02.2008; and STS 4268/2011, of 29.06.2011. Such a reasoning was also applied 
even in those cases were the applicants were considered by instance courts as guilty 
of a crime of illegal immigration punished by the Spanish penal code. The Supreme 
Court considered that once Poland or Romania had become EU member states the 
most favorable law should be applied and those EU nationals should be allowed to 
stay in Spain. The Spanish Supreme Court declared that EU citizens’ right to free 
movement is an essential freedom protected by TUE, and made a crucial difference 
between the right to freedom of movement of workers and of citizens: in the former 
case an EU member state might apply a safeguard clause, in the later it is a funda-
mental right applicable to everyone since the very entry of his or her member state to 
the EU and no restriction could be imposed upon him or her. See STS 4019/2007; 
STS 4840/2007; STS 5061/2007; STS 6645/2007; STS 7662/2007; STS 2037/2008. 
See STS 2623/2008. Also in the case where an expulsion sanction was ordered as a 
consequence of the expiry of the visa. See STS 630/2008; STS 628/2008. 
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have a visa, that they had obtained their family residence card issued by an 
EU member state in which Schengen agreements were fully applied. This 
implied a discriminatory treatment for those coming with a family residence 
card issued by an EU member state that did not fully apply the Schengen 
Agreements. The 2010 Supreme Court judgment annulled this provision.19  
 The right to reside in an EU member state for more than three months is 
envisaged in particular in Article 7 of the Spanish Royal Decree. Neverthe-
less, it must be clarified that the reference made to labour rights of the Di-
rective’s beneficiaries within the Spanish domestic regulation (Article 3.2) 
was annulled by the Supreme Court judgment already mentioned supra, as it 
denied the right of those relatives dependent from the Spanish national being 
over 21 to exercise a remunerated activity. 
 Apart from these general remarks, no specific jurisprudence has been de-
veloped yet by Spanish domestic courts on this matter. The cases that have 
been reviewed by the Supreme Court deal mainly with the economic re-
sources enjoyed by a Spanish citizen’s relative from a non EU country apply-
ing for the family reunification benefit, in order to decide if he or she was a 
dependent person, as it has already been explained supra. 
 In any case, Article 7.7 of the Royal Decree specifically establishes that 
the terms ‘sufficient economic resources’ cannot be interpreted to mean that 
national authorities may decide on a fixed amount of money beforehand, but 
that such an appreciation should be made on a case by case basis,20 although 
the amount decided will never be higher than the one considered by Spain as 
the minimum income under which social aid is prescribed in favour of Span-
ish citizens; or it would never be under the minimum Spanish retirement pen-
sion. 
Question 3 
Articles 12 to 15 of the Directive, concerning the retention of the right of res-
idence in general and in particular in the event of death and/or departure of 
the Union citizen, and in the event of divorce, annulment of marriage or ter-
mination of registered partnership, as well as procedural guarantees, have 
been faithfully transposed into Spanish domestic legal system via Article 9 
and Article 9 bis of the Royal Decree. In particular Articles 12 and 13 of the 
Directive have their correspondence in Article 9 of the Royal Decree. It has 
                                                        
19. See STS 1 June 2010 supra, séptimo. 
20. In accordance with the ECJ case law. See e.g. case Kunqian Catherine Zhu and Others v 
Secretary of State for the Home Department, of 19 October 2004. 
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to be recalled that Article 9 of the Royal Decree was partially annulled and 
amended by the Supreme Court judgment of 1 June 2010, eliminating the re-
striction concerning those partners ‘legally separated’, a category which was 
not included in the Directive’s wording, as it has been explained supra. Also, 
another provision within this article was annulled as it required those relatives 
of the dead EU citizen who had not previously acquired the right to perma-
nent residence to be granted a card residence complying with conditions es-
tablished by the domestic applicable law to third country nationals in gen-
eral,21 only available once it was demonstrated that the applicant was em-
ployed or self-employed person; he or she had sufficient economic resources; 
or he or she was integrated within another family complying with the two 
mentioned requisites. The Spanish Supreme Court considered the transposi-
tion of the Directive made in this case as a restrictive one and annulled this 
provision.22 
 As far as minimum duration required in case of death or annulment of the 
marriage or partnership the periods of time established in both systems are 
the same. 
Question 4 
The right of permanent residence enshrined in Articles 21 to 26 of the 
2004/38 Directive has been transposed into Spanish domestic law mainly 
through Articles 10 and 11 of Royal Decree 240/2007, some general provi-
sion having also been included in Articles 12 and 13, as far as procedure and 
issue of residence cards are concerned. It must be said that the Royal Decree 
provisions faithfully reproduce the regulation made by the Directive, and that 
in some cases domestic procedural steps are even more favourable than the 
corresponding Directive provision. This is the case e.g. of the deadline estab-
lished in order to apply for the residence card: meanwhile the Directive lays 
down a maximum period of six months for the residence card to be issued in 
the case of a UE citizen’s relative from a third country (Article 20), the paral-
lel Spanish provision speaks of a period of only three months (Article 11.1 of 
the Royal Decree). However, when dealing with the application for a resi-
dence card once the previous one has expired, the Royal Decree introduces a 
requirement establishing that renovation of such a card should be applied for 
one month before its expiration date, or in the next three months although in 
                                                        
21. See Spanish Law 4/2000, cit. supra. 
22. Supreme Court judgment 114/2007, octavo. 
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this late case, renovation could be subject to the appropriate and proportional 
administrative sanction. This possibility of late applying for the residence 
card subject to a proportionate administrative sanction is shared in both EU 
and domestic regulation, yet the Spanish provision (Article 11.1 in fine) is 
more restrictive, since it establishes that late application should be done in a 
fixed maximum period of three months, something that the Directive does not 
say (Article 20.2). This could be problematic in the near future. 
 Additionally, the Spanish Royal Decree complies with the requirement of 
gratuity or at least non-discrimination with regard to the issue of residence 
cards foreseen in Article 25.1 of the Directive, as it establishes in its Article 
14.1 that fares will be applicable to the issue of such cards, but that their cost 
will be the same as fares duly paid by Spanish citizens when applying for is-
sue or renovation of their identity cards. 
 Controversial aspects discussed before Spanish domestic courts have 
mainly had to do with the condition of being a relative dependant on the EU 
citizen, already explained in Question no. 1. Or they were cases in which ex-
pulsion has been decided by Spanish first instance courts as a result of the ab-
sence or the expiry of the identity card, visa, or residence card allowing those 
relatives to stay. When those cases were brought before the Spanish Supreme 
Court it has privileged the application of different criteria: first, a narrow un-
derstanding of Article 15 of the Royal Decree that would allow expulsion on-
ly as a very aggravated sanction in cases of public policy, public security, or 
public health; and second, considering that the main fact to be taken into ac-
count in order to adjudicate on the case was that such a behaviour did no 
longer constitute a crime punished by the Spanish penal code, once the indi-
vidual had become citizen of an EU member state.23 
 Finally, and with regard to data on the volume of applications to date for 
the status of permanent residence having been published by Spanish authori-
ties, it must be underlined that there is great information published concern-
ing the number of EU citizens holding a residence card or a permanent resi-
dence card issued by the Spanish authorities. This information is recorded 
and published in a report every three months.24 The report considers specifi-
cally residence cards and permanent residence cards delivered to EU citizens 
in its Part II that classifies those citizens by nationality, sex, province, or age. 
However, no publication or Spanish public record exist on the number of ap-
                                                        
23. See STS 628/2008, of 13 February 2008, in a case of a Bulgarian national; and STS 
630/2008, of 12 February 2008, in a case of a Romanian national. 
24. See http//extranjeros.empleo.gob.es/es/Estadisticas/operaciones/con-certificado/index. 
html.  
ANA SALINAS DE FRÍAS 
  786 
plications made to Spanish authorities for a residence card or a permanent 
residence card by a EU citizen or, in general, those considered to be benefi-
ciaries of Directive 2004/38. It has also not been possible to find that infor-
mation in the Spanish national reports in eudo-citizenship.eu/databases.25 
Question 5 
Article 24 (2) of the Directive deals with the equal treatment principle, that 
clearly plays a crucial role in the effective and real implementation of rights 
enshrined in it. In this regard the principle has been expressly included in Art-
icle 3.4 of the Royal Decree, guaranteeing an equal treatment of EU citizens 
and their relatives – either EU citizens or third countries nationals benefiting 
from the right to residence and/or permanent residence – to treatment of 
Spanish citizens. 
 However, the possibility of EU member states partially derogating from 
this principle – as far as some types of social assistance are concerned and 
within the limits and possibilities established by the ECJ case law26 – has not 
been expressly included in this domestic rule, and there is no signal of this 
faculty of the Spanish authorities having been implemented until now, or at 
                                                        
25. See http:// eudo-citizenship.eu/databases, then: PROMINSTAT, Country Reports, in 
http://www.prominstat.eu/drupal/?q=node/2. 
26. See e.g. case C-209/03, Dany Bidar and London Borough of Ealing, Secretary of 
State for Education and Skills, of 15 March 2005, concerning social aid limited to 
students established in a EU member state; case C-158/07, Jacqueline Förster and 
Hoofddirectie van de Informatie Beheer Groep, of 18 November 2008, on the possi-
bility of limiting the availability of social aids to migrant EU member states’ students 
having previously resided for a minimum period of time in that state. The ECJ has 
been much stricter in the case of free movement of students and their access to social 
aids in their state of residence than in the case of job-seekers, that have been, first of 
all, considered by the Court as workers in the sense of the case law developed by the 
Court; and second, cannot see their access to social aids offered by a EU member 
state constrained to the condition of having their usual residence in that given state. 
However, and in order to avoid any abuses, the ECJ has required those candidates to 
such social aids from a EU member state to have a real link with the labour market of 
that state e.g. to effectively search for a job in the given EU country or to be available 
for a job offer in that country. There have been no decisions from Spanish domestic 
courts on this matter; the majority of cases discussed before the Spanish Supreme 
Court concerning labour matters are related to calculation of the retirement pension in 
a case of a worker having contributed to the social security system of different EU 
member states. See e.g. STS 3650/2005, of 17 July 2007; STS 1044/2007, of 30 Sep-




least any signal of the existence of contentious cases on this specific matter 
brought before the Spanish Supreme Court or the Spanish Constitutional 
Court to date.  
Question 6 
Restrictions on the right of entry and of residence of EU citizens and their 
relatives included in the group of beneficiaries of Directive 2004/38 are very 
few and narrowly construed by the ECJ in order to make the fundamental 
citizenship right of freedom of movement as wider as possible. Article 27 of 
the Directive lays down general principles governing the most important ex-
isting restriction on this right: public policy, public security and public health. 
Meanwhile public health is a better defined concept, the ECJ case law has 
had the opportunity to define as sharply as possible those generic concepts of 
public policy and public security, the former having mainly to do with the 
maintenance of public order and being protected by Article 28.2 of the Di-
rective; the later having to do mainly with the internal and external security of 
the state and allowing the adoption of expulsion measures against the given 
beneficiary.27 No differences can be appreciated as far as the transposition of 
the Directive into Spanish domestic legal system is concerned. Thus, article 
15 of the Royal Decree reproduces the same cases and guarantees foreseen in 
the corresponding provisions of the Directive Articles 27 and 28. 
 Taking into account the extremely grave consequences on this right of a 
measure such as expulsion, the Court has developed some interpretation pa-
rameters such as the proportionality principle and the necessity of taking into 
account links with that member state of the beneficiary to be expelled from 
the EU member state (degree of integration, number of years of residence, 
etc). 
 The jurisprudence produced by Spanish domestic Courts up to date has not 
dealt with this specific aspect. In fact, only in a few cases could such an ar-
gument be discussed, concerning either the illegal entry within the Spanish 
territory of Romanian nationals, constituting a crime of illegal immigration 
according to the Spanish penal code, or in the aggravated case of either Ro-
manian or Lithuanian nationals forcing some women of the same nationality 
to prostitution. However, the Supreme Court did not take those crimes into 
account due to the fact that by the time of adjudicating both Lithuania and 
                                                        
27. See case C-145/09, Land Baden-Württemberg and Panagiotis Tsakouridis, of 23 No-
vember 2010; case C-348/09, P. I. and Oberbürgermeisterin der Stadt Remscheid, of 
22 May 2012. 
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Romania had become EU member states and, therefore, the Court dismissed 
the expulsion orders.28 
EU citizenship beyond Directive 2004/38/EC – exploring national 
application of primary EU Law 
Question 7 
As it has been explained supra, the ECJ frequently recalls the dual dimension 
of the freedom of movement in EU law: a freedom guaranteed in favour of all 
workers, but also a fundamental right included within the EU citizenship stat-
ute that enjoys an enhanced protection. In this vein, the Court has often in-
voked direct effect of Articles 20 and 21 TFUE in its jurisprudence in order 
to widen as much as possible the protection of this right. In so adjudicating, 
the ECJ clearly distinguishes when it is applying EU derived law – Directive 
2004/38 – and when it is directly recalling authority and direct rights derived 
from EU primary law.29 
 Yet, opposite to this practice, Spanish Supreme Court case law reviewed 
on this matter does not make such a clear distinction either between both le-
gal instruments or between their respective legal consequences, but it just 
makes sure that the ECJ interpretation is literally reproduced and followed by 
magistrates, and that their judgment does not contravene ECJ case law, even 
if the Spanish Court also accepts this dual meaning of freedom of move-
ment.30 
                                                        
28. See STS 4019/2007; STS 4840/2007; STS 5061/2007; STS 6645/2007; STS 
7662/2007; STS 2037/2008, supra. 
29. See e.g. case C-85/96, María Martínez Sala and Freitstaat Bayern, of 12 May 1998, 
paras 60 ss; case C-34/09, Gerardo Ruíz Zambrano and Office national de l’emploi 
(ONEm), of 8 March 2011, paras 42 ss. 





Spanish citizenship (nacionalidad) and, in particular, acquisition and loss of 
it, has been regulated by the Spanish civil code since 1889.31 The most rele-
vant amendment to this regulation concerning our topic is the one imple-
mented in 2002.32 According to it, and as far as acquisition of citizenship is 
concerned, there are two different possibilities: automatic acquisition of na-
tionality, by which Spain mainly embraces ‘an unqualified ius sanguinis, al-
though the system also contains certain ius solii elements’;33 and four differ-
ent modes of non-automatic acquisition of nationality, namely by option;34 by 
discretionary naturalization when extraordinary circumstances concur;35 a 
mode of residence-based acquisition;36 and finally, acquisition based on pos-
session in good faith of the status for a period of at least ten years.37 
 As far as we can gather from this regulation, other EU member states’ na-
tionals as well as third country nationals complying with those specific re-
quirements could acquire Spanish citizenship (nationality); however, unless 
he or she is included within one of the so-called privileged groups,38 the ap-
plicant, and in particular all EU member states’ nationals – with the sole ex-
ception of Portugal – will be additionally obliged to renounce his or her pre-
vious citizenship (nationality).39 
                                                        
31. Spanish citizenship (nationality) is currently regulated by Articles 17 to 28 of the 
Spanish Civil Code. Further on the distinction between nationality and citizenship see 
PÉREZ VERA, E.: ‘Citoyenneté de l’Union européenne, nationalité et condition des 
étrangers’, 261 Recueil des Cours de l’Academie de Droit International Public 
(1996), 243. 
32. Ley 36/2002, de 8 de octubre, de modificación del Código Civil en materia de 
nacionalidad, BOE núm. 242, of 09.10.2002. 
33. As it is stated by the EUDO Citizenship Observatory in the Spain’s Country Report, 
p. 2. Report available at: http://eudo-citizenship.eu/admin/?p=file&appl=country 
Profiles&f=Spain.pdf; last visited on 27.09.2013. 
34. The only will of the applicant will suffice, although this mode is available only to cer-
tain categories of citizens with special links with Spain. See Articles 19 and 20 of the 
Spanish Civil Code. 
35. By discretionary conferral, that can be denied by Spanish authorities on grounds of 
public order or national interests. See Spanish Civil Code, Article 21.1. In this case, 
ten years of uninterrupted legal residence are required, but they can be shortened in 
certain special groups of nationals (Spanish Civil Code, Article 22). 
36. Spanish Civil Code, Articles 21.2 and 22. 
37. Spanish Civil Code, Article 18. 
38. Latin American countries, Andorra, Philippines, Guinea Equatorial, and Portugal. 
39. Spanish Civil Code, Article 23.b. 
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 On the other hand, the loss of Spanish citizenship (nationality) in the case 
of those having applied for and acquired it is considered in three different sit-
uations: when the individual has only effectively used the previous nationali-
ty that he or she was supposed to have renounced for a period of three years; 
when the given individual by his own will enters to the military forces or ex-
ercises a political position in a foreign state against the express prohibition of 
the Spanish government; or, when there is a definitive judgment stating that 
the applicant has engaged in falseness, concealment, or fraud in the acquisi-
tion of Spanish nationality nullifies that acquisition.40 
 It means that, in the context portrayed by the ECJ judgment in Rottmann, 
the Spanish domestic regulation of citizenship (nationality) could still pro-
voke a similar situation as the one applying to Mr Rottmann, as any EU citi-
zen having illegally acquired Spanish nationality would be deprived of it and 
could consequently become a stateless person, taking into account that Span-
ish law requires him or her to previously renounce to his or her nationality. 
Therefore, we could infer from this that Spanish domestic legislation on ac-
quisition and loss of citizenship would not fully respect EU law, as far as the 
rights derived from the European fundamental citizenship statute would be 
unavailable for such EU citizen. 
 Nevertheless, Article 26 of the Spanish Civil Code allows those who are 
not by birth Spanish and have lost Spanish nationality to recover it, although 
uniquely by previous rehabilitation discretionally given by the Spanish Gov-
ernment. It would be necessary then to decide on a case by case basis whether 
Spanish legislation on acquisition and loss of nationality (citizenship) would 
fully comply with EU citizens’ rights taking in due account the requirements 
established by the ECJ in the said Rottmann case: gravity of the behaviour; 
period of time elapsed between the acquisition and the revoking decision; and 
possibility that the EU citizen recovers his or her nationality of birth. 
 Be that as it may, it should be concluded that Spanish regulation on this 
point is not sensitive enough to an effective enjoyment of EU citizenship’s 
rights, all the more so because EU citizenship was a proposal approved at the 
Maastricht summit at the instances of the Spanish government and that the 
last major amendment of this legislation took place in 2002, long after the en-
try into force of the EU citizenship provisions.  
                                                        
40. Spanish Civil Code, Article 25. 
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Political rights of EU citizens 
Question 9 
Political rights in Spain, and in particular rights to vote and stand for elec-
tions, have been regulated after the end of the dictatorship and the entry into 
force of the 1978 Constitution by the General Electoral Law.41 Therefore, any 
modification concerning the rights so enshrined necessarily had to be done 
through the amendment of the aforementioned law. It is well known that orig-
inally Spanish domestic legal order only granted such rights to Spaniards and 
that, by the time of the entry into force of the Maastricht Treaty Spain, as 
some other EU member States, had to amend the Spanish constitution for the 
first time, in order to include the electoral rights derived from the European 
citizenship by adding not only the possibility of ‘active’ eligibility rights, but 
also ‘passive’ ones.42 
 Consequently, the Council Directive 93/109/EC of 6 December 1993 was 
transposed into Spanish domestic law in a first stage by organic law 1/1987 
of 30 March 1994,43 that added to the elections contemplated within the Gen-
eral Electoral Law and the elections to the European Parliament, unknown 
until then for Spanish nationals. And in a second stage, those provisions of 
the Directive still to be transposed into Spanish law were implemented by the 
adoption of the organic law 13/1994 of 30 March44 and Royal Decrees no. 
157/1996 of 2 February,45 and no. 147/1999 of 29 January,46 regulating such 
a crucial aspect as the requirements needed in order to proceed to registration 
of EU citizens in the Spanish electoral register. In this vein, some additional 
requirements were laid down in the case of EU citizens: nationality, a specific 
statement of his or her will to vote for the elections to the European Parlia-
ment in Spain, and the last electoral circumscription to which he or she last 
belonged, with the main aim of avoiding that the EU citizen can vote in more 
than one member state. These conditions were reproduced in the case of pas-
                                                        
41. Ley Orgánica del Régimen Electoral General 5/1985, of 19 June, Spanish Oficial 
Journal no. 147, of 20.06.1985 
42. See Rodríguez, A., ‘Access to Electoral Rights. Spain. EUDO Citizenship Observato-
ry, June 2013, available at http://eudo-citizenship.eu; last visited 23.09.2013. 
43. Spanish Oficial Journal no. 80, of 03.04.1987. 
44. Spanish Oficial Journal no. 76, of 30.03.1994. 
45. Spanish Oficial Journal no. 44, of 20.02.1996. 
46. Spanish Oficial Journal no. 26, of 30.01.1999. 
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sive suffrage and have remained practically unaltered until now, the fact of 
acknowledging binding legal effect to the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights 
after the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty having meant no changes on 
this matter.47 
 On the other hand, as far as conditions related to residence are concerned, 
Spanish legislation clearly complies with EU derived law, as it expressly de-
clares to apply the same residence requisites to both Spanish and EU citi-
zens.48 Hence, Directive 93/109/EC has been fully implemented after the 
adoption of the law 13/1994, from 31 March 1994 onwards. 
 However, difficulties derived from the requisite of attesting the fact of not 
falling under any of the circumstances preventing an individual from being 
elector or eligible person, often dissuade potential EU non national candidates 
from taking part in the elections as an eligible candidate. In order to fight this 
inconvenience Directive 2013/1/UE of the Council, of 20 December 2012 
was adopted.49 The Directive has not formally been transposed into Spanish 
domestic law yet, nonetheless, a resolution adopted by the Board of the Elec-
toral Register on the 12 April 2013 partially simplifies such a procedure as 
laid down by the Directive.50 Yet, the crucial aspect of certifying the fact that 
the EU citizen wishing to stand as a candidate does not come under any of the 
prohibitions legally established by his or her home country has not been dealt 
with by this resolution and, therefore, this difficulty remains. Moreover, an-
other indirect restriction limiting passive suffrage still remains, since the 
Spanish law on political parties allows foreigners to participate in a political 
party, but it only entitles Spaniards to create a political party. Considering the 
fact that electoral candidates are presented mainly by political parties and not 
in an autonomous way, EU citizens in Spain would need to enrol in an al-
ready existing political party if they want to profit from public financial assis-
                                                        
47. Viciano Pastor, R. & Durban, I., Artículo 30. Derecho de sufragio activo y pasivo en 
las elecciones al Parlamento Europeo’, in Monereo Atienza, C. & Monereo Pérez, 
J.L. (Dir.): La Europa de los Derechos. Estudio sistemático de la Carta de los 
Derechos Fundamentales de la Unión Europea’, Comares, Granada, 2012, 1109. 
48. See Liñán Nogueras, J., ‘El estatuto de la ciudadanía de la Unión’, in LIÑÁN 
NOGUERAS, J. & MANGAS MARTÍN, A.: ‘Instituciones y Derecho de la Unión 
Europea’, Tecnos, Madrid, 2012, 151. Therefore, it also clearly complies with the 
ECJ case law as it has been stated e.g. in case C-300/04, of 12 September 2006, Eman 
and Sevinger v College van burgemeester en wethouders van Den Haag.  
49. See OJ L 26, of 26.01.2013. 
50. See Resolución de 12 de abril de 2013, de la Oficina del Censo Electoral, Spanish 
Oficial Journal no. 126, of 27.05.2013. 
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tance and access to the media in his or her electoral campaign.51 These two 
handicaps still need a solution on the part of Spain. 
Question 10 
Directive 94/80/EC, laying down detailed arrangements for the exercise of 
the right to vote and to stand as a candidate in municipal elections by citizens 
of the Union residing in a Member State of which they are not nationals has 
been transposed into Spanish domestic legal order by the organic law 
1/1997,52 that modifies the General Electoral Law. Thus, transposition of the 
Directive took place once the transposition period had expired, as Spain was 
one of the reluctant states that were included in the group of 11 EU member 
states to which the Commission delivered a reasoned opinion on non-
compliance, according to Article 258 TFEU. Only Belgium was brought be-
fore the ECJ by the Commission, the other ten member states having ended 
their internal transposition procedures by 1999.53 
 This delay in transposing the said Directive originated the decision of the 
High Court of Justice of Valencia Region (Tribunal Superior de Justicia de la 
Comunidad Valenciana) to declare direct effect of Article 8.B.1 of the EC 
Treaty (current Article 22 TFUE), in the local elections held in May 1995, in 
a case of two French citizens residing in Valencia who were not allowed to 
vote and could not invoke the right to vote in local elections derived from the 
Directive. The domestic Court annulled the elections held in that precise case 
and voting had to be repeated, allowing those two French nationals to exer-
cise their right.54 
 Amendments to the initial transposition law have taken place by means of 
the same domestic rules that have updated domestic norms transposing the 
right to vote for and stand as a candidate in European Parliament elections. 
The same aforementioned shortages and limitations also apply to the case of 
municipal elections, the solution of the two main problems commented on 
supra – delay in receiving attestation of not falling under any excluding cir-
                                                        
51. See Ley Orgánica de Partidos Políticos 6/2002, of 28 June, Spanish Oficial Journal 
no. 154, of 28.06.2002, Article 1.1. 
52. Organic Law 1/1997, of 30 May, Spanish Oficial Journal no. 130, of 31.05.1997 
53. See OLIVIER LEÓN, B., ‘El derecho de sufragio como elemento estructural de la 
ciudadanía europea’, 4 Revista de derecho constitucional europeo (2005), 197. 
54. See BLÁZQUEZ PEINADO, M.D., La ciudadanía de la Unión: los derechos recono-
cidos en los artículos 8.A a 8.D del TCE, Tirant lo Blanch, Valencia, 1998, 185. 
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cumstance in order to be eligible, and impossibility of creating a new political 
party – are still to be adopted. 
Question 11 
Spanish domestic legal order only allows EU member states’ citizens residing 
on Spanish soil to take part either as a eligible candidate or as a voter in local 
elections and European Parliament elections, as it is ruled by the European 
citizenship statute, Articles 20.2.b and 22 TFEU. No right to take part in na-
tional or regional elections, neither from an active nor a passive perspective, 
is franchised to EU citizens as currently Spanish General Electoral Law 
stands. In fact Article 13.2 of the Spanish Constitution does not mention this 
possible extension; consequently only Spaniards can vote and stand as a can-
didate in regional elections. 
 However it should be underlined that some recently amended Statutes of 
Autonomy mandate regional authorities to involve EU citizens residing in the 
region and to promote their taking an active part in political life and political 
affairs, although the adoption of regional laws enfranchising EU citizens in 
regional elections will not take place unless Article 13 of the Spanish consti-
tution is amended. 
Question 12 
Directives implementing the EU citizens’ electoral (political) rights analyzed 
supra recourse to domestic legislation and sent to those national provisions in 
order to regulate deprivation of voting rights in certain cases. In this regard 
Article 6 of Directive 93/109/EC and Article 5 of Directive 94/80/EC estab-
lish that deprivation of electoral rights of other EU citizens in their EU state 
of residence will depend on domestic regulation either in their EU home 
country or in the EU member state of residence where he or she intends to 
vote or to stand as a candidate. 
 In this vein, Article 3 of the Spanish General Electoral Law (LOREG) lays 
down that citizens can be forfeited of their electoral rights by a court or tribu-
nal as a result of a criminal offence, either as a main or an accessory penalty, 
during the term of their conviction. It is also foreseen the lost of electoral 
rights for those persons expressly considered as unable by a judgment; and 
also for those who are in an institution for mentally ill persons. Additionally, 
Article 559 of the Spanish criminal code has clarified this specific punish-
ment, and it has established that only eligibility rights may be forfeited to a 
convicted criminal and that the main punishment to deprive individuals from 
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the exercise of their civic rights will be a period within two to six years. 
Moreover, Article 6.2 of the General Electoral Law (LOREG) establishes that 
those condemned to deprivation of liberty cannot stand as a candidate while 
in prison. In conclusion, any person condemned to prison in Spain will com-
pulsorily and accessorily be deprived of his eligibility rights. However they 
will recover these rights once they serve their prison sentence. This has been 
e.g. the case for two Romanian citizens sentenced to prison in Spain for forc-
ing young Romanian girls to prostitute themselves in Spain and who also 
have been forfeited of their eligibility rights.55 Such a penalty is not currently 
under debate in Spain and there has not been any controversy as far as public 
opinion is concerned. 
Culture(s) of citizenship 
Question 13 
A preliminary distinction should be made in order to answer this question: 
there is a perception of EU citizenship on the part of the public instances of 
the State, mainly judges and legal operators in general; and there is another 
different perception of it on the side of population in general and public opin-
ion. 
 As far as the first is concerned, the way in which public powers invoke 
and apply any European or domestic rule concerning EU citizenship tran-
spires a deep rooted conscience of being in presence of a current right added 
to domestic constitutional rights by virtue of the European integration pro-
cess. Attention paid to, care for, and importance recognized to either EU law 
(directives and primary norms) and to the case law of the ECJ clearly show 
the higher conviction at this level of the importance of the right to freely 
move within EU granted by the EU citizenship, and its primacy. 
 This perception is not that clear as far as public opinion in general is con-
cerned. From this viewpoint, citizenship rights are less known, and in particu-
lar with regard to free movement of persons they are rather seen as an artifi-
cial door opened to other EU nationals in order to avoid application of immi-
gration law, that is, a citizens’ rights culture disappears and the fact is instead 
                                                        
55. The Supreme Court found this accessory penalty compatible with Royal Decree 
240/2007 analysed supra. See Spanish Supreme Court judgment 1038/2008, of 
05.02.2008. 
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perceived as an illegitimate attempt to profit from exemptions on visa and 
immigration controls at any cost, or the feeling of being imposed others EU 
citizens’ privileges that could be potentially harmful in a generalized eco-
nomic crisis scenario. 
 Finally, politicians practice a dual discourse at domestic and European 
level on European integration in general and, therefore, also on citizens’ 
rights. Thus, in times of general elections stress in set on fighting EU political 
instances in order to have a stronger and more dominant position for support-
ing national interests and, in so acting, the population perceives the European 
integration process as something that could be negative per se, and that 
should be curb and adapted to national needs, citizenship included. And in 
times of European elections politicians recall the invaluable advantages of be-
longing to the EU; however, participation in European elections decreases 
more and more, particularly in times of domestic political and financial cri-
ses. This other side of the medal does not counterpart the negative effect of 
the behaviour described in campaigns for general elections. 
Question 14 
It must be said that either the Supreme Court or the Spanish Constitutional 
Court have often invoked the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights since it was 
adopted in 2000, even long before acquiring its current binding legal status. It 
is used in arguments of the parties when their cases are discussed before 
Spanish domestic courts, and it has continued to be so after the entry into 
force of the Lisbon Treaty on the 1st December 2009. 
 There have not enough elements to clearly support that the fact of the 
Charter having been recognized the same legal status as the EU constitutive 
treaties has changed the way in which domestic courts conceive, interpret, or 
apply EU law in general, and citizenship provisions in particular. Courts and 
tribunals mainly make reference in their decisions to EU primary and second-
ary law, and additionally they may also cite the EU Charter, but this fact does 
not mean that it reinforces or amplifies the way in which citizens’ rights are 
construed. 
Question 15 
In order to answer this question we need to transcend the current situation of 
general economic crises that completely overshadows the debate on any Euro-
pean affair on the media. Despite this, and perhaps due to the fact that in any 
country – and also within EU member states – mass media are a de facto 
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power in the shadow, counterbalancing the de jure political power, and also 
due to the fact that the ultimate addressee of media are citizens generally con-
sidered, media tend to be in a sense sensationalistic and alarming. It also re-
flect the action and discourse of political powers and, in the case of Spain as 
it has been underlined in question no. 13, this discourse also tends to be op-
portunistic and politically biased. 
 Once this has been said, the following will be better understood: most re-
flections on European integration on the media that have been done during 
the last twenty years – that is, since the Maastricht Treaty – aiming directly to 
the citizens would not encourage or strengthen a positive view of this integra-
tion process as they mostly pay attention to the possibilities opened for third 
country nationals to become Spaniards (e.g. the remarkable case of Latin 
American nationals) and to remain in Spain after having entered as immi-
grants. Moreover, this situation has appeared at the same time that Spain has 
turned out to be an immigration country, instead of a traditionally emigration 
country, as well as EU exterior frontier reinforced with the creation of the 
European Freedom and Security area. This is also directly linked to the noto-
rious absence of any specific positive remark on EU citizenship in electoral 
programs of main political parties adopted for national or regional electoral 
campaigns. In these cases specific mentions to citizenship appear only in 
some of them, and when they do, it is usually in the form of more demands 
and petitions for the EU, rights and advantages brought by the integration 
process being considered as insufficient. 
 Or the problem created as a consequence of the different level of social 
and sanitary protection within EU member states that has had as a result the 
so called ‘health tourism’, an increasingly worrisome affair for the public ex-
penditure in some regions (comunidades autónomas) in Spain such as Anda-
lucía, where there is an extensive catalogue of very expensive health treat-
ments, surgery, etc paid by the public budget and available to other European 
citizens, that they would have to pay themselves in their own home states. In 
this vein, it has to be underlined that information transmitted to citizenship 
through the media is in most cases inaccurate and politically biased also, as 
far as editorials or transcript politicians’ declarations are concerned. Obvious-
ly, such situation provokes a negative reaction within the audience, which is 
in turn perceived by politicians and then transformed again in a ‘nationalistic’ 
discourse.  
 It should also to be noted that no specialized private or public organiza-
tions blogs have been found in Spain, but some radio channels, mainly re-
gional ones, count on some specialized programs on EU in general, and some 
of them on EU and the citizen. Nevertheless, it must be pointed out that most 
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of them do not take place in prime-time hours, but rather very early in the 
morning or at night. As far as the press is concerned, only major national 
newspapers have a permanent section on EU news, but not necessarily on EU 
and the citizen or on citizens’ rights. These are e.g. the cases of El País, El 
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Sweden 
Citizenship within Directive 2004/38/EC – stability of residence for 
Union citizens and their family members 
Question 1 
Directive 2004/38/EC has been implemented mainly through the Aliens Act 
(utlänningslagen, 2005:716) and the Aliens Ordinance (utlänningsförordnin-
gen, 2006:97).3  
 The Aliens Act lacks provisions that are applicable only to Union citizens. 
Consequently, there is no definition of ‘Union Citizen’ in the Act. The provi-
sions implementing the Directive are instead applicable to all EEA citizens. 
According to the Aliens Act (Chapter 1, Sect. 3b) an EEA citizen is every 
alien who is a national of an EEA state.  
 ‘Family member’ of an EEA citizen is defined in the Aliens Act (Chapter 
3a, Sect. 2). The provision corresponds on the whole with Art 2(2) of the Di-
rective. As Swedish legislation, according to the Aliens Act (Chapter 5 Sect. 
3), normally grants residence permit to aliens cohabiting with a Swede, the 
definition of ‘family members’ also includes cohabiting partners of EEA na-
tionals.  
 Since 2009 same sex marriages are treated equally as marriages between 
man and woman.4 
                                                        
1. LLD, Assistant Professor in Constitutional law at Stockholm University. 
2. LLM, Editor of the Swedish European Law Journal. 
3. This report is based on the current provisions in the Swedish legislation in October 
2013. In 2012 a Commission of Inquiry (SOU 2012:57, Tydligare regler om fri rör-
lighet för EES-medborgare och deras familjemedlemmar [More distinct rules on 
Free Movement for EEA citizens and their family Members], betänkande av Utred-
ningen om utlänningslagen och EES-medborgare) has proposed a new grouping of 
the provisions concerning entry, stay, work, retained residence rights, refused entry, 
and expulsion. The proposed amendments have not yet been realized. 
4. Marriage Code (Äktenskapsbalken 1987:230), Government proposition 2008/09:80. 
HEDVIG BERNITZ & JAAN PAJU 
  800 
 Both descendants and ascendants are included in the definition of family 
members according to the Aliens Act if they are ‘dependant’ on the EEA citi-
zen, the spouse, or the cohabiting partner.  
 The right of entry of EEA citizens’ family members is regulated in Chap-
ter, 2, Sect. 1 in the Aliens Act, which states that an alien entering or staying 
in Sweden must have a passport. According to the Aliens Ordinance (Chap-
ter, 2 Sect. 17), EEA citizens may instead of passport provide an ID-card. 
Third country family members do not, however, have that opportunity.5 
 The facilitated entrance of certain family members in Art 3(2) of the Di-
rective is implemented through the Aliens Act (Chapter 5, Sect. 3, 3a and 3c 
on residence permit). As to facilitating visas, every state mentioned in Art 2 
in Regulation 539/2001 is exempted from the visa requirement through the 
Aliens Ordinance (Chapter 3). Aliens with residence permit or residence card 
are also exempted (Aliens Ordinance, Chapter 3, Sect. 1). There are no provi-
sions in the Aliens Act or in the Aliens Ordinance on accelerated procedure. 
Accelerated procedure is instead regulated through instructions to the relevant 
Authorities.  
 As far as the national rapporteurs have been able to find out the protection 
of the safeguards in Art. 5 of the Directive seem effective. There is some in-
teresting case law from the Migration Court of Appeal (Migrationsöverdom-
stolen); In MIG 2009:14, for example, a third country citizen married to an 
EEA citizen could claim the right to oral proceeding in court (normally the 
procedings are administrative). In MIG 2009:37 it was laid down that a third 
country family member was exempted from the requirement that a residence 
permit must have been granted before entering the country. In case No UM 
8595-12 (2013-10-02), the Migration Court of Appeal concluded that a third 
country national had not received the help she was entitled to according to 
Art 5 in the Directive and the Community Code on Visas.  
 There are also some interesting cases from the Migration Court of Appeal 
regarding family relationships. Several cases concern the definition of ‘co-
habitant’. In for example MIG 2011:17 a person who became cohabitant with 
a foreign EEA citizen after the arrival in Sweden was considered to be a fam-
ily member according to the definition. Marriage after the arrival has also 
been accepted (Migration Court of Appeal, case No UM 3289-08 (2009-01-
29). In MIG 2009:11 a pro forma marriage was, however, not accepted and 
the person in question was not considered to be a family member.  
                                                        




The possibility to expel or refuse entry for those who do not fulfill Art. 7 in 
the Directive is implemented through Chapter 8 in the Aliens Act. Chapter 8, 
Sect. 2 states that aliens who cannot support themselves may be refused en-
try. The provision may not, according to its wording, be applied on EEA citi-
zens unless they prove to be a burden to the Swedish social welfare system 
(workers and self-employed exempted). According to Chapter 8, Sect. 3 an 
alien who has the right of residence may not be refused entry. Chapter 8, 
Sect. 7 states that an alien who cannot be refused entry may be expelled if he 
or she lacks relevant permissions to stay in the country. 
 There is some case law concerning EU citizens’ fulfillment of the condi-
tions in Art 7,6 but as far as the national rapporteurs have been able to find 
out there is no evidence that EU citizens or their family members have been 
expelled on purely economic grounds. In decisions on expulsion taken by rel-
evant authorities, the grounds for expulsion have, however, not always been 
clearly discussed from an EU perspective. There are for example situations 
were Union citizens have been expelled from Sweden because of begging7 or 
prostitution,8 in both cases because of dishonest self-support. Yet, neither 
begging nor to work as a prostitute is criminal in Sweden. In those decisions, 
the line between public order and lack of resources is not easy to draw. 
Question 3 
Article 12-13 of the Directive are implemented through the Aliens Ordinance 
Chapter 3a, Sect. 2 (death or departure of the Union citizen), Sect. 3 (educa-
tional establishment), and Sect. 4 (divorce etc.). There is no reported case 
law. 
 Article 14 is implemented through the exemptions and safeguards in the 
Aliens Act (Chapter 8). Article 14(1) is implemented through the Aliens Act 
                                                        
6. To be a burden to the Swedish social welfare system includes only the receiving of 
social welfare according to the Social Services Act (socialtjänstlagen, 2001:453). In 
MIG 2011:19, the Migration Court of Appeal concluded that a Union citizen who re-
ceived a certain kind of pension was not lacking sufficient recources, as the pension 
in question was not granted according to the Social Services Act, but according to 
other legislagtion.  
7. The Parliamentary Ombudsmen (Justitieombudsmannen), Dnr 6340-2010 (2011-06-
28). 
8. The Parliamentary Ombudsmen (Justitieombudsmannen), Dnr 4468-2011 (2012-11-
01). 
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Chaper 8, Sect. 2 which states that EEA citizens may not be refused entry un-
less they prove to be a burden to the Swedish social welfare system (workers 
and self-employed exempted). Article 14(2) is implemented through the 
Aliens Act Chapter 3a, Sect. 5, which states that the right of residence exists 
as long as the conditions are fulfilled.  
 The safeguards against automatic expulsion measures against Union citi-
zens and their family members in Art 14(3), and the exemptions from the 
provisions on expulsion in Art 14(4) are, according to the preparatory work,9 
implenented through the Aliens Act (Chaper, 8 Sect. 2 § 3). This provision 
states that EEA citizens other than workers, self-employed, job-seekers, and 
their family members may be expelled if they, after the entry, prove to be a 
burden to the Swedish welfare system according to the Social Services Act 
(socialtjänstlagen, 2001:453) The Aliens Act (Chapter 8, Sect. 3) states that 
an EEA citizen with right of residence may not be expelled.10  
 The procedural and administrative safeguards in Art 15(1) of the Directive 
are protected in the Code of Judicial Procedure (rättegångsbalken 1942:740), 
the Administrative Procedure Act (förvaltningslagen, 1986:223), and the 
Administrative Court Procedure Act (förvaltningsprocesslagen, 1971:291). 
There are also safeguards in the Aliens Act (Chapter 13-14 and 16). The par-
ties are given far reaching rights to control the desicion and the grounds for 
the decision, as well as a right to appeal instructions, right to interpreter, etc. 
The Migration Court of Appeal has in MIG 2011:30 laid down that a decision 
not to enforce a legally binding decision on expulsion could be appealed to a 
migration court because of the direct effect of Art 15(1) and 31 of the Di-
rective. In MIG 2009:14 The Migration Court of Appeal laid down that an 
oral procedure must be held in a case that concerned the expulsion of a third 
country family member of an EEA national. 
Question 4 
Art 16-21 of the Directive are implemented through the Aliens act (Chapter 
3a, Sect. 6-9),11 and the Aliens Ordinance (Chapter 3a).  
 The Aliens Act (Chapter 3a, Sect. 6), states that an EEA national who has 
stayed at least five years in Sweden legally and without interruption has the 
right of permanent residence. Chapter 3a, Sect. 7 corresponds to Art 16(2) of 
the Directive and Chapter 3a, Sect. 8 corresponds to Art 16(3). Chapter 3a, 
                                                        
9. Government proposition 2005/06:77 p. 192. 
10. Government proposition 2005/06:77 p. 73. 
11. Government proposition 2005/06:77 p. 186. 
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Sect. 9 implements Art 16(4). The Aliens Ordinance, Chapter 3a Sect. 5-11 
correspond to Art 17-21 of the Directive. 
 The Swedish Migration Board (Migrationsverket), the authority that is re-
sponsible for the registration of permanent residence rights, gives information 
on the volume of applications on request. In 2012 the number of registred 
permanent rights of residence was 1,886. For 2013 (until 17 October) the 
number is 962. 
 There is some case law from the Migration Court of Appeal concerning 
permanent residence. According MIG 2012:10 a third country family mem-
ber must have fulfilled the conditions for right of residence for five years to 
have a permanent right of residence. In MIG case No. 10802-10 (2012-05-10) 
a family member did not fulfil the five year requirement because of a divorce. 
He did not fulfill the conditions for a derived right of residence nor for reten-
sion of the right of residence. In MIG 2010:8 a man who had failed to pro-
long his EEA-permit was still considered to fulfil the requirement of legal 
stay and was entitled to permanent residence. In MIG 2010:14 a man whose 
EEA-permit had expired before the implementation of the 2004/38 Directive 
was considered having a right to permanent residence.  
Question 5 
Article 24(2) of the Directive deals with two separate issues; under what cir-
cumstances it is possible for a Member State to refuse to grant social benefits 
respectively when maintenance aid for studies can be denied visavi a union 
citizen.  
 Sweden has implemented Article 24(2) in two laws: the Aliens Act and 
the Law on Maintenance Aid for Studies (studiestödslagen 1999:1395).12 
 The Aliens Act makes a clear distinction between non-economical active 
union citizens and job-seekers. As regards the latter group, Chapter 3a, Sect. 
3 § 2 Aliens Act respects the Directive and ECJ case law and declares that the 
job-seekers have right of residence for six months or as long as the job-seeker 
can show that he/she applies for jobs and has a chance to get employment. 
With right of residence comes equal treatment with regard to social benefits.  
 The equal treatment with regard to social benefits vis-à-vis union citizens 
is, in large, respected by the social aid agencies as their thorough guidelines13 
follow the ECJ case law and relevant EU-law.  
                                                        
12. The latter amended by SFS 2010:441. 
13. EG-rätten och Socialtjänsten, National Board of Health and Welfare (Socialstyrel-
sen), 2008-126-3. 
HEDVIG BERNITZ & JAAN PAJU 
  804 
 As job-seekers are treated equally to workers and self-employed in Swe-
den the diving line has been on who is seen as a job-seeker and who is seen 
as a non-economical union citizen.14 Therefore, national case law evaluates 
the chances to get employment and for how long one shall be seen as a job-
seeker. Those cases have been decided case-by-case. In general the case law 
seems to be focusing on evaluating the personal chances and not applying a 
general time-limit. The case law also follows the Swedish unemployment 
laws and no difference is made between Swedish citizens and migrating 
union citizens.15 
 The Directive’s Article 24(2) regarding maintenance aid for studies has 
been implemented into Swedish law in the Law on Maintenance Aid for 
Studies (studiestödslagen 1999:1395). The relevant part of this law is based 
on the Directive’s article 24(2) which do not entail the ECJ’s case-law idea of 
establishing a ‘real-link’. However, the Law on Maintenance Aid for Studies 
entails a ‘real link’ test ever since the 1970s which has resemblances with the 
courts case law on a ‘real link’. A real link can, under national law, be estab-
lished if a student has been living in Sweden for at least two years and has 
been working half-time, has been married, or co-habitant with a Swedish citi-
zen for at least two years, or has children with a Swedish national.  
 The national authority responsible for maintenance aid for studies, the Na-
tional Board for Financial Aid for Studies (Centrala Studiestödsnämnden, 
CSN), respects the Court’s case law in its guidelines where the authority 
                                                        
14. As regards non economical union citizens the law, Chapter 3a, Sect. 3 § 4 of the Aliens 
Act foresees – in line with the Directive – right of residence in so far as a union citi-
zen has sufficient resources and a comprehensive sickness insurance. There is no 
equal access to social aid for union citizens not meeting the requirements. 
15. See for instance Administrative Court of Appeal (Kammarrätten i Jönköping) 27 
September 2007, case No 3248-07 where the court found that the fact that a person 
had not found employment in three months’ time did not disqualify him as a job-
seeker. In Administrative Court of Appeal (Kammarrätten i Jönköping) 3 April 
2013, case No 1823-12 the court found that two job-seekers could not longer be seen 
as job-seekers after two years active job-seeking since there could not be any genuine 
chances of getting work. A person cannot restrict himself/herself to seek certain jobs, 
but has to try to get employment on the whole job-market; Administrative Court of 
Appeal (Kammarrätten i Jönköping) 7 juni 2011, Case No 594-11. Administrative 
Court of Appeal (Kammarrätten i Jönköping) 9 juni 2011, mål 959-11 emphasises 
that it is not sufficient to simply register as an unemployed person to be seen as a job-
seeker. See also Administrative Court of Appeal (Kammarrätten i Stockholm) 10 
september 2012, Case No 7678-11 as well as Administrative Court of Appeal (Kam-
marrätten i Göteborg) 24 oktober 2011, Case No 1304-11. 
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states that a union citizen can be eligible for a study grant either on the basis 
of an employment or a real link based on the ECJ case law.16 
 The national ‘real link’ test seems to stand in the way for an EU-law as-
sessment on a real link for the National Board of Appeal for Student Aid 
(Överklagandenämnden för Studiestöd) which is the responsible tribunal for 
maintenance aid for students. The case law in the area of study grants is pri-
marily focused on the definition of a worker as it being one way of receiving 
study grants. The decided cases have followed the ECJ’s case law in this re-
spect.17 The pattern seems to be that tribunal has in its initial reasoning initial-
ly ruled out the national real link-test regarding a union citizen due to the 
facts in the cases, hereinafter has the tribunal decided the case on whether a 
union citizen has qualified as a worker according to the EU-law. There has 
not been any additional assessment of a real link out of an EU-law perspec-
tive. However the number of cases are so small that one cannot rule out that 
the tribunal will apply the ECJ real-link in the future. 
Question 6 
The national rapporteurs have not come across case law where the difference 
between public policy, public security, or public health has been at stake. The 
existing case law has all focused on the concept public security. 
 The Migration Court of Appeal has understood the concept of ‘public se-
curity’ in its widest sense in MIG 2009:21. The case dealt with the Croatian 
citizen ‘A’ who had had a residence permit in Denmark since 1995. In 2004 
the Croatian citizen ‘A’ was sentenced to 3,5 years prison for a drug related 
crime when captured with 0,5 kg heroine. In 2006 the Croatian citizen ‘A’ 
was evicted to Croatia. In January 2007 ‘A’ was investigated by the Swedish 
police. The Croatian citizen ‘A’ was now living together with his wife, a 
Danish citizen resident in Sweden. As married to a Danish citizen having a 
residence permit in Sweden the Croatian citizen ‘A’ was found to derive a 
right to reside in Sweden under EU law. The Migration Court (Migra-
tionsdomstolen, the court of first instance in migration matters) found in 2008 
that the drug related crime was, despite being serious, carried out some years 
back and that the Croatian citizen ‘A’ was now leading a normal life with 
good social contacts. The Migration Court of Appeal, in its judgment in 2009 
                                                        
16. The Guidelines have not been made public. The national rapporteurs have however 
been allowed access to them for this FIDE-report. 
17. See: Decision (beslut) 2013-04-22/Dnr. 2013-00747 and Decision (beslut) 2013-01-
28/Dnr. 2012-05577. 
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refers to the Swedish National Asylum Law, Chapter 8, Sect. 7a in the Aliens 
Act when deciding whether the Croatian citizen ‘A’ could be considered as a 
serious threat against public security.  
 Migration Court of Appeal declares in its judgment that the concept ‘pub-
lic security’ is a common EU-definition. The Migration Court of Appeal re-
fers to the ECJ-cases, Case 41/74 Van Duyn, case 36/75 Rutili, 30/77 R v 
Bocherau where the ECJ has held that eviction based on public security 
grounds have to be proportionate and of essential importance to uphold a so-
ciety. Furthermore, the threat has to be real and serious. The Migration Court 
of Appeal found, irrespective of the EU-definition which emphasises that 
eviction on public security grounds is an exception, that the convicted crime 
(in Denmark) five years back in time was a sign that the Croatian citizen ‘A’ 
(still) was a serious threat against (now) the Swedish society and therefore 
there was a ground for eviction. The court did in its judgment not take into 
account that the Croatian citizen ‘A’ had been living in Sweden for more than 
two years and had only been caught for exceeding a speed limit. The court 
did not take into account that the Croatian citizen ‘A’s’ wife was expecting 
their first child. The ECJ case law as well as the Directive 2004/38 (Article 
28(1) and the European Convention and Human Rights (Article 8(1)) points 
in a different direction where eviction should not be carried out in such cir-
cumstances. The Migration Court of Appeal still argued that the drug related 
crime indicated that the Croatian citizen ‘A’ was a serious threat to the Swe-
dish society and evicted him.18 
 In stark contrast the national rapporteurs have come across the case law of 
the appellate criminal courts where the courts require serial-crime of some 
length and seriousness combined with crime carried out in Sweden not relat-
ing too long back in time.19 
                                                        
18. Compare the appelate criminal courts that require serial-crime of some length and se-
riousness combined with crime carried out in Sweden not relating too long back in 
time; Court of Appeal (Hovrätten för Västra Sverige), 24 May 2006, B 2390-06, 
Court of Appeal (Hovrätten för Västra Sverige), 6 May 2013, B 2067-13, and Court 
of Appeal (Svea Hovrätt), 13 August 2013, B 6770-13. 
19. Court of Appeal (Hovrätten för Västra Sverige), 24 May 2006, B 2390-06, Court of 
Appeal (Hovrätten för Västra Sverige), 6 May 2013, B 2067-13, and Court of Ap-




EU citizenship beyond Directive 2004/38/EC – exploring national 
application of primary EU Law 
Question 7 
The Migration Court of Appeal has decided upon a carbon copy of the 
McCarthy-case. Furthermore, the Migration Court of Appeal has found that 
the lower courts should have applied Chen when deciding on residency. Fi-
nally, the Migration Court of Appeal has developed Zambrano in the sense 
that eviction could only be carried out within the EU (to Spain) and not to 
Colombia. 
 In MIG 2011:17 the issue was whether a Pakistani citizen could derive a 
residence permit from his wife who had dual citizenship (Swedish & Polish). 
The Migration Court of Appeal referred to C-434/09 McCarthy and found 
that the situation was purely internal as the wife had not been crossing a bor-
der of another Member State, but been living in Sweden her whole life. 
 In MIG 2009:22 the Migration Court of Appeal finds that the first in-
stance, the Migration Court (Migrationsdomstolen), has not taken into ac-
count C-200/02 Zhu & Chen when deciding whether a Japanese citizen could 
have a derived right of residence through her daughter. The Migration Court 
did decide on eviction upon the fact that the Japanese citizen was now di-
vorced from a migrating Union Citizen. However, the Migration Court of 
Appeal emphasised that their mutual child could have a residency permit on 
her own and thereby providing the mother with a residency permit. The case 
was referred back to Migration Court for a new trial. 
 In MIG 2012:15 the Migration Court of Appeal found that a family 
(mother and minor daughter) irrespective of sufficient resources could not be 
found having a residency permit since they were lacking sickness insurances. 
The Migration Court of Appeal therefore held that the family was to be evict-
ed. Referring to C 34/09, Zambrano, the court emphasised that eviction was 
not possible to the mother’s state Colombia as the daughter had become a 
Spanish citizen by birth. Since the daughter was a Spanish citizen the family 
was to be evicted to Spain in order not to deprive her union citizen’s rights. 
 The national rapporteurs have not come across any case law where Swe-
dish national courts distinguish between rights acquired under the Directive 
and the TFEU.  
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Question 8 
Swedish legislation seems to fulfil the requirements that have been laid down 
by the ECJ. No changes in Swedish nationality law are needed.  
 According to the ECJ, any national decision to deprive a person of his or 
her citizenship must take into consideration the general principles of EU-law 
(for example the principle of proportionality, the principle of non-
discrimination, and human rights). A decision regarding citizenship is viewed 
in Sweden as being a favourable administrative decision which means that a 
decision on citizenship can never be annulled. According to the Swedish 
Constitution (Instrument of Government (regeringsformen) Chapter 2, Sect. 
7) no citizen who is domiciled in the realm or who has previously been domi-
ciled in the realm may be deprived of his or her citizenship. This prohibition 
is absolute, and there is no possibility to deprive such a person of his or her 
Swedish citizenship on any grounds (even if the citizenship was, for example, 
acquired by fraud or threat, on false information, or if the person later turns 
out to be threat to national public security).20 The Rottmann situation can thus 
not occur in Sweden. The provision aims at protecting both citizens living in 
the country, as well as citizens who have left the country.  
 In 2006 a Commission of Inquiry submitted a report that recommends the 
introduction of denationalisation. Relevant referral bodies have put forward 
their comments and suggestions on the proposed amendment, and there has 
been little opposition. As a constitutional amendment is needed, the question 
must, however, be dealt with together with other constitutional changes in the 
future. When the Instrument of Government was revised in 2011 the provi-
sion in Chapter 2, sect. 7 was not amended. The report from 2006 is still valid 
and the result is yet to be seen.21 There is nothing in the Rottmann case that 
prevents the proposed legislation. If the proposal is realized in the future, the 
Government is well aware of the fact that the provisions must include a pro-
portionality test as regards Union citizens and their family members. 
 According to the ECJ the Member States may not limit the EU rights of 
foreign Union citizens (for example the free movement rights) by ignoring 
                                                        
20. Supreme Administrative Court (Högsta förvaltningsdomstolen) RÅ 2006 ref. 73. See 
also case B637/89 where the Court of Appeal (Svea hovrätt) concluded, in a case 
concerning narcotics crimes, that a decision on naturalisation regarding a man who 
had acquired his citizenship through false identity was not a nullity.  
21. SOU [Swedish Government Official reports] 2006:2 Omprövning av medborgarskap 




the person’s national citizenship (Micheletti etc.). There is no Swedish legis-
lation that gives Swedish authorities the possibility to ignore another Member 
State’s decision to grant somebody the nationality of that state. 
 As EU law is in constant development a Commission of Inquiry, that pro-
posed a revision of the Citizenship Act in 2013, discussed how the ECJ deci-
sions on citizenship could influence the national competence of Sweden in 
this legal area.22 In this context Sect. 14 of the Citizenship Act was discussed. 
According to Sect. 14 a person loses his or her Swedish citizenship automati-
cally after the statutory limitation at the age of 22 if the person was born 
abroad, has never been domiciled in Sweden, and has never been in Sweden 
under circumstances that indicate a link with the country. People with no ties 
to Sweden are thus not considered entitled to retaining Swedish citizenship. A 
person who risks losing his or her citizenship can however apply for permis-
sion to retain it, an application that may be turned down by the authorities if 
the link to Sweden is considered insufficient. The loss of citizenship does not 
apply if it would result in the person becoming stateless. The loss also in-
cludes his or her children, unless the other parent still holds Swedish citizen-
ship and the child also derives Swedish citizenship from him or her. Loss af-
ter statutory limitation is the only way that Swedish citizenship can be lost 
involuntarily. Applications concerning permission to retain citizenship are 
examined by the Swedish Migration Board. In administrative practice, appli-
cations for permission to retain citizenship are rarely refused. In 2008 216 
were applications approved. Only one case was refused. Normally, applica-
tions from the first generation born abroad are granted, while applications 
from subsequent generations are granted only as long as the ties with Sweden 
have not been completely severed.  
 As a person who loses his or her Swedish citizenship also loses his or her 
Union citizenship, the Commission of inquiry of 2013 concluded that the 
principle of proportionality must be taken into consideration when applying 
Sect. 14 of the Citizenship Act, especially if the person in question lives in 
another Member State. Sect 14, as such, was not considered unproportional 
because of the fact that EU law respects the international rule that every state 
may decide on its own acquisition and loss of nationality, and the fact that in-
ternational law accepts national conditions related to a genuine link between 
the country and the person in question. It was also pointed out that the citi-
zenship may be retained on application. 
                                                        
22. SOU [Swedish Government Official reports] 2013:29 Det svenska medborgarskapet 
[The Swedish Citizenship]. Betänkande av medborgarskapsutredningen, p. 137. 
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 The generous Swedish rules on acquisition and loss were also discussed 
by the Commission of Inquiry of 2013 from a EU loyalty point of view. It 
was concluded that as long as Swedish citizenship law rests upon the idea of 
a genuine link between the state and the individual, the principle of loyalty 
must be considered to be fulfilled. No case law from the ECJ suggests other-
wise. 
 As to acquisition of Swedish Citizenship, there are four categories that can 
use a facilitated procedure of notification: children who have not acquired 
Swedish citizenship automatically, and whose father was Swedish upon the 
birth of the child, children who have grown up in Sweden and fulfil the resi-
dence requirement, persons who reacquire Swedish citizenship, and Nordic 
citizens (Citizenship Act (medborgarskapslagen 2001:82), Sect. 5-10). 
 Aliens who cannot use the procedure of notification can apply for naturali-
sation (Sect. 11). Sweden has, for a very long time, had a rather high propor-
tion of acquisition of citizenship among long-term resident immigrants. The 
barriers for naturalisation are not very high in Sweden compared to many 
other countries. Instead, the possibilities of applying for naturalisation are ra-
ther generous. There are, however, several criteria that the applicant must ful-
fil. First, the person has to provide proof of his or her identity. This require-
ment has been tightened due to the increasing number of aliens arriving in 
Sweden without identity documents. Second, the applicant must have reached 
the age of eighteen. The applicant must also have a permanent residence 
permit, and have been residing uninterruptedly in Sweden for the past five 
years (two years if the person is a Nordic citizen, and four years if the person 
is stateless or a recognised refugee).  
 The applicant also has to fulfil a good conduct requirement. The good 
conduct requirement has been tightened up over the years. A person who has 
committed a crime in Sweden can still become a Swedish citizen, but waiting 
periods have been introduced in administrative practice. The waiting periods 
serve as guiding principles, but individual control and examination is always 
carried out. For example, if the applicant has been sentenced to imprisonment 
for one month, he or she can normally become Swedish citizen no sooner 
than four years after the crime. If the applicant has been sentenced to impris-
onment for one year he or she can become a Swedish citizen no sooner than 
seven years after the crime. Marks on a person’s record, such as unpaid taxes, 
fines or child support, can also cause an application to be rejected. 
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Political rights of EU citizens 
Question 9 
In 1997, through amendments in the former Election Act (vallagen 1997:157) 
and in the Swedish Local Government Act (kommunallagen 1991:900), the 
Directive 93/109/EC was introduced. Today, Union Citizens’ right to vote in 
European Parliament elections is governed by the new Elections Act 
(2005:837) (Chapter 1, Sect. 4-6), and the Swedish Local Government Act 
(Chapter 4, Sect. 2-3). The Elections Act states that a foreign Union Citizen, 
who has regional and local electoral rights and who has not voted in another 
EU country, has electoral rights in European parliament elections in Sweden. 
Regional and local electoral rights for Union citizens are governed by the 
Swedish Local Government Act, which states that any person registered as a 
resident of the county/municipality, and who has reached the age of 18 no 
later than on the Election Day, is entitled to vote.  
 A condition for electoral rights is that the Union citizen has registered 
himself or herself in the electoral roll. The Union citizen must, no later than 
30 days before the election, notify the County Administrative Board 
(länsstyrelsen) that he or she wishes to be included in the electoral roll. The 
person must also provide information on his or her nationality and address in 
Sweden, as well as information on where, in the country of origin, he or she 
was last registered in an electoral roll. The person must also assure that he or 
she will not vote in another EU Member State (Elections Act, Chapter 5, 
Sect. 3). There is no relevant case law in national courts. A change in the 
Electoral Act might be needed because of Art 1 in the Directive 2013/1/EU 
amending Directive 93/109/EC (that the host state shall check if the Union 
citizen has lost his or her right to stand as a candidate in the home state 
through a judicial or administrative decision). 
Question 10 
Directive 94/80/EC was implemented in Swedish law in 1997.23 The right for 
European citizens to vote in local elections (in Sweden defined as regional 
(landsting) and local (kommun) elections) was introduced by an amendment 
in the former Elections Act (1997:157) and an amendment in the Swedish 
                                                        
23. Government proposition 1996/97:70. 
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Local Government Act (1991:900). There are no additional conditions im-
posed on EU citizens compared to national citizens. There is no relevant case 
law. 
Question 11 
In regional and local elections (county and municipality) and in regional and 
local referenda any person who is a citizen of an EU country (or a citizen of 
Iceland or Norway), has electoral rights if he or she has reached the age of 18 
on the Election Day and is registered as resident in Sweden (Swedish Local 
Government Act (1991:900), Chapter 4, Sect. 2-5 and Act on Regional and 
Local Referenda (lagen (1994:692)om kommunala folkomröstningar) Sect. 
5). The person must be registered in the electoral roll. The special rules for 
Icelandic and Norwegian citizens are based on the close ties between the 
Nordic countries and on Nordic cooperation. Similar rules apply in all Nordic 
countries. Other foreigners (those who are not EU citizens or citizens of Ice-
land and Norway) also have the right to vote if he or she has been registered 
as resident in Sweden for a continuous period of three years before Election 
Day (Swedish Local Government Act (1991:900), Chapter 4, Sect. 2-5 and 
Act on Regional and Local Referenda, (1994:692) Sect. 5). 
Question 12 
There is no tension between EU law and national provisions limiting the 
scope of the franchise:  
 Mentally disabled persons are not disenfranchised. The possibility to be 
incapacitated was abolished in 1991. A person who, because of illness or 
physical disability, cannot personally go to a polling station or advance vot-
ing place may vote by messenger (relatives, carers, or rural postmen). In addi-
tion, the Election Committee (valnämnden, i.e. the local election authority) 
may appoint special persons to act as messengers for those who have no one 
to help them. Special material is required for voting by messenger and can be 
ordered from the Election Authority (Valmyndigheten) or from a municipali-
ty. 
 Persons convicted for criminal offences are not disenfranchised. The right 
to vote was introduced for convicted criminals in 1937. Persons detained on 
remand or in correctional institutions may vote by messenger. It is also possi-
ble to vote at an advance voting place. The prisons usually provide this possi-
bility, and the votes are sent in a special window envelope by the election of-
ficials to the Election Committee. Advance voting begins 18 days before 
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Election Day. A person voting in advance at a special voting place must pre-
sent his or her voting card as well as an identification document. 
Culture(s) of citizenship 
Question 13 
The overall culture of Union Citizenship in Sweden can be said being one of 
individual rights.  
 What complicates the legal status of the Union citizens is that a residence 
right is, in line with the Directive 2004/38 and relevant ECJ case-law, one of 
an on-the-spot account, i.e. each Swedish authority has to make an independ-
ent assessment whether a Union citizen has a right of residence at a given 
time. The national authorities are independent from each other and the as-
sessment might therefore differ between the authorities, given their discre-
tion.24 
 The Swedish administration has overall good comprehensive information 
on the rights that a Union citizen has. The administration has a general under-
standing of the Union citizenship as a right for an individual and not an au-
thority based permission. For instance, CSN, the National Board for Financial 
Aid for Studies has detailed information on their website on what rights a 
Union citizen has.25 The Migration board has detailed information on right of 
residence and even an easy accessible online registration for residence per-
mits.26 However there are examples of less accessible information for the 
Union citizens as the Social Security Agency’s (Försäkringskassan) web-
site27 as well as information on social aid for union citizens as the social aid is 
administered by the 290 local counties with no overarching co-ordination.28 
On the other hand the local counties are guided by thorough guidelines issued 
                                                        
24. The Swedish Authorities are independent from each other as well as from the Gov-




28. See the Stockholm county report on homeless union citizens where the city of Stock-
holm, based on legal arguments on the union citizenship, decides to support NGOs 
providing food and lodging;  
 http://insynsverige.se/documentHandler.ashx?did=1715019. 
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by The National Board of Health and Welfare (Socialstyrelsen) on the Union 
Citizenship.29 Other authorities are also guided by comprehensive in-house 
guide-lines that emphasize Union Citizenship as a right.30 
Question 14 
The binding effect of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European 
Union has played a minor role in how the rights of EU citizens are being in-
terpreted by the national courts in Sweden. The national rapporteurs have, in 
our research covering some 80 cases, not come across the use of the Charter 
in a court’s reasoning. 
 In MIG 2009:21, delivered 3 June 2009, the issue was whether a Croatian 
husband of a Union citizen resident in Sweden could be evicted on the 
ground of public security. In its reasoning the Migration Court of Appeal no-
tices that an eviction must take into account a person’s social inclusion in the 
society, for how long the person has been resident in Sweden, as well as other 
family relations. In doing so the Court refers to Article 8(1) in Convention on 
Humans Rights. Yet, there is no referral to the Charter. 
Question 15 
The EU citizenship was a salient issue in media during spring 2013. The ma-
jor Swedish newspaper Dagens Nyheter covered the issuefrom a Roma-
perspective where the reporters covered not only the situation in Stockholm 
with beggars from Romania and other Eastern European countries, but also 
explained the underlying ides of EU citizenship as well as travelling down to 
Romania to give the readers a broad understanding of the complexity of the 
EU-solidarity, free movement for persons, and the economical incentives 
travelling to Sweden.31 In parallel, the Swedish National radio ran an in-depth 
                                                        
29. EG-rätten & Socialtjänsten, published in 2008: http://www.socialstyrelsen.se/Lists/ 
Artikelkatalog/Attachments/8774/2008-126-3_20081263.pdf. 
30. Some of those guides are made public, others the national rapporteurs have come across 
in our research. See especially the Social Security Agency’s guideline: Vägledning 
2004:11 Version 4, Tillämplig lagstiftning, EU, Socialförsäkringskonventioner, m.m., p. 






coverage on the situation for a Romanian family in Gothenburg where the 
mother was finally allowed to register as a job-seeker.32 
 Overall, the national rapporteurs have a feeling that Swedish media has a 
pretty accurate reporting explaining the underlying EU principles and objec-
tively showing the tension that the Union citizenship might cause vis-à-vis 
the national welfare state. There are no major or local newspapers painting a 
picture of Union citizens coming to Sweden to take jobs, steal, and beg. 
There has not, to the knowledge of the national rapporteurs, been any head-
lines like the ones in the UK with headlines, stating that as ‘soon we will be 
another 29 million in the UK’ on the opening of the borders vis-à-vis Bulgar-
ia and Romania as of 1st of January 2014. 


















Als Nichtmitglied der EU und des EWR ist die Schweiz im Rahmen des so-
genannten Freizügigkeitsabkommens (FZA)2 teilweise an den acquis der EU 
im Bereich der Personenfreizügigkeit gebunden. Das Abkommen hat zum 
Ziel, auf der Grundlage der in der EU geltenden Bestimmungen die Freizü-
gigkeit der Staatsangehörigen der Vertragsparteien zu verwirklichen (Präam-
bel FZA). Zu diesem Zweck verpflichten sich die Vertragsparteien, den 
Staatsangehörigen anderer Vertragsstaaten unter anderem ein Recht auf Ein-
reise, Aufenthalt und Zugang zu unselbstständiger Erwerbstätigkeit oder Nie-
derlassung als Selbstständiger einzuräumen und Personen ohne Erwerbstätig-
keit ein Recht auf Einreise und Aufenthalt zu gewähren, jeweils unter Sicher-
stellung gleicher Lebens-, Beschäftigungs- und Arbeitsbedingungen wie für 
inländische Personen (Art. 1 FZA).  
 Die Personenfreizügigkeit zwischen der Schweiz und der EU wurde durch 
eine schrittweise Öffnung erreicht, wobei bei Überschreitung bestimmter 
Immigrationszahlen während eines Übergangszeitraumes zusätzlich eine vo-
rübergehende Rückkehr zu einer Kontingentierung vorgesehen ist (sogenann-
te Ventilklausel; Art. 10 Abs. 4 FZA). Von dieser Möglichkeit hat die 
Schweiz 2012 in Bezug auf Staatsangehörige der mittel- und osteuropäischen 
EU-Staaten (EU-8) Gebrauch gemacht und eine Beschränkung der fünfjähri-
gen Aufenthaltsbewilligungen vorgenommen. 2013 wurde die teilweise Kon-
                                                        
1. Dr. iur. LL.M. (Harvard), Oberassistent am Institut für Europarecht an der Univer-
sität Freiburg i.Ü. 
2. Abkommen zwischen der Schweizerischen Eidgenossenschaft einerseits und der 
Europäischen Gemeinschaft und ihren Mitgliedstaaten andererseits über die Frei-
zügigkeit, abgeschlossen am 21. Juni 1999, in Kraft getreten am 1. Juni 2002 
(FZA; SR 0.142.112.681; Abl. L 114 vom 30.6.2002). Vertragspartei ist heute die 
Europäische Union als Rechtsnachfolgerin der Europäischen Gemeinschaft (Art. 1 
Abs. 3 Uabs. 3 EUV). 
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tingentierung auch auf die Staatsangehörigen der alten EU-Staaten sowie 
Malta und Zypern (EU-17) ausgeweitet.3 
 Die Bestimmungen des Freizügigkeitsabkommens entsprechen weitge-
hend der Rechtslage der Personenfreizügigkeit in der EU zum Zeitpunkt des 
Abschluss des Abkommens (21. Juni 1999). Bei der Auslegung der Vor-
schriften des Abkommens ist die Rechtsprechung des EuGH vor dem Unter-
zeichnungszeitpunkt verbindlich, während die Gerichte an spätere Urteile des 
EuGH im Grundsatz nicht gebunden sind (Art. 16 Abs. 2 FZA e contrario). 
In der Praxis zeigt sich das schweizerische Bundesgericht jedoch bestrebt, ei-
ne zur Rechtslage innerhalb der EU möglichst parallele Rechtslage zu schaf-
fen und weicht deshalb von der Auslegung abkommensrelevanter Vorschrif-
ten durch den EuGH nur bei Vorliegen triftiger Gründe ab.4 Nicht Teil des 
Abkommens bilden die nach dem Unterzeichnungszeitpunkt vorgenomme-
nen Änderungen des aquis der EU und somit namentlich auch die durch die 
RL 2004/38/EG erfolgten Anpassungen. Die entsprechenden Vorgaben der 
Unionsbürgerrichtlinie haben folglich für Schweiz grundsätzlich keine Gel-
tung.5 Im Rahmen des FZA relevant ist die Richtlinie jedoch jedenfalls inso-
weit, als sie bereits früher bestehende Rechtsakte aufgreift oder die Recht-
sprechung des EuGH kodifiziert. 
 Die EU hat der Schweiz angetragen, das FZA an die Weiterentwicklung 
des acquis anzupassen und somit insbesondere auch die Vorgaben der Unions-
bürgerrichtlinie ins nationale Recht zu übernehmen. Diesem Vorbringen ist 
die Schweiz unter Verweis auf die gesunkene Akzeptanz des Abkommens in 
der Bevölkerung sowie auf zwei hängige Volksinitiativen, die auf eine Be-
schränkung der Migrationsströme gerichtet sind, nicht gefolgt und hat sich 
entschieden, auf die Aufnahme von Verhandlungen zur Übernahme der 
Richtlinie zu verzichten.6 Zusammenfassend lässt sich somit sagen, dass die 
für die Schweiz bindenden Rechtsvorschriften mehrheitlich auf dem Stand 
                                                        
3. Nicht von der Kontingentierung umfasst sind hingegen die Kurzaufenthaltsbewilli-
gungen, so dass die vorgenommenen Einschränkungen relativ einfach umgangen 
werden können. Ab 1. Juni 2014 gilt für die EU-25 gemäss Abkommen die volle 
Personenfreizügigkeit, Einschränkungsmöglichkeiten bestehen somit lediglich 
noch gegenüber Staatsangehörigen aus Rumänien und Bulgarien (Ventilklausel bis 
31. Mai 2019) sowie dannzumal wohl aus Kroatien. 
4. Vgl. BGE 136 II 5, E. 3.4 sowie etwa BGE 139 II 393, E. 4.1.1. 
5. Zum Grundsatz der Nichtbeachtlichkeit vgl. etwa BGE 130 II 113, E. 6.3 sowie 
BGE 136 II 65, E. 4.2 bezüglich Daueraufenthaltsrecht (Art. 16 RL 2004/38) und 
voraussetzungslosem Aufenthalt bis drei Monate (Art. 6 RL 2004/38). 
6. Vgl. hierzu Medienmitteilung des Bundesamtes für Migration vom 14.6.2011 zum 
elften Treffen des Gemischten Ausschusses zum Freizügigkeitsabkommen. 
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des Unionsrechts vor Inkrafttreten der Unionsbürgerrichtlinie basieren und 
somit stärker auf den Nexus zwischen Erwerbstätigkeit und Freizügigkeits-
rechten abstellen, als dies nach geltendem Unionsrecht der Fall ist.7 
 Die Annahme der »Volksinitiative zur Masseneinwanderung« im Februar 
2014 und die daraus resultierende Verankerung einer Verfassungsbestim-
mung, welche die Einführung eines Systems mit jährlichen Zuwanderungs-
kontingenten vorsieht, hat die Grundlagen und Rahmenbedingungen des 
Freizügigkeitsrechts in der Schweiz massgeblich verändert. Zur Umsetzung 
der Initiative soll innerhalb der nächsten drei Jahre einerseits eine – seitens 
der EU kaum konsensfähige – Neuverhandlung des Freizügigkeitsabkom-
mens angestrebt und andererseits ausführende Gesetzgebung verabschiedet 
werden, die wiederum einem Referendum untersteht. Ob und inwieweit eine 
Umsetzung der Initiative gefunden werden kann, die mit den Vorgaben des 
Freizügigkeitsabkommens vereinbar ist, wird sich zeigen müssen. Dement-
sprechend stehen die nachfolgenden Ausführungen unter dem Vorbehalt wei-
tergehender Anpassungen dieses Rechtsrahmens im Zuge der Umsetzung der 
Volksinitiative. 
Unionsbürgerschaft im Rahmen der Richtlinie 2004/38/EG – 
Beständigkeit des Aufenthalts von Unionsbürgern und ihren 
Familienangehörigen 
Frage 1 
Die Rechtslage in der Schweiz in Bezug auf die Personenfreizügigkeit basiert 
im Grunde auf dem Stand des acquis zum Zeitpunkt des Abschlusses des 
Freizügigkeitsabkommens und lehnt sich somit eng an die Vorschriften der 
Verordnungen Nr. 68/360 und Nr. 1612/68 an, die durch die Unionsbürger-
richtlinie aufgehoben worden sind. Eine weitergehende Umsetzung der Vor-
gaben aus der Unionsbürgerrichtlinie ins schweizerische Recht hingegen ist 
unterblieben. 
 Nach geltendem Recht erstreckt sich der Kreis der Familienangehörigen 
gemäss Art. 3 Abs. 2 Anhang 1 FZA auf den Ehegatten, Verwandte abstei-
gender Linie, die unter 21 Jahre alt sind oder denen Unterhalt gewährt wird, 
Verwandte aufsteigender Linie, denen Unterhalt gewährt wird, sowie die 
                                                        
7. Vgl. beispielsweise BGE 130 II 113, E. 6.1-6.3. 
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Ehegatten und die unterhaltsberechtigten Kinder im Falle von Studierenden. 
Somit zeigen sich in verschiedener Hinsicht Einschränkungen im Vergleich 
zu Art. 2 RL 2004/38/EG: Lebenspartner, mit denen eine eingetragene Part-
nerschaft eingegangen wurde, und Stiefkinder des Ehegatten oder Lebens-
partners des EU-Staatsangehörigen sind nach dem Wortlaut der Bestimmung 
nicht dem Kreise der Familienangehörigen zuzurechnen und schliesslich be-
steht eine Einschränkung in im Hinblick auf die Familienangehörigen von 
Studierenden. Die enge Definition der Familienangehörigkeit in Bezug auf 
eingetragene Partnerschaften wird insofern relativiert, als Art. 52 Ausländer-
gesetz (AuG),8 eine Bestimmung, die in diesem Fall auch auf Staatsangehöri-
ge der EU zur Anwendung gelangt,9 vorsieht, dass die Bestimmungen über 
den Familiennachzug sinngemäss auch für die Partnerschaft gleichge-
schlechtlicher Paare gilt. Sollte die Behandlung eingetragener Partnerschaften 
im Einzelfall dennoch weniger günstig ausfallen, könnte sich auch aus Art. 8 
EMRK oder dem Gleichheitssatz von Art. 8 Bundesverfassung ein Anspruch 
auf Gleichbehandlung ergeben. In Bezug auf die von Art. 3 Abs. 2 Anhang 1 
FZA nicht ausdrücklich erfassten Stiefkinder hat das schweizerische Bundes-
gericht die Rechtsprechung des EuGH in Sachen Baumbast10 und damit im 
Resultat die Neuformulierung der Bestimmung gemäss Art. 2 Abs. 2 Bst. 6 
RL 2004/38/EG nachvollzogen und entschieden, dass sich der Anspruch auf 
Familiennachzug im Grundsatz auch auf die Stiefkinder eines EU-Staatsan-
gehörigen erstreckt.11 Dazu ist gemäss bundesgerichtlicher Rechtsprechung 
jedoch erforderlich, dass tatsächlich ein soziales Familienleben im Sinne ei-
ner Beziehung von minimaler Intensität besteht. Zudem muss der nachzie-
hende Ehegatte entweder über das Sorgerecht oder bei geteiltem Sorgerecht 
über das Einverständnis des anderen Elternteils verfügen und schliesslich darf 
der Nachzugsentscheid der Eltern nicht in offenkundigem Widerspruch zum 
                                                        
8. Bundesgesetz über die Ausländerinnen und Ausländer (AuG; SR 142.20). 
9. Art. 2 Abs. 2 AuG sieht deklaratorisch den grundsätzlichen Vorrang des FZA vor 
den Bestimmungen des AuG vor, sofern nicht das AuG günstigere Bestimmungen 
einhalt. 
10. EuGH, Rs. C-413/99, Slg. 2002, I-7091 (Baumbast). 
11. BGE 136 II 65; BGE 136 II 177; vgl. auch Urteil des Bundesgerichts 2C_195/2011 
vom 17.10.2011; für eine eingehendere Diskussion der Urteile mit weiteren Nach-
weisen vgl. etwa Astrid Epiney/Beate Metz, Zur schweizerischen Rechtsprechung 
zum Personenfreizügigkeitsabkommen, in: Alberto Achermann et al. (Hrsg.), Jahr-
buch für Migrationsrecht 2011/2012, Bern 2012, S. 243 f. 
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Kindeswohl stehen, wie es sich aus der Kinderrechtskonvention ergibt.12 
Damit hat das Bundesgericht ein nach Abschluss des FZA ergangenes und 
somit eigentlich nicht verbindliches Urteil des EuGH übernommen, wobei 
dies einerseits mit der inhaltlichen Bezugnahme der europäischen Rechtspre-
chung auf die auch dem FZA zugrundeliegende Verordnung Nr. 1612/68 und 
andererseits dem Bestreben zur Schaffung eines einheitlichen Freizügigkeits-
rechts begründet wurde.13 Diese Einheitlichkeit fehlt hingegen auch weiterhin 
in Bezug auf den Kreis der Familienangehörigen von Studierenden, der nach 
Art. 3 Abs. 2 Anhang 1 FZA enger definiert wird als in der Unionsbürger-
richtlinie. Nimmt man das gesamte Normengefüge in diesem Bereich in den 
Blick, so zeigt sich im schweizerischen Recht eine grundsätzlich zur Ent-
wicklung des Unionsrechts parallele Tendenz der schrittweisen Ausweitung 
des Kreises der Familienangehörigen, ohne dass jedoch bislang eine vollstän-
dige und formelle Angleichung an die weitgefassten Begrifflichkeiten des 
Unionsrechts erfolgt wäre. 
Frage 2 
Spezifisches, nach Begründungsmotiven differenziertes statistisches Daten-
material zu ausländerrechtlichen Entscheidungen ist soweit ersichtlich weder 
für die gesamte Schweiz noch für die einzelnen Kantone verfügbar. Der 
Nachweis, dass Ausweisungen gestützt auf ausschliesslich finanzielle Gründe 
tatsächlich vorkommen, findet sich jedoch in einzelnen Gerichtsurteilen:  
 So bestätigte beispielsweise das Verwaltungsgericht St. Gallen die Zuläs-
sigkeit der Ausweisung einer rumänischen Staatsangehörigen,14 wobei insbe-
sondere in Betracht gezogen wurde, dass die betroffene Person zum entspre-
chenden Zeitpunkt in der Schweiz nicht arbeitsberechtigt war und ihr somit 
                                                        
12. BGE 136 II 65, E. 5.2; BGE 136 II 177, E. 3.2.2; vgl. zum Ganzen auch etwa 
Christine Kaddous/Diane Grisel, Libre circulation des personnes et des services, 
Basel 2012, S. 889. 
13. Ebenfalls eine Rolle spielte das Argument der Schaffung einer parallelen Rechtsla-
ge in ähnlichem Zusammenhang im Hinblick auf das Aufenthaltsrecht für Bezugs-
personen minderjähriger Unionsbürger, wo das Gericht an die Rechtsprechung des 
EuGH anknüpfte (EuGH Rs. C-200/02, Slg. 2004, I-9925 (Zhu und Chen)), indem es 
ein abgeleitetes Aufenthaltsrecht des sorgeberechtigten Elternteils im Grundsatz soweit 
ersichtlich bejahte, im zu beurteilenden Einzelfall aufgrund mangelnder finanzieller 
Mittel jedoch letztlich verneinte (Urteil des Bundesgerichts 2C_574/2010 vom 
15.11.2010). 
14. Verwaltungsgericht des Kantons St. Gallen, B 2011/114, Urteil vom 7. Dezember 
2011. 
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lediglich die Zulassung ohne Erwerbstätigkeit offenstand (Art. 24 Anhang 1 
FZA). Die vorliegenden Zusagen für eine Übernahme ihrer Lebenskosten 
durch ihren Lebenspartner waren offenbar nicht umgesetzt worden und konn-
ten zudem aufgrund der Tatsache, dass dieser selber in einer anderen Ehe 
verheiratet war, auch nicht gerichtlich durchgesetzt werden. Berücksichti-
gung fand zudem die finanzielle Situation (Gegenüberstellung von Verpflich-
tungen und möglichen Einkünften; Verschuldung; Betreibungen). Vor dem 
Hintergrund dieser Erwägungen nahm das Gericht eine Interessenabwägung 
zwischen dem öffentlichen Interesse einer Ausweisung und dem privaten In-
teresse des Verbleibs in der Schweiz mit ihren Kindern und beim Lebens-
partner vor, die zugunsten ersterer ausfiel. 
 In einem anderen kantonalen Urteil bestätigte das Verwaltungsgericht 
Graubünden15 die Verweigerung einer Aufenthaltsbewilligung für einen fran-
zösischen Staatsbürger, der nach eigenen Angaben seit mehr als zehn Jahren 
keiner Erwerbstätigkeit mehr nachging, weder über Einkommen noch über 
Vermögen verfügte und keinen Mietvertrag oder Krankenversicherungs-
schutz geltend machen konnte. Dabei stützte sich das Gericht insbesondere 
auf die Tatsache, dass auch für die Zukunft nicht damit zu rechnen sei, dass 
der Betroffene einer Erwerbstätigkeit nachgehen würde. 
 Gestützt auf diese punktuellen Einblicke in die Gerichtspraxis lässt sich 
somit zusammenfassen, dass in der Schweiz durchaus Ausweisungen von 
Unionsbürgern aus finanziellen Gründen vorgenommen werden. Dazu ist 
grundsätzlich erforderlich, dass die Voraussetzungen für einen Aufenthalt 
von Personen ohne Erwerbstätigkeit (ausreichende finanzielle Mittel sowie 
Krankenversicherungsschutz) nicht mehr vorliegen und somit kein Aufent-
haltsrecht mehr besteht (Art. 24 Abs. 1 i.V.m. Art. 24 Abs. 8 Anhang 1 FZA). 
Ein allfälliger Widerruf des Aufenthaltstitels dürfte mangels spezifischer 
Vorschriften im FZA gemäss Bundesrecht erfolgen, wobei einerseits die 
Vorgaben des Verhältnismässigkeitsgrundsatzes zu beachten sind und ande-
rerseits die öffentlichen Interessen an einer Verweigerung des Aufenthalts-
rechts aufgrund der Fürsorgebedürftigkeitsgefahr gegen die privaten Interes-
sen abzuwägen sind, wobei für Letztere auch die persönlichen Umstände und 
der Integrationsgrad Berücksichtigung finden müssen (Art. 96 Abs. 1 AuG). 
                                                        
15. Urteil des Verwaltungsgerichts Graubünden, U 11 36, vom 31. Mai 2011; vgl. auch 




Art. 12 bis 15 Unionsbürgerrichtlinie wurden nicht formell ins schweizeri-
sche Recht übernommen, welches sich in Art. 4 Anhang 1 FZA vielmehr auf 
die Vorgängerbestimmungen der Verordnung Nr. 1251/70/EWG sowie der 
RL 75/34/EWG bezieht. Nach diesen Bestimmungen kommt Familienange-
hörigen von EU-Staatsangehörigen nach Beendigung derer Erwerbstätigkeit 
ein Verbleiberecht zu, falls der Arbeitnehmer oder Selbstständige selbst ein 
Verbleiberecht erworben hat (Art. 4 Anhang 1 FZA i.V.m. Art. 3 Verordnung 
Nr. 1251/70 sowie Art. 3 RL 75/34/EWG). Stirbt der aufenthaltsberechtigte 
EU-Bürger, haben die Familienangehörigen ein Verbleiberecht, falls er (1) 
sich zum Zeitpunkt des Todes seit mindestens zwei Jahren ständig im Ho-
heitsgebiet aufgehalten hat, (2) infolge Arbeitsunfall oder Berufskrankheit 
verstorben ist oder (3) der überlebende Ehegatte die Staatsangehörigkeit des 
Mitgliedstaates besitzt oder sie durch Heirat verloren hatte. Das Urteil Givane 
des EuGH16 zum früheren Recht, wonach der zweijährige ständige Aufenthalt 
in der Zeit unmittelbar vor dem Tod vorliegen muss, wurde vom Bundesge-
richt aufgenommen, obschon es nach Unterzeichnung des Abkommens er-
gangen war.17 Darüber hinaus erachtet es das Bundesgericht als erforderlich, 
dass die Familienangehörigen bis zum Zeitpunkt des Todes einen gemeinsa-
men Haushalt geführt haben.18 Im Falle einer Scheidung oder der Auflösung 
der registrierten Partnerschaft mit dem aufenthaltsberechtigten EU-Bürger 
(bzw. eines Drittstaatangehörigen – in dieser Hinsicht besteht keine unter-
schiedliche Behandlung zu EU-Staatsangehörigen) besteht die Aufenthaltsbe-
rechtigung fort, wenn die Ehe mindestens drei Jahre bestanden hat und eine 
erfolgreiche Integration gegeben ist oder wenn wichtige persönliche Gründe 
vorliegen (Art. 50 Abs. 1 AuG). Die erfolgreiche Integration ist namentlich 
gegeben, wenn die betroffene Person die rechtsstaatliche Ordnung und die 
Werte der Verfassung akzeptiert und Wille zur Teilnahme am Wirtschaftsle-
ben und zur Erlernung der am Wohnort gesprochenen Landessprache zeigt 
(Art. 77 Abs. 4 VZAE19). Als wichtige persönliche Gründe gelten etwa eheli-
che Gewalt, Zwangsheirat oder eine starke Gefährdung der Wiedereingliede-
rung im Herkunftsland (Art. 50 Abs. 2 AuG). Entgegen der in der öffentli-
                                                        
16. EuGH, Rs. C-257/00, Slg. 2003, I-345, (Givane), Rz. 50. 
17. Urteil des Bundesgerichts 2C_926/2010 vom 21.11.2011 sowie BGE 137 II 1. 
18. Urteil des Bundesgerichts 2C_926/2010 vom 21.11.2011, E. 3.2 sowie BGE 137 II 
1, E. 3.2. 
19. Verordnung über Zulassung, Aufenthalt und Erwerbstätigkeit (VZAE; SR 
142.201). 
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chen Meinung teilweise bestehenden Ansicht sind die Abweichungen vom 
geltenden acquis der Union in Bezug auf die Aufrechterhaltung des Aufent-
haltsrechts beim Bezug von Sozialhilfeleistungen von eher begrenzter Trag-
weite.20 Der Unionsbürgerrichtlinie ist hierzu bekanntlich die Vorgabe zu 
entnehmen, dass die »Sozialhilfeleistungen des Aufnahmemitgliedstaats nicht 
unangemessen in Anspruch« genommen werden dürfen, wobei die Inan-
spruchnahme nicht automatisch zu einer Ausweisung führen darf (Art. 14 
Abs. 1 u. 3 RL 2004/38/EG). Im Rahmen des FZA haben Arbeitnehmer und 
Selbstständige grundsätzlich ein Recht auf die gleichen sozialen Vergünsti-
gungen wie inländische Arbeitnehmer und somit auf gleiche Sozialhilfeleis-
tungen (Art. 9 Abs. 2 bzw. Art. 15 Abs. 2 Anhang 1 FZA).21 Ausgeschlossen 
werden kann der Bezug von Sozialhilfe jedoch im Rahmen des Aufenthalts-
rechts zum Zweck der Arbeitssuche und für Arbeitssuchende nach Ablauf ei-
nes Arbeitsverhältnisses von unter einem Jahr (Art. 2 Abs. 1 Anhang 1 FZA) 
sowie für Studierende (Art. 24 Abs. 4 Anhang 1 FZA). Nicht ausdrücklich im 
FZA geregelt ist die Rechtslage für anderweitige Personen ohne Erwerbstä-
tigkeit (nicht mehr erwerbstätige Selbstständige, Rentner etc.), die zur Erlan-
gung der Aufenthaltserlaubnis grundsätzlich ausreichende finanzielle Mittel 
und Krankenversicherungsschutz nachweisen müssen (Art. 24 Abs. 1 Anhang 
1 FZA). Erfüllen sie diese Bedingungen nicht (mehr), so verlieren sie ihr 
Aufenthaltsrecht (Art. 24 Abs. 8 Anhang 1 FZA), womit die Aufenthaltser-
laubnis nach Art. 63 AuG entzogen werden kann. Dabei sind das Verhältnis-
mässigkeitsprinzip sowie der Schutz des Familienlebens gemäss Art. 8 
EMRK zu beachten.22 Zur Umsetzung dieser Vorgaben ist vorgesehen, dass 
die Sozialhilfebehörden den Leistungsbezug durch ausländische Staatsange-
hörige unaufgefordert an die Ausländerbehörden weitermelden (Art. 97 Abs. 
3 lit. d AuG i.V.m. Art. 82 Abs. 5 VZAE). In diesem Zusammenhang nicht 
geklärt ist die Frage, ob nach geltendem Recht bis zum Widerruf des Aufent-
                                                        
20. Wie umstritten die Thematik der Sozialhilfebezüge im Kontext des FZA ist, zeigen 
die zahlreichen parlamentarischen Anfragen in jüngster Zeit: Vgl. etwa Postulat Nr. 
13.3597 sowie Interpellationen Nr. 13.3597, 13.3880 oder 13.3775. 
21. Zudem wird teilweise die Ansicht vertreten, der Verweis in Art. 5 Abs. 2 Anhang 1 
FZA auf RL 64/221/EWG, die eine Ausweisung aus wirtschaftlichen Gründen un-
tersagt, würde einem Widerruf einer Bewilligung wegen Sozialhilfebezug entge-
genstehen: Andreas Zünd/Ladina Arquint Hill, in: Uebersax/Rudin/HugiYar/ 
Geiser (Hrsg.), Ausländerrecht, 2. Aufl., Basel 2009, Rz. 8.41. 
22. Zudem geht die Rechtsprechung von einem engen Verständnis der Sozialhilfe aus, 
unter Ausschluss etwa von Verbilligungen von Krankenkassenprämien oder Ergän-
zungsleistungen der Sozialversicherungen: Urteil des Bundesgerichts 2C_448/2007 
vom 20.2.2008, E. 3.4. 
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haltstitels grundsätzlich ein Anspruch auf Sozialhilfe besteht oder ob dieser 
aufgrund der ausländerrechtlichen Bestimmungen gar nicht erst entstehen 
kann. Die Antwort auf diese Frage dürfte insbesondere vom entsprechenden 
(auf Ebene der Kantone geregelten) sozialrechtlichen Rahmen abhängen, wo-
bei das Bundesrecht implizit jedenfalls von der Möglichkeit auszugehen 
scheint, dass auch in diesen Situationen Sozialhilfe geleistet werden kann 
(Art. 82 Abs. 5 VZAE). 
Frage 4 
Die Bestimmungen der Unionsbürgerrichtlinie zum Recht auf Daueraufent-
halt wurden nicht formell in die schweizerische Rechtsordnung übernommen. 
Gemäss dem geltenden Recht in der Schweiz steht EU-Bürgern im Grundsatz 
die Möglichkeit offen, eine Niederlassungsbewilligung, die ausländischen 
Staatsangehörigen einen gefestigten und unbefristeten Anwesenheitsstatus 
einräumt, zu beantragen.23 Erforderlich ist hierzu ein Aufenthalt von mindes-
tens 5 (erfolgreiche Integration) bzw. 10 Jahren gestützt auf Kurzaufenthalts- 
oder Aufenthaltsbewilligungen sowie eine ununterbrochene Aufenthaltsbe-
willigung während der vergangenen fünf Jahre und zudem dürfen keine Wi-
derrufsgründe vorliegen (Art. 34 Abs. 2 u. 4 AuG; Art. 60 VZAE), wobei 
grundsätzlich kein gesetzlicher Anspruch auf Erteilung einer solchen Bewil-
ligung besteht. Das FZA räumt einen Anspruch auf automatische Verlänge-
rung der ursprünglichen Aufenthaltserlaubnis von fünf Jahren für eine Dauer 
von mindestens fünf Jahren ein, wobei diese Dauer bei unfreiwilliger Arbeits-
losigkeit zum Verlängerungszeitpunkt beschränkt werden kann (Art. 6 Abs. 1 
Anhang 1 FZA). Darüber hinaus hat die Schweiz mit zehn EU-Staaten Nie-
derlassungsvereinbarungen abgeschlossen, aus denen sich zumeist ein An-
spruch auf Erteilung einer unbedingten und unbefristeten Niederlassungsbe-
willigung nach einem Aufenthalt von fünf Jahren ergibt.24 Selbiges Regime 
wird aus Gegenrechtserwägungen auch sieben weiteren EU-Staaten ge-
                                                        
23. Zur Niederlassungsbewilligung vgl. etwa Peter Uebersax, in: Uebersax/Rudin/Hugi 
Yar/Geiser (Hrsg.), Ausländerrecht, 2. Aufl., Basel 2009, Rz. 7.244. 
24. Belgien, Dänemark, Deutschland, Frankreich, Griechenland, Italien (nach Ab-
kommenstext ist ein Aufenthalt von 10 Jahren erforderlich, gemäss der vom Bun-
desrat festgelegten Praxis erfolgt die Bewilligung bereits nach fünf Jahren), Nieder-
lande, Österrreich, Portugal und Spanien. 
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währt.25 Keine solchen Vereinbarungen bestehen hingegen mit den neuen 
Mitgliedstaaten der EU sowie Zypern und Malta, deren Staatsangehörigen ei-
ne Niederlassungsbewilligung im Grundsatz nach einem regulären und unun-
terbrochenen Aufenthalt von 5 bzw. 10 Jahren erteilt werden kann. Somit 
profitieren die Staatsangehörigen der alten EU-Mitgliedstaaten gestützt auf 
bilaterale Übereinkünfte grundsätzlich von einem privilegierten, mit der 
Unionsbürgerrichtlinie teilweise vergleichbaren Status, wogegen die Gewähr-
leistung des unbefristeten und unbedingten Anwesenheitsrechts für Staatsan-
gehörige der neuen Mitgliedstaaten zeitlich länger hinausgeschoben wird. 
Diese unterschiedliche Behandlung ist in den Niederlassungsverträgen ange-
legt, die teilweise bis in die 1930er Jahre zurückreichen, und ist somit insbe-
sondere als Spiegel der diplomatischen Beziehungen mit den entsprechenden 
Staaten zu sehen. Gleichzeitig fällt auf, dass es sich bei den Vertragsstaaten 
überwiegend um Staaten mit hoher Wirtschaftsleistung handelt (bislang keine 
Verträge mit ost- und mitteleuropäischen Staaten, Abschluss der Abkommen 
mit Spanien, Portugal und Griechenland erst Ende der 1980er Jahre) sie kön-
nen somit auch als Ausdruck einer vorsichtigeren Vorteilseinräumung gegen-
über Ländern mit geringerer Wirtschaftskraft betrachtet werden. 
 Gegenwärtig (Ende 2012) sind in der Schweiz auf die Gesamtbevölkerung 
von 8.039 Mio. Personen 1'194'640 Personen aus den 28 EU-Staaten ansäs-
sig. Davon verfügen 782'470, also 65.5 % über eine Niederlassungsbewilli-
gung.26 
Frage 5 
Auch Art. 24 Abs. 2 RL 2004/38/EG wurde nicht formell ins schweizerische 
Recht übernommen. Nach dem Freizügigkeitsabkommen sind vom Grund-
satz der Gleichbehandlung sowohl für Arbeitnehmer als auch für Selbststän-
dige insbesondere Rahmenbedingungen und Leistungen in engem Zusam-
menhang zur Berufstätigkeit erfasst (Art. 2 FZA sowie Art. 9 und Art. 15 
Anhang 1 FZA), der Schutz erstreckt sich darüber hinaus jedoch auch auf 
»soziale Vergünstigungen« (Art. 9 Abs. 2 sowie Art. 15 Abs. 2 i.V.m. Art. 9 
Abs. 2 Anhang 1 FZA). In der Konturierung dieses Begriffes bezieht sich das 
                                                        
25. Finnland, Grossbritannien und Nordirland, Irland, Island, Luxemburg, Norwegen 
und Schweden. Für einen Überblick siehe Peter Uebersax, in: Uebersax/Rudin/ 
Hugi Yar/Geiser (Hrsg.), Ausländerrecht, 2. Aufl,. Basel 2009, Rz. 7.140 u. 7.249. 
26. Vgl. zu den statistischen Angaben das Zahlenmaterial des Bundesamtes für Statis-
tik im Bereich Migration: <http://www.bfs.admin.ch/bfs/portal/de/index/themen 
/01/07/blank/data/01.html> (zuletzt besucht am 15.11.2013). 
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Bundesgericht27 ausdrücklich auf das extensive Verständnis des EuGH zu 
Art. 7 Abs. 2 Verordnung Nr. 492/201128 und vertritt ebenfalls eine eher wei-
te Auslegung des Begriffs.29  
 Bezüglich Studienbeihilfen schafft das FZA für Arbeitnehmende, Selbst-
ständige und deren Familienangehörige einen grundsätzlichen Anspruch auf 
Gleichbehandlung mit Inländern,30 wobei jedoch Personen ohne Erwerbstä-
tigkeit ausdrücklich ausgenommen sind (Art. 24 Abs. 4 in fine Anhang 1 
FZA). Letzteren wird auch ein Anspruch auf Gleichbehandlung beim Zugang 
zum Studium ausdrücklich verwehrt, worauf sich die teilweise bestehenden 
weitergehenden Studienbeschränkungen für ausländische Studierende an den 
Universitäten sowie unterschiedliche Regime im Bereich der Studiengebüh-
ren abstützen lassen. In Bezug auf Studienbeihilfen ist dem schweizerischen 
Recht ein Anspruch auf Gleichbehandlung für sämtliche Personenkategorien 
zu entnehmen, sobald sie eine Niederlassungsbewilligung erlangt haben,31 
womit in der Praxis letztlich jedenfalls für die Staatsangehörigen der alten 
EU-Mitgliedstaaten eine mit Art. 24 Abs. 2 RL 2004/38/EG vergleichbare 
Lösung resultieren dürfte. 
Frage 6 
Die Freizügigkeitsrechte des FZA dürfen aus Gründen der öffentlichen Ord-
nung, Sicherheit und Gesundheit eingeschränkt werden, wobei das Abkom-
men auf die RL 64/221/EWG, 72/194/EWG und 75/35/EWG Bezug nimmt, 
die für die EU mit Inkrafttreten der RL 2004/38/EG aufgehoben wurden, aber 
im Verhältnis zur Schweiz weiterhin gelten (Art. 5 FZA). In der Auslegung 
                                                        
27. BGE 138 V 186. E. 3.4.1 sowie bereits das Urteil des Bundesgerichts 2P.142/2003 
vom 7. November 2003, E. 3.4.  
28. Früher Art. 7 Verordnung Nr. 1612/68. 
29. Als soziale Vergünstigung hat das Gericht Beiträge für Opfer von Straftaten quali-
fiziert (BGE 137 II 242, insb. E. 3.2.2). Dagegen wurde diese Qualifikation etwa 
verneint für die Erteilung eines Jagdpatents (Urteil des Bundesgerichts 
2P.142/2003 vom 7.11.2013) oder für Leistungen der staatlichen Rentenversiche-
rung (BGE 138 V 186) und in Bezug auf Sonderschulungsleistungen offengelassen 
(BGE 132 V 184, E. 6). 
30. Vgl. hierzu auch die Vorschrift von Art. 5 lit. b Ausbildungsbeitragsgesetz (SR 
416); vgl. aus dem Schrifttum etwa Astrid Epiney/Robert Mosters/Sarah Theuer-
kauf, Die Rechtsprechung des EuGH zur Personenfreizügigkeit, in: Epiney/Theuer-
kauf/Rivière (Hrsg.), Schweizerisches Jahrbuch für Europarecht 2003, Zürich 
2004, S. 100 f. 
31. Art. 5 lit. d Ausbildungsbeitragsgesetz. 
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der Einschränkungsgründe orientiert sich das Bundesgericht eng an der Inter-
pretation des EuGH und folgt ausdrücklich dessen restriktivem Verständnis.32 
Erforderlich ist demnach eine »tatsächliche und hinreichend schwere Ge-
fährdung, die ein Grundinteresse der Gesellschaft berührt«.33 Bei der Beurtei-
lung ist nicht in jeder Verletzung des nationalen Strafrechts eine schwere Ge-
fährdung eines Grundinteresses zu erblicken und es ist auf das persönliche 
Verhalten des des Betroffenen abzustellen,34 weshalb Massnahmen mit einer 
generalpräventiven Stossrichtung unzulässig sind.35 Sodann ist gemäss der 
Rechtsprechung des Bundesgerichts eine hinreichende Wahrscheinlichkeit 
erforderlich, dass der Betroffene künftig die öffentliche Ordnung und Sicher-
heit stören wird, wobei die Anforderungen an die Wahrscheinlichkeit auf-
grund der Bedeutung der Freizügigkeit nicht zu gering ausfallen dürfen und 
eine Festlegung der Wahrscheinlichkeitsschwelle anhand der Schwere der zu 
erwartenden Rechtsgüterverletzung vorgenommen wird.36 Als besonders 
schwergewichtig stuft die höchstrichterliche Rechtsprechung dabei Verlet-
zungen der Vorschriften des Betäubungsmittelrechts ein.37 Generell hat diese 
Abwägung im Rahmen der Vorgaben der EMRK und unter Beachtung des 
Verhältnismässigkeitsprinzips zu erfolgen.38 
                                                        
32. Vgl. etwa BGE 130 II 493, E. 3.2; BGE 139 II 121, E. 5.3. 
33. BGE 130 II 176, E. 3.4.1 (Hervorhebungen im Original) unter Bezugnahme auf 
EuGH, Rs. 30/77, Slg. 1977, 1999 (Bouchereau), Rn. 33 ff. sowie EuGH, Rs. C-
348/96, Slg. 1999, I-11 (Calfa), Rn. 20. 
34. BGE 130 II 176, E. 3.4.1 mit Verweis auf Art. 3 Abs. 1 RL 64/221/EWG. 
35. BGE 129 II 215, E. 7.1 mit Verweis auf EuGH, Rs. 67/74, Slg. 1975, 297 (Bon-
signore), Rn. 6 f. 
36. BGE 130 II 176, E. 4.3.1. Anhaltspunkte für die Interessenabwägung bietet auch 
Art. 96 AuG, der aufgrund des Diskriminierungsverbotes gegenüber Staatsangehö-
rigen der EU als Minimalstandard gilt. Demgemäss sind bei der Ermessensaus-
übung die öffentlichen Interessen, die persönlichen Verhältnisse sowie der Integra-
tionsgrad des Betroffenen zu berücksichtigen. Ist die Ergreifung einer bestimmten 
Massnahme den Umständen nicht angemessen, so kann auch eine Androhung vor-
genommen werden. Damit werden die Vorgaben des bereits aufgrund des Verfas-
sungsrechts zu berücksichtigenden Verhältnismässigkeitsprinzips konkretisiert. 
37. 139 II 121, E. 5.3 unter Bezugnahme auch auf die Rechtsprechung zu Art. 28 RL 
2004/38/EG (EuGH, Rs. C-145/06, Slg. 2010, I-11979 (Tsakouridis), Rn. 46 f. und 
54 ff. – ohne dass das Gericht allerdings auf die die darin angesprochenen Stufung 
der Anforderungen eingegangen wäre).  
38. Weiterführend zum erhöhten Ausweisungsschutz bei Daueraufenthalt und der 
Übertragbarkeit dieser unionsrechtlichen Vorgaben auf das FZA siehe Astrid Epi-
ney/Robert Mosters, Schweizerisches Jahrbuch für Europarecht 2012/2013, Zürich 
2013, S. 59 ff. 
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 Noch nicht vollständig geklärt ist die Frage der Umsetzung einer im Zuge 
einer Volksinitiative in die Bundesverfassung eingebrachten Bestimmung 
(Art. 121 Abs. 3-6 BV), wonach Ausländer ihr Aufenthaltsrecht unabhängig 
vom ausländerrechtlichen Status verlieren, wenn sie wegen der Begehung be-
stimmter Delikte (vorsätzliche Tötung, Vergewaltigung, andere schwere Se-
xualdelikte, Menschenhandel etc.) rechtskräftig verurteilt worden sind oder 
missbräuchlich Sozialleistungen bezogen haben. Die betroffenen Personen 
sind demnach mit einem Einreiseverbot von 5 bis 15 Jahren, im Wiederho-
lungsfall von 20 Jahren zu belegen. Jedenfalls wenn man diese Bestimmung 
als Automatismus versteht, stünde eine Anwendung der Vorschrift einerseits 
mit der EMRK (mögliche Verletzung von Art. 8 sowie des Verhältnismäs-
sigkeitsprinzips) und andererseits mit den Verpflichtungen der Schweiz aus 
dem Freizügigkeitsabkommen in einem beträchtlichen Spannungsverhältnis. 
Das Bundesgericht hat die Verfassungsbestimmung als nicht hinreichend be-
stimmt und somit nicht unmittelbar anwendbar qualifiziert und in einem – an 
den Gesetzgeber adressierten – obiter dictum die Erwägung angestellt, dass 
die neue Verfassungsbestimmung in der Umsetzung der Volksinitiative mit 
anderen in der Verfassung verbrieften Interessen (Verhältnismässigkeitsprin-
zip, Bindung an die völkerrechtlichen Verpflichtungen, Grundrechtsinteres-
sen der Betroffenen) in einen Ausgleich zu bringen sei.39 Tatsächlich sieht 
sich der Gesetzgeber in der Umsetzung mit der Herausforderung konfrontiert, 
eine Abwägung zwischen dem im Wortlaut der Bestimmung wohl angelegten 
Ausweisungsautomatismus und insbesondere den völkerrechtlichen Ver-
pflichtungen aus FZA und ERMK zu finden. Da die Schweiz ein Anwen-
dungsgebot auch für verfassungswidrige Bundesgesetzbestimmungen kennt 
(Art. 190 BV), den menschenrechtlichen Verpflichtungen des Völkerrechts 
hingegen jedenfalls im Grundsatz Vorrang gegenüber widersprechenden Ver-
fassungsvorschriften zukommt, scheint es nicht ausgeschlossen, dass sich die 
gesetzgeberische Umsetzung letztlich enger an den völkerrechtlichen Vorga-
ben als am Verfassungstext orientieren wird.40  
                                                        
39. BGE 139 I 16, E. 4.2 und E. 4.3. 
40. Angesichts der sich abzeichnenden Verzögerungen bei der Umsetzung der Volks-
initiative ist bereits eine weitere Volksinitiative zustandegekommen (»Durchset-
zungsinitiative«), wonach für dieselben inhaltlichen Forderungen einerseits eine 
Konkretisierung des Textes auf Verfassungsebene vorgesehen ist, womit auf eine 
Umsetzung durch den Gesetzgeber verzichtet werden kann, und andererseits fest-
gelegt wird, dass der entsprechende Verfassungspassus dem nicht zwingenden 
Völkerrecht vorgeht. Vgl. BBl 2013 1146. 
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Unionsbürgerschaft außerhalb der Richtlinie 2004/38/EG – 
Untersuchung der nationalen Anwendung von primärem EU-Recht 
Frage 7 
Wie bei der Anwendung des Unionsrechts ist auch der Anwendungsbereich 
des Personenfreizügigkeitsabkommens von rein internen Situationen abzu-
grenzen. Die höchstrichterliche Rechtsprechung in der Schweiz folgt auch in 
dieser Frage der Linie des EuGH, womit das Vorliegen eines »Auslandbezu-
ges« bzw. eines »grenzüberschreitenden Sachverhaltes« für eine Anrufung 
der Rechte aus dem Abkommen vorausgesetzt wird. Dagegen wird die An-
wendung der Freizügigkeitsvorschriften ausgeschlossen für »Sachverhalte, 
die einen Mitgliedstaat rein intern« betreffen.41 Der aus dieser Differenzie-
rung entstehende Raum für Inländerdiskriminierungen hat sich in der 
Schweiz insbesondere in Bezug auf die Bestimmungen zum Familiennachzug 
realisiert: Nachdem den Staatsangehörigen von EU-Staaten im Geltungsbe-
reich des Freizügigkeitsabkommens ein Recht auf Familiennachzug einge-
räumt wurde, das über jenes für Schweizer hinausging, hatte der Gesetzgeber 
die Inländerbenachteiligung mit der Schaffung eines entsprechenden Anspru-
ches für Schweizer beseitigt.42 Mit der Übernahme der Metock- und Baum-
bast-Rechtsprechung des EuGH durch das Bundesgericht43 wurde die Rechts-
lage für EU-Bürger allerdings erneut verbessert, ohne dass der Gesetzgeber 
bislang durch eine Anpassung der einschlägigen Gesetzesbestimmungen 
nachgezogen oder die Gerichte, welche aufgrund des Anwendungsgebots für 
Bundesgesetze (Art. 190 Bundesverfassung) auch verfassungswidrige Vor-
schriften zur Anwendung bringen müssen, den Schweizer Staatsbürgern ge-
stützt auf den grundrechtlichen Gleichheitssatz analoge Rechte eingeräumt 
hätten.44 
                                                        
41. BGE 129 II 249, E. 4.2 unter Bezugnahme u.a. auf EuGH, Rs. 35/82 und 36/82, 
Slg. 1982, 3723 (Morson und Jhanjan), Rn. 11 ff. 
42. Art. 42 AuG, allerdings noch unter Abstützung auf die Akrich-Rechtsprechung des 
EuGH: EuGH, Rs. C-109/01, Slg. 2003, I-9607 (Akrich). 
43. BGE 136 II , E. 3 in Bezug auf EuGH, Rs. C-127/08, Slg. 2008, I-6241 (Metock); 
BGE 136 II 64, E. 3 und 4 in Bezug auf EuGH, Rs. C-413/1999, Slg. 2002, I-7091 
(Baumbast), Rn. 57. 
44. Immerhin hat das Bundesgericht angemahnt, die Ungleichbehandlung von Inlän-
dern und Drittstaatsangehörigen durch Gesetzesänderung zu beheben, da die Ge-
richte andernfalls über eine teleologische Auslegung der Bestimmung zu einem 




 Die Diskussion um die Übernahme der EuGH-Urteile Chen, Ruiz Zam-
brano, Dereci und McCarthy kann als Illustration für den Umgang der 
schweizerischen Gerichte mit den Weiterentwicklungen des Unionsrecht her-
angezogen werden: Grundsätzlich strebt das Bundesgericht die Schaffung ei-
ner zur Rechtslage in der EU möglichst parallelen Rechtslage an und weicht 
nicht ohne Not von der Auslegung abkommensrelevanter Vorschriften durch 
den EuGH ab.45 Gleichzeitig stellt sich das Gericht auf den Standpunkt, dass 
die Regeln zur Unionsbürgerschaft und die diesbezügliche Rechtsprechung 
des EuGH für die Schweiz nur bedingt massgeblich sind und setzt für eine 
Übernahme voraus, dass es sich um Vorschriften handelt, die Sinn und Geist 
des FZA entsprechen und diesem zugrunde liegen.46 Nur bedingt relevant 
sind demzufolge Entwicklungen im Kernbereich der Unionsbürgerschaft,47 
wozu wohl auch die Hauptaussagen der Urteile Ruiz Zambrano, Dereci und 
McCarthy zu zählen sind.48 Liegt hingegen ein inhaltlicher Bezug zu sekun-
därrechtlichen Bestimmungen vor, die bereits vor dem Abschluss des FZA in 
Kraft waren, erachtet das Bundesgericht es für angezeigt, der entsprechenden 
Rechtsprechung im Grundsatz zu folgen (so für Chen und Zhu, Baumbast und 
Metock). Problematisch ist hierbei, dass das Vorliegen eines solchen Nexus 
ex ante teilweise schwierig antizipiert werden kann, da auch nicht im Einzel-
nen geklärt ist, welcher Natur und Intensität er zu sein hat (Formulierung, In-
halt, Sinn und Zweck der entsprechenden Bestimmung). Damit wird den Ge-
richten ein weiter Auslegungsspielraum belassen, der bisher im Zweifelsfall 
eher zugunsten einer unionsrechtsnahen Auslegung genutzt wurde.  
Frage 8 
Da das FZA die Schweiz nicht in die bürgerrechtliche Dimension der Uni-
onsbürgerschaft einbindet, ist wohl davon auszugehen, dass die Vorschriften 
über den Erwerb oder Verlust der schweizerischen Staatsbürgerschaft keiner-
lei Bindung an Vorgaben des Unionsrechts unterliegen. 
                                                        
EMRK feststellen könnten: BGE 136 II 120, insb. E. 3.5.3; vgl. dazu etwa Chris-
tine Kaddous/Diane Grisel, Libre circulation des personnes et des services, Basel 
2012, S. 874 f. 
45. BGE 139 II 393, E. 4.1.1; vgl. dazu bereits oben »Vorbemerkungen«. 
46. BGE 136 II 65, E. 4.2. 
47. BGE 139 II 393, E. 4.1.2. 
48. Zu den Auswirkungen auf die Schweiz und (ebenfalls zurückhaltend) zur Über-
tragbarkeit auf das FZA vgl. Robert Mosters, Anmerkung zum Urteil Zambrano, 
Asyl 3/2011, S. 31 f. und ders. Anmerkung zum Urteil McCarthy, Asyl 3/2011, S. 
33 f. 
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Politische Rechte von Unionsbürgern 
Frage 9 
Im Hinblick auf die RL 93/109/EG besteht soweit ersichtlich keine rechtliche 
Bindung der Schweiz und demzufolge wurde die Richtlinie auch nicht in na-
tionales Recht umgesetzt. 
Frage 10 
Im Hinblick auf die RL 94/80/EG besteht soweit ersichtlich keine rechtliche 
Bindung der Schweiz und demzufolge wurde die Richtlinie auch nicht in na-
tionales Recht umgesetzt. 
Frage 11 
Die Bundesverfassung überlässt es den Kantonen, die politischen Rechte auf 
ihrem Gebiet zu regeln (Art. 39 Abs. 1 BV), weshalb die Kantone ausländi-
schen Staatsangehörigen Stimm- oder/und Wahlrechte auf kantonaler oder 
kommunaler Ebene einräumen können. 
 Auf kantonaler Ebene kennen lediglich die Kantone Neuenburg und Jura 
ein Stimm- sowie ein (aktives) Wahlrecht für ausländische Staatsangehörige. 
Voraussetzung ist hierzu, dass die betreffende Person seit zehn Jahren in der 
Schweiz und davon mindestens ein Jahr im Kanton lebt (Jura), bzw. dass eine 
Niederlassungsbewilligung vorliegt und ein Aufenthalt im Kanton seit min-
destens fünf Jahren gegeben ist (Neuenburg). Im Kanton Jura sind Entschei-
dungen zur Änderung der Kantonsverfassung vom Stimmrecht ausländischer 
Staatsangehöriger ausgenommen.49  
 Auf kommunaler Ebene erhalten ausländische Staatsangehörige in vier 
Kantonen das volle Stimm- sowie das aktive und passive Wahlrecht,50 in ei-
nem Kanton wird ihnen lediglich das Stimm- und das aktive Wahlrecht ein-
geräumt51 und in weiteren drei Kantonen wird es den Gemeinden freigestellt, 
                                                        
49. Art. 3 Abs. 2 Loi sur les droits politiques vom 26. Oktober 1978 i.V.m. Art. 77 Bst. 
a, b und f Verfassung des Kantons Jura. 
50. Kantone Neuenburg, Jura (mit der Einschränkung, dass das passive Wahlrecht sich 
lediglich auf die Wahl in Gemeindeparlamente erstreckt), Waadt und Freiburg. 
51. Kanton Genf. 
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das Stimm- und Wahlrecht für ausländische Staatsangehörige einzuführen.52 
Zur Erlangung des Stimm- oder Wahlrechts wird jeweils eine bestimmte 
Mindestaufenthaltsdauer oder das Vorliegen einer Niederlassungsbewilligung 
vorausgesetzt.  
 Vergleicht man diese nationalen materiellrechtlichen Vorschriften mit den 
Anforderungen des Unionsrechts (RL 94/80/EG), so zeigt sich – abgesehen 
vom Umstand, dass die Gewährung von Ausländerstimm- und -wahlrechten 
in den Gebietskörperschaften der Schweiz noch immer die Ausnahme dar-
stellt – insbesondere bei den Anforderungen an Aufenthaltsstatus und -dauer 
eine wesentlich striktere Ausgestaltung als jene, die gemäss Art. 3 RL 
94/80/EG innerhalb der EU vorausgesetzt werden könnte. Umgekehrt ist aber 
zu konstatieren, dass das Recht einiger Kantone über den Mindeststandard 
des Unionsrechts hinausgeht, indem politische Rechte (1) sämtlichen auslän-
dischen Staatsangehörigen eingeräumt werden, (2) neben Wahlrechten auch 
das Recht zur Teilnahme an Abstimmungen umfassen, (3) sich teilweise nicht 
lediglich auf die kommunale, sondern auch auf die kantonale Ebene erstre-
cken und schliesslich (4) zum Teil auch das passive Wahlrecht für Mitglieder 
von Exekutivorganen umfassen. 
 Überblickt man die Regelungen des Wahl- und Stimmrechts für ausländi-
sche Staatsangehörige in der Schweiz, so lässt sich ein Muster weitergehen-
der Liberalität in der französischen Schweiz und ein eher restriktiver Ansatz 
in der Deutschschweiz und dem Tessin beobachten. Zudem zeigt der Um-
stand, dass die Stimmbürger in den letzten zwölf Jahren über mehr als ein 
Dutzend kantonale Abstimmungsvorlagen zum Ausländerstimmrecht zu be-
finden hatten, dass es sich bei der Partizipation ausländischer Staatsangehöri-
ger an der politischen Entscheidungsfindung in der Schweiz um ein äusserst 
umstrittenes Thema handelt, wobei insbesondere im vergangenen Jahrzehnt 
gleichzeitig eine Tendenz der Ausweitung der Wahl- und Stimmrechte zu be-
obachten war. Dass es in diesem Bereich zu einer weitergehenden Annähe-
rung oder sogar einer Bindung an die Vorgaben der EU kommen könnte, 
scheint hingegen aufgrund des engen Souveräntitätsbezugs der Wahl- und 
Stimmrechte und – damit zusammenhängend – der hohen politischen Brisanz 
der Thematik eher unwahrscheinlich. 
                                                        
52. Kanton Appenzell Ausserrhoden (umgesetzt in drei Gemeinden); Kanton Graubün-
den (umgesetzt in 18 Gemeinden); Kanton Basel-Stadt (mit Ausnahme der Ge-
meinde Basel-Stadt; bislang in keiner Gemeinde umgesetzt). 
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Frage 12 
Mangels Bindung der Schweiz an die Vorgaben des Unionsrechts in Bezug 
auf das Stimm- und Wahlrecht sind in diesem Bereich keine Konflikte zwi-
schen EU-Recht und nationalen Vorschriften ersichtlich. 
Kultur(en) der Staatsbürgerschaft 
Frage 13 
Die Personenfreizügigkeit mit der EU hatte in der Schweiz politisch von Be-
ginn einen eher schwierigen Stand und wird wohl von einem beträchtlichen 
Teil der Bevölkerung nicht so sehr als Errungenschaft, denn als Preis für den 
Einbezug der Schweiz in den Binnenmarkt betrachtet. Diese skeptische Hal-
tung dürfte bereits im Hinblick auf die ökonomische Dimension der Perso-
nenfreizügigkeit bestehen, die der Volkswirtschaft offenkundige Vorteile 
(insbesondere Zugang zu hochqualifizierten Arbeitskräften, Verbesserung der 
Finanzierbarkeit der Sozialwerke, solides Wirtschaftswachstum im vergange-
nen Jahrzehnt) und relativ geringe Nachteile (Lohndruck lediglich in gewis-
sen Branchen, weiterhin tiefe Arbeitslosigkeit, Bevölkerungswachstum) ge-
bracht hat.53 
 Trotz dieser überwiegend positiven Bilanz aus volkswirtschaftlicher Per-
spektive steht die Personenfreizügigkeit in der öffentlichen Diskussion unter 
Druck. Dies zeigt sich zum einen an der Annahme der »Volksinitiative zur 
Masseneinwanderung« und weiteren hängigen Volksbegehren, und zum an-
deren am zurückhaltenden Umgang mit den Freizügigkeitsrechten durch die 
politischen Institutionen, beispielsweise in der Anrufung der Ventilklausel 
zur Kontingentierung der Einwanderung aus dem EU-Raum durch den Bun-
desrat, der beständigen Betonung der sogenannten flankierenden Massnah-
men (Sicherstellung der Einhaltung der minimalen Lohn- und Arbeitsbedin-
gungen bei grenzüberschreitender Dienstleistungserbringung) oder dem Ver-
zicht auf eine Übernahme der Unionsbürgerrichtlinie. Ein über dieses öko-
nomische Paradigma hinausgehendes bürgerrechtlich oder konstitutionell be-
                                                        
53. Vgl. hierzu etwa den 9. Bericht des Observatoriums zum Freizügigkeitsabkommen 
Schweiz-EU zu Auswirkungen der Personenfreizügigkeit auf den Schweizer Ar-
beitsmarkt vom 11.6.2013 verfügbar unter <https://www.bfm.admin.ch//bfm/de/ 
home/themen/fza_schweiz-eu-efta.html> (zuletzt besucht am 15.11.2013). 
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gründetes Verständnis der Migrationsrechte lässt sich in der vorherrschenden 
Debatte in der Schweiz kaum beobachten. Breite Kreise der Bevölkerung 
dürften das Konzept einer Konstitutionalisierung der Migrationsrechte gera-
dezu als rotes Tuch und als Widerspruch zum gepflegten Unabhängigkeits- 
und Souveränitätstopos wahrnehmen, so dass auch migrationsfreundliche Ak-
teure in der öffentlichen Debatte auf die Heranziehung und Geltendmachung 
dieses Verständnisses verzichten. Diese festzustellende Migrationsskepsis 
kontrastiert in eigentümlicher Weise mit dem Umstand, dass die Migration, 
insbesondere auch aus und in den EU-Raum, in der Schweiz eine unverkenn-
bare Realität darstellt (2012: Ausländeranteil von 23.3 %, Anteil EU-Bürger 
von 14.8 %; Einwanderung von 125‘045 Personen; 420‘981 Schweizer 
Staatsbürger in der EU), welcher unbestrittenermassen ein wichtiger Anteil 
am Funktionieren von Gesellschaft, Volkswirtschaft und Staat zukommt. 
Wenn heute also für die öffentliche Meinung – etwas überspitzt ausgedrückt 
– eher von einer Freizügigkeitskultur der Duldung als der Konstitutionalisie-
rung gesprochen werden kann, erscheint es naheliegender, dass die Fortent-
wicklung dieses Verständnisses letztlich über die Anerkennung der bestehen-
den engen faktischen Einbindung der Schweiz in den Migrationsraum der EU 
erfolgt, als dass es rechtliche oder ideelle Faktoren sind – denen gemeinhin 
eher mit Skepsis begegnet wird –, die den Anstoss für eine Umdeutung der 
vorherrschenden Migrationskultur geben werden. 
Frage 14 
Die Wirkung der EU-Charta der Grundrechte auf die Freizügigkeitsrechte 
dürfte im Falle der Schweiz als beschränkt einzustufen sein. Gemäss Bundes-
gericht ist die Rechtsprechung des EuGH im Bereich der Grundrechte für die 
Schweiz im Prinzip nicht von Relevanz, da sich die Schweiz, abgesehen von 
einzelnen Garantien wie dem Diskriminierungsverbot gemäss Art. 2 FZA, 
nicht zur Einhaltung dieser Rechte verpflichtet hat.54 Eine Ausnahme vom 
Grundsatz der Nichtbeachtlichkeit bildet der Fall, dass der EuGH zur Ausle-
gung von Begriffen des Unionsrechts, die zur Anwendung des Freizügig-
keitsabkommens herangezogen werden (Art. 16 Abs. 2 FZA), auf grundrecht-
liche Bestimmungen zurückgreift.55 In allen anderen Fällen ist der schweize-
rische Richter nicht an die Auslegung der Grundrechte durch den EuGH ge-
bunden und beurteilt die entsprechenden Normen somit vor dem Hintergrund 
                                                        
54. BGE 130 II 113, E. 6.4. 
55. BGE 130 II 113, E. 6.5. 
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der eigenen Rechtsordnung, d.h. insbesondere unter Einbezug der Vorgaben 
der EMRK. Nun mag hierbei die als Ausnahme qualifizierte Beachtlichkeit 
der Rechtsprechung im Grundrechtsbereich tatsächlich den häufigsten Fall 
und damit eigentlich die Regel darstellen,56 für die Tatsache, dass die Ver-
bindlichkeit der Grundrechte-Charta durch den Filter der Übernahme bereits 
signifikante Auswirkungen auf die Auslegung der Freizügigkeitsrechte durch 
die Schweiz gehabt hätte, sind jedoch momentan (noch) keine Nachweise er-
sichtlich. 
Frage 15 
In der öffentlichen Diskussion über die Beziehungen zwischen der Schweiz 
und der EU stellt die Personenfreizügigkeit eines der umstrittensten und 
meistdiskutierten Themen dar. Zur Debatte stehen dabei sowohl Fragen zur 
exakten Ausgestaltung und zum Anwendungsbereich der Freizügigkeitsvor-
schriften als auch die Grundsatzfrage der Einbindung der Schweiz in den 
Migrationsraum Europa. Anlass für diese Diskussionen waren und sind ins-
besondere Volksabstimmungen über migrationspolitische Fragestellungen im 
Allgemeinen sowie über die Einrichtung und Weiterentwicklung der Perso-
nenfreizügigkeit mit der EU im Besonderen.57 Die Unionsbürgerschaft als 
solche kam in diesen Debatten bislang nur am Rande zur Sprache, einzelne 
Themen in ihrem Kontext jedoch durchaus. So stellen beispielsweise die 
Entwicklung der Lohn- und Arbeitsbedingungen, der verbleibende Spielraum 
bei der Ausschaffung von straffälligen ausländischen Staatsangehörigen so-
wie insbesondere die Frage der Sozialhilfeansprüche für zugewanderte Per-
sonen wichtige Diskussionspunkte dar. Dabei ist die Faktendarstellung in den 
                                                        
56. So Astrid Epiney, Die schweizerische Rechtsprechung zum Personenfreizügig-
keitsabkommen – ein Überblick, in: Achermann/Epiney/Kälin/Nguyen (Hrsg.), 
Jahrbuch für Migrationsrecht 2004/2005, Bern 2005, S. 144. 
57. Nach der Abstimmung über die eigentlichen sektoriellen Abkommen mit der EU 
im Jahre 2000 waren dies insbesondere Volksabstimmungen über die Ausweitung 
der Personenfreizügigkeit auf neue Mitgliedstaaten (2005; 2009 und voraussicht-
lich 2014 für die Ausweitung auf Kroatien), die Schengen- und Dublin-Asso-
ziierung (2005), die Weiterentwicklung des Schengen Besitzstandes (2009) sowie 
über die Volksinitiative über die »Ausschaffung krimineller Ausländer« (2008). 
Mit der Abstimmung zu einer Volksinitiative, die eine Beschränkung der jährlichen 
Zuwanderung auf 0.2 % der Bevölkerung verlangt (»ECOPOP-Initiative«) und der 
Abstimmung über die Ausweitung der Personenfreizügigkeit auf Kroatien steht 
auch für die kommende Zeit eine Reihe von freizügigkeitsrelevanten Themen auf 
der politischen Agenda. 
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Medien wohl mehrheitlich als korrekt anzusehen und auch eine übermässige 
inhaltliche Einflussnahme lässt sich jedenfalls für die verbreitetsten Medien 
kaum konstatieren. Eine wohl gewichtigere Einflussfunktion kommt den Me-
dien als Plattform und Sprachrohr für politische Akteure zu, wobei in Migra-
tionsfragen zu beobachten ist, dass gerade auch radikaleren politischen Expo-
nenten ein beträchtlicher Platz eingeräumt wird, was durchaus einer der Fak-
toren für den Umstand sein könnte, dass Migrationsfragen in der Schweiz 
derzeit ziemlich erbittert diskutiert werden. Trotz einer gewissen Radikalisie-
rung der Debatte blieben die politischen Resultate – jedenfalls bis zur An-
nahme der »Volksinitiative zur Masseneinwanderung« – weitgehend einem 
gewissen Pragmatismus verpflichtet, wie er sich für einen mit dem Ausland 
in wirtschaftlicher und gesellschaftlicher Hinsicht eng verbunden Kleinstaat 
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The United Kingdom 
Citizenship within Directive 2004/38 EC – Stability of Residence 
for Union Citizens and their Family Members 
Question 1 
1. Arts 2 and 3 of Directive 2004/38 EC (hereinafter: CRD) define the cate-
gories of individuals who enjoy derived rights under EU law as ‘family 
members,’2 ‘other family members’,3 or non-married partners of Union citi-
zens.4 The three distinct categories apply without reference to the nationality 
of the individuals concerned and confer distinct levels of protection. Most 
significantly, Art 5 CRD affords Union citizens and their ‘family members’ a 
right to enter the territory of the host Member State on the production of cer-
tain valid documents. Arts 2, 3, and 5 of the CRD were transposed into UK 
law through Regs 7, 8, and 11 of the Immigration (European Economic Area) 
Regulations 2006 (hereinafter: EEA Regulations).5 The European Casework 
                                                        
1. Dr Thomas Horsley and Miss Stephanie Reynolds, School of Law and Social Jus-
tice, University of Liverpool. Report complied, November 2013. 
2. The Union citizen’s spouse or registered partner (where the host State treats regis-
tered partnerships as equivalent to marriage) and the direct descendants (under the 
age of 21 or dependent) and direct dependent relatives in the ascending line of the 
Union citizen and/or his or her spouse/civil partner (Art 2 CRD). 
3. Persons who, in the country from which they have come, are dependants or members 
of the household of the Union citizen and persons requiring the personal care of the 
Union citizens on serious medical grounds (Art 3 CRD). 
4. Directive 2004/38 EC of 29 April 2004 on the right of citizens of the Union and their 
family members to move and reside freely within the territory of the Member States 
[2004] OJ L 158/1. 
5. Immigration (European Economic Area) Regulations, SI 2006/1003. For detailed re-
view of the EEA Regulations, see e.g. H. Toner, ‘New Regulations implementing Di-
rective 2004/38,’ (2006) 25(4) Journal of Immigration, Asylum and Nationality Law 
331. For discussion of the interface between the CRD/EU citizenship rights and UK 
immigration law, see J. Shaw, N. Miller, M. Fletcher, ‘Getting to grips with EU citi-
zenship: Understanding the friction between UK immigration law and EU free 
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Instructions, issued by the UK Border Agency (UKBA), supplement the EEA 
Regulations by providing UK immigration caseworkers with guidance on 
CRD rights.6 The UK has adopted special transitional provisions to govern 
the entry and residence rights of Bulgarian and Romanian nationals and their 
family members.7 These arrangements apply until 1st January 2014. 
2. The EEA Regulations categorise ‘other family members’ and non-married 
partners as ‘extended family members.’ Unless otherwise stated, we shall 
adopt this label throughout this report to refer collectively to these two specif-
ic categories of derived rights holders. The EEA Regulations apply to ‘EEA 
nationals,’ defined as nationals of an EEA State who are not also British citi-
zens. Unless otherwise stated, reference to EEA nationals in this Report 
should be taken to include the situation of Member State nationals as Union 
citizens. 
3. Our findings indicate that UK courts and tribunals understand the key dis-
tinction established by the CRD between the rights of family members and 
extended family members of Union citizens.8 National courts and tribunals 
recognise that persons qualifying as family members (Art 2 CRD/Reg 7 EEA 
Regulations) enjoy automatically, by virtue of their status as a family member 
of a Union citizen and irrespective of their nationality, a right of entry into 
and residence within the UK as host Member State. UK courts understand 
that, by contrast, extended family members (Art 3 CRD/Reg 8 EEA Regula-
tions) benefit only from a more limited procedural right; specifically: a right 
to have the UK authorities consider fully their personal circumstances with a 
view to ‘facilitating’ their entry and residence.  
                                                        
movement law,’ (2013) Edinburgh Law School Citizenship Studies and J. Shaw and 
N. Miller, ‘When legal worlds collide: an exploration of what happens when EU free 
movement meets UK immigration law,’ (2013) 38(2) EL Rev. 137. 
6. http://www.ukba.homeoffice.gov.uk/sitecontent/documents/policyandlaw/ecis/ (all elec-
tronic links last accessed on 14/11/13). 
7. Accession (Immigration and Worker Authorisation) Regulations SI 2006/3317 (as 
amended). 
8. E.g. AP (India) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2007] UKAIT 48 
and Aladeselu v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2013] EWCA Civ 
144 at paras 8-16, 52 and 54. See here also the recent decision of the CJEU in Case 
C-83/11 Secretary of State v Rahman, Judgment of the Court (Grand Chamber) of 5 
September 2012 (nyr) at para. 21 – on preliminary reference from the Court of Ap-
peal.  
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4. The distinction between family members and extended family members 
proved decisive before the UK courts in B v Home Office.9 In that decision, 
the High Court concluded that the EU law doctrine of Member State liability 
for breaches of Union law (Francovich)10 only protected the substantive 
rights of entry and residence afforded to family members under Art 2 CRD 
and not the procedural rights conferred on extended family members by Art 3 
CRD.11  
Family members 
5. With particular respect to family members, the case law of UK courts and 
tribunals to date has been concerned primarily with the interpretation of the 
two dependent variables in Art 2 CRD/Reg 7 of the EEA Regulations: (1) the 
existence of legal marriages between Union citizens and (usually) Third 
Country Nationals (hereinafter: TCN) spouses; and (2) the criterion of de-
pendency.12 The first criterion has given rise to most of the case law on fami-
ly members. Legal disputes interpreting that first criterion tend to involve ju-
dicial review of determinations of ‘sham marriages’ made by UKBA offi-
cials.13 In particular, UK courts have criticised the UKBA’s failure, in specif-
ic instances, to recognise fully the automatic rights of entry and residence en-
joyed by TCN spouses of EU citizens under Union law.14 
6. The UK was one of several Member States that opted to impose an addi-
tional requirement of prior lawful residence (within the territory of the Union) 
for TCN family members when transposing the CRD into national law. The 
UK Government introduced this extra requirement in Reg 12(1)(b) of the 
EEA Regulations. In Metock, the Court of Justice held that EU law did not 
permit the application of such a test to determine the rights of entry and resi-
                                                        
9. B v Home Office [2012] EWHC 226 (QB). 
10. Joined Cases C-6/90 and C-9/90 Francovich and others v Italian Republic [1991] 
ECR I-5357. 
11. B v Home Office, cited supra note 8 at paras 105-119. 
12. On this point, see also Shaw et al, ‘Getting to grips with EU citizenship,’ cited supra 
note 4 at p. 21. 
13. E.g. ZH (Afghanistan) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2009] EWCA 
Civ 1060 and Adetola v First-Tier Tribunal (Immigration and Asylum Chamber) 
[2010] EWHC 3197 (Admin).  
14. ZH (Afghanistan), cited supra note 21 and Papajorgji [2012] UKUT 38 (IAC). 
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dence of TCN family members of Union citizens.15 The UK Government was 
extremely slow to respond to the Metock ruling. Reg 12(1)(b) of the EEA 
Regulations was not amended to reflect the substance of that decision until 
2011.16 On the other hand, UK courts reacted more swiftly and favorably to 
the Metock ruling. That decision was followed by the English Court of Ap-
peal in ZH (Afghanistan), prior to the amendment of the EEA Regulations.17 
During the same period, the Court of Appeal also expressed its clear frustra-
tion with the UK Government’s initial delayed response to Metock. In Owusu 
that Court strongly criticised the Secretary of State’s attempt to rely, post-
Metock, on Reg 12(1)(b) of the EEA Regulations in the knowledge that that 
provision was now ‘flagrantly unlawful.’18 
Extended family members  
7. UK courts and tribunals have addressed three specific points of interpreta-
tion as regards the rights of extended family members. First, national courts 
and tribunals have been requested to examine the requirement that extended 
family members previously resided with the Union citizens in an EEA State 
before entering the UK.19 That requirement for prior EEA residence is not 
provided for in the CRD, but was (again) imposed by the UK Government 
through transposition, in parallel with its approach to family members – dis-
cussed above.20 Secondly, national courts and tribunals have reviewed the re-
quirement, included in both the CRD and EEA Regulations, that extended 
family members ‘accompany or join’ the Union citizen in the host Member 
State.21 Finally, UK courts have again been required to interpret the depend-
ency criterion, which also applies to govern the derived rights of certain ex-
tended family members under both the CRD and EEA Regulations.22 
                                                        
15. Case C-127/08 Metock and Others v Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform 
[2008] ECR I-6241. 
16. Immigration (European Economic Area) (Amendment) Regulations, SI 2011/1247. 
17. ZH (Afghanistan) v Secretary of State, cited supra note 12.  
18. R.(on the application of Owusu) v Secretary of State [2009] EWHC 593 (Admin). 
19. E.g. KG (Sri Lanka) v Secretary of State [2008] EWCA Civ 13 and SM (Sri Lanka) 
v Secretary of State [2008] UKAIT 75 (AIT). 
20. See Reg 8(2)(a) EEA Regulations. 
21. E.g. Aladeselu v Secretary of State [2011] UKUT 253 (IAT) and Aladeselu v Secre-
tary of State, cited supra note 7. 
22. Ibid.  
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8. After some initial difficulty in places,23 UK courts and tribunals now ap-
pear to be making good progress on all three of the aforementioned key is-
sues. First, following the approach for family members discussed above, na-
tional courts have struck down as unlawful the prior EEA residence require-
ment for extended family members introduced by Reg 8 of the EEA Regula-
tions.24 Secondly, with respect to the requirement – permitted by the CRD – 
that extended family members ‘accompany or join’ the Union citizen in the 
United Kingdom, national courts have kept pace with developments in the 
case law of the CJEU. Recently, for instance, the Court of Appeal ruled that 
this specific requirement must be read in light of Metock.25 In other words, it 
took the view that the requirement in both the CRD and EEA Regulations 
that extended family members accompany or join Union citizens in the host 
State must be taken to include the situation of relations who entered the host 
State – whether legally or illegally – prior to the Union citizen. Finally, on 
dependency, UK courts are working towards a generous construction of that 
criterion. In Adaleslu the Court of Appeal recently ruled that, for extended 
family members, that requirement must be assessed at the time of applica-
tion.26 Further, it also concluded that the situation of dependency need not 
have arisen in the recipient’s country of origin.27 The Court of Appeal’s posi-
tion would appear to extend beyond the requirements outlined by the CJEU 
in Rahman. The Court of Justice had strongly suggested that the situation of 
dependency on the Union citizen in Art 3(2)(a) CRD must have arisen in the 
extended family member’s country of origin.28  
9. The primary procedural safeguard as regards the right of entry into the host 
State is contained in Art 5(4) CRD. That provision obliges Member States to 
afford Union citizens and their family members ‘every reasonable opportuni-
ty’ to obtain – or have brought to them within a reasonable period – the nec-
essary documentation required to support their right of entry into the host 
                                                        
23. See esp. KG (Sri Lanka) v Secretary of State, cited supra note 17 and SM (Sri Lanka) v 
Secretary of State [2008] UKAIT 75 (AIT). In both cases UK courts struggled to as-
sess correctly the derived rights of TCNs as extended family members. 
24. Bigia v Entry Clearance Officer [2009] EWCA Civ 79. In that case, the Secretary of 
State conceded that Art 3(2) CRD had been incorrectly transposed. The EEA Regula-
tions were subsequently amended in 2011 by the Immigration (European Economic 
Area) (Amendment) Regulations, SI 2011/1247. 
25. Aladeselu v Secretary of State, cited supra note 7 at paras 39 and 44. 
26. Ibid., at para. 48. 
27. Ibid. 
28. Case C-83/11 Rahman, cited supra note 7 at para. 33. 
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State. Alternatively, Member States must permit persons to corroborate or 
prove by other means that they are covered by the right of free movement and 
residence under Union law. The host Member State is expressly prohibited 
from refusing persons entry to the national territory before the aforemen-
tioned obligations have been discharged. The substance of Art 5(4) is trans-
posed into UK law in Reg 11(4) of the EEA Regulations.  
10. Reg 11(4) has been invoked to establish, for TCN family members of 
Union citizens, a right of entry into the UK. For instance, in CO (Nigeria) v 
Entry Clearance Officer, the Asylum and Immigration Tribunal held that the 
son of a Polish national resident in the UK could rely on Reg 11(4) in order to 
secure entry into the United Kingdom.29 Equally, in Owusu the Court held 
that a Ghanaian minor was entitled to join his Dutch mother resident in the 
UK on the basis of that same provision.30 The application of Reg 11(4) to es-
tablish rights of entry and residence for TCN family members is, however, 
severely limited in practice by the UK’s rules on entry clearance.31 The UK 
has introduced financial penalties for carriers bringing TCN family members 
to the United Kingdom who have not first obtained an ‘EEA family permit’ 
in accordance with Reg 12 of the EEA Regulations.32 Thus, in effect, TCN 
family members without an EEA permit will in all likelihood be denied 
boarding by carriers even though they would be able to secure entry upon ar-
rival pursuant to Reg 11(4).  
11. The requirement under the EEA Regulations that TCN family members 
obtain a UK-issued ‘EEA family permit’ prior to entering the UK conflicts 
with Art 5(2) CRD. That provision clearly directs Member States to exempt 
non-EEA family members from visa requirements otherwise applicable under 
national law where such persons hold a valid EU residence card issued by the 
authorities of another Member State in accordance with Art 10 CRD. The UK 
Government’s refusal to transpose this obligation is based on concerns about 
the abuse of rights, fraud and, moreover, the current absence of uniform, min-
imum standards governing the issue of CRD residence cards throughout the 
                                                        
29. CO (Nigeria) v Entry Clearance Officer [2007] UKAIT 74. 
30. R. (on the application of Owusu), cited supra note 17. 
31. See here also Shaw et al, ‘Getting to grips with EU citizenship,’ cited supra note 7 at 
p. 10. 
32. Art 1(2) of the Immigration and Asylum Act 1999 (Section 40) indicates that liability 
may be waivered if the person concerned is able to satisfy the conditions in Reg 11(4) 
EEA Regulations upon arrival. 
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Union.33 In 2011 the European Commission concluded that the UK had failed 
to transpose Art 5(2) CRD correctly.34 In November 2012, the High Court 
ruled that the UK’s refusal to recognise non-UK issued residence cards in ac-
cordance with Art 5(2) CRD was justified and proportionate.35 Nevertheless, 
in the final analysis, the Court opted to refer the matter to the Court of Justice 
on a preliminary reference.36 The CJEU is yet to adjudicate on the validity of 
the UK’s legal position.37 
Question 2 
12. There is clear evidence of targeted administrative efforts to deport EU 
citizens from the UK on grounds that are inherently linked to economic con-
siderations. By way of illustration, in April 2010 the UKBA introduced a pi-
lot scheme aimed at removing homeless EEA nationals from the United 
Kingdom.38 The scheme ran in parts of London as well as in several other cit-
ies in the South of England. The Homelessness Pilot project involved UKBA 
officials issuing written notices to EU citizens requiring them to attend a local 
police station for interview. The purpose of this hearing was to determine 
whether the EU citizen concerned had a right of residence in the UK under 
the CRD (e.g. by virtue of Arts 7 or 16 CRD). The Guardian reported in July 
2010 that, one month into the Homelessness Pilot project, more than 200 
people had been targeted under the pilot, with around 100 EU citizens served 
removal notices and 13 deported.39  
13. A recent report in Inside Housing indicates that the UKBA has revived its 
removal scheme.40 As of July 2013, it is reported that Metropolitan Police 
and UK Immigration officers have again targeted homeless EU citizens in 
London. Inside Housing reports that 63 Romanian nationals were questioned 
near Marble Arch, around 20 of who were subsequently deported by plane to 
                                                        
33. See here esp. R (on the application of McCarthy) v SSHD [2012] EWHC 3368 
(Admin) at paras 41-57. 
34. http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-12-417_en.htm. 
35. R (on the application of McCarthy) v SSHD, cited supra note 32 at para. 108. 
36. Ibid., at para. 112. 
37. As Case C-202/13. 
38. For discussion, see Shaw et al, ‘Getting to grips with EU citizenship,’ cited supra 
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Romania. An official statement by the Head of the Home Office Immigration 
Enforcement Team, confirmed that a number of ‘immigration offenders from 
Eastern Europe’ were targeted in the July action on the grounds that they did 
not enjoy a right of residence in the UK under Union law.41 
14. UK courts and tribunals are only very exceptionally confronted with the 
issue of removing EU citizens from the UK on grounds that are purely eco-
nomic.42 Most of the national case law on deportation addresses the existence 
of CRD residence rights or the interpretation of the concepts of public policy, 
public security, and public health protecting EU citizens from expulsion from 
the host State.43 On the issue of residence rights (point one), national courts 
frequently conclude that EU citizens and/or their family members do not en-
joy a right of residence under EU law for want of sufficient resources (Art 7 
CRD).44 However, that determination does not, of itself, lead in law or prac-
tice to the deportation of Member State nationals. The solution adopted by 
the UK courts is to treat EU citizens who do not enjoy a right of residence by 
virtue of e.g. Art 7 CRD as simply ‘present’ in the United Kingdom.45 That 
status does not confer any right of residence in the UK under either EU or na-
tional law. Such persons are deemed subject to UK immigration control and, 
therefore, liable to removal by the Secretary of State.46 The preceding discus-
sion of the UKBA’s schemes to remove EU citizen confirms that such fol-
low-on administrative action is now being taken – at least with respect to spe-
cific categories of non-economically active EU citizens. 
Question 3 
15. Arts 12 and 13 CRD provide for the retention of residence rights, under 
certain conditions, by family members of a Union citizen following the death 
or departure from the host Member State of that citizen, or after the termina-
                                                        
41. Ibid. 
42. See here Chief Adjudication Officer v Wolke (HL) [1997] 1 WLR 1640. 
43. See further Q6 below. 
44. E.g. Lekpo-Bozua v Hackney LBC [2010] EWCA Civ 909 and Mirga v Secretary of 
State for Work and Pensions [2012] EWCA Civ 1952. The sufficient resources test 
is transposed in Reg 4(4) EEA Regulations.  
45. Kaczmarek v Secretary of State for Work and Pensions [2008] EWCA Civ 1310. 
See here also Abdirahman v Secretary of State [2007] EWCA Civ 657. 
46. As per Maurice Kay LJ, Kaczmarek v Secretary of State, cited supra note 44 at para. 
5. See here also Lord Hoffmann in Chief Adjudication Officer v Wolke, cited supra 
note 41 at p. 1656. 
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tion of a marriage or registered partnership. These provisions have been 
transposed into UK law by Reg 10(2), (3), and (5) of the EEA Regulations. 
Art 14 CRD places conditions on both the individual and the host State in re-
lation to the retention of residence under Articles 6, 7, 12 and 13 CRD. These 
broadly relate to conditions of work or self-sufficiency.47 Art 14 is transposed 
to a greater extent by Regs 14, 13(3), 19(4), and (6)(2)(b)(iii) of the EEA 
Regulations. Art 15 CRD affords Union citizens and their family members a 
range of procedural safeguards; e.g. protection from expulsion upon the expi-
ry of identity documents and a right of appeal against expulsion decisions. 
These provisions are partly transposed by Regs 26, 27, 29, and 29A of the 
EEA Regulations. The Commission has identified specific problems with the 
UK’s transposition of the rights of appeal related to Art 15 CRD – discussed 
below.48 
16. Much of the national case law in relation to Arts 12 and 13 CRD has con-
cerned the economic status required of both the Union citizen and his/her 
(former) family members for residence rights to be retained, following death, 
departure or termination of marriage/registered partnership. In short, UK 
courts have largely held that, for family members to retain residence rights, 
the Union citizen, from whom rights are derived, must have been working, 
self-sufficient or self-employed up until the point of death, departure or di-
vorce.49 This requirement has been held to apply even in relation to Art 
13(2)(c) CRD under which spouses can retain a right of residence, without 
meeting requirements as to length of residence attached to other parts of the 
provision, in particularly difficult circumstances such as domestic violence.  
17. The economic status of the Union citizen, from whom rights were origi-
nally derived, is considered irrelevant after the date of death, departure, or di-
vorce.50 At this point, the focus shifts to the economic status of the (former) 
family member. UK courts have held that, from the date of death, departure, 
                                                        
47. The initial right of residence, residence for more than three months, and the retention 
of residence respectively.  
48. COM (2008) 840 at p. 9. These issues are yet to be addressed by the UK.  
49. Amos v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2011] EWCA Civ 552 and Ah-
med v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2013] UKUT 89 (IAC). C.f. Sam-
sam v The Secretary of State for the Home Department [2011] UKUT 165 (IAC).  
50. Amos, cited supra note 48. Reasoned by reference to the fact that such a requirement 
would be impossible under Art 12 CRD, which can relate to the death of the Union 
citizen, and the similarity of the wording of Art 13 CRD.  
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or divorce, family members must themselves become employed, self-
employed or self-sufficient in order to retain derived residence rights under 
Union law. This requirement is applied to both Union citizen family mem-
bers51 and TCN family members52 who retain rights under Arts 12 and 13 
CRD. However, in one Upper Tribunal decision, it was held that a TCN who 
had obtained a retained right of residence following divorce did not lose that 
right if he subsequently ceased to be employed or self-employed.53 Finally, 
national courts have held that a condition of employment, self-employment, 
or self-sufficiency on the part of the family member does not attach to Art 
12(3) CRD, which concerns the retention of residence due to a child’s enrol-
ment at an educational establishment in the host State.54  
18. In other developments, UK courts have confirmed that the rights con-
ferred on TCNs under Art 13 CRD apply only to the dissolution of marriag-
es/civil partnerships and not with respect to durable relationships.55 On the 
termination of marriages/civil partnerships, national courts have followed es-
tablished principles of EU law by confirming that legal, rather than factual 
termination is required for this provision to give rise to retained residence 
rights.56  
19. With respect to Art 15 CRD, we identified a problem with access to ap-
peal rights for family members in specific instances. The UK presently im-
poses a requirement that family members produce evidence that they are, in-
ter alia, indeed family members of an EEA national before they are granted a 
right to appeal.57 Ordinarily, this precondition is unproblematic, e.g. in cases 
where a family member is facing deportation on grounds of public policy, 
public security, and public health. However, in certain instances, an individu-
al may be subject to a deportation order following an administrative decision 
                                                        
51. Okafor v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2011] EWCA Civ 499 at 
para. 8. 
52. Amos, cited supra note 48, through a combined reading of both paragraphs of Art 
13(2) CRD.  
53. Samsam, cited supra note 48.  
54. Okafor, cited supra note 50 at para.8. 
55. CS (Brazil) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2009] EWCA Civ 480.  
56. Ahmed. Supra note 48, based on a combined reading of both paragraphs of Art 13(2) 
CRD.  
57. Reg 26(3) EEA Regulations. 
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finding that they are not family members for the purposes of the CRD.58 In 
such circumstances, the requirement to adduce proof of the appellant’s status 
as a family member is the very basis of the substantive appeal. The European 
Commission has highlighted this approach to appeal rights under the EEA 
Regulations as a matter of concern.59 
Question 4 
20. Arts 16-18 CRD outline the conditions for the acquisition of the right of 
permanent residence by Union citizens and their family members. The basic 
right is set out in Art 16 CRD and confers a right of permanent residence to 
Union citizens and their family members who have resided legally in the host 
State for a continuous period of five years. Arts 17 and 18 CRD address the 
acquisition of the right of permanent residence by Union citizens and/or their 
family members in specific circumstances, e.g. following the Union citizen’s 
retirement, or on the basis of residence rights retained under Arts 12 and 13 
CRD. The substance of Arts 16-18 CRD is transposed principally by Reg 15 
of the EEA Regulations. Arts 19-21 CRD require Member States to issue 
Union citizens and their family members entitled to permanent residence with 
certifying documents and impose conditions on the issue and renewal of such 
documents. Arts 19-21 CRD are transposed into UK law by Reg 18 of the 
EEA Regulations. 
21. The UK Home Office has published data on the issue and refusal of resi-
dence documentation to EU citizens (as ‘EEA nationals’) and their family 
members.60 See below table:  
                                                        
58. See e.g. The Queen on the Application of AH (Iraq) v Secretary of State for the Home 
Department, Asylum and Immigration Tribunal [2009] EWHC 1771 (Admin). 
59. COM(2008) 840 at p. 9. These issues are yet to be addressed by the UK.  
60. The Home Office considers the quality of these statistics to be ‘high’. For information 
on how those statistics are compiled and their quality controlled, see:  
 https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/immigration-statistics-january-to-
march-2013/immigration-statistics-january-to-march-2013#european-economic-
area-eea, in particular, at para.14.7 and https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/ 
system/uploads/attachment_data/file/200531/user-guide-immig-statistics.pdf. 
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– invalid application 
2006  8777 1775  16 
2007  7623 1455  4 
2008  4020 1038  8 
2009  11379 1726  7 
2010  20157 3748  0 
2011  21159 1999  5222 
2012  15197 2332  9568 
 
22. According to the Home Office, the generally rising number of applica-
tions made between 2007 and 2011 might reflect an increase in the number of 
eligible EU citizens who had been living in the UK in accordance with the 
CRD for the 5-year period required under Art 16 CRD.61 The statistics record 
a fall in decisions recognising permanent residence in 2012 – across most na-
tionalities. Yet, there was a notable rise in relation to Bulgarian and Romani-
an nationals in 2012, although the Home Office indicates that the ‘numbers 
remain low’.62 In the same year, there was also an increase in the numbers re-
fused recognition of permanent residence (2,332, up 17 %). Perhaps most no-
tably, since 2011 there has been a large increase in the number of ‘invalid’ 
applications. This likely follows from a change in Government policy in 
2011. Applications are now deemed invalid during a ‘pre-application’ sifting 
process in instances where key information and/or supporting documentation 
is missing/incomplete. Immediate re-application may follow rejected or inva-
lid applications. Re-applications are included in the above statistics.  
23. Following the most recent amendment to the EEA Regulations in 2013,63 
there is now a processing and consideration fee of £55 per person to apply for 
a document certifying permanent residence/a permanent residence card, pay-
able regardless of the outcome.  
24. The two principal issues in the national case law on Arts 16-21 CRD have 
addressed: 1) the definition of ‘legal’ residence for the purposes of acquiring 
                                                        
61. Ibid. 
62. Issues to Bulgarians: 13 in 2011, 1067 in 2012; Romanians: 24 in 2011; 1110 in 
2012.  
63. The Immigration (European Economic Area) Regulations, SI 2013/1391, s. 2. 
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a permanent right of residence; and 2) the impact of imprisonment on the ac-
crual of the years of residence necessary to attain a permanent right of resi-
dence.  
The definition of ‘legal’ residence 
25. UK courts consistently interpret the requirement for ‘legal’ residence in 
Art 16 CRD to mean residence in accordance with the CRD.64 Under the 
terms of the EEA Regulations, Union citizens must therefore be resident in 
the UK as ‘qualified persons’ i.e. as a worker, or self-employed/self-sufficient 
person in order for residence to be legal. TCN family members also have to 
reside in the UK with ‘qualified persons’. Residence that does not accord 
with the terms of the CRD, but which is lawful by virtue of UK nationality,65 
or because no steps have been taken by national authorities to remove an in-
dividual,66 will not constitute ‘legal’ residence for the purposes of Art 16 
CRD. Moreover, residence that is lawful under other provisions of Union 
law, rather than the CRD, whether secondary67 or primary law,68 will not 
meet the requirements of Art 16. The approach of national courts on this 
point is in line with the UK’s approach to the implementation of EU citizens’ 
rights beyond the scope of the CRD (see Part 2 of this Report). The EEA 
Regulations clearly stipulate that the rights of residence arising from the 
Court of Justice’s decisions in Chen, Teixeira and Ibrahim, and Ruiz Zam-
brano69 do not qualify as ‘legal’ for the purposes of acquiring a right to per-
manent residence under Art 16 CRD. 
                                                        
64. Reasoned by reading Art 16 CRD in combination with Recital 17, this interpretation 
reduces the potential for conflict between the CRD and Reg 15, which requires resi-
dence ‘in accordance with these regulations’.  
65. McCarthy [2008] EWCA Civ 641.  
66. Lepko-Bozua, cited supra note 43; Okafor, cited supra note 50. The UK courts con-
sider Union residents residing in the UK, but not meeting the requirements of the 
CRD to be ‘lawfully present’ yet without a ‘right to reside.’ See Q2, para. 14 above.  
67. E.g. Art 12 of Regulation 1612/68 EEC. See Okafor, cited supra note 50; Dias v Sec-
retary of State for the Home Department [2009] EWCA Civ 807; and MDB [2010] 
UKUT 161 (IAC). The national courts often refer to the Court of Justice’s decision in 
Case C-325/09 Dias [2011] ECR I-6387 in connection with this approach.  
68. On Arts 20/21 TFEU: Lepko-Bozua, cited supra note 43 and Abdirahman, cited su-
pra note 44.  Incidentally, Art 12(3) CRD also does not confer a right to permanent 
residence. 
69. See Q7. Case C-200/02 Zhu and Chen v Secretary of State for the Home Depart-
ment [2004] ECR I-9925; Case C-480/08 Teixeira v London Borough of Lambeth 
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26. At times, national courts have taken a strict approach to whether resi-
dence purported to be in accordance with the CRD in fact meets its require-
ments. For instance, a permanent residence claim based on five years’ self-
sufficient residence in the UK was rejected on the basis that the applicant’s 
sickness insurance complemented rather than replaced all services provided 
by the UK’s publicly-funded National Health Service. The applicant had not 
been truly self-sufficient and so her residence had not been ‘legal’ under the 
CRD for the purposes of enjoying a permanent right of residence.70 On the 
other hand, the national courts have recognised a number of situations as fall-
ing within Art 16 ‘legal’ residence, in accordance with decisions of the Court 
of Justice. Thus, residence occurring before the coming into effect of the 
CRD,71 but which would have been in accordance with its terms constitutes 
‘legal’ residence for the purposes of Art 16.72 It is also recognised that spous-
es who derive residence rights from a working or self-sufficient Union citizen 
do not have to live in the matrimonial home with that Union citizen in order 
for the residence to be ‘legal’ under Art 16.73  
Imprisonment and periods of ‘lawful’ residence under the CRD 
27. Until recently, national courts had consistently held that time spent in 
prison does not constitute ‘legal’ residence for the purposes of attaining a 
right to permanent residence under Art 16 CRD. To support this conclusion, 
UK courts had referred to: 1) the integrative objectives of the CRD and the 
                                                        
and Secretary of State for the Home Department [2010] ECR I-1107; Case C-
310/08 London Borough of Harrow v Nimco Hassan Ibrahim and the Secretary of 
State for the Home Department [2010] ECR I-1065; and Case C-34/09 Ruiz Zam-
brano v ONEM [2011] ECR I-1177. Reg 15A, EEA Regulations.  
70. FK (Kenya) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2010] EWCA Civ 1302. 
See, in particular, Sullivan LJ at para. 15. The UK’s refusal to view NHS provision as 
‘sufficient medical insurance’ in relation to Union citizens is currently the subject of 
infringement proceedings brought by the European Commission:  
 http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-12-417_en.htm. 
71. In other words, before 30th April 2006.  
72. E.g. LG and CC (Italy) [2009] UKAIT 24. This approach also applies to Art 17 
CRD, see RM (Zimbabwe) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2013] 
EWCA Civ 775, particularly the judgment of Lady Justice Gloster at para. 38, also 
following C-162/09 Secretary of State for Work and Pensions v Lassal [2010] ECR 
I-9217. 
73. PM (Turkey) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2011] UKUT 89 
(IAC). 
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belief that these cannot be met whilst in prison;74 2) the fact that ‘legal’ resi-
dence requires an individual to be a worker, self-sufficient, or self-employ-
ed75 and that Art 7 CRD does not include imprisonment when listing situa-
tions in which a person retains worker status;76 and 3) a Commission Com-
munication which stated that, as a rule, Member States are not obliged to take 
time spent in prison into account when calculating periods of legal residence 
in a host State.77 Nevertheless, the Upper Tribunal in Onuekwere78 recently 
referred the question of whether, and in what circumstances, a period of im-
prisonment may constitute legal residence, for the purposes of the acquisition 
of an Art 16 CRD right to permanent residence, to the Court of Justice.79 This 
preliminary reference is currently pending. 
28. National courts have also had to consider whether periods of imprison-
ment break the continuity of legal residence required in order to enjoy a per-
manent right of residence under Art 16 CRD. In other words, does an indi-
vidual have to begin accruing years of legal residence afresh, from zero, upon 
his/her release from prison? The national courts had previously answered this 
question in the affirmative: an individual cannot aggregate periods of legal 
residence before and after imprisonment to accumulate 5 years’ legal resi-
dence under Art 16 CRD.80 However, following the Court of Justice’s Tsa-
kouridis81 judgment, the Upper Tribunal recently considered it necessary to 
refer the matter to the Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling.82 What is al-
ready clear to national courts is that, once acquired, a right of permanent resi-
                                                        
74. HB [2008] EWCA Civ 806. See the judgment of Buxton LJ at para. 9.  
75. Jarusevicius v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2012] UKUT 120 
(IAC). 
76. C v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2010] EWCA Civ 1406, per Mau-
rice Kay LJ at para. 29. 
77. Ibid., at para. 25. COM (2009) 313 final, 2 July 2009. 
78. Onuekwere [2012] UKUT 269 (IAC). 
79. As Case C-378/12.  
80. LG and CC (Italy), cited supra note 71 and C v Secretary of State, cited supra note 
75 at para. 36. 
81. Case C-145/09 Tsakouridis [2010] ECR I-11979. 
82. Onuekwere, cited supra note 77. See also Jarusevicius, cited supra note 74, although 
a preliminary reference was considered unnecessary in that case, on the facts.  
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dence under the CRD cannot be lost even by significant periods of imprison-
ment.83  
Question 5 
29. Art 24(2) CRD makes provision for Member States to restrict the entitle-
ment of EU citizens to social assistance benefits. Under that provision, Mem-
ber States are not obliged to provide social assistance to EU citizens residing 
in accordance with the right of residence for up to three months (Art 6 CRD). 
Member States are also not obliged to grant social assistance to EU citizens 
enjoying a right of residence in the host State as ‘workseekers’ for the longer 
period of residence pursuant to Art 14(4)(b) CRD. With respect to mainte-
nance aid for studies, including vocational training, consisting in student 
grants or student loans, Art 24(2) CRD permits Member States to exclude the 
payment of such benefits to economically inactive EU citizens prior to their 
acquisition of the right of permanent residence. 
30. Art 24(2) CRD – together with the positive statement on equal treatment 
contained in Art 24(1) CRD – is not transposed by the EEA Regulations. The 
substance of that provision is instead given effect in UK law through a series 
of statutory amendments to existing UK legislation on social security/student 
maintenance. The legal framework governing social security, in particular, 
has been accurately described as ‘labyrinthine’ and subject to repeated 
amendment.84 The following paragraphs offer a summary of key UK provi-
sions and judicial decisions of relevance to this question. 
Social Assistance  
31. In the social assistance context, the Social Security (Persons from 
Abroad) Amendment Regulations 2006 (hereinafter: Social Security Regula-
tions) is the most comprehensive attempt to transpose the substance of Art 
24(2) CRD.85 That Regulation entered into force on the same date as the 
CRD (30th April 2006). As the Explanatory Note indicates, its amending pro-
                                                        
83. Secretary of State for the Home Department v FV (Italy) [2012] EWCA Civ 1199. 
The Court of Appeal held that loss of a permanent right of residence for this reason 
would be inconsistent with Tsakouridis, cited supra note 80. Case C-348/09 PI, 
Judgment of the Court (Grand Chamber) of 22 May 2012 (nyr) and Art 16(4) CRD.  
84. Maurice Kay LJ, Kaczmarek v Secretary of State, cited supra note 44 at para. 5. 
85. SI 2006/1026. 
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visions were made ‘in consequence of’ the enactment of the Citizens’ Di-
rective with the purpose of modifying the criterion for entitlement to specific 
social benefits ‘to take account of Article 24(2) CRD’.86  
32. Briefly summarised, the Social Security Regulations introduce a new eli-
gibility test for EEA nationals seeking to claim Income Support; Jobseeker’s 
Allowance; Housing Benefit; Council Tax Benefit; and State Pension Credit. 
That same test also now governs entitlement to other benefits, such as Em-
ployment and Support Allowance – regulated separately.87 In short, EEA na-
tionals are now required to establish a ‘right to reside’ under EU law in order 
to secure access to the aforementioned range of UK social assistance benefits. 
EU citizens must demonstrate that they enjoy a right of residence under Union 
law as a worker (or person retaining this status pursuant to Art 7(3) CRD); 
self-employed migrant; or EU citizen with permanent residence (Art 16 
CRD). The introduction of the right to reside test introduces an important dif-
ference in treatment between EEA nationals and UK (and Irish) citizens with 
respect to social assistance entitlement. For the latter category of persons, eli-
gibility continues to be determined exclusively by the ‘habitual residence’ 
test.88 That test was introduced into the UK legal framework on social securi-
ty benefits in 1994. Prior to the adoption of the EEA Regulations, the habitual 
residence test governed entitlement for both EEA nationals and UK citizens.  
33. The UK’s right to reside test has given rise to a considerable body of case 
law before national courts and tribunals. In summary, legal disputes address 
three distinct issues. First, EU citizens have sought to contest administrative 
decisions finding that they do not qualify as ‘EU workers’ or ‘persons retain-
ing EU worker status’ pursuant to Art 7(3) CRD89 and are, therefore, not enti-
tled to social assistance. Secondly, national courts and tribunals have been re-
quested to adjudicate on whether EU citizens failing the ‘right to reside’ test 
enjoy a right of residence in the UK under primary EU law (Art 21 TFEU). 
                                                        
86. Ibid., at p. 15. 
87. The Employment and Support Allowance Regulations, SI 2008/794, Reg 70. 
88. For an overview of the habitual residence test, see e.g. ‘The Habitual Residence 
Test – Commons Library Standard Note,’ 2011 SN/SP/416 available at:  
 http://www.parliament.uk/briefing-papers/SN00416.  
89. E.g. Secretary of State for Work and Pensions v Elmi [2008] EWCA Civ 1403; R. 
(on the application of Tilianu) v Secretary of State for Work and Pensions [2010] 
EWCA Civ 1397; and Jessy ST Prix v Secretary of State for Work and Pensions 
[2011] EWCA Civ 806.  
THOMAS HORSLEY & STEPHANIE REYNOLDS 
  856 
The existence of such a right is highly significant in the social assistance con-
text. It would make it possible for EU citizens who are unable to satisfy the 
right to reside test to assert a right to equal treatment with respect to social as-
sistance benefits on the basis of Art 18 TFEU.90 Thirdly, direct challenges 
have been made to the legality of the right to reside test itself. In several re-
cent cases, EU claimants have argued unsuccessfully that the right to reside 
test is discriminatory, contrary to both EU and UK law.91 As noted above, 
that test is applied only to EEA nationals whereas UK nationals are simply 
required to demonstrate that they are habitually resident in the United King-
dom.  
34. In 2013 the European Commission commenced infringement proceedings 
against the United Kingdom with respect to its introduction of the right to re-
side test to govern entitlement to social benefits falling within the scope of 
Regulation 883/2004.92 According to the Commission, the right to reside test 
is indirectly discriminatory and, further, cannot be justified under EU law. It 
maintains that entitlement to the applicable social security benefits should be 
determined, for both UK nationals and EU citizens, under the same habitual 
residence test (as was the case before 30th April 2006). The UK Government 
has made its position clear that it does not intend to alter the current legal 
framework, which it also considers lawful.93  
Student Maintenance 
35. Separate instruments regulate entitlement to student maintenance within 
the United Kingdom.94 This reflects that fact that competence to regulate stu-
                                                        
90. See e.g. Abdirahman v Secretary of State, cited supra note 44. 
91. E.g. Kaczmarek cited supra note 44 and Patmalniece (FC) v Secretary of State for 
Work and Pensions [2011] UKSC 11. 
92. See http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-13-475_en.htm. Regulation (EC) No 
883/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2004 on the 
coordination of social security systems [2004] OJ L 166/1.  
93. See e.g. http://www.theguardian.com/uk/2013/may/30/uk-government-eu-migrant-
benefits.  
94. For England, see: The Education (Student Support) Regulations, SI 2011/1986; for 
Scotland, see: The Education (Student Loans) (Scotland) Regulations, SI 2007/154; 
for Northern Ireland, see: The Education (Student Support) (No.2) Regulations 
(Northern Ireland), SI 2009/373; and for Wales, see: The Education (Student Sup-
port) (Wales) Regulations, SI 2012/3097. For a summary of the categories and condi-
tions of entitlement, see: http://www.ukcisa.org.uk/International-Students/Fees--
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dent support is devolved to the Northern Irish, Scottish, and Welsh admin-
istrations.  
36. The provisions on student maintenance applicable within England, Scot-
land, Northern Ireland, and Wales adopt a broadly common approach with 
respect to EU citizens. In line with Art 24(2) CRD, all four sets of rules re-
strict entitlement to student maintenance for EU citizens who do not qualify 
as workers, self-employed persons, or the family members of such persons. 
Non-economically active EU citizens must satisfy a minimum period of three 
years residence in order to access student maintenance and other grants.95 An 
additional criterion also applies where the period of qualifying residence was 
completed primarily for the purposes of receiving full-time education. In such 
instances, the applicant must demonstrate that he/she was ordinarily resident 
within the EEA immediately prior to the period of residence in the UK com-
pleted for the purposes of receiving full-time education.  
37. All four sets of rules on student maintenance expressly exclude British 
nationals who have not exercised their rights of intra-EU movement under the 
Treaty from relying on their status as Union citizens in order to establish enti-
tlement to equal treatment.96 This exclusion is particularly significant in light 
of the considerable differences in entitlements available across England, 
Scotland, and Wales.  
38. UK law recognises the specific position of EU citizens as job-seekers as 
regards entitlement to social benefits. On the one hand, job-seekers are ex-
pressly excluded from the categories of EEA nationals capable of establishing 




95. The Education (Student Support) Regulations, cited supra note 93, Schedule 1, Part 
2, S.10; the Education (Student Loans) (Scotland) Regulations, cited supra note 93, 
Schedule 1, S.8; The Education (Student Support) (No. 2) Regulations (Northern Ire-
land), cited supra note 93, Schedule 1, Part 2, S.10; and the Education (Student Sup-
port) (Wales) Regulations, cited supra note 93, Schedule 1, Part 2, S.10. 
96. The Education (Student Support) Regulations, cited supra note 93, Schedule 1, Part 
2, S. 10(1)(a); The Education (Student Loans) (Scotland) Regulations, cited supra 
note 93, Schedule 1 S.8(a); The Education (Student Support) (No. 2) Regulations 
(Northern Ireland), cited supra note 93, Schedule 1, Part 2, S.10(1)(a); and The Edu-
cation (Student Support) (Wales) Regulations, cited supra note 93, Schedule 1, Part 
2, S.10(1)(a). 
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a right to reside under the Social Security Regulations. This exclusion applies 
to the following key social benefits: Council Tax Benefit; Housing Benefit; 
Income Support; and Pension Credit. On the other hand, job-seekers are enti-
tled to claim Jobseeker’s Allowance – provided that they are able to satisfy 
the ‘habitual residence’ test in Art 85A of the Jobseeker’s Allowance Regula-
tions 1996. The habitual residence test applies to both EEA nationals and UK 
citizens. 
39. The inclusion of job-seekers as persons entitled to claim Jobseeker’s Al-
lowance (subject to the habitual residence test) follows the Court of Justice’s 
decision in Collins.97 In that case – on reference from the Court of Appeal – 
the CJEU concluded that Member State nationals are entitled, as workseek-
ers, to equal treatment with UK nationals as regards financial benefits intend-
ed to facilitate access to employment in that State. However, the Court also 
accepted that it was legitimate for Member States to restrict the payment of 
such benefits to EU national job-seekers who are able to demonstrate a ‘genu-
ine link’ to the employment market of that State.98 In that connection, the 
CJEU concluded that a residence requirement, such as the UK’s habitual res-
idence test, could function as an appropriate tool to ensure that such a con-
nection is established.99 On the strength of the CJEU’s decision, the Court of 
Appeal subsequently upheld the validity of the UK’s habitual residence test 
as justified in EU law.100  
40. EU citizens who are able to satisfy the habitual residence test and, there-
fore, secure UK Jobseeker’s Allowance may be passported subsequently to 
two additional categories of social assistance. Under the Social Security Reg-
ulations, recipients of Jobseeker’s Allowance qualify as persons with a ‘right 
to reside’ for the purposes of entitlement to Housing and Council Tax Bene-
fit.101  
                                                        
97. Case C-138/02 Collins v Secretary of State for Work and Pensions [2004] ECR I-
2703. See thereafter e.g. Joined Cases C-22/08 and C-23/08 Vatsouras and Kou-
patantze [2009] ECR I-4585. 
98. Case C-138/02 Collins, cited supra note 96 at para. 67. 
99. Ibid., at paras 69-72. 
100. Collins v Secretary of State for Work and Pensions [2006] EWCA Civ 376. 
101. See Reg 10(3)(b)(k) of The Housing Benefit Regulations, SI 2006/213 and Reg 
7(4A)(k) of The Council Tax Benefit Regulations, SI 2006/215. 
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41. Art 24(2) CRD has not displaced the Court of Justice’s ‘real link’ test be-
fore UK courts and tribunals in the social assistance context.102 National 
courts continue to fall back on the ‘real link’ criterion as the primary legal ba-
sis to support the exclusion of certain EU citizens from the categories of per-
sons entitled to claim UK social assistance benefits. The recent Supreme 
Court decision in Patmalniece upholding the validity of the UK’s right to re-
side test illustrates this point clearly.103 In Patmalniece, the Supreme Court 
also made an important connection between the real link test and Member 
State concerns about the phenomenon of ‘social tourism’.104 The purpose of 
the real link test, it was argued, was to protect the UK’s resources against so-
cial tourism on the basis of the principle that entitlement is based directly on 
the claimant’s degree of economic and social integration in the UK.105 We 
suggest that the fact Art 24(2) CRD is yet to take hold as a legislative alterna-
tive to the real link test may be linked to the UK Government’s decision not 
to transpose that provision directly in the EEA Regulations. 
Question 6 
42. Arts 27 and 28 CRD permit the Member States to restrict the freedom of 
movement and residence of Union citizens and their family members, regard-
less of their nationality, subject to various conditions. Relevant individuals 
can only be refused admittance, or deported, on grounds of public policy, 
public health, and public security. ‘Serious grounds of public policy or public 
security’ are required for those enjoying a permanent right of residence, while 
those who have resided in the host State for ten years can only be expelled on 
‘imperative grounds of public security’. The national courts have consistently 
applied this increasingly stringent hierarchy of protection based on duration 
of residence106 and refer to the different levels of protection described above 
using the shorthand of ‘level one’, ‘level two’, and ‘level three’ protection re-
                                                        
102. On the real link test, see e.g. Case C-224/98 D’Hoop [2002] ECR I-6191 at para. 38 
and Case C-138/02 Collins, cited supra note 93 at para. 67. 
103. Patmalniece (FC) v Secretary of State, cited supra note 90. See also earlier e.g. Kacz-
marek v Secretary of State, cited supra note 44. 
104. To support their conclusions, UK courts attach particular authority to the decision in 
Case C-456/02 Trojani [2004] ECR I-7573.  
105. As per Lord Hope, Patmalniece (FC), cited supra note 90 at para. 52.  
106. See e.g., NYK [2013] CSOH 84; A, B, C v Secretary of State for the Home Depart-
ment [2013] EWHC 1272 (Admin); and VP v Secretary of State for the Home De-
partment [2010] EWCA Civ 806. 
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spectively.107 This Report will adopt the shorthand distinction of level one to 
three protection developed by UK courts. 
43. Whatever the level of protection, restrictions on free movement are sub-
ject to the condition that the individual represents a genuine, present and suf-
ficiently serious threat to a fundamental interest of society, the principle of 
proportionality, and to factors such as, inter alia, the individual’s age, family 
and economic situation, social and cultural integration in the host State, and 
the extent of his/her links with the Member State of origin. Transposition into 
UK law is by way of Regs 19, 20(6) 21(2)-21(6) of the EEA Regulations.  
44. National case law relating to which level of protection applies has princi-
pally concerned how to calculate duration of residence. In differentiating be-
tween the levels of protection the national courts have frequently been tasked 
with determining the type of conduct that falls within each level.  
Application: calculating the duration of residence  
45. Deportation decisions usually follow a period of imprisonment. Appel-
lants against such decisions often argue that they enjoy a permanent right of 
residence and therefore level two protection. However, this will often depend 
on whether time spent in prison constitutes the ‘legal’ residence required for 
the attainment of a permanent right of residence and/or whether any legal res-
idence accrued before a custodial sentence is lost upon entering prison. Dis-
cussed in Q4 above, this issue is currently the subject of a reference to the 
Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling108 and will not be discussed further 
here. The national courts have held that residence must also be ‘legal’ for 
level three protection to apply although there is no reference to this in Art 
28(3) CRD/Reg 21(4) EEA Regulations.109  
46. Reg 21(4)(a) of the EEA Regulations bestows level three protection upon 
those who have resided in the UK for ten years prior to the deportation order. 
                                                        
107. LG (Italy) v The Secretary of State for the Home Department [2008] EWCA Civ 
190. 
108. Onuekwere, cited supra note 77. 
109. HR (Portugal) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2009] EWCA Civ 
371, applied in LG and CC, cited supra note 71. See also Chindamo Appeal No. 
1A/13107/2006. C.f. MG and VC (EEA Regulations 2006 ‘conducive’ deportation) 
Ireland [2006] UKAIT 53.  
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The national courts have interpreted this as requiring them to count back-
wards from the date of deportation order, as opposed to forwards from the 
commencement of legal residence as one would with level two protection.110 
This is significant because, if level three protection requires ‘legal’ residence, 
and periods of imprisonment do not constitute such residence, a person who 
has lived in the UK for decades will never enjoy level three protection if a 
deportation order is made after a custodial sentence.111 However, in MG,112 
the Upper Tribunal considered that both the methodology of counting back-
wards from the deportation order and the rule that Art 28(3) CRD required 
ten years legal residence to be open to question in light of the purposes of the 
Directive and the recent decisions of the Court of Justice in Tsakouridis and 
PI.113 Consequently, a reference was made to the Court of Justice for a pre-
liminary ruling for clarification.114 Shortly after MG, however, the Court of 
Appeal decided FV,115 in which it held that, following Tsakouridis and PI, the 
test in relation to the acquisition of level three protection should involve a 
qualitative assessment of the level of integration of the individual, under 
which time spent in prison was only a factor.116 The key question, it conclud-
ed, was whether ‘integrating links’ forged with the UK had been broken. The 
Court of Appeal also considered that the loss of protection acquired after ten 
years’ legal residence caused by counting backwards from a deportation order 
would be inconsistent with the Court of justice’s approach to the facts of 
PI.117  
47. At the administrative level, a lack of consistency as to whether a person 
will be considered to have resided in the UK for past ten years, despite a pe-
                                                        
110. LG and CC, cited supra note 71. 
111. Although Art 28(3) CRD implies a similar approach by referring to the ‘previous’ ten 
years, the issue is all the more acute under the EEA Regulations, which requires ten 
years’ continuous residence prior to the deportation order.  
112. Secretary of State for the Home Department v MG (Portugal) [2012] UKUT 268 
(IAC). 
113. Cited supra note 82. Also by reference to Recitals 23 and 24 of the CRD and the 
Common Position (EC) No 6/2004, adopted by Council on 5 December 2003. See al-
so LG and CC, cited, supra note 71. 
114. As Case C-400/12. See also Jarusevicius, cited supra note 74, Onuekwere, cited su-
pra note 72 and Q4 concerning the impact on this in relation to level two protection.  
115. FV (Italy), cited supra note 82, decided 14th September 2012.  
116. Ibid., at paras 82 and 85.  
117. Ibid., at paras 81 and 84. In PI, cited supra note 82, there had been two years’ custo-
dy immediately before the deportation decision ‘and nothing was made of that.’  
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riod of imprisonment prior to the deportation order, has led to a ‘luck of the 
draw’ application of level three protection.118 
Application: the principle of proportionality; the consideration of factors 
such as how long the individual concerned has resided in the territory, 
his/her age, state of health, family and economic situation, social and 
cultural integration into the host Member State, and the extent of his/her links 
with the country of origin.  
48. In practice, the principle of proportionality contained in Art 27(2) 
CRD/Reg 21(5)(a) of the EEA Regulations overlaps with the condition that 
an individual represents a genuine, present, and sufficiently serious threat to a 
fundamental interest of society119 and the requirement to consider factors 
such as, inter alia, the individual’s age, family and economic situation, or 
links with his/her Member State of origin.120 In numerous cases, national 
courts have emphasised the need for a present threat to a fundamental interest 
of society and warned against using previous convictions or offender assess-
ment reports made at the time of the offence to inform a deportation deci-
sion.121 However, in several cases, previous convictions have been combined 
with evidence of an individual’s continued unwillingness to reform or to 
abide by the criminal law; a willingness to mislead judges;122 escalating lev-
els of violence;123 and even financial circumstances, to determine a present 
threat on the facts.124  
49. The risk of re-offending is often central to the question of whether the ap-
pellant poses a present threat and to whether deportation is proportionate. 
Following Tsakouridis, this risk is increasingly assessed by reference to the 
potential impact of deportation on the rehabilitation and social integration of 
the EU citizen/family member concerned. The ‘European dimension’ to this 
                                                        
118. Bulale [2008] EWCA Civ 806 and VP, cited supra note 105. 
119. Reg 21(5)(c) EEA Regulations/Art 27(2) CRD. 
120. Reg 21(6) EEA Regulations/Art 28(1) CRD. See, for instance, BF (Portugal) v Sec-
retary of State for the Home Department [2009] EWCA Civ 923. 
121. A, B, C, cited supra note 105 and BF (Portugal), cited supra note 119. Up-to-date 
offender assessment reports have conversely been used to find that a decision of the 
Secretary of State to deport has been disproportionate. See Flaneur’s Application for 
Judicial Review, Re [2011] NICA 72.  
122. Jarusevicius, cited supra note 74. 
123. Batista v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2010] EWCA Civ 896. 
124. Flaneur’s, cited supra note 120. 
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question is acknowledged. Thus, the Court of Appeal has stated that ‘com-
mon sense would suggest a degree of shared interest between the EEA coun-
tries in helping progress towards a better form of life’.125 This encompasses 
comparing the prospects for rehabilitation in the UK against those in the 
Member State of origin.126 Such comparisons necessitate the consideration of 
the factors contained in Art 28 CRD. Accordingly, national courts consistent-
ly take into account factors such as the applicant’s social, familial, and cultur-
al links in the UK and compare them with, for instance, the individual’s 
knowledge of the language of his/her Member State of origin, and the availa-
bility (or not) of familial and financial support in that State, when deciding 
whether deportation is permissible.127 However, there are some examples of a 
potentially tokenistic consideration of these questions resulting from a possi-
ble tendency by the national courts to overlook personal circumstances or use 
a one size fits all approach in relation to personal wealth.128  
Differentiation: Determining the type of conduct which falls within each level 
50. UK courts have recognised that, as derogations to the rights of free 
movement, grounds of public policy, public security, and public health must 
be interpreted strictly.129 While national courts have seen merit in using ad-
ministrative guidance to categorise the type of conduct that would justify de-
portation under levels one, two and three,130 they have explicitly stated that 
administrative operational manuals do not provide formal, legal categories.131 
They have also openly questioned whether administrative guidance adequate-
ly distinguishes between different levels of protection, especially in light of 
                                                        
125. Ibid., per Carnwath LJ. See also NYK, cited supra note 105.  
126. Accordingly, a proportionality assessment under the CRD should not be conflated 
with a proportionality assessment under Art 8 ECHR, which only concerns private 
and family life and is therefore narrower than under the CRD. See R. (on the applica-
tion of Essa) v Upper Tribunal (Immigration and Asylum Chamber) [2012] EWCA 
Civ 1718.  
127. See for instance A, B, C, NYK, cited supra note 105 and Essa, cited supra note 125.  
128. Essa [2012] EWHC 1533 (Admin). In that case, the High Court considered the avail-
ability of ‘quick and cheap travel to The Netherlands.’ See also NYK, cited supra note 
105. 
129. See Essa, cited supra note 127.  
130. LG (Italy), cited supra note 71. The AIT also considered a questionnaire, sent by the 
Secretary of State to other Member States, which asked how ‘imperative grounds’ 
were defined in those states.  
131. LG (Italy), cited supra note 106. 
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the case law of the Court of Justice. As a result, differentiation based on ‘se-
verity’ of the conduct or custodial sentence length alone has been rejected.132  
51. The courts have held that conduct falling within level one presupposes 
and encompasses the existence of a genuine and sufficiently serious threat to 
the requirements of public policy affecting one of the fundamental interests of 
society.133 Examples of crimes justifying deportation at level one include cul-
pable homicide,134 the use of forged or stolen passports,135 and conspiracy to 
handle stolen goods.136 Although activity does not have to be criminal, it will 
rarely be permissible to refuse to admit, or deport, an individual in relation to 
activity that is not even unlawful under UK law.137 
52. Concrete examples of offences that have been held to constitute ‘serious’ 
grounds of public policy and public security (level 2 protection) include seri-
ous domestic burglaries,138 conspiracy to handle stolen goods,139 and violent 
crime not only against society, but also against the person. In the absence of 
Union-level guidance, the Court of Appeal considers that the Member States 
have a certain amount of discretion in deciding what level of violence its law-
abiding citizens must put up with under level two, with due regard to the seri-
ousness of the conduct under domestic law.140 In Batista,141 a ‘medium risk 
                                                        
132. FV, cited supra note 82, per Lord Carnwath in consideration of Tsakouridis and PI, 
cited supra note 82. See also LG (Italy), cited supra note 106. 
133. LG (Italy), cited supra note 71 and LG (Italy), cited supra note 106.  
134. NYK, cited supra note 105. 
135. R v Clarke (Thomas) [2008] EWCA Crim 3023. 
136. Jarusevicius, cited supra note 74. 
137. GW (Netherlands) [2009] UKAIT 50, concerning the expression of views that Islam 
should not be tolerated or followed.  
138. R. v Laurusevicius (Vytautas) [2008] EWCA Crim 3020. 
139. While not giving rise to ‘imperative grounds of public security’, conspiracy to handle 
stolen goods must constitute ‘serious grounds’ if committed on a particularly large 
scale. Jarusevicius, cited supra note 74. 
140. B (Netherlands) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2008] EWCA Civ 
806, reasoned with reference to an examination of the travaux préparatoires to the 
CRD and applying Case 41/74 Van Duyn v Home Office [1974] ECR 1337. See also 
Batista, cited supra note 122. 
141. Cited supra note 122.  
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of serious harm to the public’, amongst other things, was sufficient to estab-
lish level two grounds.142 
53. Administrative guidance provides the following examples of conduct fall-
ing within ‘imperative grounds’ (level 3 protection): murder, terrorism, drug 
trafficking, serious immigration offences, or serious sexual or violent offenc-
es carrying a maximum penalty of ten years or more imprisonment.143 The 
national courts have generally adopted a restrictive approach to the definition 
of imperative grounds, holding that, even if the threshold includes crimes 
other than terrorism, the threat must be ‘so compelling that it justifies the ex-
ceptional course of removing someone who ... has become ‘integrated’ by 
‘many years residence in the host State’.’144 The risk of the future commis-
sion of even serious offences will not be enough.145 Accordingly, the differ-
ence between levels two and three cannot be merely a matter of degree, but 
must entail a qualitative difference.146 The Court of Appeal, in FV,147 has re-
cently interpreted the Court of Justice’s decisions in Tsakouridis and PI as 
meaning that any deportation decision must consider, inter alia, the excep-
tional seriousness of the threat; the serious negative consequences deportation 
might have on the rehabilitation of genuinely integrated Union citizens and 
therefore whether the measure is strictly necessary or the objective can be 
met through less strict means. ‘Imperative grounds’ presuppose not just a 
threat to public security, but also one of a particular high degree of serious-
ness to the calm and physical security of the population.148 Accordingly, the 
appellant’s conviction for manslaughter did not constitute ‘imperative 
grounds of public security’. A distinction was drawn here between the risk of 
homicide to the public at random and potential for violence towards a specific 
person.  
                                                        
142. The conflated consideration of ‘serious grounds’ and a ‘sufficiently serious threat to a 
fundamental interest of society’ in this case risks blurring level one and two in light of 
the decision in LG that level one ‘presupposes a sufficiently serious risk to a funda-
mental interest of society’.  
143. http://www.ukba.homeoffice.gov.uk/sitecontent/documents/policyandlaw/modern 
ised/criminality-and-detention/34-eea-offender-cases?view=Binary.  
144. LG (Italy), cited supra note 106, quoting the Preamble to the CRD. See also, VP, cit-
ed supra note 105.  
145. MG and VC [2006] UKAIT 53. 
146. LG (Italy), cited supra note 106. 
147. FV (Italy), cited supra note 71. 
148. Ibid., at para. 132. 
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EU citizenship beyond Directive 2004/38 EC – exploring national 
application of primary EU law 
Question 7 
54. The Court of Justice’s case law grounded directly on the Treaty provi-
sions on Union citizenship has bolstered further the rights of EU citizens, par-
ticularly as regards the right of residence for their dependent TCN family 
members. In Chen, on reference from the UK, the CJEU established a right of 
residence for primary carers of minor EU citizens resident in a Member State 
of which they are not a national – subject to self-sufficiency and a require-
ment for medical insurance.149 In Ruiz Zambrano the Court of Justice devel-
oped its case law on Union citizenship rights further by concluding that Art 
20 TFEU precluded national measures that had the effect of depriving Union 
citizens of the ‘genuine enjoyment’ of the rights conferred on them by the 
Treaty as citizens of the Union. On the facts of that case, this conferred a 
right to reside and work on the TCN parents of dependent minor EU citizens, 
residing in their home Member State, who would have to leave the territory 
of the Union if such rights were not bestowed upon their parents.150 
55. The UK Government has implemented CJEU’s jurisprudence on primary 
law citizenship rights though a series of statutory amendments. The Immigra-
tion (EEA) (Amendment) Regulations 2012 amends the EEA Regulations to 
give effect to the Court of Justice’s decision in Chen.151 That instrument 
amends Regs 11 and 15A of the EEA Regulations accordingly by providing 
rights of entry and residence for ‘the primary carer of an EEA, who is (a) un-
der the age of 18 and (b) residing in the United Kingdom as a self-sufficient 
person, where the denial of such a right would prevent the EEA national child 
from exercising his or her own right of residence’.152 A second instrument, 
                                                        
149. Case C-200/02 Chen, cited supra note 68. 
150. Case C-34/09 Ruiz Zambrano, cited supra note 68. 
151. SI 2012/1547. 
152. Ibid., explanatory notes. The UKBA Immigration Rules have also recently been 
amended in light of the Chen ruling. In July 2013, Paragraph 257 C, regulating ‘re-
quirements for leave to enter or remain as the primary carer or relative of an EEA na-
tional self-sufficient child’, was deleted. See http://www.ukba.homeoffice.gov.uk/ 
sitecontent/documents/policyandlaw/statementsofchanges/2013/hc1039.pdf? 
view=Binary at paras 86-88. 
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the Immigration (EEA) (Amendment) (No 2) Regulations 2012 gives effect 
to the Ruiz Zambrano judgment.153 It amends the EEA Regulations by con-
ferring rights of entry and residence on the ‘primary carer of a British citizen 
who is residing in the United Kingdom and where the denial of such a right 
of residence would prevent the British citizen from being able to reside in the 
United Kingdom or in an EEA State’.154 Significantly, where a Union citizen 
minor has two primary carers, the amended EEA Regulations state that both 
primary carers must be required to leave the UK before a derivative right can 
be enjoyed by P.155 As the wording of the amended EEA Regulations makes 
clear, the UK has opted for a narrow transposition of the Ruiz Zambrano de-
cision, closely orientated around the particular facts at issue in that deci-
sion.156 Broadly, this is in line with the terms of the CJEU’s subsequent clari-
fications in e.g. McCarthy, Dereci and Iida.157 
56. Significant consequential changes have also been made to UK legislation 
on social security entitlement in light of CJEU’s case law on primary law citi-
zenship rights. Perhaps most notably, the UK legal framework has been 
amended to exclude entitlement to a range of UK social assistance benefits 
for persons resident in the UK under the terms of the Ruiz Zambrano rul-
ing.158 Additionally, the amended EEA Regulations make it clear that indi-
                                                        
153. SI 2012/2560. 
154. Ibid., explanatory notes.  
155. Reg 15A(7A) EEA Regulations. The amended Regulations apply only to children. 
This makes explicit what is implicit in the judgments of the Court of Justice, that Union 
citizen adults, not usually requiring care, will not be considered compelled to leave 
the Union territory if their spouse is deported to a third country and so will not trigger 
Ruiz Zambrano protection. See also F & ANR [2013] EWCA Civ 76 for national ju-
dicial consideration of this point.  
156. In stark contrast, commentators continue to reflect, more dynamically, on what other 
factual situations might deprive a Union citizen of the genuine enjoyment of the 
rights associated with his/her Union citizenship. See e.g. D. Kochenov and R. 
Plender, ‘EU Citizenship: From an Incipient Form to an Incipient Substance?’ (2012) 
37 EL Rev. 369; N. Nic Shuibhne ‘(Some of) the Kids Are All Right: Comment on 
McCarthy and Dereci’ (2012) 49 CML Rev. 349, 364-366; S. Reynolds, ‘Exploring 
the ‘Intrinsic Connection’ between Free Movement and the genuine Enjoyment Test: 
Reflections on EU Citizenship after Iida’ (2013) 38 EL Rev, p. 376.  
157. Case C-434/09 McCarthy [2011] ECR I-3375; Case C-256/11 Dereci and Others v 
Bundesministerium für Inneres [2011] ECR I-11315; and Case C-40/11 Iida v Stadt 
Ulm, Judgment of the Court (Third Chamber) of 8 November 2012 (nyr). 
158. Social Security (Habitual Residence) (Amendment) Regulations, SI 2012/2587, 
amending, inter alia, Income Support (General) Regulations 1987; Jobseeker’s Al-
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viduals residing in the UK on the basis of derived residence rights conferred 
by primary EU law cannot acquire permanent residence under Art 16 CRD. 
This introduces an important additional restriction on EU citizenship rights in 
the UK context. Such individuals can also be deported more easily.159 
57. There is a growing body of case law addressing EU citizenship rights be-
yond the CRD framework. A review of the jurisprudence indicates that, over-
all, UK courts and tribunals are responding appropriately to the evolving case 
law of the Court of Justice in this area. For instance, the reasoning of national 
courts and tribunals indicates that they are capable of distinguishing clearly 
between the rights acquired under the CRD and those under Arts 20 and/or 21 
TFEU. UK courts have demonstrated that they are able to progress logically 
through the co-authored framework of citizenship rights guaranteed in Union 
law – assessing, in sequence, the rights contained with the CRD; the subse-
quent case law of the ECJ extending the scope of EU legislative provi-
sions;160 and the jurisprudence on Union citizenship rights under primary EU 
law.161 
58. First, with respect to the Chen ruling, UK courts and tribunals were quick 
to recognise that that decision establishes, in primary EU law, a derived right 
of residence for TCN family members in their capacity as primary carers of 
dependent minor EU citizens.162 Much of the subsequent UK case law on 
Chen addresses the interpretation of the conditions attached to the existence 
of the derived residence right under primary EU law established in that deci-
sion: self-sufficiency and the requirement for comprehensive medical insur-
ance. On this matter, UK courts have upheld the requirement to satisfy both 
                                                        
lowance Regulations 1996; State Pension Credit Regulations 2002; and The Em-
ployment and Support Allowance Regulations 2008. See here also R. (on the applica-
tion of Sanneh) v Secretary of State for Work and Pensions [2013] EWHC 793 (Ad-
min). 
159. Reg 21A, EEA Regulations.  
160. Case C-480/08 Teixera, cited supra note 68 and Case C-310/08 Ibrahim, cited supra 
note 68. 
161. Okafor, cited supra note 50. 
162. E.g. M-T v T [2005] EWHC 79 (Fam); W (China) v Secretary of State for the Home 
Department [2006] EWCA Civ 1494; and Bassey v Secretary of State for the Home 
Department [2011] NICA 67. 
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conditions in order to establish the derived right of residence under Chen.163 
Additionally, in W (China), the Court also concluded that Art 20 TFEU did 
not establish a right to work in the host Member State for TCN family mem-
bers; in other words, that provision did not enable such persons to create suf-
ficient resources for the family unit as required in Chen.164 The House of 
Lords rejected a request for permission to appeal this assessment, noting that 
there was ‘no scope of reasonable doubt’ on this issue.165 
59. In relation to Ruiz Zambrano, it is worth noting in the first instance, that 
cases involving very similar facts have been resolved with no reference to 
Ruiz Zambrano or the genuine enjoyment test. For example, in ZH166 Lady 
Hale found that the validity of a decision to deport the TCN parent of a Brit-
ish child, who may take that child with him/her, was to be determined by ref-
erence to the best interests of the child and in accordance with the UK’s obli-
gations under the United Nation’s Convention on the rights of the child.  
60. Nevertheless, UK courts have engaged with Ruiz Zambrano in several 
key cases.167 In summary, national courts have adopted a restrictive approach 
to that judgment, relying frequently on the Court of Justice’s subsequent de-
cision in Dereci.168 The Ruiz Zambrano ruling is now understood as being 
‘exceptional’ in character, and is not considered to cover anything short of the 
situation in which an EU citizen is forced to leave the territory of the 
Union.169 The courts have made clear that, while strong emotional and psy-
chological ties within the family would be significantly likely to rupture in 
instances of separation, diminishing the enjoyment of life in the UK, this 
would not, on its own, trigger the Ruiz Zambrano principle. Only when quali-
ty of life is so diminished that an individual is effectively compelled to leave 
Union territory would Ruiz Zambrano apply. Consequently, the High Court 
has explicitly stated that ‘where a non-EU ascendant relative is compelled to 
leave EU territory, the Art 20 [TFEU] rights of an EU child will not be in-
                                                        
163. W (China) v Secretary of State cited supra note 161; Liu v Secretary of State for the 
Home Department [2007] EWCA Civ 1275, and Z v Secretary of State for the Home 
Department [2013] CSIH 16. 
164. W (China), cited supra note 161. See also Bassey, cited supra note 161. 
165. Ibid. 
166. ZH (Tanzania) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2011] UKSC 4. 
167. Harrison v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2012] EWCA Civ 1736; 
Ahmed, cited supra note 48; and Sanneh, cited supra note 157.  
168. Case C-256/11 Dereci, cited supra note 156. 
169. Elias LJ in Harrison, cited supra note 166. See also Sanneh, cited supra note 157. 
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fringed if there is another ascendant relative who has the right of residence in 
the EU, and who can and will in practice care for the child.’170 The courts 
have, however, taken a fact-sensitive approach to the application of this rule, 
noting, for instance, in MDB that Union citizen children could not be cared 
for by their abusive Italian national father if their Argentine mother were de-
ported.171  
61. New factual constellations that push the boundaries of Ruiz Zambrano 
have chiefly concerned what other rights – aside from the right of residence 
and the right to work – must be respected in order to ensure that a Union citi-
zen is not compelled to leave the Union territory. In this connection, the in-
tervention of the Home Secretary in Pryce v Southwark LBC172 suggests that 
the question of a Ruiz Zambrano-based right to social welfare has arisen fre-
quently at the administrative level. In that case, it was held that an individual 
would have a right to certain social benefits once a residence right has been 
established pursuant to Ruiz Zambrano. Yet, due to a significant concession 
made by the defendant local council in that case, Pryce does not establish 
whether recourse to and denial of social assistance will itself give rise to a 
Ruiz Zambrano right of residence. The Court of Appeal considered this to be 
fact-sensitive.  
62. The argument that denial of social welfare to a TCN parent effectively 
compels Union citizen children to leave the Union territory is currently before 
the national courts in Sanneh.173 Now on appeal to the Court of Appeal, the 
Upper Tribunal rejected Sanneh’s case because she had been ‘surviving’ in 
the UK since 2006 and was continuing to do so in 2011. As a result, she was 
not compelled to leave the Union territory. Similarly, Sanneh’s application to 
the High Court for the interim payment of social welfare while her substan-
                                                        
170. Sanneh [2013] ECHW 793 at para. 20. See also Harrison, cited supra note 166. 
There is a contrary approach by the national courts to the same issue in relation to 
Chen-based residence rights. See Bassey, cited supra note 161. The national courts 
have voiced some concern that the focus on the provision of primary care can result 
in the removal of children from homes, where they are happy and settled, in order to 
live with a TCN parent who seeks to establish a Ruiz Zambrano right to residence. 
See here R (on the application of Bent) v Secretary of State for the Home Department 
[2012] EWHC 4036 (Admin).  
171. MDB (Italy) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2012] EWCA Civ 1015. 
See also Ahmed, cited supra note 48. 
172. Pryce v Southwark LBC [2012] EWCA Civ 1572.  
173. Sanne,h cited supra note 157. 
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tive case proceeded through the court system was rejected on the basis that 
Sanneh had ‘survived’ in the UK to date and that Sanneh herself had accepted 
that she would never, in practice, leave the UK due to economic pressure as 
she was ‘absolutely determined’ to stay in the UK as her case progressed. The 
High Court in Sanneh rejected the argument that paragraph 44 of Ruiz Zam-
brano174 means that it must be assumed, irrebuttably and as a matter of law, 
that a person such as Sanneh must be accorded both the right to residence and 
to access a particular level of funds by way of earnings or benefits.175  
63. National courts have also been charged with determining whether Ruiz 
Zambrano applies to non-British Union citizens living in the UK. While this 
is clearly not anticipated in the 2012 amendments to the EEA Regulations, 
the Upper Tribunal held in Ahmed that ‘nothing said by the Court of Justice 
in any of the Art 20 TFEU cases excludes the potential application of Ruiz 
Zambrano principles to third country national parents if the practical effect of 
a refusal decision is that the children are obligated to leave the territory of the 
Union as a whole, notwithstanding that the children are not, as in Ruiz Zam-
brano, citizens of the host Member State’.176 The application of Ruiz Zam-
brano to non-British Union citizen children arguably undercuts the conditions 
attached to the derived rights of residence for TCN primary carers established 
in Chen, rendering it unnecessary to meet the requirements for sufficient re-
sources and conferring a right to work on relevant individuals. However, the 
emerging UK case law on this potential extension to the scope of the Ruiz 
Zambrano ruling is far from clear. For instance, in JYZ, the Court of Session 
held that Irish citizen children would not be compelled to leave the territory 
of the Union if their TCN parents were not afforded the right to work in the 
UK as the family could move to Ireland where Ruiz Zambrano would ap-
ply.177 
64. Decisions of the UK courts and tribunals make occasional reference to the 
existence of a ‘purely internal situation’ or, to the same effect, the absence on 
                                                        
174. ‘... if a work permit were not granted to such a person, he would risk not having suffi-
cient resources to provide for himself and his family, which would result in the chil-
dren, citizens of the Union, having to leave the territory of the Union’.  
175. At para. 100.  
176. Ahmed, cited supra note 48 at para.68. See also MDB (Italy), cited supra note 170. 
177. JZY (China) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2013] CSIH 16. See also 
Pryce v Southwark LBC, cited supra note 171. On this point at Union level, see Case 
C-86/12 Alopka, Judgment of the Court (Second Chamber) of 10 October 2013 (nyr). 
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the facts of a relevant ‘connecting factor’ to EU law.178 UK courts and tribu-
nals apply these linguistic markers simply to acknowledge that the legal dis-
pute in issue does not fall within the scope of the Court’s existing case law on 
Union citizenship rights beyond the CRD. For example, in Bent, the Court 
concluded that there was ‘no EU law connection’ on the basis of the finding 
that the claimant could not be reasonably regarded as the primary carer of a 
minor EU citizen.179 
65. There is particularly interesting discussion of the internal rule in Harri-
son. In that decision Elias LJ accepted that free movement can generally be 
breached by activity that impedes, rather than totally deprives an individual 
of that right. Elias LJ took the view that a stricter test was necessary in rela-
tion to the genuine enjoyment test in Ruiz Zambrano ‘precisely because it 
does not require the exercise of free movement’.180 Thus, whilst the Court of 
Justice still insists that there is an ‘intrinsic connection’ between free move-
ment and the genuine enjoyment test,181 the UK Court of Appeal, in this case 
at least, seems to have accepted that, in some instances, the purely internal 
rule, as a synonym for a cross-border requirement, no longer applies. Indeed, 
the Court of Appeal considered that Ruiz Zambrano had removed the condi-
tion of ‘even an exiguous cross-border link’, previously required by Chen. 
Question 8 
66. The British Nationality Act 1981 (as amended) sets out the principal rules 
on the acquisition and loss of British citizenship.182 That instrument defines 
various categories of British nationality in an effort to rationalise and narrow 
entitlement to key citizenship rights (chiefly: the right of abode in the UK).183 
At the same time, the 1981 Act also seeks to recognise both the historic and 
                                                        
178. E.g. R. (on the application of H) v Secretary of State for the Home Department 
[2008] EWCA Civ 245; R. (on the application of Bent) v Secretary of State for the 
Home Department [2012] EWHC 4036 (Admin); and McCarthy, cited supra note 
64 at para. 21  
179. R. (on the application of Bent), cited supra note 177. See also R (on the application 
of H) cited supra note 177. 
180. Harrison, cited supra note 166 at para. 65. 
181. See Case C-40/11 Iida, cited supra note 156. 
182. British Nationality Act 1981. 
183. For analysis, see the EUDO Citizenship Country Report on the United Kingdom: 
http://eudocitizenship.eu/admin/?p=file&appl=countryProfiles&f=United%20King
dom.pdf. 
THE UNITED KINGDOM 
 873 
continuing links that many overseas nationals have with the United Kingdom. 
The declaration of the UK Government on the definition of ‘nationals’, an-
nexed to the EU Treaties, defines the categories of person considered to be 
nationals of the United Kingdom for the purposes of EU law.184 The EUDO 
Citizenship Observatory provides a detailed overview of the rules governing 
the acquisition and loss of British citizenship.185  
67. The 1981 Act makes no special provision for EEA nationals. It has also 
not been amended in light of Court of Justice’s decision in Rottmann.186 
However, the UK legal framework on nationality acquisition/loss is arguably 
relatively open to the unique features of Union citizens. First and foremost, 
UK law does not preclude British citizens from holding dual or multiple na-
tionalities – in contrast to certain other Member States. EEA nationals who 
acquire British citizenship are, therefore, not, as matter of UK law, required 
to surrender the nationality of their home Member State, as was the case un-
der both German and Austrian law in Rottmann. The decision to renounce 
British citizenship is, from a UK legal perspective, entirely at the discretion 
of the citizen concerned. S.12 of the 1981 Act provides that a British citizen 
may renounce their citizenship by declaration on the condition that they will 
become a citizen of another country within 6 months.187 Further, it is also 
open to British citizens to reinstate British citizenship by registration if that 
status was renounced in order to acquire the citizenship of another (Member) 
State.188 Yet, resumption under s.13 of the 1981 Act is permitted only 
once.189 This limitation might potentially, over the course of a lifetime, im-
pact on the migration choices of EU citizens (including British citizens) who 
hold, have held, or wish to acquire British citizenship. 
                                                        
184. [1983] OJ C 23/1, as revised at Lisbon by Declaration No.63. On this point, see also 
Case C-192/99 Queen v Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex parte: Kaur 
[2001] ECR I-1237. 
185. See, respectively: http://eudo-citizenship.eu/databases/modes-of-acquisition?p= 
&application=modesAcquisition&search=1&modeby=country&country=United+K
ingdom and http://eudo-citizenship.eu/databases/modes-of-loss?p=&application 
=modesLoss&search=1&modeby=country&country=United+Kingdom.  
186. Case C-135/08 Rottmann v Freistaat Bayern [2010] ECR I-1449. 
187. To protect against statelessness, that provision states that British citizenship will be 
reinstated automatically should the applicant fail to acquire citizenship of another 
country within the prescribed time period. 
188. S.13. 
189. S.13(2).  
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68. Non-British EU citizens over the age of 18 and of full capacity may ac-
quire the status of ‘British citizen’ through naturalization.190 The general rules 
in the 1981 Act apply: requiring persons to satisfy a minimum residence peri-
od of 5 years (with requirements related to absences etc); to demonstrate 
good character; sufficient knowledge of English, Welsh, or Scots Gaelic as 
well as of life in the United Kingdom.191 Applicants must also declare an in-
tention to reside in the UK as their principal home.  
69. S.40 of the British Nationality Act 1981 permits the Secretary of State to 
deprive persons of their status as British citizens. First, the Secretary of State 
may issue an order to this effect where he/she are satisfied that to do so is 
‘conducive to the public good.’ An order may not be issued in circumstance 
where the individual would be left stateless.192 Secondly, s.40(4) of the 1981 
Act permits the Secretary of State to deprive a person of British citizenship 
by order where that status was acquired – through registration or naturaliza-
tion – by fraud; false representation; or concealment of material facts. In all 
cases under s.40, the Secretary of State is required to give reasons for the dep-
rivation order. The individual concerned is also afforded certain rights of ap-
peal. The Rottmann judgment suggests that, subject to the demands of the 
proportionality principle, s.40 of the 1981 Act may be compatible with the 
requirement of EU law. In that decision, the Grand Chamber noted expressly 
that EU law did not, in principle, preclude a Member State from depriving its 
nationals of its citizenship where this had been obtained by fraud or decep-
tion.193 With respect to s. 40(2) – deprivation ‘conducive to the public good’ 
– the UK rules on the loss of citizenship may also be defensible. In Rottmann, 
the CJEU pointed clearly to the possibility of justifying revocation decisions 
for reasons ‘relating to the public interest,’ within which it is arguably possi-
ble to subsume the substance of s.40(2) of the UK Act.194 
70. The Rottmann decision remains particularly relevant in the UK context in 
connection with decisions to revoke British citizenship from persons who 
hold the nationality of a non-Member State. In such instances, the revocation 
of British citizenship under the 1981 Act necessarily deprives such individu-
als of the status of Union citizenship. Thus far, the UK courts appear reluctant 
                                                        
190. S.6 of the 1981 Act. 
191. See Schedule 1. 
192. S.40(4). 
193. Case C-135/08 Rottmann, cited supra note 185 at para. 59. 
194. Ibid., at para. 51. 
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to engage with Rottmann in that context. In G1 v Secretary of State, the ap-
pellant had argued that, following Rottmann, the decision to revoke his Brit-
ish citizenship under s. 40(2) of the 1981 Act triggered the application of EU 
law.195 Interpreting the Grand Chamber’s decision in Rottmann, it was argued 
that loss of British citizenship necessarily entailed the loss of the appellant’s 
status as a Union citizen.196 For that reason, the decision to deprive him of his 
British citizenship fell within the scope of EU law, meaning that national law 
must ‘have due regard to EU law.’ The Court of Appeal rejected this argu-
ment outright. It took the view that there was ‘no cross-border element what-
soever’ to the case.197 On the facts, the appellant was a British citizen who 
had not exercised his Treaty free movement rights. On one view, this was a 
key distinction with Rottmann. However, by adopting this position, the Court 
arguably failed to engage with another, broader reading of that decision; 
namely, that Member State authorities are obliged post-Rottmann to have re-
gard to EU law in connection with the deprivation of national citizenship per 
se because this would also lead to the loss of Union citizenship. On that pos-
sible interpretation, the Court of Appeal was clear. If the CJEU had intended 
in Rottmann to establish such an approach, then this raised serious concerns 
about the jurisdiction of the Court of Justice in the area of Member State na-
tionality law.198 
Political Rights of EU Citizens 
Question 9 
71. Directive 93/109 EC grants Union citizens the right to vote and stand as a 
candidate in elections to the European Parliament as residents of a Member 
State of which they are not nationals. The UK implemented that instrument in 
1994 within 15 days of the transposition deadline through the European Par-
liamentary Elections (Changes to the Franchise and Qualification of Repre-
sentatives) Regulations.199 The 1994 Regulations amended para.5 of Sched-
                                                        
195. G1 v Secretary of State [2012] EWCA Civ 867. 
196. Ibid., at para. 30. 
197. As per Laws LJ, G1 v Secretary of State, cited supra note 194 at para. 41. 
198. Ibid., at para. 43. 
199. SI 1994/342. For an overview of the political rights of EU citizens within the UK, see 
the EUDO Citizenship Report on Access to Electoral Rights available at: http://eudo-
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ule 1 of the European Parliament Elections Act 1978 to provide Union citi-
zens who are not British citizens, but resident in the UK with the right to 
stand as a candidate in elections to the European Parliament.200 Reg 7 of the 
1994 Regulations extended the franchise to vote in European Parliamentary 
elections to the same category of persons. The Commission’s 1998 Report on 
the application of Directive 93/109 EC identified no specific concerns with 
the UK’s implementation of that instrument.201 
72. The legal framework governing EU citizens’ right to vote and stand for 
election in European Parliamentary elections has been subject to several 
amendments. The 1978 Act has been replaced by the European Parliamentary 
Elections Act 2002 (hereinafter: the 2002 Act). Section 8(5) of the 2002 Act 
currently regulates the electoral franchise. The relevant rules to which that 
section refers are set out in revised Regulations.202 The 2002 Act also re-
pealed the provisions of the 1994 Regulations governing the right of resident 
non-national EU citizens to stand as candidates in European Parliamentary 
elections. The current rules are set out in the European Parliamentary Regula-
tions 2004.203 The UK legislative provisions fully implement Directive 
93/109 EC.  
73. With respect to the right to vote, the UK has not opted to implement Art 
9(3)(a)-(c) of Directive 93/109 EC. Under that provision Member States may 
require EU citizens to declare that they have not been deprived of the right to 
vote in their home Member State; to produce a valid ID document; and/or to 
indicate the date from which they have been resident in the host Member 
                                                        
citizenship.eu/admin/?p=file&appl=countryProfiles&f=1310-UK-FRACIT.pdf. See 
also e.g. J. Shaw, ‘Citizenship and Electoral Rights in the Multi-Level ‘Euro Polity’ – 
The Case of the United Kingdom,’ in H. Lindahl (Ed.), A Right to Inclusion and Ex-
clusion: Normative Fault Lines of the EU’s Area of Freedom, Security and Justice 
(Oxford: Hart, 2009). 
200. The special position of Irish nationals is discussed further below (para. 73). 
201. Report from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council on the ap-
plication of Directive 93/109/EC – Voting rights of EU citizens living in a Member 
State of which they are not nationals in European Parliament elections [1998] COM 
(97) 731 Final. 
202. The European Parliamentary Elections (Franchise of Relevant Citizens of the Union) 
Regulations, SI 2001/1184, as amended by The European Parliamentary Elections 
(Franchise of Relevant Citizens of the Union) (Amendment) Regulations, SI 
2009/726. 
203. SI 2004/293. 
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State. However, the UK has invoked the derogation in Art 14(2) of Directive 
93/109 EC to exempt Irish nationals from the registration regime established 
in that instrument. Under Reg. 1(2) of the 2011 Regulations, Irish nationals, 
as well as Commonwealth citizens (here: citizens of the UK, Malta, or Cy-
prus) are excluded from the definition of ‘relevant citizen of the Union’ to 
which the Regulations apply. This special provision for Irish and certain 
Commonwealth citizens reflects the particular constitutional relationship be-
tween the UK and citizens of these Member States.204 Finally, as for voter 
registration, the UK has not opted to require Union citizens to provide a valid 
ID document to support their application to stand as candidates in elections to 
the European Parliament. Art 10(3) of the Directive permits this restriction.  
74. The UK Government has already prepared a draft statutory instrument to 
implement the changes required by Directive 2013/1 EU.205 The draft Euro-
pean Parliamentary Elections (Amendment) Regulations 2013 abolishes the 
requirement for Union citizens wishing to stand as election candidate to ob-
tain an attestation from their home Member State certifying that they have not 
been deprived of their right to stand as a candidate in that Member State or 
that no disqualification is known to them. The 2013 draft Regulations replac-
es the attestation requirement, which was identified as a barrier to the exer-
cise of Union citizens’ rights,206 with an obligation on candidates to declare 
that they have not been deprived of their right to stand in their home Member 
State. The host Member State is then required to check the validity of this 
declaration in cooperation with the designated authority in candidate’s home 
Member State. 
75. The issue of prisoners’ voting rights takes centre stage in the UK case law 
on European Parliamentary elections.207 This important line of case law is 
considered in Q12 below. Aside from the issue of prisoners’ voting rights, 
there is relatively little judicial activity on the topic of EU citizens’ right of 
participation in elections to the European Parliament. The case law on Euro-
pean Parliamentary elections in the national context has focussed on exten-
sions to the franchise. In Matthews, the European Court of Human Rights 
held that the UK had violated Article 3 of the Protocol 1 of the ECHR by ex-
                                                        
204. See here e.g. Shaw, cited supra note 198 at pp. 246-247. 
205. The European Parliamentary Elections (Amendment) Regulations, SI 2013/2876. 
206. Directive 2013/1 EU, preamble 4. 
207. See McGeoch v Lord President of the Council [2011] CSIH 67 and, recently, 
McGeoch v Lord President of the Council [2013] UKSC 63. 
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cluding Gibraltarians from voting in European Parliamentary elections.208 
The UK Government amended its election rules to give effect to the Court’s 
judgment. The European Court of Justice subsequently confirmed the validity 
under EU law of the amended UK provisions in the context of an Art 258 
TFEU infringement procedure initiated by the Spanish Government.209 
Question 10 
76. The UK was one of the first four Member States to transpose fully Di-
rective 94/80 EC, which lays down arrangements for the exercise of the right 
to vote and stand as a candidate in municipal elections for citizens of the 
Union residing in a Member State of which they are not a national. Transpo-
sition was in the form of a statutory instrument, namely the Local Govern-
ment Elections (Changes to the Franchise and Qualification of Members) 
Regulations 1995.210 This amended, inter alia, the Representation of the Peo-
ple Act 1983, allowing a person to vote at local government elections if he is, 
on the day of the poll, a relevant citizen of the Union. S.1(c) of the Elected 
Authorities (Northern Ireland) Act 1989 introduces the changes for local elec-
tions in Northern Ireland. ‘Citizen of the Union’ is defined by reference to 
Art 20 TFEU, whilst ‘relevant Union citizen’ refers to Union citizens who are 
not citizens of the Commonwealth or the Republic of Ireland.211 Various 
pieces of primary legislation divided according to region allow ‘relevant 
Union citizens’ to stand as candidates in local government elections: the Lo-
cal Government Act 1972, s.79; The Local Government (Scotland) Act 1973 
s.29; The Local Government Act (Northern Ireland) 1972 s.3; and the Greater 
London Authority Act 1999 s.20. The terms ‘citizen of the Union’ and ‘rele-
vant Union citizen’ are defined as they are above.212 
                                                        
208. Matthews v United Kingdom, No 24833/94 (1999). 
209. Case C-14/05 Spain v United Kingdom (Gibraltar) [2006] ECR I-7917. 
210. SI 1995/1948. 
211. S.202(1) Representation of the People Act 1983; s.10(1) Elected Authorities (North-
ern Ireland) Act 1989; and s.4(1) City of London (Various Powers) Act 1957. Com-
monwealth citizens and citizens of the Republic of Ireland have more extensive vot-
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212. E.g. s.79(2)A Local Government Act 1972; s.29(2) Local Government (Scotland) Act 
1973; and s.3(2) Local Government Act (Northern Ireland) 1972. Commonwealth 
and Republic of Ireland citizens may also stand under these provisions.  
THE UNITED KINGDOM 
 879 
77. Directive 94/80 EC permits derogations from the general rule that Union 
citizens should be able to vote in local elections in the host Member State 
where the proportion of non-national Union citizens of voting age in that 
Member State exceeds 20 % of the total number of Union citizens residing 
there.213 This does not apply to the UK and has not been used by the UK.214 
Under Art 12(3), a Member State may also derogate from Arts 6-11 of the 
Directive, which relate to the exercise of the right to vote and stand as a can-
didate in municipal elections, in respect of non-national Union citizens who 
have a right to vote in national parliamentary elections and are thus entered 
on the national roll under exactly the same conditions as national voters. Al-
though Irish, Maltese and Cypriot citizens can vote in UK parliamentary elec-
tions, the UK has not availed itself of this derogation. The UK has a separate 
register of ‘local government electors’.  
78. In order to be able to vote in elections in the UK, individuals must register 
to vote, whether they are British nationals or not. There are number of condi-
tions for eligibility that apply equally to British citizens and eligible voters of 
other nationalities. Similarly, the UK imposes no additional requirements on 
EU citizens when compared with UK nationals in relation to standing as a 
candidate in local government elections. The Directive permits Member 
States to restrict some posts related to the executive of local government to its 
own nationals. Yet, the UK has not opted to impose any such restrictions. 
Accordingly, in the UK, a non-national EU citizen can be the head, deputy or 
member of the executive of basic government units.215  
79. The only UK case law relevant to the discussion of the voting rights un-
der Directive 94/80 EC is discussed in Q12 below. This concerns attempts to 
invoke EU law in order to contest the UK’s prohibition on prisoner voting. 
80. According to the European Commission’s 2012 report on the application 
of Directive 94/80/EC, awareness of the right to vote for EU citizens living in 
the UK had risen from 32 % in November 2007 to 72 % in March 2010. Fur-
ther, the UK has adopted target measures to inform EU citizens of their elec-
toral rights in municipal elections by activating a dedicated helpline. Overall 
turnout in local elections is nevertheless low. In London’s most recent munic-
ipal elections, at the time of the report, turnout was just 45.30 % while in Sal-
                                                        
213. Art 12(1) Directive 94/80 EC. 
214. For more detail on this derogation see COM (2012) 99 final at p. 12. 
215. Ibid., at p. 11.  
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ford, it was 29.35 %.216 Turnout, nationally, in the May 2013 local elections 
was 31 %. National research has found that registration rates are lower 
amongst eligible non-UK nationals: while 84 % of UK nationals are regis-
tered to vote, only 56 % of Union citizens resident in the UK have regis-
tered.217 For the May 2013 elections, the Electoral Commission developed 
new media advertisements using the online platform www.itsyourvote.org to 
encourage interaction and as an opportunity to target under-registered 
groups.218 Used as a ‘test run’, the Electoral Commission is looking to use 
this campaign in relation to the European Parliamentary elections in 2014.  
Question 11 
81. The right to vote has been extended to (certain) Union citizens beyond the 
franchise for Union citizens in local and European Parliament elections re-
quired by Directives 94/109 EC and 94/80 EC in the following areas: 
– National parliamentary elections 
– Elections in relation to devolved bodies 
– Police commissioner elections  
National parliamentary elections  
82. Under S.1 of the Representation of the People Act 1983, citizens of the 
Commonwealth and of the Republic of Ireland can vote in national parlia-
mentary elections. As a result citizens of Cyprus, Malta, and the Republic of 
Ireland are eligible to vote in all elections within the UK. This is because 
Commonwealth citizens and citizens of Ireland are not viewed as ‘foreign’ in 
UK law.219  
                                                        
216. COM (2012) 99 final.  
217. The Electoral Commission: Great Britain’s electoral registers 2011 (December 
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Elections to devolved administrations  
83. Under s. 11(1)(b) of the Scotland Act 1998, those who are registered to 
vote in the register of local government electors are entitled to vote in Scot-
tish Parliamentary elections. As Union citizens are permitted to vote in local 
government elections, they appear on this register. Union citizens are there-
fore also able to vote in Scottish parliamentary elections. Under Article 16(2) 
of the same Act, a citizen of the European Union resident in the United King-
dom is not disqualified from being a member of the Scottish Parliament be-
cause he was born outside the United Kingdom. The same rules apply in rela-
tion to The Welsh Assembly, by virtue of s. 12(1)(b) and 17(2) of the Gov-
ernment of Wales Act 2006.  
84. The right of Union citizens to vote in elections to the Scottish and Welsh 
administrations is, therefore, based on their inclusion on local government 
registers, rather than as a result of an explicit provision that makes specific 
reference to a right of the European citizen to vote in elections to devolved 
bodies. Nevertheless, this ‘loophole’ is openly acknowledged. The general 
information website for voting in the UK ‘www.aboutmyvote.co.uk’ states 
that Union citizens can vote in such elections.220 Furthermore, Union citizens 
were able to vote in the referendums concerning the establishment of the 
Scottish Parliament and Welsh Assembly in the first place. In relation to the 
forthcoming referendum on Scottish Independence, s. 2 of the Scottish Inde-
pendence Referendum (Franchise) Act 2013 states that, ‘a person is entitled 
to vote in an independence referendum if, on the date on which the poll at the 
referendum is held, the person is ... a relevant citizen of the European Union.’  
85. Union citizens in Northern Ireland were permitted to vote in the last elec-
tion to the Northern Irish Assembly but were not permitted to vote in the ref-
erendum on the voting system.221 S. 36(7) of the Northern Ireland Act 1998 
clearly states that: A person is not disqualified for membership of the Assem-
bly ... by reason only ... that he is born out[side] of the Kingdom if he is a citi-
zen of the European Union.  
86. Although electors for elections for devolved bodies are drawn from local 
government elections, national courts do not appear to consider the devolved 
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administrations in Scotland, Wales, and Northern Ireland as ‘basic local gov-
ernment units’ under Directive 94/80 EC. As a result, the right to vote in such 
elections is interpreted as extending the franchise for Union citizens beyond 
the requirements of the Directive rather than as implementing it. This is clear 
from the approach of the Supreme Court in McGeoch.222 In that case, the 
Court noted expressly that elections to the Scottish Parliament did not consti-
tute ‘municipal elections’ within the meaning of Directive 94/80 EC. In its 
view, municipal elections referred specifically to ‘local government elections 
at a lower level of government, closer to people and with a more direct re-
sponsibility for service delivery’.223 
87. In relation to the London Assembly, s.17 of the Greater London Authority 
Act 1999 makes reference to Schedule 3 of the same Act which amends the 
Representation of the People Act 1983, treating elections to the London As-
sembly as local government elections. Under s.20 of the 1999 Act, in order to 
be Mayor or a member of the London Assembly, one must be, inter alia, a 
‘relevant citizen of the Union’.  
Police commissioners 
88. In November 2012, local police authorities were replaced with democrati-
cally elected ‘Police and Crime Commissioners’ in an attempt to make the 
police more accountable. It is unclear whether this role falls under the de-
scription of a ‘basic local government unit’ defined in Art 2 of Direc-
tive/94/80 EC.224 If it did, a Police and Crime Commissioner could reasona-
bly be interpreted as the elected head of the basic local government unit. 
Member States are permitted to restrict such posts to their own nationals. 
Nevertheless, under s.52(1)(a) of the Police Reform and Social Responsibility 
Act 2011, a person is entitled to vote in the elections for the Police and Crime 
Commissioner for their area if they are registered to vote as an elector at a lo-
cal or government election. Accordingly, this includes Union citizens. The 
right of Union citizens to stand for election results from a combined reading 
of s. 66(1) and s. 68 of the 2011 Act. 
                                                        
222. McGeoch, cited supra note 206. 
223. Ibid., at para. 45. 
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Question 12 
89. Two specific areas of tension have recently come to light in the UK case 
law concerning the relationship between EU law and national provisions lim-
iting the scope of the franchise. First, the Court of Appeal was requested to 
rule on whether the UK provision on ‘overseas electors’ constitutes an obsta-
cle to intra-EU movement. Secondly, as referenced in Q9 and Q10, there is a 
recent line of national case law considering the compatibility with EU law of 
the current UK prohibition on prisoners’ voting.  
The UK’s ‘15-year rule’ on overseas voting as an obstacle to intra-EU 
movement 
90. The validity of the UK rules on overseas voting arose in Preston.225 In 
that case the applicant, a British citizen resident and engaged in economic ac-
tivity in Spain since 1992, sought judicial review of the UK’s so-called ‘15-
year rule’ on overseas voting. Under s.1 of the Representation of the People 
Act 1983, non-resident British citizens retain the right to vote in national 
elections as overseas electors for a period of 15 years.226 The applicant main-
tained that this limitation constituted an obstacle to intra-EU movement in 
that it was liable to deter economic actors and EU citizens from exercising 
their free movement rights guaranteed in Union law.  
91. The Court of Appeal accepted that, in principle, the loss of the right to 
vote under the 15-year rule could be qualified as a ‘disadvantage.’227 How-
ever, it held that not every disadvantage constitutes an obstacle to the exercise 
of the rights of intra-EU movement.228 On its view, it was necessary to adopt 
a ‘long term view’ when determining the potential deterrent effect of national 
measures on EU free movement rights.229 Further, the Court asserted that 
electoral rights were ‘qualitatively and quantitatively different’ from social 
benefits.230 National measures limiting the latter category of entitlements 
                                                        
225. R. (on the application of Preston) v Wandsworth LBC [2012] EWCA Civ 1378. 
226. The 15-year period is calculated from the date of an individual’s last entry on the 
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227. As per Mummery LJ in Preston, cited supra note 224 at para. 79. 
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worth LBC [2011] EWHC 3174 (Admin) at para. 38.  
229. As per Mummery LJ in Preston, cited supra note 224 at para. 79. 
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were considered capable of constituting direct and immediate barriers to the 
exercise of free movement rights. By contrast, and with respect to the rela-
tionship between the 15-year rule and the exercise of the Treaty free move-
ment rights, the Court concluded that: 
‘No legal test, whether formulated in terms of ‘probability’, or ‘likelihood’, or ‘capability’, 
or ‘liability’, or ‘real possibility’, addresses the basic difficulty that what is asserted in the 
claimant’s case is too speculative, remote and indefinite to establish a case.’231  
92. The Court of Appeal also held that, even if evidence could be adduced to 
indicate a deterrent effect, the 15-year rule could be justified in EU law. Ac-
cording to the Court, that rule served a legitimate and proportionate objective 
of testing the strength of British citizens’ link with the United Kingdom to 
ensure that only those maintaining close links remain eligible to vote.232 In 
the Court of Appeal’s view, the justification ground alone was sufficient to 
reject the appellant’s request for a preliminary reference to the Court of Jus-
tice.  
Prisoners’ voting rights and EU law 
93. EU law has been recently invoked to challenge the legality of the UK’s 
blanket ban on prisoners’ voting rights.233 Successful attempts have already 
been made to challenge the legality of that prohibition under Art 3 of the 1st 
Protocol of the ECHR.234 The UK Government is yet to implement the Stras-
bourg jurisprudence on prisoners’ voting rights.235  
94. With respect to Union law, the Supreme Court ruled in October 2013 in 
McGeoch that British citizens detained in custody in the United Kingdom do 
not enjoy the right to vote in municipal elections as a consequence of their 
status as Union citizens.236 The argument advanced in support of extending 
                                                        
231. Ibid., at para. 80. 
232. Ibid., at paras 88-95. The Court of Appeal made particular reference to the jurispru-
dence of the Strasbourg Court on the compatibility with the ECHR of the UK’s 15-
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233. See s. 5(2) of the Representation of the People Act 1983. 
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the franchise relied principally on the specific wording of Art 20(2)(b) TFEU. 
That provision, inserted by the Treaty of Lisbon, grants Union citizens ‘the 
right to vote and stand as candidates in elections to the European Parliament 
and in municipal elections in their Member State of residence, under the same 
conditions as nationals of that State.’ In McGeoch, it was argued that the 
omission of the phrase ‘in a Member State of which he is not a national’ as a 
qualifier in Art 20(2)(b) TFEU was decisive.237 The absence in that provision 
of any reference to the right to vote in host Member States, it was submitted, 
granted Union citizens electoral rights in the Member State of which they are 
nationals under the terms required by EU law. That core argument was bol-
stered further with reference to the Court of Justice’s evolving case law on 
the rights of static Union citizens – both in terms of political and non-political 
rights238 – as well as to Arts 39 and 40 of the Charter on Fundamental Rights. 
95. The UK Supreme Court unanimously rejected the argument advanced for 
the appellant to the effect that the insertion of Art 20(2)(b) TFEU had estab-
lished a self-standing right for EU citizens to vote in municipal elections in 
the Member State of which they are nationals. The Supreme Court concluded 
that it would be ‘positively misleading’ to adopt such an interpretation of that 
provision in light of the Treaty’s structure.239 The right to vote in municipal 
elections under EU law was considered limited to resident EU citizens who 
are not nationals of the host Member State.240 Lord Mance noted further, that 
this interpretation of the franchise under EU law was also supported by the 
wording of Arts 39 and 40 of the EU Charter on Fundamental Rights.241 The 
Supreme Court also rejected the appellant’s request for a preliminary refer-
ence to the Court of Justice.242 
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Culture(s) of citizenship 
Question 13 
96. Our findings lead us to conclude that, for the most part, Union citizenship 
is generally still understood in the UK context as an adjunct to national im-
migration law.243 With respect to the legislative transposition, administrative 
application and judicial interpretation of the rights of EU citizenship, there is 
– to differing degrees – evidence of a permissions-based approach to the im-
plementation of the rights conferred by EU law.244 In certain instances, this 
permissions-based approach is inherent in the implementation process itself, 
e.g. through the transposition of EU Directives. In other instances, it follows 
as a result of administrative and judicial ‘seepage’ – a phenomenon whereby 
the approach of the UKBA and national courts and tribunals to EU citizen-
ship rights is shaped by the administrative and legal framework governing 
non-EU immigration.245 The impact of seepage on the culture of EU citizen-
ship within the UK is particularly significant in light of the UK’s strong per-
missions-based system governing non-EU migration.246  
97. The transposition of the CRD through the EEA Regulations provides the 
clearest example of the predominantly permissions-based approach to EU 
citizenship rights within the UK. In line with its full title, that instrument ef-
fectively casts the free movement rights of EU citizens as an adjunct to UK 
immigration law.247 That instrument integrates (many of) the rights contained 
                                                        
243. For recent analysis on the interface between EU citizenship rights and UK immigra-
tion law, see Shaw et al, ‘Getting to grips with EU citizenship,’ cited supra note 4 and 
Shaw and Miller, cited supra note 4. 
244. Shaw and Miller characterise the interface between EU citizenship and UK immigra-
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and Miller, cited supra note 4 at p. 156. 
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within the CRD into a national immigration system that is based squarely on 
frontier controls and residence rights that are directly linked to a non-nation-
al’s ‘leave to enter’ the United Kingdom.248 Specific provisions of the EEA 
Regulations also permit the immigration detention of EU citizens even prior 
to the adoption of a decision by the Secretary of State to remove that person 
on grounds of public policy, public security and public health grounds.249  
98. Structured as an adjunct to UK immigration law, the EEA Regulations 
deal only with the CRD rights of entry, residence and expulsion for EU citi-
zens and their family members. Other core rights of EU citizenship contained 
within the CRD are not transposed. Most notably, the EEA Regulations do 
not transpose Art 24(1) of the CRD – the right to equal treatment.250 That 
provision is not directly transposed in UK law. The UK Government has 
again taken a permission-based approach to the transposition of the rights of 
equal treatment in Art 21 CRD. As discussed in Q5, EU citizens must estab-
lish a ‘right to reside’ in the UK under the CRD in order to secure access to a 
range of social assistance benefits. That test applies only to non-British citi-
zens. Moreover, it positions EU citizens and their family members directly 
alongside non-EU migrants, who are also required to establish a right to re-
side to secure entitlement to the principal UK social assistance benefits. As 
such, its application further embeds the rights of EU citizenship within the 
general framework of UK immigration law.  
99. Our review of the administrative practices of the UKBA provides addi-
tional evidence to support the view that EU citizenship rights within the UK 
are predominantly construed as permission- rather than rights-based. We have 
identified numerous instances of ‘seepage’ in the approach of UKBA officials 
towards EU nationals and their family members – exposed through litigation. 
The decision of the Court of Appeal in Bassey provides a particularly striking 
instance of seepage in the administrative context.251 In that case, UKBA offi-
cials failed outright to identify and uphold the appellant’s derived rights of 
entry and residence under EU law. UKBA officials simply applied ordinary 
UK immigration rules and, ultimately, detained the appellant pending depor-
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tation. Whilst accepting that the appellant had falsely declared his intentions, 
the Court of Appeal strongly criticised the approach of the UKBA. In its 
view, the UKBA had wrongly treated the appellant’s situation as a ‘straight-
forward case of illegal entry by deception by an individual with no arguable 
right to the in the country’.252 The case law on ‘sham marriages’ exposes fur-
ther examples of seepage in the administrative practices of the UKBA. In 
several cases, the UKBA has been criticised by the UK courts for failing to 
recognise that the TCN spouse of a EU citizen enjoyed an automatic derived 
right to enter and reside in the United Kingdom under EU law.253  
100. National courts also fall victim to the phenomenon of seepage. By way 
of illustration, we detected some discussion of the ‘credibility’ of individual 
litigants – a benchmark of UK immigration law – in individual EU citizen-
ship cases.254 This is clearly at odds with the approach to citizenship rights 
and their abuse in EU law. Additionally, our findings also identified isolated 
problems with judicial implementation of EU citizenship rights. In McCarthy 
(Q5), for example, the High Court upheld the validity of the UK’s refusal to 
recognise, pursuant to Art 5(2) CRD, residence cards issued to TCN nationals 
by other Member States in accordance with the CRD.255 In B v Home Office 
(Q1) that same court adopted a particularly restrictive reading of the doctrine 
of State liability under EU law, in respect of a serious administrative delay in 
issuing a residence permit to an extended family member of a Union citi-
zen.256 In places, we also detected some resistance on the part of national 
courts to engage fully with particular landmark rulings of the CJEU on EU 
citizenship rights. The Court of Appeal decision in G1 v Secretary of State 
(Q8) on the scope of application of the Rottmann judgment illustrates this 
point most forcefully.257  
101. On the other hand, our review of the UK legal framework also revealed 
a degree of understanding of EU citizenship as a more vibrant, rights-
centered legal status, distinct from ordinary UK immigration law. National 
courts and tribunals drive this more positive vision of EU citizenship – sub-
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ject to the preceding remarks. Additionally, there is also evidence of a strong-
er constitutional culture in connection with the transposition of the political 
rights of EU citizenship. In this area, EU citizens are closely assimilated with 
British nationals as rights holders – at least insofar as the former enjoy lim-
ited electoral participation rights under Union law. The political rights of EU 
citizens have also been extended beyond the requirements of Union law. 
102. UK courts and tribunals play an absolutely critical role in entrenching 
the constitutional rights-orientated character of EU citizenship within the UK 
legal order. This is clear already from the preceding decisions scrutinising 
UKBA practices (e.g. Bassey). National courts also have corrected errors in 
the UK Government’s transposition of the CRD. As discussed in Q1, the 
Court of Appeal struck down as ‘flagrantly unlawful’ Reg 12(1)(b) of the 
2006 Regulations – introducing an additional requirement of prior lawful res-
idence within the EEA for TCN family members of EU citizens.258 However, 
it is through their approach to judicial interpretation that UK courts and tribu-
nals have arguably impacted most significantly on the culture of EU citizen-
ship within the UK. Our review of the case law demonstrates, to a greater ex-
tent, that the national courts and tribunals broadly understand and, further, are 
able properly to apply the rights of EU citizenship within the national judicial 
context. This is apparent, in particular, from the consistent application of the 
CRD hierarchy of protection from deportation on public policy, public securi-
ty, and public health afforded to Union citizens and their family members.259 
Moreover, in numerous cases, UK courts have demonstrated their ability to 
step outside of the UK legal framework and resolve EU citizenship cases in 
accordance with interpretative principles developed and applied by the Court 
of Justice.260 Finally, there has been express judicial recognition of the ‘fun-
damental’ character of EU citizens’ rights of movement and residence.261 
103. To a greater extent, UK courts have also responded well to the challeng-
es presented by the evolutionary nature of EU citizenship. As demonstrated in 
Q7 above, national courts have managed to implement specific CJEU deci-
                                                        
258. R. (on the application of Owusu), cited supra note 17.  
259. See here e.g. BF (Portugal), cited supra note 119; LG and CC (Italy), cited supra 
note 71 and B (Netherlands), cited supra note 139. 
260. See e.g. Aladeselu, cited supra note 20 at para. 19 and PM (Turkey), cited supra note 
72 at para. 32. 
261. E.g. Essa, cited supra note 127. See also Moses LJ in ZZ v Secretary of state for the 
Home Department [2011] EWCA Civ 440 at para. 54. 
THOMAS HORSLEY & STEPHANIE REYNOLDS 
  890 
sions enhancing the rights of EU citizens and their family members beyond 
the terms of the CRD – ahead of the legislative transposition of these judg-
ments.262 We also identified evidence of the ability of UK courts to transpose 
the substance of particular CJEU decisions to parallel factual constellations. 
The Court of Appeal’s decision in Adaleslu (Q1), in which that Court applied 
Metock by extension to the situation of extended family members, offers a 
clear illustration of this openness to crosspollination.263 Equally, when faced 
with specific questions of interpretation, the Court of Appeal and Supreme 
Court have made appropriate preliminary references to the Court of Jus-
tice.264 Moreover, we would highlight that UK courts have also made refer-
ences to the CJEU in instances where the scope of EU citizenship rights was 
arguably rather clear, but where there was a sense, on the part of the referring 
national court, that greater rights protection is desirable. For example, in 
Jessy ST Prix the Supreme Court requested the CJEU to determine whether 
‘retained worker’ status in Art 7(3) CRD extends to cover the situation of an 
EU citizen who gives up work, or seeking work, because of the physical con-
straints of the late stages of pregnancy/child birth.265 As the Supreme Court 
noted, the CRD is actually rather clear on this point: it does not.266 The Su-
preme Court is inviting the Court of Justice to develop further the rights of 
EU citizens beyond the terms of the CRD on fundamental rights grounds.267 
104. Finally, there is also a somewhat stronger constitutional character to the 
political rights of EU citizenship in the UK. Overall, our findings indicate 
that EU citizens are more closely integrated with British citizens as rights 
holders in the political context. The legislative framework governing the elec-
toral rights of EU citizens does not employ the permission-based entitlement 
tests such as the right to reside introduced to govern the exercise of the sub-
stantive rights of intra-EU movement. Equally, as discussed in Qs 9, 10 and 
11 above, the UK Government has not opted to introduce special restrictions 
on the voting rights of EU citizens, even where permitted under EU law – 
contrary to the position of certain other Member States. It has also already 
drafted legislation to implement the changes required by Directive 2013/1 
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EU. The more favorable treatment of EU citizens as compared with the posi-
tion on entry, residence, and entitlement to social advantages may simply be 
linked to the low cost implications associated with the right to vote in munic-
ipal and European Parliamentary elections. In any case, the strength of rights 
in this context is an important component of the qualified constitutional char-
acter of EU citizenship within the UK legal order. A review of the legislative 
framework on municipal elections (Q11), also demonstrates that the electoral 
rights of EU citizens has been extended beyond the terms of Directives 
94/109 EC and 94/80 EC.  
Question 14 
105. Legal practitioners increasingly make reference to the Charter to support 
arguments concerning the interpretation of the rights of Union citizens before 
national courts. In ZZ, Maurice Kay LJ neatly summarised the impact of the 
Charter in its national context:  
‘... the Charter is not a free-standing rights-creating legislative instrument. It is akin to a 
restatement of rights, freedoms and principles already established in law as a result of, inter 
alia, the judgments of the Luxembourg Court...what the Charter does not and cannot do is 
to give birth to rights, freedoms and principles in areas in which the Treaties claim no rule-
making competence but acknowledge the exclusive competence of Member States. This is 
spelt out by Article 51.2 of the Charter.’268  
106. Based on our findings in this report, we highlight three specific exam-
ples of the Charter’s emerging impact on the interpretation of the rights of EU 
citizens within the UK: 
1) The application of the UK’s contested ‘right to reside’ test 
2) The application of the ‘genuine enjoyment test’ following Ruiz Zambrano  
3) The use of the Charter to create new substantive rights for Union citizens  
The application of the UK’s contested ‘right to reside’ test 
107. Attempts have been made in some cases to address the perceived harsh-
ness of the UK’s current ‘right to reside’ test by using rights that EU citizens 
derive from the Charter. In Mirga,269 a Polish national was found not have 
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satisfied the ‘right to reside’ test, as she was not a ‘qualified person’, i.e. 
working, self-employed, or self-sufficient, and so did not qualify for income 
support. M argued that denial of a right to reside would violate her right to 
family life under Article 7 of the Charter, as she had given birth to a child in 
the UK. In considering this argument, the Court of Appeal acknowledged, 
first, that while legal effect was only given to the Charter by the Lisbon Trea-
ty, which post-dated the appellant’s application, the fundamental right to fam-
ily life was a fundamental principle of Union law.270 Nevertheless, the Court 
of Appeal held that ‘the protection of her fundamental rights did not require 
that she be accorded such a ‘right of residence’.’271 The Court of Appeal cited 
a previous judgment in which it was stated that to allow a right of residence 
where a category of person had clearly been excluded from Directive 2004/38 
would be an attack on the Directive itself and in which the Court did not ac-
cept fundamental rights arguments.272  
The application of the ‘genuine enjoyment test’ following Ruiz Zambrano  
108. The Charter of Fundamental Rights has been raised in the arguments of 
appellants in a number of cases relating to whether or not an individual has 
been deprived of the genuine enjoyment of the rights arising from their Union 
citizenship. Applying Dereci, the national courts have repeatedly stated that 
the Charter only applies if the ‘genuine enjoyment’ test is satisfied; in other 
words, that the Charter only applies if the matter falls within the scope of EU 
law.273 Moreover, relevant national case law consistently features the state-
ment in Dereci that a desire to keep one’s family together will not be suffi-
cient, alone, to trigger protection under the genuine enjoyment test.274 How-
ever, the national courts have also remarked that Dereci is not entirely clear 
on whether the separation family members can ever trigger the test. In Harri-
son, Elias LJ suggested that the Court of Justice ‘might have been envisaging 
that Article 7 [EU Charter] could be relevant to the question whether the EU 
citizen was in fact compelled to follow the non-EU citizen out of the territory 
of the EU’ but that the case law had not developed to that stage yet.275 In-
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deed, in Harrison itself, the Court of Appeal focussed on the factual possibil-
ity for the British citizen children concerned to remain in the Union despite 
the deportation of their fathers in order to hold that the genuine enjoyment 
test had not been triggered.276  
The use of the Charter to create new substantive rights for Union citizens  
109. Finally, we highlight that the entry into force of the Charter is also open-
ing up new lines of argument for litigants. The example of prisoners’ voting 
rights was discussed above in Q12. Here EU law – and the Charter – is being 
invoked in order to inject a new supranational EU dimension into existing 
domestic legal challenges. In other instances, the Charter is invoked to estab-
lish rights in new legal contexts. For example, in Sandiford the Charter was 
invoked in an effort to establish an obligation on the United Kingdom Gov-
ernment to provide legal aid to one of its own nationals who had been con-
victed and sentenced to death in a Third Country for drug trafficking offenc-
es.277 That argument was unsuccessful. 
Question 15 
110. EU citizenship and related issues feature frequently in the mainstream 
UK media. National media coverage is often rather negative in character, re-
flecting perhaps the influence of a powerful centre-right British press. In the 
first instance, we identified only very infrequent discussion of substantive 
citizenship ‘rights’ – even in strands of the media that are not openly critical 
of the UK’s continued membership of the EU (e.g. BBC; Guardian; Inde-
pendent). Mirroring the legislative framework implementing EU citizenship 
rights (Q13 above), the UK media tends to identify EU nationals as ‘mi-
grants’ or ‘foreign nationals’ rather than EU citizens. Notably, there is also 
only infrequent reporting on the rights enjoyed by British nationals as EU citi-
zens in host Member States. The focus is squarely centered on incoming ‘mi-
grants’, which again reinforces the view that EU citizenship is simply an ad-
junct to UK immigration law and not part of a framework of reciprocal rights. 
We would also observe that, where they exist, reports on the exercise of Trea-
ty rights by British nationals are often framed negatively. This includes, for 
example, emphasizing the costs to the UK taxpayer of the exercise of their 
                                                        
276. See Q7.  
277. The Queen on the application of Lindsay Sandiford v The Secretary of State for For-
eign and Commonwealth Affairs [2013] EWCA Civ 581. 
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rights of intra-EU movement as EU citizens (e.g. ‘European Court Ruling 
will increase the number of Brits abroad who can claim winter fuel allow-
ance,’ Daily Mail Jan 2013).278  
111. The dominant and recurring themes in the UK media related to EU citi-
zenship include entitlement to social welfare benefits; access to public ser-
vices (particularly the NHS and State education sector); the rights of entry 
and residence enjoyed by EU citizens and their family members (particularly 
TCN family members); and the EU rules governing the expulsion of Union 
citizens. These key themes feature particularly predominantly in the centre-
right UK press (chiefly: Telegraph; Daily Mail; Daily Express). Reporting on 
these key issues by this strand of the UK press is highly critical of EU citi-
zenship, typically presenting headline-grabbing projections of both the num-
ber of incoming ‘EU migrants’ and their direct costs to the UK taxpayer.279 
As Shaw et al observe, there is a certain preoccupation within large sections 
of the UK media that EU migrants opt to exercise their Treaty rights in order 
chiefly to exploit the United Kingdom’s welfare system.280 Yet, we did detect 
evidence of clear efforts to counter the validity of such perceptions within 
strands of the UK media.281 Notably, the situation of EU citizens resident in 
the UK as economically active/self-sufficient Member State nationals does 
not feature prominently in national media, except to the extent that such per-
sons and their family members contribute to an overall increase in demand 
for the UK public services (e.g. ‘Urgent need for 250,000 school places, 
spending watchdog warns,’ BBC News Online, 15th March 2013 and ‘EU in-
flux leaves 3,000 children without primary places for the new term,’ Daily 
Mail, 1st Sept 2013).282  
                                                        
278. http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2259585/Sunshine-test-stop-expats-claim 
ing-16million-year-taxpayers-money-help-winter-fuel-bills.html#ixzz2h8qjrzOM.  
279. See e.g. http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/10375358/True-scale-
of-European-immigration.html and http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2460 
704/One-10-dole-claimants-outside-UK-Cameron-moves-limit-access-benefits-
foreigners.html.  
280. Shaw et al, ‘Getting to grips with EU citizenship,’ cited supra note 4 at p. 27. 
281. See e.g. http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2013/mar/06/uk-benefits-eu-
migrants-what-crisis (countering claims regarding the costs of EU migration to UK 
taxpayers) and http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/7525472.stm (emphasising the rights-
enhancing character of the CJEU’s decision in Metock). 
282. http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/education-21785796 and http://www.dailymail.co.uk/ 
news/article-2408231/EU-influx-leaves-3-000-children-primary-places-new-term.html.  
THE UNITED KINGDOM 
 895 
112. The centre-right UK press also tends periodically to isolate individual 
categories of EU citizens as ‘bad’ or ‘undesirable’ migrants.283 These labels 
were often applied with reference en masse to nationals of the 10 Central and 
Eastern European States that acceded to the European Union in 2004. Inter-
estingly, the situation of EU citizens from Western EU Member States is 
rarely discussed. This is despite the fact that nationals from these Member 
States (and their family members) have triggered the most significant exten-
sions in the scope of rights/entitlement to social welfare benefits for EU citi-
zens within the United Kingdom (e.g. Baumbast; Chen; Bidar; Teixera).284 
Most recently, Romanian nationals – and more specifically: members of the 
Roma community – have been singled out as ‘bad migrants’ by strands of the 
centre-right press as a target for particularly unfavorable treatment. The Daily 
Express, Daily Mail, and Daily Telegraph have all run a series of articles on 
the prospect of an ‘invasion’ by Romanian nationals following the lifting of 
the UK’s transitional arrangements for Romanian (and Bulgarian) nationals 
in January 2014.285 Reports in all three papers frequently present a distorted 
image of Romanian nationals. (e.g. ‘The Roma invasion of Paris ... next stop 
Britain,’ The Daily Telegraph, 6th Oct. 2013).  
113. As the preceding comments indicate, the quality of reporting on EU citi-
zenship issues in the UK is generally rather selective and non rights-centered. 
In addition, we suggest that, in places, UK reporting is often misleading.286 
For instance, there is still a tendency to conflate EU citizenship rights with 
the legal framework of rights protection under the ECHR/Human Rights 
Act.287 The UK Office of the European Commission publishes official clari-
                                                        
283. On this point, see also Shaw et al, ‘Getting to grips with EU citizenship,’ cited supra 
note 4 at p. 29. 
284. Case C-413/99 Baumbast and R v Secretary of State [2002] ECR I-7091, Case C-
202/02 Chen, cited supra note 68, Case C-209/03 Bidar [2005] ECR I-219 and Case 




pire.html and http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/immigration/10013810/Diplo 
mats-admit-35000-Romanian-and-Bulgarian-migrants-may-come-to-Britain.html re-
spectively. Cf. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/feb/02/ romania-uk-immigrants 
-diplomatic-row.  
286. See here also Shaw et al, ‘Getting to grips with EU citizenship,’ cited supra note 4 at 
pp. 53-54. 
287. Ibid., at pp. 29-30. 
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fying responses to such instances of misreporting on EU issues on a near dai-
ly basis.288 Its efforts appear to have little impact on the quality press report-
ing by the centre-right British press. 
114. It is difficult in a study of this scope and nature to draw robust conclu-
sions on the impact of the reporting on EU citizenship issues by the UK me-
dia on national public discourse. However, on the strength of our limited and 
illustrative sample, we would argue that the mainstream UK media contrib-
utes little to the sense of EU citizenship as rights-based legal status that is 
destined to become the fundamental status of all Member State nationals. As 
is perhaps inevitable in the national context, issues affecting or related to EU 
citizens are subsumed within broader political debates on e.g. immigration; 
public service reform; and criminal justice. In each context, EU citizens re-
main easily cast as ‘others’ – as EU migrants; welfare tourists; foreign crimi-
nals – at least within an influential strand of the UK media. There is, of 
course, a wealth of alternative media sources, including internet blogs that of-
fer a more balanced and overtly rights-centered analysis of EU citizenship.289 
However, these attract the attention of more limited, specialist audiences.  
 
                                                        
288. http://ec.europa.eu/unitedkingdom/blog/.  
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ABBREVIATED QUESTIONNAIRE GENERAL TOPIC 2 
Annex 
 
Abbreviated version of the questionnaire in English 
Citizenship within Directive 2004/38/EC – Stability of Residence 
for Union Citizens and their Family Members 
Question 1  
With respect to a Union citizen’s family members, how have Articles 2, 3, 
and 5 of the Directive been transposed into national law? How have national 
courts and/or tribunals dealt with the different types of family relationships 
outlined in Articles 2 and 3? Are the procedural safeguards contained in Art-
icle 5 providing effective protection? 
Question 2 
Is there any evidence of the expulsion of EU citizens (and/or their family 
members) on purely economic grounds (i.e. failure to satisfy the conditions 
set out in Article 7 of the Directive) e.g. in the decisions of national courts 
and/or tribunals? 
Question 3 
How have Articles 12-15 of the Directive been transposed into national law? 
Have any disputes on the interpretation or application of these provisions 
been addressed within national courts or tribunals? 
Question 4 
How have Articles 16-21 of the Directive been transposed into national law? 
Has data on the volume of applications to date for the status of permanent 
residence been published for your Member State? Have any disputes on the 
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interpretation or application of these provisions been addressed within na-
tional courts or tribunals? 
Question 5 
How has Article 24(2) of the Directive been transposed into national law? 
Does national law distinguish between the categories specified in Article 
24(2) and job-seekers in terms of entitlement to social benefits? Has Article 
24(2) displaced the Court of Justice’s ‘real link’ case law before national 
courts or tribunals? 
Question 6 
Please describe how the national courts and tribunals have understood, ap-
plied, and differentiated between the concepts of ‘public policy, public secu-
rity, or public health’ (Article 27), ‘serious grounds of public policy or public 
security’ and ‘imperative grounds of public security’ (Article 28). How has 
the principle of proportionality been understood and applied in these con-
texts? How have the national courts and tribunals taken account of considera-
tions such as how long the individual concerned has resided on its territory, 
his/her age, state of health, family and economic situation, social and cultural 
integration into the host Member State, and the extent of his/her links with 
the country of origin? 
EU Citizenship beyond Directive 2004/38/EC – Exploring National 
Application of Primary EU Law 
Question 7 
To what extent do national courts and tribunals tend to reject arguments 
based on EU citizenship rights on the grounds that the dispute involves a 
‘purely internal situation’? To what extent has the Court of Justice’s case law 
grounded directly on the TFEU’s citizenship provisions (e.g. Chen, Ruiz 
Zambrano, and subsequent decisions) been effectively implemented and ap-
plied at the national level? Does national case law distinguish clearly between 
rights acquired under Directive 2004/38 and under Articles 20 and/or 21 
TFEU when EU citizens are seeking family reunification rights from their 
home Member States? Have legislative or specific administrative changes 
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been put in place? How are these matters being dealt with by the national 
courts?  
Question 8 
In the context of the judgment in Rottmann, to what extent do rules on the ac-
quisition and/or loss of national citizenship reflect the implications of the par-
ticular requirements of EU citizenship? Please consider the EUDO Citizen-
ship Observatory data on acquisition and loss of citizenship in answering this 
question. 
Political Rights of EU Citizens 
Question 9 
Since when has Directive 93/109/EC on European Parliament elections been 
fully implemented? Have there been any derogations? Are there any addi-
tional conditions imposed on EU citizens compared to national citizens (spe-
cial registration or residence requirements)? Has there been relevant case law 
in domestic courts? What additional changes will be required by the Decem-
ber 2012 amendments to Directive 93/109/EC. 
Question 10 
Since when has Directive 94/80/EC on local elections been fully implement-
ed? Have there been any derogations? Are there any additional conditions 
imposed on EU citizens compared to national citizens (special registration or 
residence requirements)? Has there been relevant case law in domestic 
courts? 
Question 11 
Briefly report on regional and other elections in which EU citizens residing in 
the country are granted electoral rights under national law. Is there a franchise 
for EU citizens that goes beyond the local and EP electoral rights required 
under EU law? What have been the reasons for extending such rights specifi-
cally to EU citizens? 
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Question 12 
Are there any specific areas where tensions exist between EU law and nation-
al provisions limiting the scope of the franchise (e.g. in relation to the voting 
rights of persons convicted of criminal offences or persons with mental im-
pairments)? In answering this question, rapporteurs may be interested to 
know about an emerging line of case law in the UK on the application of EU 
law, specifically Article 39 CFR, to restrictions on prisoners’ voting, which 
will reach the UK Supreme Court in June 2013. 
Culture(s) of Citizenship 
Question 13 
On the basis of your findings from the above questions, do you consider that 
the implementation of EU citizenship in your Member State is understood at 
the national level as part of a rights-based EU ‘free movement’ and ‘constitu-
tional’ culture, or as an adjunct to national immigration systems based on 
‘permissions’ to non-nationals to be present in the territory? 
Question 14 
Has the binding effect of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European 
Union, following the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty in 2009, played 
any role in how the rights of EU citizens are being interpreted by the national 
courts and/or tribunals? 
Question 15 
Please describe the extent to which issues connected to EU citizenship have 
been a salient issue in the national media and how this issue has been dealt 
with in the national media. Are there any particularly dominant themes within 
media reporting (e.g. expulsion; access to state benefits; derived rights for 
third country nationals)? How accurate is national reporting of EU citizen-
ship issues? Can you detect evidence of the influence of the media on nation-
al public discourse?  
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